Latest / Reformed Thinking / Does Free Will Really Exist? | Jonathan Edwards

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Does Free Will Really Exist? | Jonathan Edwards · Reformed Thinking

0:00
Welcome to reformed thinking. Yes, glad to be here with you
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today. You know, usually when we talk
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about a physical mechanism, there is this expectation of
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precision. Right.
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Like with engineering or, you know, anatomy.
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Yeah, if you fall off a ladder and your arm hurts, you go to
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the hospital. And they take an X-ray.
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They take an X-ray and it shows that jagged white line right
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there on the screen. The doctor just points at it and
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says, well, there is the fracture.
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It is very binary. I mean, it is clean.
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You do not debate the philosophy of the bone.
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No, you just look at the mechanics of the brake.
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Or, you know, think about a car engine.
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If the Pistons are firing, the crankshaft turns.
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And if the fuel line is cut, the engine stops.
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Right. The physical world gives us
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these rigid, very reliable laws of cause and effect.
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And honestly, we find a lot of comfort in that predictability.
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We really do. We like things to be visible,
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neatly categorized, and operating according to rules we
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can actually observe. Absolutely.
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But then you step into the world of human decision making,
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theology, and the invisible mechanics of choice.
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And suddenly that X-ray machine is completely broken.
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It is we are looking at a philosophical landscape that is,
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well, honestly, it is completely murky.
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It is the absolute definition of diagnostic Muddy Waters.
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You have 10 different people how human free will operates and you
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will get 10 different, often contradictory answers.
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Yeah, the moment you move from the physical anatomy of the
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brain to the spiritual anatomy of the soul, people just
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abandoned the rules of logic that they rely on for everything
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else in life. They really do.
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They start inventing these mystical, floating concepts of
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human autonomy that just, you know, defy reason.
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But the brilliant thing about the text we are examining today
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is that the author refuses to let us get away with that.
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Right. He insists on bringing that same
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level of rigorous X-ray precision to the human will.
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I am so glad we are doing this because today we are taking a
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deep dive into why that X-ray machine of human choice is
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broken and how to fix it. We have a massive stack of notes
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and excerpts in front of us from Jonathan Edwards classic
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theological treatise Freedom of the Will.
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It is a massive text. It really is, and our specific
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mission today is to thoroughly investigate Edwards systematic
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dismantling of the Armenian view of human liberty.
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Right. Specifically, we are looking at
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the idea that the human will possesses an autonomous,
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selfdetermining capacity that is totally unlinked to any prior
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'cause. Now you might be listening to
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this and wondering why you should care about an 18th
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century philosophical argument. You might be thinking I just
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need to get through my work day. Yeah, I mean, it sounds so
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academic, but the reality is that how you define your own
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freedom dictates how you view God's sovereignty.
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Absolutely. It dictates how you view human
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responsibility and the actual mechanics of the choices you
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make every single day. If you get the definition of
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freedom wrong, your entire theological framework.
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It does, and that gives us a clear lay of the land for our
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investigation. What is fascinating here is that
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Edwards does not rely on emotional appeals to make his
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case. No, he does not try to
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manipulate your feelings at all. Instead, he uses razor sharp
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logic to prove that the Armenian concept of a completely
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independent neutral will is a mathematical and philosophical
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contradiction. He takes their premises, assumes
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they are true for the sake of argument, and walks them out to
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their inevitable logical conclusions.
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Right, he shows how those premises just collapse under
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their own weight. He proves that such an
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autonomous capacity cannot exist in any created being.
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It is a masterful exercise in logical reduction, demonstrating
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that what many people call free will is actually an impossible
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fiction. OK, let us unpack this step by
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step. We were jumping right into the
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initial sections of the text. Yeah, sections 1 and 2.
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Right to begin, we need to understand the opposing view
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that Edwards is targeting. So Armenian theology proposes
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that the essence of moral liberty consists in the will
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determining its own free acts. They argue for a self
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determining capacity within the will itself.
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Now, Edward starts by pointing out a basic flaw in how we even
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talk about this. Yeah, drawing on the philosopher
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John Locke, right? Yes, he notes that actions
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belong to agents, not to the properties of agents.
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So it is improper to say the will decides because the will is
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just a faculty. Right, it is an attribute.
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The correct phrasing is that the soul or the person decides using
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their capacity of willing. We often talk about the will as
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if it is a little person sitting inside our heads.
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Yeah, like a homunculus making choices independently of our
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minds. But Edwards grants them their
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phrasing for the sake of argument.
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He does. He assumes they mean the soul
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determining its own volitions. He is incredibly generous in
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granting their definitions before he dismantles them.
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He really is, he says. Fine, let us assume the will
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determines its own acts. OK?
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If the will determines its own acts, it must do so by making a
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choice. Right.
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The will determines things by choosing them.
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Therefore, every free act of choice is determined by a
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preceding act of choice. Think about the geometry of that
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for a second. Yeah, map it out.
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If your current choice was determined by your will, then
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your will had to make a choice to determine that choice.
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And if that preceding choice was also free, it had to be
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determined by an even earlier choice.
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This creates an impossible infinite regress.
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You have an endless chain of choices going backward forever.
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Right. Or you eventually hit a first
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choice that was not determined by a preceding choice.
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But if that first choice was not determined by the will, then by
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their own definition it was not free.
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Spot on. And if the first choice in the
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chain is not free, none of the subsequent choices caused by it
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can be free either. I want to make sure we make this
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highly concrete, so I'm going to build an analogy here.
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Go for it. Imagine a freight train sitting
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on a set of tracks. OK, a train.
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Let us say this train consists of five connected train cars.
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All hooked together. Yeah, the fifth car is moved by
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the 4th car. The 4th car is moved by the
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third car. The third is moved by the 2nd
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and the second is moved by the 1st.
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Everything is connected and the motion is transferred down the
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line. But what moves the first car?
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Right. If the first car does not have
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an engine, if it does not have an independent source of motion,
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then none of the following cars move.
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Thus, a free act cannot be the cause of the very first free
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act. If the first act is not free, if
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it is determined by something outside the will, like a
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locomotive pulling from the outside, then the whole chain is
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determined from the outside. You cannot have 10,000 links in
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a chain where the first link is moved by an outside force and
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then claim the subsequent links are moving themselves.
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The whole concept of a self determining chain of choices is
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mathematically impossible. Precisely the logic there is
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airtight. It is like falling dominoes.
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If the first domino is pushed by an outside finger, every
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subsequent domino falling is the result of that initial outside
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force. And Edwards anticipates the
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evasions people will try to use to escape this trap.
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He knows what they're going to say.
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He does. He asks what if the Armenian
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claims it is the faculty of the soul, not a prior act, that
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determines the choice? So what if the capacity itself
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just generates the choice without a preceding action?
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Edwards responds using flawless logic.
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He says for a faculty to determine anything, it must act.
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To determine a choice is to perform an action.
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Right and action requires a prior 'cause.
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You cannot have a dormant capacity suddenly produce an
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effect without an action bringing that effect into
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existence. Think about a sleeping man who
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has the physical capacity to run.
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That capacity sits completely dormant.
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For that capacity to produce the effect of running, an action
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must occur to wake him up and trigger the muscles.
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The contradiction remains unbroken.
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The determining act must be distinct from the ACT being
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determined. You cannot be the cause of your
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own existence before you exist. Wait, I might push back here on
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behalf of someone analyzing this for the first time.
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Sure, what is the objection? What if they try to collapse the
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timeline? What if they say, well, the soul
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exerts A volition, and that exertion is the determination?
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Meaning it happens at the identical split second.
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Yeah, they might say the exertion is both the cause and
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the effect simultaneously. Does that solve the infinite
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regress? That is a clever attempt.
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Because if they happen together, there is no chain going
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backward, right? Edwards addresses that specific
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defense, and he shows why it fails.
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How does he dismantle that? He points out that making the
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exertion both the cause and the effect is nonsensical.
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Right. If the choice is determined at
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all, it has a reason for existing in a specific way
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rather than another way. And that reason must be distinct
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from and prior to the effect. Yes, to say the soul orders
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itself to act by the very act itself is like saying a house
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built itself by the act of being built.
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Or that a book wrote itself by the act of being written.
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The cause must precede the effect, at least in the order of
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nature, if not in time. You must have a builder before
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you have a building. Therefore, because Edwards
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establishes that a choice cannot 'cause itself without leading to
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an infinite regress or a logical absurdity, we are forced to ask
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the next logical question. Right.
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Which means if we accept that choices cannot cause themselves
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without creating an endless loop, we are forced into an even
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stranger corner. We really are.
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We have to ask, can a choice just happen at a sin air
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uncaused? Let us investigate the concept
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of contingents. Armenians argue that for a
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choice to be truly free, it must be a contingent event.
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Right. And in this philosophical
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context, contingent means it comes to pass without any
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preceding necessity or 'cause. It is a completely uncaused
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event that just springs into reality.
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To tackle this bizarre claim, Edwards first defines what A
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cause actually is. He uses the word in a broad
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philosophical sense. A cause is anything that is the
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ground or reason why an event happens this way rather than
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another way. It does not always mean a
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positive productive force. No, not at all.
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For instance, the absence of the sun is the cause of water
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freezing at night. The absence of the sun is not
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actively doing something. Right, it is a negative cause,
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but it is still the true reliable reason why the water
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freezes. It provides the condition for
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the effect. Edwards argues that nothing
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begins to exist without a 'cause this is a basic dictate of human
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common sense. If things could pop into
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existence without causes, we would lose all rational proof
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for the existence of God. I want to pause right there
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because that is a massive statement.
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It really is. What does this abstract
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philosophical point mean for the average person's faith?
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Why does losing cause and effect destroy the logical proof of
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God? Because our primary argument for
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a Creator, as the apostle Paul lays out in Romans 1, is
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reasoning from effects back to a first 'cause.
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We look at the universe, we see the intricate design of nature,
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the stars, the human body, and we recognize that all of this is
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an effect. From that effect, we logically
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deduce it must have a maker. If events, including human
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choices, can begin to exist without any cause whatsoever,
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then why could the universe not begin to exist without a cause?
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Wow. If you abandoned the universal
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law of cause and effect to save a philosophical notion of human
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free will, you accidentally demolish the logical foundation
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for defending the existence of God.
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The atheist could simply say, well, the universe is just a
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contingent event. It's sprang into existence
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uncaused, just like your human choices do.
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Edwards is warning us that the intellectual price tag for
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Armenian free will is the destruction of Christian
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apologetics. That is a staggering consequence
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when you put it that way. The stakes are incredibly high.
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And to make this relatable, everyday common sense dictates
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that effects have proportionate causes.
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You do not get a massive explosion from a tiny spark
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unless there is a huge room full of gas.
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You do not get an intricate watch without a watch mater.
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Edwards uses this fantastic analogy of rain falling from the
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sky to illustrate the absurdity of uncaused events.
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I love this part, he says. If things happen purely without
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cause, it would be blind chance. Nothing has no choice.
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Nothing cannot discriminate. So if human volitions happen
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without a cause, why wouldn't other things happen without a
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cause? Why would this effectual no
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'cause exclusively produce water falling from the sky?
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Blind chance does not pick and choose its elements.
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If non entity could bring forth existence, we would expect
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stones, stars, beasts and angels to pop into existence randomly
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out of the clouds. The fact that only waterfalls
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from the clouds shows there's a specific, reliable cause for
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rain. Similarly, the fact that human
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volitions follow consistent patterns like seeking happiness
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or avoiding pain shows they have specific, reliable causes.
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That analogy highlights the absurdity perfectly.
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And when pressed on this, the defenders of uncaused volition
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often retreat to the idea of the active nature of the soul.
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They say, well, the soul is an active spiritual substance,
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unlike rocks and trees. Therefore, it's active nature is
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the reason it can make uncaused choices.
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It just acts because it is its nature to act.
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Edwards dismantles this by distinguishing between a general
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tendency and a specific effect. A general tendency to be active
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does not explain why a specific choice is made at a specific
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time. I love how he illustrates that.
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It is like asking why did this person choose to eat an apple
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instead of an orange at noon today?
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And the answer being because they have the general biological
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ability to eat. That is a terrible answer.
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It explains their general capacity to consume food, but it
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offers absolutely 0 explanation for the specific limitation,
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direction and determination of that specific act of picking up
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the apple. Why the apple?
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Why at noon? Active?
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Nature alone cannot explain why you chose one distinct thing
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over another in a specific moment.
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Spot on. If the soul's general act of
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nature were the sole 'cause, then the same 'cause without any
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variation would produce vastly different effects at different
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times. Which contradicts the
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fundamental nature of causality. Yes, a uniform cause should
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produce a uniform effect. Since choices cannot happen
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without a cause, and we have already established they cannot
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cause themselves without an infinite regress, the Armenian
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defense usually retreats to a third position.
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They argue that the mind makes choices in a state of perfect
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neutrality or equilibrium. This brings us to a really
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fascinating part of the discussion because it touches on
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how we actually perceive our own decision making.
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The claim here is that liberty requires a state of perfect
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indifference, where the mind has no prior bias toward one option
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over another. The scales are perfectly
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balanced, the weights are equal on both sides, and the will in
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its sovereign capacity just tips the scale on its own without any
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prevailing motive. Edwards absolutely destroys this
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idea. His argument is incredibly
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straightforward. To choose something is to prefer
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it. You cannot prefer something
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while simultaneously remaining perfectly indifferent to it.
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Preference and indifference are logical opposites.
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They cannot exist in the same subject at the same time
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regarding the same object. The moment a choice happens,
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indifference has vanished. Therefore, no choice is ever
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made in a state of freedom if freedom is defined as
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indifference. You might be indifferent before
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the choice, but the act of choosing is the act of ending
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the indifference. It is like saying you are
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sitting completely still in the identical moment you are
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sprinting across the field. I want to spend some time on
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this because it is so counterintuitive to how we feel.
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Right. It feels like we were neutral a
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lot of the time. I want to use Edward's famous
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chess board analogy, but let us update it for a modern listener
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first and then look at the chess board, OK?
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Let us do the modern version. Imagine you and I are sitting on
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the cache on a Friday night. We open up a streaming app and
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there are thousands of movies. And we just stare at the screen.
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Yeah. And I say I am complete,
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completely indifferent. I do not care what we watch.
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It feels like perfect neutrality.
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But eventually I click on a comedy.
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Why? Not out of pure neutrality, but
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because my brain subconsciously weighed the exhaustion of my
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work week and preferred something light over a heavy
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documentary. You had a motive, even if it was
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subtle. Now Edwards uses the chess board
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to show how we deceive ourselves about this neutrality.
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Right, the chess board. Imagine I have a chess board in
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front of me. You, my friend, asked me to
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touch any one of the 64 squares. OK, just touch any square.
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Now, looking at the board, I might feel completely
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indifferent about the squares themselves.
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There is nothing inherently better about square A1 compared
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to square H8. So it feels like you are making
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a choice in perfect indifference.
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But Edwards points out a massive blind spot in that thinking.
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You are not choosing the object, the square itself, right?
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We're choosing the action of touching a spot based on a
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prevailing inducement. That distinction between the
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object and the action is vital. We confuse our indifference
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toward the object with an indifference toward the action.
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Let us breakdown the micro steps of that psychological process to
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see where the motives are hiding.
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OK, let me see if I can map this out step by step.
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Walk us through. Step one.
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I make a general determination to touch a square.
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Why? Because I have a prevailing
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motive. I want to fulfill your request.
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You are not indifferent about honoring your friend's request.
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Right step two. I determined to give myself up
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to what we call accident. I decide I will just touch
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whatever square catches my eye first.
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Why do you do this? Because I have a motive to make
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a quick decision and avoid standing there awkwardly staring
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at a chess board all day. That is a strong motive.
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TE 3 my eye falls on a secific square, let us say C4 and I
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touch it. I yield to accident because I
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have a prior motive to resolve the situation efficiently.
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In none of these steps is the mind actually indifferent.
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Every single micro action is driven by a prevailing
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inducement. What is illuminating here is how
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Edwards strips away the illusion of randomness.
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Even when we flip a coin to make a decision, the coin toss seems
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random to us, but the outcome is driven by physics.
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Gravity. The force of the thumb Air
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resistance. Similarly, the accidents of our
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thoughts, the wandering of our eyes across the chess board have
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causes. And, more significantly, our
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decision to rely on those accidents is a highly motivated
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choice. Furthermore, Edwards
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demonstrates that even deciding to suspend a choice is a
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motivated act. Right.
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Let us say you were offered two jobs and you say I'm going to
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remain indifferent and think about it for a week.
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That suspension is a choice driven by a motive.
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The motive is your desire for deliberation, your fear of
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making a mistake, or your desire For more information.
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There is no escape from motives. The mind is never in a state of
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perfect equilibrium when an action is taken.
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So if we review where we are, we have proven that the will cannot
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cause itself. We have proven that choices
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cannot be uncaused events popping into existence.
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And we have proven that the mind is never truly indifferent or
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neutral. The discussion logically flows
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into determining what actually tips the scales.
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If we are never neutral, what exactly drives the human will?
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This is where Edwards lays out his positive case.
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Yes, in sections 9 and X he focuses on the relationship
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between the will, the understanding and motives.
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Edwards asserts a core theological and philosophical
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truth. The will always follows the last
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dictate of the understanding. In other words, we always choose
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what appears to be the greatest good in the mind's view at that
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specific split second. We act according to what seems
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most agreeable to us. I can hear someone objecting
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right now. What are they going to say?
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They might say hold on. I have chosen to do things I
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knew were bad for me. I ate the whole pizza late at
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night even though my understanding dictated it was a
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terrible idea for my health. They chose the lesser good.
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That is a very common misunderstanding of what Edwards
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means by the understanding and the greatest good.
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He is not talking about cold, rational long term calculation,
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is he? No, he is not talking about what
20:06
your doctor thinks is best. He is talking about what appears
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most agreeable to the mind in the split second the choices
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made. Factoring in all appetites,
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physical cravings, emotional States, and immediate desires.
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In that moment of eating the pizza, the immediate sensory
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pleasure of the food appeared as a greater good to your mind than
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the abstract future good of physical health.
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Your craving was louder than your logic.
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The will still followed the strongest motive present in the
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understanding at that specific instant.
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That makes perfect sense. The strongest motive might be a
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base appetite, but it is still the strongest motive.
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You know, Edward spends a lot of time in this section critiquing
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an Armenian author named Mr. Chubb.
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Chubb tries to have his cake and eat it too.
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He argues that motives excite the will, but that the will
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freely chooses which motive it will yield to.
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He says no action can take place without a motive, but the will
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retains sovereignty over the motives.
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Yes, Edward systematically breaks down Chubb's
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chronological contradiction, and it is a masterpiece of logical
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dismantling. Chubb claims the will chooses a
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motive. Let us look at the timeline.
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How can the will choose a motive before that motive has
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influenced the will? If the will is choosing which
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motive to yield to, it is acting.
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What is the motive for that prior act of choosing?
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If the mind chooses to comply with a modus before it falls
21:30
under its influence, then the motive comes in too late to be
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the cause of the choice. It makes the motive both the
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cause of the choice and the result of the choice at the same
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time. It is a total chronological
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pretzel. It release.
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Let us say at noon I have a motive and one second past noon
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I make a choice. Chubb is suggesting the choice
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at one second past noon actually caused the motive to be selected
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at noon. And effect cannot precede its
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cause. Chubb also says the motive is
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the passive ground or reason of that action.
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And Edwards rightly points out that passive background is a
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meaningless phrase. To excite the will is to
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actively do something. You cannot have a passive
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'cause. If the motive excites the will,
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the motive is causing the volition.
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This raises A vital question from the listener's perspective.
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When you map it out like a chronological timeline, it
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starts to sound very deterministic.
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Yes, I am going to push back here on behalf of the listener.
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Does this mean you are just a passive victim of whatever looks
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most appealing to you? If your will always follows your
22:30
strongest motive, and you do not choose your motives because they
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are shaped by your biology, your upbringing and your fallen
22:37
nature, are you just a biological robot reacting to
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stimuli? It is the most natural question
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to ask at this stage. Edwards clarifies that we are
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not passive victims of outside forces.
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The Armenian framework often confuses necessity with
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constraint. Constraint of being forced to do
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something contrary to your will, like being physically bound and
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pushed into a room. You did not want to go in the
23:00
room, but a stronger physical force compelled you.
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That destroys freedom. However, necessity of
23:05
consequence simply means your choices have reliable causes.
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We are acting according to our own internal desires.
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You are not a victim of your desires.
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Your desires are you. They make up your character.
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You are doing what you want to do.
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Let me use Edward's example of a hungry man to solidify this idea
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that we cannot escape our motives.
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OK, the hungry man. Suppose a man is starving and
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you set 2 plates of food in front of him.
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One plate has a prime rib cooked perfectly, which he absolutely
23:32
loves. The other plate has stale, moldy
23:35
bread, which he hates. According to Chubb's logic of
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absolute independence, the man might choose the stale bread
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just to prove his freedom from his physical appetite.
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He can neglect the strongest motive and follow the weakest.
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But look at the psychology of that choice.
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If he chooses the stale bread, did he choose it without a
23:53
prevailing motive? Not at all.
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The desire to prove his freedom simply became the new strongest
23:59
motive overriding his physical appetite for the prime rib.
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He valued his philosophical pride more than his taste buds
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in that moment. The rule remains unbroken.
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The will always follows the strongest motive.
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If you try to act randomly just to prove you're free from
24:15
motives, your desire to prove your freedom is the motive
24:18
dictating your random action. You cannot escape the mechanism.
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And Chubb's whole scheme implies that human beings are capable of
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acting absolutely without motive, which he previously
24:27
admitted was impossible. Think about a balance scale.
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If you put 10 lbs of weight on the left side and 1 LB of weight
24:34
on the right and the scale tips to the right, that would defy
24:38
the laws of physics. Similarly, if the mind has a
24:42
massive motive to choose option A and a tiny insignificant
24:46
motive to choose option B, and it chooses B, it is acting
24:50
against the very concept of motivation.
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It means the mind can act completely detached from reason.
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Edwards points out that if this is what Armenians call liberty,
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the capacity to act completely detached from reason or motive,
25:04
that is not a noble privilege. It reduces human beings to
25:07
erratic, irrational creatures blown about like smoke in the
25:10
wind, completely disconnected from understanding or wisdom.
25:13
That is a devastating takedown of the entire philosophy.
25:16
It shows that what they call freedom is actually just
25:18
irrational chaos. Establishing that all human
25:21
choices are driven by prior motives and causes perfectly
25:25
sets the stage for the final, most theological argument.
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If choices are a chain of causes, how does this interact
25:31
with the sovereign God who knows the end from the beginning?
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Let us transition to the final portion of the text where
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Edwards addresses God's foreknowledge and the
25:38
impossibility of contingents. Up until now, Edwards has used
25:42
pure philosophy and logic. But in sections 11 and 12 he
25:45
moves into scripture. He argues that God's infallible
25:48
foreknowledge of human actions completely overthrows the
25:51
Armenian concept of contingent, uncertain free will.
25:54
If God knows something will happen, it is absolutely certain
25:57
it will happen. And if it is absolutely certain
25:59
to happen, it is not contingent, it is a fixed necessary event.
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Edwards brings a massive amount of biblical receipts here.
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He lists specific prophecies to prove God foreknows the moral
26:10
choices of individuals. Let us look at Pharaoh, God
26:14
tells Moses in Exodus. I am sure that the king of Egypt
26:18
will not let you go. God did not guess Pharaoh's
26:20
stubbornness based on a personality profile.
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He knew it with absolute certainty.
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Then there is King Josiah. The Josiah prophecy is
26:27
incredible. Think about first Kings 13.
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A prophet cries out against the altar at Bethel.
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And foretells Josiah's exact moral conduct, his zealous
26:35
reforms destroying the altars and burning the bones of the
26:39
priests 300 years before Josiah was even born.
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He is called out by name. Means the specific free moral
26:46
actions of Josiah were infallibly known 3 centuries
26:50
prior to him taking a breath. And Cyrus Isaiah prophecies
26:53
about Cyrus the Great, the Persian king by name.
26:57
He details his mercy to the Jews and his decree to rebuild the
27:01
Temple over 100 years before Cyrus existed.
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And of course, the most chilling example Judas betraying Christ.
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Jesus knew who would betray him, and it was prophesized in the
27:11
song centuries earlier. Jesus tells Peter he'll deny him
27:14
three times before the rooster crows.
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These are specific moral choices infallibly known ahead of time.
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If we connect this to the bigger picture, Edwards reasons that if
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God perfectly knows a future event, that event has a certain
27:26
infallible connection to his knowledge.
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If an event might not happen, God could not know it will.
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Happen. You cannot infallibly know
27:32
something that is fundamentally uncertain.
27:34
Knowledge requires evidence. If an event is truly contingent,
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meaning it has no cause and its outcome is completely up in the
27:42
air, there is 0 evidence of its outcome existing in the
27:45
universe. Not even God can see evidence
27:48
that does not exist. Therefore, if God knows it, the
27:51
evidence of its certainty must already exist.
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The event is fixed. I'm going to play devil's
27:56
advocate here, using the argument of Doctor Whitby, a
28:00
prominent Armenian cited by Edwards.
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OK, let us hear Doctor Whitby's argument.
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Doctor Whitby says, But God's foreknowledge does not 'cause
28:07
the event to happen. Knowing something does not force
28:11
it to occur. My knowing the sun will rise
28:13
tomorrow does not 'cause the sun to rise.
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That is a very common objection. Edward's response to it is
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brilliant because he distinguishes between the cause
28:22
of the event and the certainty of the event.
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He says it does not matter if the foreknowledge causes the
28:28
event. The fact that infallible
28:29
foreknowledge exists proves the event is already a necessary
28:33
fixed reality. OK.
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Let me make sure I follow that distinction.
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Think about it this way. If I have infallible divine
28:38
knowledge that you will eat an apple tomorrow at noon, my
28:42
knowledge did not force you to eat the apple.
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But my infallible knowledge proves that you're eating the
28:47
apple is a fixed certainty. It is impossible for you to not
28:51
eat the apple because if you didn't, my knowledge would have
28:53
been wrong. And by definition, infallible
28:56
knowledge cannot be wrong. So whether the knowledge caused
29:00
the event or God's decree caused the event is irrelevant to the
29:04
question of necessity. The existence of infallible,
29:07
allowable foreknowledge demonstrates an unbreakable,
29:10
necessary connection between the present and the future.
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If it is foreknown, it is fixed. If it is fixed, it is not
29:17
contingent. If it is not contingent, the
29:19
Armenian definition of free will collapses entirely.
29:22
That is a watertight argument. It shifts the burden of proof
29:26
entirely. And we have to spend some time
29:28
speculating on the alternative. What are the theological
29:31
implications of a guy who does not know the future?
29:34
Because to save their definition of free will, some modern
29:37
theologians, like open theists, have had to bite the bullet and
29:40
claim God does not actually know future free choices.
29:44
The implications of that are disastrous.
29:46
If human choices were truly contingent and uncertain, God
29:49
would be constantly surprised. He would be forced to alter his
29:53
plans daily based on what humans decide to do.
29:56
He would be repeatedly frustrated by human beings
29:59
thwarting his designs. He would be, as Edward suggests,
30:02
constantly mending broken links in his cosmic plan as best as he
30:06
could, reacting rather than ordaining.
30:08
That does not sound like the God of the Bible.
30:10
The God of Isaiah says I declare the end from the beginning and
30:13
from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying My
30:16
counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure.
30:19
If God does not know the future volitions of men, then His grand
30:23
plan of redemption was built on pure guesswork.
30:26
Consider the cross. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ
30:29
was the climax of human history, predicted in stunning detail
30:33
throughout the Old Testament. It required the specific wicked
30:36
moral choices of Judas, the Pharisees, Pilot, and the Roman
30:39
soldiers. If those choices were contingent
30:41
and uncertain, then God's promise to save humanity was a
30:45
gamble. Jesus might have come to earth,
30:48
lived a perfect life, and died of old age without ever being
30:51
crucified if the human actors had freely chosen differently in
30:55
an unpredictable way and. What about the promises of the
30:58
success of the gospel? God promises that the knowledge
31:02
of the Lord will cover the earth as the waters cover the sea.
31:05
He promises that Christ will build his church and the gates
31:08
of hell will not prevail against it.
31:10
These promises depend on millions of future human choices
31:13
to believe the gospel. If God cannot foresee those
31:16
choices, those promises are just hopeful wishes.
31:19
If God is ignorant of the future, he could be totally
31:22
frustrated in his end for creating the world.
31:25
He could throw a massive wedding banquet for his son and nobody
31:28
shows up because they all use their autonomous free will to
31:31
decline the invitation. Which is entirely contrary to
31:34
the biblical portrait of a sovereign Creator.
31:36
Edwards proves that you cannot hold to absolute contingency of
31:40
the human will and simultaneously hold to the
31:42
omniscience and sovereignty of God.
31:44
One has to give way, and for Edwards, standing firmly on the
31:47
Westminster Confession. God's sovereignty is absolute.
31:51
Let us summarize this incredible investigation for everyone
31:55
listening. Jonathan Edwards successfully
31:57
prayers that the Armenian version of liberty, a will that
32:00
determines itself, acts without causes and sits in perfect
32:05
indifference, is a logical impossibility.
32:08
It requires an infinite regress of choices, it defies the
32:12
universal law of cause and effect, and it invents A
32:15
psychological state of neutrality that nobody actually
32:17
experiences. Instead, our choices are always
32:20
driven by our strongest motives, shaped by our understanding of
32:23
what is best in the moment. And all of history, including
32:26
our very desires, is securely held in the infallible knowledge
32:30
and sovereign plan of God. It is a rigorous, unyielding
32:33
logical progression. He strips away our philosophical
32:36
pride. He takes away the illusion that
32:38
we are independent little gods running our own universes.
32:41
He reveals the true mechanics of the human heart.
32:44
We act according to our greatest desire.
32:46
Which leaves us with a final thought to Mull over.
32:48
If true freedom is not the ability to act randomly without
32:51
a cause, but rather the ability to act according to your
32:55
greatest desire, then the state of your soul comes down to what
32:59
you desire most. If you are chained by nature to
33:02
follow your strongest motives, and your strongest motives are
33:05
inherently bent away from God due to the Fall, you are trapped
33:09
by your own wants. You will always freely choose to
33:12
rebel because that is what you want to do.
33:14
Therefore, is true spiritual liberation simply the act of God
33:18
graciously changing what your heart loves?
33:20
That is the core of reformed theology.
33:22
Freedom is not an empty neutral will.
33:25
Freedom is a heart given new desires by the Holy Spirit.
33:29
So the next time you look at that X-ray of your physical body
33:32
and appreciate the clean, visible mechanics of a broken
33:35
bone, you can also appreciate the intricate, unseen, and
33:38
perfectly sovereign mechanics of your own will.
33:41
The diagnostic waters of human choice might look murky to us,
33:44
but they are crystal clear to the one who designed the mind,
33:47
weighs our motives, and knows the end from the beginning.
33:50
Thank you for joining us today on Reformed Thinking.