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010 - Chapter 5 Part 1 - Red China to the Rescue · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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  Speaker 1: Chapter five, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain red China to the Rescue.
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  Speaker 1: Up to this time, the first Marine Division had virtually
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  Speaker 1: been waging two separate wars in the southern zone. As
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  Speaker 1: was related in the last two chapters, blocking and screening
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  Speaker 1: operations were conducted by RCT one against NKPA remnants. RCT seven,
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  Speaker 1: with RCT five in reserve, had meanwhile been confronted in
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  Speaker 1: the north by some of the first Chinese Communist troops
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  Speaker 1: to enter the Korean conflict. In order to trace the
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  Speaker 1: movements of these two marine regiments, it will be necessary
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  Speaker 1: to go back over chronological ground previously covered. Division Operation
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  Speaker 1: Order eighteen DASH fifty, issued on twenty eight October to
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  Speaker 1: implement ten core OI DASH thirteen and supplementary telephone orders
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  Speaker 1: received from CORE assigned RCT seven the mission of proceeding
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  Speaker 1: from WANs On to Hamhung prepared for an advance to
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  Speaker 1: the Manchurian border one hundred thirty five miles to the north.
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  Speaker 1: RCT five was assigned a zone behind RCT seven. Plans
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  Speaker 1: for the northward advance brought up the vital problem of
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  Speaker 1: providing security for the seventy eight mile main supply route
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  Speaker 1: MSR and the parallel railway stretching along the coast from
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  Speaker 1: WANs On to Hamhung. Division orders of the twenty eight
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  Speaker 1: assigned RCT five less two five temporarily under the operational
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  Speaker 1: control of RCT IE the responsibility for the security of
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  Speaker 1: the Munschon and Yunghung areas sixteen and fifty seven miles
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  Speaker 1: north of Wanson, respectively. Company a First Tank Battalion attached
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  Speaker 1: to RCT five had orders to establish blocking positions on
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  Speaker 1: three main roads joining the MSRs from the west. RCT seven,
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  Speaker 1: after being partially issued cold weather clothing at Wansan, moved
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  Speaker 1: by road and rail to the ham Hung area during
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  Speaker 1: the last three days of October. The First Motor Transport
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  Speaker 1: Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company were attached, along with other
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  Speaker 1: reinforcing units. Since this regiment had been designated to lead
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  Speaker 1: the advance of the First Marine Division to the Manchurian border.
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  Speaker 1: RCT five completed a motor march meanwhile from its assembly
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  Speaker 1: area near Wansan to assigned positions along the Wansan Hamhung MSR.
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  Speaker 1: General almans Oi Dash fifteen thirty October had directed the
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  Speaker 1: dispatch of two marine RCTs to the ham Hung area,
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  Speaker 1: which meant that Lieutenant Colonel Murray's regiment was to follow
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  Speaker 1: RCT seven. On the thirty first, General Smith ordered him
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  Speaker 1: to advance a battalion to Chigyong, eight miles southwest of
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  Speaker 1: hem Hung. Murray selected his first battalion and directed that
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  Speaker 1: one of its companies be detached to relieve an RCT
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  Speaker 1: seven company guarding the advanced supply point at Jungpo Airfield,
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  Speaker 1: five miles southwest of hung Nam. Two additional marine units
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  Speaker 1: were assigned to assemblyaries along the MSR. The first tank
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  Speaker 1: battalion less company C attached to the first Marines, moved
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  Speaker 1: up to Muncheon and regained its company A. Since the
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  Speaker 1: landing of the eleventh Marines, less the battalions attached to RCTs,
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  Speaker 1: the Artillery Regiment minus had occupied positions in munpiong NI,
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  Speaker 1: five miles northwest of Janson. When four days passed without
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  Speaker 1: enemy contacts along the MSR, General Allman decided to expedite
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  Speaker 1: the movement. Of RCT five to the ham Hung area.
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  Speaker 1: In a conference with General Smith on two November, he
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  Speaker 1: outlined a plan for using patrols and state intead of
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  Speaker 1: blocking positions. Under this system, rct IE with elements of
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  Speaker 1: the first Tank Battalion would be made responsible for MSR
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  Speaker 1: security as far north as Munchon. The fifty four mile
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  Speaker 1: stretch between Munchon and Chigyong would be assigned to the
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  Speaker 1: Special Operations Company US Army and Korean agents, both under
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  Speaker 1: COREP control. As soon as these arrangements could be put
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  Speaker 1: into effect, RCT five would be free to advance to Hamhong.
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  Speaker 1: That same day to November, the second Battalion was released
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  Speaker 1: from operational control of rct IE and moved to Hamhong. Ironically,
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  Speaker 1: the second was also the date of the first guerrilla
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  Speaker 1: raid on the MSR. A patrol from the first Tank
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  Speaker 1: Battalion was sent by division to the aid of the
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  Speaker 1: Special Operations Company, which had reported and attack west of Munchon,
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  Speaker 1: resulting in a wound, casualty and loss of equipment. The
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  Speaker 1: Marines drove the guerrillas back into the hills Chinese and
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  Speaker 1: ten Corps zone. Red Korean guerrilla activities were overshadowed by
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  Speaker 1: confirmation of reports that organized CCF units had appeared in
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  Speaker 1: the ten Corp zone as well as on the eighth
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  Speaker 1: Army Front. After crossing the Yalu, they had secretly infiltrated
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  Speaker 1: through the mountains, marching by night and hiding by day
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  Speaker 1: from air observation. Their numbers and intentions remained a mystery
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  Speaker 1: at this date, but late in October, the eighth US
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  Speaker 1: Cavalry Regiment and the sixth Rock Division were surprised by
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  Speaker 1: Chinese in Northwest Korea and badly mauled. First hand evidence
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  Speaker 1: of CCF penetrations in northeast Korea was obtained by three
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  Speaker 1: marine officers of RCT seven Shortly after arrival in the
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  Speaker 1: Hamhung area. The regimental commander sent out reconnoitering parties in
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  Speaker 1: preparation for the northward advance on one November. The one
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  Speaker 1: to seven patrol on thirty one October consisted of a
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  Speaker 1: fire team and three jeeps led by Captain Myron E.
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  Speaker 1: Wilcox and first Lieutenants William G. Graber and John B. Wilson.
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  Speaker 1: As a result of their visit to the CP of
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  Speaker 1: the twenty six Rock Regiment of the third Rock Division
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  Speaker 1: which URCT seven was scheduled to relieve near Sudong On
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  Speaker 1: two November, the marine officers reported to their regimental headquarters
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  Speaker 1: that they had seen one Chinese prisoner. As a matter
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  Speaker 1: of fact, the Rock Regiment took sixteen Chinese prisoners in all.
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  Speaker 1: They are identified as belonging to two regiments of the
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  Speaker 1: one hundred twenty fourth CCF Division, one of the three
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  Speaker 1: divisions of the forty second CCF Army. This force had
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  Speaker 1: crossed the Yalu about sixteen October, according to Pow testimony,
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  Speaker 1: and moved southward without being observed into the chosen reservoir
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  Speaker 1: area during the following ten days. Not only was Colonel
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  Speaker 1: Litzenburg aware that he would be facing Chinese adversary in
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  Speaker 1: this area, he also suspected that they had infiltrated toward
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  Speaker 1: his left rear. He sent a patrol consisting of twenty
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  Speaker 1: men and five jeeps of Recon Company as far as
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  Speaker 1: Chigyong on the thirty first, without making any enemy contacts.
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  Speaker 1: The following morning, CORCT seven ordered Recon Company in twenty
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  Speaker 1: one jeeps to conduct a reconnaissance to the Huksu Rie area,
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  Speaker 1: approximately forty five miles northwest of Hamhung after bypassing a
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  Speaker 1: blown bridge. First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman's force dug in
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  Speaker 1: for the night four thousand, five hundred yards short of
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  Speaker 1: its objective. Shots were exchanged several times that night and
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  Speaker 1: early the following morning, with North Korean guerrillas in company strength,
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  Speaker 1: but the patrol returned with a negative report as far
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  Speaker 1: as Chinese forces were concerned. News was received on one
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  Speaker 1: November of the heavy losses taken by the First Cavalry
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  Speaker 1: Division at the hands of the Chinese in Northwest Korea.
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  Speaker 1: There was no change, however, in Corps orders calling for
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  Speaker 1: the advance of Litzenburg's regiment to the border. Coodo Ree,
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  Speaker 1: twenty three miles north of majohn Dong, was the first objective.
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  Speaker 1: The right flank of the Eighth Army was about sixty
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  Speaker 1: eight miles southwest of majohn Dong, so that RCT seven
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  Speaker 1: must advance without protection for its left flank, except for
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  Speaker 1: Division Recoon Company, which was to be relieved as soon
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  Speaker 1: as possible by RCT I. Under these circumstances, commented General
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  Speaker 1: Smith at a later date, there was no alternative except
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  Speaker 1: to continue forward in the hope that the Eighth Army
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  Speaker 1: situation would right itself, and that we would succeed in
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  Speaker 1: our efforts to close up the entire first Marine Division
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  Speaker 1: behind RCT seven. Introducing the new enemy here, it is
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  Speaker 1: hardly a digression to pause for a brief survey of
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  Speaker 1: the organization, tactics, and aims of the new enemy, who
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  Speaker 1: was about to prolong their Korean conflict by intervening on
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  Speaker 1: behalf of the beaten NKPA. The powerful, ever ready military instrument,
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  Speaker 1: which the Chinese reads knew as the People's Liberation Army PLA,
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  Speaker 1: had been forged and tempered in the fires of civil strife.
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  Speaker 1: It came into being in the late summer of nineteen
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  Speaker 1: twenty seven during the abortive Nanchang Rebellion. Following their defeat,
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  Speaker 1: the Communists found a refuge in Kiangsi Province of South
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  Speaker 1: China and gained strength as disaffected Kiomin Tang units came
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  Speaker 1: over to their side. The infant PLA managed, with difficulty
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  Speaker 1: to survive the first four bandit suppression campaigns waged by
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  Speaker 1: Chiang Kai Shek. When he launched his fifth in nineteen
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  Speaker 1: twenty three, the Chinese Reds planned the celebrated Long March,
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  Speaker 1: which has become one of their most cherished traditions. Breaking
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  Speaker 1: out of Chang's En circlemen in October nineteen thirty four,
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  Speaker 1: they took a circuit six thousand mile route to avoid
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  Speaker 1: Nationalist armies. Of the ninety thousand who started, only twenty
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  Speaker 1: thousand were left a year later when the PLA reached
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  Speaker 1: Yenan in the Shensi Province. This destination in northwest China
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  Speaker 1: gave the communists a refuge, with Mongolia and Soviet Russia
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  Speaker 1: at their backs. There, Matsee Tung and his colleagues alternately
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  Speaker 1: fought and negotiated with the government. Finally, in nineteen forty one,
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  Speaker 1: the communists and nationalists agreed to cease fighting one another
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  Speaker 1: in order to make common cause against the Japanese invaders.
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  Speaker 1: The Communists took advantage of their membership in the People's
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  Speaker 1: Political Council, a nationalist sponsored organization which theoretically united all
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  Speaker 1: factions in China against the Japanese, to continue their boring
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  Speaker 1: from within tactics. Chang's estimate of his troublesome allies was
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  Speaker 1: summed up in a quotation attributed to him in nineteen four.
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  Speaker 1: You think it is important that I have kept the
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  Speaker 1: Japanese from expanding. I tell you it is more important
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  Speaker 1: that I have kept the Communists from spreading. The Japanese
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  Speaker 1: are a disease of the skin. The Communists are a
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  Speaker 1: disease of the heart. Communist victory and civil war in
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  Speaker 1: late nineteen forty five, with the Japanese no longer a menace,
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  Speaker 1: the grapple for mastery began. Anew chen Kai Shek held
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  Speaker 1: the material and moral advantage. As a result of the
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  Speaker 1: arms and other assistants supplied by the United States. Nationalists
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  Speaker 1: controlled all the important centers of population and industry, and
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  Speaker 1: the major lines of communication. The Communists, with their backs
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  Speaker 1: to the wall, eagerly accepted the United States proposal for
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  Speaker 1: a ceasefire in January nineteen forty six. General George C. Marshall,
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  Speaker 1: a personal representative of President Truman, flew out to Nanking
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  Speaker 1: in December nineteen forty five and tried for twelve months
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  Speaker 1: to arrange a workable compromise between two a reconciable ideologies. Meanwhile,
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  Speaker 1: the Reds retrained and re equipped their forces with the
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  Speaker 1: vast supply of weapons which had fallen into their hands
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  Speaker 1: as a result of the collapse of the Japanese army
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  Speaker 1: at Manchuria in August nineteen forty five. By the spring
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  Speaker 1: of nineteen forty seven, they were ready again for war.
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  Speaker 1: They denounced the truce and recommenced military operations. From that time,
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  Speaker 1: the balance of power swung steadily in their favor. Although
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  Speaker 1: the PLA had seized the initiative, the government still had
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  Speaker 1: an army of about two million, seven hundred thousand men
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  Speaker 1: facing one million, one hundred fifty thousand reds, according to
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  Speaker 1: estimates of American military advisers in China. But Chang was
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  Speaker 1: committed to a positional warfare. His forces were dangerously overextended
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  Speaker 1: and and for reasons of prestige and political considerations, he
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  Speaker 1: hesitated to withdraw from areas of dubious military value. Mao's
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  Speaker 1: hard and realistic strategy took full advantage of these lapses.
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  Speaker 1: As a result, the Communists won the upper hand in
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  Speaker 1: Manchuria and Shantung, and by the end of the year
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  Speaker 1: had massed large forces in Central China. Early in nineteen
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  Speaker 1: forty eight, a year of decision, the PLA recaptured Jenan
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  Speaker 1: along with thousands of government troops. But the most crushing
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  Speaker 1: Communist victory of all came with the surrender of Tinan,
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  Speaker 1: the capital of Shantung, and its garrison of eighty five
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  Speaker 1: thousand to one hundred thousand nationalists. In his summary of
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  Speaker 1: Nationalists Reverses, Major General David G. Barr, senior officer of
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  Speaker 1: the United States Military Advisory Group in China, reported to
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  Speaker 1: the Department of the Army on sixteen November nineteen forty eight,
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  Speaker 1: no battle has been lost since Maya Rai due to
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  Speaker 1: lack of ammunition and equipment there. The Chinese nationalists military debacles,
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  Speaker 1: in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's
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  Speaker 1: worst leadership and many other morale destroying factors that lead
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  Speaker 1: to a complete loss of will to fight. By the
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  Speaker 1: early spring of nineteen forty nine, the military collapse of
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  Speaker 1: the Nationalists had gone so far that the enemy controlled
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  Speaker 1: the major centers of population and the railroads from Manchuria
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  Speaker 1: south to the Yangsei Valley, Nanking, Hankou, and Shanghai were
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  Speaker 1: soon to fall into the hands of communists, whose military
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  Speaker 1: strength increased every day as they captured Nationalist arms and
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  Speaker 1: were joined by nationalist deserters. Perhaps the best summary of
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  Speaker 1: the Chinese Civil War was put in a few words
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  Speaker 1: by Dean Atchison. The U S Secretary of State, the
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  Speaker 1: national armies did not have to be defeated, they disintegrated.
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  Speaker 1: In addition to the aid extended during World War II,
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  Speaker 1: Washington had authorized grants and credits to nationalis accounting to
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  Speaker 1: two billion dollars since VJ Day. Nor was American assistants
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  Speaker 1: confined to arms and monetary grants. From nineteen forty five
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  Speaker 1: to nineteen forty seven. The occupation of certain key cities
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  Speaker 1: in North China e g. Tiensen, Peiping, and Singtao, etc.
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  Speaker 1: By sizeable US Marine forces held those bases secure for
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  Speaker 1: the nationalist government and permitted the release of appreciable numbers
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  Speaker 1: of Chang's soldiers for offensive operations who would otherwise have
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  Speaker 1: been tied up in garrison type duty. The Marines, upon
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  Speaker 1: their withdrawal, were directed to turn over vast stores of
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  Speaker 1: weapons and munitions to the Chinese nationalists. In addition, the
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  Speaker 1: nationalists were sold large quantities of military and civilian war
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  Speaker 1: surplus property, with a total procurement cost of more than
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  Speaker 1: a billion dollars for a bargain price of two hundred
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  Speaker 1: thirty two million. Organization of the CCF. Although the victorious
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  Speaker 1: Army continued to be called the People's Liberation Army by
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  Speaker 1: the Chinese reads themselves. It was known as the Chinese
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  Speaker 1: Communist Forces by commentators of Western nations. At the head
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  Speaker 1: of the new police state, where the seventy two regular
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  Speaker 1: and alternate members of the Central Committee or Politbureau, formed
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  Speaker 1: at the Seventh Party Congress in nineteen forty five. This
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  Speaker 1: body consisted, for the most part of Mao's close associates
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  Speaker 1: leaders identified with the revolutionary movement from the beginning. From
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  Speaker 1: top to bottom of the Chinese state, the usual Communist
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  Speaker 1: dualism of high political and military rank prevailed. The highest
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  Speaker 1: governing body, the People's Revolutionary Military Council, consisted of leaders
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  Speaker 1: holding both positions. After they determined policies, the execution was
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  Speaker 1: left to the general headquarters of the army. Organization comprised
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  Speaker 1: a General Staff Section, a Rear Services Section, and a
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  Speaker 1: General Political Bureau. The largest CCF administrative unit was the
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  Speaker 1: Field Army, which reported directly to headquarters. Composed of two
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  Speaker 1: or more army groups, the Field Army had a small
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  Speaker 1: headquarters of its own. The Army group, as the largest
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  Speaker 1: unit encountered by UN forces, was comparable to an army
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  Speaker 1: in the American military system. CCF army groups in Korea
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  Speaker 1: consisted of two to four armies with an average total
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  Speaker 1: strength of sixty thousand to one hundred. Twenty thousand troops,
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  Speaker 1: equivalent to an American corps was the CCF Army, an
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  Speaker 1: organization including three infantry divisions and an artillery regiment. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: the average strength of a CCF army was about thirty
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  Speaker 1: thousand men. The CCF Infantry Division, with a paper strength
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  Speaker 1: of ten thousand men, averaged from seven thousand to eight
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  Speaker 1: eight thoy five hundred men in Korea, according to various
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  Speaker 1: estimates triangular and organization. It included three infantry regiments and
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  Speaker 1: an artillery battalion. Divisional units consisted of reconnaissance and engineer
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  Speaker 1: companies of about one hundred men, a one hundred and
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  Speaker 1: fifty man transport company, a one hundred man guard company,
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  Speaker 1: and a sixty man communications company. Transport companies had only
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  Speaker 1: draft animals and carts, since little motor transport was organic
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  Speaker 1: to a CCF division at that time. The CCF Infantry Regiment,
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  Speaker 1: averaging about two thy two hundred men in the field,
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  Speaker 1: broke down into the following units, three infantry battalions, an
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  Speaker 1: artillery battery of four to six guns, a mortar and
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  Speaker 1: bazuka company, a guard company, a transportation company, a medical
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  Speaker 1: unit with attached stretcher personnel often composed of impressed civilians,
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  Speaker 1: and a combined rec re connaissance and signal company. The
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  Speaker 1: CCF infantry battalion, with an authorized strength of eight hundred
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  Speaker 1: and fifty two men in an actual strength of perhaps
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  Speaker 1: seven hundred, consisted of a mortar and machine gun or
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: heavy weapons company, a signal squad, a medical squad, and
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  Speaker 1: a small battalion headquarters, in addition to the three rifle
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  Speaker 1: companies of about one hundred seventy men each. Each of
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  Speaker 1: the latter was composed of a headquarters platoon, a sixty
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  Speaker 1: millimeter mortar platoon, and three rifle platoons. The CCF Artillery
• 19:32
  Speaker 1: battalion organic to every division must be considered theoretical rather
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: than actual as far as Korean operations of nineteen fifty
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  Speaker 1: are concerned. As a rule, only a few horse drawn
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  Speaker 1: or pack howitzers were brought into action by an infantry division,
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  Speaker 1: depending chiefly on mortars. End of Chapter five, Part one
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  Speaker 1: read by Aaron Bennett