Latest / No Way Out / Thinking Beyond the Battlefield: Lessons From John Boyd's Impact on Marine Corps Thinking with GI Wilson | Ep 27
Transcript
- 0:21Mark McGrath: So, gi Wilson, thanks for coming on.
- 0:23Mark McGrath: No Way Out, we'll dive right into it.
- 0:26Mark McGrath: I want to take you back to 1979.
- 0:28Mark McGrath: I won't tell you where I was or how old I was then, but you're a young officer and you're an infantry officer and you meet this retired Air Force Colonel that may well have been from another planet, named Colonel John Boyd.
- 0:46Mark McGrath: What was that like?
- 0:50GI Wilson: When I first met him, he definitely was a force of nature.
- 0:54GI Wilson: It was very, very interesting because we were from two different worlds He was from the aviation community and Air Force and I was an infantry ground officer.
- 1:07GI Wilson: The tween shall never meet between the pilots and the ground officers.
- 1:15GI Wilson: It was very, very interesting In the conversation with him.
- 1:19GI Wilson: It was like being in a dogfight, except that being a ground officer had never been in a dogfight before.
- 1:28GI Wilson: So it was a very interactive and constantly changing experience, because I would take a particular approach to an issue and all of a sudden he would switch and start looking at the issue from another perspective.
- 1:53GI Wilson: Then at times he would be arguing my position and I couldn't figure out what was going on.
- 1:59GI Wilson: What he was doing was that he was looking at things from a very multidisciplinary approach.
- 2:07GI Wilson: Back then He called it through a prism.
- 2:11GI Wilson: It was very, very exciting because it was fun to see someone who could see an issue or a problem from multiple perspectives and then pick out common things from those multiple perspectives and pull them together.
- 2:32Mark McGrath: So Boyd comes and appears As the story goes.
- 2:36Mark McGrath: at this point he's retired from the Air Force and he's giving a briefing called Patterns of Conflict to anyone who will listen.
- 2:46Mark McGrath: Apparently some Marines did.
- 2:48Mark McGrath: I guess now Boyd was not some magician that showed up and was like some kind of wizard.
- 2:56Mark McGrath: He was tapping into something that had already begun in the Marine Corps that you were very much a part of.
- 3:02Mark McGrath: What was he tapping into and what gave it a lot of gas to build it into a really powerful movement?
- 3:11GI Wilson: Boyd's connection to the Marine Corps was through.
- 3:14GI Wilson: My experience was through General Gray and Mike Wiley.
- 3:21GI Wilson: They made that connection.
- 3:23GI Wilson: We had been working on a concept of war fighting referred to today as maneuver warfare.
- 3:30GI Wilson: Though we did not care for the term maneuver warfare, it was more akin to fighting smart or audacity warfare.
- 3:39GI Wilson: There were some of the terms that we used back then And Boyd's way of adjusting to constantly changing situations, in other words, leveraging chaos, leveraging uncertainty, being able to work in an environment was the certain amount of ambiguity and realizing that the enemy has a vote as well, instead of something just being pumped into a computer and expecting the enemy to behave in a particular way.
- 4:10GI Wilson: We were more concerned about the enemy's ability to exercise its vote in a conflict, in other words, impose its will upon us.
- 4:22GI Wilson: And how do we impose our will upon the enemy?
- 4:26GI Wilson: And Boyd, from his fighter pilot experience, had developed for lack of a better term structured professional judgment tools, and back then it was referred to as the Oodaloop.
- 4:38GI Wilson: Unfortunately, it's been simplified way too much today And as a result of that, we learned to adjust our first decision with our second decision, and we also learned to be very, very creative in how we approach a problem.
- 4:55GI Wilson: If something was successful once, boyd taught us, don't do it again two or three times in the row because you become very, very predictable.
- 5:05GI Wilson: So it was using that uncertainty and that novelty that comes out of a situation where you just don't know exactly what's going to happen.
- 5:14GI Wilson: You have an intent but it doesn't always play out the way that you wanted to.
- 5:19GI Wilson: And that fit very much into our thinking, our warfighting thinking, our maneuver war for mindset, being able to be agile, being able to survive in an environment that's constantly changing.
- 5:40Mark McGrath: So it's not unlike a lot of business situations where people think before the consultant showed up, nothing ever happened and it was like a ship adrift with no rudder and no captain.
- 5:50Mark McGrath: But the Marine Corps is not like that, as many successful businesses are not like that.
- 5:55Mark McGrath: Somebody with another perspective, like a John Boyd, came in and incited thinking, incited creativity, incited collaboration and it helped accelerate them with the theories that they had already begun, like the direction that they wanted to go to get better and more innovative.
- 6:15Mark McGrath: Is that an accurate restatement?
- 6:18GI Wilson: I think for me one of the most significant things about Boyd was that he was from outside the system.
- 6:24GI Wilson: In other words, he was looking in or looking down And in my perspective, from a ground officer, it was kind of like looking through a soda straw at the challenges before us.
- 6:38GI Wilson: And Boyd was on the outside, he wasn't part of our mindset or our group think and he was able to teach us to begin to consider the possibility that we may have been working the wrong problems.
- 6:53GI Wilson: Are we working the right issue?
- 6:56GI Wilson: In other words, take more of a holistic approach and being able to look at a situation and say this is what we want to happen, but what are we going to do if it doesn't quite play out that way?
- 7:10GI Wilson: And Boyd would use this famous description of pumping energy in and pumping energy out and dumping energy, and the one that really struck me.
- 7:21GI Wilson: He says sometimes you don't do anything at all.
- 7:27GI Wilson: He says you just give them the silence treatment and he says that can drive them right up a wall.
- 7:32GI Wilson: So very, very interesting.
- 7:34GI Wilson: It wasn't always doing something.
- 7:38GI Wilson: It was more of adjusting your first decision with your second, doing analysis, than a synthesis and going back and testing it again.
- 7:51GI Wilson: Like doing analysis, it was a constant updating.
- 7:56GI Wilson: Instead of saying, okay, the objectives over here, take that objective and consolidate on the high ground, what happens if you only get halfway to the objective.
- 8:08GI Wilson: What do you do then?
- 8:11GI Wilson: And Boyd was very, very good at being able to stand outside or what we found out was a closed system, and say you need to be able to gain perspective.
- 8:26GI Wilson: And that was very, very interesting.
- 8:29GI Wilson: And Boyd would be very, very helpful in tearing a problem apart, disaggregating it.
- 8:38GI Wilson: He had a brief call creation, destruction, and you would take a challenge and you would break it down into component parts and then you would reassemble it new and creative ways.
- 8:53GI Wilson: It may be the same old tactic, technique and procedures, but you use it in a way it's never been used before.
- 9:01GI Wilson: So it was a matter of dealing with somebody who could.
- 9:06GI Wilson: As Boyd would say, you can never measure the system with the system, and that's what we were doing.
- 9:15GI Wilson: We were constantly measuring our system, our performance, by what we thought the standards in the criteria should be.
- 9:24GI Wilson: And again, as I say, we were looking through a soda straw and he was able to see the entire horizon.
- 9:31GI Wilson: So again, it's very, very important to be able to step outside and realize there's a vast universe out there And of course, in that universe there's a lot of unexpected opportunities and also a lot of uncertainties.
- 9:49GI Wilson: Boyd would say you want to be able to see opportunities, create opportunities, leverage opportunities And in some cases you want to be able to walk away from an opportunity.
- 11:01GI Wilson: Sometimes that is more effective than seizing an opportunity.
- 11:10Mark McGrath: So when you're only looking internally or inwardly and as a system cannot I mean a system will only validate itself if it's looking inwardly is it that we forget that the enemy also has a vote or that competitors also have a vote?
- 11:23Mark McGrath: Is that disregarded when you're doing that?
- 11:26GI Wilson: We constantly do that.
- 11:27GI Wilson: Boyd was very good at helping us realize that we need to focus on the enemy, not on terrain, not on a bridge, not on a crossroads, not on a hill.
- 11:40GI Wilson: We got very terrain focused because the terrain was easy to deal with.
- 11:47GI Wilson: It didn't move, it didn't go anywhere.
- 11:49GI Wilson: We knew where it was on the map.
- 11:50GI Wilson: We didn't know where the enemy was on the map.
- 11:53GI Wilson: So Boyd says you need to focus on the enemy, not on terrain.
- 12:00GI Wilson: And also, there is sometimes a misperception that Boyd was anti-technology.
- 12:06GI Wilson: He wasn't anti-technology, but he also pointed out that technology cannot always be the solution.
- 12:14GI Wilson: He said that people come first, then ideas and hardware, and that people and ideas are really what win wars in the way you need to enter into a competitive environment.
- 12:31GI Wilson: He would point out that the over reliance on technology has always been something that we have to deal with.
- 12:40GI Wilson: For example, everybody uses GPS today.
- 12:44GI Wilson: What happens if GPS goes out?
- 12:46GI Wilson: What do you do then?
- 12:49GI Wilson: Well, we take out our old linseed compass and use it, or we'd use dead reckoning.
- 12:56GI Wilson: So again, you need to realize and we didn't at that point what our challenges was.
- 13:06GI Wilson: And at that time we weren't focusing on the enemy or the competition.
- 13:11GI Wilson: We were focusing on products, basically You find in the marketplace, instead of focusing on what the competition was.
- 13:19GI Wilson: We would look at it and say, well, we've got to make a better car, all right.
- 13:28Mark McGrath: And.
- 13:29GI Wilson: Boyd would say but what kind of car do people want?
- 13:33GI Wilson: You're busy looking at the car you have and trying to make it better, but is that the car that people want?
- 13:41GI Wilson: And you go and he says that's like focusing on the enemy or the competition, saying how are you going to get ahead of that Finding out?
- 13:51GI Wilson: He would call it the competitive market at times.
- 14:02Mark McGrath: So you think of the context of what became known as the maneuver movement, the thinking that was already occurring in the Marine Corps.
- 14:10Mark McGrath: That had a connection with what Boyd was doing.
- 14:13Mark McGrath: And this was right after Vietnam, which was very much driven from the top down, very much a technology capital tonnage approach.
- 14:22Mark McGrath: I've read in the archives where he has handwritten notes that it's not about hardware and logistics.
- 14:28Mark McGrath: If it's about hardware and logistics, well when every time, but we don't And you can't wage wars because you say terrain doesn't win war, wage wars, machines don't wage wars.
- 14:39Mark McGrath: And Boyd was very famous for saying that people wage war and they use their mind.
- 14:45Mark McGrath: So that was really the climate of the military in those days, correct?
- 14:51Mark McGrath: I mean, he was tapping into some.
- 14:53Mark McGrath: There were some self-reflectors that were thinking about what had just happened with Vietnam, whereas others were out scapegoating and rationalizing and blaming You've heard it the hippies, the media, whatever.
- 15:11Mark McGrath: I've heard the Beatles accused, but whereas Boyd and the founding fathers, so to speak, of what became the maneuver movement that you were directly involved with, that all started with that sort of self-reflection from Vietnam.
- 15:26Mark McGrath: Was that really the catalyst, looking at what happened?
- 15:31GI Wilson: Yeah, boyd and Colonel Wiley made points like in Vietnam, we had air superiority, we had technological superiority And we still didn't do very well.
- 15:43GI Wilson: And it was very terrain focused.
- 15:45GI Wilson: It was always about taking this hill and maintaining this piece of terrain And we didn't really understand how the enemy was imposing its will on us And we were becoming very, very reactive.
- 16:01GI Wilson: And it was fascinating to listen to them, because you would have thought that, since we had air superiority, we had fixed wing aircraft, we had helicopters, we controlled the air, we used long range bombing strikes, we would figure that all of that would help you win on the ground.
- 16:27GI Wilson: And it didn't.
- 16:29GI Wilson: And that was really quite the realization for us.
- 16:33GI Wilson: And we had well what I would consider well equipped forces And we were going up against individuals that, as Colonel Wiley would say, would run around in black pajamas And they should basically Now Colonel Wiley now he had a background in guerrilla warfare right in the combined action program.
- 17:00Mark McGrath: Yes, yeah, and those were all very people-centric.
- 17:06GI Wilson: Very people-centric and dealt with people and ideas And of course his thinking and Boyd's thinking were in concert with each other And of course, that of General Gray.
- 17:20GI Wilson: And we were in the process of developing our maneuver warfare concepts And we looked for focus of effort and commanders and tent and surfaces and gaps And trusted and we tried to develop a report to his trust relationships or trust and subordinate, and we actually talked about contracts.
- 17:43GI Wilson: Then A leader had a contract of clearly telling everybody what he wanted to happen.
- 17:51GI Wilson: What hit the outcome was that he wanted to do in order to defeat the enemy.
- 17:55GI Wilson: It wasn't I want to take this hill.
- 17:59GI Wilson: This is what the impact is I want to have on the enemy And the subordinates.
- 18:04GI Wilson: You know the people on the line.
- 18:06GI Wilson: They had an absolute obligation to raise their hand and say I don't understand how we're going to do what you want to be done.
- 18:17GI Wilson: I just don't get it.
- 18:22GI Wilson: So you had a trust contract on both sides where the commander had to clearly define his intent and how that was going to impact the enemy, and the subordinates were supposed to raise their hand and question how they were going to do it if they didn't understand what the leader wanted from them.
- 18:44GI Wilson: I always found that very, very, very interesting.
- 18:50Mark McGrath: So let's talk about that.
- 18:51Mark McGrath: So you brought up the word intent, and that's a concept that Boyd was huge on, having studied the Germans and other mutual friends of ours.
- 19:00Mark McGrath: Like Don Vandergriff, is very big on intent and mission command.
- 19:04Mark McGrath: And what could leaders take away from what Boyd was saying around the concept of intent?
- 19:11Mark McGrath: What does it empower decision makers at every level to do, and how does it make an organization more effective?
- 19:19GI Wilson: First of all, you have to understand that the commander's intent should be something that everybody embraces and understands And he has to articulate it extremely well in probably the most basic, basic terms possible.
- 19:37GI Wilson: But when you look at it the commander's intent you usually think of the commander being on top and the troops on the bottom.
- 19:47GI Wilson: You sort of want to flip it around, but the personnel on top and the commander on the bottom, so that when he gives his intent it goes out.
- 19:57GI Wilson: It doesn't funnel down, but it goes out to everybody sort of a broadcast And everybody knows what they need to do to support the commander's intent.
- 20:07GI Wilson: And the interesting thing about a commander's intent a junior leader can say yes, I know exactly what happens.
- 20:15GI Wilson: Excuse me, this is a.
- 20:17GI Wilson: I know exactly what happens when I have the commander's intent in mind.
- 20:26GI Wilson: It may not work out in a particular fashion that I want to, instead of going to the right, all right, I can't go that way, So I'll go around to the left, but the commander wants me to get in and behind the enemy, So I know where the commander wants me to end up.
- 20:41GI Wilson: And the same thing in any competitive environment, whether you're playing checkers or you're doing something that involves any kind of competition.
- 20:54GI Wilson: You know what the ultimate goal is.
- 20:56GI Wilson: You're supposed to be going right and then you go left And, as a result of that, you get to where you're supposed to be, because you understand the commander's intent.
- 21:10GI Wilson: It's not about going up the middle, It's not about going around to the right.
- 21:15GI Wilson: You could do both.
- 21:17GI Wilson: The fact is that you go out of your way to make all that happen, because you understand where you're supposed to be, where you're supposed to end up.
- 21:31Mark McGrath: Yeah, i can't ever remember my own experience in the Marine Corps.
- 21:35Mark McGrath: I can never remember being told other than this is what has to happen.
- 21:41Mark McGrath: But no one ever told me how.
- 21:42Mark McGrath: And then when I in turn would give an order to NCOs or staff NCOs, i would give them a, give them the intent, and I didn't have to do anything.
- 21:50Mark McGrath: So I'll just try to show organizations what you could take away with that kind of decentralized decision making where you empower people at every level.
- 22:00Mark McGrath: As a young 20-something year old that I was empowered to make big time executive decisions that were in line with the organizational intent.
- 22:11Mark McGrath: It makes the organization faster, streamlined, harmonized.
- 22:16Mark McGrath: It develops and promotes trust.
- 22:19Mark McGrath: And that was very big to John Boyd right.
- 22:26GI Wilson: Yeah, and back then, when you look at the period of time when we were in, micromanagement was huge, all right, and micromanagement slowed things down and that was one of the things that we were trying to overcome, because it was all about command and control, not command and coordination or collaboration, and basically there was a lot of effort placed in designing and going through what we refer to tactics, techniques and procedures in the very same way all the time.
- 23:04GI Wilson: It was like rote memory and we realized our adversaries, whoever they were going to be, and at that particular time we were worried about the Soviets, the Russians today, where Marines would have been vastly outnumbered.
- 23:20GI Wilson: We were trying to figure out how to fight in an environment where you were completely outnumbered And if there was a way to do that and if you were always waiting for orders, if you're always waiting to hear from on high, all right.
- 23:37GI Wilson: That slowed things down immensely and made you very, very targetable and predictable.
- 23:42GI Wilson: So, as a result of that, we tried to come up with different concepts of fighting smart and commanders.
- 23:51GI Wilson: Intent was sort of the glue that held everything together And, as a result of that, you wanted to have initiative at the lower level.
- 24:03GI Wilson: You wanted to be the D Individuals who are on the line to be able to adjust their first decision with their second, knowing, knowing what the commander wanted to happen to the enemy in the end.
- 24:21Mark McGrath: And like a lot of things.
- 24:22Mark McGrath: boyd, if you wanted you to do something or think about something, he wanted your competitors or your enemy or your threats not to think that way and vice versa.
- 24:31Mark McGrath: the things that we were advised not to do, you want them to do to give you the advantage and to create, amplify disadvantages for the for the enemies act is that?
- 24:46Mark McGrath: am I following that one right?
- 24:48GI Wilson: Yeah, we want to do is create mismatches for the enemy, mismatches and we know any enemy would create mismatches for us and we wanted to be able to take it, take it, take advantage of that.
- 25:01GI Wilson: And it's it's like computer wargaming.
- 25:05GI Wilson: We found out that the wargaming was very, very good for decision making.
- 25:12GI Wilson: Wargaming was was not was not particularly useful, and I came to predicting things or do or doing analysis, but it was good in conditioning people to learn how to make decisions, how to make this decisions in terms of the context of the situation, what?
- 25:32GI Wilson: one of the things that we always tried to do was to create ways in which the enemy would do something and they would find themselves in a dilemma.
- 25:43GI Wilson: For example, a very simple example you hastily put mines out in front of you And the enemy veers off to the left, but what they didn't know is that you created a fire pocket for artillery when they went off to the left.
- 25:59GI Wilson: So they avoid the mines, but they drive, they drive right into a fire pocket.
- 26:05GI Wilson: So it's these kind of dilemmas that you want to create, that the enemy will find itself on the horns of a dilemma and you use it.
- 26:16GI Wilson: It's it's not that maneuver Would not use a trishin if you, if you were facing a force that you know you.
- 26:25GI Wilson: you Out numbered them 10 to one.
- 26:28GI Wilson: Of course you would just roll on over because it would be very effective and it would be a swift operation.
- 26:36GI Wilson: You know maneuvers, believe in firepower.
- 26:39GI Wilson: You know they did.
- 26:41GI Wilson: When it gets right down to it, you know it becomes a necessary part of combined arms.
- 26:46GI Wilson: But you want to be able to create impression where the enemy thinks that you're everywhere.
- 26:53GI Wilson: You know it's.
- 26:55GI Wilson: It is amazing what happens when they, when they start seeing visions in their, in their mind and you may not even be everywhere you just create the, the impression that that you're, you're everywhere, or you give them mismatches that they they have a hard time dealing with that.
- 27:13GI Wilson: For example again, let's just use the old fashioned landmine.
- 27:17GI Wilson: All right, the enemy detect your landmine with the, with the mind detector, and that's because the landmines casing is made out of metal.
- 27:27GI Wilson: So you start making mines that are made of cigar boxes, which a metal detector can't detect.
- 27:32GI Wilson: You keep creating these tech, at least these mismatches.
- 27:37GI Wilson: Now, are land mines new?
- 27:40GI Wilson: no, but you can use them in new and creative ways.
- 27:43GI Wilson: Instead of making landmines that are you know they have a metal case that are detected by landmine detectors, you start making landmines that are cardboard boxes or cigar boxes.
- 27:53GI Wilson: I don't even know if there's a car boxes around today, but you know, bring back the cigar boxes.
- 27:58GI Wilson: So you think of, you think of ways to counter and create mismatches for the enemy, because he's gonna create them for you and then, when they create some for you, you take advantage, take advantage of.
- 28:16Mark McGrath: You mentioned being seemingly everywhere, even even if you're not night.
- 28:21Mark McGrath: I don't know what.
- 28:22Mark McGrath: I forget what army general it's attributed to, because I've seen it Attributed to various army generals, but in the invasion of Grenada It said what you know, why do I have three regiments of soldiers pinned down and whatever, but I've got two companies of Marines doing whatever they want, running all over the place, the north side of the island?
- 28:42Mark McGrath: you know that was a.
- 28:44Mark McGrath: that sounds to me like a very, a very good example of what you're talking about.
- 28:49GI Wilson: Yeah, that was.
- 28:50GI Wilson: That was a right Smith.
- 28:51GI Wilson: Later on became it became a general.
- 28:53GI Wilson: He had one particular lieutenant by the name of they called him dog leash.
- 28:59GI Wilson: His name was Daglish and he was very much into, you know, recon fall.
- 29:05GI Wilson: You know he was all over the island and sometimes he would like to put a dog leash on him but he, he was everywhere and as a result of that, people thought the marine, the Marines were, and basically they were in terms of Knowing you know where his people were and how he used.
- 29:28GI Wilson: I would say he would have you would have called it infiltration tactics instead of being a broad front, penetrated that different, different points.
- 29:41GI Wilson: And infiltration tactic can be very, very Effective if you used creatively.
- 29:49GI Wilson: You know you've heard about the famous marine amphibious landings.
- 29:53GI Wilson: Well, what happens if you would do amphibious landings, where you use amphibious points instead of amphibious beaches, where you would infiltrate forces amphibiously and you would go where the enemy is not.
- 30:07GI Wilson: In other words, you don't land directly on into the know the very, very frontage of the enemy itself.
- 30:17GI Wilson: You go around to the side, you go where he, where he is not.
- 30:20GI Wilson: Then you end up behind the enemy where his logistics and his command and control are very, very Not, not, not to not to sidetrack too far, because it is relevant.
- 30:32Mark McGrath: You mentioned Ray Smith now.
- 30:34Mark McGrath: Now, wasn't he a young lieutenant in the battle of way city?
- 30:37GI Wilson: yes, yeah he so.
- 30:40Mark McGrath: So there's a book.
- 30:41Mark McGrath: There's a book about way 1968, which is a great book for leaders of any organization to read because, as I understand it and I learned it, you know, the Marines were very adaptive and very innovative because they were facing something that they had never faced before.
- 30:57Mark McGrath: And they were, they were making it up as they, as they go along, and I I believe it was future lieutenant general, then lieutenant colonel Ernie Cheatham, who, as a Pittsburgh, i love to point out, he played for the Steelers He, he, he was, you know, he was empowering his Marines to make it up as we go along, because we had never faced this before.
- 31:19Mark McGrath: Is that, is that kind of Yeah, that seems to me, that's another thing that Boyd was tapping into our inherent adaptiveness as Marines are inherent need to innovate as Marines.
- 31:32GI Wilson: And they did.
- 31:33GI Wilson: I mean, they did such things as is a fire, three point five rockets from inside buildings, which is something you know you don't want to do.
- 31:45GI Wilson: All right, you're firing you're basically firing a bazooka from inside a building, and they did.
- 31:51GI Wilson: They did a lot, of, lot of creative things like that to impose their will On the enemy and also to figure out how to how to get in and get in around and behind the enemy.
- 32:04GI Wilson: And again, much of it depended upon small leader leaders.
- 32:11GI Wilson: You know small unit leadership at the time.
- 32:15GI Wilson: interesting thing, the best book I read about way was actually written by a gentleman, by the Nolan, who is a high school student, and it's kind of interesting because he was, you know he was somebody that was detached from what's going on and he was able to look at it objectively.
- 32:34GI Wilson: He didn't have a lot of emotional investment in it, very much like Boyd and you know, when he was working with us, you know he was from an entirely different realm.
- 32:47GI Wilson: As a result of that, you could see things more clip, more clearly.
- 32:52GI Wilson: So it's always been fascinating when you Bring somebody in for lack of a better term, i sometimes call it the Delphi effect.
- 33:00GI Wilson: You know you bring someone in.
- 33:03GI Wilson: That can, that can, that can see the whole context of the situation, because many times you get stuck, you know the four corners of a page and you, you, you restrain.
- 33:15GI Wilson: You restrain yourself because of the way that you have traditionally looked at things and you gotta learn it.
- 33:21GI Wilson: Look at things a little bit differently and take another perspective.
- 33:25GI Wilson: And that goes back to what we referred to as multi disciplinary teams And it's carried over into what I do today.
- 33:34GI Wilson: I do, i teach and I do a lot of what they call threat assessment and we've learned over time the threat assessment teams, when dealing with with individuals and people, are very, very unpredictable, are much better at managing threat situations involving individuals.
- 33:54GI Wilson: Then you know someone who's just doing it singularly.
- 33:58GI Wilson: So you know multi disciplinary teams are absolutely essential and boy boy taught us that, remember.
- 34:05GI Wilson: You know Boyd would like to break things down And then rebuild them.
- 34:11GI Wilson: You know the famous snowmobiles and and when he was doing that he also, when you, when you build a snowmobile, he also thought about the mismatches that was creating for creating for the enemy.
- 34:27Mark McGrath: Hmm, what's interesting.
- 34:29Mark McGrath: So we're mentioning, you know, on the topic of books, it's a big part of the Boyd Sort of hate to say Boyd cannon, but you know, the boy effect on on the Marines.
- 34:37Mark McGrath: You know he, here's this Air Force Colonel That his own service thinks he's not, sir, you know, not not worth the time of day.
- 34:46Mark McGrath: And he comes to Quantico, to Colonel Mike Wiley's amphibious warfare class, and he said he insists on giving this briefing that it takes, you know, anywhere from six to eight hours And he and here's an Air Force Colonel talking about the battle of marathon, the battle of the electric and the battle of, you know, goga Mellon, everything else.
- 35:08Mark McGrath: And at the end of the brief there is a source list of books that is multiple pages and he gets these Marine officers reading books that they had never, they never heard of.
- 35:25Mark McGrath: What did, what did that lead to?
- 35:26Mark McGrath: that's now I mean now to think.
- 35:27Mark McGrath: Even when I was in, you know, every Marine was reading books all the time.
- 35:31Mark McGrath: So what was the?
- 35:33Mark McGrath: I know that was the Genesis was there.
- 35:35Mark McGrath: Tell us about that and why and why organizations should, should, do this.
- 35:39GI Wilson: Yeah, the interesting thing about Boyd we quickly realized they're actually politicians that knew more about our job than we did, because we didn't.
- 35:50GI Wilson: We didn't read about our profession and Boyd got us to focus on reading about our profession One of the most interesting things.
- 35:57GI Wilson: I always love telling this story.
- 35:59GI Wilson: When Boyd gave his brief, you were, you were in for the whole day.
- 36:04GI Wilson: In other words, he there was no Abbreviated portion of it.
- 36:08GI Wilson: It goes on for hours and if you, if you were, if you were willing to listen to your brief, you were going to listen to the whole thing.
- 36:16GI Wilson: I remember a very famous general during the about the middle of boys brief Get up to go somewhere and he's to serve.
- 36:24GI Wilson: Please sit down.
- 36:25GI Wilson: I'm not done yet, all right, i mean, it would want to make sure that you understood exactly exactly where he was coming from.
- 36:36GI Wilson: But the interest, the other interesting thing that was so fascinating about boyd, is that he could, he would sit there and look at his pencil, sometimes the end of his pencil.
- 36:50GI Wilson: He would twist it around, all right, and what he was actually doing, i know, is he was thinking of the different ways that you could look at a problem and he was very good At sitting down, making sure by interacting and debating.
- 37:08GI Wilson: He was an incredible debater And he believed in what we refer to as wire brushing things are, you come up with a good idea, but he would challenge your ideas and expected you to challenge his ideas.
- 37:25GI Wilson: It was two, two ways, three And, what I found extremely fascinating, that boyd had the most phenomenal impact not only upon the Marine Corps With his way of thinking, with the OO, the loop and you know, i did the fourth and penetrate, isolate, subdues and subvert and Reorient, reharmonize, with all these things that he came up with.
- 37:50GI Wilson: He impacted all of the DOD.
- 37:52GI Wilson: And he did this after he retired And I always found that very, very fascinating.
- 37:58GI Wilson: And what was even more fascinating, i was still in uniform and I actually Got the opportunity to spend time in the Pentagon and it was fascinating how the active duty folks would just go, some of them in the Air Force side of the house.
- 38:14GI Wilson: We go absolutely bonkers when they hear about boyd.
- 38:21GI Wilson: And he was retired, but that's because his ideas and his approach to things Were all evidence based.
- 38:30GI Wilson: In other words, he researched it and he understood his profession better than anyone.
- 38:35GI Wilson: And there was no one.
- 38:37GI Wilson: There was no one that understood bureaucracies Better than boyd.
- 38:42GI Wilson: One of the things that boyd talked to taught me is that when you're dealing with bureaucracies and all bureaucracies you know they're layered, you have chains of command and you have multiple ways of slowing things down.
- 38:55GI Wilson: He said.
- 38:56GI Wilson: He said if you really want to upset a bureaucracy, use their own rules and regulations and words against them.
- 39:03GI Wilson: And he says they won't, they won't know what to do.
- 39:06GI Wilson: So not only the boyd look for things that orders that said you could do things.
- 39:10GI Wilson: He said look for orders and regulations that don't say that you can't do something.
- 39:15GI Wilson: In other words, it didn't say you could do it, didn't say you couldn't do it, and you and you cite those orders, orders and regulations.
- 39:23GI Wilson: But he really had probably the most remarkable understanding of just how bureaucracies operate in general and how to short circuit them and how important it was to have informal loops in your organizations Where you were in touch with those individuals who were actually doing doing the work.
- 39:46GI Wilson: You didn't, you weren't isolated, you were, you were had this.
- 39:50GI Wilson: He would call them sensors or informal loops, so that He would know what that young corporal was thinking, that that young airman was thinking, or the, or just you know, a gs three in the Pentagon was thinking he knew what was what was going on.
- 40:08GI Wilson: And with the other thing that the boy taught me was extremely fascinating was to get your wants and needs down to zero, then he then they can't take anything away from you.
- 40:21GI Wilson: And boyd and I had a colleague by the name of Chuck's Benny And he ended up on the time of on front of Time magazine.
- 40:29GI Wilson: Once, of course, boy walked in says well, that's done, move on, okay.
- 40:32GI Wilson: Boyd, never, never, never stayed in one place for a long.
- 40:36GI Wilson: You know that that was great.
- 40:36GI Wilson: You ended up on On Time magazine, okay.
- 40:39GI Wilson: Next, the interesting thing was it's been.
- 40:44GI Wilson: It's been irritated, some of the bureaucracy, the leadership in the Pentagon, and what was funny, they figured that they tried to figure out something they could take away from him.
- 40:54GI Wilson: That would teach him a lesson, and of course, the one of the most prized things that the Pentagon is a parking space.
- 41:02GI Wilson: All right, and they took spinnies parking space away from him.
- 41:07GI Wilson: And of course, boyd and spinny just thought that was hilarious, because spinning never drove to work.
- 41:13GI Wilson: He lived close enough that he would.
- 41:15GI Wilson: He would take the metro into work though the though the bureaucracy thought that they had.
- 41:20GI Wilson: You know, that gets back to boyd's, boyd's philosophy getting your wants and needs down to zero.
- 41:26GI Wilson: The bureaucracy felt that they had taught him a lesson by taking away his parking space And all the time it was it had it was irrelevant to either one of them because he didn't use that use that parking space.
- 41:40GI Wilson: So again, it's fascinating to see, to see some of the things that boyd would do.
- 41:46GI Wilson: And he And he was.
- 41:50GI Wilson: He was such a such an intellect and I think I think the reason he was such an intellect is that I always I thought he was one of the brightest people I've ever met, but also He was always learning.
- 42:06GI Wilson: He was never quite there.
- 42:09GI Wilson: You know.
- 42:10GI Wilson: He talks about the conceptual spiral and mismatches, and I don't think ever felt that he had completely Accomplished everything he wanted to accomplish.
- 42:23GI Wilson: It was always in the making.
- 42:25GI Wilson: And I know boyd said, if you ever feel like you're you got to where you wanted to go, that's not good.
- 42:34GI Wilson: You still want to be striving.
- 42:36GI Wilson: And he was continuing learning.
- 42:40GI Wilson: He never, i mean, i remember when he was in in the hospital, on his deathbed, he was still talking about The whole idea of the essence of winning.
- 42:55GI Wilson: He was talking about that concept he came up with, called I the fourth, you know, which was insight, imagination, intent and implementation.
- 43:08GI Wilson: It was similar to Another term he called pisser, which was you know how to get in somebody's, you know, penetrate, isolate, subdued, subvert, reorient and reharmonize.
- 43:22GI Wilson: Well, he came up with another abbreviated form where, especially when you, when you, when you, looked at the conceptual spiral, i always thought his two greatest works were creation of destruction And the conceptual spiral, and of course there was organic design in between patterns of conflict.
- 43:40GI Wilson: But I always, i always gravitated to those, those particular, those particular works.
- 43:47GI Wilson: And again it goes back to Your, your learnings, never done And right.
- 43:55GI Wilson: And you must.
- 43:56GI Wilson: You must look at yourself as a multi faceted.
- 44:00GI Wilson: What's the word I'm looking for?
- 44:02GI Wilson: Renaissance man, you must be able to see things, or a polymath or something.
- 44:08GI Wilson: Yes, but it is when people study, boy, they think they're gonna study and get it.
- 44:16GI Wilson: It doesn't work that way.
- 44:18GI Wilson: All right, you start studying, yeah, and then you go, wow, what did I open up?
- 44:25GI Wilson: and then you realize that that every time you, you, you start looking at boys work, you go around another corner and there's new insight, and that allows you to see things from a slightly different perspective.
- 44:41Mark McGrath: It's such a critical point, you know, i, yeah, i often say you know.
- 44:46Mark McGrath: People ask me like, when did you first come into contact with boy?
- 44:49Mark McGrath: and I said, well, when I was a midshipman, enable ROTC In our evolution of the art of warfare class.
- 44:56Mark McGrath: We had to read FM, fm one which had not been revised yet, that came in 97, and You know, in the footnotes there's boy and we learned about the quote unquote boy cycle and ironically he was still alive.
- 45:11Mark McGrath: I would have loved to have sat down with them and talked about these things, but when I, when people ask me how long have you been interested, boy?
- 45:20Mark McGrath: or say boys, this is 1994 and you know, in your case 1979, and it never stops, it just keeps going.
- 45:27Mark McGrath: Because the more you know, the more you drink from the glass of boy.
- 45:31Mark McGrath: You just want more and the glass never empties because his mind and the directions that he went in were almost ceaseless and, to your point, they were extremely multidisciplinary.
- 45:44Mark McGrath: So it's amazing.
- 45:46Mark McGrath: You know, i'm an undergrad historian and an economist by master's degree.
- 45:49Mark McGrath: My business partner, ponce, is a fighter, fighter, maybe naval aviator.
- 45:55Mark McGrath: That comes at it more from the neuroscience and the in the math aspect.
- 46:00Mark McGrath: But we come to the same conclusion and we've had people on the show that Never have been in the military and the concepts and the principles that boy was running down.
- 46:08Mark McGrath: They encapsulate literally anything where humans are making decisions and actions, and I think that's the thing that people really have to understand that when You're you're integrating these concepts into your business or you're integrating these concepts into your battalion or whatever organization you're in, whatever industry, the work does not stop.
- 46:28Mark McGrath: There's no recipe, there's no formula, there's no template, there's no checklist.
- 46:33Mark McGrath: You have to keep doing the learning because everything is always in a state of change.
- 46:40GI Wilson: No, you know, it was evolving Absolutely.
- 46:44GI Wilson: And and the one of the things that you need, you need to realize, particularly in the military, is that your enemies I said before your adversary has a vote And you know, not only are you trying to impose your will upon him, he's trying to impose his will upon you.
- 47:04GI Wilson: And if you have an adversary that uses not only military means but political means, economic means, if you have an adversary where everything in a population is targetable, not just the military but the civilian population, it's economy, it's logistics, all right, it's infrastructure It becomes eye-opening because you're dealing with someone who is looking for mismatches and is trying to figure out.
- 47:37GI Wilson: You know how to win, basically how to penetrate your culture, isolate you not only from globally but from parts of your own culture, all right.
- 47:50GI Wilson: And it's fascinating when you start realizing the value of Boyd's work and it applies, you know, not only to the military, but I've used it in threat assessment.
- 48:03GI Wilson: I've seen my friends use it in business check Richard is probably one of the most prominent practitioners, but if you read a lot of material that's out there today, you know there was an old book talked about reinventing the corporation.
- 48:24GI Wilson: You know, reinventing your company.
- 48:26GI Wilson: It's kind of interesting because you look at it and say, gosh, this reminds me, reminds me of Void, if you look at Megatrends.
- 48:36GI Wilson: All right way back when you read that old book Megatrends, you said you know this guy was picking up on the trajectories of things that were, on people and ideas and how the world was moving, where we went from an industrial base to an information base, to a services economy.
- 48:56GI Wilson: And it was fascinating And, if I remember correctly, he'd spent quite a while in prison thinking about these things.
- 49:03GI Wilson: The author of Megatrends In prison.
- 49:07GI Wilson: I think he had been.
- 49:08GI Wilson: Oh, the author of Megatrends.
- 49:09GI Wilson: Yeah, yeah, yeah But.
- 49:13Mark McGrath: I'm sure people wanted to put Boyd in prison, but to be clear, boyd was never in prison, he was never in the brig.
- 49:18Mark McGrath: No, no, no.
- 49:20GI Wilson: No, the author of Megatrends was, but I can guarantee you he probably would have been there a week, okay, and the warden would be coming to him to ask him what was going on and what things he needed to work on to make the prison a better place.
- 49:34GI Wilson: I guarantee Boyd would have.
- 49:36GI Wilson: You know Boyd would have figured it out And you know Boyd would say about bureaucracies, sometimes they have to learn.
- 49:44GI Wilson: Pain goes both ways.
- 49:46GI Wilson: And especially when you, when you, when you can use part of the bureaucracy itself against each other, which was very, very fascinating.
- 49:54GI Wilson: But what that gets down to is developing, you know, trusted subordinates.
- 50:01GI Wilson: you know not subordinates who are, who are blindly loyal, but subordinates that will tell you the truth because you have to deal with reality.
- 50:11GI Wilson: You know you have to have subordinates that would say, sir, i don't think I would do that if I were you.
- 50:18GI Wilson: And that was probably one of the most critical things about Boyd.
- 50:23GI Wilson: Boyd was had these informal loops.
- 50:25GI Wilson: He was a much better listener than people ever realized, but he was.
- 50:30GI Wilson: he was able to take, take that input, analyze it, synthesize it and then go out and test his hypothesis and immediately turn that around.
- 50:44GI Wilson: you know, get feedback And see, see if he was, he was going in the in the right direction.
- 50:51Mark McGrath: It goes back to your point Constantly learning, and it also goes back to your point about getting an outside, an outside view, because oftentimes people in command or people in leadership, any organization, the people that are subordinate to them are telling them what they think the general wants to hear, what they think the CEO wants to hear not necessarily what they what they need to hear And that has that can have a very negative impact on on decisions and also on on learning, as as as time advances and circumstances unfold.
- 51:27Mark McGrath: Yeah, And a lot of times, to be fair, those people are quashed.
- 51:30Mark McGrath: I mean, imagine the person that being, that person at Kodak that discovered digital photography and told the board and they said get out of here.
- 51:38Mark McGrath: We're the, we're Kodak, we don't need to listen to you.
- 51:42GI Wilson: And and they had isolated themselves because they didn't realize there was an opportunity there.
- 51:47GI Wilson: And Boyd was very good, very good about that And you know it's interesting, boyd Boyd, you know he, he taught himself calculus.
- 52:01GI Wilson: Yeah, i mean, i mean I have a heart.
- 52:05GI Wilson: It's amazing, i mean how somebody could sit down and teach themselves calculus, but that was the kind of kind of brain that that he had And it was absolutely, absolutely fast, fascinating.
- 52:22Mark McGrath: You know, i was talking to Chuck Spinney and I am just looking at the notes because I, you know, i have a Boyd collaborator and Boyd friend notebook when every time I talk to them, i, you know, like yourself, i have notes from our discussions.
- 52:34Mark McGrath: And there was something that Chuck had said.
- 52:37Mark McGrath: I forget the title of it, the name of it, but basically Boyd, unwittingly, had done this certain type of algebraic equation that's extremely difficult and esoteric, but he did it on his own recognizance, using his own mind.
- 52:50Mark McGrath: He didn't learn it, he didn't know what it, what it was, and I forget the term but said, oh my gosh, you just did a whatever equation.
- 53:03GI Wilson: He came up with the equation, he came up with the solution.
- 53:07GI Wilson: Right Yeah.
- 53:08Mark McGrath: Yeah.
- 53:10GI Wilson: To a, to a very complex mathematical problem which he wasn't really working.
- 53:14GI Wilson: He just came up with this, which was, which was, which was very, very fascinating.
- 53:19GI Wilson: You know the probably, in terms of of learning and leadership, boyd probably had a phenomenal impact.
- 53:32GI Wilson: upon fact, i know he did on Don Vandergrip, who, you know, is very much into outcomes based learning.
- 53:40GI Wilson: Oh, yes, and in in, if you, if you, if you become a fan of outcome based learning or lifelong learning, in addition to that, you'll see a lot of Boyd in there.
- 53:54GI Wilson: And, and I think I think, if, if, if individuals would spend a little time focusing in outcome based learning, they would, they would get a better appreciation of Boyd and commanders intent in allowing people to use their own creativity and imagination And being able to make things happen from their, from their perspective, very, very interesting.
- 54:25GI Wilson: I mean.
- 54:25GI Wilson: so here it.
- 54:27GI Wilson: you know how people it's.
- 54:30GI Wilson: it's like being in a stadium watching a football game.
- 54:34GI Wilson: All right, okay, it's like watching the.
- 54:37GI Wilson: you know the Steelers, the Steelers play, you know you're it's different if you're down on the field.
- 54:44GI Wilson: Then if you're, you know, if you're sitting up on a box, even though you're watching you're, you're watching the same game, but the experience level, is is much, much different.
- 54:55GI Wilson: in the perspective, is is much, much different.
- 54:59Mark McGrath: So I found the notes.
- 55:00Mark McGrath: It was Chuck Spinney that told me that Boyd had calculated, he had devised, he had derived what's called the Breguet equation, which I don't I'm a historian, I don't know.
- 55:10Mark McGrath: I mean, he did it on an envelope and I guess people were shocked like, oh my gosh, you just did a Breguet equation and didn't even do.
- 55:18Mark McGrath: I think he was calculating fuel fractions, something to do with energy maneuverability theory.
- 55:23GI Wilson: Yes, And but, and out of that came Boyd's ability, and Boyd's always had this ability to do trade-offs.
- 55:30GI Wilson: You know, yeah, it's, it's.
- 55:33GI Wilson: It's something that people often forget about.
- 55:37GI Wilson: In order to get to a particular end state that you want to get to, Sometimes you have to do, you have to do trade-offs, you have to give something up in order to, you know, get to where, get to where you're going.
- 55:48GI Wilson: And the interesting thing, i once told Boyd, when I first met him he was doing something with, talked about energy, maneuverability and physics, and he said well, you know, i'm Irish kid from the hills of Pennsylvania, i'm not very good at math.
- 56:05GI Wilson: And he said, well, that's okay.
- 56:07GI Wilson: He says, you know, math is imprecise.
- 56:10GI Wilson: And I said what He says?
- 56:12GI Wilson: yes, he says he says everybody thinks math is, is so precise.
- 56:16GI Wilson: But he said, you know, we need to talk sometimes about the imprecision of mathematics.
- 56:21GI Wilson: And and he says we, you know, he says in unpredictability, he says that's very, very important And of course I'll never forget that, you know, i and and he says yes, he says he said there, he said most people never, never want to address the whole issue of the imprecision of mathematics.
- 56:42GI Wilson: But he said the point is you never get to the final equation, where it's so precise it can't be any more precise.
- 56:53GI Wilson: And he said, and he said that's the.
- 56:54GI Wilson: He says that's because of the novelty that comes into situations.
- 56:58GI Wilson: And he said that's the situation you want to be in, where you never quite get there, you're always striving, and he said.
- 57:07GI Wilson: Then he said you know you're doing the right thing because you're constantly adjusting, changing and staying, staying up with the environment that you're in.
- 57:15GI Wilson: You know business wise.
- 57:18GI Wilson: I know, i know Boyd was a big fan of SWAT.
- 57:20GI Wilson: It's strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
- 57:25GI Wilson: I mean, he was, he was, he was.
- 57:29GI Wilson: I think he used that as a structured professional judgment tool that when he gauged any, any any engage in any situation, immediately summed up the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that are in that situation.
- 57:44Mark McGrath: Now, yeah, he, i mean to be clear.
- 57:47Mark McGrath: he wasn't necessarily opposed to those sorts of things, he was just opposed to them becoming the final word, the end, all be all that, that, that a SWAT should inform your orientation as you shape and adapt.
- 57:59Mark McGrath: A SWAT should not be a recipe that you, you tape up and then you go off it, as if it's a linear, step by step.
- 58:09GI Wilson: You're absolutely right.
- 58:09GI Wilson: You make a very good observation.
- 58:12GI Wilson: Yeah, and he was a checklist and he very, very much opposed checklist, because if you did everything on the checklist, how could, how could anything possibly go go wrong?
- 58:24GI Wilson: And you mentioned, i think, that Boyd Boyd thought, and I know, i know that Spinny and and and chat would tell you that the most important part of what we refer to as the OOLO, it's not a closed system, all right, and it's just.
- 58:40GI Wilson: It's not simply you know, observe or orient, decide, act.
- 58:44GI Wilson: There's much more to it than that.
- 58:46GI Wilson: But I think you pointed out the orientation.
- 58:49GI Wilson: I think that is perhaps because it goes back to being able to look at things from a multifaceted perspective.
- 58:57GI Wilson: I think the orientation and being able to work the right problem is probably one of the more critical, critical parts of of of you know the concept of the OOLO.
- 59:10Mark McGrath: Yeah, the way we go about teaching it is to start really with the orientation and how and how we what it is and you know how it makes us up and that kind of a thing.
- 59:19Mark McGrath: Because what, what I've learned and and Chuck and I actually talked about this too I told them about two different papers.
- 59:25Mark McGrath: I wrote One had the OOLO diagram sketch in it And the.
- 59:31Mark McGrath: The second one, which was an expanded edition, didn't, and I got more interaction on that one.
- 59:37Mark McGrath: Because I think when, anytime you put and I think this was one of Boyd's fears, and Chuck and others have confirmed this that when you give somebody the OOLO sketch, they, they, they write, they automatically think that this is it, that's the way it was, and the answer is no, that's the way that it evolved.
- 59:54Mark McGrath: Because even Boyd's own theory of OODA evolved, as when you know, when you look at his patterns of conflict at the very beginning, the early versions, and you get later on, you realize that the final OODA loops sketch, which he always used in quotes, was, was an evolution, and then it, then he died, and then if he had lived, it would have changed, probably even even more and more, because, as Chuck reminded me, it's an abstraction.
- 1:00:22Mark McGrath: It's not something that you tape on a wall or you tape on the, on the, on the dashboard of your cockpit or the heads up display and follow line by line.
- 1:00:33Mark McGrath: It's not a, it's not a map in that sense.
- 1:00:35Mark McGrath: It's just an abstraction of how our orientation, as you say, shapes, how it influences, how it guides us, how it controls how it, how it affects our decisions, how it affects our actions and our learning, our capacity for learning.
- 1:00:51GI Wilson: Absolutely right And, as, as I look back on it, in the early days of developing the maneuver warfare concept, boyd Boyd it was.
- 1:01:01GI Wilson: It was, it was such a an opportunity to work with Boyd back then because dealing with somebody that was not emotionally invested in an organization that he was able to look from, basically what I called the you know, the outside, looking in, and as a result of that, he could help you fine tune your orientation so that you know, you didn't realize that.
- 1:01:30GI Wilson: You know, being in the organization itself often restrained your ability to see opportunities, create opportunities and to seize those opportunities.
- 1:01:42GI Wilson: Because you were, you were, you know, you were literally constrained by where you are in the organization And Boyd Boyd was very good at helping everybody to reorient their orientation.
- 1:01:57GI Wilson: Yeah, in other words, being able to you know this, particularly back then reading there wasn't the internet, so, you know, having a book list and reading history and studying your profession, yeah, put things in context.
- 1:02:12GI Wilson: And who said that?
- 1:02:14GI Wilson: you know, if you want to, if you, if you, if you want to come up with a new idea, read an old book.
- 1:02:19GI Wilson: Well, that may be an old, an old, tried and true saying, but there's a, there's a.
- 1:02:26GI Wilson: Boyd will tell you that there's a lot to that.
- 1:02:28GI Wilson: The.
- 1:02:29GI Wilson: The challenge is coming up with new, creative ways to use, to use old ideas.
- 1:02:36GI Wilson: And again, here's the thing I find most amazing All right, boyd was retired out of uniform and he had a phenomenal impact, not only upon the Department of Defense, but upon business and and and law enforcement.
- 1:02:53GI Wilson: I mean, you know the.
- 1:02:54GI Wilson: There are individuals like Fred Leland who uses a lot of Boyd's work in his, his, his law enforcement training courses.
- 1:03:03GI Wilson: So it it.
- 1:03:05GI Wilson: It can universally apply, universally apply to environments of which I refer to as competitive, maybe hostels and as another, another great word, but it is a.
- 1:03:20GI Wilson: It is a great approach, a great lens to, to begin looking at things.
- 1:03:25GI Wilson: That, because it's Boyd was always.
- 1:03:28GI Wilson: He told us, and it's, and it happened, he told us.
- 1:03:31GI Wilson: He says the biggest thing you have to worry about when it comes to the new warfare or warfighting is that it becomes it's important, that it's inculcated into your doctrine, but then it becomes dogma.
- 1:03:45Mark McGrath: Yeah.
- 1:03:46GI Wilson: And that's exactly what, what, what has happened, so that you know when you, when you have a document that's not a living document, one that's not updated, you have the moment that that that great signed off on the, what I referred to as the seminal or doctrine of the Marine Corps, which is basically called war fighting.
- 1:04:11GI Wilson: It's referred to as Marine Corps doctoral publication one.
- 1:04:16GI Wilson: The moment that Gray signed off on it, boyd says well, you got to start working on this update.
- 1:04:23GI Wilson: And I only know one general that actually updated, and I think it was General Krulak, if I remember correctly.
- 1:04:32Mark McGrath: You're right.
- 1:04:32Mark McGrath: Yeah, it was General Krulak in 97.
- 1:04:34GI Wilson: Yeah, he updated it.
- 1:04:35GI Wilson: So the moment you and he was trying to impress upon press on all of us And I had the very fortunate opportunity to work with John Schmidt, who wrote war fighting, you know, myself and Wiley And Van Riper all had an opportunity to give him input which was unbelievable.
- 1:05:00GI Wilson: But it was fascinating to see this young captain, you know, write the seminal document for the Marine Corps which I find still very, very useful today And I think it does need a few things to be updated, but parts of it are absolutely timeless.
- 1:05:21GI Wilson: That's what, you know, boyd tried to impress upon, i think, john Schmidt and Wiley.
- 1:05:28GI Wilson: The parts of it should be timeless And other parts of it should be constantly updating And it just was a phenomenal experience.
- 1:05:39GI Wilson: And again, boyd would always put the emphasis, even though he was a fighter pilot and loved aircraft I mean, he was intimately involved in the F-15 and the 16th and he loved hardware and he loved technology He always emphasized the role of people, ideas and then hardware.
- 1:06:00GI Wilson: Because this Boyd would say, you know, people fight wars, not machines, and sometimes we develop an over-reliance on technology and machines.
- 1:06:14Mark McGrath: So you mentioned Lieutenant General Paul van Rijper, who is certainly well known to Marines and certainly you know New Boyd, new Boyd, and attended Boyd briefings and things like that and taught a class at Marine Corps University, an elective course on Boyd which he wrote in the preface to Ian Brown's book.
- 1:06:41Mark McGrath: He says you know, it was amazed that more Air Force officers attended my class than on Boyd, than Marine officers did.
- 1:06:49Mark McGrath: But when we talk about General van Rijper there's two great books, blink by Malcolm Gladwell and Red Team by Mike Azenko that talk about General van Rijper is, i think, phenomenal application of Boyd-type thinking with Millennium Challenge 2002.
- 1:07:09Mark McGrath: Why should leaders look into that and learn about that?
- 1:07:15GI Wilson: Oh, i find that the Millennial Challenge thing is just a fascinating story where General van Rijper created mismatches for the gamers, the people that were putting Millennial Challenge on, because it was very interesting, because they tried to constrain him in what he could use and what he could use, and of course they had a very, very conventional thinking And General van Rijper created these mismatches.
- 1:07:45GI Wilson: We're basically, in many cases he used lower no-tech to defeat high-tech And you know, he wanted to win and his focus stayed on the enemy And as a result of that, he graphically demonstrated that when you have an over-reliance on technology or you use checklists or you think that your doctrine is sound and the enemy is going to act a certain way, which he did not do.
- 1:08:23GI Wilson: He did not act the way that they thought he would, or the, i suspect, computer thought that they would, but it was just an excellent application of Boyd-type thinking.
- 1:08:42GI Wilson: And, by the way, they never asked General van Rijper to come back and I wish they would have to participate in more games.
- 1:08:52GI Wilson: Do another war game?
- 1:08:53GI Wilson: Yes, and again, war games are very, very essential for teaching decision-making.
- 1:09:00GI Wilson: But the ability to do analysis by war gaming or do or predict things with war gaming, you know, it's a very, very iffy Enterprise of basting, and all he demonstrated was the value of the human mind, of the individual, the ingenuity, people and ideas right up front.
- 1:09:26GI Wilson: And I just it's something that it's always enjoyable to talk about General van Rijper and Millennial Challenge It was, yeah, it was, it was Well, and he and General van Rijper is such a pioneer too in complexity thinking for military personnel to get to understand complexity, the nature of complexity.
- 1:10:00Mark McGrath: You know that those two books do a pretty good job of encapsulating what he did at Millennial Challenge 2002.
- 1:10:06Mark McGrath: But I can't think of a more scholarly like General van Rijper.
- 1:10:14Mark McGrath: He was always reading and talking about things.
- 1:10:18GI Wilson: Buddy's his profession, You know, and there have been other generals that really study their profession Tony Zinni, Chuck Krulak.
- 1:10:28GI Wilson: Probably one of the most well-read generals I've ever met is General Bill Mullen.
- 1:10:34GI Wilson: I mean, he must read a book a day And I don't think there's ever a book that he's ever picked up.
- 1:10:43GI Wilson: He didn't like, but he's a voracious reader And what that does is it gives you context.
- 1:10:51GI Wilson: You know military history.
- 1:10:53GI Wilson: You may not want to do the same things that Napoleon did, especially at Waterloo, But it gives you context, It broadens your experience base And I think it's very, very important.
- 1:11:08GI Wilson: There's a really interesting book, relatively new, called Range.
- 1:11:15GI Wilson: I think Guy Benham-Ebsting wrote it And it's basically about performance.
- 1:11:24GI Wilson: That's it.
- 1:11:25GI Wilson: That's it.
- 1:11:26Mark McGrath: Yeah, dave Epstein, that's it?
- 1:11:28GI Wilson: Yeah, it's a great book.
- 1:11:30GI Wilson: And do you see the?
- 1:11:32GI Wilson: do you see?
- 1:11:32GI Wilson: I mean, i see a lot of parallels between what he was saying and what and Boyd's work.
- 1:11:39Mark McGrath: You know, it's funny that you say it that way, because in my previous life, working as a manager, i was actually giving a.
- 1:11:47Mark McGrath: I used to teach investment advisors and others UDA, you know, and how to understand Boyd and how to apply it to capital markets.
- 1:11:56Mark McGrath: And somebody came up to me afterward and said hey, i think you'd really like this book range, because a lot of what you're talking about sounds like, sounds like this book, and I'm always up for a book, as you can, as you can see, and I got it and I thought, yeah, it's phenomenal.
- 1:12:12Mark McGrath: And how it starts off, with Tiger Woods only doing golf, you know, and Roger Federer being exposed to so many different sports and things, and they just had a completely different outcome in the long run.
- 1:12:26Mark McGrath: But the importance of being a multidisciplinary, multi-dimensional, multi-subject thinker is so important because when we're you know, you become reliant on tech, as you say, that's reliant and over-specializing, to the point where we become so myopic because we've specialized on something or we've outsourced our thinking to something like that And then we lose the big picture, we lose the connectivity that we have to what's unfolding in front of us because we're over-relying on technology.
- 1:13:04Mark McGrath: And, as you say, john Boyd was not a Luddite.
- 1:13:07Mark McGrath: He loved technology, but technology that served ideas, that served people first and foremost.
- 1:13:16GI Wilson: And the application of that technology.
- 1:13:19GI Wilson: I think if Boyd was around today he would be just going gangbusters with AI, figuring out how to leverage it, how to use it, but particularly, you know how to create, particularly for our enemies, ambiguity, uncertainty.
- 1:13:40GI Wilson: Figure out how he could use Love the ambiguity right, oh, it was really, really into creating ambiguity.
- 1:13:47GI Wilson: But he would also figure out how AI could.
- 1:13:52GI Wilson: He would figure out ways that it would be used to drain your adversary's strengths away from them.
- 1:13:58GI Wilson: You know they get them so wrapped around say one product that they were trying to continually increase their product share in just one product line And forget about everything else about it.
- 1:14:12GI Wilson: I remember I was totally unaware of it until Boyd or Chet Richards brought it up one day that he was talking about Neutron Jack from GE, jack Welch How he realized that a product line was going nowhere and he shut the whole product line down.
- 1:14:28GI Wilson: And you mean, that was insight, all right.
- 1:14:33GI Wilson: And then and it was pretty, pretty interesting And sometimes when you you are so emotionally invested in something, you forget to do trade-offs, you forget to step back.
- 1:14:47GI Wilson: And that was the you know the interesting thing we had Boyd and Bill Linn to bounce our ideas off from And they were not part of the organization.
- 1:14:58GI Wilson: Does that make sense?
- 1:14:59GI Wilson: They were detached.
- 1:15:00GI Wilson: They weren't Yeah, totally They weren't emotionally involved.
- 1:15:05GI Wilson: They didn't have their you know their own particular bias about the organization that they worked in.
- 1:15:11GI Wilson: So it always became fascinating And I think you know it's, it's we had, and I say you know, bill Woods and myself and Schmittek, we were young officers at Camp Lejeune and the Maneuver Warfare Board But we had incredible leadership that were open to our ideas And when we screwed up, all right, it was a learning experience.
- 1:15:40GI Wilson: It was not a, it was not a firing experience.
- 1:15:43GI Wilson: And we, we and it it was things, things would happen.
- 1:15:47GI Wilson: It was like I remember General Gray one day walked into the room and he we were in a conference room and he said who was the dumb SOB that did that?
- 1:15:55GI Wilson: And I raised my hand, all right, and he says don't ever do that again.
- 1:16:01GI Wilson: A few days later it came back and he says who's the dumb SOB that did that?
- 1:16:05GI Wilson: And I raised my hand again and said always, here it comes.
- 1:16:08GI Wilson: He says, you know, it worked out pretty well, didn't it?
- 1:16:11GI Wilson: All right, you know, to him, to him at the moment it did not seem like a good idea But after, after several days went by, it turned out, it worked out, worked out pretty well.
- 1:16:25GI Wilson: And you need to have an organization where the that you know people have somebody they can bounce things off from And it was, it was, it was just really great.
- 1:16:36GI Wilson: And also you need to have an organization where you know that you're expected to take the initiative And if you do, if you do, if you do screw up not, you know, not negligently, but if you do it with, with good intent, that it will you'll have the opportunity to redeem yourself or at least demonstrate you won't do it again But it was.
- 1:17:00GI Wilson: It's fascinating how that learning experience which you go back to, it's you know, you hypothesize, test, do analysis, synthesize, then you know that void, that void approach to to dealing with your environment, with reality, Chuck Spinney told me that one of the characteristics of Boyd and I think this is a big takeaway for leaders is that he, boyd, loved to bounce his ideas off.
- 1:17:30Mark McGrath: Others like himself not just have ideas bounced off him, but he loved to bounce his own ideas off others to get Chuck's perspective, chet's perspective, bill Lynn's perspective, your perspective, others to get it challenged from so many directions so that I hate to.
- 1:17:48Mark McGrath: You know I'm trying to think of.
- 1:17:49Mark McGrath: You know, say he had more confidence in what he was talking about, or or or thinking that you know I'm on the right path.
- 1:17:55Mark McGrath: You know, I think Pierre Spray was one that he loved to bump things off of, because Pierre Spray would put it through an empirical buzzsaw And if it could, if it could withstand that, then he thought he was onto something.
- 1:18:09GI Wilson: Yeah, and I'm glad you mentioned Pierre Spray.
- 1:18:13GI Wilson: Yet, as Spinney would say, boyd literally thought out loud And Pierre was, pierre was probably the brightest of that whole group back then.
- 1:18:28GI Wilson: I mean, i would listen to Boyd and I would, i would say what the hell is he talking about?
- 1:18:34GI Wilson: And then, and then I'd have a conversation with Pierre and Pierre would walk, walk me, walk me through it.
- 1:18:40GI Wilson: And you got to remember, pierre was a mathematician but he was also multilingual, so he had the capability and he loved music.
- 1:18:49GI Wilson: I mean he, you know he had a recording studio.
- 1:18:52GI Wilson: I think he had more in love with music than he, than he did the defense industry.
- 1:18:56GI Wilson: But he also came from a background very similar to Boyd which was, you know, in many, many respects mathematics is very specialized, many respects being a pilot is very specialized, but they both, they both realized that that experience was, yes, was valuable, but you had to be able to cross over into other other disciplines.
- 1:19:22GI Wilson: And it was amazing to talk to Pierre because you could.
- 1:19:27GI Wilson: You could be talking about one music one one, one moment, and you could be talking about Gertle the Neck Gertle the next moment.
- 1:19:35GI Wilson: It was.
- 1:19:37GI Wilson: It was just fascinating And and he translated a lot of what Boyd was saying for me at times because, as, as Spitty would point out, boyd was thinking out loud And it was very complex thinking, very, very complex thinking.
- 1:19:59GI Wilson: And it was, you know, and I'll never forget, you know, we were talking about pumping energy in out, dumping it, doing nothing at all, actually, actually, i think that's how Pierre explained it to me, you know, in just basic physics, and I go, wow, this is pretty interesting.
- 1:20:21GI Wilson: But you do, you can, you do the same thing in terms of developing your, your, your, your mental, mental agility.
- 1:20:30GI Wilson: And, again, it was fascinating to see the impact that you know that, and Pierre as well, like Boyd, had upon, you know, the Department of Defense, after, after he was retired.
- 1:20:49GI Wilson: In fact, i, i, i, i.
- 1:20:53GI Wilson: There was one you'll have to ask Chet or Spitty, but there was.
- 1:20:57GI Wilson: There was one, there was one general who said we need to get him back in uniform on active duty so we can keep him under control.
- 1:21:05GI Wilson: All right, i mean they really.
- 1:21:09GI Wilson: I mean that's how powerful his work was, and and I think, i think the the the moment that they let him go home and retire.
- 1:21:18GI Wilson: I think that that that that not shortly thereafter they realized that was really not to their advantage to do that.
- 1:21:25GI Wilson: They would have been better off keeping him, utilizing him in the system, than having him on the outside looking in where he, where he came up with some of the, some of his greatest, greatest work, And I I always find that Yeah, oh, yeah, i agree, yeah, i could not agree more.
- 1:21:46Mark McGrath: I mean that that is so.
- 1:21:48Mark McGrath: Here's a save round.
- 1:21:49Mark McGrath: and for the nonmarines in the audience, save round is something I forgot to mention that I wanted to bring up earlier.
- 1:21:55Mark McGrath: You're talking about how we have to get outside perspectives, how, if, if, if we only look inward, you know, as, as global taught, you know, the system, the system is only going to verify itself right, if, if we're not, and that's going to lead to disaster in the long run.
- 1:22:14Mark McGrath: Chuck reminded me of a term and he said I can't remember if it was.
- 1:22:18Mark McGrath: He says he told me I can't remember if it was me, ray Leopold or boy that came up with the term, but the term that he used, which I think is very instructive for leaders to be on guard for, and it's very instructive for teams to be on guard for, was incestuous amplification.
- 1:22:32Mark McGrath: Yes, and incestuous amplification.
- 1:22:35Mark McGrath: Talk about that, because I think that's that's what you're when, when you were saying if we don't get outside views, if we don't have our assumptions, challenges challenged, we can wind up with incestuous amplification and that's going to destroy us in the long run.
- 1:22:53GI Wilson: Yeah and absolutely right.
- 1:22:54GI Wilson: And basically, you know you, it's like saying you drink, you drink the Kool-Aid.
- 1:23:00GI Wilson: Or your doctrine becomes dogma And there's no, there's no, not, not novelty, there's, there are no mismatches, and it's the.
- 1:23:09GI Wilson: It sort of becomes the safe way to to see something And one of the you know, one of the things that happened and Boyd actually prepared us for it in the old days, way back in the, in the late 70s, when we were developing the medieval warfare concept it was called wire brushing was to take any idea that we had and we would throw it out there, and it didn't matter whether it was peers or somebody junior to us or even even individuals who were senior to us.
- 1:23:43GI Wilson: It was important to have that wire brushing in order to make sure that we saw.
- 1:23:49GI Wilson: We saw the pros and cons of our ideas And if there was any weaknesses in our, in our ideas, or flaws, and you're, you're, you're absolutely right.
- 1:24:01GI Wilson: And if you start start confirming everything, we call it confirmation bias You, you know you.
- 1:24:09GI Wilson: When you start, you start, you start developing a process where you use information that confirms what you think.
- 1:24:16GI Wilson: All right, you're unable to, you're unable to take, and I find it very, very interesting And you see it today, particularly in DC no one, no one they think an argument is is is how loud you scream over somebody else They're unable to to debate things or wire brush things without taking it personal.
- 1:24:43GI Wilson: And when and you notice that when people start taking it personal, then they get right back into what we refer to as confirmation bias, and it it's it's.
- 1:24:53GI Wilson: It's very, very interesting is that you can have very few conversations today with individuals that that you know basically are part of wire brushing.
- 1:25:08GI Wilson: And I, i, i, of all individuals you've probably met or interacted with General Van Ruiper, he'll tell you that he and I have seen things entirely differently.
- 1:25:16GI Wilson: But that does not, does not mean that we don't respect each other.
- 1:25:21GI Wilson: I hold him in high regard, i find.
- 1:25:25GI Wilson: I find him just an absolutely marvelous thinking.
- 1:25:29GI Wilson: And then I I talked to individuals on, say, active duty today, young officers, and they'll look and they immediately label you call you an old retired guy, and of course I laugh, i go think a boy, i think a boy, old retired guy, boy, changed, changed a lot of things, but they immediately that's that's what I refer to as labeling, because they don't want to get into the wire brushing, they don't want to hear something.
- 1:25:58Mark McGrath: Yet There's counter to what they want to hear, and that's now they wind up attacking the person, not the, not the map right, they attack the person, not the, not the map Or not the sand table or the issue.
- 1:26:11GI Wilson: This the issue at hand.
- 1:26:13GI Wilson: So I always very very, very Interesting I've packed up.
- 1:26:18GI Wilson: An old retired guy wrote an article about old retired people and Basically, you know, said well, they're, they're old, they're old retired folks.
- 1:26:30GI Wilson: I thought that was fascinating Example, great example of an old retired guy mocking In giving you know the backhand to old retired people, and he's retired himself.
- 1:26:42GI Wilson: And of course, that's a great example of dogma when you have a retired guy criticizing retired people were wire brushing, a Concept that's supposed to be the latest and the greatest.
- 1:26:55GI Wilson: And they and they have, they take real umbrage With somebody, somebody from the outside, which I find even more fascinating, somebody from the outside criticizing it, trying to point out some, some of the flaws in it.
- 1:27:08GI Wilson: So you know, and that's who gets right back to all right, incestuous amplification.
- 1:27:15Mark McGrath: Okay, it's this was amplification.
- 1:27:18GI Wilson: It's not only drinking the Kool-Aid.
- 1:27:19GI Wilson: Is drinking the Kool-Aid and believing your own BS At the same time?
- 1:27:24GI Wilson: It's, it's, it's what's what's bringing?
- 1:27:28GI Wilson: home Oh.
- 1:27:32Mark McGrath: Yeah, i mean it.
- 1:27:34Mark McGrath: It's a concept in a term that that leaders need to be very familiar with and guard against it, because by by not understanding these concepts and again, we know them to be applicable everywhere By not understanding these concepts, you're gonna have exactly that incestuous amplification, and you know it's not necessarily something that could be measured or quantified, but you could probably bet that companies that no longer exists or or teams that got there, you know what's handed to them.
- 1:28:05Mark McGrath: It's, it's likely that incestuous amplification was a big part of their, their downfall.
- 1:28:11Mark McGrath: Yeah, let's, let's shift.
- 1:28:14GI Wilson: Let's as we, incestuous amplification.
- 1:28:17GI Wilson: Oh good, yeah, sorry, um, i once heard incestuous amplification described as getting the feedback loop that you want.
- 1:28:24GI Wilson: All right, you know.
- 1:28:27GI Wilson: In other words, it's, it's, it's, it's all it.
- 1:28:29GI Wilson: you're getting the feedback that you only want to hear and that that's.
- 1:28:33GI Wilson: I thought it was a pretty decent, decent, taken on One aspect of am you know, incestuous amplification And you, and sometimes you know it's, you can't, you can't get that a feedback Unless you let you go outside the system.
- 1:28:52GI Wilson: In other words, you can't measure the system with the system and you you can't Really peer into the system by getting the system to look into it.
- 1:29:02GI Wilson: You know it's like it's.
- 1:29:04GI Wilson: It's like A corporation has their internal security investigate something in the corporation And, of course, the security who works for the corporation.
- 1:29:15GI Wilson: They're gonna do what's good for the Corporation.
- 1:29:17GI Wilson: So it's the yeah outside, what's the word they use?
- 1:29:24GI Wilson: outside counsel, they like assess the word there.
- 1:29:26Mark McGrath: Yeah yeah, incestuous amplification is where and I've seen Boyd quote in some of the transcripts the Pogo, the famous Pogo Cartoon.
- 1:29:36Mark McGrath: You know we have met the enemy and he is us.
- 1:29:39Mark McGrath: And An incestuous amplification is you are your own worst enemy at that point and Your competitors that can identify that.
- 1:29:49Mark McGrath: So let's say you have a competitor that it understands Boyd and studies Boyd and gets these concepts.
- 1:29:52Mark McGrath: They're going to amplify your incestuous amplification to ensure that you are no longer a competitive threat to them right Or you know, or they'll get you to expand resources.
- 1:30:06GI Wilson: You don't have to expand, trying to try, trying trying to make Yeah, i mean that's, that's you know draining, draining your strength away from your adversary, get, getting them to spend more on marketing and spend a fortune on average.
- 1:30:23GI Wilson: I mean it, that's exactly right.
- 1:30:27Mark McGrath: Yeah, bleed them dry, it's just.
- 1:30:29Mark McGrath: Yeah, it's, it's something, so let's, let's bring it home.
- 1:30:30Mark McGrath: We're getting towards the the end here, but you wrote, ten years after you meet Boyd, more or less, you wrote a co-wrote, a seminal article The changing face of war into the fourth generation.
- 1:30:44Mark McGrath: And In addition to yourself, there's some other luminaries that were your co-authors, to include Colonel Michael Wiley, as we've mentioned, or, i'm sorry, not Mike Wiley John Schmidt, who's one of the principal forces behind war fighting, bill Lind, who is one of the principal drivers behind, you know, maneuver war fare and the maneuver warfare handbook and the study of fourth generation warfare.
- 1:31:07Mark McGrath: Colonel Keith Nightingale and and Colonel Joseph Sutton.
- 1:31:11Mark McGrath: You, you co-authored this paper and then, maybe a little over ten years later, i read it others read it, i'm sure, and I think that other other Other organizations and other places Have have read it.
- 1:31:30Mark McGrath: We've talked several times on the podcast with others about unrestricted warfare, which is On a lot of the, a lot of the military, military reading lists, and now, once again, we find ourselves in a, a discussion, you know, a well-known, a very public discussion about, you know, the future of Where the Marine Corps should go and what it should do, and it's nothing new.
- 1:31:58Mark McGrath: This has happened to the Marine Corps Time and time and time again.
- 1:32:04Mark McGrath: You know over our 200 and Almost the 47 years of existence, or almost 248 years of years of existence.
- 1:32:13Mark McGrath: So once again we find ourselves in a debate.
- 1:32:17Mark McGrath: You start writing about the changing things that we're doing.
- 1:32:22Mark McGrath: We start writing about the changing face of war.
- 1:32:27Mark McGrath: A publication comes out for a potential american adversary, or we're, you know, we're told, we read about.
- 1:32:34Mark McGrath: It seems like they understand sun sue and they understand boyd, and they understand a lot of the Concepts that boyd was talking about, that It's not necessarily battle on a battlefield or it's not necessarily a weapon system versus weapon system, that it might be media, financial, maybe social media, that there's other other ways to to confront your, your adversary.
- 1:33:01Mark McGrath: Well, let's talk about that first.
- 1:33:04Mark McGrath: You know what's the effect of that paper, that article, i mean?
- 1:33:08Mark McGrath: it seems to me it was very, it was very prescient.
- 1:33:12GI Wilson: Yeah, it was.
- 1:33:13GI Wilson: It was We were trying to figure out What threats we were going to be facing in the future and we were trying to figure out how to basically Um being able to predict the least likely thing that would happen black swans.
- 1:33:28GI Wilson: We were concerned about black swans at the time And if you noticed on those authors they were, they were, there were marines, their army and there was a civilian, so it was a multidisciplinary team.
- 1:33:43GI Wilson: Um, one of the things that at that time I was studying quite, quite a bit with gangs and how effective gangs are and how they operate, um, and particularly the flat business models that that gangs have.
- 1:33:56GI Wilson: You know, we used to think of gangs as being, you know, they would control a certain part of the city.
- 1:34:01GI Wilson: You know, today we have international Gangs, gangs that you know work across borders.
- 1:34:07GI Wilson: Um, we have adversaries Uh, we sometimes refer to musteris that you know they work across borders.
- 1:34:15GI Wilson: Um, and we even thought about back then such things as invasion by immigration, which we're, we're, we're f we're facing today, but you know, other than artillery or aircraft, what could be seen or used as weapons?
- 1:34:33GI Wilson: and we were saying, you know everything, from money To, you know, to oil, um, uh to.
- 1:34:40GI Wilson: You know, uh, supply lines, um And how, how those things could come into play and how would you take down um a culture, a democracy that you know afforded individuals all kinds of opportunities.
- 1:34:59GI Wilson: And You know, we we looked at, we looked at, we looked at how gangs often use the very particular Um uh, particularly international uh street gangs when it comes to um moving narcotics and human trafficking.
- 1:35:13GI Wilson: You know they if, if they get arrested In our country, they use the very laws Uh that we have in place to defend themselves with.
- 1:35:23GI Wilson: You know, so we, we, our system, our system helps them defend ourselves.
- 1:35:29GI Wilson: So you say, wow, that's pretty fascinating, they're using the bureaucracy against itself.
- 1:35:33GI Wilson: Right, like what are you saying?
- 1:35:35GI Wilson: They're using the bureaucracy against themselves.
- 1:35:37GI Wilson: So we started, we started saying, you know, um, what will what?
- 1:35:40GI Wilson: what could we possibly face in the future?
- 1:35:43GI Wilson: Because we, we knew, we knew that gangs would, would, they would, they would never try to, um, completely take over, because they always wanted the ability to operate within a certain environment, to be allowed to operate without having to say, run a state or run a county.
- 1:36:01GI Wilson: Uh, but they, but they wanted to be able to, to operate.
- 1:36:05GI Wilson: And we looked, we looked at things Like we're referred to the blurring of targets, where everything in a society becomes targetable, whether it's just not, you know, once, once nation state military Facing off against another nation state military, where that individuals may or may not wear uniforms, in most cases wouldn't be wearing the uniform.
- 1:36:29GI Wilson: Those individuals would blend back into society very quickly.
- 1:36:33GI Wilson: Um, gang members do the same thing, all right, uh, they, they blend back in very, very quickly in many, in many cases, particularly when somebody's looking for them.
- 1:36:42GI Wilson: So we, we, we began toying around with the idea of looking at things through what we call a fourth generation warfare lens.
- 1:36:51GI Wilson: Um, and as a result, as a result of that, we, we discovered that, yes, you could use everything from economics, oil, pharmaceutical supply lines.
- 1:37:06GI Wilson: You could use those as tools or weapons to to, to shape, um, your future, um, and we, we begin to realize the most fascinating thing.
- 1:37:17GI Wilson: We begin to realize back then, the nation state was losing Okay, it's monopoly over what we refer to as as violence.
- 1:37:25GI Wilson: All right, we, we were, we were discovering That terrorists that did not wear uniforms, did not have air superiority, did even have a fixed wing Aircraft, could, all right, grab ha headlines by, by Creating horrific, horrific events, so, and they would cross borders, um, and You know, borders became, became meaningless, um, the average ordinary citizen was now targetable in in society, was just not not the military itself.
- 1:38:00GI Wilson: And then, and then, you know, you saw the advent of cyber warfare, where you know anything on the internet That is now a target, whether it's the banking system, whether it's the healthcare system.
- 1:38:13GI Wilson: And you, you see, not only do do banks get hacked, but hospitals get hacked And, in significant rancor, are paid.
- 1:38:21GI Wilson: So it, we, we began looking at that.
- 1:38:24GI Wilson: And then, that's then we, we think The, the chinese paid a particularly, a particular amount of attention looking, looking at that, and they came up with their own version Of what we referred to as the fourth generation warfare lens, or how we, how, another way of looking, another perspective at looking at what conflict may or may not be like in the future.
- 1:38:48GI Wilson: Um, and if you, if you watch what the chinese are doing today, they're executing it very well.
- 1:38:55GI Wilson: You know, for example, all right, i, i love that, you know, they, they, they have absolutely doing They're, they're seeing the opportunity.
- 1:39:05GI Wilson: They're seeing an opportunity with, with ukraine.
- 1:39:07GI Wilson: All right, they're now buying Russian oil.
- 1:39:11GI Wilson: The chinese are at a, a, a pretty good discount, because nobody else is buying russian oil.
- 1:39:18GI Wilson: You know russian oil.
- 1:39:20GI Wilson: Then, at the same time, the chinese are offering to negotiate.
- 1:39:23GI Wilson: Uh, and, and, when they're offering to negotiate, they're offering the ukrainians Well, we'd like to be part of the rebuilding of ukraine.
- 1:39:31GI Wilson: So They're, they're, they're really playing this.
- 1:39:36GI Wilson: This is quite well, um, at this point.
- 1:39:39GI Wilson: But also, you know, look at the supply chain problems we've had, um, and we've discovered how dependent we are on china for many, many things.
- 1:39:50GI Wilson: Um, you know, we're, we're, we're, we're busy trying to think of how to create a, a imaginal line in the pacific that the chinese will have trouble to to cross, but we've failed to realize the chinese control All the port services in every major port in the world.
- 1:40:09GI Wilson: So, they don't, they don't worry, they don't have to worry about going across that, that magical line.
- 1:40:13GI Wilson: They are in, around and behind us already.
- 1:40:16GI Wilson: I just think if they shut down the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal or the other thing, is that they, they, they have Infiltrated our educational system, particularly the research.
- 1:40:29GI Wilson: So this all plays into Looking at, looking at things to up, you know, a fourth-generation warfare lens.
- 1:40:38Mark McGrath: So it seems like they paid attention to your article.
- 1:40:40Mark McGrath: That was a said very predictive impression and was 12 years Prior to it.
- 1:40:45Mark McGrath: And in the seventh chapter of that book and really throughout the whole book, and again It's on all the reading lists.
- 1:40:50Mark McGrath: This is not some conspiracy tone that, that that's esoteric and hard to find now.
- 1:40:55Mark McGrath: This is an actual Application.
- 1:40:57Mark McGrath: That's on a lot of our various services reading lists.
- 1:41:01Mark McGrath: That it's amazing to me how often they quote ourselves, they quote American leaders and defense White papers and things of that nature.
- 1:41:13Mark McGrath: But the seventh chapter is entitled ten thousand methods combined as one, combinations that Transcend boundaries, and it's summarized well in the introduction that you're saying.
- 1:41:23Mark McGrath: You know the things that you're talking about financial warfare, smuggling warfare, cultural warfare, drug warfare, media fabrication warfare, technological warfare, resources warfare, psychological warfare, network warfare, international law warfare, environmental warfare and economic warfare.
- 1:41:41Mark McGrath: And they say economic aid warfare rather.
- 1:41:44Mark McGrath: And the quote that they start the chapter with It's from Alvin Toffler and it says today's wars will affect the prices of gasoline and pipelines, the price of food and supermarkets And the price of securities on the stock exchange.
- 1:41:57Mark McGrath: They will also disrupt the ecological balance and push their way into our homes by way of the television screen or The iPhone or the or the computer.
- 1:42:07Mark McGrath: So I guess, tying it back to Boyd, it seems to me that They have a pretty good understanding of, maybe we would say at a superficial level, we'd say, the way Sun Sue would approach war as a moral and mental game, less physical versus sort of the Western industrialized physical game, because the mental, immoral shifts with with every different administration or whatever, and it's all over the place.
- 1:42:38Mark McGrath: But they're playing a much longer game and this is, seems to me, exactly what Boyd is counseling us.
- 1:42:45Mark McGrath: In patterns of conflict and other things that we're, we're, we're, we're putting ourselves in a in a bad spot maybe.
- 1:42:55GI Wilson: Yeah, and it all goes back to, you know, boyd's emphasis on people and ideas It people I do, is it then?
- 1:43:03GI Wilson: yeah, i think I think you're, i think you're absolutely right, boyd was boyd.
- 1:43:08Mark McGrath: We find out I was gonna.
- 1:43:11GI Wilson: Yeah, boys was gonna say, so we find ourselves in these, this oh.
- 1:43:14GI Wilson: Sorry, yeah, no, i was gonna say boyd was always emphasizing the moral mental.
- 1:43:20GI Wilson: I think it was Sun Sue is what?
- 1:43:22GI Wilson: three to one?
- 1:43:23GI Wilson: the morals, the mental is something he also was a big fan of Musashi.
- 1:43:28GI Wilson: You know the book of five rings again, which is has the phenomenal mental aspect to it.
- 1:43:36GI Wilson: But you're, you're, you're, you're, i think, 100% on the money.
- 1:43:43Mark McGrath: But it and it did so so let's look at it this way.
- 1:43:46Mark McGrath: so So there's a debate, a discussion.
- 1:43:50Mark McGrath: It's very public, it's very vocal, it's all over LinkedIn, it's all over everywhere.
- 1:43:54Mark McGrath: You know, sometimes it's just summarized as force design 2030 and you know people are coming down on one side or the other, or people see Merit in in both sides.
- 1:44:04Mark McGrath: You know, from your perspective, as someone that was there at the very beginnings of the maneuver movement and interacted and collaborated with Boyd, just using that as a frame of reference, just using maneuver thinking, just using fourth generation warfare thinking, just using boyd, what are the questions or considerations that you would recommend someone think about To the you know, the undecided voter, if you will, the unmoved person in the in the discussion, what are some of the questions that you would think?
- 1:44:35Mark McGrath: Again, given that sort of boyd maneuver for fourth generation warfare background, what are some of the questions that need to be asked and address?
- 1:44:44Mark McGrath: What would you recommend?
- 1:44:47GI Wilson: Well, a couple of things.
- 1:44:48GI Wilson: First of all, i'm not a fan of force design 2030, but all right, i I thought.
- 1:44:57GI Wilson: As I read and studied it, i thought that there was a phenomenal effort by the individuals who were conceptualizing Force design 2030 at the very top.
- 1:45:08GI Wilson: In other words, they're trying to institute change from the top.
- 1:45:10GI Wilson: They were trying to create mismatches for the Chinese.
- 1:45:14GI Wilson: And I think that's, that's a very significant goal to have, and that's not new in the Marine Corps, right?
- 1:45:23Mark McGrath: That's not new.
- 1:45:23Mark McGrath: We're always reinventing ourselves.
- 1:45:25GI Wilson: We're always Innovating, we're always looking for better ways.
- 1:45:29GI Wilson: Yes, and I, and, and I was, and when I first read The common odds planning guidance that he put out, it was very, very excited because there was a lot of really good stuff in there about you know, adapting and Changing and being able to adjust your you know first decision with your second, that, that whole idea of people and ideas not over reliance on technology.
- 1:45:56GI Wilson: And then, all of a sudden, this force design thing was conceived and what?
- 1:46:02GI Wilson: what I Referred to as a closed loop, in other words, much of it was shrouded in non-disclosures.
- 1:46:10GI Wilson: It was done from top down And I would say from the maneuver warfare days.
- 1:46:15GI Wilson: I would prefer to have seen the change come from bottom up, where everything was wirebrushed in advance.
- 1:46:22GI Wilson: You know, like one of the big shortfalls with force design 2030s logistics, and now they're just thinking about The ludge, the logistics.
- 1:46:32GI Wilson: So the you know how you go about change Is interesting organization.
- 1:46:38GI Wilson: I know that in in Either one of the force design 2030 iterations or maybe is the common odds planning guidance.
- 1:46:47GI Wilson: He refers to codder, who is supposed to be a change expert from from Harvard, and Just the he I believe he said that just to begin implementing change only has about a 30% chance of happening.
- 1:47:03GI Wilson: Okay, just beginning the implementation change, that's not the sustainment of it, that's not seeing the follows through, that's not the follow-up, that's not the outcome, that's just be, you know, just begin.
- 1:47:16GI Wilson: Kind of interesting, particularly if you, if you start things from the top down And I know there, there, there are probably various ways of looking at it, but I think Boyd would say you would want to start from from the bottom up, wire, brush everything, bounce your ideas, socialize your ideas from from the ground up.
- 1:47:37GI Wilson: And Boyd was a master at trading, trading off things.
- 1:47:41GI Wilson: And Why would you want to give up people for structure and equipment before before you actually have all the capabilities you need are in place?
- 1:47:54GI Wilson: And I've seen that happen.
- 1:47:57GI Wilson: We gave up a lot of different assets, whether it was aviation or artillery, or engineers, so on and so forth.
- 1:48:04GI Wilson: We gave up that capability Before we had something to backfill it with, and they called it divesting to invest, alright.
- 1:48:13GI Wilson: And And it's really unfortunate, because I think that there was some really good thinking That was behind Forced force design 2030 and that, and that was that the Marine Corps, you know, needs to be on the leading edge of innovation, but not so much in terms of technology but in terms of Creativity, imagination, and now it's all become about one one threat, one region using one technology long-range precision fires.
- 1:48:51GI Wilson: In the history of the effectiveness of long-range Precision fires Has as often been called into question, and again, i think that what happened is that a lot of force design 2030, which I thought was Really going to be headed in the right direction, got caught up in incestuous Amplification because they developed a closed loop at the at the top.
- 1:49:21GI Wilson: Am I?
- 1:49:21GI Wilson: am I making sense?
- 1:49:24Mark McGrath: Because yeah, no and I I The idea of creating this message is great, yeah, yeah, and I, you know, i've been out of the Marine Corps longer than I was in it and you never leave the Marines, as you know.
- 1:49:40Mark McGrath: I mean, you know, and I have friends on both sides of the argument and I find myself Still somewhere in the middle, because I, i guess my concern is the things that I read in unrestricted warfare is that We, the, the, you describe a magical line in the, in the, in the sea, that might, net, might might not ever have to come into play.
- 1:50:01Mark McGrath: And if the closer I look at patterns of conflict, the closer I read Sun Sue, we kind of want your enemy to do that and defeat him with tiktok or defeat him with, with, with, with something else, as the things that they annotate in there in their white paper, you know, drugs, economic warfare, resource warfare, etc.
- 1:50:24Mark McGrath: There's other ways to To confront them, and that's that.
- 1:50:27Mark McGrath: I guess that's the big question that I have is That when you know we're, we're thinking we have there's a fourth-generation warfare Handbook and there's still a lot of scholarship that's ongoing, because it's a very fluid.
- 1:50:40Mark McGrath: It's a very fluid discussion.
- 1:50:41Mark McGrath: I feel like Boyd would be In that.
- 1:50:45Mark McGrath: I think that he would have a lot to say.
- 1:50:46Mark McGrath: I can't speculate to imagine what exactly he would say.
- 1:50:49Mark McGrath: You might have a better idea and you've shared some things there.
- 1:50:52Mark McGrath: I just think that, the way we think, the moral level will be the differentiator, probably more so than the physical levels.
- 1:51:06GI Wilson: There's a good chance of that.
- 1:51:08GI Wilson: What I see happening is that is that I Don't know how and maybe there is.
- 1:51:15GI Wilson: That's one of the questions I have How do you take the Marine Corps doctoral base Which, more fighting, is a seminal document and translate that into Being focused on one enemy in one theater, using one technology long-range precision fighters?
- 1:51:35GI Wilson: you know, there's, i I think that you should be able to adjust and be able to adapt, and I'm not sure how you do that When you, when you no longer Can, can provide.
- 1:51:47GI Wilson: You're basically servicing targets.
- 1:51:50GI Wilson: You create a marginal line, you're fixed to an island and you're servicing targets, but they, the Chinese, have what?
- 1:51:57GI Wilson: 64 million square miles of ocean to move around in and you're fixed.
- 1:52:02GI Wilson: You're fixed in a marginal line and the Chinese already Control the port services and all the major ports in the world.
- 1:52:11GI Wilson: The Chinese have the corner on the rare earth's market.
- 1:52:14GI Wilson: The Chinese could really put a hurt on us when it comes to some pharmaceuticals.
- 1:52:20GI Wilson: So you start saying wait, wait, wait a minute.
- 1:52:24GI Wilson: And, by the way, in the meantime, who is expending all their resources in?
- 1:52:30GI Wilson: in Ukraine, china or the US?
- 1:52:32GI Wilson: So you, you you kind of?
- 1:52:36GI Wilson: say you say you know, i guess the Chinese took void seriously, Because he would have emphasized here's what the, the moral, mental.
- 1:52:46Mark McGrath: I Think what's fascinating and why we'll link to the article.
- 1:52:52Mark McGrath: The changing face of war into the fourth generation was Fascinating about that to me, gi, as a scholar of history and someone that remembers those days very well I was, i was 13, you wrote this.
- 1:53:06Mark McGrath: It was published in the Marine Corps Gazette, october of 1989.
- 1:53:10Mark McGrath: The very next month, the Berlin Wall fell down and Not long after that the Soviet Union crumbled into a million pieces and then the, the, the, the Yugoslavia fell apart and there was this, terrible, terrible wars and in Bosnia and other places.
- 1:53:31Mark McGrath: And it's amazing that the month before You that all happened was when your article was Was published.
- 1:53:40Mark McGrath: And at the time what was everybody preparing for?
- 1:53:44Mark McGrath: I mean, when I went to fill artillery school, and in 1999, ten years later, and we were still learning how to attack BRDMs and we were still learning about, you know, soviet battle formations and things.
- 1:53:56Mark McGrath: I mean things that we're never gonna, no one ever dealt with, you know.
- 1:54:03GI Wilson: Artillery played a primary Suppression of air defense and artillery is yes, you two, three, four in the open.
- 1:54:13GI Wilson: Yeah, but I mean, if you look what's, happening in Ukraine today, the artillery is is at many, many, at many instances, used to to Blind the, the Russians Radars and their acquisition radars and and some some of their command, command and control.
- 1:54:34GI Wilson: But it's it's kind of funny because we, if you look, if you look at what's going on in Ukraine, and everybody's number one, i think they've jumped to a lot of lessons learned, except that you do notice, they asked for tanks, all right, they asked for artillery.
- 1:54:50GI Wilson: They asked for, they asked for a lot of the.
- 1:54:54GI Wilson: You know this, the stuff that's been a, it's been around for a while.
- 1:54:57GI Wilson: So it's kind, it's kind of interesting to see how things unfold.
- 1:55:01GI Wilson: But I I think then You know, if you go back and look at forces, vine 2030 and the, i think the original tent was to in fact create mismatches on a on a different, different kind of lack of a better word battlefield or on a global scale.
- 1:55:24GI Wilson: That that, that that was, you know, probably a pretty good perspective.
- 1:55:30GI Wilson: It's about how they decided to institute that change, that that I think a lot of individuals have Have issues with and giving up stuff that you have you don't have to replace with.
- 1:55:43GI Wilson: And again, it seems to be more about long-range precision fires and hardware than it is about people, people and ideas.
- 1:55:50GI Wilson: And I'm not sure how any of our doctrine today, the Marine Corps doctrine today, would fit.
- 1:55:57GI Wilson: You know, maneuver warfare tends to be proactive, offensive in nature and we're talking about, you know, becoming somewhat defensive, fixed and do target servicing.
- 1:56:07GI Wilson: I, you know, i'm not, i'm not sure how, how that would fit.
- 1:56:12GI Wilson: And, and there have been, there was a lieutenant colonel by the name I think his name is drake which He is proposed and maybe rightly so to do away with warfighting, mcdp1, you know, because it it the, the doctrine and the ethos and the war fighting mentality today is catty wampus with the with the force design 2030.
- 1:56:38GI Wilson: So he he may conflict he absolutely right.
- 1:56:43GI Wilson: I'm, i'm, i'm open to that, but I, i'm, i'm just Or flexed on on how the change was was instituted because it It, yeah, it's.
- 1:56:54GI Wilson: Nobody wants to openly debate it And you know, the first thing you hear is about all those old retired guys.
- 1:57:01GI Wilson: Don't know what they're talking about.
- 1:57:02GI Wilson: Um, i never heard anybody say that about john john boyd after he retired.
- 1:57:07GI Wilson: They always just went running the other way, said, oh my gosh, here comes boy.
- 1:57:11GI Wilson: Um, they may have a point if you, if your idea is so good And if you think you're doing the right thing that it should be open To wire brushing.
- 1:57:23Mark McGrath: Well, as boyd taught us, if I'm staring at an equilateral triangle And I'm going to die on the hill, that it's an equilateral triangle And I'm missing the perspectives of the people that saw square, or saw square with an accident, or saw a Triangle with a line down it, i could actually be looking at a pyramid.
- 1:57:41Mark McGrath: And if I only prepared for equilateral triangle and it in turn, it in fact turns out to be a pyramid, i'm in a lot of trouble.
- 1:57:52GI Wilson: So I mean, you know, i mean it.
- 1:57:55GI Wilson: It our, our philosophy, our doctrine prepared us to be a force and readiness.
- 1:57:59GI Wilson: All right, and I, i, i, i've gotten the impression that force design 2030 No longer sees us a force and readiness, but a, a, a force for one theater, one enemy and for long range Precision fires designed for target servicing.
- 1:58:18GI Wilson: So I, you know, i, we should, then we should change, then we need to change everything else, um, and maybe lieutenant colonel drake was right.
- 1:58:27GI Wilson: You know, do away with uh, uh, marine Corps, uh, mc vd, dp1,.
- 1:58:34GI Wilson: You know, warfighting, it was meant to be timeless, um, but I, i, i, i think that You know, it would be quite candid.
- 1:58:43GI Wilson: Probably, maneuver warfare has been dead in the Marine Corps for about 20 years.
- 1:58:46GI Wilson: Um, it's been replaced by, you know, buzzwords, and it's been.
- 1:58:50GI Wilson: And you have whole generations of officers who Think they know what maneuver warfare is.
- 1:58:55GI Wilson: But they, they, they've grown up in a, in a, uh, um, they, you know, in an environment where technology, technology, technology becomes a priority over reliance and technology, um, so you know and we see one of the things that really drives punchy up a wall.
- 1:59:15Mark McGrath: Uh, and I know other boy enthusiasts and scholars share this is when you see a lot of those same, because I used to do it too until I really got the context after I left the Marine Corps.
- 1:59:26Mark McGrath: Teaching UDA is a four-step process that you use in certain occasions and not in others.
- 1:59:32Mark McGrath: It just you've missed the force for the trees and, um, that's really what we're trying to help People understand, whether they're Marines, whether they're not, whether they're military or or not.
- 1:59:43Mark McGrath: That when you understand concepts effectively and you continue to learn and develop the thinking, which is the whole Three reason our podcast even exists is to challenge assumptions And it's to.
- 1:59:55Mark McGrath: It's to have those debates and you know I've talked to people as you have, on on both sides of the discussion.
- 2:00:02Mark McGrath: Um, like I said, i can see, certainly see merits on on on both sides and in some things, and That's the kind of discourse that we were trained as Marines to have in a non, nothing against the person, but against the uh, or you know, constructive to the, to the mission and what we're supposed to do, and that's um, i think that's a very valuable thing to do You have to have those kinds of discourses?
- 2:00:27Mark McGrath: same thing in a company if you don't have Transparent discourse, if you don't have effective feedback.
- 2:00:33Mark McGrath: Somebody saw something.
- 2:00:35Mark McGrath: It's going to be a problem down the road, but everybody ignored that person because they were a lower rank.
- 2:00:41Mark McGrath: Or everybody ignored that person because, well, i don't work in that Silo, i work in this silo, or has nothing to do with me, and and that sort of uh, that, that sort of approach Is just not effective and it's it's not how we improve capacity for, for an independent action.
- 2:00:59Mark McGrath: And I'm with you, i think that destruction and creation and, um, the conceptual spiral are the, the, the top of the pyramid of uh, of, of, of void briefings.
- 2:01:11Mark McGrath: So, um, g I, i can't thank you enough for for joining me today.
- 2:01:17Mark McGrath: Um, it means especially, you know, a lot to me personally and I'll tell you why, and you can see I wore my.
- 2:01:23Mark McGrath: You know we are brother marines.
- 2:01:27Mark McGrath: Today is the 25th anniversary as we record today.
- 2:01:30Mark McGrath: Uh, today is the 25th anniversary of my commissioning as a second lieutenant in the marine corps, and and I could not think of a better way to spend it than Uh talking with a mentor and a friend and a brother marine about somebody that we both admire, and uh continue to study, and uh continue to learn more and more every day because of and that's that's Colonel John Boyd.
- 2:01:51Mark McGrath: So thank you very much for uh, for allowing uh the opportunity to spend the the occasion with you in that respect.
- 2:02:00GI Wilson: My pleasure.
- 2:02:04Mark McGrath: Semper fi, and we'll talk soon.
- 2:02:06Mark McGrath: So for the um, um semper fi.
- 2:02:08Mark McGrath: So for the don't go anywhere.
- 2:02:10Mark McGrath: I'm just gonna stop the recording.