Latest / The Epstein Chronicles / Judge Graf And The Order To Bind Tyler Robinson Over For Trial On All Counts Charged (Part 4) (9/6/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In
- 0:03Speaker 1: this episode, we're going to pick up where we left
- 0:05Speaker 1: off with Judge Graff and the bind over order for
- 0:08Speaker 1: Tyler Robinson for the alleged murder of Charlie Kirk. D,
- 0:13Speaker 1: probable cause, supporting the victim targeting enhancement. The state also
- 0:17Speaker 1: alleges that the defendant intentionally selected Mr. Kirk because Mr.
- 0:21Speaker 1: Kirk's political expression under Utah Code section 76-3-203.14. Defendant disputes
- 0:29Speaker 1: whether the evidence establishes the required motive. For the reasons
- 0:33Speaker 1: set forth below in the court's analysis of the sentencing enhancements,
- 0:37Speaker 1: the court concludes that the state has established probable cause
- 0:40Speaker 1: as to the victim targeting allegation. The court does not
- 0:43Speaker 1: rely on defendant's political associations, beliefs, or personal relationship standing alone.
- 0:49Speaker 1: The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence reasonably supports an
- 0:54Speaker 1: inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk because of defendant's perception
- 0:59Speaker 1: of Mr. Kirk's protected political expression. As explained below, Section 76-3-203.14
- 1:06Speaker 1: does not expressly identify an additional penalty consequence for a
- 1:10Speaker 1: capital felony conviction. The court, therefore, preserves the state's notice
- 1:14Speaker 1: without deciding that the allegation independently alters the penalty applicable
- 1:18Speaker 1: to Count 1, Count 2, felony discharge of a firearm
- 1:22Speaker 1: causing serious bodily injury, first-degree felony. To bind defendant over
- 1:26Speaker 1: on Count 2, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious
- 1:29Speaker 1: bodily injury, a first-degree felony under Utah Code Section 7611-210-2
- 1:35Speaker 1: and 2 or 3c. The state must establish probable cause
- 1:40Speaker 1: that defendant 1. Discharged a firearm, 2. In the direction
- 1:43Speaker 1: of Charlie Kirk, 3. Knowing or having reason to believe
- 1:47Speaker 1: that Charlie Kirk may be endangered by the discharge, and 4.
- 1:52Speaker 1: The act caused serious bodily injury to Charlie Kirk. The
- 1:55Speaker 1: evidence described above supports a reasonable belief that defendant positioned
- 1:59Speaker 1: himself on the roof of the Losey building and discharged
- 2:02Speaker 1: the Mauser. 30- 06 rifle in the direction of Charlie Kirk.
- 2:06Speaker 1: The medical examiner determined that Mr. Kirk died from a
- 2:09Speaker 1: gunshot wound to the neck and classified the matter of
- 2:12Speaker 1: death as homicide. The fatal gunshot wound constitutes serious bodily injury. Accordingly,
- 2:18Speaker 1: count two is bound over for trial. Count three, obstruction
- 2:22Speaker 1: of justice, second-degree felony. To bind defendant over on count
- 2:26Speaker 1: three of obstruction of justice, a secondary felony under Utah
- 2:29Speaker 1: Code Section 76.8.306.2, the state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant, one,
- 2:37Speaker 1: acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
- 2:43Speaker 1: or punishment of any person. Two, regarding conduct that constitutes
- 2:48Speaker 1: a criminal offense. And three, concealed or removed the firearm
- 2:52Speaker 1: allegedly used in the shooting. Under that statute, the offense
- 2:56Speaker 1: is a second-degree felony. If the underlying conduct constitutes a
- 3:00Speaker 1: capital or first-degree felony, Utah Code 76-8306-2C. The underlying charged
- 3:07Speaker 1: homicide constitutes a capital or first-degree felony for purpose of
- 3:12Speaker 1: Section 76-8306-2C. Following the shooting, the Mauser. 30- 06 rifle was
- 3:19Speaker 1: concealed in a dense wooded area on the UVU campus
- 3:22Speaker 1: wrapped inside a dark towel. Defendant alleged intent to hinder
- 3:26Speaker 1: the investigation is supported by the text messages attributed to him,
- 3:31Speaker 1: in which he stated that he had concealed his rifle
- 3:33Speaker 1: by leaving it in a bush where he changed outfits.
- 3:37Speaker 1: The alleged concealment of the rifle in a wooded area
- 3:39Speaker 1: after the shooting, together with the attributed messages concerning its
- 3:43Speaker 1: concealment and possible recovery, supports a reasonable inference that defendant
- 3:48Speaker 1: acted with intent to conceal physical evidence and hinder his apprehension.
- 3:53Speaker 1: Count three is bound over for trial. Count four, obstruction
- 3:56Speaker 1: of justice, second degree felony. To bind defendant over on
- 4:00Speaker 1: count four, obstruction of justice, a second degree felony under
- 4:03Speaker 1: Utah Code 76.8.306.2, the state must establish probable cause that defendant, one,
- 4:10Speaker 1: acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
- 4:16Speaker 1: or punishment of any person, two, regarding conduct that constitutes
- 4:20Speaker 1: a criminal offense, and three, destroyed, concealed, or removed the
- 4:24Speaker 1: clothing allegedly worn during the shooting. The state has presented
- 4:28Speaker 1: sufficient evidence to establish probable cause as to count four.
- 4:32Speaker 1: The UVU surveillance video depicts the shooter wearing a specific
- 4:36Speaker 1: outfit as he moved towards the rooftop of the Losey building.
- 4:39Speaker 1: The communications attributed to defendants state that he changed outfits
- 4:44Speaker 1: in the wooded area where the rifle was left. The
- 4:47Speaker 1: clothing depicted on the alleged shooter was not recovered. Those
- 4:50Speaker 1: circumstances viewed together support a reasonable inference for purposes of
- 4:55Speaker 1: this prelim hearing that defendant concealed or destroyed the clothing
- 4:59Speaker 1: with intent required by the statute. Count four is bound
- 5:02Speaker 1: over for trial. Count five, tampering with a witness, third
- 5:06Speaker 1: degree felony. To bind defendant over on count five, tampering
- 5:09Speaker 1: with a witness, a third degree felony under Utah Code 76-8508,
- 5:15Speaker 1: the state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant, one,
- 5:19Speaker 1: believed an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about
- 5:22Speaker 1: to be instituted or intended to prevent an official proceeding
- 5:26Speaker 1: or investigation, and two, attempted to induce or otherwise cause
- 5:30Speaker 1: another individual to withhold testimony, information, a document, or an item.
- 5:36Speaker 1: An instruction to delete communication may constitute an attempt to
- 5:39Speaker 1: cause another person to withhold information or a document when
- 5:43Speaker 1: made with the intent required by Utah Code 76-8508. After
- 5:48Speaker 1: the shooting, defendant allegedly sent Twiggs text messages in which
- 5:52Speaker 1: he stated that he'd shot the victim and concealed the rifle.
- 5:55Speaker 1: At the end of the exchange, defendant texted Twiggs, delete
- 5:59Speaker 1: this exchange. The surrounding circumstances support an inference that defendant
- 6:03Speaker 1: knew law enforcement was investigating the shooting and searching for
- 6:07Speaker 1: the person responsible. The instruction to delete this exchange, considered
- 6:11Speaker 1: in context, supports a reasonable inference that defendant attempted to
- 6:15Speaker 1: cause twigs to withhold those communications from investigators by deleting them.
- 6:20Speaker 1: Count five is bound over for trial. Count six, tampering
- 6:24Speaker 1: with a witness, third-degree felony. To bind defendant over on
- 6:28Speaker 1: count six, tampering with a witness, a third-degree felony under
- 6:31Speaker 1: Utah Code section 76.8.508, the state must demonstrate probable cause
- 6:37Speaker 1: that the defendant, one, believed an official proceeding or investigation
- 6:41Speaker 1: was pending. or about to be instituted or intended to
- 6:44Speaker 1: prevent an official proceeding or investigation, and two, attempted to
- 6:48Speaker 1: induce or otherwise cause another individual to withhold testimony, information,
- 6:53Speaker 1: a document, or an item. The state alleges that defendant
- 6:56Speaker 1: committed this offense by directing his roommate to stay silent
- 7:00Speaker 1: if police questioned them. Information at three. The evidence shows
- 7:05Speaker 1: that on September 11th, 2025, defendant sent a text message
- 7:08Speaker 1: to Lance Twiggs stating, If any police ask you questions,
- 7:12Speaker 1: ask for a lawyer and stay silent. Defendant argues that
- 7:16Speaker 1: count six must be stricken as a matter of law.
- 7:19Speaker 1: He contends that this message was merely advising a loved
- 7:22Speaker 1: one to exercise constitutional rights to remain silent and seek counsel,
- 7:26Speaker 1: which cannot, standing alone, constitute a criminal offense. Defendant therefore
- 7:31Speaker 1: argues that the record does not support the required obstructive intent.
- 7:35Speaker 1: The court considers this a meaningful distinction because the words,
- 7:39Speaker 1: ask for a lawyer, and stay silent, viewed in isolation,
- 7:42Speaker 1: describe lawful advice concerning constitutional rights, and do not themselves
- 7:47Speaker 1: establish criminal intent. Standing alone, advising another person to request
- 7:51Speaker 1: counsel and remain silent is lawful and does not establish
- 7:55Speaker 1: witness tampering. The state relies, however, on the context of
- 7:59Speaker 1: the communication, including defendants' earlier alleged instruction to delete this exchange.
- 8:05Speaker 1: Viewed together and in the light most favorable to the state,
- 8:08Speaker 1: those communications permit a reasonable inference that defendant intended to
- 8:11Speaker 1: cause twigs to withhold information from investigators. The court does
- 8:16Speaker 1: not determine at this stage whether that inference is ultimately
- 8:19Speaker 1: more persuasive than defendant's lawful advice explanation, and it does
- 8:23Speaker 1: not treat the exercise of legal rights or advice concerning
- 8:26Speaker 1: those rights as criminal conduct standing alone. Although defendant's lawful
- 8:31Speaker 1: advice interpretation remains a reasonable, competing interpretation of The surrounding
- 8:36Speaker 1: communications permit the state proposed inference as well. Because the
- 8:40Speaker 1: court may not choose between reasonable competing inferences at the
- 8:43Speaker 1: prelim stage, probable cause supports count six. Count six is
- 8:47Speaker 1: bound over for trial. Count number seven, violent offenses committed
- 8:52Speaker 1: in the presence of a child. Class B, misdemeanor, reclassified
- 8:56Speaker 1: as class A. To bind defendant over on count seven,
- 9:00Speaker 1: violent offense committed in the presence of a child, a
- 9:03Speaker 1: Class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Section 76-3, 203.102 and 2.
- 9:11Speaker 1: The state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant 1. committed
- 9:15Speaker 1: criminal homicide, 2. in the physical presence of a child
- 9:18Speaker 1: younger than 14 years old, and 3. with knowledge that
- 9:21Speaker 1: the child was present and may have seen or heard
- 9:24Speaker 1: the commission of the criminal homicide. The state further alleges
- 9:28Speaker 1: that the offense is reclassified as a Class A misdemeanor
- 9:31Speaker 1: under under Section 76-3, 203.143, A2, because of the victim
- 9:37Speaker 1: targeting allegation. The first two elements are supported by evidence
- 9:42Speaker 1: of the charged homicide and evidence that children younger than
- 9:44Speaker 1: 14 were physically present at the event. The disputed and
- 9:48Speaker 1: closer issue is knowledge. Defendant argues that the state has
- 9:52Speaker 1: not shown that, from a distance of approximately 415 feet,
- 9:56Speaker 1: he knew a child younger than 14 was present and
- 9:59Speaker 1: might see or hear the offense. Knowledge may be established circumstantially,
- 10:03Speaker 1: but it cannot rest solely on the general proposition that
- 10:06Speaker 1: children sometimes attend public events. The relevant question is whether
- 10:11Speaker 1: the circumstances described in the record permit a reasonable inference
- 10:14Speaker 1: that defendant knew a child was present. The state relies
- 10:18Speaker 1: on several circumstances specific to the event. Defendant allegedly planned
- 10:22Speaker 1: the shooting for more than a week. He visited the
- 10:25Speaker 1: event area twice before the shooting and had an opportunity
- 10:28Speaker 1: to observe the venue and preparations. The state's evidence places
- 10:32Speaker 1: them at an elevated location with a clear line of
- 10:35Speaker 1: sight toward the event area, where thousands of participants were present,
- 10:40Speaker 1: and the rifle contained an optical scope. The event video
- 10:43Speaker 1: also depicts young children and infants within the event area.
- 10:47Speaker 1: The court recognizes the force of defendant's argument that an
- 10:51Speaker 1: opportunity to observe a large crowd does not necessarily establish
- 10:55Speaker 1: knowledge that a child younger than 14 was present. The
- 10:58Speaker 1: court therefore does not infer knowledge from crowd size alone.
- 11:03Speaker 1: The combined circumstances permit do not compel an inference that
- 11:06Speaker 1: defendant knew a child was present and might see or
- 11:09Speaker 1: hear the shooting. The court does not equate being familiar
- 11:12Speaker 1: with the venue and opportunity to observe the crowd. or
- 11:16Speaker 1: the presence of an optical scope with actual knowledge. Rather,
- 11:20Speaker 1: the court considers the circumstances collectively, and under the prelim
- 11:23Speaker 1: hearing requirement that reasonable inferences be drawn in the state's favor,
- 11:28Speaker 1: taken together, these circumstances are sufficient at this stage to
- 11:31Speaker 1: establish probable cause as to the knowledge element. Whether defendant
- 11:36Speaker 1: actually observed the child, and whether the state's inference is
- 11:39Speaker 1: ultimately persuasive, remain questions for the trier of fact. Count
- 11:43Speaker 1: 7 is bound over for trial. Analysis of merger double
- 11:47Speaker 1: jeopardy objections. Defendant argues that count two must merge with
- 11:51Speaker 1: count one because both arise from a single gunshot directed
- 11:54Speaker 1: at a single victim. Utah Code section 76-1402 limits multiple
- 11:59Speaker 1: convictions when one offense is included within another. But merger
- 12:04Speaker 1: ordinarily concerns convictions and punishment. And a fact-dependent merger determination
- 12:08Speaker 1: may be premature before the charges have been presented to
- 12:12Speaker 1: the trier of fact. At this stage, the court determines
- 12:15Speaker 1: only whether probable cause independently supports the charged offenses. The
- 12:20Speaker 1: court does not decide whether either offense is ultimately a
- 12:23Speaker 1: lesser included offense of the other. If convictions are returned
- 12:27Speaker 1: on both counts, the merger issue may be addressed at
- 12:30Speaker 1: the time under Section 76.1.402. Analysis of the Sentencing Enhancements
- 12:37Speaker 1: The information presents three related but legally distinct matters. The
- 12:42Speaker 1: Separate Offense Charged in Count 7, under Utah Code 76-3203-10,
- 12:46Speaker 1: the presence of a child sentencing, consideration under Section 76-3203-9,
- 12:54Speaker 1: and the victim targeting allegation under 76-3203-14, because these provisions
- 13:00Speaker 1: have different legal effects. The court addresses them separately. Because
- 13:04Speaker 1: the victim targeting allegation would reclassify Count 7 from a
- 13:07Speaker 1: Class B to a Class A misdemeanor, Under Section 76.3203.14.3a.2,
- 13:14Speaker 1: that allegation is subject to the probable cause determination, C. Apprendi,
- 13:19Speaker 1: 1st New Jersey, 530 U.S., 2000. The court also considers
- 13:24Speaker 1: whether the remaining sentencing allegations have factual support without deciding
- 13:29Speaker 1: that each constitutes a separate element of an offense, a
- 13:32Speaker 1: presence of a child allegation. For the reason stated in
- 13:35Speaker 1: the analysis of Count 7, the record provides probable cause
- 13:39Speaker 1: for the factual allegation that the charged conduct occurred in
- 13:42Speaker 1: the presence of a child under 76.3.203.9. That circumstance operates
- 13:48Speaker 1: as a sentencing consideration rather than a reclassification of the
- 13:53Speaker 1: underlying felony. B. Victim Targeting Allegations Utah Rule of Evidence
- 13:59Speaker 1: 417 limits the use of defendants' expressions or associations in
- 14:03Speaker 1: proving a victim targeting allegation. The evidence must otherwise be
- 14:07Speaker 1: admissible and must specifically relate to the defendant's selection of
- 14:11Speaker 1: the victim. Pastor Engelhardt's statement may establish the nature of Mr.
- 14:16Speaker 1: Kirk's public expression, but it does not independently establish defendant's motive, knowledge,
- 14:20Speaker 1: or state of mind. Defendant argues that the state has
- 14:23Speaker 1: not established probable cause that he selected Mr. Kirk because
- 14:27Speaker 1: of a qualifying personal attribute identified here as political expression.
- 14:32Speaker 1: Utah Code Section 76-3-20314-1K2. The court therefore considers Englehart's statement
- 14:40Speaker 1: only for the limited purpose described above and looks to
- 14:43Speaker 1: other evidence to determine defendant's alleged reason for selecting Mr. Kirk.
- 14:48Speaker 1: When asked why he shot Mr. Kirk, defendant alleged response,
- 14:51Speaker 1: I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be
- 14:53Speaker 1: negotiated out. The word hatred standing alone is ambiguous and
- 14:58Speaker 1: does not establish the statutory motive. The state also presented
- 15:02Speaker 1: evidence that defendant identified Mr. Kirk by name in communications
- 15:06Speaker 1: concerning the planned shooting, allegedly planned the shooting in advance,
- 15:11Speaker 1: and carried it out during a public event associated with Mr.
- 15:14Speaker 1: Kirk's political expression. Viewed together, in the light most favorable
- 15:19Speaker 1: to the state, those circumstances support a reasonable, though not compelled,
- 15:23Speaker 1: inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk because of perception of Mr.
- 15:28Speaker 1: Kirk's political expression. the court does not determine whether that
- 15:31Speaker 1: inference will ultimately prove more persuasive than other interpretations of
- 15:36Speaker 1: defendant's statement. At this stage, the targeting allegation satisfies the
- 15:40Speaker 1: probable cause standard. Its legal consequences differ by count. For
- 15:45Speaker 1: count 7, section 76-3203.14.3a2 reclassifies the offense from a Class
- 15:53Speaker 1: B to a Class A misdemeanor. For count 2, a
- 15:56Speaker 1: first-degree felony, the statute makes the victim's selection in aggravating
- 16:00Speaker 1: sentencing consideration rather than reclassifying the offense. Section 76-3203.14 does
- 16:07Speaker 1: not expressly identify a penalty consequence for a capital felony.
- 16:12Speaker 1: The court, therefore, does not decide that the statute authorizes
- 16:16Speaker 1: an additional penalty for count one. The state's notice remains preserved,
- 16:20Speaker 1: but any asserted consequence for a capital felony conviction must
- 16:24Speaker 1: rest on separately identified legal authority. This ruling does not
- 16:28Speaker 1: affect the targeting allegation as applied to counts two and seven.
- 16:32Speaker 1: Ruling and order. For the foregoing reasons and based on
- 16:35Speaker 1: the record and the party submissions, it's hereby order that
- 16:38Speaker 1: defendant Tyler James Robinson is bound over for trial in
- 16:42Speaker 1: the 4th Judicial District Court on the following counts and
- 16:45Speaker 1: sentencing allegations. A. Count 1. Aggravated murder. A capital felony.
- 16:51Speaker 1: In violation of Utah Code section 76-5-202. including the capital
- 16:57Speaker 1: aggravating circumstance under Section 76.5.202.2.A.3. B. Count 2. Felony discharge
- 17:05Speaker 1: of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, a first-degree felony
- 17:09Speaker 1: in violation of Utah Code Section 76-11.2.10.2.3.C., including the victim
- 17:12Speaker 1: targeting allegation under 76.3.203.14.2. Subject to the sentencing treatment described
- 17:24Speaker 1: in 76.3.203.14.3b and the presence of a child aggravating factor
- 17:31Speaker 1: under section 76.3.203.9. Count 3. Obstruction of justice. Secondary felony
- 17:33Speaker 1: in violation of Utah Code 76.8.306.2. D. Count 4. Obstruction
- 17:36Speaker 1: of justice. A secondary felony in violation of Utah Code
- 17:40Speaker 1: section 76.8.306.2. Count 5. Tampering with a witness. a third-degree felony,
- 17:54Speaker 1: in violation of Utah Code 76-8508. Count six, tampering with
- 17:58Speaker 1: a witness, third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 76-8508.
- 18:04Speaker 1: Count seven, violent offenses committed in the presence of a child,
- 18:08Speaker 1: a Class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Section 76-3-20310. Reclassified
- 18:15Speaker 1: as a Class A misdemeanor under 76-3-20314-3-A-2. based on the
- 18:21Speaker 1: victim targeting allegation under Section 76.3.203.14.2. All evidentiary determinations in
- 18:29Speaker 1: this order are limited to the prelim hearing and do
- 18:32Speaker 1: not determine admissibility or the ultimate weight of the evidence
- 18:35Speaker 1: at trial. Nothing in this order constitutes a final determination
- 18:39Speaker 1: of defendant's guilt or witness's credibility. Defendant remains presumed innocent
- 18:45Speaker 1: and the state bears the burden at trial of proving
- 18:48Speaker 1: each charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Its sole order
- 18:52Speaker 1: dated this first day of September, 2026, and this order
- 18:56Speaker 1: was signed by Judge Graff. All the information that goes
- 19:00Speaker 1: with this episode can be found in the description box.