Latest / The Hidden History of Bengal: Kingdoms, Empires, and Revolution — Fexingo History / The Forgotten Famine of 1769: Bengal Before the British
Transcript
- Lucas: Luna, when we talk about famines in Bengal, most people jump straight to 1770 — the Great Bengal Famine — or the 1943 disaster. But there was another famine, just a year before the big one, that I think tells us a lot about how the British East India Company was already reshaping Bengal's economy in brutal ways. Luna: Wait — a famine in 1769? I've never heard of that. Lucas: Exactly. It's often overshadowed, but the Bengal famine of 1769 was a separate disaster. It started with a failed monsoon in 1768. The rains were erratic, and the autumn harvest was poor. Then in 1769, the rains failed again. But here's the thing — the Company had just been granted the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in 1765, which meant they had the right to collect revenue. And they were determined to squeeze every rupee out of the land, regardless of the harvest. Luna: So they kept demanding taxes even when there was no grain? Lucas: Yes. And it wasn't just the Company itself. The zamindars — the local landlords who actually collected the taxes — were under immense pressure to meet their revenue quotas. If they failed, they lost their land. So they continued to extract grain from the peasants, leaving them with nothing to eat. The Company's governor at the time, John Cartier, was notoriously inflexible. He refused to suspend revenue collection or release grain from Company stores. Luna: John Cartier — I don't think we've mentioned him before. What was his background? Lucas: He was a Company servant who had worked his way up. He became governor of Bengal in 1769, right as the famine was unfolding. He's not as famous as Robert Clive or Warren Hastings, but his policies were devastating. He actually banned the export of grain from areas that had surplus, but that was too little, too late. And meanwhile, Company officials were hoarding rice to sell at inflated prices. There are records of them buying up grain and then reselling it at a profit while people starved. Luna: That's horrifying. So how many people died in this 1769 famine? Lucas: Estimates are difficult, but contemporary sources suggest hundreds of thousands — possibly up to a million people — died in Bengal alone. The famine hit hardest in the western districts, around Murshidabad and the Hooghly river. But it also spread into Bihar and Orissa. The thing that's striking is that the following year, 1770, the famous famine hit, and it was even worse — maybe ten million died. But the 1769 famine was the precursor. It weakened the population, depleted grain reserves, and exposed the cracks in the colonial revenue system. Luna: So in a way, the 1769 famine set the stage for the 1770 one? Lucas: Exactly. And the Company's response in 1769 was a template for what would happen again in 1770: deny the severity, keep collecting taxes, and blame the weather. There's a famous letter from John Cartier to the Court of Directors in London where he downplays the crisis, saying the scarcity was 'not so great as represented.' Meanwhile, relief measures were minimal. The Company did open some soup kitchens in Calcutta, but they were poorly managed and reached very few people. Luna: And there was no media coverage like we'd have today. Lucas: No, and even the Company's own records are patchy. But we do have some firsthand accounts. A British surgeon named William Hunter wrote about the famine in his journal. He described seeing corpses piled on the banks of the Hooghly, and people eating leaves and grass. He also noted that many peasants fled to the jungle, only to die there. The land was left fallow, which meant the next harvest was even worse. Luna: It's like a cascade of failures. And all because the Company prioritized profit over people. Lucas: Yes, and that's the deeper story. The 1769 famine wasn't just a natural disaster — it was a policy disaster. The Company had introduced a new revenue system called the 'Five-Year Settlement' in 1765, which fixed the revenue demand at a high level. But the settlement didn't account for bad harvests. So when the rains failed, the zamindars had to borrow from moneylenders at high interest to pay the Company, and then they passed that debt onto the peasants. It was a debt trap that pushed millions into destitution. Luna: That sounds like the precursor to the permanent settlement later on. Lucas: Exactly right. The 1769 famine showed the flaws in the Company's early revenue experiments, and it contributed to the later introduction of the Permanent Settlement in 1793 under Cornwallis. But that's another episode. For now, I want to focus on something specific: the role of the 'banians' — Indian intermediaries who worked for the Company. These were local merchants and brokers who often colluded with British officials to hoard grain. One infamous figure was a banian named Omichund, though he was more involved in the Plassey era. But there were others, like Ganga Govind Singh, who later became a powerful figure in Company administration. Luna: So some Indians also profited from the famine. Lucas: Yes, it's a complex picture. The famine created opportunities for those with capital. They could buy land cheaply from distressed zamindars or sell grain at inflated prices. But most of the huge profits went to the British. The Company itself made massive profits from its monopoly on salt and opium, even as people starved. And the money flowed back to England, funding the Industrial Revolution. So the 1769 famine is a stark example of how colonial extraction worked in practice. Luna: I'm trying to imagine what it was like for the common person. You're a farmer, you've had two bad harvests, and the tax collector still comes demanding grain. Lucas: Yes, and you have no safety net. The Mughal system had some mechanisms — like grain banks and tax remissions during famines. But the Company dismantled those. They saw them as inefficient or corrupt. So when the famine hit, there was no institutional response. The zamindars, who might have traditionally provided relief, were themselves squeezed by the Company. So they had no resources to help. The result was mass starvation, and also a wave of migration. Many peasants moved to cities like Calcutta, hoping for work, but they often ended up in slums. Luna: And did the famine have any political consequences? Lucas: It did, but not immediately. The Company's reputation took a hit, but they still had a monopoly on power. However, the famine contributed to a growing sense of resentment among the Indian elite. For example, the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II, who was a puppet of the Company, wrote letters complaining about the Company's revenue demands. But he had no power to change anything. The famine also weakened the economic base of many zamindars, which led to a shift in land ownership. Some new families rose, like the Deys of Calcutta, who became wealthy by trading in grain. Luna: So the famine reshaped the social structure too. Lucas: Absolutely. And one more thing that's often overlooked: the 1769 famine had a devastating impact on Bengal's textile industry. Weavers and artisans depended on the rural economy. When people starved, demand for cloth collapsed. Many weavers died or fled, and the skills were lost. The Company's textile exports actually declined in the early 1770s because of the famine. So it wasn't just agriculture — it was a systemic shock to the entire economy. Luna: And the British just let it happen. Lucas: Yes, and that's the uncomfortable truth. But we should also note that there were some British voices of dissent. A few Company officials, like Henry Vansittart, who had been governor earlier, criticized the revenue policies. But they were ignored. The Court of Directors in London was focused on dividends, not on the welfare of the Indian population. And that mindset persisted for decades. Luna: It's hard to hear this and not feel angry. Lucas: I think it's important to feel something. But we also need to understand the complexity. The Company wasn't a single evil entity; it was a collection of individuals with different motives. Some were greedy, some were racist, some were just following orders. But the system itself was exploitative. And the 1769 famine is a case study in how that system operated. Luna: You know, we talk about these things on the show, and sometimes I wonder how we manage to keep making episodes like this. I mean, the research alone... Lucas: It's a good point. And honestly, it's because of the listeners who support us. We don't run ads, we don't have a corporate sponsor. It's just a handful of people who chip in through buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo that makes it possible to spend the time digging into stories like this. So if you've been getting something out of these conversations, that's the way to keep them going. Luna: Yeah, it's a small thing that adds up. And we really appreciate it. Lucas: Anyway, back to the famine. One detail I find especially telling is that in 1770, the Company actually exported grain from Bengal to other parts of India, even while people were starving. There's a record of a ship carrying rice from Calcutta to Madras in March 1770. That's the kind of moral blindness that defined early colonial rule. Luna: They were literally shipping food out of a famine zone. Lucas: Yes. And when questioned, they said the grain was needed for the Company's troops in the Carnatic. That's the logic: military priorities over human life. It's a reminder that famines are often not just about food scarcity, but about who controls the food and how it's distributed. Luna: So what finally ended the 1769 famine? Or did it just merge into the 1770 one? Lucas: It technically ended with the monsoon of 1770, which was normal. But by then, so many people had died and so much land was untilled that even a good harvest couldn't restore the population. The 1770 famine then followed, made worse by the weakened state of the economy. So there's a real continuity between the two disasters. Some historians even argue they should be seen as one prolonged famine from 1769 to 1770. Luna: And yet we only remember the 1770 one. Lucas: Because it was bigger. But I think the 1769 famine is actually more instructive. It shows the mechanisms of exploitation in their early form, before the full horror of 1770. It's like watching the gears of the colonial machine start to turn. Luna: It's a sobering thought. Lucas: It is. But I think understanding it helps us see that the famines of Bengal were not inevitable. They were the result of choices — choices made by the Company and its officials. And that's a lesson that resonates beyond Bengal, beyond the 18th century.