Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Shiller P/E ‼️: 📉 Crash Predictor or Overhyped? | History, Myths & How to Use It Today
Transcript
- 0:00Have you ever stared at the stock market, you know, seeing
- 0:02all these headlines about new highs and just quietly wondered,
- 0:06is this, is this actually expensive right now or is there
- 0:11still value out there? It's a huge question, isn't it?
- 0:14Every single investor thinks about.
- 0:15It exactly. And getting a clear answer
- 0:18feels, well, really complex sometimes.
- 0:21So today our deep dive is into a pretty powerful and definitely
- 0:27often debated valuation metric that's designed to help us with
- 0:30just that, the Schiller PE ratio.
- 0:32Also known as KE. Right, KE cyclically adjusted
- 0:35price to earnings. Our mission really is to unpack
- 0:38what this ratio is all about, look at how it's been used
- 0:40historically, maybe to predict market moves, and then really
- 0:44critically examine if it, you know, if it still holds water in
- 0:46today's market, which feels like it's changing so fast.
- 0:48Absolutely. Hopefully you'll walk away with
- 0:50a much clearer picture of this tool and what it might mean for
- 0:53your own financial thinking. OK, let's unpack this.
- 0:56Let's do it. It really is a cornerstone in
- 0:59valuation. And what's fascinating, as you
- 1:01said, is that the core idea isn't new at all.
- 1:04It's actually quite old. Oh really?
- 1:06Where does it come from? Well, the the intellectual DNA,
- 1:10you could say, traces right back to Benjamin Graham and David
- 1:12Dodd. The fathers of value investing.
- 1:14Exactly. They're famous 1934 book
- 1:17Security Analysis. They realized way back then that
- 1:20just looking at one year's earnings is often, well,
- 1:24misleading. Profits swing wildly with the
- 1:26business cycle, right? Sure.
- 1:27Booms and busts. So they proposed averaging
- 1:30earnings over, say, 5-7, maybe even 10 years.
- 1:33To get a more stable picture. Precisely to find a company's
- 1:36true earning power, not just its fleeting profits from one good
- 1:39or bad year. OK.
- 1:40So that makes total sense for one company smoothing out the
- 1:43bumps, right? But how did that scale up to the
- 1:45whole market? Well, that's the bridge.
- 1:46Decades later, in the late 80s, the early 90s economists Robert
- 1:50Shiller and John Campbell, they took that exact Graham and Dodd
- 1:54principle. And applied it systematically to
- 1:56the entire S&P 500 index. They used A10 year average of
- 2:00earnings, crucially adjusted for inflation.
- 2:03Inflation adjusted, OK. And compare that average earning
- 2:05power to the current market price.
- 2:08Shiller then really popularized this metric, which they called
- 2:12KTE right in his 2000 book Irrational Exuberance.
- 2:16Davis Timing. Irrational exuberance.
- 2:18Yeah, that definitely put Shiller PE on the map.
- 2:19I remember that. OK, so for those of us not
- 2:23crunching these numbers daily, how is it actually calculated?
- 2:26Can you walk us through the steps?
- 2:28Yeah, sure. It's a pretty systematic process
- 2:30designed for consistency over time.
- 2:31First step, you got a 10 years of historical annual earnings
- 2:35per share EPS for the S&P 500 index. 10 years, got it. 2nd,
- 2:39and this is key, each of those 10 EPS figures gets adjusted for
- 2:42inflation, usually using the CPI, the consumer price index.
- 2:45To bring it all into today's dollar.
- 2:47Exactly. Real dollar terms.
- 2:49So you're comparing apples to apples across the decade.
- 2:51Third, you just calculate a simple arithmetic average of
- 2:54those 10 real EPS figures. OK.
- 2:56Average the 10 inflation adjusted numbers right?
- 2:59And finally, Step 4, you divide the current real price of the
- 3:03S&P 500 index by that 10 year average real earnings figure you
- 3:07just calculated. OK.
- 3:08So it's price divided by the 10 year average inflation adjusted
- 3:11earnings more involved than a simple PE.
- 3:14Can you give us like a quick example?
- 3:16Sure. Let's say the S&P 500 index is
- 3:18currently priced at say $200 in real terms.
- 3:22And let's imagine it's average inflation adjusted earnings over
- 3:24the past 10 years comes out to $10, right?
- 3:27Then the CPE is simply 200 / 10, which is 20.
- 3:30So KPE is 20, meaning investors are paying $20.00 for each
- 3:34dollar of that long term smoothed out earning power.
- 3:37Exactly. And the big advantage, the
- 3:39reason for doing all this is it acts like a noise cancelling
- 3:42filter. Think about the global financial
- 3:44crisis in 2008, 2009. Oh yeah, the normal PE ratio,
- 3:47the trailing 12 month one. The one you usually see
- 3:49reported. Right.
- 3:50It just looks at the last year's earnings.
- 3:52Well, earnings absolutely collapsed then, so the TTMPE
- 3:55ratio soared. It went over 100.
- 3:57Making the market look insanely expensive.
- 3:59Right when it was actually crashing, but the keep AP,
- 4:02because it includes earnings from the previous nine years,
- 4:04didn't collapse nearly as much. It's 10 year average earnings
- 4:08held up better. So it didn't spike up like the
- 4:10TTMPE. No, quite the opposite.
- 4:13The price fell so much more dramatically than the 10 year
- 4:16average earnings that KPE actually signaled the market was
- 4:19becoming undervalued. Wow, OK, that really highlights
- 4:22the difference. Relying on just one year
- 4:24snapshot can be totally misleading in extremes.
- 4:27Precisely, it raises that question, how reliable is a
- 4:30single year's picture when things can change so
- 4:33drastically? That distinction is critical.
- 4:35OK, so moving on. Well, it's maybe not a perfect
- 4:38timing tool. Definitely not.
- 4:39The Shiller PE is kind of famous or infamous for its historical
- 4:43warnings. It seems to have this knack for
- 4:45preceding major market declines. This is where it gets really
- 4:48interesting, right? Absolutely.
- 4:49This is its claim to fame. You could say the track record
- 4:51is quite remarkable. Can you give us some of those
- 4:53big examples? Sure.
- 4:55The first sort of major validation was way back before
- 4:58the 1929 crash. The KP ratio for the market
- 5:01index back then went above 30. Peaked at 32.6 right before the
- 5:06crash where the Dow lost what, 89%?
- 5:09OK, 1929, what else? Then much more recently, the.com
- 5:13bubble in the late 1990s. Schiller and Campbell were
- 5:16actually warning the Fed about valuations back in 1996.
- 5:19Really. Yeah, and the CP kept climbing,
- 5:22peaking at an all time high of 44.2 in December 1999. 44 That's
- 5:27huge compared to the historical average.
- 5:29Astronomical. And that's exactly when Schiller
- 5:32published Irrational Exuberance. Perfect timing.
- 5:34Then, of course, the S&P 500 lost almost half its value, the
- 5:37NASDAQ nearly 80%. Incredible examples.
- 5:39Has it worked in, let's say, less extreme downturns too, like
- 5:43the 2008 crisis? It did, leading into the 2008
- 5:46GFC. The KPP around 27.3 in 2007.
- 5:49Not as high as 1999, but still very elevated historically.
- 5:52And then the market plunged. Plunged 56% and we've seen
- 5:55similar patterns more recently to KPA went above 30 in late
- 5:592017 before that sharp 20% correction in late 2018.
- 6:02I remember that one. Then again, it was above 30 in
- 6:04late 2019, early 2020, right before the COVID crash hit,
- 6:07which was about 33%. And most recently, it climbed
- 6:10again from late 2020, getting up near 40 in January 2022.
- 6:15Just before the 2022 bear market.
- 6:18Exactly, which saw about a 25% decline.
- 6:20So the pattern seems consistent. It doesn't tell you what
- 6:23disaster is coming. Right, it don't predict the
- 6:24trigger. No, but it measures how much.
- 6:26Let's say explosive powder is in the barrel.
- 6:29It's a barometer of market vulnerability.
- 6:31A barometer of vulnerability. I like that it measures the
- 6:33condition, not the event. But beyond these, like
- 6:36historical anecdotes, is there harder data?
- 6:39Quantitative evidence. Oh yes, absolutely.
- 6:41Rigorous statistical work confirms this relationship.
- 6:44There's a very strong negative correlation between the starting
- 6:46KPE ratio and the subsequent long term real stock returns.
- 6:50Meaning IKP predicts low future returns.
- 6:53Over the long run, yes. Specifically over 510, even 20
- 6:56years. The higher the CPE when you
- 6:58invest, the lower your likely real returns will be over the
- 7:01next decade or two. But not for short term returns.
- 7:03Interestingly, no. It has almost 0 predictive power
- 7:06for short term returns, say the next year.
- 7:08The signal really only emerges over those longer horizons.
- 7:11How strong is that long term signal statistically?
- 7:14It's actually remarkably strong for financial data if you look
- 7:17at the correlation between starting KP and subsequent 10
- 7:21year real returns, particularly since the early 1980's.
- 7:23The R-squared. The measure of how much
- 7:26variation it explains. Right, it has been as high as
- 7:28.78. Wow, 78%?
- 7:32That's incredibly high for market data.
- 7:34It suggests starting Cape explains a huge chunk of future
- 7:37long term returns. It does.
- 7:39It's a very powerful long term signal.
- 7:40And I know Schiller and Jiraj did some work looking at
- 7:43quintiles dividing the historical Cape range into 5
- 7:46buckets. Yes, that's another compelling
- 7:49way to look at it. They sorted history based on the
- 7:51starting KP ratio from the lowest 20% of readings to the
- 7:54highest 20%. And what did they find about
- 7:56future returns in those different buckets?
- 7:58The results are stark. When the starting KP was in the
- 8:00lowest quintile. That's below about 9.6
- 8:03historically. So when the market looked really
- 8:04cheap by this measure? Exactly.
- 8:07The average 10 year real return afterwards was a fantastic 9.8%
- 8:10per year, and even the worst outcome in that cheap bucket was
- 8:14still a +4.2% return. OK, so cheap starting point,
- 8:18great future returns on average. What about the other end?
- 8:21High KP. When the starting KP was in the
- 8:23highest quintile historically above about 26.4.
- 8:27Like we saw before the big crashes and here we are now.
- 8:29Precisely. The average 10 year real return
- 8:32plummeted to just .9% to a year. Less than 1%.
- 8:36And the worst case scenario in that expensive bucket wasn't
- 8:38just low returns, it was a painful loss of 6.1% per year in
- 8:43real terms for a decade. Ouch.
- 8:45So that quintile data really drives home the point valuation
- 8:49shifts the whole range of possibilities for your future
- 8:51returns. It absolutely does.
- 8:53It's not deterministic, but it systematically shifts the odds.
- 8:56That's a vital point for long term investors.
- 8:58It's about probabilities, not certainties.
- 9:00OK, but despite this really strong historical track record,
- 9:04the Schiller PE faces a lot of criticism today, doesn't it?
- 9:07It certainly does. The market feels different,
- 9:09technology is different. What are the main arguments
- 9:11against sort of this time is different critiques?
- 9:14That's the heart of the debate now, especially because as you
- 9:17alluded to, the KP ratio has been above its long term average
- 9:20of around 17 for most of the time since the mid 1990s.
- 9:24Right, it seems persistently high.
- 9:26Which leads some to argue we're on a permanently high plateau.
- 9:30There are several key critiques driving this.
- 9:32OK, what's the first big one? Well, a major one revolves
- 9:35around accounting changes and the rise of intangible assets.
- 9:39Intangibles like brand value, software, R&D.
- 9:42Exactly. Historically, value was more
- 9:45tied to physical factories, machines, tangible stuff.
- 9:48Now, a huge amount of the S&P 500's value, maybe 90% by some
- 9:52estimates, is in intangibles. And accounting rules haven't
- 9:55kept up. That's the argument.
- 9:57Under current gap accounting, companies expense things like
- 10:00R&D, software development and marketing immediately.
- 10:02They treat it as a cost right away.
- 10:04Right. Instead of capitalizing it as a
- 10:05long term asset the way they would have factory.
- 10:07This artificially depresses reported earnings compared to
- 10:10how similar investments might have been treated implicitly or
- 10:12explicitly in the past. Making today's tech heavy
- 10:15companies look more expensive on APE basis.
- 10:19Yes, it makes the E in Cape potentially understated for
- 10:23modern knowledge based companies.
- 10:25Plus there was a specific rule change FAS 142 back in 2001.
- 10:29It eliminated goodwill amortization that also boosted
- 10:33reported earnings after 2001 compared to before, creating a
- 10:36kind of break in the data series and apples to oranges comparison
- 10:39issue across that 2001 divide. So the E might be flawed because
- 10:43of accounting changes and the shift to intangibles.
- 10:46That's a big one. Another.
- 10:47Huge factor is the rise of share buybacks.
- 10:50Yes, companies buying back their own stock.
- 10:52It's become a. Dominant way to return cash to
- 10:54shareholders, often instead of dividends.
- 10:56When a company buys back shares, the number of shares outstanding
- 10:59goes down, right? So even if total net income
- 11:01stays exactly the same, the earnings per share EPS
- 11:04automatically goes up because the.
- 11:06Same earnings are divided by fewer shares precisely.
- 11:08Quick example, $100 earnings, 100 shares, that's $1.00 EPS.
- 11:12Buy back 10% of the shares. Now you have 90 shares, same
- 11:14$100 earnings, but now it's $1.11 EPS.
- 11:17OK, so. Buybacks boost EPS.
- 11:19How does that affect KP it creates?
- 11:21An upward bias. The P price goes up, reflecting
- 11:25the value returned via buybacks, but the E and KP being a 10 year
- 11:29average lags behind. It doesn't fully capture the
- 11:32immediate EPS boost from recent buybacks relative to the price
- 11:35increase, so it makes the. Ratio look higher than it might
- 11:38otherwise. Exactly 1.
- 11:39Study suggested 2 identical companies 1 using dividends, 1
- 11:42using buybacks could end up with KP's of like 10 versus 15 just
- 11:46because of that mechanical difference.
- 11:48Wow, that's. A significant distortion.
- 11:49OK, accounting buybacks. What's next?
- 11:52The changing. Composition of the market
- 11:54itself, especially the dominance of Big Tech, right?
- 11:57Apple, Microsoft. NVIDIA, They're a huge part of
- 12:01the S and T500 now a. Massive part and these are
- 12:04fundamentally different businesses than the industrials
- 12:06or utilities that dominated decades ago but typically asset
- 12:09light have higher profit margins global reach and they.
- 12:11Naturally trade at higher PE multiples generally.
- 12:14Yes, investors are willing to pay more for their growth
- 12:16prospects and margins so comparing today's tech heavy
- 12:20index keep to the keep of the 1970s arguably problematic
- 12:24because the. Underlying nature of the average
- 12:26company in the index has changed so much.
- 12:29Exactly. The PE reflects today's high
- 12:31multiple giants while the EE is averaging today's high earnings
- 12:35with smaller earnings from a decade ago when these companies
- 12:38weren't as dominant or maybe didn't even exist in their
- 12:41current form. If you look at CPE by sector,
- 12:44tech is way up there, maybe near 59 while financials are closer
- 12:48to 21. The overall average is pulled up
- 12:50by tech that makes. Sense it's like the average
- 12:53temperature rising because you added a few volcanoes.
- 12:55OK, one more big critique. I always hear about interest
- 12:58rates, yes. The influence of interest rates.
- 13:01This is a fundamental point. How does that work?
- 13:02Basic finance theory the value of any asset, including stocks,
- 13:07is the present value of its expected future cash flows.
- 13:09To get the present value, you discount those future cash flows
- 13:13back to today using a discount rate and that.
- 13:15Discount rate is related to interest rates, very much so.
- 13:17The baseline is usually the risk free rate, like the yield on
- 13:20long term government bonds. When the risk free rate is
- 13:22lower, the discount rate used for stocks is also generally
- 13:25lower. OK.
- 13:26So lower discount rate means it means those.
- 13:28Future earnings are discounted less heavily.
- 13:30They're worth more in today's dollars.
- 13:32OK, so lower interest rates justify higher present values,
- 13:36correct? Which in turn justifies higher
- 13:38valuation multiples like PE ratios and by extension the CPE
- 13:42ratio. So the.
- 13:43Argument is, it's maybe irrational to expect CP to go
- 13:46back to its old average of 17 when interest rates have been
- 13:50structurally much lower for A time than they were during much
- 13:53of the period that formed that average.
- 13:55That's precisely. The argument how much of today's
- 13:57high he P is just a rational response to lower rates versus
- 14:01actual irrational exuberance or overvaluation?
- 14:04That's the $1,000,000 question, or perhaps trillion dollar
- 14:07question. It really is.
- 14:08OK, so we've got the history, the warnings mechanics and now
- 14:12these really significant critiques.
- 14:14How should someone listening, how should you actually use the
- 14:17Schiller PE today? What's the practical take away
- 14:20for your portfolio considering all this?
- 14:22Let's start with where is PP right now, right as we.
- 14:24Record this around mid 2025. The S&P 500 CPE ratio is
- 14:29hovering around 35 to 3645. To 36, just to reiterate, how
- 14:33does that compare historically? It's.
- 14:35Extremely elevated. It's higher than the peak before
- 14:37the 1929 crash, which was 32.6. It's higher than the peak before
- 14:41the 2008 crisis, which was 27.3. It's getting closer to that.com
- 14:46bubble peak of 44.2, and it's well above the peak around 40
- 14:49reached in late 2021, early 2022.
- 14:52And crucially, it's more than double its very long term
- 14:55historical average of about 17. Double the.
- 14:57Average. OK, so we have this really high
- 14:59reading, flashing warning signs based on history, but we also
- 15:02have these compelling arguments about structural changes,
- 15:05accounting, buybacks, tech rates that might justify a higher
- 15:10level. How do you square that circle as
- 15:12an investor? It really.
- 15:13Forces you to confront a central strategic question you have to
- 15:16ask yourself. Do I believe the powerful
- 15:18historical forces of mean reversion, the tendency for
- 15:21valuations to eventually revert to their averages, are stronger?
- 15:25Or do I leave that the powerful forces of modern structural
- 15:27economic change are more dominant and justify these
- 15:30higher levels being sustained? The bear case?
- 15:32Versus the bull case on valuation itself exactly.
- 15:36The bear case says history rhymes, high valuations crush
- 15:39future returns, and the structural arguments are just
- 15:42narratives people tell themselves to justify
- 15:44overpaying. The bull case says no, things
- 15:47are different, intangibles matter more.
- 15:49Buybacks are real, tech dominance is structural rates
- 15:52are lower and therefore expecting a return to the old
- 15:55average of 17 is unrealistic. A higher baseline is the new
- 15:59normal. And where you?
- 16:00Land on that question has big implications.
- 16:02Huge implications. For your long term asset
- 16:04allocation, there's no single right answer, but you need to
- 16:07have a view. So what are?
- 16:08The practical actions or mindset shifts that suggests for
- 16:11listeners how can they apply this OK 3.
- 16:14Main things I think first use it for managing expectations.
- 16:17OK, with the KP in the mid 30s, expecting the historical average
- 16:21stock market return of say 710% inflation adjusted for US large
- 16:25caps over the next decade is probably unrealistic setting
- 16:28yourself. Up for disappointment?
- 16:29Potentially. Yes, returns are statistically
- 16:32likely to be much more modest, maybe low single digits, maybe
- 16:36flat, maybe even negative in real terms over 10 years.
- 16:39Some forecasts, like one from Invesco based on a KP near to
- 16:4237, projected barely positive, like .5% annualized capital
- 16:47returns. OK, temper.
- 16:48Expectations. What's the second application
- 16:50use it? To inform adjusting your
- 16:52strategic equity exposure now this is crucial.
- 16:55It's not about market timing. Don't try to sell at the peaks
- 16:57or buy at the bottom based on KP right we.
- 16:59Establish it's bad for short term timing.
- 17:02Exactly. But it can guide gradual
- 17:04strategic shifts in your long term allocation.
- 17:06When KP is very high, like now, maybe you gradually trim your
- 17:10allocation to the expensive asset class, in this case US
- 17:13large cap stocks, and perhaps reallocate a bit towards less
- 17:16expensive assets, maybe bonds or cash, depending on your goals
- 17:19and risk tolerance and. Conversely, when KP is low, when
- 17:22it's low. Like it was in early 2000 time
- 17:24history suggests that's a time to be strategically more
- 17:26aggressive with your equity allocation, leaning into the
- 17:28cheapness. It's about disciplined long term
- 17:31risk management based on valuation levels.
- 17:33Makes sense? Manage expectations, adjust
- 17:36strategic allocation gradually. What's their take away use it
- 17:39for? Informing geographic allocation.
- 17:41This is really important right now because the.
- 17:43US looks expensive, but other places don't precisely.
- 17:45The US market with its KPE in the mid 30s is a major outlier
- 17:49globally. Many international developed and
- 17:52emerging markets have significantly lower KP ratios.
- 17:55Can you give some? Examples.
- 17:56Where are other markets sure based?
- 17:58On recent data, say late 2024, early 2025 numbers, the US is up
- 18:03there 32 to 37, very overvalued territory.
- 18:07India is also quite high, around 34.
- 18:09OK. But then you look at Japan,
- 18:11maybe 2628 moderately overvalued, perhaps Germany
- 18:14around 2021 looks fairly valued. The UK is even lower, maybe 1819
- 18:17potentially fairly valued or even a bit undervalued.
- 18:19And what about? Emerging markets like China,
- 18:21China's. KPE has been quite low, maybe in
- 18:23the 13 to 15 range. Hong Kong even lower, maybe 8 or
- 18:269. Those look very undervalued
- 18:28based on this metric. Wow.
- 18:29Huge. Differences.
- 18:30So the KP provides a pretty clear data-driven case for
- 18:33global diversification. Absolutely.
- 18:35It suggests diversifying away from the most expensive market,
- 18:39the US right now and potentially allocating more towards regions
- 18:43that offer lower starting valuations and therefore
- 18:46potentially higher long term expected returns that.
- 18:48Global perspective is a massive take away.
- 18:51It really highlights the range of valuations out there.
- 18:54So a question for you listening. What stands out to you about how
- 18:58differently markets are valued across the globe right now?
- 19:01Does it change how you think about your own portfolio?
- 19:04It's definitely. Food for thought.
- 19:05OK, so. Shiller PE is powerful, but you
- 19:07said it yourself, no single metric is perfect.
- 19:10How does it fit into a sort of broader evaluation toolkit?
- 19:14Are there other signals sending the same message, or maybe
- 19:16different ones? Great point.
- 19:18You should always look for confirmation from different
- 19:19angles, and right now, several other major macro valuation
- 19:23indicators are telling a similar cautionary story about the US
- 19:27market. Like what?
- 19:28Well. There's the famous Buffett
- 19:30indicator total market cap divided by GDP.
- 19:33That's currently way over 200% in the US.
- 19:35It's historical average is more like 85%.
- 19:38And Buffett himself has suggested that levels above 130%
- 19:41start to look expensive. So 200% is flashing extreme
- 19:45overvaluation supporting the QDE signal.
- 19:47OK, Buffett. Indicator agrees.
- 19:49Anything else? Tobin.
- 19:50'S Q ratio that compares the market value of companies to the
- 19:54replacement cost of their actual assets.
- 19:57It's also at levels historically only seen near major market
- 19:59peaks like 1929 and 1999. Two thousand so.
- 20:02Multiple big picture indicators are aligned right now.
- 20:05What about something like Price to book?
- 20:07Price to book. Is a classic, but it's
- 20:09usefulness has arguably diminished a bit.
- 20:11Why? For the same reason key PE is
- 20:13critiqued in tangible assets. Because they're not.
- 20:16On the balance sheet exactly. Intangibles like brand value or
- 20:18software code don't show up properly in the book value
- 20:20calculation, making key be less meaningful for today's tech and
- 20:24service heavy economy. Similar to the E problem in KP.
- 20:27Got it. So other indicators largely
- 20:30confirm the expensive signal, especially for the US.
- 20:32Now are people trying to improve on at KP itself to address those
- 20:35critiques we talked about? Yes.
- 20:36Absolutely. Researchers are constantly
- 20:39trying to refine these tools. There are several interesting
- 20:41innovations or adjustments to Cape such.
- 20:44As one is. The total return Cape or TR
- 20:46Cape. Instead of just using the price
- 20:48index in the numerator, it uses a total return index which
- 20:51includes reinvested dividends. How does that help?
- 20:54It better accounts for total shareholder yield, including
- 20:57buybacks implicitly and makes comparisons more consistent
- 21:00across time periods with different mixes of dividends and
- 21:03buybacks. OK, that.
- 21:04Addresses the payout method issue.
- 21:06What else? There's the excess.
- 21:07Cape yield or ECY. This one directly tackles the
- 21:10interest rate critique. It calculates the Cape earnings
- 21:13yield, which is just one divided by the KP ratio, the inverse.
- 21:17Of KP, right? And then it subtracts the long
- 21:19term real interest rate, like the 10 year real treasury yield.
- 21:23So look at the spread between stock earnings yield and bond
- 21:26yields focusing. On relative value, are stocks
- 21:29attractive compared to bonds given current rates?
- 21:31Exactly. It shifts the focus from
- 21:33absolute Cape level to relative attractiveness.
- 21:36Interesting. Any others worth mentioning?
- 21:38Well. Another approach, slightly
- 21:40different but related, is the Hussman PE.
- 21:43It tries to normalize the E not just by averaging over 10 years,
- 21:48but by adjusting profit margins relative to their historical
- 21:51trend. It's another way to tackle that
- 21:53issue of earnings cyclicality or potential distortions in current
- 21:56margins. So lots.
- 21:58Of ongoing work to refine these valuation concepts, definitely.
- 22:01It shows how researchers are trying to adapt these powerful
- 22:05older ideas to today's, you know, ever evolving financial
- 22:08world this deep. Dive into the Shiller PE ratio
- 22:11has been well, it's incredibly insightful.
- 22:13It's clear it's a landmark metric, right.
- 22:14It's got this proven historical track record offering a really
- 22:18powerful signal about long term market vulnerability.
- 22:21But as we've discussed, absolutely exists in a complex
- 22:23modern market. There are legitimate critiques,
- 22:25accounting buybacks, the shift to tech interest rates.
- 22:29We can't ignore those. No, you can't.
- 22:30So the take away isn't that it's a simple buy or sell signal.
- 22:33It's definitely not that, no, but maybe think of it more like
- 22:35a valuation thermostat or a vital input for long term risk
- 22:39management. I think that's.
- 22:40A great way to put it. A thermostat.
- 22:42A barometer. Yeah.
- 22:43So maybe for you, for long term investors listening, the real
- 22:46question isn't just whether the Schiller PE is technically right
- 22:49or wrong today, but maybe it's more about whether you're
- 22:52willing to confront what its signal implies for your own long
- 22:56term expectations, for your own tolerance for risk, especially
- 23:00given current high levels. How will you use this insight to
- 23:04perhaps adapt your investment strategy going forward?
- 23:07A. Crucial question for everyone to
- 23:09ponder.