Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 59-62) (7/5/26)

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Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 59-62) (7/5/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

0:00
Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
0:03
In this episode, we're picking up where we left off
0:06
with the OIG report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. Epstein was
0:11
required by the NPA to plead the only two state charges,
0:15
and even assuming that each charge was premised on a
0:18
crime against a different victim and the solicitation charge involved
0:22
three separate victims, there were thus only at most four
0:26
victims of the charge state offenses. Without at least inquiring
0:29
into the state's intentions, Acosta had no way of determining
0:33
whether the state intended to notify more than those few victims. Moreover,
0:38
the federal investigation had resulted in the identification of several
0:41
victims who had not been identified by the PbD during
0:45
its investigation into Epstein's conduct. Absent information from the USAO,
0:50
the state would not have been in a position to
0:53
notify those additional victims of the state plea proceeding, even
0:56
if the state attorney had decided to include other victims
0:59
I identified during the state investigation. Furthermore, at the time
1:04
he made the decision, Acosta had already been advised by
1:07
Villa Fauna that bellehovlk in November of two thousand and seven,
1:11
had requested that the USAO notify victims, presumably those identified
1:15
during the federal investigation about the state plea hearing. Acosta
1:20
told OPR that it had been his understanding at the
1:23
time of Epstein's plea that the victims would be made
1:26
aware of the preceding and would have an opportunity to speak.
1:29
Acosta also told OPR that he expected the state would
1:33
have notified the victims that that was an all encompassing plea,
1:37
that the state court sentence would also mean that the
1:39
federal government was not preceding. There is no evidence, however,
1:43
that he verified this understanding with Slowman or Villa Fauna,
1:47
let alone the state attorney. OPR found no indication that
1:50
Acosta ever communicated or directed Slowman or Villa Fauna to
1:54
communicate his decision to the state attorney or to provide
1:58
the State Attorney's office with a complete victims identified during
2:02
the federal investigation. OPR located a draft letter to the
2:05
State Attorney's office that Villa Fauna prepared and forwarded to
2:09
Acosta in December of two thousand and seven, which did
2:12
provide such information, but OPR found no evidence that the
2:15
letter was ever sent, and it was not among materials
2:18
publicly released from the State Attorney's office. OPR also found
2:22
evidence that both Sloman and Villafana interacted with the State
2:26
Attorney's Office in the months leading up to the June thirtieth,
2:29
two thousand and eight plea hearing, but there's no indication
2:32
that they discussed victim notification issues with that office, and
2:36
Villa fauna last minute request to PbD chief writer to
2:39
notify victims indicates that the USAO had not coordinated with
2:43
the State Attorney's office. Bellohovlk told OPR that no one
2:47
from the USAO provided her with a list of victims
2:50
or coordinated any notification of victims to appear at the hearing.
2:55
Krisher and Bellohovlk were thus evidently unaware that Acosta had
2:58
decided to leave it to them to decide whether to
3:01
notify victims about the state proceeding in the absence of
3:04
some discussion of which or how many victims the state
3:08
intended to notify, what the state intended to tell them
3:11
about Epstein's plea, and whether the state intended to let
3:14
victims speak at the plea hearing. A Costa had no
3:18
way to ensure that his assumption about victim notification was accurate.
3:22
In other words, Acosta failed to plan for how all
3:25
of the identified victims of Epstein's crimes, both federal and state,
3:29
would be aware of what was happening in the state
3:31
court and have an opportunity to speak up at the
3:34
state court hearing. OPR did find evidence that a Costa
3:38
acted for the purpose of excluding victims from the plea hearing,
3:41
and a cost of assumption that the state would handle
3:44
victim notification appropriately was not unsupported. State prosecutors are subject
3:49
to victim notification requirements under the Florida Constitution, and the
3:53
state prosecution offices have victim witness personnel, resources and processes
3:58
to help accomplish notification. However, Acosta was aware, through the
4:02
prosecution memoranda, the draft indictment, and email communications from Villa
4:07
Fauna that usao's investigation had expanded beyond those victims identified
4:12
in the original PbD investigation, because the state indictment and
4:17
information appeared to pertain to far fewer than the total
4:20
victims identified in either the state or the federal investigation,
4:24
and no one at the USAO was certain which victims
4:26
were covered by the state charges. It should have been
4:29
apparent to Acosta that without advanced planning between the USAO
4:33
and the State Attorney's Office, there was a substantial risk
4:36
that most of the victims identified in the federal investigation
4:40
would not receive notice of the hearing. Notification to the
4:43
broadcast possible number of identified victims could only have been
4:47
successful if there was appropriate communication between the USAO and
4:51
the state prosecutors, communication that had previously been lacking regarding
4:56
other significant issues relating to Epstein. Afauna and Sloman hastily
5:02
arranged effort to enlist in the notification process. PbD chief writer,
5:07
who likely played little role in complying with the state's
5:10
victim notification obligations in a typical case, was not adequate
5:14
substitute for careful planning and coordination with the State Attorney's office.
5:19
Even if the State Attorney's office had notified all of
5:21
the identified victims of the upcoming plea hearing, there was
5:24
no guarantee that such notification would have included information that
5:28
the state plea was resolving not just the state's investigation
5:31
of Epstein, but the federal investigation as well. The State
5:34
Attorney was not obligated by state statutes to inform the
5:38
victims of the status of the federal investigation, and there
5:41
was little reason to assume Krisher or one of his
5:44
staff would voluntarily do so, thereby putting the State Attorney's
5:47
office in the position of fielding victim questions and concerns
5:51
about the outcome. Furthermore, as both the USAO and Defense
5:56
had differing views as to who could lawfully participate in
5:59
the state plea hearing, there is no indication that Acosta, Sloman,
6:02
or Villa Fauna took steps to confirm that if victims appeared,
6:06
they could actually participate in the state court proceeding when
6:09
they were not victims of the charge crimes. Through council,
6:12
Acosta asserted to OPR that because Villa Fauna and Sloman
6:16
both told OPR that they believe that state officials would
6:19
notify the victims, OPR identified no reason why Secretary Acosta
6:24
should have distrusted his team on these points. Acosta's council
6:29
further argued that Acosta should have been able to rely
6:32
on his staff to accomplish the victim notification task, and
6:35
thus had no responsibility to personally confirm that chief writer
6:39
would notify the victims of the hearing. Acosta is correct that,
6:43
under usual circumstances, USAO management played no role in the
6:47
victim notification process. However, in this case, the issue of
6:50
victim notification had been elevated from a role of administrative
6:55
task to a major area of dispute with the defense.
6:58
Acosta personally involved in them by resolving the notification dispute
7:02
with defense counsel in his December nineteenth, two thousand seven letter,
7:06
Villa Fauna provided Acosta with a draft letter to state
7:09
officials that would have opened a dialogue concerning the notification
7:13
of all the victims identified in the federal investigation. OPR
7:17
found no evidence, however, that Acosta sent the letter or
7:20
any similar communication to the State Attorney's office, or that
7:24
he provided Villa Fauna and Sloman with instructions concerning victim
7:28
notification other than those contained in his December nineteenth, two
7:31
thousand seven letter. Having inserted himself into the notification process,
7:36
Acosta had a responsibility to ensure that the expectation that
7:40
the victims would be notified could be accomplished through the
7:43
state process. Many victims only learned of Epstein's state court
7:47
please when they later received a letter from the USAO
7:50
informing them that those pleas had resolved. The federal investigation,
7:54
and some victims only learned of the state pleas and
7:56
sentencing from the news media In the end, although Villa
8:00
Fauna and Sloman hastily attempted to ensure victim notification through
8:04
chief Writer, their effort was too little and too late
8:07
to ensure that victims had the opportunity to attend the
8:10
plea hearing or were given sufficient information about its significance
8:15
to their own cases. Although Acosta may have conferred with
8:18
others about the decision to defer the responsibility for notifying
8:22
victims to the state attorney, Acosta was responsible for choosing
8:26
this course of action. OPR concludes that under the unique circumstances,
8:31
its criticisms are warranted because Acosta personally decided to change
8:35
the process initiated by his staff, and although he expected
8:39
that the federal victims would be notified, he did not
8:42
take the necessary steps to ensure that they would be.
8:46
Acosta could have authorized disclosure of the plea hearing to
8:49
victims even if he did not believe the CVRA required it,
8:52
to ensure that the victims identified in the federal investigation
8:56
were aware of the state court proceeding because the state
8:59
please ended the federal investigation into Epstein's conduct. Ensuring that
9:03
the victims were notified of the state plea hearing would
9:06
have been consistent with the department's over arching commitment to
9:09
treat victims with fairness, dignity, and sensitivity. A Costa's failure
9:14
to prioritize notification and coordinate communication about resolution of the
9:19
case to ensure Epstein's victims were given an opportunity to
9:23
attend the plea hearing and to possibly speak about the
9:25
impact of Epstein's crimes presented a glaring contrast with the
9:29
Costa's responsiveness to the demands of Epstein's attorneys, which included
9:33
the unusual courtesy of allowing them to preview and respond
9:37
to the usao's draft victim notifications. This contrast added to
9:41
the victim's perception that they had been treated unfairly, of
9:44
view shared by the public. Nothing in the documentary records
9:48
suggests that Acosta thought through the issue of determining which
9:52
victims would be notified by the state, or that he
9:54
took any steps to ensure that all of the known
9:57
federal victims received information about the state plea hearing instead,
10:01
as with his decision to resolve the federal investigation through
10:05
a state based resolution, Acosta exercised poor judgment when he
10:09
made critical decisions affecting the federal investigation and the victims,
10:13
but he also failed to consider the full consequences of
10:16
those decisions or what was needed to implement them. Acosta's
10:20
failure to consider these issues before simply leaving the responsibility
10:24
for making notifications entirely to the State attorney's discretion reflected
10:28
poorly on the USAO and the department as a whole.
10:32
It let victims in the dark about an important proceeding
10:35
that resolved federal investigation, an investigation about which the USAO
10:39
had communicated with victims for months. It also ultimately created
10:45
the misimpression that the department intentionally sought to silence the
10:48
victims by keeping them uninformed about the NPA and resulting
10:53
state proceeding. Acosta failed to ensure that victims were afforded
10:57
an opportunity to attend to hearing that was related to
11:00
their own cases, and thus failed to ensure that victims
11:03
were treated with forthrightness and dignity. All right, we're going
11:07
to wrap up right here, and in the next episode
11:09
we're going to pick up with five. Villa Fauna did
11:12
not commit professional misconduct and her oral communication to victims.
11:16
All of the information that goes with this episode can
11:18
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
11:23
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
11:26
going to pick up where we left off with the
11:28
OIG report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. Five Villa Fauna did
11:33
not commit professional misconduct in her oral communication to victims
11:37
and victims attorneys, in which she described the case as
11:41
under investigation, but did not disclose the existence of the
11:45
NPA to some victims. From September twenty fourth, two thousand
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and seven, when the NPA was signed, until after Epstein's
11:52
June thirtieth, two thousand and eight, state court plea, the
11:55
case agents, acting under Villa Fauna's direction, directly informed only
11:59
three victims that the government had signed an NPA and
12:02
that if Epstein complied with its terms, the federal investigation
12:06
would be closed. During this time period, Villa Fauna and
12:09
the case agents interacted with several victims and their attorneys,
12:13
and Villa Fauna contacted victim's attorney brought the Edwards to
12:17
encourage him to attend the state court plea hearing, but
12:20
she did not inform victims or Edwards of the NPA
12:23
or the resolution of the federal investigation as described in
12:27
Part one of this chapter. After the NPA was signed,
12:30
the FBI case agent and co case agent began notifying
12:34
victims about the NPA. After speaking to three victims, however,
12:38
the FBI case agent became concerned that informing the victims
12:42
about the NPA and the monetary damages provision would create
12:46
potential impeachment material for the victims and the agent should
12:49
Epstein breach the NPA and the case proceed to indictment
12:53
and trial, As the case agent told OPR, I would
12:56
have to testify. And I told every one of those
12:59
girls that they could sue mister Epstein for money. And
13:02
I was not comfortable with that and I didn't think
13:04
it was right. The case agent and Villa Fauna consulted
13:08
with the usao's Professional Responsibility Officer about the matter, and
13:12
thereafter stopped notifying the victims about the NPA and their
13:15
ability to pursue monetary damages. According to its terms. Villa
13:20
Fauna advised Sloman by email of her concerns regarding the
13:24
potential impeachment evidence, telling them one thing I'm concerned about
13:28
is that if we file charges now, cross examination will
13:32
consist of the government told you that if mister Epstein
13:35
is convicted, you're entitled to a large amount of damage right.
13:39
Explaining the decision in her later CVR declaration, Villa Fanna
13:43
said that Epstein's attorneys complained that the victims were receiving
13:47
an incentive to overstate their involvement with mister Epstein in
13:51
order to increase their damage's claim. She concluded that informing
13:55
additional victims would compromise the witness's credibility at trial if
14:00
Epstein reneged on the agreement. Acosta was aware of these concerns,
14:04
as he referred to them in an August two thousand
14:06
and eight email. We also believed that contacting the victims
14:09
would compromise them as potential witnesses. Epstein argued very forcefully
14:14
that they were doing this for the money, and we
14:16
did not want to discuss liability with them, which was
14:19
a key part of the agreement. The case agents interviewed
14:22
victims in October and November of two thousand and seven,
14:25
but did not inform them about the NPA. On January
14:29
thirty first, two thousand and eight, FBI agents, Villa Fauna
14:33
and the CEOs trial attorney interviewed three victims, including Courtney Wilde,
14:37
and they interviewed at least one more victim the next day.
14:40
Wilde and two others had been contacted by the FBI
14:44
in the fall of two thousand and seven and may
14:46
have been informed about the resolution of the federal investigation.
14:50
Villa Fauna told OPR that during the January thirty first,
14:54
two thousand and eight interviews, she did not specifically tell
14:57
the victims that there was a signed non prosecute agreement
15:00
that had these terms. She stated that she would not
15:03
use terminology such as NPA because most people don't understand
15:07
what that means. Instead, with respect to the three victims, who,
15:11
according to Villa Fauna, had been informed by the FBI
15:14
about the resolution, she stated that an agreement had been
15:17
reached where Epstein was going to be entering a guilty plea,
15:20
but it doesn't look like he intends to actually perform,
15:23
and now it looks like this may have to be
15:25
charged and it may have to go to trial. Villa
15:28
Fauna recalled telling some victims that Epstein was supposed to
15:32
enter a plea in state court that would end the investigation,
15:35
but she did not recall distinguishing between the federal investigation
15:39
versus the state investigation. Villa Fauna told OPR she explained
15:43
the case was under investigation, She and the agents were
15:46
preparing again to file charges and they hope that charges
15:50
would be brought. An email from Villa Fanna to Sloman
15:53
and Acosta during this time period reflects that she had
15:56
such discussions with at least one victim interviewed on this
16:00
The second girl was very upset about the eighteen month
16:03
deal that she had read about in the paper. She
16:06
would rather not get any money and have Epstein spend
16:09
a significant time in jail. Villa Fauna, however, did not
16:13
recall telling all of the victims interviewed at this time
16:15
of the state plea. Rather, she likely only told those
16:19
who knew about the resolution from the FBI. In her
16:22
own twenty fifteen CVR case declaration, Wild stated that she
16:27
was not told about any NPA or any potential resolution
16:31
of the federal investigation. I was cooperating in if I
16:34
had been told about an NPA, I would have objected,
16:37
while further stated in her declaration that, based on what
16:41
the FBI had been telling me, I thought they were
16:43
still investigating my case. Neither the CEO's trial attorney nor
16:48
FBI case agent recalled the specifics of the victim interviews.
16:52
The FBI reports memorializing each interview primarily addressed the facts
16:56
elicited from the victim regarding Epstein's abuse, and did not
17:00
describe any discussion about the status of the case or
17:03
the victim's view about the prosecution of Epstein. When asked
17:07
whether she was concerned that failing to tell victims about
17:09
the NPA when she was interviewing them would mislead victims.
17:13
As previously noted, Villa Fauna told OPR that she believed
17:17
she and the agents were conducting an investigation because they
17:20
continued interviewing witnesses and doing all these things the file
17:24
charges and prepare for a federal trial. As Villa Fauna stated,
17:28
so to me, saying to a victim the case is
17:30
now back under investigation is perfectly accurate. Villa Fauna also
17:35
was aware that some victims were represented by counsel in
17:38
connection with civil lawsuits against Epstein, but did not proactively
17:42
inform the victim's attorneys about the NPA. In a twenty
17:46
seventeen Avid David filed in the CVRA litigation, victims attorneys,
17:51
Bradley Edward alleged that during telephone calls with Villa Fauna,
17:55
he was asked very specific questions about what stage the
17:58
investigation was in, and Villa Fauna replied that she couldnot
18:02
answer his questions because the matter was an ongoing, active investigation.
18:07
Edwards stated that Villa Fauna gave him the impression that
18:10
the federal investigation was ongoing, very expansive, and continuously growing,
18:15
both in the number of identified victims and complexity. Edwards
18:19
also stated a fairer characterization of each call was that
18:23
I provided information and asked questions, and Villa Fauna listened
18:27
and expressed that she was unable to say much or
18:29
answer the questions I was asking. In her written response
18:33
to OPR, Villa Fauna stated that she listened more than
18:36
she spoke during her interactions with Edwards, and that due
18:39
to the uncertainty of the situation and the possibility of
18:42
a trial, she did not feel comfortable sharing any information
18:45
about the case. Villa Fauna also told OPR that because
18:50
of all these concerns and instructions that I had been
18:52
given by Alex and Jeff not to disclose things further
18:56
and not to have any involvement in victim notification, she
18:59
felt prohibited from providing additional information to Edwards. Slowman told
19:04
OPR that although neither the NPA terms nor the CVRA
19:08
prevented the USAO from exercising its discretion to notify the victims,
19:13
it was of concern that this was going to break
19:16
down and result in US prosecuting Epstein, and that the
19:19
victims were going to be witnesses and if we provided
19:21
a victim notification indicating hey, you're going to get one
19:25
hundred and fifty GS, that's going to be instant impeachment
19:28
For the defense, a Costa told OPR that because Epstein
19:31
did not plead guilty in October two thousand and seven,
19:35
as the USAO expected, it was a very open question
19:38
whether the case would go to trial, and Acosta thought
19:41
that where there is no legal requirement, there has to
19:44
be discretion to judge how much you can tell the
19:47
victims and when Epstein's attorney's conduct during the time period
19:51
between the signing of the NPA and Epstein's entry of
19:54
a state guilty please illustrated the risk that Acosta, Slowman,
19:58
and Villafauna, all identified as Epstein's council deposed victims related
20:03
to the state court criminal charges and civil cases against Epstein.
20:07
Council suggested that the victims were motivated to testify against
20:11
Epstein by the government's promise of financial gain. For example,
20:16
during a February twentieth, two thousand and eight, state deposition
20:19
of a victim, defense Council asked her whether the federal
20:22
prosecutor or FBI agents told her that she was entitled
20:26
to receive money from Epstein. In her twenty seventeen declaration
20:30
in the CVRA litigation, Villa Fauna identified that line of
20:34
questioning as a motivating factor in the government's decision to
20:37
stop notifying the victims about the potential for US Code eighteen,
20:41
section twenty two to fifty five recovery. On June twenty seventh,
20:45
two thousand and eight, the friday before Epstein's Monday June thirtieth,
20:49
two thousand and eight, state court guilty plea hearing, Villa
20:52
Fauna contacted Edwards to inform them about the upcoming hearing.
20:56
Villa Fauna told OPR she was not given authorization to
20:59
contact any victim attorney other than Edwards about the scheduled
21:02
state plea hearing. In his twenty seventeen aff David prepared
21:06
for the CVR litigation, Edwards stated that Villa Fauna gave
21:10
the impression that she was caught off guard herself, that
21:13
Epstein was pleading guilty, or that this event was happening
21:17
at all. Edwards said in a twenty sixteen court filing
21:21
that Villa Fauna told him only that Epstein was pleading
21:24
guilty to state's solicitation of prostitution charges involving other victims,
21:29
not mister Edward's clients nor any of the federally identified victims.
21:33
Villa Fauna stated in her twenty seventeen declaration that she
21:37
never told Attorney Edwards that the state charges involved other victims,
21:41
and neither the state court charging instrument nor the factual
21:45
proffer limited the procurement of prostitution charge to a specific victim.
21:50
Villa Fauna told OPR she strongly encouraged Edwards and his
21:54
clients to attend the plea hearing, but could not be
21:57
more explicit because she was not authorized by the other
22:00
office to disclose the terms of the NPA. In his
22:03
twenty seventeen affid, David Edwards acknowledged that Villa Fauna did
22:08
express that this hearing was important, but never told me
22:11
why she felt that way. Edwards claimed that Villa Fawna's
22:14
failure to inform him that the guilty please in state
22:17
court would bring an end to the possibility of a
22:19
federal prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement resulted in his
22:23
clients not attending the hearing. Edwards himself was out of
22:26
town and not able to attend the hearing. In his affid,
22:30
David Edwards asserted, there was no possible way that I
22:33
could have believed that this state plea could affect the
22:36
federal investigation or the rights of my clients in that
22:39
federal investigation. In while the Eleventh Circuit panel stated that
22:43
the government seemingly deferred to Epstein's attorneys and their requests
22:47
not to notify the victims about the NPA, and that
22:51
in sending the January and May two thousand and eight
22:54
FBI letters to the government, efforts seemed to have graduated
22:57
from passive non disclosure to or at least close to
23:00
active misrepresentation. Although both the appellate Court and the District
23:05
Court focused on the FBI's letters, for which OPR concludes
23:09
that neither Villa, Fauna, Sloman nor Acosta was responsible, OPR
23:13
considered the court's analysis in evaluating weather similar representations Villafana
23:18
made to the victims whom she interviewed on January thirty
23:22
first and February first of two thousand and eight and
23:25
to Edwards were misleading. Therefore, OPR considered whether Villafanna's statements
23:30
that the matter was under investigation and her failure to
23:33
inform all of the victims whom she interviewed or Edwards
23:36
about the NPA violated FRPC four dash four dot one
23:40
A and four dash eight dot four C or four
23:44
dash eight dot four D. All right, folks, we're gonna
23:47
wrap up right there, and in the next episode we're
23:49
gonna pick up with FRPC four dash four dot one
23:53
A prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement.
23:57
All of the information that goes with this episode can
23:59
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
24:03
welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're going
24:05
to pick up where we left off with the OIG
24:08
report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. FRPC four dash four dot
24:13
one A prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false
24:16
statement of material fact or law to a third person
24:20
during the representation of a client. The FRPC defines knowingly
24:24
as denoting actual knowledge of the fact in question, and
24:28
states that such knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. The
24:32
comments to FRPC four Dash four dot one states that
24:35
misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements
24:40
or emissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.
24:44
The comment references FRPC four Dash eight dot four for
24:48
dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement.
24:52
Like FRPC four Dash four dot one A, rule four
24:56
dash eight dot four C requires evidence that the attorney
24:59
knew this statement in question was false. Under FRPC four
25:03
Dash eight dot four C, the intent requirement can be
25:07
satisfied merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing,
25:11
and the motive underlying the lawyer's conduct is not determined. Instead,
25:16
the issue is whether he or she purposely acted. In Feinberg,
25:20
the court concluded that the prosecutor violated FRPC four Dash
25:24
four dot one and four Dash eight dot four c
25:27
ND by deliberately making untruthful statements to a defense attorney,
25:31
despite evidence that the prosecutor intended to help the defendant
25:35
by making the statements. In this case, Villa Fauna was
25:38
fully aware of the signed NPA when she interviewed the
25:42
victims on January thirty first and February first, two thousand
25:45
and eight, and when she spoke to Edwards on the telephone,
25:48
but she did not inform them specifically of the signed NPA.
25:52
The question is whether this omission amounted to a knowing
25:55
false statement or misrepresentation. One difficulty in determining what Ville
26:00
Lafauna actually said during conversations that participants were asked to
26:04
recall many years later. With respect to three of the
26:07
victims whom she interviewed in January and February of two
26:10
thousand and eight, Villa Fauna contended that she discussed the
26:14
agreement with them, even if she did not specifically refer
26:17
to it as an NPA or discuss all of its terms,
26:21
and as previously noted, there is some contemporaneous evidence supporting
26:25
her assertion. Bila Fauna's mention of the agreement, even if
26:29
not described in specific terms, would have been sufficient to
26:32
apprize those victims of the status of the federal investigation. Nevertheless,
26:37
Villa Fauna did not recall discussing the NPA specifically or
26:40
in general terms with other victims interviewed at the time,
26:43
nor did she do so with Edwards or any other
26:46
victim's attorney. OPR therefore considered whether the omission of information
26:51
about the existence of the NPA during these interactions rose
26:55
to the level of professional misconduct in violation of FRPC
26:59
four dash flow dot one or four dash eight dot four.
27:03
OPR evaluated Villa Fauna's conduct in light of the comments
27:07
to FRPC four Dash four dot one. A lawyer is
27:10
required to be truthful when dealing with others on a
27:13
client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform
27:16
an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur
27:20
if the lawyer in corporates or affirm statements another person
27:24
that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur
27:28
by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are
27:31
the equivalent of affirmative false statements. The victims in their
27:35
attorneys were certainly not opposing parties to the USAO, but
27:39
the comment indicates that the rule recognizes that omissions made
27:43
during discussions with third parties, even of relevant facts, are
27:46
not always treated as false statements. Here, the evidence does
27:50
not show that Villa Fauna knowingly made an affirmative false
27:53
statement to the victims or Edwards, or that her omissions
27:56
were the equivalent of affirmative false statements about material facts. First,
28:01
Villa Fauna told OPR that she believed the investigation was ongoing,
28:05
and her statement to that effect truthful and as discussed
28:09
earlier in this chapter. The evidence shows that Villa Fauna
28:11
and the agents did continue to investigate the case until
28:15
Epstein entered his guilty plea in state court in June
28:18
of two thousand and eight. Villafanna's email correspondence with her
28:21
supervisors reflects her strong advocacy during that timeframe to declare
28:26
Epstein in breach and to charge them. The evidence similarly
28:30
does not show that Villa Fauna knowingly made affirmative false
28:33
statements to Edwards when she informed him of the state
28:36
court plea, although she declined to provide additional information in
28:40
response to his questions. Second, in reaching its conclusion, OPR
28:44
consider the full context in which Villa Fauna interacted with
28:48
the victims and Edwards. Prosecutors routinely make decisions about what
28:52
information will be disclosed to witnesses, including victims, for a
28:55
variety of strategic reasons. In many cases, prosecutors must make
28:59
decisions about providing information to witnesses, and they often cannot
29:04
fully reveal either the facts or the status of an investigation,
29:08
even to the victims. The two thousand and five Guidelines
29:11
advise that in consulting with a victim, prosecutors may be
29:15
limited to their disclosures. Because victims are not clients, may
29:18
become adverse to the government and may disclose whatever they
29:21
have learned from consulting with prosecutors. Such consultations may be
29:25
limited to gathering information from victims and conveying only nonsensitive
29:29
data and public information. Villa Fauna's concern about generating potential
29:34
impeachment evidence by informing victims of their potential to recover
29:37
monetary damages from Epstein was not unreasonable. Indeed, the case
29:42
agents initially raised the impeachment issue, and after considering the problem,
29:46
Villa Fauna agreed with the agent's concerns. Villa Fauna raised
29:50
those concerns with the USAOs Professional Responsibility Officer in October
29:54
of two thousand and seven after the agents brought the
29:57
issue to her attention, and she ultimately raised the issue
30:00
with Sloman and Acosta as well, neither of whom advised
30:03
her that those concerns were improper or unsound. OPR also
30:08
considered that although Villa Fauna had sought to notify the
30:11
victims in writing of the NPA soon after it was signed,
30:14
her supervisor, the US Attorney, had decided otherwise. When authorized
30:19
to inform Edwards of the schedule change of plea hearing,
30:22
she did so, although she did not inform Edwards that
30:25
the plea was part of a global resolution that would
30:28
end the federal investigation. The evidence does not show that
30:32
Villa Fauna acted for the purpose of deceiving Edwards or
30:34
preventing him from attending the hearing. Had she sought to
30:38
exclude him from the state proceedings, she could have elected
30:41
not to inform Edwards at all, or she could have
30:43
discouraged them from attending the state proceedings. Rather, as Edwards confirmed,
30:48
Villa Fauna told him the hearing was important, and Villa
30:52
Fanna sought to strike a difficult balance of securing Edwards
30:55
and his client's attendants at the state court plea while
30:58
obeying her managements to that informing victims of the resolution
31:02
of the federal investigation should not be done until completion
31:06
of the state please. Therefore, after carefully considering all of
31:10
the circumstances, OPR concludes that the evidence does not establish
31:14
that Villa Fauna violated her obligations under FRPC four H
31:19
four dot one or four dot four C or D. Nonetheless,
31:24
as discussed below, Vila Fauna's interactions with victims and victims
31:28
attorneys without informing them of the NPA and the potential
31:31
conclusion of the federal investigation contributed to the likelihood that
31:36
the victims would feel that the government was intentionally concealing
31:39
information from them, and was part of a series of
31:42
interactions with victims that led to condemnation of the government's
31:45
treatment of victims. Six. The government failed to treat victims
31:50
forthrightly and with sensitivity when it failed to timely provide
31:53
victims with important information about the resolution of federal investigations.
31:59
Although OPR does not conclude that any of the subjects
32:02
committed professional misconduct, either by failing to consult with the
32:05
victims before the NPA was signed or in interactions afterwards.
32:09
Opr's findings are not an endorsement of the government's course
32:12
of action. The government's interactions with victims confused and frustrated
32:16
many of the victims, particularly the two CVRA petitioners and
32:20
the two victims who had unsuccessfully attempted to join the
32:24
CVR litigation. As a result, the victims and the public's
32:27
perception of the matter is that the prosecutors worked with
32:31
Epstein's attorneys to disenfranchise and silence the victims. It's unfortunate
32:35
and appears fundamentally unfair to the victims that Acosta and Sloman,
32:39
after Menschlin Lori departed, took the unusual step of deciding
32:43
to vet the USAO victim notification letters with the defense
32:47
after the NPA was signed, but failed to go beyond
32:50
the requirements of the CVR or the two thousand and
32:53
five guidelines to consult with the victims before the NPA
32:56
was signed. This result is contrary to the department's intent
33:00
as set forth in the two thousand and five guidelines
33:03
that Department employees worked to minimize the frustration and confusion
33:07
of the victims of crime that they endure in its wake.
33:10
When considering the entirety of the government's interactions with victims,
33:13
OPR concludes that victims were not treated with the fourth
33:17
rightness and sensitivity expected by the Department. Wild's criticisms of
33:21
the government conduct were based on interactions that are similar
33:25
to and generally representative of the government's interactions with other
33:29
EPSTEIN victims, and that demonstrate an overall lack of sensitivity
33:32
by the victims by the government. Wild experienced a series
33:36
of confusing and inconsistent communications in her interactions with Villa
33:40
Fauna and the case agents. While received Villa Fauna's letter
33:45
in June two thousand and seven stating inaccurately that she
33:48
was a federal victim entitled to CVR rights, She was
33:51
interviewed by the FBI in August two thousand and seven,
33:55
but was not told of a potential outcome of a
33:57
state plea. Shortly after this September twenty fourth, two thousand
34:01
and seven signing of the NPA, the FBI contacted her
34:04
to informer of the resolution of the Federal case. Nonetheless,
34:09
on January tenth, two thousand and eight, the FBI sent
34:12
her a victims rights letter indicating that the case was
34:15
under investigation and that some of her CVR rights may
34:19
not apply until after the defendant was charged. On January
34:23
thirty first, two thousand and eight, Villa Fauna reinterviewed Wild
34:27
along with CEOs attorney and FBI agents, and told Wild
34:31
that the case was under investigation, but did not specifically
34:34
mention the NPA, although she may have mentioned the possible resolution.
34:38
In mid June two thousand and eight, when Edwards contacted
34:41
Villa Fauna on Wild's behalf, Villa Fauna informed them that
34:44
the case was under investigation, but did not mention the NPA.
34:48
Just before Epstein's June thirtieth, two thousand and eight, state
34:51
court plea, Villa Fauna informed Edwards about the state plea,
34:54
but did not mention the NPA or the fact that
34:57
the state please would resolve the federal investigation. Edwards then
35:01
filed the CVR A petition and learned about the NPA
35:05
signed months earlier, and that the federal investigation of Epstein
35:08
had concluded with Epstein's state guilty Please. Wild only received
35:12
access to the NPA when a judge permitted it in
35:15
August two thousand and eight, pursuing too a protective order.
35:18
After considering this series of interactions, it's not surprising that
35:22
Wild came away from that experience feeling confused and believing
35:26
that she had been misled. All right, we're going to
35:28
wrap up right here, and then the next episode we're
35:30
going to pick up with OPR did not find evidence
35:33
supporting a conclusion that Villa Fauna Acosta, Sloman menchel Or
35:37
Laurie opted not to consult with victims. All of the
35:40
information that goes with this episode can be found in
35:43
the description box. What's up everyone, and welcome back to
35:46
the Epstein chronicles. In this episode, we're picking up where
35:50
we left off with the OIG report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA.
35:55
OPR recognizes that the Epstein investigation occurred soon after the
35:59
passage of this In the years since, the department's prosecutors
36:03
and personnel have become more familiar with its provisions. OPR
36:07
encourages the department as a whole to take the issues
36:10
discussed above into account when providing training and direction to
36:14
its employees regarding victims' rights. To ensure that in the future,
36:18
Department attorney's actions promote victim inclusion whenever possible. For example,
36:23
although the division of responsibility between the FBI and the
36:27
USAO for communicating with victims works efficiently and appropriately in
36:32
the average case, the USAO failed to consider that in
36:35
a case involving a pre charge disposition, the victims were
36:39
receiving in consistent and confusing communications from the separate entities.
36:44
In certain cases, such as the Epstein case, prosecutors may
36:47
need to provide more oversight when multiple department components are
36:52
communicating with victims to avoid providing confusing and contradictory messages conclusion.
36:59
In November twenty eighteen, the Miami Herald published an extensive
37:03
investigative report about the state and federal criminal investigations initiated
37:08
more than twelve years earlier in allegations that Jeffrey Epstein,
37:11
a wealthy financier with residences in Florida, New York, and
37:15
other United States and foreign locations, had coerced girls into
37:19
engaging in sexual activity with them at his Palm Beach,
37:22
Florida state. The Miami Herald reported that in two thousand
37:25
and seven, the U S Attorney for the Southern District
37:28
of Florida, R Alexander Acosta entered into an extraordinary deal
37:32
with Epstein that permitted Epstein to avoid federal prosecution and
37:36
a potentially lengthy prison sentence by pleading guilty in state
37:39
court to two prostitution charges, immunized from prosecution Epstein's co
37:45
conspirators and concealed from Epstein's victims the terms of the NPA.
37:50
Following the Miami Herald's report and after receiving a congressional
37:54
request to investigate, OPR initiated an investigation into the allegations
37:59
that prosecutors in the USAO and properly resolved the federal
38:03
investigation into the criminal conduct of Jeffrey Epstein by negotiating
38:08
and executing the NPA. OPR subsequently included in its investigation
38:13
allegations stemming from judicial criticism of the government's conduct relating
38:18
to federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents interactions with Epstein's victims.
38:23
In July of two thousand and eight, a victim later
38:25
joined by a second victim, filed in federal court in
38:28
the Southern District of Florida an emergency petition for enforcement
38:32
of her rights under the CVRA. In February twenty nineteen,
38:36
the District Court found that the government violated the CVRA
38:40
by failing to advise victims about its intention to enter
38:44
into the NPA. The court also found that letters the
38:48
government sent to victims after the NPA was signed describing
38:51
the investigation as ongoing were misleading. During the course of
38:55
its investigation, OPR obtained and reviewed hundreds of thousands of
38:59
recis records from the USAO, the FBI, and other Department
39:03
of Justice components. The records included emails, letters, memoranda, and
39:08
investigative materials. OPR also collected and reviewed materials relating to
39:13
the state investigation and prosecution of Epstein, including sealed pleadings,
39:19
grand jury transcripts, grand jury audio recordings, and examined extensive
39:24
publicly available information, including depositions, pleadings, orders, and other court records,
39:29
and reviewed media reports and interviews, articles, podcasts, and books
39:33
relating to the Epstein case. OPR conducted more than sixty
39:37
interviews of witnesses, including the FBI case agents, their supervisors,
39:42
and FBI administrative personnel, current and former USAO staff and attorneys,
39:47
current and former Department attorneys, and senior managers, and the
39:51
former State Attorney and Assistant State Attorney in charge of
39:55
the state investigation of Epstein. OPR also interviewed or received
40:00
written information from several victims and attorneys representing victims concerning
40:05
victims contacts with the USAO and federal law enforcement. OPR
40:09
identified the following five former USAO attorneys as subjects of
40:13
its investigation based on information indicating that each of them
40:17
was involved in the decision to resolve the case through
40:20
the NPA or in the negotiations leading to the agreement.
40:24
Former us Attorney R. Alexander Acosta and former AUSA Jeffrey H. Slowman,
40:30
Matthew I. Menchel, Andrew C. Lorie, and Anne Maurice C. Villafauna.
40:36
Each subject submitted written responses detailing their involvement in the
40:40
federal investigation of Epstein, the drafting and execution of the NPA,
40:45
and decisions relating to victim notification and consultation. OPR conducted
40:50
extensive interviews of all five subjects. The subjects also submitted
40:54
comments on opr's draft report. OPR evaluated the conduct of
40:59
each subjet rebject based on his or her individual role
41:03
in various decisions and events and assess that conduct pursue
41:06
into opr's analytical framework. OPR found that Acosta made the
41:11
pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein through
41:15
a state base plea, and either developed or approved the
41:18
terms of the initial offer to the defense that set
41:21
the beginning point for the subsequent negotiations that led to
41:25
the NPA. Although Acosta did not sign the NPA, he
41:29
participated in its drafting and approved it with knowledge of
41:32
its terms. Therefore, OPR considers Acosta to be responsible for
41:36
the NPA and for the actions of the other subjects
41:39
who implemented his decision. Based on its extensive investigation, OPR
41:45
concludes that the subject did not commit professional misconduct with
41:48
respect to the development, negotiation, and approval of the NPA.
41:53
Under opr's framework, professional misconduct requires a finding that a
41:57
subject attorney intentionally or recklessly violated a clear and unambiguous
42:02
standard governing the conduct at issue. OPR found no clear
42:06
and unambiguous standard that required Acosta to indict Epstein on
42:10
federal charges or that prohibited his decision to defer prosecution
42:15
to the state. Furthermore, none of the individual terms of
42:19
the NPA violated departmental or other applicable standards. As the
42:25
u S Attorney, Acosta had the authority under established federal
42:28
law and department policy to resolve the case as he
42:31
deemed necessary and appropriate, as long as his decision was
42:35
not motivated or influenced by improper factors. Acosta's decision to
42:39
decline to initiate a federal prosecution of Epstein was within
42:43
the scope of his authority, and OPR did not find
42:46
evidence that his decision was based on corruption or other
42:50
impermissible considerations, such as Epstein's wealth status or associations. Evidence
42:56
shows that Acosta resisted defense efforts to have the matter
42:59
at time to the state for whatever result state authorities
43:02
deemed appropriate, and he refused to eliminate the incarceration and
43:06
sexual offender registration requirements. OPR did not find evidence establishing
43:11
that Acosta's breakfast meeting with one of Epstein's defense council
43:15
in October of two thousand and seven led to the NPA,
43:18
which had been signed weeks earlier, or to any other
43:21
significant decision that benefited Epstein. The contemporaneous records showed that
43:27
the USAO managers concerns about legal issues witness credibility and
43:31
the impact of trial on the victims led them to
43:34
refer a precharge resolution, and that Acosta's concerns about the
43:37
proper role of the federal government in prosecuting solicitation crimes
43:42
resulted in his preference for a state based resolution. Accordingly,
43:46
OPR does not find that Acosta engaged in a professional
43:49
misconduct by resolving the federal investigation of Epstein in the
43:53
way he did, or that the other subjects committed professional
43:56
misconduct through their implementation of Acosta's decisions. Nevertheless, OPR concludes
44:02
that a Costa's decision to resolve the federal investigation through
44:06
the NPA constitutes poor judgment, although this decision was within
44:10
the scope of Acosta's broad discretion and OPR does find
44:14
that it resulted from improper factors, the NPA was a
44:17
flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest that caused the
44:21
government to open its investigation of Epstein. An Acosta's view,
44:25
the federal government's role and prosecuting Epstein was limited by
44:29
principles of federalism, under which the independent authority of the
44:33
state should be recognized, and the federal responsibility in this
44:36
situation was to serve as a backstop to state authorities
44:40
by encouraging them to do more. However, a Costa failed
44:44
to consider the difficulties inherent in a resolution that relied
44:48
heavily on action by numerous state officials over whom he
44:51
had no authority. He resolved the federal investigation before significant
44:56
investigative steps were completed, and he agreed to several unusual,
45:00
u and problematic terms in the NPA without the consideration
45:03
required under the circumstances. In some Acosta's application of federalism
45:08
principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest
45:12
in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of
45:15
the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision
45:19
to use the NPA. Furthermore, because a Costa assumed a
45:23
significant role in reviewing and drafting the NPA, and the
45:26
other three subjects who were supervisors left the USAO, were
45:30
transitioning to other jobs or were absent at critical junctures,
45:34
Acosta should have ensured more effective coordination and communication during
45:38
the negotiations and before approving the final NPA. The NPA
45:43
was a unique resolution and one that required greater oversight
45:46
in supervision than a costa provided. OPR further concludes that
45:51
none of the subject attorneys committed professional misconduct with respect
45:55
to the government's interactions with victims. The subjects did not
45:59
intentionally or rectlessly violate a clear and unambiguous duty under
46:03
the CVRA by entering into the NPA without consulting with
46:07
the victims. Because the USAO resolved the Epstein investigation without
46:11
federal criminal charge. Significantly, at the time the NPA was signed,
46:16
the Department did not interpret CVR rights to attach unless
46:20
and until federal charges had been filed, and the federal
46:23
courts had not established a clear and unambiguous standard applying
46:27
the CVRA before criminal charges were brought. In addition, OPR
46:31
did not find evidence that the lack of consultation was
46:35
for the purpose of silencing victims. Nonetheless, the lack of
46:38
consultation was part of a series of government interactions with
46:42
victims that ultimately led the public and court condemnation of
46:46
the government's treatment of the victims. Reflected poorly on the
46:50
Department as a whole, and is contradictory to the department's
46:53
mission to minimize the frustration and confusion that victims of
46:57
crime endure. OPR determined that none of the subjects was
47:01
responsible for communication sent to certain victims after the NPA
47:05
was signed that described the case as under investigation and
47:09
that failed to inform them of the NPA. The letters
47:12
were sent by an FBI administrative employee who was not
47:15
directly involved in the investigation, incorporated standard form language used
47:20
by the FBI when communicating with victims, and were not
47:23
drafted or reviewed by the subjects. Moreover, the statement that
47:27
the matter was under investigation was not false, because the
47:30
government in fact continued to investigate the case in anticipation
47:34
that Epstein would not fulfill the terms of the NPA. However,
47:39
the letters risked misleading the victims and contributed to victim
47:42
frustration and confusion by failing to provide important information about
47:46
the status of the investigation. The letters also demonstrated a
47:51
lack of coordination between the federal agencies responsible for communicating
47:55
with Epstein's victims and showed a lack of attention to
47:58
oversight regarding communication with victims. After the MPa was signed,
48:03
Acosta elected to defer to the state Attorney the decision
48:06
whether to notify victims about the state plea hearing pursue
48:09
into the state's own victim rights requirements. Although Acosta's decision
48:14
was within his authority and did not constitute professional misconduct,
48:17
OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment when he failed
48:22
to make certain that the state intended to and would
48:25
notify victims identified through the federal investigation about the plea hearing.
48:30
His decision led victims uninformed about an important proceeding and
48:34
resolved the federal investigation, an investigation about which the USAO
48:39
had communicated with victims for months. It also ultimately created
48:44
the misimpression that the department intentionally sought to silence the victims.
48:48
A Costa failed to ensure that victims were made aware
48:51
of court proceedings that were related to their own cases,
48:54
and thus he failed to ensure that victims were treated
48:56
with forthrightness and dignity. ARC concludes that the decision to
49:01
postpone notifying victims about the terms of the NPA after
49:05
it was signed, and the omission of information about the
49:08
NPA during victim interviews and conversations with victims attorneys in
49:12
two thousand and eight do not constitute professional misconduct. Contemporaneous
49:17
records show that these actions were based on strategic concerns
49:21
about creating impeachment evidence. At Epstein, victims had financial motives
49:25
to make claims against them, evidence that could be used
49:28
against victims at trial, and were not meant for the
49:31
purpose of silencing victims. Nonetheless, the failure to reevaluate the
49:35
strategy prior to interviews of victims and discussions with victims
49:39
attorneys occurring in two thousand and eight led to interactions
49:42
that contributed to victim's feelings that the government was intentionally
49:46
concealing information from them. After examining the full scope and
49:50
context of the government's interactions with victims, OPR concludes that
49:55
the government's lack of transparency and its inconsistent messages led
49:58
to victims feeling confused, used, and ill treated by the government.
50:02
Gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government
50:05
had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret
50:08
from the victims, and undercut public confidence in the legitimacy
50:12
of the resulting agreement. The overall result of the subjects
50:17
handling of this case understandably left many victims feeling ignored
50:21
and frustrated, and resulted in extensive public criticism in some
50:25
OPR concludes that the victims were not treated with forthrightness
50:29
and sensitivity expected by the department. All right, folks, well
50:34
that does it for this mammoth beast. And I'll tell
50:37
you what. If I've learned anything about the OPR and
50:40
the process that goes into it, I've learned this that
50:44
all of these OIG reports, all of these Inspector General reports,
50:49
all of these internal investigations never lead to any sort
50:52
of change. So what's the point. The whole reason that
50:55
they do it is so that they can come out
50:57
and get a narrative on the record, and that's what
51:00
they're doing here, and that's exactly what they did with
51:02
the OIG report into Epstein's death, and on and on
51:06
it goes. So you see from getting the whole report
51:09
yourself that the whole process was straight up garbage, and
51:12
were once again left with this question, who's watching the watchers?
51:18
All right, folks, that's gonna do it for this one.
51:20
All of the information that goes with this episode can
51:22
be found in the description box.