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Inside Trump’s China Policy with Miles Yu | China Considered | Hoover Institution · China Considered

• 0:07
  - Welcome to China.
• 0:08
  Considered a podcast that brings fresh insight
• 0:11
  and informed discussion to one
• 0:12
  of the most consequential issues of our time,
• 0:14
  how China's changing and changing the world.
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  Today, I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Miles.
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  Yu Miles is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute,
• 0:23
  where he also directs the China Center.
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  In addition, he's a professor at the US Naval Academy,
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  and most interestingly,
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  perhaps he was Secretary Pompeo's top China advisor
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  during the first Trump administration. Welcome Miles.
• 0:37
  - Hi, Liz. Thank you for inviting me
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  and glad to be able to share my thoughts
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  with you in this very unique and modern forum.
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  - It's really great to have you, miles.
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  So let me start off with a little bit
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  of a personal note or question.
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  You grew up in China in the 1960s and 1970s,
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  and then came to the United States in the 1980s.
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  But you know, in the course of your sort
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  of 20 odd years in China,
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  you experienced the cultural revolution,
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  which certainly is one
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  of contemporary China's most tumultuous periods.
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  How did the cultural revolution, recognizing of course,
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  that you were still, you know, very little,
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  how did it shape your thinking about China, if, if at all?
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  - Well, actually it's, it's pretty profound.
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  I'm, I'm sure you know, this is not like a Oprah Winfrey
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  level, but the childhood does really affect people's
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  opinion when they grow up and how they look at the world,
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  how, how this childhood memory actually guide
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  their behavior in a way.
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  So you're, you're right, I was quite young
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  during the cultural version,
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  but my parents went through all those sort of, you know,
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  pretty extraordinary periods in China since
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  in the 1950s and and sixties.
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  So from then, I really had the probable sense
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  of this very unique period of, in China's history,
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  it's like somebody went through the
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  French Revolution, right?
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  You see all the violence, you see all this rhetoric, and,
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  and then when the dust settled down
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  and you realize what we have done, what we have seen.
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  So, cultural erosion means a lot of things to me.
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  And I think one of the things that when I,
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  well actually I became quite aware
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  of in a very intellectual level toward the end
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  of the cultural erosion when I was a teenager.
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  So I did witness a lot of things,
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  which is a very fundamentally shocking, in retrospect,
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  prisoners being executed as, as almost as a sign
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  of entertainment for, for teenagers.
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  So those kind of shocking memory also, the,
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  the brutal practice of, of family planning, right?
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  So one child policy, those things actually come back
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  to haunt you when, once you are on a free soil.
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  So, and I think, you know, basically the excess
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  of the state is actually unbelievable when you come
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  to the United States, the government, yes, the,
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  they tax you, but they're so far away, you can do a lot
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  of things that really,
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  freedom means something very concrete to me.
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  So when I first got an inkling come
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  to the United States was when I heard the Ronald Reagan
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  debating Jimmy Carter in 1980
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  during the presidential election when,
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  when Reagan says something like, you know,
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  evil freedom is lost here in the, in the United States.
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  There is no escape, nowhere to escape to,
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  and this is the last chance on earth.
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  And I wa that was very, very shocking to me.
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  So I came here during the Reagan years
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  and exactly second that kind of, you know,
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  detachment from the excess of the state.
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  And I think, you know, over the years, obviously
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  I did have a very comparative perspective
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  because I live in the United States.
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  Actually, my experience in the United States is much longer
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  than my life in China now, almost double.
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  So I come to appreciate the, the meaning, two meaning
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  of being American,
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  and not just the convenience of the passport for travel,
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  but a model of governance different from China's.
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  So that draw that drew me to not just to live
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  as an American, but also to study what means
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  and my scholarly interest and my research
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  and my fascination with American history,
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  culture, accessories, et cetera.
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  So I might say, you know, without, you know, something like,
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  you know, self-promoting i I, my scholarly life devoted
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  to sort of a not only China study,
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  but also to American study too,
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  that giving a very interesting
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  and I think useful perspective.
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  - Yeah, I mean, I think it's interesting
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  because some people from China come here
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  and you came, what year did you come actually?
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  - 1985. - 1985.
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  So you, you were coming then
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  as a college student or a graduate
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  - Student, you know, God, you mentioned Yo, I study U2 Liz,
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  because we went to the same school.
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  I came to Swarthmore. Oh, that's your alma mater.
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  So I had a very, very fond memory
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  of my two years at Swarthmore.
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  Very extraordinary, very painful by the way,
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  because it's not like, you know,
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  I originally watched a Robin Williams fascinating movie
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  called The Moscow on the Hudson.
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  Oh yeah. I think he deserved the,
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  definitely deserved the Oscar for some reason.
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  It is about the Russian sort musician
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  defected to New York City.
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  I mean, it's not all about the hunky dory.
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  All of a sudden you become free man and you become free
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  because you upbringing your way of thinking was
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  so motivated in the communist system.
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  When I enter Swarthmore, I sort
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  of in classroom discuss some issues
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  with my American colleagues or college students,
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  and there are free thinkers no matter how
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  incomplete their thinking are, but their own.
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  And I was so formatted over there,
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  that was a very painful realization
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  that basically prompted me to go through two years
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  of very painful, deep programming of myself.
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  - Wow. And then what did you do after that?
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  So you were there from, that was 84 to 86?
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  - Well, I was 85. - 85,
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  - Okay.
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  So after that I went to this wonderful institution called
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  the University of California at Berkeley, where I, I really,
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  really did gain a new birth of freedom to, to quote Lincoln.
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  So it was, it was amazing experience.
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  I spent seven years there getting my doctorate
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  in, in history.
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  And after that I came
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  to this great institution called the United States Naval
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  Academy, and I've been teaching here ever since.
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  So it's, my life is, is very,
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  very exciting to some, but also it's very boring to me
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  because I just went through with just
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  a very small institutions.
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  Yeah,
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  - Right.
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  Well, you went from one very liberal institution, Swarthmore
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  to a, to another, I have to say, interesting choices given,
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  given where you landed, which, you know,
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  was in the first Trump administration as Secretary
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  of Pompeo's, sort of top China advisor.
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  So talk to us a little bit about what a day that, you know,
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  I think you were there for how many years? Two years?
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  - A little over over two years, yes.
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  - Two years. Right. So talk to us a little bit about
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  what a day in the life
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  of Miles was at the State Department. Yeah, what
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  - Was, well, I was naturally what
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  - Was the nature of the position then I wanna talk about
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  some of the substance of it,
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  but I, I, I think people would be interested in just
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  understanding what is it that you would do in that position.
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  And Secretary Pompeo was very, very high profile, of course,
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  and very vocal on China.
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  So talk to us about, you know, what you did,
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  how you shaped his perspective.
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  - Well, I'm not sure I shaped his perspective.
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  I mean, it's just like two minds just clicked.
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  I was unlike most of the political appointees
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  or even public servants, I was detailed from the US Navy.
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  In other words, Navy still owned me.
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  So, and I was detailed to the office of Secretary
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  of State EO as the, the principle
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  of China policy advisor in the Office of Policy Planning.
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  Policy planning is the sort of a private think tank
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  for the secretary.
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  He can use whatever he want.
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  So it's function of free thinking.
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  Intellectuals basically provide policy advice.
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  But that was not really important to me
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  because my relationship
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  with Secretary Pompeo is based upon some kind of really sort
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  of a intellectual understanding of the same thing.
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  And I was just, you know,
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  bureaucratically housed in the policy planning called sp.
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  But what really is influential, impactful to me is
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  that I represent Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo
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  in the critical chain of clearances.
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  You know, you work in the government, you know,
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  every single major individual goes to the, the, the, this,
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  the leader would have
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  to be clear by a whole bunch of people.
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  So my clearance, I represent, I'm a sp
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  so I represent anything with the s department,
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  represents the secretary.
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  So my required clearance, my okay, is required
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  of everything that goes to the desk of my Pompeo.
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  So that give me impact, influence.
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  And I, I didn't shy away from that, that utility.
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  So basically, you know, I use that also
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  as a several Pompeo is very close advisor on China things.
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  I basically travel with him all the time, unlike most
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  of my colleagues in sp.
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  So, so I know some
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  of my colleagues are getting a little jealous of, of me on
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  that, but, you know, hey, life is not entirely fair.
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  - Yeah. So what would you say were some
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  of your major intellectual contributions?
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  So you were, let, let's say you, you basically, you were,
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  you controlled the paper, you held the pen
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  for everything on China that went to the secretary.
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  That is enormously powerful
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  and you travel with him, which means that you had his ear,
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  you know, sitting next to him in the car
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  as you're walking from one meeting to the next, you know,
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  I understand exactly what that is, what that is like.
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  So what would you say were some of your,
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  your most important contributions to his thinking
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  or to policy during the time that you were there?
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  - I think I, my job is not to just teach him something.
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  I mean, he was a CIA director
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  before he came to this state department,
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  and he had a lot of access to a lot
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  of very good analysis about China.
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  So I think one of the major problems in the US policy toward
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  China is perception that work policy.
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  So we deal with China and, and all,
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  but our relationship as if this is just like
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  another policy issue.
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  Policy means how to manage the relationship, how
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  to make things that make sure that things are carried out,
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  executed correctly.
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  So that's why policy varies,
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  depends on different administrations.
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  So the China problem we have had is not a policy issue,
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  it's a doctrinal issue.
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  We do not understand the fundamental intentions
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  of, of the CCP.
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  We don't understand how the Chinese way
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  of conducting geopolitical policies
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  from their point of view.
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  And so those kind of things that I think we're lacking,
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  you know, one of the first thing I did was
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  to compile a quotation.
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  You know, I grew up in the, in the period
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  of the German chairman quotation, so that's all I
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  - Know. You own little
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  - Red book, what's called 300
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  Quotations of Chinese Leaders.
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  Oh, all from open sources
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  by reading Miles star selected works bin works,
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  John Hu works.
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  And for some reason, you know, the,
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  the bureaucrats basically classify, I mean it's,
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  it's all open sources.
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  So, but
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  that 300 quotations all about Chinese leaders since
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  Mao, their views about the United States.
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  You can see there is an ideological doctrinal consistency
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  of treating United States as the arch enemy.
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  Not just because whether we have China friendly part
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  of president or not, not just
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  because United States sometimes have good friendly China
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  friendly president like George W. Bush, like, you know,
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  bill Clinton or has some hostile president, right?
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  Like John F. Kennedy, like Eisenhower like Trump.
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  None of this really, really matters
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  because China, as the very existence view,
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  the very existence of United States as a fundamental threat
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  to this region survival,
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  because America has an enormous inspiration
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  of power upon these people.
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  So that's one reason why it's trying to demonize America.
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  They demonize the system.
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  So we're thinking about basically to change that approach
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  of dealing with China from the policy perspective to one
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  that really about doctrines, about the models of DA
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  of governance.
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  And so this actually is a very effective,
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  and I think, you know, one of things,
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  as a professor in the higher education institution, I,
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  I cannot do anything except that just the teaching courses,
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  teaching seminars, that's what I did.
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  So I had about seven seminars, state department basically
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  for all those people with China PFO portfolios.
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  Some of them even do not have China portfolios.
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  I asked them to read George Kenon to read, you know,
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  mouse Works to read Xi Jinping's works
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  to read doc document number nine.
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  So those kind of, you know,
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  theoretical intellectual understanding of the regime
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  of China and also China's pository United States actually
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  is one of the things that I think I,
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  you know, I'm very proud of.
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  I did another way I think, you know, I can,
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  I helped the State Department was to,
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  to basically, you know, clarify some of the, some
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  of the very specific implementations,
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  for example, on Hong Kong, on Taiwan.
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  And I think, you know, I help Secretary State
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  to implement some of things.
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  For example, I was the person chosen
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  to actually dismantle our special treatment with Hong Kong.
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  So I went to the treaty office
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  and I found out there were 12 treaties with Hong Kong
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  that make Hong Kong very different policy wide vis-a-vis
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  and other part of China.
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  So, and I was the guy who basically dismantled some of them,
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  not all of them, but so, so policy planning is very flexible
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  and a very powerful unit.
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  Small but very meaningful.
• 14:29
  - Yeah, I don't think that many people
• 14:31
  that I know certainly who've served in policy planning
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  played quite the role that, that you played.
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  I maybe you created something perhaps a little bit unique.
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  Maybe the person who heads policy planning sometimes can
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  play that kind of role.
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  But I think for a single person within policy planning
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  to shape things the way that you did, I think is,
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  is actually fairly unusual now.
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  You know, you talked about educating, you know, people,
• 15:01
  the state department on sort of the underlying doctrine
• 15:05
  of the Communist Party.
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  How do you think, just then thinking
• 15:10
  through the Trump administration's strategy toward
• 15:14
  China, how do you think Secretary Pompeo, you know, you
• 15:20
  shaped or influenced, you know, what came back at China,
• 15:25
  you know, from the United States.
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  So you've educated now people about
• 15:30
  what China's intentions are, presumably
• 15:33
  what their capabilities are.
• 15:35
  Then what does that do to us? Policy in response?
• 15:39
  - Okay, so we have an excellent dramatic core.
• 15:43
  Many my colleagues, the dedicated to our entire life to
• 15:47
  conducting American foreign policy.
• 15:49
  Those are very good efforts.
• 15:52
  The problem is that I think they always try to fix things.
• 15:57
  They try to fix all the problems
• 15:58
  with the US China relationship.
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  There are a lot of problems. Every time there's a problem,
• 16:03
  those crisis diplomats always try to fix it.
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  So they try to do the things right.
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  So several poel approach is encouraging that, that's fine,
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  but he's more concerned about how to do the right thing.
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  And so he go back to, to review some
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  of the first principle issues.
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  Like why is that we have to really
• 16:28
  confine the US Taiwan relationship in the framework
• 16:31
  of US China relationship.
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  Why can't we just develop a relationship
• 16:34
  with Taiwan separately, like we develop
• 16:36
  with any, any other countries.
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  Also on issues of, on issues of
• 16:42
  governance differences,
• 16:44
  secretary Pompeo basically deviated away from the
• 16:48
  transactional approach.
• 16:50
  He elevated, for example, the religious freedom
• 16:53
  to the highest level of US diplomacy,
• 16:55
  creating this religious freedom forum.
• 16:57
  And this is truly a amazing headed
• 16:59
  by former governor of Kansas.
• 17:02
  Simon Brownback did a fantastic job,
• 17:04
  and also he developed this approach
• 17:08
  to US China relationship,
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  basically US China relationship under Trump first term,
• 17:14
  completely reverse the, the US policy
• 17:19
  with China since Richard Nixon, that is engagement first
• 17:22
  and forever without really sort of a, a, a result.
• 17:27
  So Senator Pompeo basically said, we're gonna engage
• 17:30
  with China, but it's not just a bilateral engagement.
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  US-China relationship fundamentally is a t trilateral
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  engagement that is, we're gonna engage
• 17:39
  with Chinese government, we're also gonna
• 17:41
  engage with Chinese people.
• 17:43
  So that really get Chinese government really mad at him.
• 17:47
  So, and he doesn't shy away from the fundamental
• 17:50
  issues of China's human rights.
• 17:51
  For example, human rights really,
• 17:53
  really was at the top agenda
• 17:56
  of State Department under Mike Pompeo.
• 17:58
  You know, he, he made virtually every distant group
• 18:03
  in his office, a seventh floor, which has never happened
• 18:06
  before in the history of the US government.
• 18:08
  So he met with activist dissident from Tibet,
• 18:12
  from from Xinjiang, right, from Ong and,
• 18:15
  and massacre survivors.
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  And on the 30th anniversary of Ian Massacre in 2019.
• 18:22
  And he, and he asked me
• 18:24
  to help him draft some kind statement.
• 18:26
  And that was amazingly moving and long statement.
• 18:30
  He linked, he saluted the, the heroes of T Square
• 18:33
  and he linked the, the coming down the Berlin wall
• 18:36
  to the heroes in Emmen Square both happened in 1989.
• 18:39
  And it, it's a very courageous statement,
• 18:42
  and I think, you know, you made the
• 18:44
  White House a little bit nervous.
• 18:45
  So because that's, that was at the height of the negotiation
• 18:48
  for sort of trade agreement phase one.
• 18:52
  So President Trump did make a call to him
• 18:55
  and say, Mike, could you tie, tie down a little
• 18:57
  bit, dial down a little bit.
• 18:59
  And he probably stopped for about day or two.
• 19:01
  So go back to a day or two prior policy.
• 19:04
  - Yeah, you, you, you preempted my, my question, which was,
• 19:08
  I think it's clear what came out
• 19:09
  of the State department was very strong on human rights
• 19:12
  and democracy, even sort of the more technical stuff, the,
• 19:17
  you know, was clean networks that was
• 19:19
  - Yes. Pushed
• 19:20
  - Out, you know, sort of trying to compete
• 19:22
  with China's digital Silk Road going after Huawei.
• 19:25
  So with all of that sort
• 19:27
  of forward leaning momentum on those issues,
• 19:31
  how did that intersect with the rest of the administration?
• 19:35
  Did you find pockets of support?
• 19:37
  Were you out, you know, leagues ahead of everybody else?
• 19:41
  I think Congress was probably pretty supportive,
• 19:43
  as I recall, of what you were trying to do.
• 19:46
  But what was the mix of perspectives
• 19:49
  and views, you know, coming at it from USTR and,
• 19:52
  and treasury and other agencies, the NSC
• 19:55
  and the president himself?
• 19:57
  - Well, we have, Andrea, you asked a question, Liz,
• 20:00
  you know, when I went to the State Department,
• 20:03
  I was overwhelmed by the realization that
• 20:07
  I'll be working in the hostile re environment
• 20:09
  because, you know, the State Department was assumed
• 20:13
  to be a overwhelming democratic ba you know,
• 20:16
  in the 20 15, 20 16 election cycle,
• 20:20
  something like 97% of the donations from state went
• 20:23
  to Hillary Clinton, not Trump.
• 20:25
  So I was very mindful of that.
• 20:26
  However, just
• 20:27
  after a few weeks, I realized when,
• 20:29
  when it comes down China,
• 20:31
  pretty much everybody I encounter was, was on board.
• 20:34
  There was no qu whatsoever from a
• 20:36
  State department point of view.
• 20:38
  So I think, you know, it has something to do
• 20:40
  with the leadership when the nation was publicly consumed
• 20:44
  by Russia, Russia, Russia, state Department, you know,
• 20:47
  it's all China, China, China.
• 20:48
  That's, that's a message very clear from Pompeo,
• 20:51
  from Secretary of Pompeo.
• 20:54
  As far as the other government section concerned, I,
• 20:57
  I've been to several, many like White House
• 21:02
  PCCs, the policy coordination committees.
• 21:06
  I think, you know, it's overwhelmingly on board.
• 21:09
  There's a very few dissonance except treasury.
• 21:13
  I'm not sure USTR is actually against us.
• 21:15
  I think USTR is pretty much on board.
• 21:17
  Their concern is about, is not
• 21:19
  to derail the, the trade talk.
• 21:21
  Other than that, you know, intellectually they're with us.
• 21:24
  Treasury has a very different role to play, as you know,
• 21:27
  their job is to, to maintain the stability of the dollar.
• 21:32
  So they're worried about the, any kind of a rocking boat
• 21:35
  between China and United States might really have negative,
• 21:40
  negative impact on the stability of the dollar.
• 21:42
  I don't think that's necessary.
• 21:43
  But in the end, let me just frame this in a
• 21:46
  larger perspective.
• 21:49
  The predominant geopolitical strategy
• 21:52
  of Trump administration is deterrence,
• 21:55
  deterrence, deterrence.
• 21:57
  So that's why you have to make
• 21:59
  deterrence is a matter of perception.
• 22:02
  That perception has to come from your consistency,
• 22:05
  a credibility of deterrence.
• 22:07
  So when China, when Trump President Trump says something,
• 22:10
  he carried out that deterrence.
• 22:12
  So that's one reason why China really sort
• 22:15
  of internalized the American's deterrence resolve.
• 22:18
  This is the reason why there is a virtually no provocation,
• 22:23
  cantankerous action by China, either over Taiwan Street
• 22:28
  or in the South China Sea.
• 22:29
  So this is why that is very stable.
• 22:32
  So I don't think there is a really a, a problem of
• 22:37
  split government in the Trump administration.
• 22:40
  Number one, there are a few people who would disagree
• 22:43
  with Trump policy, but mostly that's right
• 22:46
  after, to the very end, very end.
• 22:48
  That's like after January 6th, a few senior officials sort
• 22:51
  of resign, right?
• 22:53
  But on China policy, as you mentioned, as you mentioned,
• 22:56
  and the Congress, Congress
• 22:57
  support is almost a hundred percent.
• 22:59
  You know, don't forget that the overwhelming mood
• 23:02
  of the nation since like 2017
• 23:07
  until this very moment, almost 10 years later,
• 23:10
  has always been very negative on China.
• 23:13
  I, I, I've seen p polls
• 23:15
  and, you know, gala polls on China,
• 23:17
  the popular sentiment negative of polling on China is
• 23:21
  around 80%.
• 23:22
  That's very, very high for Americans to agree on one country
• 23:26
  that is to that degree, that was pretty amazing.
• 23:30
  So I don't think there is any kind of a dissonance
• 23:34
  in a very meaningful way as far as I experienced.
• 23:38
  - So talk to us about what's going on
• 23:41
  with the Trump administration today,
• 23:43
  because the policy seems to be quite different.
• 23:47
  I think the administration has said outright
• 23:50
  that it has a quote, non-ideological foreign policy.
• 23:55
  The sort of idea of an alliance
• 23:57
  of democracies is not discussed at all
• 24:01
  as far as I can tell.
• 24:02
  Even sort of stalwart supporters, traditional supporters of
• 24:07
  democracy,
• 24:08
  and I would say strong China hawks like Secretary
• 24:11
  of State Rubio, you know,
• 24:13
  are much quieter than I think many people would have
• 24:16
  anticipated.
• 24:18
  What, what's different this time from last
• 24:22
  time, would you say?
• 24:24
  Or, or do you reject my characterization
• 24:27
  that there is a significant difference when it comes
• 24:29
  to the priority placed on human rights
• 24:32
  and democracy by the second Trump administration from the
• 24:36
  first Trump administration?
• 24:37
  - Yeah, I don't think there is kind of a disruption
• 24:40
  or even reversal of China policy
• 24:44
  during the first and second.
• 24:46
  You know, there is a larger strategic outlook
• 24:52
  and there is a specific implementation of the out outlook.
• 24:57
  I think the, the United States fundamental shift
• 25:00
  of our strategic focus took breath in Trump's first term.
• 25:04
  That is basically codified in two documents published in
• 25:07
  December 27th, 2017, and also January, 2018.
• 25:12
  One is the national security strategy
• 25:13
  and other one is national defense strategy.
• 25:16
  In those two historic documents,
• 25:18
  United States redefine China's role in American's a
• 25:21
  threat priority list.
• 25:23
  We are designated China as a number one threat
• 25:25
  to American's national security.
• 25:27
  That is a fundamental shift
• 25:30
  in American's geopolitical strategy since
• 25:31
  time of nut Nixon you might say.
• 25:33
  So, you know, if you, I'm a historian by training,
• 25:36
  so I might even want to go back to like the time
• 25:38
  of Pearl Harbor when Japan bombed the United States,
• 25:41
  United Pearl Harbor, think Americans, you know, battleship
• 25:44
  of flee ever since that moment.
• 25:46
  United States policy, oddly enough,
• 25:48
  has always been your first Asia second.
• 25:51
  So with the nato, with the, you know, cold War later on,
• 25:55
  there's a Middle Eastern, you know, in, in Brazil, all that,
• 26:01
  despite Americans war in Vietnam
• 26:03
  and in Korea, American strategic focus has always been
• 26:06
  outside of the Indo-Pacific, outside of China
• 26:09
  until Trump's first turn.
• 26:10
  So I think that's historic.
• 26:12
  Now, we have said enough about ideological differences
• 26:16
  during first term.
• 26:17
  We have said, en said enough about all those, the,
• 26:21
  the value based differences between us and China.
• 26:24
  The second term, however, is very different.
• 26:27
  I think that strategic focus,
• 26:31
  China being the number one national security
• 26:33
  threat has never changed.
• 26:35
  It is just how to approach, how to deal with that.
• 26:37
  I think this is basically,
• 26:39
  I would characterize a second term from the Trump,
• 26:42
  Trump administration's approach to China.
• 26:44
  That is, they reduced the amount of rhetorical
• 26:51
  hostility toward China because this is no longer necessary.
• 26:55
  You know, structure said, if you wanna change the nation,
• 26:58
  you must win the argument first,
• 27:01
  and then you implement the policy.
• 27:04
  And I think the first term was about winning the argument.
• 27:07
  We already won the argument,
• 27:08
  China was the American number one enemy.
• 27:10
  Second term is how to implement those.
• 27:12
  And I think the second term,
• 27:13
  the Trump administration overwhelmingly focused on
• 27:16
  specific actions.
• 27:18
  For example, kick the US Chinese inference out
• 27:21
  of Latin Western Hemisphere and to deal with Greenland
• 27:24
  and Panama Canal
• 27:27
  and also imbalance of trade, right?
• 27:31
  Tariffs. And I think, you know, and also debilitating
• 27:35
  and mitigating China's proxies in Latin America,
• 27:38
  Venezuela in particular, and Cuba and now in Iran.
• 27:41
  So all the things were specific implementation
• 27:44
  of China's of Trump administration.
• 27:46
  The first strategic shift, first on the first term.
• 27:49
  So I don't see any kind of a
• 27:53
  fundamental reversal of anything.
• 27:55
  It's just approach different, it is regrettable
• 27:58
  that we voluntarily dismantle our tools of soft power radio,
• 28:03
  free Asia, voice of America, national do democracy.
• 28:07
  But I think, you know, it's coming back, it's coming back.
• 28:09
  I mean, I just regarded that that move unfortunately
• 28:13
  as a malign inference from Silicon Valley, from Wall Street.
• 28:17
  And I think gradually the congress is,
• 28:21
  is is giving the money
• 28:22
  to those institutions gradually the America as a country
• 28:26
  with the enormous civil society resilience is coming back.
• 28:30
  So I I, I'm not terribly worried about that,
• 28:32
  but I think, you know, there is a intrinsic connection
• 28:36
  between the Trump first term
• 28:38
  and Trump's second term in when it comes to China policy.
• 28:41
  - Yeah, I mean, I, I guess I would say first of all, they,
• 28:43
  they didn't dismantle the National Endowment for Democracy.
• 28:46
  So the, the funding is supposed to be there.
• 28:49
  They're just actually Aren releasing the, the money,
• 28:52
  but they didn't dismantle it.
• 28:53
  But radio free Asia, you know, and radio free Europe
• 28:57
  and Voice of America, all have, have suffered,
• 29:00
  have suffered more, and I think have even maybe at least one
• 29:04
  of them has been sort of fully almost dismantled.
• 29:08
  But I, I think, I mean, I don't wanna push
• 29:09
  back a little bit here, miles.
• 29:11
  I do think that there are some
• 29:12
  pretty fundamental difference.
• 29:13
  I think saying that there is a non,
• 29:14
  we have a non-ideological foreign policy is
• 29:17
  fundamentally different.
• 29:19
  The fact that there is no effort to find common ground
• 29:23
  among democratic allies on the basis
• 29:25
  of our being democratic allies,
• 29:28
  I think is also different, right?
• 29:31
  There's very little, we're not working together,
• 29:33
  for example, with other countries to deal
• 29:36
  with China's export of its over capacity, right?
• 29:39
  Europe has come to us and said, will you do that with us?
• 29:41
  And we've basically said, no, you know, we've told Europe,
• 29:45
  you know, certain European countries not to mess
• 29:47
  around in the Indo-Pacific, you know,
• 29:49
  focus on your own backyard.
• 29:51
  I don't think that that would've been the case in the first
• 29:54
  Trump administration, right?
• 29:56
  Greenland, I mean, I think you
• 29:58
  and I both know that if we're looking for areas
• 30:01
  of real Chinese influence,
• 30:02
  Greenland is not really at the top of the list
• 30:06
  and Venezuela is not a proxy for China.
• 30:09
  It, you know, does, you know, China gets some oil,
• 30:12
  China does infrastructure investment.
• 30:14
  It is an important for know creditor,
• 30:17
  but it's not, Venezuela is not a proxy for China.
• 30:20
  So maybe I take a little bit of issue with the, the lines
• 30:23
  of continuity that I think you're, you're drawing.
• 30:26
  I think there's much more of a, of a, of a,
• 30:29
  of a rupture than, than not.
• 30:33
  But let me, let me say, I, I could, I would say that
• 30:37
  where I agree with you, I think is
• 30:38
  that I think this Trump administration continues
• 30:42
  to see China as, as a maybe the number one competitor
• 30:46
  to the United States when it comes to technology,
• 30:48
  when it comes to security, when it comes to our economy.
• 30:52
  So I think that remains the case,
• 30:56
  and you're right, that the rhetoric around it has,
• 30:58
  has changed pretty dramatically.
• 31:00
  But I also think the way
• 31:01
  that we're approaching China has changed
• 31:04
  because we're not doing it in the same way.
• 31:09
  - Okay. So I I,
• 31:11
  you know, I I take your point.
• 31:15
  I, I take your point, but I'm not sure I'm comfortable
• 31:17
  with the idea that Venezuela is China, not China's proxy.
• 31:21
  I'm not sure if Greenland is not,
• 31:23
  China's is not the China focused, you know,
• 31:25
  Trump tweeted about Greenland in 2019,
• 31:29
  and he said this is about China
• 31:31
  and not to pay attention to, to to that, that's
• 31:33
  because of this, this calculation about, you know, China's,
• 31:38
  you know, if you look at the China's ICBMs,
• 31:40
  they're gonna hit the west coast.
• 31:41
  They mostly the launch West coast, they're gonna, their,
• 31:45
  their missiles will, will fly over Alaska.
• 31:47
  That's where our, our interceptors are concentrated in.
• 31:51
  If you don't want to, to hit the East coast from Boston
• 31:55
  to Washington DC
• 31:56
  or New York City, so they would have
• 31:58
  to fly over the Arctic region.
• 31:59
  That's where agreed, that's where, that's where you have
• 32:03
  to have the early warning systems installed.
• 32:06
  So, I mean, this, this, this, this is why,
• 32:08
  this is the argument Venezuela is, you know,
• 32:11
  Venezuela is totally in China's pockets.
• 32:14
  And Venezuela, you know, you know, there,
• 32:18
  there's only country in the world that's trying,
• 32:20
  is talking about Monroe doctrine.
• 32:22
  It's not the United States, it's China.
• 32:24
  China wants to talk about Monroe doctrine
• 32:26
  because China wants the United States is inference
• 32:28
  limited to West Hemisphere.
• 32:30
  The, and that's why saying,
• 32:32
  - Oh, miles, come on.
• 32:33
  Before the election,
• 32:34
  before the election, there was an enormous amount of talk
• 32:37
  by members of the administration, soon
• 32:39
  to be administration about spheres of influence,
• 32:42
  that the United States is gonna have a sphere of influence,
• 32:45
  sort of orientation. Yeah. So
• 32:47
  - Yes, that's, I I agree, right?
• 32:48
  That's, that's, that's
• 32:49
  because China has established their spheres
• 32:52
  of influence in Westminster already.
• 32:54
  So, I mean, yes, okay, so Maduro owned,
• 32:59
  Chi owned China about fif $150 billion of debt.
• 33:04
  So Maduro's son is study in Beijing,
• 33:07
  and La Venezuela is the only country,
• 33:10
  the the Chinese military has a footprint.
• 33:13
  They provide not just the minority
• 33:16
  - Small project, a small - Project, not to give the, no,
• 33:19
  they, they're training ral jungles every year.
• 33:21
  They provide the jets over there.
• 33:23
  So, because Venezuela wants to have, you know,
• 33:28
  basic of China wants to, to prop up Venezuela as the,
• 33:31
  as the sort of the Iran of the Western hemisphere.
• 33:35
  So this is, this was understanding, I, I don't think,
• 33:38
  I don't think, you know, the, the connection
• 33:41
  between Venezuela and, and,
• 33:44
  and China could be discounted.
• 33:47
  And I think that's, you know, oil, yes,
• 33:49
  oil is not risk significant.
• 33:51
  Venezuela's import oil import to China, 4%, 4%, 4%
• 33:55
  - Of China's oil. I know. Got it.
• 33:57
  - But, but, but Venezuela's oil, overwhelming majority
• 34:02
  of them goes to one country.
• 34:03
  That's China. So that's, that's basically it is the issue.
• 34:06
  I don't think, you know, the inference
• 34:09
  is really the main focus of this administration.
• 34:12
  They want to keep this control of Western Hemisphere out
• 34:15
  of Chinese inference, definitely.
• 34:18
  But I don't think United States is really confined
• 34:20
  to be the most influential country in western hemisphere,
• 34:23
  United States basically is global power.
• 34:25
  They want to keep West Hemisphere free of Maah influence,
• 34:28
  so the US can lead globally. That's my take.
• 34:31
  - Okay. I mean, I, I I will, I will say it,
• 34:34
  it was reassuring to me that, you know,
• 34:36
  in the national security strategy, the Indo-Pacific did,
• 34:39
  did come in number two.
• 34:40
  Now, you know, in terms of the sort of order
• 34:44
  of importance after the
• 34:45
  - Western, what, what's number one?
• 34:47
  - Western Hemisphere was number one.
• 34:49
  - Yeah, well, what I'm saying is China has a market in the
• 34:53
  Western hemisphere, they'll capture so many.
• 34:55
  - If you really wanna look where China has the,
• 34:57
  the deepest sort of tentacles you would and,
• 35:00
  and the reach, you would look to Southeast Asia and Africa
• 35:03
  before you would look to Latin America,
• 35:05
  and you know, Brazil plays, you know, anyway, miles,
• 35:09
  we can get into a big discussion of this,
• 35:11
  - Lindsay.
• 35:12
  I don't, I don't think this is probably,
• 35:13
  we're gonna have this argument for a long time.
• 35:15
  Yeah, I don't think,
• 35:16
  I don't think national security establishment in
• 35:20
  intelligence defense establishment even, I don't think,
• 35:23
  you know, Latin America is really secondary to China.
• 35:26
  I mean, you look at our, our efforts in Indo-Pacific,
• 35:29
  our entire approach to global issues from Ukraine
• 35:34
  to, to Iran, to, to Venezuela, all China related.
• 35:38
  So western hemisphere is important
• 35:40
  because the Western hemisphere in American backyard, that's
• 35:43
  where we have to deal with the first starting with Panama
• 35:46
  - Canal.
• 35:47
  Yeah, I'll just say last point I'll make is
• 35:49
  that Western Hemisphere is also important
• 35:51
  to this administration, I think because of immigration and
• 35:54
  because of drugs, right?
• 35:56
  So I think if you had to ask them
• 35:57
  what the top two issues were for,
• 35:59
  for the Western hemisphere, I think they would say those two
• 36:01
  before, you know, proxy concerns in
• 36:06
  - Latin.
• 36:07
  Yeah. Also, also in Latin
• 36:08
  - America, China proxy concerns,
• 36:09
  - Who's a, who's a descendant of, of Western
• 36:11
  hemisphere ancestry. Yeah.
• 36:13
  - Okay. So let me,
• 36:15
  let me just switch gears a little bit here.
• 36:17
  And you know, one of the things that has happened
• 36:20
  as a result of your sort of tough policy,
• 36:23
  your outspokenness, is that
• 36:26
  China has placed personal sanctions on you, right?
• 36:29
  So you cannot travel to China anymore.
• 36:33
  Were you surprised by that?
• 36:36
  Have you tried to, you know, talk to the Chinese embassy
• 36:39
  or the Chinese consulate about this?
• 36:41
  Is it problematic for you, or does it not matter?
• 36:45
  - No, not at all. It has zero impact on me
• 36:47
  and on the way I behave, on the way how I think.
• 36:50
  No, I think the, it is typical Chinese intimidation
• 36:53
  campaign, and it is not working on me
• 36:56
  because it truly is a badge of honor.
• 36:58
  You know, Liz, as you know, I have many friends who are,
• 37:01
  who hold the same view.
• 37:03
  I'm not a really extremist by any chance.
• 37:05
  I mean, I have so many people who, who are mad at me
• 37:08
  because I, I'm just as radical.
• 37:10
  Well, not as radical, as outspoken as you are.
• 37:13
  How come you got a sanction? I'm not. So I want that honor.
• 37:17
  So this is a, this is truly an honor.
• 37:19
  Another thing is, you know, this is a very interesting
• 37:22
  side story here.
• 37:25
  The Chinese government has sanctioned me twice.
• 37:26
  The first time is right after the, the, the,
• 37:30
  the Trump administration ended.
• 37:31
  Biden King came in, and I was not named,
• 37:35
  but there are 28 of them are named, and
• 37:37
  or 20 of them were sanctioned by only 10
• 37:39
  of them named publicly.
• 37:40
  Second time around, they sanctioned about three years
• 37:42
  ago by name.
• 37:44
  And, and
• 37:45
  because it's a counter sanction against American sanction
• 37:50
  on the, the Tibetan party chief, the gentleman by the name
• 37:54
  of, ah, You know, the funny thing is
• 38:00
  that party secretary last year
• 38:04
  was convicted of corruption.
• 38:05
  He's now spending in jail for a life term.
• 38:10
  So sentence.
• 38:12
  So I think the Chinese government owes me an apology.
• 38:16
  - I wouldn't hold my breath, but
• 38:18
  - Either, either way, you know what, I don't give a damn.
• 38:21
  - Okay. Okay, fair, fair, fair, fair enough.
• 38:25
  So I wanna talk a little bit about Taiwan,
• 38:28
  because you've been very strong on this issue, very vocal.
• 38:33
  And you've talked about,
• 38:35
  talked about the importance of Taiwan.
• 38:37
  How, how do you think about the importance of Taiwan?
• 38:41
  Why do you think it matters for the United States?
• 38:44
  And how do you think about sort of the Trump administration,
• 38:47
  this Trump administration's approach to Taiwan?
• 38:50
  What do you see as the strengths
• 38:51
  and the weaknesses of how it's approaching Taiwan?
• 38:53
  So first, your own perspective on why Taiwan matters,
• 38:57
  and then how you see this administration's approach.
• 39:01
  - Taiwan matters not only to the United States,
• 39:03
  but to China too, and to Chinese.
• 39:05
  I think a lot of theatrical side of that,
• 39:07
  because China always needed a permanent enemy.
• 39:12
  They need a crisis.
• 39:14
  And every time there is an internal problem,
• 39:19
  they, they sort of problem the Taiwan crisis.
• 39:21
  So one after another. So this was basically open state, the
• 39:24
  by Mao, and then by then, and they've been all, all along.
• 39:27
  You know, it's been all along. Taiwan also is a real issue,
• 39:31
  though Geog is a geopolitical reality
• 39:34
  because China perceived itself as besieged contained
• 39:38
  by a imperialist imperialistic
• 39:42
  conspiracy related by the United States.
• 39:44
  So that's why it is unfinished revolution for China.
• 39:48
  You know, people keep saying, oh, this is a civil war,
• 39:50
  you know, result of civil war, it's nonsense.
• 39:53
  In China, nobody called that war, civil war,
• 39:55
  and they call war of liberation.
• 39:58
  So Chinese communist party still has this
• 40:00
  mentality of liberation.
• 40:02
  Taiwan, they now sugarcoated as a reunification,
• 40:05
  which is also is a funny
• 40:06
  because Taiwan has never been ruled by, by, by the PRC.
• 40:09
  So there's no unity in the first place.
• 40:12
  How Kong you reuni reunify.
• 40:14
  So another thing is, you know,
• 40:16
  Taiwan is a very different now
• 40:20
  than say 1970s and 1980s.
• 40:22
  Taiwan is a fullblown democracy with a very successful
• 40:27
  governance model of democratic capitalism.
• 40:30
  Taiwan's, you know, personal GDP has suppressed that
• 40:33
  of Japan and South Korea.
• 40:34
  It is doing enormously well.
• 40:37
  And it commands the key sectors, the key links
• 40:42
  of global economy.
• 40:44
  Without semiconductor, you know, industry,
• 40:47
  the world economy will come to the halt.
• 40:49
  So different.
• 40:50
  Taiwan now also is definitely the defense
• 40:53
  of United States, a self-interest.
• 40:55
  So I think, you know, there's enough Taiwan,
• 40:57
  US economic technological integration now.
• 41:01
  And I think, you know, this is a, a very important thing.
• 41:03
  Now, Taiwan is never just about Taiwan from the grand
• 41:07
  strategy point of view.
• 41:09
  Taiwan is just the first of the chain
• 41:11
  of aggression for China.
• 41:13
  You know, if we give up Taiwan, China may go
• 41:16
  after Japan, India, Vietnam,
• 41:19
  Philippines, and South Korea even.
• 41:20
  So, there is no end for this.
• 41:23
  So that's why you have to stop the aggression from the
• 41:25
  beginning, the first step.
• 41:27
  So that's why defense of Taiwan is very, very important.
• 41:32
  And I think, you know, that's just having said all
• 41:36
  that, of course values,
• 41:39
  alliance confidence is all important.
• 41:42
  And I think, you know, China knows this.
• 41:43
  And you know, the,
• 41:46
  that's why US policy toward Taiwan has firm,
• 41:49
  I'm glad it's firm
• 41:50
  and I don't think anybody is, is willing to,
• 41:53
  to give up on Taiwan's defense.
• 41:54
  And, you know, I'm defending Taiwan not just
• 41:59
  as somebody who, who chair, who cherish liberty and freedom,
• 42:03
  but also as American,
• 42:04
  I think is in American's fundamental interest
• 42:08
  to have a pro Taiwan policy.
• 42:12
  - And what about how this administration is
• 42:14
  approaching Taiwan?
• 42:15
  What have you heard that reassures you?
• 42:18
  What have you heard that concerns you?
• 42:22
  What do you think they're getting right,
• 42:23
  or maybe not quite so? Right.
• 42:25
  - I think they're doing, doing the right thing.
• 42:27
  I mean, I think, you know, we have this, we have, you know,
• 42:29
  even though it's an unofficial relationship,
• 42:32
  but I think we have given Taiwan really substantive
• 42:37
  essential self-defense weapons, you know,
• 42:41
  from high Mars to parties to, you know,
• 42:46
  you know, standard missiles and a lot of naval
• 42:50
  and intelligence and long range radar.
• 42:53
  So all the things Taiwan needs for self-defense, it's,
• 42:57
  that's lawfully compliant
• 43:01
  weapons we have given Taiwan.
• 43:02
  So in addition to, to that,
• 43:05
  and I think, you know, we have a very robust economic
• 43:09
  and technological integration, you know,
• 43:12
  during the first term of Trump administration, the Congress,
• 43:16
  and also I do the, the, the Biden administration.
• 43:19
  A lot of credit too, because that kind of trend continued.
• 43:22
  The Congress have passed so many Taiwan related acts,
• 43:26
  almost unanimously, every single one of them.
• 43:28
  Taiwan Travel Act, Taiwan Insurance Act.
• 43:31
  And the President Trump
• 43:33
  and President Biden sign almost immediately without any qum.
• 43:36
  So that's actually a very good com show
• 43:39
  of Americans commitment to Taiwan's defense.
• 43:42
  And I think right now you have a, you know, Taiwan Americans
• 43:48
  in Taiwan, you know, this is what a IT
• 43:50
  you have a very good team there.
• 43:52
  I mean, you know, director Ray Graham is friend of mine.
• 43:55
  He's doing a fantastic job, very proactive.
• 43:58
  And I think, you know, Taiwan's democracy, Taiwan's,
• 44:00
  a future is of course in the hands of,
• 44:03
  of Taiwanese people themselves.
• 44:05
  But to a larger degree is also the,
• 44:09
  the obligation I would say of the United States
• 44:12
  because we have a very long standing relationship
• 44:16
  with Taiwan, you know, since 1949 for during good times
• 44:20
  and bad times, regardless, you know, we want Taiwan not
• 44:24
  to be taken by communist China.
• 44:25
  So that policy has sustained and, and has flourished.
• 44:30
  And I think, you know, the, the, the, the,
• 44:35
  it has full back in American people as well.
• 44:36
  I mean, I was, I was reading a, a recent poll by the,
• 44:41
  by the Reagan Institute saying, in the case of China,
• 44:45
  military takeover of Taiwan,
• 44:47
  would you support Americans American recognize recognition
• 44:51
  of Taiwan immediately, something like 67 to 70% say yes.
• 44:55
  And I think, you know, I originally participated in a debate
• 44:58
  hosted by TBS in New York City,
• 45:00
  and the argument they, the, the, the, the, this,
• 45:04
  the question was it, is it worthwhile for Americans to,
• 45:08
  to fight in Taiwan against China?
• 45:10
  Well, it actually is worthwhile to sacrifice American lives,
• 45:14
  to defend, to defend Taiwan.
• 45:15
  And I think, you know, my view of course was yes.
• 45:19
  And I think, you know, 57% of the audience in the immediate
• 45:23
  poll agree with me.
• 45:25
  So, and I think you can see that America, you know,
• 45:28
  they are, this is democracy
• 45:29
  and I think the public awareness is there, which comes
• 45:33
  to the issue, I think in
• 45:36
  probably we should have said a few words about
• 45:38
  strategic ambiguity.
• 45:40
  This is such a stupid idea.
• 45:42
  It's not only stupid, it's also very dangerous.
• 45:44
  This strategic ambiguity came out of the 1990s.
• 45:48
  The, the height of engagement.
• 45:50
  It's basically a soothing, self kidding scenario
• 45:55
  that basically says, if we don't tell the Chinese what,
• 45:58
  what we're gonna do are we're gonna get involved militarily
• 46:01
  in case of Chinese military in much of Taiwan.
• 46:03
  And then that will serve as determines, determines factor.
• 46:08
  There's a total nonsense.
• 46:09
  There's a zero, there has been zero deterrence factor.
• 46:12
  Nobody in Chinese high command has ever believed
• 46:15
  for a second the American will be ambiguous about
• 46:19
  the defending Taiwan.
• 46:21
  Whether this is true or not,
• 46:22
  but that's what they mean, you know,
• 46:24
  deterrence really is a matter
• 46:25
  of perception, as I said earlier.
• 46:27
  So there's no deterrence fact, you know,
• 46:30
  if effect whatsoever.
• 46:31
  This, and plus the, this,
• 46:34
  I said the strategic ambiguity is dangerous
• 46:36
  because it constantly provoke China
• 46:40
  to do this very dangerous, cantankerous dangerous moves just
• 46:44
  to test American's bottom line.
• 46:46
  Because they want to make sure America is
• 46:48
  really, really ambiguous or not.
• 46:50
  That's why I see this very dangerous
• 46:53
  and pernicious Chinese reaction in the aftermath of Pelosi
• 46:57
  visit is the unfortunate result
• 47:01
  of the strategic ambiguity practitioner.
• 47:03
  - But miles, miles, I have to stop you.
• 47:05
  I mean, there's been one president who's been unambiguous,
• 47:08
  and that's President Biden, who four times said
• 47:12
  that the United States would come to the defense of Taiwan.
• 47:15
  So the, I'm not sure that the strategic ambiguity was the,
• 47:19
  the least amount of strategic ambiguity
• 47:21
  that's existed in the past few
• 47:22
  - Decades - Yes, yes.
• 47:23
  Has been during the Biden administration.
• 47:25
  - Yes, yes, yes, yes. But I totally agree with you.
• 47:27
  But Biden administration wants China's corporation.
• 47:31
  Many issues are vital to the interest
• 47:33
  of democratic party climate, right?
• 47:35
  All the things China knows, this is,
• 47:37
  this is the leverage they have.
• 47:39
  So that's one reason I think you're absolutely right.
• 47:41
  I give President Biden enormous credit
• 47:43
  for saying on four occasions that we're gonna get this.
• 47:46
  But that is no surprise for the Chinese,
• 47:48
  every president either openly said or not, they know this.
• 47:51
  So that's why I'm saying this,
• 47:53
  you should not give any ambiguity to China.
• 47:55
  Taiwan must be defended by America, period.
• 47:58
  - You know, so miles, I mean, I think if, if, you know,
• 48:02
  if there's a, a president that has been the most ambiguous,
• 48:06
  I would say it's President Trump in his second term.
• 48:10
  And the fact that they, they,
• 48:12
  the administration didn't permit the transit,
• 48:15
  that they hit the pause button on the arm sales, they never,
• 48:19
  ever talk about the importance of democracy
• 48:23
  with regard to Taiwan.
• 48:24
  In fact, I had a senior Trump administration official say
• 48:27
  to me explicitly, you know, well, it's nice
• 48:31
  that Taiwan's democracy,
• 48:33
  but that's not what is important to us.
• 48:35
  So I think, I think there's maybe a little bit more
• 48:38
  of a shift in this administration than maybe you're
• 48:43
  acknowledging when it comes to Taiwan.
• 48:45
  I think ambiguity has increased. Again, I don't disagree.
• 48:49
  I think Secretary Hegseth has been pretty direct.
• 48:53
  I think Secretary Rubio has been as direct as he can be,
• 48:57
  but I think the president has not,
• 48:59
  and other people around the president have also not.
• 49:02
  - Yeah, that's right. That's right. You know,
• 49:04
  the president has said, you know, he's friendly
• 49:06
  with the Ner Putin, he's a red with the Kim Jong,
• 49:09
  he's friendly with Xi j Pxi jining.
• 49:11
  Yeah. I mean, nobody should take that as, as face value.
• 49:13
  That's his approach, right?
• 49:15
  So, and,
• 49:16
  and I think, I think, you know, it's a,
• 49:19
  it's a very interesting to notice that while
• 49:22
  or we're saying all these things, the Chinese knows
• 49:27
  that we're business, we're mean business.
• 49:29
  Look at the buildup in Indu, Paycom, a OR look at the,
• 49:32
  you know, the alliance building along Chinese periphery.
• 49:35
  And look at the, the weapons we sold Taiwan,
• 49:37
  it is really substantive, is
• 49:39
  - We haven't sold the weapons, we've sold them,
• 49:40
  but we haven't provided them.
• 49:42
  And we hit the pause button on the most recent
• 49:44
  ones and we hit the pause button. We
• 49:46
  - Provided them, well, they bought, they bought, you know,
• 49:48
  har missiles.
• 49:50
  We deliver an unprecedented rate recently.
• 49:53
  Americans manufacturer weapons manufacturing is,
• 49:55
  is in high demand.
• 49:57
  So that's one reason why, but we're speeding up.
• 49:59
  I, I think, you know, not only
• 50:01
  that the Congress has given Taiwan free money.
• 50:04
  They give Congress on a yearly basis.
• 50:06
  They give free money for self-defense for
• 50:09
  to three countries, Israel, Ukraine,
• 50:11
  and Taiwan, even though Taiwan is smaller.
• 50:13
  But that shows that, you know, there's national result.
• 50:15
  President Trump has never vetoed any of this stuff.
• 50:17
  So what I'm saying is there are different leaders play a
• 50:20
  different role, you know, diplomats
• 50:24
  and defense officials, they are for real.
• 50:27
  And I think they're doing really, really good things.
• 50:31
  And the president as a leader, his job is
• 50:33
  to avoid ev at all possible at a minimum cost
• 50:37
  for the United States Connecticut direct conflict.
• 50:40
  You know, if you can, now I'm also
• 50:42
  want to say one more thing.
• 50:43
  Wait, wait a minute, miles, seriously,
• 50:45
  - President, the, the president's top
• 50:47
  job, the president's top
• 50:48
  - Job is to employ conflict.
• 50:50
  I know it's top job. I'm not defending anybody.
• 50:52
  I'm just saying what I, what I know.
• 50:53
  - I'm just saying it's a little ironic given that we are,
• 50:56
  you know, bombing, you know, Iran right now.
• 50:59
  So I'm not sure that's the, the president's top,
• 51:02
  this president's top job, but yeah,
• 51:05
  - Well, I, well I think the Iranians connection
• 51:07
  with China is, is absolutely essential.
• 51:09
  So I think that's all China related.
• 51:11
  President Trump has a, has a very different approach
• 51:15
  than most president that is, he is gonna negotiate,
• 51:19
  but he is also is perfectly willing
• 51:21
  to walk away from any negotiating table if the
• 51:24
  deal is not to his.
• 51:25
  Like, so, you know, he deal with the Kim Jon
• 51:29
  for three years and he didn't like it
• 51:31
  fi finally he walk away.
• 51:33
  So in other words, you don't want your, your, your adversary
• 51:37
  to know you are told psychological depending on them.
• 51:40
  So that's one reason I think
• 51:41
  that President Trump is playing that game.
• 51:44
  I've seen this again and again and again.
• 51:45
  So I've given him some, some, some, some, you know,
• 51:50
  some, some space because he's elected leader.
• 51:54
  I mean, whether right or not,
• 51:56
  I mean, he's commander in chief.
• 51:57
  So I think, you know, some of the things that
• 52:01
  I would prefer a different approach.
• 52:02
  But, you know, I'm not the president, so I'm just,
• 52:05
  - Okay, so let me, let me actually push you on
• 52:07
  that last point there and then, we'll,
• 52:10
  - I knew you would Liz - Tie things up.
• 52:11
  You gave me the opening finally.
• 52:13
  I've been trying to get you to say something that,
• 52:16
  that you might disagree with
• 52:17
  with the administration's approach.
• 52:19
  So maybe you could just say a couple of things
• 52:22
  that you would maybe do differently with regard.
• 52:25
  - Yeah, I said already, I mean I regret
• 52:28
  that the administration's stance on dismantling the
• 52:31
  tools of soft power.
• 52:32
  - Okay. - So secondly, I also believe right now,
• 52:38
  you know, one of the things that
• 52:39
  during my time at the State Department is
• 52:42
  that we almost completely get rid
• 52:44
  of all the lobby inference, particularly from,
• 52:47
  from people like Henry Kissinger,
• 52:48
  you know, all these lobbyists.
• 52:50
  They are so harmful to America's policy making process.
• 52:53
  So we get rid all of that. I think now the
• 52:58
  inference of Silicon Valley lobbyist
• 53:01
  and the inference of Wall Street lobbyists is creeping
• 53:03
  in to the demonstration.
• 53:05
  That's very unfortunate.
• 53:06
  I would really, really warning
• 53:10
  if I had the chance you, the President Trump, to be,
• 53:12
  to be careful because those were profit minded people.
• 53:16
  They are like either,
• 53:18
  either the Silicon Valley geeks engineers, they view
• 53:22
  the whole US China relationship as a matter
• 53:25
  of just pure science.
• 53:26
  In other words, there is no border,
• 53:27
  there is no systemic restraint.
• 53:30
  So that's a mistake
• 53:31
  because you are dealing with adversary can
• 53:33
  who can use your technology to destroy you.
• 53:36
  So we're trying, if if we continue this, this, this,
• 53:39
  this road and I think it is, is a Silicon Valley engineers
• 53:42
  and Wall Street, you know, hedge fund managers,
• 53:45
  they're going to basically lay the foundation
• 53:49
  for our own demise because we are creating the Frankenstein
• 53:52
  of our own making if we are not careful.
• 53:55
  - Yeah, I mean I think the, the last point is a good one.
• 53:57
  I think we probably wanna acknowledge
• 53:59
  that there are differences among
• 54:02
  and within these communities.
• 54:03
  So you do have, you know, the difference between, you know,
• 54:07
  the head of Anthropic Dario Am right?
• 54:09
  And, and some of the other AI people
• 54:13
  I think is quite substantial when it comes
• 54:15
  to talking about the sort of security challenge
• 54:18
  that China presents.
• 54:19
  I think some people in AI
• 54:22
  and tech are much more national security focused.
• 54:25
  And that's also true with hedge funds ma managers.
• 54:27
  'cause some of them actually have developed, in fact,
• 54:29
  what is the Deputy Secretary of Defense, right?
• 54:32
  Because I refuse to call diversity Secretary of War,
• 54:34
  deputy Secretary of Defense, I believe, you know, is,
• 54:39
  is a, a hedge fund manager who had a, a fund
• 54:43
  that was specifically targeted to assisting in sort
• 54:47
  of US national security endeavors like investing in
• 54:51
  bases in the Philippines.
• 54:53
  So I think there are people in both communities
• 54:56
  who do have sort of the national security
• 54:59
  of the United States at heart.
• 55:01
  But I agree with you, we've seen a lot of other influences
• 55:05
  that have been driven primarily by profit with less
• 55:10
  of a, a concern
• 55:12
  or less of an understanding of the implications
• 55:14
  for us economic and national security and,
• 55:17
  and that that has been detrimental.
• 55:19
  So, okay.
• 55:21
  Let's, let's wind up with the last couple of,
• 55:24
  of quick questions.
• 55:26
  You know, you've, I think you've kind of given me a sense
• 55:29
  of, of what you might advise the Trump administration to do.
• 55:33
  But if you had the president's ear, you know,
• 55:36
  for an hour, what would you say,
• 55:39
  I'd really love to see you do this?
• 55:41
  President Trump.
• 55:44
  - I think he should insulate himself from this, you know,
• 55:49
  Twitter experts on China,
• 55:52
  particularly people like Tucker Carson, people like,
• 55:56
  you know, Jeffrey Sachs, all those guys,
• 56:00
  they were just very dangerous people
• 56:02
  to America's national security
• 56:04
  and they have some influence over there.
• 56:06
  So that's one thing I would say.
• 56:09
  Secondly, I would
• 56:12
  hope Trump would make some very
• 56:16
  speech strong speeches.
• 56:18
  I mean, I mean, in my lifetime, at the first term,
• 56:22
  my time in the first term, I think there are two speeches
• 56:25
  that really stood out that was tremendously popular in the
• 56:27
  influential one is given by President Trump when he went to
• 56:32
  the parliament of South Korea.
• 56:34
  He gave a very passionate speech about the meaning
• 56:38
  of liberty and democracy that really redefine
• 56:42
  what North Korea, what South Korea is.
• 56:44
  And that was a very powerful speech.
• 56:47
  So at every state of the Union speech
• 56:49
  during the Trump first term,
• 56:51
  he brought up North Korean dissonant.
• 56:53
  So those are very inspiring.
• 56:55
  My second speech, of course, was given by p
• 56:57
  by Secretary Pompeo in July, 2020.
• 57:00
  And I was directly involved in Na speech.
• 57:02
  He delivered that the Nixon library in California.
• 57:06
  So, and na speech was very
• 57:10
  monumental in sort of defining what the,
• 57:14
  the real meaning of us China rivalry was all about.
• 57:19
  It's about freedom, it's about, you know,
• 57:21
  fundamental difference of, to governments.
• 57:23
  I I would think that Trump definitely has the
• 57:26
  capacity to, to do that.
• 57:28
  Unfortunately, I think Americans are partisan bickering is
• 57:32
  so strong that the administration is,
• 57:34
  is sort of consumed by that.
• 57:36
  And I hope they're gonna get out of that
• 57:38
  and to focus more on the larger issue dealing with China.
• 57:42
  And also I think, you know, even though he,
• 57:48
  he already has so many jobs, I think Marco Rubio should be
• 57:52
  the director of President Trump's speech writing team.
• 57:56
  - Yeah. He does have so many jobs. Poor man.
• 58:00
  Yes, yes.
• 58:01
  If, if Marco Rubio could be the director
• 58:04
  of his speechwriting team
• 58:05
  and actually say what Mark Marco Rubio believes,
• 58:08
  I think that would be great.
• 58:11
  So, okay. And, and what about a book
• 58:13
  or an article that you think is particularly important
• 58:17
  for our viewers to, to read sort
• 58:21
  of really informative about sort of China
• 58:24
  or US-China relationship in this moment?
• 58:27
  - Well, none of the, yeah, that's a very good question.
• 58:31
  So, you know, you know, you are like, you recommend one
• 58:36
  of your own, you, you both,
• 58:38
  both in the very deeply in the China watching business.
• 58:41
  You know, I normally, I have a healthy, healthy dose
• 58:44
  of disrespect for people
• 58:45
  who write China books, to be honest with you.
• 58:48
  I read them and, but I don't take them seriously
• 58:50
  because they don't not have this kind of perspective
• 58:53
  that I would prefer some of them terrific.
• 58:56
  Some of them terrific.
• 58:57
  I mean, because, you know, as you, as you see, you know,
• 58:59
  this American intelligent is deeply sort of specialized.
• 59:04
  People are anthropologists, economists and historian.
• 59:06
  Each one of them carry this sort
• 59:08
  of disciplinary perspective, which is very limited.
• 59:11
  So, so let me just recommend the two books, one book
• 59:16
  and one article that have related to China,
• 59:18
  but also is intrinsically related to China.
• 59:21
  One is a book called The Witness by Whitaker Chambers.
• 59:26
  - Mm. - So,
• 59:28
  and it was amazing book about his
• 59:33
  transformation, his, you know, he was a Soviet agent.
• 59:36
  - Yeah. - And he saw the light
• 59:38
  and he became the key witness
• 59:41
  to alter his betrayal.
• 59:44
  And it was very controversial book,
• 59:46
  but he wrote the book for his, for his children.
• 59:48
  It was really, really amazingly powerful and,
• 59:52
  and intellectually honest
• 59:55
  and also intellectually very powerful.
• 59:57
  So that book, I would like to recommend anybody who try
• 1:00:01
  to understand the true meaning of communism,
• 1:00:03
  true meanings of America.
• 1:00:05
  And that's really important.
• 1:00:07
  An article I would recommend, again, it's not about China,
• 1:00:09
  but it's also related to China,
• 1:00:11
  is George Ken's famous article.
• 1:00:14
  It's called Source Sources of Soviet Conduct.
• 1:00:18
  We are really wi witness the exactly same kind
• 1:00:20
  of situation right now.
• 1:00:22
  In 1947, the nation was befuddled
• 1:00:25
  by the reason why the Soviet was so aggressive.
• 1:00:29
  They were in the, the central, central Europe.
• 1:00:31
  They were in the Mediterranean
• 1:00:33
  and everybody said, eh, Soviet Union had the legitimate
• 1:00:35
  concern because they wanted to build the sort of buffer zone
• 1:00:38
  to prevent another ba rosa operating bar Rosa.
• 1:00:41
  And also they want to have their own sphere of inference.
• 1:00:44
  And, you know, George Kenon came out
• 1:00:47
  and said, no, this is all nonsense.
• 1:00:49
  The reason Soviet Union has to conquer, has to invade others
• 1:00:53
  because its ideology demands.
• 1:00:55
  So, because communist ideology requires constant thrill
• 1:01:01
  of Congress and success
• 1:01:02
  and triumphs to sustain the myth
• 1:01:05
  that communist party is invincible
• 1:01:08
  and infallible, that's exactly
• 1:01:10
  what Chinese Communist party is.
• 1:01:11
  Now it's driven by communist ideology.
• 1:01:14
  It's try to instill to the hearts
• 1:01:16
  and minds of Chinese people that
• 1:01:18
  the Chinese Communist Party is infallible
• 1:01:21
  and is invincible is.
• 1:01:26
  And so this is why China is very aggressive
• 1:01:31
  and very, very provocative.
• 1:01:33
  It's a challenge to not only
• 1:01:35
  to the neighborhood, but also to the globe.
• 1:01:37
  And this has everything to do
• 1:01:38
  with the Chinese commons ideology.
• 1:01:40
  So I recommend that everybody read
• 1:01:42
  that the George Ken's sources of Soviet conduct.
• 1:01:45
  So we cannot just be consumed
• 1:01:48
  by studying the conduct itself.
• 1:01:49
  Of Chinese Communist Party, but also
• 1:01:51
  to understand the sources of it.
• 1:01:53
  So that's why I make these two recommendations.
• 1:01:56
  - I think those are great and, and,
• 1:01:58
  and very unusual recommendations.
• 1:02:00
  I just can't resist asking you, do you think
• 1:02:03
  that the Chinese Communist Party is persuasive
• 1:02:08
  when it comes to its ideological campaign
• 1:02:12
  with the Chinese people?
• 1:02:14
  - No, I mean,
• 1:02:16
  but the, the party has a key to the prison,
• 1:02:18
  so you cannot really escape that without the key being sort
• 1:02:22
  of using, used to unlock the, the gate.
• 1:02:26
  I think, you know, there is enough
• 1:02:31
  power to persuade portions of the society
• 1:02:36
  to believe in the party.
• 1:02:37
  You know, the old Ladies of neighborhood committee,
• 1:02:40
  you know, those guys, they believe in that
• 1:02:43
  because they have no access to other information source.
• 1:02:47
  And I think one of the most amazingly successful Chinese
• 1:02:51
  Communist Party information control is not
• 1:02:53
  to control the access to information.
• 1:02:55
  It's really to control the interpretive
• 1:02:58
  frame of information.
• 1:03:00
  So every single piece of news,
• 1:03:02
  even though it's a factory presented to China,
• 1:03:05
  Chinese Communist Party has successfully convinced people
• 1:03:07
  to use one singular interpretation
• 1:03:11
  to understand those things.
• 1:03:13
  So, so that's why, to change the mindset,
• 1:03:17
  to change the conceptual framework of Chinese narrative is
• 1:03:21
  so, so crucial.
• 1:03:23
  So to answer your question, I don't think anybody
• 1:03:27
  who is affected by China's economic policy, which is lousy
• 1:03:31
  by, by China's human rights policy, which is terrible,
• 1:03:36
  would really believe in the re rhetoric of Chinese
• 1:03:40
  communist parties of propaganda, you know,
• 1:03:43
  but for reasons of survival, I believe a lot
• 1:03:47
  of people will join the party.
• 1:03:49
  Sometimes you may just say, you know,
• 1:03:51
  I'm joined the party not believing what they say,
• 1:03:54
  but gradually, you know, fantasy becomes reality
• 1:03:57
  and the rhetoric become propaganda becomes
• 1:03:59
  your own language.
• 1:04:01
  So, so that's one of the reasons very,
• 1:04:03
  very interesting to see.
• 1:04:05
  I don't think, you know, instinctively given the choice,
• 1:04:07
  I don't, nobody in China would believe communism,
• 1:04:10
  but the question is they have no choice.
• 1:04:13
  - And I just can't resist for the very last question.
• 1:04:17
  We are just about to have the first, well,
• 1:04:21
  I guess the first summit meeting, real summit meeting
• 1:04:23
  between President Trump and,
• 1:04:25
  and presidency of President Trump's second term.
• 1:04:29
  You know, any big expectations for the meeting?
• 1:04:33
  Any big breakthrough? Do you think that might happen?
• 1:04:36
  Or do you think it's likely to be some more soybeans,
• 1:04:39
  some airplanes, some energy? You know,
• 1:04:43
  - No, I don't think there, we should have,
• 1:04:45
  we should have any high expectation.
• 1:04:48
  Both sides. Were basically, you know, using negotiations
• 1:04:52
  to buy time, and we are, we have all sort of work to do.
• 1:04:56
  China knows, you know, we, it's running out time.
• 1:04:59
  So, and I think both sides is going to do their
• 1:05:04
  maximum to smile at each other,
• 1:05:06
  but deep inside, you know, they just,
• 1:05:08
  you know, they have a different plan.
• 1:05:10
  So I think, you know, the issues right now is, is a death
• 1:05:14
  of trust because China, you know,
• 1:05:18
  for all these tariffs, all the agreements were, China,
• 1:05:21
  by the way, has never signed anything, you know, right now.
• 1:05:24
  So they just agree to think about it.
• 1:05:27
  So that's why President Trump wants to go to Beijing
• 1:05:29
  to make sure know anything is, is signing,
• 1:05:32
  and also it is gonna be some kind of achievement.
• 1:05:35
  So it can come back and say, Hey, listen, listen, I, I,
• 1:05:36
  I solved the problem with the Chinese
• 1:05:39
  unfair trading practice with the United States,
• 1:05:42
  but also say one last thing that Donald Trump
• 1:05:46
  is carrying on a noble dream
• 1:05:48
  of American presidents since the time William McKinley,
• 1:05:52
  you know, it was during William McKinney's time when the US
• 1:05:56
  major foreign policy was announced.
• 1:05:57
  That is open door policy.
• 1:05:59
  Open door policy basically contain two very
• 1:06:02
  essential elements.
• 1:06:03
  Number one, to preserve China's territorial integrity so
• 1:06:08
  that no European powers can cover up China to establish
• 1:06:13
  selfish sphere of inference.
• 1:06:14
  That's American's sort of a policy number two,
• 1:06:19
  equal opportunity for commerce
• 1:06:20
  that is open up China markets.
• 1:06:23
  So it is Donald Trump's dream, I think, to
• 1:06:27
  open up China markets,
• 1:06:29
  and that has the dream
• 1:06:31
  that the American president has been pursuing
• 1:06:34
  for over 120 some years.
• 1:06:36
  To that, I will say good luck, Mr. President.
• 1:06:39
  - Yeah. Good luck, Mr. President.
• 1:06:40
  And, and by the way, preserving Chinese sovereignty is,
• 1:06:44
  is president is part of President Trump's dream?
• 1:06:47
  - I think so. I don't think China, I, I don't think,
• 1:06:49
  I don't think, well, that actually the urgency has gone
• 1:06:53
  because remember at the time of box rebellion, you know,
• 1:06:55
  when open door policy were announced,
• 1:06:57
  every European council wants to cover up China, right?
• 1:06:59
  And in the twenties, Japan jumped in
• 1:07:01
  and everybody also wants to try again.
• 1:07:03
  So that's why we had the Washington Conference in
• 1:07:05
  the 19 22, 19 23.
• 1:07:07
  One of the most important accomplishment, the purpose of
• 1:07:09
  that is to force countries to sign nine power treaties
• 1:07:14
  to promise that they're not gonna cover up China
• 1:07:16
  to preserve China territory integrity.
• 1:07:18
  Nowadays, of course, you don't have that kind of continu,
• 1:07:20
  nobody's talking about covering up China, so
• 1:07:22
  that's why it's totally unnecessary.
• 1:07:24
  So even brings up, but trade
• 1:07:27
  closed market is the problem.
• 1:07:29
  That's why this remaining issue now,
• 1:07:32
  president Trump is in that way.
• 1:07:34
  He is not only a should businessman, a very
• 1:07:38
  unpredictable politician, he's also idealist.
• 1:07:44
  - Well, miles, I think this has been one
• 1:07:46
  of the most provocative discussions that we've had
• 1:07:50
  to date on, on China considered.
• 1:07:52
  And I really wanna thank you for that.
• 1:07:55
  I think you've introduced a, a whole range of, of new ways
• 1:07:59
  of, of thinking about the US-China relationship
• 1:08:02
  and in particular about Trump administration policy and,
• 1:08:06
  and, and strategy.
• 1:08:08
  So thank you for bringing your ideas
• 1:08:12
  to the podcast.
• 1:08:13
  It's been a real treat to have you with us.
• 1:08:17
  - Well, thank you Liz, and more power to Hoover.
• 1:08:20
  - If you enjoyed this discussion
• 1:08:21
  and want more informed insight on China,
• 1:08:24
  please subscribe to China.
• 1:08:25
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• 1:08:27
  or your favorite platform of choice.