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Why Did George Washington Stop Asking the Senate for Advice? - The First Cabinet and the Origins of Presidential Advice | Sleepy Facts About History · Sleepy Facts About History

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Welcome to Sleepy Facts About History. The United
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States Constitution outlines the office of the
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President, but never mentions a presidential
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cabinet. When George Washington took office in
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1789, he faced the practical challenge of governing
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a new nation with no blueprint for executive
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advice. This episode explores how the American
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cabinet emerged, not from a grand constitutional
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design, but from Washington's practical needs,
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his failed experiment with consulting the Senate
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in person, and his reliance on the written opinions
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of his department heads. The narrative examines
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the distinct roles of the first executive officers,
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including Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton,
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Henry Knox, and Edmund Randolph. By looking at
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major early crises, such as the debates over
1:05
the Bank of the United States, the Neutrality
1:07
Proclamation, and the Whiskey Rebellion. The
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episode reveals how Washington used his advisors.
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He sought their written arguments, weighed their
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differing visions for the Republic, and always
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retained the final decision for himself, establishing
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a flexible precedent that shaped the executive
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branch. I kept returning to one question while
1:31
working on this episode. How do you build a government
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from scratch? when the founding document leaves
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out the instructions. Understanding Washington's
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solution offers a clear look at how American
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political institutions actually developed through
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experimentation rather than rigid design. The
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Constitution creates a precedent, gives him a
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few explicit tools, and says nothing about how
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he should be advised. This left George Washington
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to build the machinery of executive council from
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silence. Experiment. and the practical necessity
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of governing alone. The Constitution never mentions
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a cabinet. It creates a president, gives him
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a few explicit tools, and leaves the rest unsaid.
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That silence is where this story begins. When
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George Washington took the oath of office in
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April 1789 on the balcony of Federal Hall in
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New York City, he became the head of a government
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that existed largely on paper. The Constitution
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had been ratified, and the first Congress had
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assembled. But the machinery of the executive
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branch had not yet been built. Washington understood
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something that the document did not spell out.
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A president alone cannot govern. He would need
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advice, and he would need it reliably, confidentially,
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and in forms he could control. What he did not
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have was any blueprint for how to get it. The
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Constitution does contain two relevant passages,
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though neither was drafted with Cabinet government
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in mind. Article 2, Section 2 says the President
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may require the opinion in writing of the principal
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officer in each of the executive departments.
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This clause was added late in the Constitutional
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Convention. It was not a grand design for an
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advisory system. It was a modest provision allowing
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the President to seat departmental counsel when
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needed. The same section says the President shall
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make treaties with the advice and consent of
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the Senate. This was a compromise. The Senate
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would have a role in treaties and appointments.
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But the Framers did not make it a General Advisory
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Council. Those are the only advisory mechanisms
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the Constitution contains. There is no Cabinet,
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no Council of Ministers, no Privy Council adapted
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from British practice. The word itself never
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appears. Washington would have to decide what
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kind of advice he wanted, from whom, in what
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form, and with what expectations. The first Congress,
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meeting in that same temporary capital, began
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to create the offices Washington could consult.
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In July 1789, it established the Department of
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Foreign Affairs, soon renamed State, with responsibility
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for diplomatic correspondence and treaties. In
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August, it created the Department of War, charged
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with military and frontier affairs. In September,
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it established the Treasury Department, the most
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powerful of the new offices, with broad authority
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over revenue, debt, and fiscal policy. The Judiciary
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Act of that same year created the Office of Attorney
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General, though not as the head of a department.
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Edmund Randolph would serve as a part -time legal
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advisor. continuing his private law practice
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while advising the President on constitutional
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questions. These were statutory creations, not
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constitutional requirements. Congress could have
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structured them differently. Washington could
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have used them differently. The fact that we
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now take these four offices for granted obscures
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how contingent their origins were, and how much
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depended on the sequencing of their creation.
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Treasury came last but would become most consequential,
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because Hamilton's financial program would generate
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the era's defining constitutional conflicts.
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Washington began by consulting the men he appointed
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to these positions individually and informally.
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He knew most of them personally, and he had selected
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each because his experience matched a distinct
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governmental need. Thomas Jefferson, who became
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Secretary of State and served as a diplomat in
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France, and was a fellow virginian his diplomatic
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experience made him the natural source on foreign
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affairs and treaty obligations alexander hamilton
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the secretary of the treasury had been washington's
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aid during the revolutionary war and had demonstrated
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administrative and financial expertise his wartime
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experience managing supply and his latest study
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of public finance made him the obvious choice
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for fiscal matters Henry Knox, the Secretary
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of War, had been with Washington since the siege
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of Boston. His military background informed his
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advice on frontier defense and Indian affairs.
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Edmund Randolph, the Attorney General, had served
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in the Virginia delegation to the Constitutional
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Convention. His legal training made him useful
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on constitutional questions, though his part
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-time status limited his day -to -day involvement.
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These were not strangers thrust into rivalry
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by ambition alone. They were men. Washington
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had selected because he trusted their judgment
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in distinct areas and because their backgrounds
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shaped the kind of advice they could offer. But
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trust and structure are different things. Washington
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needed to know how to consult them, and the Constitution
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offered him two paths. The written opinion clause
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suggested one. He could ask department heads.
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to put their views in writing, compare them at
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his leisure, and decide. The Advice and Consent
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Clause suggested another. He could go to the
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Senate itself, the body the Constitution explicitly
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named as an advisory partner in treaties, and
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seek its counsel in person. In August 1789, Washington
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tried this second path. The results would shape
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everything that followed. The immediate occasion
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was a treaty with the Creek Nation, a matter
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of frontier diplomacy that required careful handling.
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On August 22, 1789, Washington went to the Senate
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chamber in Federal Hall in person, bringing the
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treaty documents and expecting to discuss them
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then and there. The scene that unfolded is recorded
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in the Senate Executive Journal. Washington sat
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before the assembled senators. The treaty was
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read aloud. Then, as the journal records, specific
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senators raised objections. They objected not
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to the treaty's substance primarily, but to the
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procedure. They were not prepared to deliberate
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immediately. A motion was made to refer the matter
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to a committee for further study. Washington,
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still present, asked when he should return for
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their answer. The Senate debated whether to postpone
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the question. The motion to refer carried. Washington
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waited while the Senate worked through its procedures.
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The committee reported. The Senate deferred again.
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He left frustrated, and he would not return to
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seek in -person advice from the Senate again.
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This failure is easy to misunderstand. The Senate
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did not reject the treaty, nor did it refuse
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all advisory role in foreign affairs. The Constitution
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explicitly gave it advice and consent power over
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treaties and appointments. What the Senate's
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procedures and sensibilities made impossible
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was the kind of immediate, informal, face -to
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-face consultation that Washington had attempted.
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The Senators confronted with the President physically
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present and awaiting immediate response were
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uncomfortable. They did not want to deliberate
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under his gaze. The Senate saw itself as a legislative
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body. not a council of advisors. Its members
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wanted time, committee review, and distance from
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executive pressure. Washington wanted speed,
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confidentiality, and direct exchange. The two
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institutions were not designed to interact in
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the way he had tried. The experiment collapsed,
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and with it collapsed the most obvious constitutional
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alternative to private departmental advice. Washington
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turned back to the written opinion clause and
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to the department heads he had appointed. This
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would become the central mechanism of his advisory
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practice. It is worth understanding precisely
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how it worked, because it differs fundamentally
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from modern assumptions about cabinet government.
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When Washington faced a major decision, he would
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often ask his department heads to submit their
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views in writing. They would do so sometimes
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at length. laying out constitutional arguments,
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policy considerations, and practical recommendations.
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Washington would read them, sometimes ask follow
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-up questions, sometimes meet with one or more
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advisers individually, and then decide. The cabinet
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was not a board that voted. It was not a collective
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body that arrived at consensus. It was a set
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of individual advisors whose influence depended
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entirely on Washington's willingness to consult
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them and his assessment of their arguments. The
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most famous example of this process, and the
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one that reveals its character most clearly,
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was the debate over the Bank of the United States
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in 1791. Hamilton had proposed a national bank
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as part of his broader financial program. which
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included federal assumption of state debts and
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new excise taxes. The bank bill passed Congress,
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but Washington had to decide whether to sign
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it. He was uncertain about its constitutionality,
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and he asked his cabinet for written opinions.
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Hamilton's response, submitted February 23, 1791,
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argued for broad construction of the Constitution.
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The Constitution granted specific powers to Congress,
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including the power to tax, to borrow, to regulate
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commerce, and to provide for the common defense
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and general welfare. The necessary and proper
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clause, Hamilton contended, gave Congress implied
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powers to choose the means for executing these
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enumerated powers. A national bank was a legitimate
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and effective means for managing the nation's
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finances, collecting taxes, supporting commerce
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and maintaining public credit. The word necessary
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did not mean absolutely indispensable, Hamilton
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argued. It meant needful, useful and conducive
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to the end in view. The Constitution should not
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be read as a straitjacket, but as a framework
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that authorized reasonable and useful institutions.
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To deny Congress the power to choose appropriate
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means would be to deprive the government of the
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capacity to act effectively. Jefferson's opinion
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submitted February 15, 1791 argued the opposite.
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The Constitution granted specific, enumerated
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powers to Congress and no others. A national
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bank was not among them. The necessary and proper
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cause could stretch only to means that were truly
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indispensable to executing an enumerated power.
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A bank was not indispensable. The government
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could collect taxes and manage finances without
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one. If necessary were interpreted to mean merely
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convenient or useful, then Congress could do
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anything it pleased, and the enumeration of powers
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would become meaningless. Such broad construction
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would eventually eliminate all limits on federal
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power and consolidate authority at the expense
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of the states. Jefferson pressed the point further.
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The power to create corporations was not granted
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to Congress, and the bank was a corporation.
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To allow it would be to rewrite the Constitution
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by interpretation. Randolph sided with Jefferson
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on constitutional grounds, adding his own legal
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analysis. Washington read all three opinions.
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He also considered the practical consequences.
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The country's finances were fragile. Hamilton's
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program had begun to establish public credit.
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A veto might disrupt the delicate political bargain
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that had brought Assumption and the capital relocation
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together. After weighing the arguments, Washington
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signed the bank bill. He accepted Hamilton's
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broad construction. Though his own instincts
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were often more cautious than Hamilton's program,
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the decision was his. The cabinet had advised.
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It had not decided. This pattern would repeat
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throughout his presidency, and the bank debate
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illustrates something essential that is often
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lost in simplified accounts. It is tempting to
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reduce this conflict to Hamilton versus Jefferson.
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Two brilliant and strong -willed men who came
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to despise each other. The personal animosity
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was real and would deepen. But the disagreements
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were also structural and principled. They concerned
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whether the United States would be a commercial
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nation with centralized financial institutions,
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or an agrarian republic with limited federal
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power. They concerned whether the Constitution
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should be interpreted flexibly or strictly. Hamilton's
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vision was nationalist, developmental, oriented
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toward manufacturing and public credit. Jefferson's
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was decentralized, suspicious of commercial and
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financial concentration, protective of state
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authority. These were not questions of personality
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alone. They were questions of national direction.
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They were debated not only in Washington's cabinet,
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but in Congress, in state legislatures, in newspapers
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and in correspondence networks that extended
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from Philadelphia to Charleston to Paris and
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London. The foreign policy crisis of 1793 brought
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this advisory process to another test. Revolutionary
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France had declared war on Britain and the United
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States had treaty obligations to France from
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1778. American public opinion was strongly pro
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-French. particularly among those who saw the
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revolution as an extension of American principles.
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But the United States was in no condition to
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fight Britain. Its navy was negligible. Its finances
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were fragile. Its western frontier was unsettled.
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Hamilton and Jefferson divided predictably. Hamilton
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favored neutrality with a tilt toward Britain.
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Jefferson favored honoring the French alliance
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and supporting the revolutionary cause. Washington
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consulted his cabinet extensively. He received
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written opinions. He met with individual advisors.
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He weighed the risks of each course. The specific
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dangers were concrete. War with Britain would
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threaten American trade, expose coastal cities
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to naval attack. and potentially reignite frontier
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conflicts with British -backed Indian nations.
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Alignment with France might satisfy public sentiment,
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but would alienate Britain, the country's largest
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trading partner, and risk economic ruin. On April
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22, 1793, Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation,
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declaring that the United States would pursue
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a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent
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powers The proclamation was his decision, announced
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in his name, after cabinet consultation, but
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not cabinet authorization. The French minister,
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Edmond Charles Jeannette, would soon arrive and
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test this neutrality through provocative actions.
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He commissioned American privateers, attempted
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to organize expeditions against British and Spanish
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territories, and appealed directly to the American
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public over the president's head. Washington's
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cabinet debated how to respond to Genet's successors.
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With Jefferson initially reluctant to press too
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hard against a revolutionary ally, but the advisory
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process itself had functioned as Washington intended,
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it had given him a range of considered opinion
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without displacing his final responsibility.
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The Genet Fair demonstrated that neutrality was
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not merely a policy choice but a continuous management
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problem. The cabinet's role was to advise on
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that management, not to make it. The Whiskey
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Rebellion of 1794 offered another test, this
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time of domestic authority in the advisory process
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itself. Western Pennsylvania farmers resisted
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the federal excise tax on whiskey, attacking
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tax collectors, threatening insurrection, and
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defying federal law. Washington consulted his
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cabinet on how to respond. Hamilton favored military
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force to establish federal supremacy and demonstrate
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that the new government could enforce its laws.
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Knox, whose military background informed his
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assessment, supported the use of force, but with
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attention to logistical and strategic considerations.
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Jefferson, typically more sympathetic to agrarian
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protest, argued that the tax was unpopular and
20:02
that conciliation might be preferable to coercion.
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Randolph provided legal analysis of the president's
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authority to call out the militia. Washington
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weighed this advice in the pattern he had established.
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He used written opinions, individual consultation,
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and his own deliberation. He was concerned not
20:22
only with suppressing the rebellion, but with
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the precedent his response would set. If the
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federal government could not enforce its revenue
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laws, its authority would be hollow. Yet excessive
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force might confirm anti -federalist fears of
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centralized tyranny. He eventually decided on
20:42
military action, leading a militia force into
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western Pennsylvania. This was the only time
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a sitting president has commanded troops in the
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field. The rebellion collapsed without significant
20:54
violence, the farmers dispersing before the main
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force arrived. The point for our purposes is
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not the military operation but the advisory process
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that preceded it. Written opinions, individual
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consultation, presidential decision. Each advisor
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contributed from his distinct expertise and Washington
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retained final judgment. Throughout these episodes,
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the cabinet remained what Washington had made
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it, not what later practice would transform it
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into. There were no regular cabinet meetings
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in the modern sense during Washington's first
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term. The four department heads and the Attorney
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General did not sit as a collective body with
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assigned seats, formal agendas, and recorded
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minutes. They met sometimes separately or in
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small groups, often at Washington's initiative,
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often informally. Their influence varied with
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the President's confidence and the subject at
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hand. Hamilton's dominance in financial matters
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was real. So was Jefferson's in diplomatic correspondence.
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Knox's role in military and Indian affairs mattered,
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though he is less remembered. Randolph's legal
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opinions were sought when constitutional questions
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arose, but none of this was institutionalized
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in fixed procedures. It was all personal, flexible,
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dependent on Washington's habits and judgments.
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This is the crucial distinction that separates
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the first cabinet from modern conceptions. We
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now expect cabinets to meet regularly, to operate
22:35
with some collective solidarity, to represent
22:39
constituencies or party factions in more or less
22:42
balanced ways. None of this applied in the 1790s.
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The first cabinet was not a party cabinet, because
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parties as we understand them did not yet exist
22:55
in organized form. The divisions between Hamilton
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and Jefferson would contribute to the emergence
23:01
of partisan alignments. But during Washington's
23:05
presidency, these were still fluid. Washington
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himself hoped to avoid party division, though
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he would increasingly be drawn toward Hamilton's
23:13
positions and away from Jefferson's. The cabinet's
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flexibility meant that its later shape would
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depend on how subsequent presidents chose to
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use it. not on any constitutional requirement
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or Washington's specific precedent. Congress
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mattered throughout this process in ways that
23:31
are sometimes overlooked. It created the departments.
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It passed the legislation that generated the
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constitutional questions. It debated Hamilton's
23:42
financial program, modified it, and in the case
23:45
of the Assumption Bill, relocated the national
23:48
capital to Philadelphia. and then to the Potomac
23:52
as part of the political bargain. State governments
23:55
mattered too, particularly in the finance debates,
23:59
since assumption of state debts directly affected
24:01
their fiscal situations. Diplomats and foreign
24:05
governments shaped the environment in which Washington
24:08
sought advice. The French and British ministers
24:11
in Philadelphia were active participants in American
24:14
politics, not distant observers. Newspapers amplified
24:19
cabinet disagreements. often through anonymous
24:23
essays written by the cabinet members themselves
24:25
or their allies. This public dimension complicated
24:29
Washington's preference for confidentiality.
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The National Gazette, established in 1791 with
24:37
Jefferson's encouragement and edited by Philip
24:39
Frenot, became a voice for Jeffersonian positions.
24:43
It attacked Hamilton's financial program and
24:46
defended strict construction of the Constitution.
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The Gazette of the United States, aligned with
24:52
Hamilton and supported by John Fenno, defended
24:55
the administration's fiscal policies and broad
24:58
constitutional interpretation. Pseudonymous essays
25:02
allowed cabinet members and their allies to argue
25:05
in public what they could not say directly in
25:08
official capacity. Hamilton wrote as Pacificus
25:12
in defense of the Neutrality Proclamation. Other
25:15
essays appeared under names like An American
25:18
or A Friend to the Union. The public sphere was
25:23
already forming, and cabinet conflicts became
25:25
public knowledge, despite Washington's preference
25:28
that advice remain confidential. This newspaper
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warfare meant that the cabinet was not a sealed
25:34
room. It operated within a public arena that
25:38
shaped and amplified its conflicts, sometimes
25:41
distorting them, sometimes forcing positions
25:44
to harden beyond what private consultation might
25:47
have produced. The physical setting of these
25:51
consultations is worth picturing because it shapes
25:54
what was possible. In New York, Washington initially
25:58
resided in a house on Cherry Street, then moved
26:02
to the McComb House on Broadway. The Treasury
26:05
and state offices were nearby, a short walk or
26:08
carriage ride away. Federal Hall, where Congress
26:12
met and where Washington had his abortive Senate
26:15
consultation, stood at the intersection of wall
26:18
and broad streets. The city was compact, its
26:23
streets navigable on foot. Written opinions could
26:26
be delivered by hand and read the same day. Personal
26:30
meetings could be arranged quickly, sometimes
26:33
over breakfast or dinner. When the government
26:36
moved to Philadelphia in 1790, the pattern continued.
26:41
Washington occupied the President's House on
26:43
Market Street. with executive offices nearby
26:46
on chestnut and walnut streets the distances
26:50
were small enough that informal consultation
26:52
remained natural washington could have insisted
26:56
on more formal procedures more rigid separation
26:59
of his advisors more dependence on the senate
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he chose not to the geography facilitated his
27:07
preferences it did not determine them by the
27:12
end of washington's presidency The practice of
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consulting department heads individually and
27:18
in writing had become established enough to be
27:21
recognizable as a precedent, though still not
27:24
a constitutional requirement. When John Adams
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succeeded him in 1797, he inherited the same
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offices and the same flexibility. Adams would
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use the cabinet differently, retaining Washington's
27:39
appointees initially, struggling with their loyalties.
27:42
eventually building his own advisory relationships.
27:45
The cabinet's form would continue to vary with
27:48
each president. Some would rely heavily on cabinet
27:52
counsel. Others would bypass it for private advisors
27:56
outside the departmental structure. The institution's
28:00
durability came from its adaptability, not from
28:04
any fixed design. What Washington had created,
28:08
then, was not a cabinet in the modern sense.
28:11
but a practice of organized private council that
28:15
became an executive institution through repetition
28:18
and acceptance. The Constitution's silence on
28:22
advisory structures, which might have been a
28:25
defect, became a space for presidential invention.
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The written opening clause provided a textual
28:32
hook. The Senate's unwillingness to serve as
28:35
an in -person council closed off the main alternative.
28:39
The department head's expertise and proximity
28:41
made individual consultation natural. Washington's
28:46
own temperament, cautious, deliberate, unwilling
28:49
to surrender final judgment, shaped the process
28:52
into one that served his needs without binding
28:55
his successors. The disagreements between Hamilton
28:59
and Jefferson, so often dramatized as personal
29:02
rivalry, were also genuine debates about the
29:05
Republic's future that Washington had to adjudicate.
29:09
He did so not by splitting differences, but by
29:13
making decisions, sometimes favoring one advisor,
29:16
sometimes another, always retaining the authority
29:20
to choose. The cabinet's influence depended on
29:24
him, not on any independent constitutional status.
29:28
This is why the episode matters beyond antiquarian
29:31
interest. It shows how institutions can emerge
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from practical necessity. constitutional silence,
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and presidential choice. It shows how the American
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executive branch acquired features the framers
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did not explicitly design, and it shows how much
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depends on how officeholders interpret their
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opportunities within the spaces that constitutions
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leave open. There remains uncertainty about how
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fully Washington intended this outcome. Did he
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see himself as creating a lasting institution?
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or was he simply solving immediate problems as
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they arose? The evidence is mixed. He was not
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a theorist of administration. He did not write
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essays explaining his advisory methods. His letters
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reveal a man concerned with getting sound counsel,
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maintaining dignity, avoiding monarchical appearance,
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and preserving his own decision -making authority.
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Whether he foresaw that future presidents would
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consult cabinets, kitchen cabinets or neither
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is unclear what he established was a flexible
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precedent not a fixed model the precise frequency
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and format of early cabinet meetings are not
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fully documented we know about the written opinions
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because they were preserved we know less about
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informal conversations meals rides in carriages
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and other settings where advice may have been
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offered and received Washington's private reasoning
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on some decisions remains partly inferential.
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We can see that he read Hamilton's and Jefferson's
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bank opinions and signed the bill, that we cannot
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fully reconstruct the moment of decision in his
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own mind. The influence of written advice is
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sometimes clear, sometimes more diffuse. What
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we can say with confidence is that the cabinet
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as we know it was not designed by the Constitution,
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was not inevitable. and was not originally a
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collective decision -making body. It emerged
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from one president's practical needs, his failed
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experiment with Senate consultation, his turn
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to written departmental opinions, and his insistence
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on retaining final authority. The men who advised
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him were consequential, but they advised. They
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did not govern collectively. Their influence
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depended on presidential choice, and that dependence
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would remain the cabinet's defining characteristic
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long after Washington left office. The Constitution's
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silence on executive advice was not an oversight
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to be corrected, but a space to be filled. Washington
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filled it with a practice that served his presidency
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and shaped those that followed. The cabinet became
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durable because it was flexible, and flexible
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because it rested. on presidential discretion
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rather than constitutional command. That is the
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institutional origin story the evidence support.
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Not a designed institution, but an invented one,
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born of necessity, tested by conflict, and preserved
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by its capacity to adapt.