Latest / The Nation Podcasts / Preparing for the Next War on Iran | The Time of Monsters with Jeet Heer

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Preparing for the Next War on Iran | The Time of Monsters with Jeet Heer · The Nation Podcasts

• 0:01
  [SPEAKER_01]: The old world is dying, the new world struggles to be born.
• 0:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now is the time of monsters.
• 0:07
  [SPEAKER_01]: With those words from Graham Chi, I welcome you to the time of monsters podcast.
• 0:10
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm G.T.
• 0:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: here of the nation magazine.
• 0:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: This podcast is sponsored by the nation.
• 0:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now this week I want to return to this an issue that we've often discussed on this podcast, which is the danger of
• 0:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: wider regional war than released, which we saw kind of preview of in June, where I think many of us at that time feared that this was like the longstanding conflict with Israel and the United States on one side and around on the other that many of us had feared for many years.
• 0:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: It turned out to be a briefer war with the considerable restraint, particularly on the Iranian side, but it could also be a preview for a wider conflict.
• 0:48
  [SPEAKER_01]: My guest this week is a cleanup party who's the co-founder and vice president of the Quincy Institute.
• 0:54
  [SPEAKER_01]: He's been writing a lot in place like foreign policy, which I'll link to, about the fact that the war is not over.
• 1:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: That both Israel and the United States are forces that are laying the groundwork for like second match.
• 1:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the second eruption of this conflict could be very different than the first.
• 1:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: So first of all, welcome, thanks for once again being on the podcast.
• 1:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: My pleasure, good to be back.
• 1:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: So yeah, let's just lay out the broader politics with a Trump and Netanyahu and why you think as you wrote in foreign policy, we could have a war between, like any time between now and December.
• 1:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think it's first important to then understand what were the objectives of Israel in this war.
• 1:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think the three most important ones were first of all to finally get the U.S.
• 1:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: into a direct war with Iran.
• 1:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: This is something Netanyahu in particular has been pushing.
• 1:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: for decades, at least for two decades, and he finally got it.
• 1:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: But it was much more limited than I think these rallies wanted.
• 1:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: They wanted the United States to go all out against Iran and instead it was just a one-off limited to a few nuclear sites.
• 2:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think the fact that the US then pulled out of it
• 2:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: is a critical reason as to why the Israelis didn't agree to a ceasefire.
• 2:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: They were taking a lot of hits towards the end of the war, but I think they would be happy to absorb those as long as Iran was being attacked by the US.
• 2:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: But by the time the US stopped, then it wasn't worth it for the Israelis to continue the war either given the cost that they were paying.
• 2:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: So that was the first objective.
• 2:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: And it was partially successful.
• 2:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: The two other objectives were not successful.
• 2:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: One was then to decapitate the regime.
• 2:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: Not to have regime change, regime change means that you actually replace the government there.
• 2:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: There's no historical example of an successful regime change operation through air warfare alone.
• 2:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: You would really need to go in with ground troops, et cetera.
• 2:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: These rallies can't do this.
• 2:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: The US is not in the mood for that.
• 2:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: But regime collapse is actually in some ways better and cheaper because you don't take responsibility for what happens afterwards.
• 2:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: You just create chaos and you let the chaos fester.
• 3:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: And initially they had some significant successes.
• 3:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: They took out a large number of Iranian top generals, nuclear scientists, and their families incidentally, which is rarely mentioned in the Western media.
• 3:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: But within
• 3:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: eighteen or so hours, Devonians replaced them and then started firing back.
• 3:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think that the hope that these rallies had to disrupt Devon's command and control was very limited.
• 3:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the resilience of the regime took these rallies by surprise.
• 3:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: The third objective is the most important one, ultimately, which is, to reduce Iran into a country similar to Lebanon and Syria, that Israel can bomb with impunity at will
• 3:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: without American involvement.
• 3:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then pursue a strategy of mowing the grass.
• 3:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: These are these railies term themselves, meaning that every whatever is three months, six months, you just go back in your bum a little bit more to make sure that those countries never managed to rebuild their defenses, the deterrence and pose a challenge to this.
• 4:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: and be able to do so without American help, so that Israel's moving the grass is not dependent upon American goodwill or America's political talent.
• 4:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: That they clearly did not succeed with because at the end of the day, again, the Iranian retaliation, yes, these rallies was very, very costly for these rallies.
• 4:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: They were running out of interceptors towards the end, how the war continued, perhaps the hits that these rallies would be forced to absorb what had been even greater.
• 4:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think it's also clear that these railies knew they were not going to manage to get to amowing the grass strategy in just one round.
• 4:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: They would probably take one or two or three rounds to get to that point.
• 4:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: But they needed to achieve more in the first round.
• 4:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: And having started it now, they are essentially under pressure to continue in order to finish it.
• 5:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: Because if they give the Iranians too much time, they will rebuild
• 5:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: their air defense systems, perhaps by better ones.
• 5:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: They will restock their stockpile of missiles.
• 5:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: And next time Israel goes after them, they may actually be even stronger position to strike back at Israel.
• 5:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: So you can't allow the Iranians the time from these really perspective.
• 5:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: And you need to go ahead again.
• 5:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: And my prediction would be that before December, perhaps as early as end of August, these rallies may take action.
• 5:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: But the US response is going to be, and all of this is always going to be very critical.
• 5:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think one thing that would likely differ in this next war, compared to the previous war, is that in the previous war, the Iranians played the long game.
• 5:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: They could have gone harder on the missiles.
• 5:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: They didn't.
• 5:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: There are many different factors, but one of it was because they thought this is going to be a long war and that they had to prepare themselves for the endurance.
• 6:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: Instead it ended up becoming just twelve days mainly because of the US intervention.
• 6:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: In the next war, I think the Iranian calculation is going to be that they need to strike it hard and fast as possible.
• 6:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: in order to quickly dispel these rallies.
• 6:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: From the view that a moving the grass strategy with Iran can work that it is feasible, make it as costly as possible for them.
• 6:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that to me suggests that if these rallies end up taking a lot of such hits, the pressure on the US to get involved is going to be far greater than it was in the previous war.
• 6:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and as you sort of outline it, I think it's worth thinking about the different goals of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, because I think what you make clear is that Netanyahu's goal is not just a war with Iran, but a deep American involvement in a war with Iran.
• 6:58
  [SPEAKER_01]: To you know, Cheyvans that is your can't achieve on its own now Donald Trump gave support for the sort of quick war in June But does he like actually want is he up for you know like a certain large-scale war you know along the lines of the American George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan
• 7:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think so.
• 7:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: Again, with Trump, it seems like almost anything is possible.
• 7:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: He could have gone to Tehran and make a peace deal, and he could have also gone ahead and bumped the nuclear facilities.
• 7:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think it still is valid to say that Trump loves military action, but abhor's war, meaning that he doesn't want to get involved in anything that is long term,
• 7:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: that can drag on, in which he doesn't have a very quick exit from, that he doesn't control the end of it, but he's very keen on using military force in a fast, quick way to establish how powerful the US is and Trump's own dominance.
• 8:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: But anything that drags out is a completely different story.
• 8:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: And this is where the significant mismatch between Trump and Netanyahu's interests really was made clear.
• 8:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: I would argue that there's an even clearer divergence between the US as
• 8:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: and Israel's interests in the sense that I don't think this was actually serving U.S.
• 8:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: interests at all to engage in this war and give these rallies, keep on giving these rallies a green light to do things that then changes the situation and reduces America's options and increasingly turns America's options into more and more negative ones.
• 8:38
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think Trump, to a large extent, closed the door for diplomacy and now his only options is to go into another war again or pretend that his first war was utterly successful.
• 8:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: instead of actually being also able to have a diplomatic option.
• 8:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: That can be revived, but in the short term, I think it has been killed by Trump's own actions.
• 8:56
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 8:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 8:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: I know.
• 8:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, it's sort of the crap that Trump has fallen into is one of escalation.
• 9:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, it's hard to see options that the United States has other than escalation, even if, you know, like in theory, Trump wants to rule out a larger war,
• 9:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: you know like if you keep having a string of these small words like what does it lead to yeah exactly exactly absolutely so in some ways like it does seem like trump himself is boxed in and now a more recent piece that you also wrote is on the issue of the role of the Europeans in this which I think is like very interesting and very important and I think maybe not reported enough
• 9:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: in the sort of American press.
• 9:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: But do you want to talk a little bit about the kind of diplomatic moves that Europeans are making, which are very likely to feed into this push for a second war?
• 9:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes.
• 9:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Europeans just triggered the snapback provision after you went.
• 9:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was a element as a mechanism that was created in the JCPOA that would allow any JCPOA member
• 10:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: to snap back all previous UN sanctions on Iran by making the argument that Iran is in non-compliance with the JCP, which is funny, mindful of the fact that there's nothing left of the JCPOA.
• 10:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: The US just bombed Iran is we'll start at a war.
• 10:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Europeans have not lived up to the JCPOA in themselves, but now they're using this to say that the Iran is out of compliance, which are technically can also be correct, but it's just like, you start paying rent for a house that doesn't exist anymore.
• 10:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: And ostensibly they're triggering this, first of all, they're doing it because it expires in October.
• 10:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: So this is essentially their last chance to trigger it.
• 10:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they're triggering this because they want to press Iran to restart negotiations with the US and intensify access for the IEA inside of Iran, which on the surface sounds pretty reasonable, right?
• 10:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: You know, restart negotiations, et cetera.
• 11:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: But when you scratch the surface when you realize that
• 11:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you're objective actually is to restart negotiations for the purpose of finding a diplomatic solution.
• 11:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: This is not the right strategy.
• 11:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: First of all, asking the Iranians to come to the table when the Iranians were at the table.
• 11:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: but these railies and the Americans blew the table up.
• 11:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: And you're not asking the US side to stop bombing.
• 11:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's kind of an imbalance to approach.
• 11:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Iranians have to come back to the table despite the fact that they got bombed, but there's no demand from the Europeans that they shouldn't be any more bombings.
• 11:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: Moreover, I think it's important to recognize the two sides are very far away from each other on the core issue here, which is enrichment.
• 11:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Iranians are still not
• 11:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: in the mood of capitalating on enrichment.
• 11:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: They believe that it's there right, sovereign right to be able to have enrichment on their own solar.
• 11:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: And Trump initially was in favor of accepting some of that limited, but on the pressure from Israel, you went back to the position of insisting was a enrichment.
• 12:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: We've seen no movement on this issue.
• 12:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: to start negotiations again with the third day window, and the very limited patients that Trump has, combined with pressure from Israel, to stick to zero enrichment, is all the ingredients you need to have in order to ensure that diplomacy fails.
• 12:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if diplomacy fails, then the pressure on Trump to take more military action re-agitites significantly.
• 12:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: So if you're pressing to quickly go to talks,
• 12:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: that are extremely unlikely to succeed.
• 12:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: And in essence, you are pressing to quickly go to milk reaction.
• 12:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you want the diplomatic solution, then you should be working towards making sure that the circumstances are conducive to diplomatic success instead of putting a very short timeline for talks where the ingredients are clearly pointing in the wrong direction.
• 13:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: Moreover, you know, the Iranians do have a concern about collaboration with the IAA.
• 13:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: They have suspicion.
• 13:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: They claim that they have evidence that the IAA shared information, the names and the whereabouts of Iran's nuclear scientists that these railies then, I think, killed nineteen of them, plus their families.
• 13:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if they now give the IA information of what where they think or where they know that the stockpile of sixty percent enriched Uranium is, well, that only provides these radies and the United States with a target of where to bomb next, particularly mindful of the fact that there is no European demand that there shouldn't be any more bombings.
• 13:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: So, again, all of this, I think points to a scenario in which I find it very hard to believe that this is actually done in order to succeed diplomatically.
• 13:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: I fear that there's another explanation.
• 13:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: which is that the European's actually want an escalation, because Europe's perspective on this has changed dramatically.
• 13:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: geopolitical circumstances have turned Europe into something very, very different from what it was pre-toe-toe-toe.
• 14:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I think that's where I had that you wanted to take the concern conversation, because I think people will follow this issue for a long time will kind of have memories that the European intervention in this was often as a check against American and Israeli aggression, particularly in the period of the presidency of George W. Bush.
• 14:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: where the Europeans kind of set up these mechanisms as a way of preventing, what was at the time pushed by people like Dick Cheney for a war with Iran to have these diplomatic structures in place.
• 14:38
  [SPEAKER_01]: But I think it's less well understood, and which I think you're writing brings out is that Europe itself has changed, and has a very different incentive structure and a very different view of what its role is, both in the Middle East and with regard to the US.
• 14:53
  [SPEAKER_01]: You want to kind of lay that out?
• 14:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, and so, as you mentioned, those were followed this no very well that the Europeans played a very important role in trying to make sure that these, this issue in particular was resolved peacefully.
• 15:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: And in fact, the whole E-free constellation did not exist before, it was created.
• 15:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: for the explicit purpose of preventing George W. Bush from invading Iran after having disastrously invaded Iraq.
• 15:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Europeans injected themselves sought a diplomatic solution.
• 15:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: In fact, it created a lot of tensions inside of Europe.
• 15:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: Because suddenly, three European states, the E-III, Germany, France and the UK, essentially elevated themselves as the leaders of Europe as a whole of foreign policy.
• 15:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: which upset other countries, such as Italy and Spain and Poland who were like, okay, so are we being relegated to like a second level status in Europe?
• 15:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: But nevertheless, its intent was to find peaceful solutions.
• 16:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, because of a dramatically changed geopolitical circumstance, I think the European calculation has changed.
• 16:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: First of all,
• 16:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: Iran was never seen as a direct threat.
• 16:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: The threat was war with Iran.
• 16:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: The threat was Iranian nuclear weapon, and that could be resolved diplomatically.
• 16:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: After Iran's support for Russia and Ukraine, the perspective on Iran has changed dramatically in Europe.
• 16:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: Iran is seen as a state that is supporting another state that is increasingly described in Europe rightly or wrongly as an existential threat to Europe.
• 16:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think escalating and pushing this toward a confrontation is a way of punishing Iran for its role in Ukraine, inflicting a cost on it, because of that.
• 16:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: Secondly, because of the fact that Iran is seen as a threat, and Iran is increasingly becoming unimportant to Europe, from economic standpoint, as a result of years of sanctions.
• 17:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: Before the Europeans had
• 17:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: hesitance about further escalation because they were importing your Iranian oil, they were importing Iranian goods, and they had trade relations, and oil in particular was important.
• 17:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: All of that is now gone, and it's not going to come back.
• 17:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: So what is important is to find some sort of a way of getting along with the Trump administration, given it's very, very aggressive posture towards Europe.
• 17:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: throwing Iran essentially under a bus, aligning yourselves with a hard line elements in the Trump administration that do want to escalation with Iran.
• 17:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it's calculated to be a way of endearing themselves to the Trump administration in the hope that it will help stabilize the transatlantic relationship given the very, very unprecedented strains that it currently is under
• 18:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: due to Trump's approach to Europe and to Russia and to Ukraine.
• 18:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think it has much more to do with that, with the intent of escalating rather than what is now is being presented as if triggering this actually is something that actually helps in diplomacy.
• 18:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that's right.
• 18:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it doesn't seem like we often talk about sort of like, you know, Pharker's America or Trump's isolation's America that is unconcerned with sort of diplomacy.
• 18:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: But it seems to me that, you know, whether one wants to blame the Russian invasion of Ukraine or other factors that we have seen a kind of Pharker's Europe.
• 18:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: I kind of, you know, like a Europe that has kind of circled the wagons and is mainly concerned with a kind of maintain maintenance of NATO and is linked to, you know, sacrifice other considerations.
• 18:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: And to my mind, that's a very interesting because the Europeans did, like, you know, not too long ago under the presidency of George W. Bush act as a kind of like restraining factor.
• 19:07
  [SPEAKER_01]: in American foreign policy and it's a significant change, that's no longer there.
• 19:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you have any other thoughts on that?
• 19:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: You're absolutely right, and it's very, I have to say bad for the US itself.
• 19:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: The United States need to Europe that everyone's in a while can check America's bad impulses.
• 19:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: As it did, unfortunately, unsuccessfully, but it nevertheless tried in two thousand three when the US
• 19:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: was going to go into Iraq.
• 19:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: I wish we had listened to the Europeans.
• 19:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think America would have been in a much better position if they had listened to the Europeans and not invaded Iraq, not set the stage for the creation of ISIS, not set the stage for this massive instability that followed, as well as the extremism that festered as a result of this.
• 20:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: But now we have a Europe that increasingly is acting like a vessel
• 20:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: of the United States.
• 20:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: What's most important is to be in the good grace of the United States, rather than actually asserting a level of independence for the betterment of both the US and Europe.
• 20:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think it is in the US's interest to be of us.
• 20:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Let alone in the interest of the Europeans to be of us.
• 20:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: But we don't have that.
• 20:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: We don't have that on Gaza.
• 20:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: We don't have that on Iran, and we certainly don't have that on Ukraine, because then the rules are even reversed.
• 20:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's where the Europeans are the most militant, even though they're not the ones that are actually providing troops or the majority of the funding for that war.
• 20:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I would say that you still have some countries, Spain, on Gaza, France as well, to serve extent on Israel, Palestine, that show shadows of what you're up used to be, but it is still not really what you used
• 20:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: Europe used to be.
• 20:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: I'm sure you remember the speech of the French Foreign Minister at the time, Vilepat, and the Security Council against the invasion of Iraq, which is one of the first rare occasions in which the speech got standing orvation as an applause.
• 21:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's actually not permitted in the room of the Security Council, but it was a historic speech.
• 21:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: That Europe no longer exists.
• 21:17
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, no.
• 21:19
  [SPEAKER_01]: I think this clarifies why we're in a much more dangerous position, because some of the brakes and restraints are no longer there.
• 21:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I just wanted to, like, just on a final point of this, because you had this quote, which I think people really need to understand for the German Chancellor about what Israel is doing on behalf of Europe.
• 21:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I really did kick it.
• 21:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you remember the quote?
• 21:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, and then I said at the end of the piece, don't take it for me if you don't buy my analysis totally fine.
• 21:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: Explain to me how we should understand that when the Israeli is launched in a war of aggression and nuclear weapons states attacking and non-nuclear weapons states without having been attacked in the middle of negotiations that German chancellor came out and said Israel is doing Europe's duty work for it Yeah, I mean to going from being a country that did everything it could valiantly to prevent war to endorsing it
• 22:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: You have to explain what happened here.
• 22:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: You don't have to buy my analysis.
• 22:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: But having said that, you cannot put that next to yes, your peers are trying to prevent water.
• 22:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: Your peers are trying to find a diplomatic solution.
• 22:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: It just doesn't work out.
• 22:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, no, no, absolutely.
• 22:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, what I wanted to now get to is what can be done to prevent this?
• 22:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: Because if the Europeans are not acting as the fake.
• 22:42
  [SPEAKER_01]: And in fact, I think there's a real argument
• 22:44
  [SPEAKER_01]: that they're acting as an accelerant.
• 22:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, like, well, what are, you know, the actual breaks because when doesn't see, you know, certainly from other countries in the Middle East, there hasn't been a willingness to hold the U.S.
• 23:01
  [SPEAKER_01]: or Israel in check.
• 23:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Israel has successfully reduced neighbors like Syria and Lebanon to like a position where the
• 23:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: you know, they can't really resist.
• 23:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: So so I mean, like, what what what checks can we possibly imagine on, you know, like what I think you and I both agree would be a catastrophic war.
• 23:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think ultimately what it comes down to is really how the US reacts to this.
• 23:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Europeans cannot start to war on their own and these railies and they wouldn't be part of the war, I believe.
• 23:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: These railies cannot fight this war without the United States.
• 23:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: This is the thing that is important to understand.
• 23:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: There's a lot of talk about how Israel is establishing its hegemony in the Middle East.
• 23:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: And to certain extent, it is trying to exert military dominance.
• 23:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: You know, a normal hedge amount by definition needs to be able to fight on its own.
• 23:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: You're not really a great power or a hedge amount if you're thirty percent of your military budget is being paid for someone else and you actually cannot defend yourself unless a superpower intervenes and puts up all kinds of air defense shields around your country.
• 24:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: So this is a country that is trying to get the benefits of hegemony while the United States is paying the cost for it.
• 24:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: And part of the reason I think you're seeing at a very fast and strong reaction on the maga rights against this form of relationship between United States and Israel is precisely because of a clear recognition.
• 24:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's long time been there, but perhaps it was more politically comfortable for them to ignore it.
• 24:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: That Israel is the country that has most likely to drag the United States into another war in the Middle East.
• 24:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: and that the United States is paying the line share of the cost of both the war with Iran, but also the genocide that Israel is committing in Gaza.
• 24:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: The culmination of these two things, the risk of dragging the US into war, the matter in which it is trying to box in the president and the matter in which this is costing the US a lot, has led to scenario in which a lot of voices on the right that never would have been considered the anti-Israel and still do not believe themselves to be anti-Israel.
• 25:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: Nevertheless, believe that this is not compatible in any way, shape a form with any variation, any conceivable variation of America first form policy.
• 25:28
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, can we put some names to like this distendency?
• 25:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I would, you know, say, certainly Tucker Carlson, Stephen Bannon, but, but like, how are we seeing this play out like politically or in this course?
• 25:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: Tucker Carlson, as you mentioned, Steve Bannon has been very, very explicit on his show.
• 25:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: Kurt Mills and Andrew Day at the American Conservative is a very central voice in all of this.
• 25:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: A lot of other conservatives that may not have the same platform but have the ears of important individuals in the administration.
• 26:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then, of course, you look at the polls and you see that young Republicans have shifted dramatically on this issue as well.
• 26:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's more of a demographic change rather than a party change at this point.
• 26:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: young people regardless of whether they're Republican or Democrats tend to have a very different view on this matter compared to America's sixty-five and
• 26:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, and particularly Republican, sixty-five enough.
• 26:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: Because I, I, I'm concerned.
• 26:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, yeah, I'm Democrats in general.
• 26:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, there's certainly, there's some age difference, but I think even older Democrats are.
• 26:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's only as I'm curious to see whether that is because they truly have shifted or because now there's no longer a Democratic office and has a result that's more comfortable for them to.
• 26:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: I'm sure it is a combination of the two because that demographic tends to be much more
• 26:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: party loyal.
• 26:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: So they go where the party is kind of going about going with their president, whereas the younger Americans, which I think is very interesting and ultimately potentially very positive development is much more loyal to ideas and ideals rather than parties and even individuals, which is very very interesting.
• 27:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: So this type of party loyalty and discipline, identity of a party does not exist amongst the younger Americans at all.
• 27:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, no.
• 27:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: It is a very interesting shift.
• 27:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: And as you say, if you listen to the sort of podcast or news outlets that are popular among young people on the right, there's a lot of voices.
• 27:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: that are very critical of this.
• 27:44
  [SPEAKER_01]: And if you suggest on the Democratic side with older Democrats, it is a matter of part of similarly.
• 27:49
  [SPEAKER_01]: It does seem to me that if you had like a few prominent voices that were coming out of speaking against this coming war,
• 27:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: you would get like that half of America mobilized along with the Republicans being split.
• 28:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: So that's just a very interesting political dynamic where it would make someone like Trump very cautious, you know, like someone who wants a quick, easy war, but does that want to be seen as like dragging America into like a large costly war?
• 28:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: So is that the sort of like political coalition that can be built?
• 28:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think so, as I think, the most important element of the coalition, if it happens in the next six months, is still going to be the people on the rights.
• 28:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think White House will care that much about where the Democrats are on this.
• 28:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: But there is a perception, of course, and I think, to certain extent, is a perception that is actively being promoted by the Lindsey Graham kind of Republicans, which is, look, that word that's military strike, that
• 28:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: Trump conducted was super successful, all of the predictions that it would lead to a large regional war was not true.
• 28:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: So there's been a lot of scared, mongering about what war actually would mean.
• 28:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: We can go back to a world in which, you know, every once in a while, we can take military action and they will have no negative consequences.
• 29:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: Moreover, it didn't cost Trump anything significant with his base.
• 29:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that is a lot of wishful thinking.
• 29:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: The cost of the base actually was there.
• 29:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: It didn't end up occurring very visible.
• 29:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: for a couple reasons.
• 29:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: First of all, it was a military strike and he stopped it and it didn't lead to a long war.
• 29:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: Had that thing gone on for four or five weeks, had American body bags come home, I'm sure that a lot of his magazine support would have collapsed.
• 29:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: More of it has happened six months into his presidency.
• 29:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: He was still not honeymoon, but nevertheless, this is very, very different.
• 29:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: Had it been two and a half years into his presidency.
• 29:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: Those factors, I think, reduced the political cost to think that that then means that he can go ahead and start new wars and it will be fine and Maga will be okay, where I think is a huge mistake.
• 29:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think there are people in the White House who fully recognize this.
• 30:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: But the question really will be if he manages to resist the pressure from these ratings.
• 30:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: And so far,
• 30:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it would be fair to say that he has shown a greater ability to resist Israel than Biden did, and the bar is very low, what he's not been able to do is to sustain and know to Israel.
• 30:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: They keep on pressing, and eventually it seems that the pattern is that he caves it.
• 30:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if he caves it on this one, it will have very significant implications.
• 30:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I think that's a very good point.
• 30:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: And maybe it's something that we should think about in terms of Trump's foreign policy and the limits of him as a president.
• 30:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like it does not seem.
• 30:49
  [SPEAKER_01]: And once he's just in Ukraine, Russia as well, that he doesn't have any sustainability to carry through a policy.
• 30:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's very easily pressured by
• 30:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: whoever is the last person to talk to their work.
• 31:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: And so it's like, to me, that's one problem.
• 31:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the other problem I want to raise with you is like, you know, like any sort of offram will have to involve diplomacy of some sort.
• 31:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that there's a lot of evidence that this is just not an investigation that does
• 31:19
  [SPEAKER_01]: diplomacy.
• 31:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I think one could have made that same critique of Biden.
• 31:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: But in Trump's case, there's an added factor that the whole sort of attitude is almost anti-diplomatic.
• 31:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: It is a one sort of like, you know, American swagger or showmanship of the sort of that we saw at the, you know, last time reading, with not really the sort of you know, diplomatic preparation.
• 31:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, like, when you can give all sorts of examples, I'll mention
• 31:44
  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, the American ambassador to Turkey at a recent meeting in a recent press conference in Lebanon, you know, told the Lebanese reporter is, you know, to not be animalistic and to become civilized, and that caused a huge problem also the current issue with Denmark, where
• 32:01
  [SPEAKER_01]: Apparently, some of Trump's cronies are in Greenland trying to stir up a secessionist movement.
• 32:07
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is because, you know, Denmark is like of all the NATO countries, aside from the, you know, the most, you know, the pro-verk.
• 32:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
• 32:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: And they call the American diplomats in to have a talk about this.
• 32:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: So it does seem like like Trump's administration the way they do do.
• 32:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: They don't do diplomacy.
• 32:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: And to me, like, that seems like a major hurdle.
• 32:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, I agree with you.
• 32:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: I have to say, however,
• 32:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: And this is in no way a ship of form, a defense of what the Trump administration is doing, you know, claiming Greenland and things of these nature.
• 32:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: To me is a manifestation of a desire to withdraw from global hegemony in order to triple down on hemispheric judgment, which I think is highly problematic.
• 32:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's not the size of the empire that it's the problem.
• 32:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's the empire that it's the problem.
• 32:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I have to say this.
• 33:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I say this way European had, since I grew up in Europe, what on earth are Europeans thinking?
• 33:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it's an illegal invasion, it was wrong, there's no defending it, et cetera, et cetera.
• 33:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: But they just rushed blindly into the arms of a transatlantic relationship with the assumption that Biden represented the future of America.
• 33:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: This counting any likelihood of Trump coming back.
• 33:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: This counting the fatigue in the American public when it comes to this type of foreign policy over extension or a war with nuclear power Russia.
• 33:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then essentially created a worldview in which
• 33:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: America is this, can do no wrong.
• 33:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's your ultimate friend.
• 33:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: Everything is fine.
• 33:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: All focus has to be on Russia.
• 33:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: Trump comes in and he actually starts claiming European territory.
• 34:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: and is engaged in the kind of things that you just mentioned.
• 34:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the Europeans cannot wrap their heads around how could that be and how could they not have foreseen or at a minimum, how could they not have a strategy that at least had some sort of contingency readiness of things of this kind happening, mindful of the fact that you really had to be blind, not to see that there was a significant likelihood that Trump would come back to.
• 34:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, no.
• 34:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's absolutely the case.
• 34:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, if you want to think of, so it's a strategic blindness.
• 34:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: I did think like, you know, even before Trump was elected in twenty fifteen, I thought the wisest course of action would have been for the Europeans to be thinking about getting more independent foreign policy, moving beyond NATO and having some sort of European defense
• 34:49
  [SPEAKER_01]: They did not choose that path.
• 34:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: And in some ways, NATO has become this kind of moral hazard, which has tied the Europeans to a superpower that is often, you know, reckless or unreliable, but they are not willing to do what it takes to, you know, we know away from that.
• 35:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, so yeah, I think you're right in saying that there's a problem that goes well beyond Trump of the sort of, you know, about seasons of the European policy elite.
• 35:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, on a final note,
• 35:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: I want to think we haven't talked too much about the Iranian side but there's something I've been reading about and I'm curious on your take about this because there are some people in I think Iranian public opinion is a fracturing after the sort of unification of that came from the war and there are some indications that there are political movements among the reformers to like themselves say like let's just move away in return
• 35:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you think that there's any possibility of like that, a change in the dynamic, or do you think that the sort of more hard-line position is going to continue to hold?
• 35:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: So here's the thing where I think that makes the belief that they would just give up on enrichment really unfeasible.
• 36:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: In order for them to think that it necessitates that there is a belief on their end
• 36:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: that they can end this confrontation by keeping in on enrichment.
• 36:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: And reality is there's no evidence that that is the case.
• 36:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: Even if they were to stop enrichment this issue would go away because at the end of the day, it's not enrichment that is the driving force of Israel and Iran's rivalry.
• 36:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: It is one element of it.
• 36:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's a dangerous element of it.
• 36:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: Israel wants, as I said earlier on, is to turn Iran into a country that cannot challenge Israel.
• 36:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: And right now, these raides actually can make a very strong case that even without enrichment, Iran's missile capabilities is a major threat to them, because it actually is an effective deterrent.
• 36:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: So if the cable and enrichment did the method immediately is going to be what you can't have a missile program either.
• 37:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then later on probably they're not allowed to have kitchen I've seen.
• 37:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: So there is no belief that there is an end to this if they came on enrichment because the root of the conflict is not enrichment.
• 37:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: Enrichment is one of the symptoms of the conflict, not a root of the conflict.
• 37:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, there's some elements on the reformists out that came out in the letter urging for accepting zero enrichment.
• 37:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they actually became quite controversial and were pushed back by a lot of other reformists.
• 37:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: Not because there isn't a desire to find a diplomatic exit out of this.
• 37:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's just that the symptom of the problem is not where the solution of the problem lies.
• 37:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: You have to go to the root of the problem.
• 37:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: And Iván at the end of the day also has now a stronger case perhaps to make that it needs to have some deterrent capabilities.
• 37:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh no, I did it.
• 37:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's absolutely true.
• 37:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: And it was attacked.
• 37:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, it was attacked.
• 37:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: And non-nuclear state attacked by two nuclear power states in the middle of negotiations.
• 38:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: Have a pretty compelling case for any of the deterrence.
• 38:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: Perhaps enrichment and nuclear is not the deterrence.
• 38:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: But what is the guarantee from their end that if they capitulate on that point, the pressure will not shift.
• 38:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: and zero in on their other elements of deterrence.
• 38:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: What would actually end this conflict?
• 38:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: And you can't convince that falling short on an investment would end the conflict.
• 38:28
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that's absolutely compelling.
• 38:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think to me, there's always the major argument against the first war, which is that the only, like, absolutely increases the logic of Iran to develop a nuclear weapons.
• 38:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: But on that, rather, it's sovereign to, I would have, like, till the party see once again,
• 38:45
  [SPEAKER_01]: being on the program and I would encourage listeners to read the writing that I'll provide in the links to the show notes but also to be thinking about politically ways in which we can start mobilizing to let American politicians know that a second war against Iran would not be something that the population supports.
• 39:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you so much for having me.