Latest / Dark Perimeter: Real Breaches, Real Stakes / The Breach Files — Episode 5: "God Mode"
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_02: September 10, 2023, 2.40 in the afternoon.
- 0:04SPEAKER_02: The Bellagio.
- 0:06SPEAKER_02: A player sits down at a slot machine, inserts$20, and nothing happens.
- 0:11SPEAKER_02: The screen is dark, they move to the next machine.
- 0:14SPEAKER_02: Dark, the next row, dark.
- 0:17SPEAKER_02: At the check-in counter, a line is forming.
- 0:20SPEAKER_02: The reservation system is down.
- 0:22SPEAKER_02: Staff are writing room assignments on paper.
- 0:25SPEAKER_02: The key card kiosks are offline.
- 0:27SPEAKER_02: Guests are being manually escorted to rooms and let in by hotel engineers with physical override keys.
- 0:34SPEAKER_01: What is happening?
- 0:35SPEAKER_01: I need status from every department right now.
- 0:38SPEAKER_01: Gaming floor, online or offline.
- 0:40SPEAKER_01: Reservations online or offline.
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: Somebody talk to me.
- 0:44SPEAKER_00: Gaming floor is offline.
- 0:46SPEAKER_00: Reservations offline.
- 0:48SPEAKER_00: This IM is throwing alerts I've never seen before.
- 0:51SPEAKER_00: We have ransomware.
- 0:52SPEAKER_00: MGM has ransomware.
- 0:55SPEAKER_02: Ten hours earlier, a member of Scattered Spider had found something useful on LinkedIn.
- 1:00SPEAKER_02: Scattered Spider is not a nation state.
- 1:02SPEAKER_02: They are not a shadowy Eastern European crime syndicate.
- 1:06SPEAKER_02: They are predominantly English-speaking teenagers and young adults, Americans mostly, with some British members, who organize on Telegram and Discord and communicate in a vernacular that sounds more like a gaming lobby than a criminal enterprise.
- 1:20SPEAKER_02: Their average member age in 2023 was 19.
- 1:24SPEAKER_02: They had, by that September, successfully breached dozens of major corporations.
- 1:30SPEAKER_04: Got him.
- 1:31SPEAKER_04: IT manager, ten years at MGM, still listed as employed.
- 1:36SPEAKER_04: Name, title, employee ID in the bio.
- 1:40SPEAKER_04: That's all we need.
- 1:41SPEAKER_02: The call to MGM's IT help desk lasted approximately ten minutes.
- 1:46SPEAKER_04: Yeah, hey, this is David, David Chen, IT infrastructure manager.
- 1:52SPEAKER_04: I'm getting locked out of my account.
- 1:54SPEAKER_04: Yeah, I've been traveling for a conference and I think something happened with my credentials.
- 2:00SPEAKER_04: Can you help me get back in?
- 2:02SPEAKER_04: Sure I can help with that.
- 2:03SPEAKER_04: Can I get your employee ID?
- 2:05SPEAKER_04: Yeah, it's let me pull that up.
- 2:08SPEAKER_04: It's M-774912.
- 2:12SPEAKER_04: And can you verify the last four of your employee badge number?
- 2:15SPEAKER_04: 88324.
- 2:17SPEAKER_04: Okay, and I'm going to send a verification to the email on file.
- 2:21SPEAKER_04: So that's actually the problem.
- 2:23SPEAKER_04: I can't access that email because I'm locked out.
- 2:26SPEAKER_04: That's the whole thing.
- 2:28SPEAKER_04: Is there another way you can verify?
- 2:31SPEAKER_04: I have my manager's contact if you need.
- 2:34SPEAKER_04: One second.
- 2:35SPEAKER_04: Let me see what I can do.
- 2:37SPEAKER_02: The help desk operator, following a recovery process designed for legitimate locked out employees, reset the account and issued a temporary credential.
- 2:46SPEAKER_02: The call ended.
- 2:47SPEAKER_02: Scattered Spider was inside MGM's Active Directory.
- 2:51SPEAKER_02: Over the next several hours, they moved laterally through MGM's environment with the patience of professionals.
- 2:58SPEAKER_02: They identified domain controllers, they mapped the network, they located the systems that ran the casino floor, the slot machines, the gaming management systems, the hotel property management platform, and they deployed ransomware across all of it simultaneously.
- 3:14SPEAKER_02: The timing was deliberate.
- 3:15SPEAKER_02: A Sunday afternoon, peak occupancy, maximum operational disruption.
- 3:21SPEAKER_01: We're looking at full shutdown of gaming operations, reservations, digital key.
- 3:26SPEAKER_01: The loyalty program database is encrypted.
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: Digital payment on the floor is down.
- 3:30SPEAKER_01: We're cash only.
- 3:32SPEAKER_01: I need to know.
- 3:33SPEAKER_01: Do we pay?
- 3:34SPEAKER_00: FBI guidances do not pay.
- 3:36SPEAKER_00: The moment we pay, we confirm the model works.
- 3:39SPEAKER_00: We become a target forever.
- 3:41SPEAKER_01: The floor is losing$10 million a day, every day.
- 3:44SPEAKER_01: Tell me what option two looks like.
- 3:46SPEAKER_00: Option two is we rebuild.
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: We restore from backups where we have them.
- 3:51SPEAKER_00: We rebuild where we don't.
- 3:53SPEAKER_00: We estimate four to six weeks to full restoration.
- 3:56SPEAKER_02: MGM chose not to pay.
- 3:59SPEAKER_02: The restoration took 11 days for basic operations and weeks more for full recovery.
- 4:04SPEAKER_02: The company disclosed$100 million in total impact in its quarterly earnings.
- 4:09SPEAKER_02: Across the street, Caesars Entertainment had faced the same attack two weeks earlier.
- 4:14SPEAKER_02: Caesars had paid approximately$30 million.
- 4:18SPEAKER_02: Their systems were restored within days.
- 4:20SPEAKER_02: They disclosed the breach quietly in an SEC filing.
- 4:24SPEAKER_03: Scattered Spider, also known by the aliases UNC 3944 and Octo Tempest, is responsible for breaches at over a hundred organizations between 2022 and 2024, including telecommunications companies, financial services firms, gaming operators, and technology companies.
- 4:45SPEAKER_03: The group employs social engineering, sim swapping, and identity-based attacks that do not rely on technical exploits.
- 4:53SPEAKER_03: Their entry point is almost invariably a phone call to a help desk.
- 4:58SPEAKER_02: The arrests came slowly.
- 5:01SPEAKER_02: A 17-year-old in Wolsall, England, a 19-year-old in Scottsdale, Arizona, others in Florida.
- 5:08SPEAKER_02: The prosecutions stretched into 2025.
- 5:11SPEAKER_02: Several members were still active even as others were indicted.
- 5:15SPEAKER_02: The help desk operator who reset the account was following procedure.
- 5:20SPEAKER_02: The procedure had no mechanism to verify that the person on the phone was who they claimed to be.
- 5:25SPEAKER_02: The LinkedIn profile was public.
- 5:28SPEAKER_02: The employee ID format was guessable.
- 5:30SPEAKER_02: The recovery flow was designed for convenience.
- 5:34SPEAKER_02: The call lasted 10 minutes.
- 5:36SPEAKER_02: The cleanup lasted 10 months.
- 5:38SPEAKER_02: This is the breech files.