Latest / Statecraft / Leninist Technocracy with Grand Opera Characteristics
Transcript
- 0:05SPEAKER_01: Hi, I'm Santi Ruiz, and you're listening to Statecraft.
- 0:09SPEAKER_01: Today, I'm talking to Dan Wang.
- 0:11SPEAKER_01: Dan has a new book out this week.
- 0:13SPEAKER_01: It's called Breakneck, China's Quest to Engineer the Future.
- 0:17SPEAKER_01: Breakneck is a great read.
- 0:18SPEAKER_01: I really enjoyed it.
- 0:20Dan spent the better part of the last decade in China and published a yearly
- 0:23letter
- 0:24SPEAKER_01: summarizing his thoughts,
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: his explorations,
- 0:26SPEAKER_01: his eating,
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: and so on.
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: Breakneck is a lot like those letters.
- 0:30SPEAKER_01: It goes all over the place.
- 0:32SPEAKER_01: And this conversation also goes a lot of places.
- 0:35SPEAKER_01: America's overabundance of lawyers,
- 0:37SPEAKER_01: whether our ruling class should be all economists,
- 0:40SPEAKER_01: stylish propaganda,
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: the book collections of Yale professors,
- 0:44SPEAKER_01: iPhone manufacturing,
- 0:46SPEAKER_01: forced sterilization,
- 0:47SPEAKER_01: and planting cassava.
- 0:49One of the things I like most about Dan's work is that he's comfortable
- 0:52lookingat
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: China through multiple,
- 0:54SPEAKER_01: very different lenses.
- 0:56Parts of Breakneck explicitly use China as a lens to think about the U.S.,
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: about our own political culture,
- 1:02SPEAKER_01: our institutions.
- 1:03OtherpartsofthebooktryveryhardtotakeChinaonitsowntermswithout
- 1:07SPEAKER_01: reading our own culture into it.
- 1:10SPEAKER_01: This is a long episode, one of the longest we've recorded.
- 1:13SPEAKER_01: I think it's worth it.
- 1:14SPEAKER_01: Tell me if you think the same.
- 1:38SPEAKER_01: Okay, without further ado, here's Dan.
- 1:41SPEAKER_01: Dan Wong, thank you for joining Statecraft.
- 1:42SPEAKER_01: It's my pleasure to be here, Santi.
- 1:44SPEAKER_01: It's really good to have you.
- 1:45SPEAKER_01: I want to start with this.
- 1:46SPEAKER_01: How did your plan for breakneck change over time?
- 1:49SPEAKER_01: How similarly did it turn out to your initial conception of the book?
- 1:53SPEAKER_00: When I moved to China at the start of 2017,
- 1:57SPEAKER_00: when Trump had just entered the White House for the first time,
- 2:01SPEAKER_00: threatening to launch a trade war,
- 2:03SPEAKER_00: I'd always been thinking,
- 2:04SPEAKER_00: what is the right way to write about China?
- 2:08And as Trump's trade war morphed into a tech war that focused substantially
- 2:13on
- 2:13SPEAKER_00: semiconductors and then AI and drones,
- 2:18IwasthinkingaboutwhetherIshouldwriteabookaboutChina'stechnology
- 2:22SPEAKER_00: development,
- 2:23SPEAKER_00: especially focused on Made in China 2025,
- 2:26whichisthisbigindustrialplanthatIwenttoChinainsubstantialpartsto
- 2:30study this big Beijing desire to dominate the key industries of the future.
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: Then as I was thinking more about this project,
- 2:39as I actually wrote a lot of research notes for financial clients on
- 2:44semiconductors
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: and the tech war,
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: and I thought maybe no one actually wants to read a book about China and
- 2:49SPEAKER_00: semiconductors.
- 2:50And so I tried to broaden out my scope a little bit to think more about the U.S.
- 2:56SPEAKER_00: side of the equation,
- 2:58given that I'm a Canadian who spent about equal parts of my life between China
- 3:02as
- 3:03SPEAKER_00: well as the U.S.
- 3:04SPEAKER_00: So I really try to bring in the American dimension too.
- 3:06SPEAKER_01: Yeah,
- 3:07SPEAKER_01: that is one of the things I liked most about the book,
- 3:09SPEAKER_01: frankly,
- 3:09is that I felt like you're very explicit that one of the things you can get out
- 3:14of
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: really paying attention to China is a better sense of America.
- 3:17And you're very conscious of the ways that you can do that and the ways that
- 3:20that
- 3:20SPEAKER_01: framing can go wrong.
- 3:22SPEAKER_01: Before we get into the actual subject,
- 3:23SPEAKER_01: there's one more thing I wanted to ask you about book writing,
- 3:25SPEAKER_01: which is you wrote a little note about the writing of the book,
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: and I'll quote you here.
- 3:29You said that you became a better reader by writing this book because you
- 3:33learned
- 3:34SPEAKER_01: to detect when writers succumb to laziness.
- 3:36SPEAKER_01: And you say,
- 3:36there are parts of every book where writers cover a topic they have little
- 3:40interest
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: in out of some obligation.
- 3:42SPEAKER_01: Is this true about every book?
- 3:43SPEAKER_01: And if so,
- 3:43whichpartofBreakneckdoesitdescribethatthere'satopicyouhavelittle
- 3:47SPEAKER_01: interest in?
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: Oh,
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: no,
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: I'm afraid I just sprang a trap on myself that you activated,
- 3:53SPEAKER_00: Santee,
- 3:54SPEAKER_00: wasted by my own petard,
- 3:56SPEAKER_00: as they would say.
- 3:57SPEAKER_00: Something like that.
- 3:58SPEAKER_00: I think that certainly it is really difficult to write a book that...
- 4:06thewritertotallywantstowritebecausewritingisnecessarilyasolitary
- 4:12SPEAKER_00: activity,
- 4:13but the best writers bring in some collaborative process through the
- 4:18editinginto
- 4:19SPEAKER_00: making this a book that makes broader appeal,
- 4:24SPEAKER_00: makes more sense in ways that do improve the book.
- 4:28SPEAKER_00: And I think that I am very pro editors.
- 4:31SPEAKER_00: I have a great editor.
- 4:33SPEAKER_00: I hired a
- 4:34My own editor,
- 4:35I really try to work collaboratively and think well with my editors.
- 4:41I just want to interrupt and say you're really buttering me up here as my job
- 4:44title
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: is editor,
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: so I'm eating this up right now,
- 4:47SPEAKER_01: Dan.
- 4:48SPEAKER_00: The greatest editor I know,
- 4:50SPEAKER_00: Santi Ruiz,
- 4:51I think I would have been privileged to have worked with Santi for this book.
- 4:56But I recognize that the writer isn't always necessarily his or her own best
- 5:02guide
- 5:03SPEAKER_00: into the best piece of writing.
- 5:05SPEAKER_00: We know from a lot of fiction in particular,
- 5:07SPEAKER_00: serialized fiction,
- 5:09SPEAKER_00: book one starts out great,
- 5:10SPEAKER_00: book seven has collapsed.
- 5:12SPEAKER_00: And so it is better to have some sense of a guide and actually writing
- 5:17And I am willing to listen when someone tells me that this part of Chinese
- 5:20history,
- 5:21SPEAKER_00: though it is potted,
- 5:22SPEAKER_00: needs to be recapped.
- 5:24SPEAKER_00: I try to minimize that as much as possible.
- 5:26SPEAKER_00: I try to enliven some of the descriptions of important things like
- 5:30SPEAKER_00: the Cultural Revolution or the Great Leap Forward.
- 5:32SPEAKER_00: But I try to also keep that to a minimum.
- 5:35And one other bit I'll say about this is that I try to make my book shorter
- 5:40rather than longer.
- 5:41SPEAKER_00: And so if you take a look at my book page length, it's 288 pages.
- 5:46SPEAKER_00: I did my best to keep it under 300 pages.
- 5:50SPEAKER_00: And I much wanted to undershoot rather than overshoot.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: And so I didn't want to write a lengthy tome.
- 5:55I hope this is something that people can read and say,
- 5:58I wish I had a lot more day on.
- 6:00Well,
- 6:01I do want a lot more,
- 6:02Dan,
- 6:02and I thought the book was tremendously readable.
- 6:04I did not detect the section that you describe in every book where you were
- 6:08phoning it in.
- 6:09SPEAKER_01: Let's get to the actual material here.
- 6:11The main thesis of Breakneck,
- 6:13China is an engineering state,
- 6:15is your term,
- 6:16and the U.S.
- 6:16SPEAKER_01: is a lawyerly society.
- 6:18Those two terms,
- 6:18engineering state and lawyerly society,
- 6:20are your two poles.
- 6:22SPEAKER_01: I'm not going to spend a ton of time on this thesis,
- 6:24SPEAKER_01: but just to give listeners a flavor,
- 6:25I wonder if you could talk a bit about how this difference between
- 6:28engineering
- 6:29state and lawyerly society shows up in the leaders of our respective
- 6:33countriesor
- 6:34SPEAKER_01: the leadership classes of China and the U.S. ?
- 6:36SPEAKER_01: ?
- 6:36Very briefly,
- 6:37the US is a lawyerly society because it has been lawyerly since the founding.
- 6:43Something like the Declaration of Independence reads like a legal
- 6:46document.
- 6:47SPEAKER_00: Most of the founding fathers practiced law at some point.
- 6:49SPEAKER_00: Among the first 16 US presidents from Washington to Lincoln,
- 6:54SPEAKER_00: all but three of them had practiced law at some point.
- 6:58SPEAKER_00: And even in the present moment,
- 6:59there are still way too many lawyers in the White House as well as the US
- 7:03Congress.
- 7:03SPEAKER_00: So
- 7:04SPEAKER_00: 47 US senators with law degrees.
- 7:07SPEAKER_00: one U.S.
- 7:07SPEAKER_00: senator with anything resembling an engineering degree.
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: Quite different in China,
- 7:12wheretherewasaveryconsciouseffortafter1980byDengXiaopingtosayMao
- 7:17SPEAKER_00: messed up.
- 7:18SPEAKER_00: He messed up big time.
- 7:19He was a warlord and he was a poet,
- 7:22but he should have been a little bit more technocratic.
- 7:24And so Deng's overcorrection was to promote a lot of engineering trained
- 7:28people
- 7:29SPEAKER_00: into the Politburo.
- 7:30They really flowered by 2002 when the entirety of the Standing Committee of
- 7:34thePolitburo
- 7:35SPEAKER_00: which has nine members.
- 7:37SPEAKER_00: That's the highest ruling echelon in China's political system.
- 7:41SPEAKER_00: All nine of them had degrees in engineering of a very Soviet sort.
- 7:44AndsoIwantedtogetpastbeyondthesepoliticalframeworksfromthepast
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: century,
- 7:50SPEAKER_00: these terms like socialist or capitalist or neoliberal or democratic,
- 7:55really to try to have a sense to try to understand what motivates the US and
- 7:59China
- 8:00SPEAKER_00: today.
- 8:01SPEAKER_00: So this is kind of my little device that I've hung my hat on to
- 8:04Ihaveathreadtodrawthroughoutthebooktotrytoexplainwhatisthereal
- 8:08SPEAKER_00: difference between China and the US in the stylistic example.
- 8:12You do use some of the frameworks from the last century,
- 8:17at least somewhat tongue in cheek.
- 8:18There's a point where you say you sometimes like to think about the Chinese
- 8:22system
- 8:22SPEAKER_01: as Leninist technocracy with grand opera characteristics.
- 8:25SPEAKER_01: Can you say a little bit about what that term means?
- 8:28The Communist Party is Leninist because it is founded by a cadre of people who
- 8:34view
- 8:35themselves as to be the vanguard of the revolution that is going to modernize
- 8:39the
- 8:39SPEAKER_00: country.
- 8:40Andsotheyviewtheirmaintaskasdrivingthecountryindifferentseriesof
- 8:44SPEAKER_00: campaigns towards modernization as they view it.
- 8:48It is technocratic because China is pretty rational in terms of a lot of
- 8:54designs.
- 8:54You can't build a bridge,
- 8:56you can't build a subway system without some degree of rationality.
- 8:59SPEAKER_00: though California has been doing its best to try to prove that wrong.
- 9:03SPEAKER_00: But a lot of engineering projects do have to be pretty technocratic.
- 9:07SPEAKER_00: Since imperial times,
- 9:08China is famously the country that administered the imperial exam to all of
- 9:12its
- 9:12SPEAKER_00: mandarins.
- 9:13You can debate how large of an influence this had on its political system,
- 9:17butIwouldsaythatChinahasbeensomewhatmoretechnocraticthanalotof
- 9:22SPEAKER_00: Western democracies,
- 9:23SPEAKER_00: let's say.
- 9:24SPEAKER_00: And it has grand opera characteristics,
- 9:27SPEAKER_00: because at various points,
- 9:28China's rationalism shades into this preposterous hysteria in which
- 9:33everything
- 9:34SPEAKER_00: collapses in some sort of great Gotterdammeron,
- 9:37SPEAKER_00: where the gods really enter into Valhalla with this voluptuous noise.
- 9:43SPEAKER_00: So I don't want to take the grand opera thought too far,
- 9:46SPEAKER_00: but there is something really Wagnerian about the Leninist systems where
- 9:51there is something really life or death at all moments in Leninist systems
- 9:56because
- 9:57SPEAKER_00: everything could collapse.
- 9:58SPEAKER_00: Everything could go away.
- 10:00The entire political system might fall because of some minor slippage here.
- 10:05And that's one point in which I think that China has this apocalyptic sense
- 10:11thatis
- 10:11SPEAKER_00: somewhat endemic to a lot of communist Leninist systems.
- 10:15SPEAKER_00: The other aspect that I want to point out here is that
- 10:18the line between practical and preposterous shades pretty easily into each
- 10:24other.
- 10:24And so one of my central chapters in the book is about living in China
- 10:28throughout
- 10:29SPEAKER_00: the three years of zero COVID,
- 10:31SPEAKER_00: which started out impressively until everything completely collapsed.
- 10:35SPEAKER_00: And at the start of 2020,
- 10:37SPEAKER_00: when I was living in Beijing,
- 10:39Beijing was implementing the playbook that was suggested by the World
- 10:43Health
- 10:44SPEAKER_00: Organization,
- 10:45SPEAKER_00: which you had a cordon sanitaire,
- 10:46SPEAKER_00: you had
- 10:48SPEAKER_00: centralized quarantine systems who kind of closed off all the borders.
- 10:51SPEAKER_00: And China was implementing that somewhat to the envy of a lot of leftist
- 10:56SPEAKER_00: commentators,
- 10:57SPEAKER_00: including in the United States.
- 10:59SPEAKER_00: But then as the virus became more and more transmissible,
- 11:03it just kept tightening and kept going down the system such that every step
- 11:08looked
- 11:08pretty logical on its own terms that followed the logic of the previous step
- 11:13until
- 11:13SPEAKER_00: China got to this point where its largest city,
- 11:16SPEAKER_00: Shanghai,
- 11:17SPEAKER_00: city of 25 million,
- 11:18SPEAKER_00: where I was living in 2022,
- 11:21blocked people from exiting their apartment compounds over the course of
- 11:24eight
- 11:24SPEAKER_00: weeks.
- 11:25And so this is also where the line between rational and irrational is pretty
- 11:30thin.
- 11:31SPEAKER_00: And sometimes it collapses in
- 11:33SPEAKER_00: this grand Wagnerian finale that isn't very good for the world.
- 11:37Iwanttostayonthatpointforasecondbecauseyou'vetalkedabouthowoneof
- 11:43the problems or one of the things that makes the system brittle is that
- 11:48factional
- 11:49SPEAKER_01: struggle is baked into the Leninist system.
- 11:52SPEAKER_01: What does that mean exactly?
- 11:54Because I guess I'm just curious about the things that tip the Chinese system
- 11:58on
- 11:58SPEAKER_01: occasion from hyper-rationality into madness.
- 12:02SPEAKER_00: Leninists struggle.
- 12:03SPEAKER_00: It's what they do.
- 12:04SPEAKER_00: It's what they get out of bed for.
- 12:06And so there is this very broad sense among the Communist Party that it needs
- 12:13to
- 12:13SPEAKER_00: modernize the population by hook or by crook.
- 12:16SPEAKER_00: Thinking back to the founding of the People's Republic in 1949,
- 12:20MaoZedongandtherestoftheCommunistPartyhadjustrecoveredfromfirsta
- 12:28SPEAKER_00: brutal fascist invasion by the Empire of Japan.
- 12:32And then fighting off the nationalist party that were backed by the
- 12:35Americans,
- 12:36SPEAKER_00: eventually dispatching them to the island of Taiwan.
- 12:41They were thinking about,
- 12:42you know,
- 12:42what does it mean to be a modern country?
- 12:45And they were getting all of their answers from Joseph Stalin and the Soviet
- 12:49Union,
- 12:50SPEAKER_00: which also repelled a brutal fascist invasion.
- 12:53And so there is this sense of struggle baked into the Chinese political
- 12:58system,
- 12:59where if they aren't mobilizing the population into some sort of a great
- 13:04campaign,
- 13:05whetherthatistoproducesteelandkillallthesparrowsinthecauseofthe
- 13:11SPEAKER_00: Great Leap Forward,
- 13:12whetherthatistobombardtheheadquartersanddecapitatemuchofthetop
- 13:16SPEAKER_00: leadership,
- 13:17SPEAKER_00: including Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution,
- 13:20SPEAKER_00: or to modernize economically in the case of Deng Xiaoping,
- 13:24or even to implement zero COVID and to tell people to stay home and not
- 13:28transmit
- 13:29SPEAKER_00: the virus.
- 13:30Chinaisaverycampaign-drivensocietywheretheleadershiptreatsalotof
- 13:35SPEAKER_00: decisions as life or death,
- 13:38SPEAKER_00: They are serious.
- 13:40SPEAKER_00: They are self-serious.
- 13:41SPEAKER_00: And they really feel like,
- 13:44SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 13:44SPEAKER_00: if they are not dragging the population somewhere,
- 13:48SPEAKER_00: then what exactly are they doing?
- 13:50One thing I got a good sense of from reading Breakneck and from reading your
- 13:54yearly
- 13:54lettersisthesystemsthatareinplaceinChinesesocietytomobilizethese
- 13:59SPEAKER_01: campaigns.
- 14:00SPEAKER_01: So you talked a few years ago about reading every issue of Tio Shi,
- 14:04SPEAKER_01: But which is the party's flagship theory journal, as you describe it.
- 14:07And the point of the journal is to spell out where we are in socialism with
- 14:13Chinese
- 14:13SPEAKER_01: characteristics,
- 14:14SPEAKER_01: what we're thinking about,
- 14:15SPEAKER_01: what are the kind of top-down mandates.
- 14:17And institutions like that journal or the practice of the constant slogans
- 14:22yousee
- 14:23SPEAKER_01: kind of memed in the U.S.,
- 14:25SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 14:25SPEAKER_01: as you talk about,
- 14:26one really useful way to think about them is their tools to try and coordinate
- 14:30a
- 14:30SPEAKER_01: really massive apparatus around specific campaigns.
- 14:33SPEAKER_01: Is that right?
- 14:35SPEAKER_00: The Communist Party is driven by centralized campaigns of inspiration,
- 14:38SPEAKER_00: in which the top leadership sets priorities,
- 14:41and then the cadres have to go out and implement these priorities layer by
- 14:47layer,
- 14:48SPEAKER_00: all the way down to the village level,
- 14:50SPEAKER_00: all the way down to the apartment compound level.
- 14:55is a system in which the person in charge of propaganda can be immensely
- 15:01powerful
- 15:02because that propaganda slogan is really setting the terms for what is the
- 15:07campaign
- 15:07SPEAKER_00: of the moment.
- 15:08And so I spent a lot of time reading this theoretical magazine called Jiu Shi,
- 15:14SPEAKER_00: which means seeking truth in Chinese.
- 15:17SPEAKER_00: It comes from one of Mao's favorite phrases,
- 15:21SPEAKER_00: seek truth from facts,
- 15:22SPEAKER_00: which is something that Mao used and then Deng really promoted.
- 15:26So Seeking Truth is the party's flagship theory magazine that is published
- 15:31oncea
- 15:32SPEAKER_00: month in this bright red font with a white background.
- 15:36SPEAKER_00: Every issue's cover looks identical.
- 15:39SPEAKER_00: And it is just a fabulous reading experience.
- 15:41SPEAKER_00: I recommend it, Santi.
- 15:42SPEAKER_00: Get your hands on a couple.
- 15:43SPEAKER_00: I think it'll be great fun.
- 15:45SPEAKER_00: Someone doing a good translation?
- 15:47SPEAKER_01: Does it exist into English?
- 15:48SPEAKER_00: That's a good question.
- 15:49SPEAKER_00: Might be a good project for someone.
- 15:51SPEAKER_00: Their other big flagship paper is the People's Daily.
- 15:55SPEAKER_00: And People's Daily is published every single day.
- 15:58SPEAKER_00: There are people who scrutinize it.
- 15:59SPEAKER_00: I did not try to read the party's pronouncements every day.
- 16:02SPEAKER_00: That would be madness.
- 16:04SPEAKER_00: Rather, I constrained myself to reading it once a month.
- 16:07SPEAKER_00: And once a month, a copy of Jiu Shi would land in my mailbox.
- 16:12SPEAKER_00: Every issue starts with a speech or an essay excerpt from Xi Jinping.
- 16:18SPEAKER_00: His essay is in a different font from the rest of the magazines.
- 16:22AndtherewillbethesewonderfulimagesofXiJinpingorothertopChinese
- 16:27SPEAKER_00: leadership going out to the villages,
- 16:29SPEAKER_00: shaking hands,
- 16:30SPEAKER_00: admiring the dancing from an ethnic group which has put on there.
- 16:34SPEAKER_00: ethnic garb in particular for the visit by the top leaders.
- 16:39And there will be these excellent pictures of really tall bridges or really
- 16:42big
- 16:42SPEAKER_00: ports that are scattered throughout the magazine as well.
- 16:46And so I mostly read Xi's essay that is in the start of the magazine that is
- 16:54about
- 16:54SPEAKER_00: three or four pages long.
- 16:56SPEAKER_00: They're not usually super lengthy.
- 16:59SPEAKER_00: And
- 17:00SPEAKER_00: Xi is actually,
- 17:01SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 17:02his propaganda team makes him out to be a fairly more folksy writer than you
- 17:08might
- 17:08SPEAKER_00: imagine.
- 17:09Now,
- 17:09there is a lot of really,
- 17:11really unreadable dense prose coming out of his essays.
- 17:15SPEAKER_00: The very first issue I picked up, I remember very starkly.
- 17:19SPEAKER_00: It was an essay by Xi on dialectical materialism.
- 17:22IreallyhadtolookupthistermandimaginethatwhyintheworldisXitalking
- 17:27SPEAKER_00: about dialectical materialism in the party's main magazine.
- 17:31But then there are a lot of other pieces that are really useful for
- 17:34understanding
- 17:35SPEAKER_00: how the leadership is thinking about things.
- 17:37SPEAKER_00: And so the leadership has this
- 17:39SPEAKER_00: big propaganda apparatus, the magazines, the newscasts, which are daily.
- 17:45SPEAKER_00: And there's a dozen of these big newscasts,
- 17:48a dozen of these big magazines and newspapers that are trying to tell the
- 17:53nearly
- 17:54SPEAKER_00: 100 million strong member of the Chinese Communist Party,
- 17:59SPEAKER_00: here is what the Politburo is thinking of,
- 18:01SPEAKER_00: and here is what you need to do.
- 18:02SPEAKER_00: So for a while, it might be poverty alleviation.
- 18:05SPEAKER_00: That's a big thing that is perennially big on the mind of Xi Jinping.
- 18:10SPEAKER_00: For a while, it might be environmental protection.
- 18:13SPEAKER_00: For a while, it might be technological catch-up.
- 18:15SPEAKER_00: And so you get the guidance from the top leadership.
- 18:19SPEAKER_00: The core leadership of Kyoshi, I would say, consists of three groups.
- 18:25SPEAKER_00: The first group are lower-level officials.
- 18:27SPEAKER_00: You
- 18:27in the villages as well as the second third tier cities who want to have a sense
- 18:32of
- 18:32okay well this is what i need to do to prioritize myself and get myself noticed
- 18:36by
- 18:37the organization department in beijing so that i can have a more plumb
- 18:41positionthe
- 18:42SPEAKER_00: second are people with a little bit too much time on their hands
- 18:46SPEAKER_00: These are retired cadres who,
- 18:47whenthey'retiredofplayingmajiangoverteaandgossipingwiththerestof
- 18:53SPEAKER_00: their neighbors,
- 18:54they take a glance at the newspapers and the magazines because that is their
- 18:58habit
- 18:58SPEAKER_00: to do.
- 18:59SPEAKER_00: Then the third group of people are eccentrics like myself,
- 19:03who was just kind of curious about what the rest of the party state was
- 19:06reading.
- 19:07SPEAKER_00: And that was a delightful, fun experience.
- 19:08SPEAKER_00: So again, a plug for Kyoshi.
- 19:10SPEAKER_00: You can get your hands on a copy.
- 19:12SPEAKER_00: Do read it.
- 19:13SPEAKER_00: That's great.
- 19:14SPEAKER_00: That is a good plug.
- 19:15SPEAKER_01: Let me have you summarize one more point from Breakneck,
- 19:18and then I want to get into some counter arguments that I want to have you
- 19:22respond
- 19:22SPEAKER_01: to.
- 19:23SPEAKER_01: As you point out,
- 19:24SPEAKER_01: there's a useful rule of thumb for thinking about Chinese production and
- 19:29SPEAKER_01: manufacturing.
- 19:30SPEAKER_01: The rule of thumb is China produces a third of the world's manufacturing.
- 19:33SPEAKER_01: It's a nice concrete number to pin on.
- 19:36Will you talk a little bit about what the actual consequences of having
- 19:42engineers
- 19:43at the top of Chinese society have been beyond just the manufacturing boom?
- 19:47SPEAKER_01: I think most Americans have a sense that China produces a lot of goods,
- 19:50SPEAKER_01: but what are the other effects of an engineering state?
- 19:53SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 19:54SPEAKER_00: In certain areas,
- 19:56SPEAKER_00: manufacturing production is not evenly distributed around the world,
- 19:59SPEAKER_00: of course.
- 20:00SPEAKER_00: And in certain areas, China has a
- 20:04SPEAKER_00: 80-90% of global production capacity,
- 20:07just as semiconductors tends to be concentrated in a few advanced
- 20:10economies.
- 20:12SPEAKER_00: In certain goods, China has something like 90% of a chokehold.
- 20:17This is something that includes rare earth metals that we've very well
- 20:21understood
- 20:22in the aftermath of the second trade war launched by Donald Trump in which
- 20:26China
- 20:26was able to suspend rare earth minerals and their magnets and automakers
- 20:31aroundthe
- 20:32SPEAKER_00: world found that they couldn't produce their cars.
- 20:35SPEAKER_00: China produces around 90% of solar photovoltaic panels and so
- 20:40SPEAKER_00: There's no way to get solar that's not being produced in China.
- 20:45SPEAKER_00: And this is almost every segment of the value chain of solar,
- 20:48everything from the polysilicon processing down to the modules
- 20:52themselves.
- 20:53SPEAKER_00: And a lot of active pharmaceutical ingredients I see cited
- 20:58SPEAKER_00: antibiotics as well as ibuprofen.
- 21:00SPEAKER_00: China has about 90% capacity.
- 21:02SPEAKER_00: And so within this 30% figure,
- 21:04SPEAKER_00: there's hidden a few areas in which China is really,
- 21:08really dominant and the world's biggest producer of a lot of different
- 21:11goods.
- 21:12SPEAKER_00: And I think that is in part a consequence of the engineering state.
- 21:16SPEAKER_00: This is why I don't want to use these
- 21:18political science terms from the prior century to try to understand what's
- 21:22goingon
- 21:22SPEAKER_00: at the moment.
- 21:23SPEAKER_00: What is it that engineers like to do?
- 21:25SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 21:26SPEAKER_00: they build a ton of shit,
- 21:28whether that's roads or bridges or hyperscalers or coal plants or nuclear
- 21:33plants.
- 21:34China sort of treats building another big megaproject as the solution to any
- 21:39of its problems.
- 21:40SPEAKER_00: If the economy is weak,
- 21:41SPEAKER_00: well,
- 21:42SPEAKER_00: the Politburo will announce just another big infrastructure program,
- 21:45SPEAKER_00: something like flood control,
- 21:47SPEAKER_00: which might well be necessary,
- 21:49but probably not the very best use of money to try to stimulate the economy.
- 21:54SPEAKER_00: This month,
- 21:54they announced that they're building this really big dam that I think will
- 21:57have
- 21:58SPEAKER_00: something like four times the power output of the Three Gorges Dam,
- 22:01SPEAKER_00: which is the next biggest,
- 22:03is going to use 60 times more concrete than the Hoover Dam in the United
- 22:07States.
- 22:08SPEAKER_00: And so they just really like having megaprojects as the solution to it.
- 22:12any of their economic problems,
- 22:14frankly,
- 22:15also any of their political problems as well.
- 22:17And so one of the things that I think the Chinese system has decided is that it
- 22:22is
- 22:22SPEAKER_00: somewhat difficult to do redistribution,
- 22:25SPEAKER_00: but it is a lot easier to have these organized business interests
- 22:30SPEAKER_00: to say, oh, well, sure, we wouldn't mind another subway system.
- 22:34SPEAKER_00: We wouldn't mind another high-speed rail system.
- 22:35SPEAKER_00: We wouldn't mind another really tall bridge.
- 22:37SPEAKER_00: It doesn't really matter if the people really need these sort of things.
- 22:41SPEAKER_00: And maybe sometimes they do,
- 22:42but that is just a corporatist way to really try to organize a lot of things.
- 22:47And so I think the engineering state is characterized by a leadership that is
- 22:53much
- 22:53more substantially trained by engineering than the United States on any
- 22:58measure.
- 22:59SPEAKER_00: Previously, it used to be more formal training.
- 23:02Not all of these Politburo members actually did anything with their
- 23:05engineering degrees.
- 23:07SPEAKER_00: But now,
- 23:07SPEAKER_00: starting in 2022,
- 23:08SPEAKER_00: Xi Jinping promoted a lot of people from the military industrial complex,
- 23:13SPEAKER_00: the people who are launching rockets,
- 23:15the people who are building fighter jets into the top ranks of the Politburo.
- 23:20And so these are people who have practical experience managing mega
- 23:23projects.
- 23:24SPEAKER_00: So you have people who are more technically trained,
- 23:29and have better technical knowledge about how to build a lot of different
- 23:33things.
- 23:34You have people who are really willing to listen to the state-owned
- 23:38enterprise
- 23:39SPEAKER_00: sector,
- 23:39SPEAKER_00: as well as the economic ministries.
- 23:41SPEAKER_00: who are always planning more shovel-ready projects like,
- 23:45SPEAKER_00: oh,
- 23:46SPEAKER_00: let's build a new high-speed rail system here out in the West,
- 23:49SPEAKER_00: or let's give a new subway system here to this third-tier city.
- 23:53There's a very big constituency in the political system for constructing
- 23:57more.
- 23:58And I think this is maybe the most important and dangerous part of my book is
- 24:03that
- 24:04SPEAKER_00: they're not just physical engineers.
- 24:06SPEAKER_00: They're not just building infrastructure.
- 24:08China's leadership is fundamentally made up of social engineers that treat
- 24:13society
- 24:14SPEAKER_00: as just another optimization problem,
- 24:16as if the population could be torn down and remoted as if it were just another
- 24:21big
- 24:22SPEAKER_00: high-speed rail project.
- 24:23AndsothisiswhyIspendalotoftimeinmybooktalkingabouttheone-child
- 24:27SPEAKER_00: policy,
- 24:28SPEAKER_00: as well as zero-COVID,
- 24:29SPEAKER_00: The number is right there in the name.
- 24:31SPEAKER_00: There's no ambiguity about what these are.
- 24:33AndsothisisoneofthesewaysthattheChineseleadershipreallyconstrain
- 24:37SPEAKER_00: people's movement,
- 24:38SPEAKER_00: constrain people's choices,
- 24:40because they believe that the population is just another optimization
- 24:44problemthat
- 24:45SPEAKER_00: could be channeled into their favorite areas as they wish.
- 24:49I definitely want to get into some of the social policy parts of Breakneck.
- 24:54SPEAKER_01: I thought they were some of the most interesting parts in
- 24:56SPEAKER_01: the most informative for me.
- 24:58SPEAKER_01: But before we do that,
- 25:00I've got a couple counter arguments to this dichotomy that I want to throw out
- 25:04there.
- 25:04I'm not sure I believe them,
- 25:05but I want to throw them out here and see what you think.
- 25:07You pointed out that the US Senate right now includes something like 47
- 25:11former
- 25:12SPEAKER_01: lawyers and one engineer,
- 25:14SPEAKER_01: which is true.
- 25:15SPEAKER_01: But by some measures,
- 25:16the number of lawyers in the US government was way higher at times in history
- 25:20when
- 25:20SPEAKER_01: we were building a lot more,
- 25:22when you could have characterized the US more as an engineering state than it
- 25:26is
- 25:26SPEAKER_01: today.
- 25:27SPEAKER_01: For instance,
- 25:27the number of members of Congress with a legal background in the late 1800s,
- 25:32SPEAKER_01: when we're building a massive rail system,
- 25:35SPEAKER_01: huge amount of heavy industries coming online,
- 25:38SPEAKER_01: it's higher than today.
- 25:39And so does that challenge the relationship between lawyers being high
- 25:44statusand
- 25:45SPEAKER_01: an inability to build?
- 25:47SPEAKER_01: Or am I overreading the hypothesis?
- 25:49SPEAKER_00: Santi, you know what I call that?
- 25:51SPEAKER_00: I call that progress.
- 25:52SPEAKER_00: If the US Congress is less dominated by lawyers,
- 25:56I think that is probably good to have our legislators not come almost
- 26:01entirelyfrom
- 26:01SPEAKER_00: one profession.
- 26:03IthinkyouraiseagoodchallengethatIthinkisaveryvalidrebuttaltothe
- 26:09SPEAKER_00: central thesis in my book,
- 26:11whichisthatiftheUnitedStateshasbeenalawyerlysocietysincethevery
- 26:15SPEAKER_00: beginning,
- 26:15SPEAKER_00: as I mentioned,
- 26:16SPEAKER_00: since the founding,
- 26:17SPEAKER_00: then how has it been able to get anything done at all?
- 26:21And I certainly acknowledge that the US has been an engineering state at
- 26:26various
- 26:27SPEAKER_00: points in its history.
- 26:28SPEAKER_00: Most notably,
- 26:29SPEAKER_00: there were these two big spurts,
- 26:31SPEAKER_00: first in the second half of the 19th century when the U.S.
- 26:34SPEAKER_00: was building the transcontinental railroad,
- 26:38SPEAKER_00: the canal systems earlier,
- 26:40SPEAKER_00: these fantastic cities with some of the first skyscrapers in the world,
- 26:44SPEAKER_00: projects like the Brooklyn Bridge.
- 26:46These are all valid engineering state projects that the United States was
- 26:51engaging in.
- 26:52AndthenthesecondbigspurtcameafterthewarwhenEisenhowerbuiltthe
- 26:56SPEAKER_00: highways,
- 26:56SPEAKER_00: Robert Moses tore up a lot of New York City,
- 27:00and the country embarked on these big projects like Manhattan as well as
- 27:04Apollo,
- 27:05SPEAKER_00: which are eminently engineering state projects.
- 27:09SPEAKER_00: So what has been the shift?
- 27:10SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 27:11the shift I would present to you is that quantity is a quality all its own,
- 27:17SPEAKER_00: but quality is important too.
- 27:18SPEAKER_00: And the quality of the lawyers in the United States changed quite a lot,
- 27:23SPEAKER_00: basically after the 1960s.
- 27:25SPEAKER_00: So I would cite that a lot of lawyers were big in government,
- 27:30SPEAKER_00: including throughout the war,
- 27:32SPEAKER_00: including in the New Deal when Franklin D.
- 27:35SPEAKER_00: Roosevelt,
- 27:36SPEAKER_00: as well as a lot of New Dealers,
- 27:38SPEAKER_00: were trained lawyers themselves.
- 27:39And I think the lawyerly training that they had back then were kind of these
- 27:43Wall
- 27:43SPEAKER_00: Street dealmakers in which we were working for the
- 27:46robber barons and the railroad tycoons to figure out,
- 27:49well,
- 27:49how do we build this railroad?
- 27:51SPEAKER_00: Or how do we raise this bond offering to try to build these railroads?
- 27:54SPEAKER_00: And so there were a lot of these creative types.
- 27:58SPEAKER_00: The character of the lawyers very substantially changed in the 1960s.
- 28:02SPEAKER_00: This is very well laid out in Paul Saban's excellent work,
- 28:06SPEAKER_00: Public Citizens,
- 28:07SPEAKER_00: in which the lawyers,
- 28:08SPEAKER_00: he wrote,
- 28:09movedawaysomewhatfromthedealmakingtypeintomuchmoreofthelitigious
- 28:14SPEAKER_00: regulatory type.
- 28:15After the catastrophes of the environmental movement in the 1950s,
- 28:19in which the U.S.
- 28:21SPEAKER_00: was spraying way too much DDT everywhere.
- 28:24After Robert Moses rammed just a few too many highways through elite circles
- 28:28inNew
- 28:28SPEAKER_00: York that were tired of having their neighborhoods ruined.
- 28:32SPEAKER_00: Through the catastrophic war in Asia, first Korea and then second Korea.
- 28:37SPEAKER_00: Vietnam,
- 28:38SPEAKER_00: a lot of people got very tired of big government,
- 28:40and they had been skeptical of the government getting a little bit too cozy
- 28:45with
- 28:45SPEAKER_00: the corporates as well.
- 28:46SPEAKER_00: And so there was this big movement centered in elite law schools,
- 28:50SPEAKER_00: especially Yale Law School,
- 28:52SPEAKER_00: as well as the Harvard Law School.
- 28:54in which the students decided to say that we're going to sue the bastards,
- 28:58SPEAKER_00: the bastards meaning the government,
- 29:00SPEAKER_00: constrain their power.
- 29:01And that was the way that the lawyers turned into much more people that were
- 29:06trying
- 29:07SPEAKER_00: to block deals rather than trying to create new deals.
- 29:09SPEAKER_00: I think that is one of the things that happened throughout the 1970s.
- 29:13SPEAKER_00: WTF happened in the 1970s.
- 29:16Well,
- 29:16the Lawyerly Society taking shape,
- 29:18I would submit,
- 29:19is one of these things that happened.
- 29:21SPEAKER_01: I think that is very plausible.
- 29:23SPEAKER_01: And as you point out,
- 29:24SPEAKER_01: I mean,
- 29:25SPEAKER_01: to argue against my own thesis here,
- 29:27SPEAKER_01: it's true that the big infrastructure pushes in the US,
- 29:29youcankindofbucketinthesecondhalfofthe1800sandWorldWarIIandits
- 29:35SPEAKER_01: after effects.
- 29:36SPEAKER_01: I learned recently that when Robert Moses arrived in New York,
- 29:40SPEAKER_01: no new bridge had been built in the city in a quarter century.
- 29:43SPEAKER_01: So there really were these phases,
- 29:46SPEAKER_01: even 100 years ago,
- 29:47SPEAKER_01: that look a lot like today's America,
- 29:49SPEAKER_01: where it is quite hard to build.
- 29:51But here's another question about the kind of framing of these two
- 29:55societies.
- 29:56SPEAKER_01: We're richer than China is.
- 29:58SPEAKER_01: If you go back a little ways,
- 30:00you could also look at the United Kingdom as a society that used to build a lot.
- 30:05SPEAKER_01: It's now richer.
- 30:06SPEAKER_01: It does not build nearly as much.
- 30:08SPEAKER_01: You could call the UK much more of a lawyerly society,
- 30:11SPEAKER_01: although maybe there are some meaningful differences between them and us.
- 30:15SPEAKER_01: Is there some natural progression where at a certain point,
- 30:19societies that were engineering states become richer and something about
- 30:24the
- 30:25proliferation of interest groups with power or just regulatory accretion
- 30:29overtime
- 30:30or the marginal value of a new piece of infrastructure being lower than the
- 30:35first
- 30:35SPEAKER_01: time you built a transcontinental railroad,
- 30:37SPEAKER_01: for instance –
- 30:39Is there something about those long-term trends that mean we should expect
- 30:43Chinain
- 30:44SPEAKER_01: 50 years or 100 years to be much more of a lawyerly society,
- 30:47SPEAKER_01: say?
- 30:48SPEAKER_00: Santi, what are you, an economist?
- 30:50I think I have a lot of derogatory words to say about lawyers and engineers,
- 30:54SPEAKER_00: but nothing I can say would approach the social view of economists.
- 30:58SPEAKER_00: Should we stop building just because we're rich?
- 31:00I don't think so,
- 31:01because the US is now facing all sorts of affordability crises at the moment.
- 31:07SPEAKER_00: I think it is really hard to look at the cities in the U.S.,
- 31:11SPEAKER_00: namely big cities like New York or San Francisco or Boston,
- 31:15SPEAKER_00: and say,
- 31:15SPEAKER_00: we have enough housing.
- 31:16SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
- 31:17SPEAKER_00: I think it is really pathetic that California,
- 31:21SPEAKER_00: basically one of the wealthiest states in the union,
- 31:24SPEAKER_00: say,
- 31:25SPEAKER_00: we are going to build high-speed rail and get nothing out of it,
- 31:28essentially 20 years after voters approved a referendum in 2008 to actually
- 31:32build
- 31:33SPEAKER_00: something like this.
- 31:34IthinkitispatheticthatNewYorkCitycannotbuildsubwaysforlessthan$2
- 31:39SPEAKER_00: billion per mile.
- 31:41I think it is pathetic that New York is trying to upgrade the Port Authority
- 31:45bus
- 31:45SPEAKER_00: terminal,
- 31:46SPEAKER_00: and it is going to take,
- 31:47SPEAKER_00: I think,
- 31:48SPEAKER_00: six years and a few billion dollars in order to upgrade a bus station.
- 31:53SPEAKER_00: Just what is sort of puny civilization are we living in, Santi?
- 31:57SPEAKER_00: Now,
- 31:57SPEAKER_00: I certainly take your point that as countries grow richer,
- 32:02SPEAKER_00: the interest groups start organizing.
- 32:04SPEAKER_00: This is what Master Olson wrote about.
- 32:07It becomes much more sclerotic and it becomes much more difficult to do
- 32:10things.
- 32:11SPEAKER_00: And I say, that's not good enough.
- 32:13SPEAKER_00: I think that we cannot end up looking like the British,
- 32:18SPEAKER_00: which is not the lawyerly society,
- 32:20SPEAKER_00: but the PPE society.
- 32:22SPEAKER_00: It's not only that their prime ministers all go to Oxford University.
- 32:26They all study politics,
- 32:27philosophy,
- 32:27and economics from Balliol College at Oxford University.
- 32:31They are really not building almost anything at all,
- 32:34from airport runway to any sort of trains.
- 32:37SPEAKER_00: And they have these insane housing prices where people
- 32:40SPEAKER_00: I was in London just recently.
- 32:42SPEAKER_00: It is kind of unbelievable to imagine that
- 32:45SPEAKER_00: average rent is higher than average monthly income.
- 32:48SPEAKER_00: And so this is not where we need to be.
- 32:50SPEAKER_00: America needs to be something better.
- 32:52SPEAKER_00: As we've mentioned before, the US had these big growth spurts.
- 32:55SPEAKER_00: I think we need another big growth spurt,
- 32:58SPEAKER_00: not only to solve the problems that we have at the moment,
- 33:01SPEAKER_00: which is housing unaffordability,
- 33:03SPEAKER_00: lack of mass transit.
- 33:04SPEAKER_00: We also need to solve the problem of tomorrow,
- 33:06SPEAKER_00: which is to decarbonize the economy much more substantially.
- 33:09SPEAKER_00: And here is where I'm not
- 33:11SPEAKER_00: expecting that China would ever become a lawyerly society.
- 33:14SPEAKER_00: Because first,
- 33:15Chinahasnolawyerlysocietygenesthataremuchmoredeeplyembeddedinits
- 33:21SPEAKER_00: political system in the way that the US has.
- 33:24IthinkitisalmostfairtosaythatChinahadaminimalliberaltradition
- 33:30SPEAKER_00: throughout its 2000 years of imperial organized state history,
- 33:35which the court intelligentsia was entirely captured by the imperial exam
- 33:39system
- 33:40The exam system administered who was going to be allowed to become one of the
- 33:44top
- 33:45SPEAKER_00: mandarins who were allowed to advise the emperor.
- 33:48And very few people got close to the emperor by advocating for constraints on
- 33:52imperial power.
- 33:53SPEAKER_00: And so the Chinese were practicing absolutism since about the year 0 BC,
- 33:58SPEAKER_00: way before any European monarchs whiffed this idea.
- 34:02AndIalsobelievethattheChinesemoderncommunistsystemisreallygeared
- 34:06SPEAKER_00: towards,
- 34:07SPEAKER_00: again,
- 34:07SPEAKER_00: modernization in the Leninist sense,
- 34:09SPEAKER_00: as well as building a lot to establish its political legitimacy.
- 34:13SPEAKER_00: And so when you have few lawyerly genes in the political tradition,
- 34:18as well as this modern communist system and a substantial disregard for
- 34:25peopleand
- 34:26SPEAKER_00: their public interest,
- 34:27as well as a lack of environmental protection that has wavered over the last
- 34:32few
- 34:33SPEAKER_00: decades,
- 34:34SPEAKER_00: When you add all of that up,
- 34:35SPEAKER_00: I suspect that China will just keep building,
- 34:38SPEAKER_00: just keep replacing their depreciating apartments and bridges,
- 34:41SPEAKER_00: and just treat that as the core project for the next few decades as well.
- 34:45SPEAKER_01: To be clear, I would not like the US to go the way of the UK.
- 34:50SPEAKER_01: And I think I've...
- 34:51Made that very clear to my British friends,
- 34:53much to their chagrin at times on this podcast.
- 34:57SPEAKER_01: But I do want to push a little bit.
- 34:59SPEAKER_01: Is there something,
- 35:01SPEAKER_01: in your view,
- 35:01SPEAKER_01: about increasing wealth in a society that makes it harder to build?
- 35:06SPEAKER_01: Whether or not there are ways that we can,
- 35:08SPEAKER_01: and I think we can,
- 35:09SPEAKER_01: make it easier to build in the US.
- 35:11I think there's a lot of things we could do to bring costs down,
- 35:13to reduce specific veto points.
- 35:16SPEAKER_01: And at IFP, we've spent a lot of time thinking about this.
- 35:19SPEAKER_01: But I do wonder,
- 35:20is there something structural about the fact that we're a much wealthier
- 35:23nation
- 35:24SPEAKER_01: that just creates more opportunities for rent-seeking,
- 35:27SPEAKER_01: say,
- 35:28SPEAKER_01: than in a country that's playing catch-up?
- 35:30Is there some structural thing that China experiences now where it's doing a
- 35:36huge
- 35:36amount of catch-up growth that it won't be able to sustain as it gets closer to
- 35:40the
- 35:40SPEAKER_01: frontier or to the per capita wealth of the US?
- 35:43SPEAKER_00: There absolutely is.
- 35:45SPEAKER_00: So it is not my base case,
- 35:46but I think that the potential way out of the engineering state is that
- 35:52residents
- 35:53SPEAKER_00: in the really rich first-tier cities,
- 35:55SPEAKER_00: especially Beijing,
- 35:57SPEAKER_00: Shanghai,
- 35:58SPEAKER_00: and Shenzhen,
- 35:59decide that they don't want a big rare-earth mineral processing plant
- 36:05reallyclose
- 36:05SPEAKER_00: to them.
- 36:06There have been protests of trash incinerators being placed in certain
- 36:11urbanneighborhoodsthat
- 36:12And there have been instances of Chinese wealthier protesters defeating
- 36:16thesesort
- 36:17SPEAKER_00: of plans to try to move them elsewhere.
- 36:19SPEAKER_00: So nimbyism is endemic to any person with property.
- 36:24SPEAKER_00: And I think that is something that is going to be more real and biting.
- 36:28I think something else that is going to restrain the engineering state is
- 36:32just
- 36:32SPEAKER_00: higher debt levels.
- 36:33So the Chinese government has built a lot of infrastructure that doesn't
- 36:37lookvery
- 36:38SPEAKER_00: useful,
- 36:38certainly the infrastructure that isn't able to pay back the value of its
- 36:42bonds.
- 36:43SPEAKER_00: And so at a certain point,
- 36:45SPEAKER_00: their argument among a lot of Chinese is that,
- 36:48SPEAKER_00: well,
- 36:49SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 36:49SPEAKER_00: you built this bridge to nowhere,
- 36:50SPEAKER_00: but...
- 36:51SPEAKER_00: After you build a bridge, two nowheres become two somewheres.
- 36:54SPEAKER_00: And so at various points, that has been true.
- 36:57SPEAKER_00: A lot of places desperately did need infrastructure in the past,
- 37:01and it is valid to connect these villages that are really in these
- 37:05mountainous
- 37:06SPEAKER_00: outposts.
- 37:07SPEAKER_00: But at a certain point,
- 37:08SPEAKER_00: given declining population especially,
- 37:10SPEAKER_00: it's not really going to be very valuable for building more highways,
- 37:14SPEAKER_00: more high-speed rail,
- 37:14SPEAKER_00: and more subways.
- 37:16SPEAKER_00: And more really tall bridges as well.
- 37:18SPEAKER_00: And China is already suffering from a really high debt burden.
- 37:21AndsoIthinkIwanttoacknowledgethatthesearechallengesagainstthe
- 37:25SPEAKER_00: engineering state,
- 37:26SPEAKER_00: both among the wealthy opposition,
- 37:29SPEAKER_00: as well as the problem of debt.
- 37:31But I also think that there is still something to the Leninist system in which
- 37:36the
- 37:37Chinese government is really intent on dragging its population into
- 37:41modernity.
- 37:42It is inflected by its socialist heritage in which increasing the
- 37:45discretionofthe
- 37:46SPEAKER_00: state to build big projects is a noble act of socialism,
- 37:50SPEAKER_00: where yes,
- 37:50SPEAKER_00: just giving money to people is a despicable act of capitalism.
- 37:54SPEAKER_00: Therefore, we should be doing noble things rather than
- 37:56SPEAKER_00: despicable things.
- 37:58SPEAKER_00: And therefore, we need to be building still more bridges.
- 38:00SPEAKER_00: And so I think there's going to be restraints,
- 38:02but I think there's still going to be the engineering state 50 years from now.
- 38:06SPEAKER_01: Last week, I had Judge Glock on.
- 38:07SPEAKER_01: He's a friend and an economic historian.
- 38:10SPEAKER_01: And we didn't get to talking about this in our conversation,
- 38:12but he had a paper arguing that much of the infrastructure we build today in
- 38:17theUS
- 38:17SPEAKER_01: just has way lower social returns than it used to.
- 38:21SPEAKER_01: And I think there's something about this that's plausible.
- 38:23SPEAKER_01: And
- 38:23SPEAKER_01: and that you're describing, right?
- 38:24The Transcontinental Railroad is economically far more valuable than the
- 38:29Second
- 38:30SPEAKER_01: Avenue subway in New York City today,
- 38:32SPEAKER_01: say.
- 38:33And so because the gains from the new project are not distributed so widely,
- 38:38SPEAKER_01: they're not so large from that building,
- 38:41SPEAKER_01: there's more incentive for you,
- 38:44SPEAKER_01: the interest group,
- 38:44SPEAKER_01: the local owner,
- 38:45SPEAKER_01: to get your pound of flesh by trying to stop a project with litigation,
- 38:49SPEAKER_01: et cetera.
- 38:50thanifyou'rewaitingforthenewrailroadtobebuiltandthegainsfromthat
- 38:55SPEAKER_01: will be obvious to you.
- 38:56SPEAKER_01: You could take that basic economic intuition and say,
- 39:00SPEAKER_01: okay,
- 39:00SPEAKER_01: American local politicians,
- 39:03mayors and governors used to be rewarded more politically for building
- 39:06things.
- 39:06SPEAKER_01: There was obviously huge backlash to the railroads,
- 39:09SPEAKER_01: but there was clear political gain to building major new infrastructure.
- 39:14SPEAKER_01: What's the political gain that Chinese leaders,
- 39:17local leaders get today for building that extra new bridge or that extra road
- 39:22or
- 39:22SPEAKER_01: that extra coal plant?
- 39:24What's the feedback loop there that rewards individual politicians for
- 39:29making these big pushes?
- 39:31SPEAKER_00: The Leninist system has three essential instruments for control.
- 39:36SPEAKER_00: The first,
- 39:37SPEAKER_00: as I already mentioned,
- 39:38is the propaganda system that sets priorities for the cadres in these
- 39:41centralized
- 39:43SPEAKER_00: campaigns of inspiration.
- 39:44SPEAKER_00: The second big instrument is the Ministry of Fear,
- 39:48SPEAKER_00: as well as the coercive apparatus that really tries to discipline people.
- 39:53And one of my favorite names in the communist system is the Central
- 39:57Commissionfor
- 39:58SPEAKER_00: Discipline Inspection.
- 39:59SPEAKER_00: Can't get more Orwellian than that.
- 40:01And that is one of these things that is the control apparatus within the party
- 40:05to
- 40:05SPEAKER_00: really discipline people.
- 40:07Then the third great instrument within the Communist Party for governance
- 40:10isthe
- 40:10SPEAKER_00: organization department.
- 40:12Thisisthenomenclaturasysteminwhichthere'sadossiercompiledonevery
- 40:17SPEAKER_00: governor,
- 40:18SPEAKER_00: every mayor,
- 40:20SPEAKER_00: every party secretary of whatever to figure out how they're doing.
- 40:24SPEAKER_00: And so this is a very engineering approach.
- 40:27SPEAKER_00: It is giving you a report card of how you,
- 40:31SPEAKER_00: Santi,
- 40:31SPEAKER_00: as the governor of Gansu,
- 40:33SPEAKER_00: has managed this year.
- 40:35SPEAKER_00: Did you have a lot of political protests on your hands?
- 40:39SPEAKER_00: Well, that's not very good.
- 40:40SPEAKER_00: Did you build a lot of new airports?
- 40:43SPEAKER_00: Well, that's probably pretty good.
- 40:44SPEAKER_00: Did you manage food insecurity?
- 40:46SPEAKER_00: Did you have any sort of a
- 40:49SPEAKER_00: inspiring new idea to promote tourism.
- 40:53There's these hard metrics based on evaluation criteria that have
- 40:58sometimesmade
- 40:59SPEAKER_00: their way out into the public.
- 41:00And so we have some sense of how the organization department actually
- 41:05assesses its cadres.
- 41:07Andsowecanseethenumericalgradelevelsthateverymayororgovernoror
- 41:13SPEAKER_00: whatever is receiving.
- 41:15SPEAKER_00: And
- 41:15SPEAKER_00: All of these people are really trying to maximize their metrics.
- 41:19And for a long while,
- 41:20the cadre assessment system in China was pretty straightforward.
- 41:25SPEAKER_00: If you had high GDP growth, that's great.
- 41:28SPEAKER_00: If you had minimal political protests, even better.
- 41:30And so that was the way that a lot of people were getting promoted into more
- 41:34senior leadership.
- 41:36SPEAKER_00: And for a long while,
- 41:37itwasreallyeasytobuildanewairportandgooseupyourGDPbecauseyouhave
- 41:43SPEAKER_00: immediate construction jobs.
- 41:45For a long while,
- 41:45it was really good to build these silly tourism projects.
- 41:49You have these pointless replicas of European town squares that don't look
- 41:52very good.
- 41:53And so people were simply building because that's what the organization
- 41:56department
- 41:57SPEAKER_00: has tried to do.
- 41:58SPEAKER_00: Now,
- 41:59SPEAKER_00: one of the things that Xi Jinping has done well,
- 42:02SPEAKER_00: I think,
- 42:03SPEAKER_00: was to try to remove these hard metrics in terms of cadre assessment.
- 42:10But there's some debate about whether Xi Jinping has actually done this well
- 42:13in practice.
- 42:14SPEAKER_00: And so in principle,
- 42:15IthinkitmakeseminentsensenottofocusonGDPastheonlyassessmentofhow
- 42:20SPEAKER_00: well a mayor is doing.
- 42:22SPEAKER_00: principle, something like environmental protection is good.
- 42:25SPEAKER_00: But this instrument has been somewhat degraded.
- 42:28It becomes really difficult to assess how well you did in environmental
- 42:32protection.
- 42:33And so a lot of the cadre assessment system has eroded over the last 10 years
- 42:38under Xi Jinping.
- 42:39And there's some debate among the specialists about whether that has
- 42:42produced
- 42:42SPEAKER_00: actual results in China.
- 42:44SPEAKER_00: But that is one of the reasons that these leaders have built so much,
- 42:47SPEAKER_00: in part because they're incentivized to
- 42:49Part because it is really difficult to be dropped in the middle of a zone which
- 42:54you
- 42:54SPEAKER_00: have no connection to and be expected to perform really well.
- 42:58SPEAKER_00: One of the systems that's really important in China is that,
- 43:01SPEAKER_00: in general,
- 43:02SPEAKER_00: you cannot be the leader of your own hometown.
- 43:04SPEAKER_00: You cannot be the leader of your home province.
- 43:07SPEAKER_00: You don't have characters like Joe Biden,
- 43:09SPEAKER_00: who spent his entire life representing the state of Delaware,
- 43:12SPEAKER_00: which is essentially where he's from with a detour in Pennsylvania.
- 43:16SPEAKER_00: But
- 43:16SPEAKER_00: In China, you're not allowed to govern your own province.
- 43:19SPEAKER_00: So you grew up in the northeast,
- 43:22SPEAKER_00: you're dropped in the southwest or the southeast,
- 43:24SPEAKER_00: whose manners are kind of alien to you.
- 43:27SPEAKER_00: You have no idea how to develop this.
- 43:29SPEAKER_00: So why not just build another big bridge or another big airport?
- 43:32SPEAKER_01: Let me change gears a little bit.
- 43:34SPEAKER_01: A couple months ago,
- 43:34SPEAKER_01: when the tariff news was first breaking,
- 43:37Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick took some heat for going on TV and
- 43:41sayingwe
- 43:42SPEAKER_01: were going to bring iPhone manufacturing back to the US.
- 43:45SPEAKER_01: Now, something like a month later, I read your book.
- 43:47SPEAKER_01: And you say,
- 43:48SPEAKER_01: I quote,
- 43:49SPEAKER_01: this scenario sounds a bit fantastic,
- 43:51SPEAKER_01: but if the iPhone were built in the United States rather than Shenzhen,
- 43:55SPEAKER_01: then an American city,
- 43:56SPEAKER_01: say Detroit,
- 43:57SPEAKER_01: Cleveland,
- 43:57SPEAKER_01: or Pittsburgh,
- 43:58SPEAKER_01: might be hailed as the hardware capital of the world.
- 44:01So are you and Secretary Lutnick in agreement here about the value of
- 44:05bringing
- 44:05SPEAKER_01: iPhone manufacturing back to the U.S. ?
- 44:07SPEAKER_01: ?
- 44:08I would love it if Secretary Lutnik could move to Ohio and build my iPhone.
- 44:13SPEAKER_00: I think that would be fantastic.
- 44:15I think it is a better thought experiment than an actual policy prescription
- 44:22to
- 44:22SPEAKER_00: imagine that states like Ohio,
- 44:26SPEAKER_00: Michigan,
- 44:26SPEAKER_00: where I'm speaking to you now,
- 44:29AlotofthefadingindustrialrustbeltintheUScouldbecomethehardware
- 44:34SPEAKER_00: capital of the world again,
- 44:35SPEAKER_00: as Detroit and parts of Ohio once were.
- 44:38So I'm not especially optimistic that iPhone production can move back to the
- 44:44US.
- 44:44There are too many headwinds for the US to become a major manufacturing power
- 44:49again.
- 44:49But I would just like to present the scenario that if the US were actually
- 44:53building
- 44:54SPEAKER_00: all of the iPhones that Shenzhen started making in 2008,
- 44:59then the US could have captured many more of the spillover benefits that came
- 45:03from
- 45:04SPEAKER_00: manufacturing iPhones.
- 45:05SPEAKER_00: Now, a lot of these spillover benefits came in the form of
- 45:09training and labor force so that you might have been building an iPhone for
- 45:13Foxconn
- 45:14SPEAKER_00: one year,
- 45:15SPEAKER_00: but you moved on to a rival smartphone maker in your second year.
- 45:19SPEAKER_00: Then you went to go assemble a drone in your third year.
- 45:22And then you went to go build some electric vehicle batteries in your fourth
- 45:25year,
- 45:26because you have this very fluid labor force that was very skilled and that
- 45:30applied
- 45:30SPEAKER_00: their talents into building sometimes more sophisticated products.
- 45:34And that is something that I would like to see more in the United States,
- 45:37because
- 45:38Once you kick away the bottom rung of the ladder in terms of there doesn't seem
- 45:42to
- 45:42SPEAKER_00: be that much glory in turning screws in an iPhone.
- 45:46SPEAKER_00: But once you kick away that segment of the ladder,
- 45:48it becomes much more difficult to be in more glorious industries like
- 45:52electric
- 45:53SPEAKER_00: vehicle battery production as well.
- 45:55I'm not especially optimistic that the US will be a big manufacturing power.
- 45:59SPEAKER_00: But in this fantastic scenario,
- 46:02Iwantpeopletoatleastdesireitsothatwedohavebetterpoliciesinplace
- 46:07such that the United States is not facing too many headwinds in
- 46:10manufacturingonce
- 46:11SPEAKER_00: more.
- 46:11SPEAKER_01: I think that's also a goal of mine.
- 46:14you point out several different reasons for Chinese manufacturing
- 46:17success.
- 46:18SPEAKER_01: And one of them that you mentioned here is these deep pools of expertise,
- 46:22these quite fluid labor markets where you have tons of people doing
- 46:27differentparts
- 46:27SPEAKER_01: of the value chain.
- 46:28SPEAKER_01: You list a bunch of the other things that you can point to.
- 46:31SPEAKER_01: Some IP theft,
- 46:33SPEAKER_01: labor costs were lower,
- 46:34SPEAKER_01: although that's increasingly not necessarily the case in manufacturing,
- 46:37SPEAKER_01: as you point out.
- 46:37SPEAKER_01: That was true a little while ago.
- 46:39SPEAKER_01: But at least there are several different features
- 46:42SPEAKER_01: of the Chinese manufacturing success story.
- 46:45My colleague Brian Potter asked me to ask you whether there's a hunger to
- 46:50succeed
- 46:50or a hustle mindset that is also a part of that manufacturing success story.
- 46:55SPEAKER_01: For listeners who don't know,
- 46:56SPEAKER_01: Brian writes a newsletter called Construction Physics,
- 46:59SPEAKER_01: which is about the details of building here in the U.S.
- 47:03And in his experience in the construction industry and talking to folks,
- 47:06he
- 47:07he's come across many people who will flag that this is a challenge of
- 47:11competing with China.
- 47:11SPEAKER_01: Is there some kind of
- 47:13deeper hunger or hustle in certain industries that people don't encounter
- 47:18in the U.S.
- 47:18SPEAKER_01: Is that reductive?
- 47:19SPEAKER_01: Is there some truth to that?
- 47:20SPEAKER_01: What's your experience?
- 47:22SPEAKER_00: First, I want to say that maybe my favorite editor is Santi Ruiz of IFP.
- 47:29SPEAKER_00: And second, maybe my favorite substacker is Brian Potter.
- 47:33SPEAKER_00: I was privileged to read an earlier draft,
- 47:35SPEAKER_00: The Origins of Efficiency,
- 47:37SPEAKER_00: which is coming out next month,
- 47:39SPEAKER_00: published by Stripe Press.
- 47:41SPEAKER_00: And so I am a big fan of Brian Potter and his new book.
- 47:45SPEAKER_00: Do you want to come on next week and do this again, Dan?
- 47:47SPEAKER_00: This is great.
- 47:48SPEAKER_00: Yeah, you can book me as much as you want, Santi.
- 47:51SPEAKER_00: I want to be a fan of the podcast.
- 47:54SPEAKER_00: I think there is certainly a hunger and a sense of hustle in China,
- 47:59SPEAKER_00: but I certainly don't want to say that is unique to China.
- 48:02SPEAKER_00: Are Chinese bigger hustlers than Americans?
- 48:06SPEAKER_00: No, I would say that they are complete peers in this regard.
- 48:09SPEAKER_00: I think that Americans and Chinese are hustlers par excellence.
- 48:13And so that is not where I would situate the biggest part of China's
- 48:19manufacturing advantage.
- 48:20SPEAKER_00: I think China's biggest manufacturing advantage is the pulse of labor.
- 48:24This is what I call process knowledge in my book,
- 48:27in which people just know how to do things.
- 48:29And that can't really be written down in patents or blueprints or cannot be
- 48:33encoded
- 48:34SPEAKER_00: in actual physical tools.
- 48:36They just have a sense of knowing how to store a wafer before it becomes,
- 48:40you know,
- 48:41SPEAKER_00: an Intel chip,
- 48:42SPEAKER_00: how to really build a good electric vehicle battery,
- 48:45SPEAKER_00: which involves all of these steps that are not easily transferable.
- 48:49SPEAKER_00: That's one big part of China's big manufacturing success.
- 48:53SPEAKER_00: And so that's the process knowledge is the first component.
- 48:56SPEAKER_00: Second component that I would acknowledge is
- 48:59SPEAKER_00: A lot of these criticisms about China not quite respecting IP,
- 49:03SPEAKER_00: I think that is absolutely valid.
- 49:04Criticism that China is subsidizing a lot of manufacturers,
- 49:08I think that is absolutely valid.
- 49:10And for the people who are criticizing the Chinese for doing these sort of
- 49:13things,
- 49:14SPEAKER_00: I would turn around and say,
- 49:15SPEAKER_00: well,
- 49:15SPEAKER_00: if these methods are effective,
- 49:17SPEAKER_00: why doesn't the U.S.
- 49:18SPEAKER_00: actually do these sort of things?
- 49:20SPEAKER_00: Why doesn't the U.S.
- 49:21actually subsidize manufacturing much more substantially rather than
- 49:25turningevery
- 49:25SPEAKER_00: cylindra into a cautionary tale?
- 49:29There's another component in which China has very actively welcomed
- 49:33American
- 49:34SPEAKER_00: manufacturing on its own shores.
- 49:36This was pretty different from Japan when Japan was the big industrial power
- 49:39inthe
- 49:39SPEAKER_00: 1970s and 1980s.
- 49:41SPEAKER_00: Japan did not encourage much foreign investment.
- 49:44SPEAKER_00: It made it really difficult for Americans to build.
- 49:48Every Mitsubishi product and every Sony product was almost entirely
- 49:53Japanese
- 49:53SPEAKER_00: value-added in its exports.
- 49:55SPEAKER_00: And that was pretty different with China.
- 49:57SPEAKER_00: China invited Apple and Tesla and a
- 50:01SPEAKER_00: a million and one other manufacturers to go into China,
- 50:05SPEAKER_00: train its workforce,
- 50:06SPEAKER_00: and then export these products back.
- 50:08SPEAKER_00: And this is part of the big issue
- 50:11SPEAKER_00: advantage that China has had to really build a better workforce,
- 50:14SPEAKER_00: import expertise,
- 50:16SPEAKER_00: import better managerial techniques,
- 50:18import better quality control techniques in order to train its own
- 50:21workforce.
- 50:22SPEAKER_00: And here again,
- 50:23SPEAKER_00: I would ask the US,
- 50:24SPEAKER_00: well,
- 50:25SPEAKER_00: if this method were very effective,
- 50:27why doesn't the US actually welcome a lot more electric vehicle and the
- 50:31battery
- 50:31SPEAKER_00: manufacturers or
- 50:32SPEAKER_00: where the expertise in China is clearly better than in the U.S.
- 50:36SPEAKER_00: Why not have them build more plants in Michigan and Ohio?
- 50:39SPEAKER_00: Why still be very resistant to that?
- 50:41SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 50:42SPEAKER_00: China became a major manufacturing power by hook or by crook,
- 50:46SPEAKER_00: but I would say that a lot of it is just a workforce issue.
- 50:50SPEAKER_00: There is valid hustle culture,
- 50:51althoughIwouldn'tsaythatthehustlersinShenzhenareanyworsethanthe
- 50:55SPEAKER_00: hustlers in Silicon Valley.
- 50:56SPEAKER_00: There has been a lot of government involvement,
- 50:59SPEAKER_00: and then there were some policies that were effective.
- 51:02And so a lot of what DC could do is to have a good debate about which policies
- 51:07have
- 51:07SPEAKER_00: been effective.
- 51:08SPEAKER_00: And if they have been effective, why not copy them?
- 51:10SPEAKER_01: I think that's right.
- 51:11SPEAKER_01: Let's talk a little bit about the future of Chinese economic growth.
- 51:15SPEAKER_01: What's your sense of slowing or flatline Chinese productivity growth?
- 51:20you've got global headwinds on exports potentially depending on how the
- 51:24whole
- 51:24tariff thing shakes out you've got a aging population that will soon be
- 51:29shrinking
- 51:30quite quickly as well taken together all of these headwinds for economic
- 51:34growthfor
- 51:34kindoftheprojectoftheccpwhatarethecausesforoptimisminthatmodel20
- 51:41SPEAKER_01: years out 30 years out yeah
- 51:44SPEAKER_00: I think that every factor that you cite is real and indisputable.
- 51:51ButtheexercisethatIwanttoengageinisnottoonlylookattheseheadwinds
- 51:58SPEAKER_00: that are facing China and to ask how could the leadership also succeed.
- 52:04SPEAKER_00: And so there's no dispute that China is facing a huge amount of debt.
- 52:09SPEAKER_00: China's population has already peaked.
- 52:11SPEAKER_00: China's population is going down every year now.
- 52:14SPEAKER_00: China's consumption spending has been limp.
- 52:17SPEAKER_00: It is facing a property crisis.
- 52:18SPEAKER_00: It is facing broad deflation.
- 52:20SPEAKER_00: There's problems left, right, and center.
- 52:23SPEAKER_00: The issue is that if we take a look at any major economy,
- 52:27SPEAKER_00: you can find all sorts of headwinds if you want it.
- 52:30And we don't have to go on about what these possible headwinds are for the
- 52:33United
- 52:34SPEAKER_00: States at the current moment.
- 52:35SPEAKER_00: But if you only wanted to look at the headwinds,
- 52:37SPEAKER_00: you can construct an ugly picture about anything.
- 52:40SPEAKER_00: And so coexisting with this ugly picture with China,
- 52:44SPEAKER_00: I think it's also a kind of cherry pick some nice points too,
- 52:48SPEAKER_00: which is that China is the world's largest automotive exporter.
- 52:53SPEAKER_00: China's trade surplus in manufactured goods continues to rise.
- 52:57SPEAKER_00: China is doing very well in artificial intelligence,
- 53:00SPEAKER_00: which was not quite my expectation a year ago.
- 53:03SPEAKER_00: China is still making these very good strides in advanced manufacturing.
- 53:08SPEAKER_00: And so if we want to be Marxist about this,
- 53:10SPEAKER_00: which I like to do every so often as a former reader of Chioshe,
- 53:14SPEAKER_00: how do Marxists reason?
- 53:16SPEAKER_00: Well, they reason through this concept of the contradiction.
- 53:19SPEAKER_00: And what is the central contradiction of the moment?
- 53:21SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 53:21SPEAKER_00: it is first this economic headwinds,
- 53:24aswellasmoveonfromtheeconomicsheadlinesandmoveintothebusiness
- 53:28SPEAKER_00: headlines.
- 53:28AndyouwillseethatChina'selectricvehiclesandallsortsofproductsare
- 53:32SPEAKER_00: continuing to make great advances overseas.
- 53:35SPEAKER_00: And so how do we reconcile that?
- 53:37Well,
- 53:37I would say that about 50% of China's economy is pretty dysfunctional.
- 53:41SPEAKER_00: There's 5% that's gaining spectacularly.
- 53:44And that 5%,
- 53:45I think,
- 53:46is the part that we need to spend much more time thinking about.
- 53:48Because that 5% is going to continue to de-industrialize Michigan and Ohio.
- 53:53SPEAKER_00: It's going to continue to de-industrialize Germany.
- 53:56SPEAKER_00: It is the part that is threatening Silicon Valley's dominance.
- 53:59SPEAKER_00: And that has been a lot of my career so far,
- 54:02SPEAKER_00: which is to not look at the broader morass of China's economy.
- 54:06SPEAKER_00: Because there is also a really broad morass in American economy as well.
- 54:11SPEAKER_00: But for me to really look at the 5%,
- 54:13SPEAKER_00: maybe even the top 0.05% of successes and ask,
- 54:18SPEAKER_00: what if that momentum continues to succeed?
- 54:20SPEAKER_00: Well, in that case, we're going to have a much weaker Germany.
- 54:23SPEAKER_00: We're going to have a much weaker Japan.
- 54:24SPEAKER_00: is somewhat weaker,
- 54:25SPEAKER_00: the United States as well,
- 54:26SPEAKER_00: because these countries will all be deindustrialized to some extent.
- 54:30And what if China keeps making big strides in everything aside from AI or even
- 54:36including AI?
- 54:37SPEAKER_00: That is a pretty bad situation for the US.
- 54:39SPEAKER_00: So that's,
- 54:40SPEAKER_00: I think,
- 54:40SPEAKER_00: more the scenario that we need to be driven by,
- 54:42SPEAKER_00: not the headwinds that are more macro in nature.
- 54:46SPEAKER_01: whether or not you project economic growth out in the future.
- 54:49In recent years,
- 54:51that kind of incredible clip of Chinese economic growth has slowed.
- 54:55SPEAKER_01: How do people on the ground think about that?
- 54:58SPEAKER_01: What's their mental model for it?
- 54:59SPEAKER_01: How does it affect their lives?
- 55:01SPEAKER_01: Yeah, like do a little bit of man on the street explaining for me here.
- 55:05SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 55:05the first thing I feel like I have to acknowledge is that 1.4 billion people,
- 55:11SPEAKER_00: 1.4 billion different experiences.
- 55:13I will first acknowledge that there's tremendous nuance here as in
- 55:17everything.
- 55:17SPEAKER_00: But here's how the people that I know it experience things.
- 55:22SPEAKER_00: So I lived in China's most dynamic zones,
- 55:25SPEAKER_00: especially Beijing as Shanghai,
- 55:28SPEAKER_00: better than Hong Kong,
- 55:28SPEAKER_00: where I also lived,
- 55:30where people have a broad sense that the political environment is
- 55:36worsening.
- 55:37SPEAKER_00: That is definitely the case,
- 55:39thatcensorshipoverthelast12yearsofXiJinping'srolehasbeenworseand
- 55:45SPEAKER_00: worse.
- 55:46There has been much more of a crackdown on anything resembling independent
- 55:50journalism.
- 55:51SPEAKER_00: Comedy clubs have been banned for a while.
- 55:54SPEAKER_00: Chinese movies used to be, I think, more interesting than they are today.
- 55:59There's much more mainstream culture that is simply nationalist and very,
- 56:03very commercial.
- 56:04SPEAKER_00: And so that is, I think, a universal sentiment.
- 56:08SPEAKER_00: And then economically, you have a variety of different experiences.
- 56:12SPEAKER_00: If you're in a third-tier city,
- 56:14these are places that are still growing at a faster clip from a lower base.
- 56:19SPEAKER_00: These are cities that are still getting new subway systems,
- 56:22thataregettingnewparkswherepeoplefeellikethefuturemightwellbe
- 56:26SPEAKER_00: improving.
- 56:28In first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai,
- 56:30they're still building some subway systems.
- 56:33SPEAKER_00: Shanghai is building a lot of parks.
- 56:35SPEAKER_00: By the end of this year,
- 56:35SPEAKER_00: Shanghai is expected to have 1000 parks,
- 56:38SPEAKER_00: which is one of these round metrics that the Chinese love to optimize.
- 56:41But I think in a very real sense,
- 56:43Shanghai is getting more pleasant from a very high base.
- 56:46SPEAKER_00: And then I guess the economic experience is that for a lot of people,
- 56:51SPEAKER_00: for a lot of younger people,
- 56:53SPEAKER_00: Their economic outcomes are usually not really great.
- 56:56SPEAKER_00: If you are an elite in China,
- 56:59SPEAKER_00: you're graduating from a top university in Beijing or Shanghai,
- 57:03SPEAKER_00: a lot of people end up working for the government,
- 57:05SPEAKER_00: which is really low pay,
- 57:07SPEAKER_00: but in a very secure job,
- 57:09SPEAKER_00: which the state is taking care of.
- 57:11SPEAKER_00: water housing, your future child education costs.
- 57:15SPEAKER_00: You get access to the state-owned enterprise canteens.
- 57:18These are the same canteens that are cooking for the top leaders when they
- 57:21come by.
- 57:22SPEAKER_00: So your lunch every day is actually really good and really cheap,
- 57:25SPEAKER_00: but you don't make a ton of money.
- 57:28SPEAKER_00: You might be doing that.
- 57:29SPEAKER_00: You might be working for
- 57:32SPEAKER_00: a village administration,
- 57:33SPEAKER_00: which is not that really fun,
- 57:35SPEAKER_00: but you have a chance to enter the Politburo one day,
- 57:38SPEAKER_00: you might be working for China's most dynamic internet companies.
- 57:42SPEAKER_00: These are companies like ByteDance or Alibaba or Tencent,
- 57:46SPEAKER_00: in which are working hours that are described in China as 996,
- 57:49SPEAKER_00: 9 a.m.
- 57:49SPEAKER_00: to 9 p.m., six days a week.
- 57:53SPEAKER_00: I know that's how hard the Institute for Progress people work,
- 57:57SPEAKER_00: but that's not really universal everywhere.
- 57:59And so the Chinese are working hard for these ByteDance-like companies for
- 58:04pretty
- 58:04SPEAKER_00: good pay,
- 58:05SPEAKER_00: but not necessarily in a very happy way.
- 58:08SPEAKER_00: And then outside of that, you're probably working for
- 58:11SPEAKER_00: Companies that are not paying you very well,
- 58:14SPEAKER_00: they're not giving you a lot of money,
- 58:17SPEAKER_00: still for 996 hours.
- 58:18SPEAKER_00: A lot of people are opting out of employment.
- 58:21SPEAKER_00: China's youth unemployment is really, really high.
- 58:23SPEAKER_00: They might want to try to open a bubble tea shop.
- 58:26SPEAKER_00: They might want to open a cafe.
- 58:28SPEAKER_00: I hear friends in Shanghai who tell me that
- 58:30SPEAKER_00: Some cafes go down in a matter of days after a big launch goes wrong,
- 58:35SPEAKER_00: and then they just get replaced by the next cafe.
- 58:38SPEAKER_00: How are they able to do these things?
- 58:39Well,
- 58:40they have wealthier parents who have apartments in Beijing or Shanghai.
- 58:45SPEAKER_00: They have been allocated apartments by the state.
- 58:47SPEAKER_00: Over the past few decades,
- 58:49you'reabletoliquidateoneofthesethingsandyou'reabletoaffordagood
- 58:53education in Los Angeles or something where you're able to rent a pretty nice
- 58:57home
- 58:58SPEAKER_00: in LA or get even a nice car to be able to drive yourself to work.
- 59:03SPEAKER_00: And so that has supported a lot of the economic dynamism in China.
- 59:07You know,
- 59:08the property wealth has been a restraint against more broad discontent.
- 59:12SPEAKER_00: But I think there is very broad discontent in China,
- 59:15SPEAKER_00: just to summarize this long answer,
- 59:16SPEAKER_00: which is that politically,
- 59:18SPEAKER_00: I think that a lot of young people are not terribly happy because
- 59:22SPEAKER_00: They feel the censorship apparatus tightening around them.
- 59:25SPEAKER_00: Some people don't care.
- 59:26They have all the entertainment that they need looking at the local
- 59:29instancesof
- 59:30SPEAKER_00: TikTok or Douyin.
- 59:31SPEAKER_00: But for a lot of people,
- 59:33theyhaveaverykeensensethattheinternettheygrewupwithismuchless
- 59:37SPEAKER_00: vibrant than before.
- 59:38I think there is quite a lot of economic discontent in China where people
- 59:42don'thavethe
- 59:44economic opportunities that their parents have had they're not working at
- 59:47jobsthat
- 59:47they love they don't have the prospect of coming into apartments that are
- 59:51allocated
- 59:52bythestateandthenthereisthisstillquitealotofdynamisminthirdor
- 59:58fourth tier cities where people do have greater employment opportunities
- 1:00:03froma
- 1:00:03lowerbaseandallofthatismademorepossiblebecausethereisthisluckier
- 1:00:07SPEAKER_00: generation of parents in the past that are able to help out their kids
- 1:00:13eitherbylettingthemliveathomeorbyliquidatingoneoftheirseveral
- 1:00:17SPEAKER_00: apartments to support their bubble tea venture or something.
- 1:00:20SPEAKER_00: So that's how the discontent is bottled up.
- 1:00:23SPEAKER_01: Dan,
- 1:00:24SPEAKER_01: this has all been fascinating,
- 1:00:25but I feel kind of bad that we've taken this long to get to the social
- 1:00:29engineering
- 1:00:29SPEAKER_01: side,
- 1:00:30SPEAKER_01: which...
- 1:00:31at least to this reader,
- 1:00:32was some of the most interesting stuff in the book.
- 1:00:34SPEAKER_01: Now,
- 1:00:35maybe that's because I've spent a lot of time reading you on manufacturing,
- 1:00:39SPEAKER_01: thinking about the infrastructure side of things professionally,
- 1:00:42SPEAKER_01: and less time thinking and learning about the one-child policy.
- 1:00:44ButIwanttoaskyoutowalkthroughsomeofthehistorythatyouprovideonthe
- 1:00:51SPEAKER_01: engineering state's attempts to engineer the soul,
- 1:00:55SPEAKER_01: which is originally Stalin's phrase,
- 1:00:57SPEAKER_01: but Xi likes the phrase too.
- 1:01:00What you do in Breakneck is basically re-explain the one-child policy
- 1:01:04throughthis
- 1:01:05SPEAKER_01: engineering lens.
- 1:01:06SPEAKER_01: Will you walk me through the history there?
- 1:01:10What is it about the engineering state that leads to the actual shape and form
- 1:01:15of
- 1:01:15SPEAKER_01: the one-child policy as it exists?
- 1:01:18SPEAKER_00: I'm really glad you're picking that up, Santi, because...
- 1:01:22SPEAKER_00: I did not expect this,
- 1:01:24SPEAKER_00: but I have a clear favorite chapter of my book,
- 1:01:28SPEAKER_00: and I want to disclose to your readers that it is chapter four,
- 1:01:34SPEAKER_00: One Child.
- 1:01:35SPEAKER_00: It was also my favorite chapter.
- 1:01:37SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
- 1:01:38SPEAKER_00: The One Child Policy was something really fascinating to uncover.
- 1:01:45part because I think it is just this very clear encapsulation of the theory
- 1:01:50andthe
- 1:01:51SPEAKER_00: practice of the engineering state.
- 1:01:54So the theory here is that the one-child policy grew in reaction to the mayhem
- 1:02:01of the Mao years.
- 1:02:02After Mao died in 1976,
- 1:02:04Deng Xiaoping emerged to be the top leader by 1979.
- 1:02:09SPEAKER_00: And Deng Xiaoping,
- 1:02:10SPEAKER_00: along with his top peer,
- 1:02:13SPEAKER_00: a fellow named Cheng Ying,
- 1:02:15SPEAKER_00: who is in charge of the economy,
- 1:02:16SPEAKER_00: were trying to figure out,
- 1:02:18SPEAKER_00: well,
- 1:02:18SPEAKER_00: how do we restart development in China?
- 1:02:21SPEAKER_00: One of the things that they really feared was overpopulation.
- 1:02:24And one of the major mine viruses that came out of the West throughout the
- 1:02:281960s
- 1:02:30SPEAKER_00: One of several was this population bomb,
- 1:02:32ClubofRomeargumentthatwhatweneedtodoistostopcountriesfromgrowing
- 1:02:38SPEAKER_00: because they're going to blow themselves up with too many people.
- 1:02:43SPEAKER_00: Too many Chinese people came into contact with this argument.
- 1:02:47And the problem in China then was that China had crossed about a billion
- 1:02:52peopleand
- 1:02:52the leadership didn't quite realize exactly how many people there was in
- 1:02:56China,
- 1:02:57in part because Mao's cultural revolution destroyed anything that could be
- 1:03:01as
- 1:03:01SPEAKER_00: organized as a national census.
- 1:03:04SPEAKER_00: So into this heady mix comes a missile scientist named Song Jian.
- 1:03:09SPEAKER_00: Song was a brilliant mathematician.
- 1:03:12SPEAKER_00: He was one of the chief theoreticians of cybernetics in China.
- 1:03:17SPEAKER_00: He co-wrote a textbook on this theme.
- 1:03:19SPEAKER_00: He was one of the top missile scientists working in China.
- 1:03:23Song came into the hallways of power because that is what military leaders,
- 1:03:29military scientists had the prerogative to do and whispered into Beijing's
- 1:03:34ears
- 1:03:34SPEAKER_00: that,
- 1:03:35SPEAKER_00: well,
- 1:03:35SPEAKER_00: what we really need is something like a one-child policy.
- 1:03:38Here's some really fancy math that I've done on terrifically neat graph
- 1:03:42papertoshowthat
- 1:03:44population trajectories can be just as firmly controlled as missile
- 1:03:48trajectories.
- 1:03:49SPEAKER_00: And so this is one of the stories told in this really remarkable book by
- 1:03:53SPEAKER_00: anthropologist Susan Greenhog called Just One Child,
- 1:03:55in which she traced the intellectual lineage of Song Jian in the leadership
- 1:04:00in
- 1:04:01which the military scientist and eminent engineer was really able to
- 1:04:05influence
- 1:04:06SPEAKER_00: population policy.
- 1:04:08SPEAKER_00: And that was the first act of the one child policy.
- 1:04:12The second act of the one child policy was just this brutal enforcement that
- 1:04:17took
- 1:04:17place mostly in the countryside where people had a norm of having three or
- 1:04:21four
- 1:04:22children because that was the only way to have any economic security if
- 1:04:25you're
- 1:04:26SPEAKER_00: growing up as a farmer in China.
- 1:04:28in which the state meted out over the course of the one-child policy's
- 1:04:32lifetime
- 1:04:32SPEAKER_00: from 1980 to 2013,
- 1:04:35SPEAKER_00: more than 300 million abortions.
- 1:04:37SPEAKER_00: This is China's official statistics,
- 1:04:39SPEAKER_00: which is about the population of the United States at present,
- 1:04:43SPEAKER_00: and hundreds of millions of forced sterilizations as well.
- 1:04:47SPEAKER_00: Again,
- 1:04:47thesearebothofficialstatisticsthatarecompiledbytheNationalHealth
- 1:04:51SPEAKER_00: Commission in China.
- 1:04:53SPEAKER_00: This was a campaign that is best described as a campaign of rural terror.
- 1:04:57I wrote quite a lot about just these gruesome scenes in villages of babies
- 1:05:04being destroyed.
- 1:05:05And I don't really want to get into it here,
- 1:05:07but if you are curious to read it,
- 1:05:09These are some really wrenching scenes that I wrote about and picked up that
- 1:05:14took
- 1:05:14SPEAKER_00: place in China's countryside.
- 1:05:16And the third great act of the one child policy is that after China concluded
- 1:05:21the
- 1:05:21SPEAKER_00: one child policy in 2013,
- 1:05:22SPEAKER_00: it has moved on to
- 1:05:26SPEAKER_00: trying to re-engineer the population to have quite a lot of kids again,
- 1:05:29becauseithasrealizedthatdecliningpopulationisnotsogoodforfuture
- 1:05:34SPEAKER_00: economic prospects.
- 1:05:35But what Xi and the rest of the leadership has discovered is that it is pretty
- 1:05:39easy
- 1:05:39SPEAKER_00: to prevent births if you are brutal enough,
- 1:05:42but it is really difficult to induce people to copulate because the state is
- 1:05:47not
- 1:05:47SPEAKER_00: very good at
- 1:05:48SPEAKER_00: making teenagers get it together.
- 1:05:51SPEAKER_00: So they have not been very successful,
- 1:05:54SPEAKER_00: but they are sending out party members to harangue women to ask,
- 1:05:58SPEAKER_00: when was your last period?
- 1:05:59And hey,
- 1:05:59why don't you have another child,
- 1:06:01which is upsetting women in all manners of ways.
- 1:06:04But I think this is still an instance in which the Chinese leadership has
- 1:06:09learnednothingfrom
- 1:06:11SPEAKER_00: the dangers of engineering the population.
- 1:06:14SPEAKER_01: There's a lot to talk about here,
- 1:06:15but one of the things that really struck me in that chapter was the way in
- 1:06:19which,
- 1:06:20SPEAKER_01: as you say,
- 1:06:20SPEAKER_01: the one-child policy starts as this kind of shock campaign,
- 1:06:23SPEAKER_01: and it involves a campaign of rural terror,
- 1:06:26SPEAKER_01: these persuasion groups where officials will come out to your house and
- 1:06:30SPEAKER_01: tens or dozens or a hundred times to pressure you to have an abortion.
- 1:06:36SPEAKER_01: But it also involves this really labyrinthine administrative apparatus,
- 1:06:41SPEAKER_01: as you say,
- 1:06:42SPEAKER_01: by 1990,
- 1:06:43SPEAKER_01: to have a first child,
- 1:06:45SPEAKER_01: a woman needed up to 12 documents from her workplace and party officials,
- 1:06:49and to sign a consent form agreeing to contraceptive measures after birth.
- 1:06:53SPEAKER_01: That was in order to have just your one allowed child.
- 1:06:56SPEAKER_01: And
- 1:06:57SPEAKER_01: And as you also say, just another statistic that boggled my mind.
- 1:07:01By 1999,
- 1:07:0135% of married women of reproductive age had been sterilized by the state.
- 1:07:08SPEAKER_01: Yes.
- 1:07:08SPEAKER_01: Just remarkable.
- 1:07:09You talked in the book about how studying the one-child policy changed your
- 1:07:13viewon
- 1:07:14SPEAKER_01: the idea of quote-unquote following the science,
- 1:07:16SPEAKER_01: or at least the framing of that idea.
- 1:07:19SPEAKER_01: Will you say a little bit about that?
- 1:07:21SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 1:07:21asI'vestartedtopresenttheideaoftheengineeringstateandthelawyerly
- 1:07:26SPEAKER_00: society to people,
- 1:07:28SPEAKER_00: I like that people are often very thoughtful about,
- 1:07:30SPEAKER_00: hmm,
- 1:07:31SPEAKER_00: I'm not sure if it's better to be governed by engineers or lawyers.
- 1:07:36SPEAKER_00: And that is, I think, the correct attitude to have.
- 1:07:38Now,
- 1:07:38I made fun of you a little bit,
- 1:07:40Santi,
- 1:07:40earlier to say,
- 1:07:41what are you,
- 1:07:42an economist?
- 1:07:43But I want to say that actually there is the right profession to govern
- 1:07:47society.
- 1:07:48SPEAKER_00: It is economists.
- 1:07:49SPEAKER_00: And economists, I think, are... I don't know if I'd go that far.
- 1:07:53SPEAKER_00: I think they are just technocratic enough,
- 1:07:56SPEAKER_00: like the engineers,
- 1:07:57and just humanist and social science-y enough not to do anything as stupid as
- 1:08:01the
- 1:08:01SPEAKER_00: one-child policy.
- 1:08:03One of the things that redeems economists forever in my mind was that
- 1:08:07economistsin
- 1:08:08SPEAKER_00: the West,
- 1:08:09SPEAKER_00: as well as in China,
- 1:08:10SPEAKER_00: were the main people arguing against one-child policy proposals.
- 1:08:15They were the main intellectuals criticizing things like the population
- 1:08:18bomb
- 1:08:19SPEAKER_00: published by the Ehrlichs to say that,
- 1:08:21SPEAKER_00: well,
- 1:08:21SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 1:08:22SPEAKER_00: preferences are dynamic and you shouldn't have this linear straight line
- 1:08:26SPEAKER_00: extrapolation.
- 1:08:28SPEAKER_00: So that is something that I want to say is quite nice about economists.
- 1:08:32SPEAKER_00: They are the right in between.
- 1:08:35SPEAKER_00: And as we get to these statements like following the science,
- 1:08:39I've become a little bit skeptical of these people who say that scientists
- 1:08:44needto
- 1:08:44SPEAKER_00: rule because the scientists are the ones that are
- 1:08:48SPEAKER_00: engaging in linear extrapolation of population trajectories.
- 1:08:53SPEAKER_00: They are the ones advocating for the most severe lockdowns,
- 1:08:56SPEAKER_00: which looked right at the time,
- 1:08:58SPEAKER_00: but not necessarily very smart in retrospect.
- 1:09:01SPEAKER_00: They are the ones that are saying that,
- 1:09:04SPEAKER_00: well,
- 1:09:04SPEAKER_00: maybe we need to fully stop the economy now in order to decarbonize.
- 1:09:08SPEAKER_00: I think that is simply the wrong approach.
- 1:09:11I believe it was Winston Churchill who said that scientists need to be on tap,
- 1:09:14not on top.
- 1:09:15SPEAKER_00: And I think what we need to have is
- 1:09:18SPEAKER_00: is pluralism in our governing elites.
- 1:09:21SPEAKER_00: We shouldn't be ruled entirely by lawyers.
- 1:09:24SPEAKER_00: We shouldn't be ruled entirely by engineers.
- 1:09:26There should be a little bit more pluralism such that we have some economists
- 1:09:31in the mix.
- 1:09:32SPEAKER_00: We should have some humanists in the mix.
- 1:09:34SPEAKER_00: We should have some lawyers.
- 1:09:36We should have some engineers in which we have an earnest debate about what it
- 1:09:40is
- 1:09:40SPEAKER_00: that the scientists are recommending.
- 1:09:43And here's where I think that it might be the prerogative of superpowers to
- 1:09:49really specialize.
- 1:09:50SPEAKER_00: And so the U.S.
- 1:09:51is definitely a lawyerly society and the Chinese are definitely the
- 1:09:55engineering state.
- 1:09:56But I think it is much more difficult to characterize other countries like
- 1:10:01Canada or Germany.
- 1:10:03SPEAKER_00: They don't have a neat description here.
- 1:10:05SPEAKER_00: There's no country ruled by dentists, for example.
- 1:10:08SPEAKER_00: And I think it is the privilege of the superpowers to specialize.
- 1:10:12Now,
- 1:10:12I know you've had an interesting fellow on,
- 1:10:15Santi,
- 1:10:15named Edward Ludwak.
- 1:10:17SPEAKER_00: And one of Ludwak's very nice phrases is sense of great power autism,
- 1:10:22SPEAKER_00: in which these people have really narrow focuses.
- 1:10:25And so I think other more reasonably sized countries like Canada are also
- 1:10:30somewhat
- 1:10:31SPEAKER_00: more reasonable in their mix of pluralism.
- 1:10:33AndwhatIwantisforboththeChineseandtheAmericanstobealittlebitmore
- 1:10:39SPEAKER_00: reasonable in their pluralism and not be so...
- 1:10:42SPEAKER_00: artistic about their governing elites.
- 1:10:44SPEAKER_01: I'm curious,
- 1:10:45you talked in past yearly letters about the Chinese nationals who try to get
- 1:10:50out
- 1:10:51SPEAKER_01: and try to leave the country.
- 1:10:53SPEAKER_01: And you spent a lot of time in northern Thailand, where many
- 1:10:57SPEAKER_01: Chinese expats end up.
- 1:10:59Youtalkedabouthowinthepastcoupleofyearshavebeenrisingnumbersof
- 1:11:02SPEAKER_01: Chinese nationals apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border,
- 1:11:06people flying to Ecuador and taking this perilous route through Panama to
- 1:11:11the
- 1:11:11SPEAKER_01: American border.
- 1:11:12SPEAKER_01: Practically speaking,
- 1:11:13SPEAKER_01: today,
- 1:11:14SPEAKER_01: if there's somebody who looks a lot like me or like you,
- 1:11:18lives in Beijing or Shanghai and runs their mouth on the internet a little bit
- 1:11:22too
- 1:11:22SPEAKER_01: much,
- 1:11:23SPEAKER_01: is disfavored by the authorities,
- 1:11:25SPEAKER_01: how would this friend of ours practically leave the country?
- 1:11:29SPEAKER_01: How would he get out?
- 1:11:30Ithinkourfriendwouldstartbytryingtoapplyforsomesortofschoolingin
- 1:11:37probably a European country because the European master's programs are
- 1:11:40considerably
- 1:11:41SPEAKER_00: cheaper than the US.
- 1:11:43SPEAKER_00: Maybe they go to Australia, maybe they go to the Netherlands.
- 1:11:46SPEAKER_00: So they try to get schooling that way.
- 1:11:49SPEAKER_00: They pay the master's program fee.
- 1:11:52SPEAKER_00: Let's call it something like 10,000 US dollars.
- 1:11:55And then they probably have saved enough where they could get this money from
- 1:11:59their
- 1:11:59SPEAKER_00: parents to get a visa to hang out for a few years in Europe.
- 1:12:03SPEAKER_00: So a lot of Chinese nationals have washed up in Europe in particular.
- 1:12:08And so that is someone more elite who is able to afford and qualify for this
- 1:12:11sort
- 1:12:13SPEAKER_00: of schooling abroad.
- 1:12:14SPEAKER_00: If you're less elite,
- 1:12:15SPEAKER_00: if you are more of a migrant worker,
- 1:12:17SPEAKER_00: have no family to support,
- 1:12:20SPEAKER_00: but you just really want to get out,
- 1:12:22SPEAKER_00: Then many people have traveled to Ecuador,
- 1:12:25SPEAKER_00: where the only reason that they fly to Ecuador is that for a while,
- 1:12:29SPEAKER_00: Ecuador didn't require a visa from Chinese nationals.
- 1:12:32SPEAKER_00: Now that has changed,
- 1:12:33SPEAKER_00: and then they walk up the Darien Gap,
- 1:12:35SPEAKER_00: along with many Central and Southern Americans.
- 1:12:39The numbers there have collapsed since President Trump's crackdown on
- 1:12:42immigrants,
- 1:12:43in part because the United States has revealed itself to be much more hostile
- 1:12:48to
- 1:12:49SPEAKER_00: Chinese migrants over the last few months under the Trump administration.
- 1:12:53That appetite has substantially evaporated among Chinese to really try to
- 1:12:57come to the U.S.,
- 1:12:58AndIthinkthatisashamethatthisisnotalandoftheStatueofLiberty
- 1:13:02SPEAKER_00: beckoning those who yearn to be free.
- 1:13:05SPEAKER_00: These are people who are quite dissatisfied with the regime.
- 1:13:08I think America would be stronger if it had more of these Chinese migrants
- 1:13:12here.
- 1:13:13Let's say this friend of ours is on a list somewhere and the state would not
- 1:13:19like
- 1:13:19SPEAKER_01: him to leave the country and to be a critic of the state from outside.
- 1:13:25Sohecan'tgetthatvisatoEcuadoranymoreandhewon'tgettogotothat
- 1:13:29SPEAKER_01: master's program in Belgium.
- 1:13:31SPEAKER_01: What are his options?
- 1:13:33Chinese government has made it more difficult for Chinese nationals to go
- 1:13:39abroad,
- 1:13:40SPEAKER_00: mostly by controlling who gets to have a passport.
- 1:13:43SPEAKER_00: And so that is very real.
- 1:13:45A lot of even public school teachers have had to surrender their passports
- 1:13:49because
- 1:13:50SPEAKER_00: Beijing doesn't like it when they go on a nice holiday in Malaysia.
- 1:13:54SPEAKER_00: And so that is very practical.
- 1:13:56And I think that has been a concern among Beijing that people go abroad and
- 1:14:02shoot
- 1:14:02SPEAKER_00: their mouths off about the Communist Party.
- 1:14:05SPEAKER_00: For a while, Beijing tolerated a lot of dissidents to go abroad.
- 1:14:09SPEAKER_00: This was most prominent after 1989, when a lot of
- 1:14:13SPEAKER_00: University students fled in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre.
- 1:14:18SPEAKER_00: And for the most part, China permitted them to.
- 1:14:21SPEAKER_00: But now China has revealed that it is less eager for people to go abroad.
- 1:14:27It has become more sophisticated in controlling people through their
- 1:14:30families.
- 1:14:31SPEAKER_00: And it is just expecting you to stay at home and be good children.
- 1:14:36So there is perhaps rising discontent because people aren't even able to go
- 1:14:41to
- 1:14:42SPEAKER_00: holidays in Malaysia,
- 1:14:43SPEAKER_00: much less master's programs in Belgium.
- 1:14:45SPEAKER_00: And I think that is one of these questions,
- 1:14:47how much discontent there is and whether the Communist Party is really able
- 1:14:52to
- 1:14:52SPEAKER_00: bottle that up.
- 1:14:54SPEAKER_00: Sure.
- 1:14:55SPEAKER_01: I think you and I have a similar taste in books.
- 1:14:58SPEAKER_01: I know we both enjoyed Stalin's War by Sean McMeekin.
- 1:15:03SPEAKER_01: And recently you came across James C.
- 1:15:05SPEAKER_01: Scott's personal book collection donated to a local bookstore.
- 1:15:09SPEAKER_01: I think we're both fans of Scott as well.
- 1:15:12SPEAKER_01: Two questions.
- 1:15:13One is how much of Scott's personal book collection did you end up buying?
- 1:15:17And two is what have you been reading lately that you would recommend to me and
- 1:15:22our listeners?
- 1:15:24SPEAKER_00: I was a fellow at the Yale Law School's Paltai China Center,
- 1:15:28SPEAKER_00: which meant I was based in New Haven when I was writing a lot of my book.
- 1:15:33IhavemaybeoneofmyfavoritebookstoresintheworldiscalledGreyMatter
- 1:15:38SPEAKER_00: Books,
- 1:15:39in which a lot of Yale University professors give their used books to this
- 1:15:44very
- 1:15:44SPEAKER_00: savvy curator that has this book collection.
- 1:15:47SPEAKER_00: And so I visit Grey Matter Books pretty much on
- 1:15:51SPEAKER_00: every occasion that I have to be a New Haven.
- 1:15:54And one day I came across this collection shortly after James C.
- 1:15:58Scott died.
- 1:15:59There were several shelves of James C.
- 1:16:02Scott's books that I was happy to look at.
- 1:16:05I did the generous thing,
- 1:16:07which was that I bought only two or three volumes from that set.
- 1:16:10SPEAKER_00: Now,
- 1:16:10SPEAKER_00: obviously,
- 1:16:11SPEAKER_00: I could have bought the entire shelf,
- 1:16:12SPEAKER_00: but I think that would not be really the Scottian thing to do.
- 1:16:16AndIthinkoneofthethingsthatScotthasreallyilluminatedformeisthatI
- 1:16:22thinkthereisaverysubstantialtensioninmyownthinkingabouthowmuch
- 1:16:26SPEAKER_00: civilization to partake.
- 1:16:29SPEAKER_00: Now, I reference a grand opera, not so much because I love Wagner.
- 1:16:34SPEAKER_00: I have pretty mixed feelings about Wagner,
- 1:16:36SPEAKER_00: but I am generally an opera fan,
- 1:16:37SPEAKER_00: especially of the Italian comic operas.
- 1:16:40SPEAKER_00: opera bufa, the funnies.
- 1:16:42Opera is very much associated with quote-unquote civilization as well as
- 1:16:46the court,
- 1:16:47SPEAKER_00: but I have to reconcile my tastes,
- 1:16:50which are run a little bit more opera and Costco musical and novelistic with
- 1:16:56my
- 1:16:57fierce instinct to be a barbarian and plant maize and plant cassava and hide
- 1:17:02outin
- 1:17:03SPEAKER_00: the mountains and not partake in civilizations.
- 1:17:05SPEAKER_00: And so this is not something that I'm able to resolve very easily.
- 1:17:09SPEAKER_00: Now, I think I'll just leave Statecraft with one book recommendation.
- 1:17:13And that is my favorite James C.
- 1:17:15Scott work,
- 1:17:15The Art of Not Being Governed.
- 1:17:17SPEAKER_00: This is about Zomia, a land that I am very familiar with.
- 1:17:21I'm from the part of Zomia in southwestern China,
- 1:17:26which is very mountainous.
- 1:17:27SPEAKER_00: And so Zomia refers to this broad expanse in highland Southeast Asia that
- 1:17:33SPEAKER_00: run as north as southwest China,
- 1:17:35SPEAKER_00: where I'm from,
- 1:17:36SPEAKER_00: to as far south as Vietnam,
- 1:17:39inwhichthere'sjustfartoomuchjungleandmountainforthestatetohave
- 1:17:43SPEAKER_00: practical control.
- 1:17:44SPEAKER_00: And so these were peoples that avoided civilization.
- 1:17:47Theyplantedalotofmaizeandcassavainordertohidefromthetaxmanaswell
- 1:17:52SPEAKER_00: as the state coming over to them for conscription.
- 1:17:55They have an oral culture,
- 1:17:56which makes their ethnicity a little bit more malleable.
- 1:17:59SPEAKER_00: And so I every so often dream that
- 1:18:02SPEAKER_00: of running off into the mountains and becoming a barbarian myself.
- 1:18:05And if there's anything that I would like for the listeners of Statecraft to
- 1:18:09do,
- 1:18:11SPEAKER_00: it is to join me and my mountain tribe,
- 1:18:13SPEAKER_00: become barbarians,
- 1:18:14SPEAKER_00: and figure out how we can best resist the Statecraft.
- 1:18:17SPEAKER_00: What do you think?
- 1:18:19SPEAKER_01: You heard the man.
- 1:18:20SPEAKER_01: It has been,
- 1:18:21SPEAKER_01: I've noticed,
- 1:18:22SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 1:18:23in prepping for this conversation that I've not talked nearly enough about
- 1:18:27Scotton
- 1:18:28SPEAKER_01: Statecraft,
- 1:18:29SPEAKER_01: and maybe there's also a tension in my own project.
- 1:18:32SPEAKER_01: And if I had thought of that sooner, maybe we could have had him on.
- 1:18:35SPEAKER_01: Unfortunately, he passed away, I believe, a year ago.
- 1:18:38SPEAKER_01: I'll leave you with one more question before we wrap.
- 1:18:41As we talked about already,
- 1:18:43Breakneck is largely about seeing America through the Chinese lens.
- 1:18:49what features of American culture or civic life that makes you most bullish
- 1:18:54onthe
- 1:18:54SPEAKER_01: American project in the 21st century?
- 1:18:57SPEAKER_00: How about all of it?
- 1:18:59SPEAKER_00: How about the fact that
- 1:19:01SPEAKER_00: When you go to a bar in the US,
- 1:19:05SPEAKER_00: you can talk to a perfect stranger and have a nice conversation.
- 1:19:08SPEAKER_00: I've just spent a month in Denmark.
- 1:19:10SPEAKER_00: Something like that is really difficult to imagine.
- 1:19:14SPEAKER_00: How about the fact that it is pretty easy to make friends in the US,
- 1:19:18SPEAKER_00: whereas in most parts of Europe and Japan,
- 1:19:22SPEAKER_00: Your friends are made by high school or latest by college,
- 1:19:24and then you're done with having friends who all kind of live close around
- 1:19:28you.
- 1:19:29SPEAKER_00: And even with the Trump administration,
- 1:19:32I will make no secret that I am very deeply distressed by many parts of the
- 1:19:37Trump
- 1:19:37SPEAKER_00: administration's agenda.
- 1:19:39There's still something hopeful about this chaos and churn that Trump
- 1:19:43represents
- 1:19:44SPEAKER_00: that is much more difficult to imagine in Europe and Japan
- 1:19:48but represents something about the enormous dynamism in America that at
- 1:19:54leasthasa
- 1:19:54SPEAKER_00: sense to really try to confront its own problems.
- 1:19:57And so I don't think that Trump is solving many of America's or maybe even any
- 1:20:02of
- 1:20:03SPEAKER_00: America's great challenges.
- 1:20:05SPEAKER_00: I think that's something I'm able to change my mind on.
- 1:20:08SPEAKER_00: But just to have this
- 1:20:10raw life force and pure chaos of Trump himself,
- 1:20:14whom I think is a sui generis act of God.
- 1:20:17I think that is probably a hopeful thing that America is able to confront
- 1:20:21these
- 1:20:21SPEAKER_00: types of questions.
- 1:20:22SPEAKER_01: Well, I'll leave it there on that very thoughtful answer.
- 1:20:25SPEAKER_01: Dan, it's been a real pleasure.
- 1:20:27SPEAKER_01: Thank you for joining.
- 1:20:28SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Santi.