Latest / The Nation Podcasts / Israel’s Escalating Conflict with Turkey w/ Adam Weinstein

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Israel’s Escalating Conflict with Turkey w/ Adam Weinstein · The Nation Podcasts

• 0:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: The old world is dying, the new world struggles to be born.
• 0:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now is the time of monsters.
• 0:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: With those words from Gramsci, I welcome you to the time of monsters podcast.
• 0:10
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm Jeet here of the nation magazine, which is the sponsor of the podcast.
• 0:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: We've often discussed the various wars and the release on this podcast, and they continue.
• 0:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: And what an interesting recent development is that there's been a sort of escalation of rhetoric between Israel and Turkey.
• 0:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is coming at a time where, you know, like Israel, along with the United States has been fighting these wars again in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen among others.
• 0:45
  [SPEAKER_01]: And what's interesting is that Turkey is the conflict might actually broaden out certainly
• 0:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: speeches made by Benjamin Netanyahu where do we take in seriously?
• 1:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: The question is how to take how seriously should we take them?
• 1:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: To discuss all this, I'm very happy to have on.
• 1:05
  [SPEAKER_01]: Adam Weinstein, who's a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute where he is a director of Middle Eastern Affairs, first of all, Adam, welcome to the program.
• 1:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: Thanks for having me.
• 1:17
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, let's just get started.
• 1:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, what exactly is going on between Israel and Turkey?
• 1:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, Israel and Turkey are budding heads in Syria and in a greater sense budding heads as competing hedge imons in the Middle East.
• 1:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 1:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 1:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the Syrian particular seems to be like the sort of the real battleground for this conflict.
• 1:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: To what degree is this like a result of the sort of like the weaknesses of the Syrian state and the way in which it could therefore become a battleground for competing a military projects.
• 1:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, under the Assad regime, as you know, Syria was part of the access of the so-called access of resistance that included Hugg Belay Iran and so forth, the Houthis, and it was a ally of Iran, and certainly the Israeli government did not like the Assad regime, but they knew the Assad regime, and that's the difference.
• 2:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: They don't really know Alshara and HGS and their belief is that Alshara and HGS are radicals lamas and that as soon as they have the capacity to attack Israel, they will.
• 2:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you look at the moves and statements that Shada has made, the leader of Syria, he seems to want a more pragmatic relationship with Israel, but the Israelis simply don't trust that.
• 2:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: And so that's why you saw when the Assad regime fell, the Israelis conducted a bunch of airstrikes on chemical weapons, depots, and conventional military capacity, airfields.
• 3:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: The, of course, they had that target list when Assad was in power and they didn't use it.
• 3:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: But again, they saw Assad as somewhat of a rational actor.
• 3:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think they feel the same way about, about Shahra.
• 3:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: So they're not willing to take any risks.
• 3:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's the first part.
• 3:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: But Turkey itself has sort of like interest in like Syria, particularly I guess a big issue with them is the sort of like Kurdish population and the degree to which they might be the basis for like a Kurdish state.
• 3:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: So Turkey itself has both under Assad and now made its presence on in Syria.
• 3:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, how are they looking at things?
• 3:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, well, Turkey has two interests in Syria.
• 3:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: The first interest is a strategic interest, which is the Kurdish issue.
• 3:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: And you know, I,
• 3:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: Just immediately, months ago, I drove from Damascus all the way to punish the northeast of Syria, which had been under SDF control, and was essentially a Kurdish state, but even though it wasn't official.
• 3:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that was a torn in the side of Turkey, because they always believed that the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces were synonymous with the PKK, or the Kurdish
• 4:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: For Turkey, for the Turkish government, the PKK might as well be Altaira.
• 4:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, to know if it is Altaira, in terms of that, that's how they view it emotionally.
• 4:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they think that the goal is to break up the Turkish state, and that's, you know, preventing that as a vital, national interest.
• 4:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: for Turkey.
• 4:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: And it really strained relations during the Syrian Civil War, especially during the anti-Isis campaign, between the United States and Turkey, because Turkey believed that US Central Command was propping up the SDF and its fight against ISIS, which it was in a sense, and therefore enabling by extension the P.K.
• 4:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: The second interest that Turkey has in Syria is this idea, it's sometimes called neo-automism.
• 4:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: This idea that Turkey was a great power and that it should have influence over what was the Ottoman Empire, a little bit similar to the Monroe doctrine, especially the Trump administration's interpretation of it.
• 5:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: And so the Turks believe that why shouldn't they have a
• 5:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I mean that makes sense.
• 5:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean like alarmingly like, you know, like the Ottoman Empire would include like light swaths of like the Middle East, right?
• 5:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like it is a very large claim that actually parts of Europe as well.
• 5:32
  [SPEAKER_01]: What is the thing that's seriously so.
• 5:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: Israel has been like, you know, as you mentioned, sort of striking in Syria.
• 5:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is part of you, you know, with the view towards keeping a government that they distrust weak.
• 5:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: But in some of these strikes, Benjamin Netchenyah, who has, like, also issued warning shots against Turkey.
• 5:56
  [SPEAKER_01]: There was, like, in August 18th, they had the strike at
• 6:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: air base in Syria and the comment coming out of these really Prime Minister was Syria was on the verge of reaching the status quo by providing Turkish troops to deploy at an air base near Aleppo.
• 6:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: Israel repeatedly warned Syria that such a deployment would pose threat to Israel security, Syria chose to ignore these warnings, Israel will not tolerate threats to its security and would welcome a return to the status quo.
• 6:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: So reading that statement, I mean, it's directed against Syria, but it's also saying, like, you know, the breach here is like permitting Turkish troops.
• 6:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: How soon is air we to take like this idea that like, you know, like Israel is, you know, prepared to use military force to prevent this Turkish expansion of influence into Syria?
• 6:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, they just demonstrated that they're willing to use military force.
• 6:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think the real question is, would they be willing to kill Turkish soldiers?
• 6:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: What they did in this book is they made these air fields unusable.
• 6:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: The reason being is that Israel is not really afraid of the capacity of the Syrian government's military, which is the HTS group that has been turned into an actual army, but what they are concerned about is Turkey.
• 7:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Israel is not just conducting strikes in Syria.
• 7:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: Israel is occupying Syria in the air, not just the gold on heights, but they have sent troops much further into that.
• 7:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: They've been deeply involved in Sueda.
• 7:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: You may remember when they were fighting between Damascus and Sueda, which is a government in the inside Syria that's primarily Jews.
• 7:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you remember that last summer, they had bombed Ministry of Defense buildings and
• 7:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: Israel is very willing to conduct strikes inside Syria to project what it considers this status quo.
• 7:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you step back for a second and you look at it objectively, you might think, well, why can't the Turks have a little bit of a buffer in the north and the Israelis have a buffer in the south?
• 8:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, but for the fact that it completely violates Syria and sovereignty, but looking at this from a realist perspective, why can't these two nations have respective
• 8:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: especially Netanyahu, they view this in a zero-some way.
• 8:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's simply not acceptable, even in the northern parts of Syria for the to be a Turkish presence.
• 8:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: The only acceptable presence is in Israeli presence in the south, and it's because I think there is a trust deficit with Erdogan, and they very much are beginning to view Turkey as the new Iran.
• 8:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, yeah, which is like a really interesting development.
• 8:42
  [SPEAKER_01]: I wouldn't wish I wanted to do this podcast, because the United States and Israel are currently fighting around in this often on war.
• 8:52
  [SPEAKER_01]: So it seems odd to like, you can't finish this war that you're fighting now.
• 8:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: They open up like a second front.
• 8:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: against like you know like another powerful agent one of which which happens also to be a NATO ally of the United States and I know that I mean you know we're discussing this a little bit on the email before but like there's an article in Israel how about a paper there saying that you know just because Turkey is a member-state in NATO doesn't mean that it's protected in Syria
• 9:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: And so the argument is article five of NATO calling out states to defend each other might apply if like Israel or to invade Turkey proper.
• 9:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: But if Israel is fighting to have Turks are in Syria, then they're fair game.
• 9:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: That doesn't seem like a little bit more of an escalation than simply Bobby the Syrian government and saying like don't be friends with the Turks, right?
• 9:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like this sort of claim that article five doesn't necessarily apply in Syria.
• 9:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, it is an escalatoric comment.
• 9:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: Turkey has always been kind of the wild card in the NATO alliance because it sits at the crossroads of the Middle East in Europe.
• 10:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: And, you know, look, that's why it was so hard for, you know, it's been so difficult at the times that Turkey has wanted to become part of the European Union.
• 10:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's been so difficult because of the reality of Turkey's location.
• 10:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: You know, you can see that Turkey behaves differently than a typical NATO partner.
• 10:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: You can see it in terms of its relations with Russia.
• 10:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: The United States and Turkey, one could argue, we're in a proxy war in Northeastern Syria.
• 10:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, that wasn't really an intentional proxy war.
• 10:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was the fact that the Turks prioritized fighting the DPKK and then by extension the SDF.
• 10:38
  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's because the United States prioritized fighting ISIS.
• 10:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: But the reality was you could make a case that we were in a proxy war with Turkey despite being NATO allies.
• 10:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: So when you look at it from that perspective,
• 10:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: And these rallies might think, well, what are you talking about?
• 10:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the Americans were backing and co-locating their special forces with the arch enemy of Turkey.
• 11:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: So why can't we protect our interests?
• 11:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's probably the Israeli perspective.
• 11:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, of course, the difference is that the United States is much bigger than Israel and also rhetoric does matter, and that is very escalatory rhetoric.
• 11:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: And when Israel challenges NATO, they're not just challenging Turkey, they're challenging the United States of America.
• 11:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: They're main benefactor.
• 11:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I know, I mean, I mean, you know, I say it's being the United States of being the head of NATO, that wasn't for any country of NATO, like, you know, as one sees with Trump's, you know, comments about Denmark and other countries, it has the right to swap down a NATO ally, but that's very different than some of the outside of NATO, which is really like, you know, like making such an open challenge to NATO.
• 11:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, and I think Nanyahu is challenging Trump and calling Trump's bluff and playing a game of chicken with Trump as Netanyahu tends to do and he's very good at doing that.
• 12:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think he, I mean, I personally think he's gotten way too big for his shoes, but he has proven time and time again that he can kind of play this game of chicken with Trump and sort of out-wit Trump.
• 12:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, um, uh, I think that's right.
• 12:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: And maybe we'll enter, like, we framed this is like to like ask what are exactly American interest in the region?
• 12:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: Because I think, like, the Trump administration has made noises to the effect that they want to stable Syria.
• 12:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: And that this would be, uh, indeed, interest of, like, the Middle East.
• 12:34
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it seems like, like, a lot of what,
• 12:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: Israel has been doing, and arguably what Turkey is doing, like mitigate together, like actually cuts against like, you know, like American hopes that like, you know, a settled and stable Syria could become economically dynamic again, integrated into the neighborhood, and then take back many of the refugees that had fled during the Civil War.
• 12:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, yeah, I mean, like to what degree is what Israel is doing, and then maybe what
• 13:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I think the United States wants a, it says it wants a stable Middle East.
• 13:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: It doesn't behave in that way.
• 13:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: For sure.
• 13:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: Administration.
• 13:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, in terms of Syria, the Trump Administration has been very,
• 13:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: pragmatic.
• 13:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, one thing I'll say about Trump is his instinct seems to be towards dialogue and making deals.
• 13:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's his initial instinct.
• 13:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: The problem is that instinct is extremely fickle.
• 13:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: And, you know,
• 13:38
  [SPEAKER_00]: He's very easily swayed one direction or the other and when it comes to complex diplomacy like the kind of diplomacy that is required to end the Iran war, the kind of diplomacy that under Obama achieved the JCPOA, that kind of complex diplomacy.
• 13:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: President Trump doesn't seem to have much patience for that.
• 13:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: He likes the photo op.
• 13:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: He likes the photo op with Kim Jong-un.
• 13:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: He likes to say that he's willing to reach out to the Ayatola in a post on truth social.
• 14:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: He doesn't seem to like the hard work that takes many, many months.
• 14:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, what the JCPO took something like 20 months to negotiate.
• 14:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: He has trouble with the follow-through.
• 14:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: But in Syria, he's delegated a lot of that to
• 14:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Tom Barric, who's the ambassador to Turkey and was serving as the special envoy to Syria, although the official title changed, I think.
• 14:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: But he has had a very good relationship with Shara, he's an Arabic spooker, and they have quickly removed the terrorist designations and the sanctions from the new Syrian government and given them a chance to prosper.
• 14:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: um, despite some serious concerns about that government, but I think in their view, okay, well, let's, let's give this new government a chance and see what happens.
• 14:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: It helps that Alshara is, you know, an enemy of Iran and an enemy of Hezbollah, because he was fighting them in this area in Civil War for years and years.
• 15:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that helps Shara's case.
• 15:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: Also, Shara has been, you know, incredibly good at PR, so that might be a part of it as well.
• 15:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: he does seem to care about that.
• 15:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: When he said the, you know, he said the, the same thing about the new Iraqi Prime Minister, he seems to focus on that.
• 15:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: But when you step back, that pragmatism isn't applied to the region as a whole.
• 15:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: And actually, this is becoming a thorn in the Trump administration side.
• 15:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: And you will see,
• 15:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: You know, the criticize is really strikes against Syria.
• 15:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: They've always criticized it.
• 15:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: In the case of Turkey, you know, it's hard to say.
• 15:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think Washington would probably prefer Turkish influence in the Middle East over Iranian influence.
• 15:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Turks want to build this development road that extends from Basra, through Iraq, all the way to Turkey.
• 15:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think Turkey's a...
• 15:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: I'll be at a flawed democracy, it's a democracy, it's yes, desire to want to express support for Hamas and so forth, sure.
• 16:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: But he's not seen as much of a threat as the Iranian government.
• 16:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think Turkish influence is more acceptable to Washington than Iranian influence.
• 16:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: And somebody's going to have influence.
• 16:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: what Israel is doing in Syria is destabilizing.
• 16:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now I think Israel is making a mistake.
• 16:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: I actually think Israel had this once in a generation opportunity to sort of start with a clean slate with the new Syrian government and see what happens.
• 16:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: They weren't willing to do that because October 7th has made them completely risk a verse when it comes to any kind of
• 16:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: dual-making with actors that it views as extremist or anti-Israel.
• 16:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: Even, you know, of course what they're doing instead is they're overextending themselves and they're destroying their reputation on the world's stage.
• 17:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they're trying to kill their way to victory, which you can't do.
• 17:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: That is their strategy right now, I think they missed a huge opportunity with the new Syrian government.
• 17:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: Every time I've been in Syria in the last year and a half, I've been twice and I've been all over Syria.
• 17:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: And even when you talk to some of the former commanders of rebel groups that were fighting the Assad regime, you'll talk to them about Israel and their attitude is basically, oh, yeah, Israel is what they're doing in Gaza's wrong.
• 17:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: But let's talk about Iran.
• 17:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's who we really don't like.
• 17:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: Israel could have had a natural partner with the new Syrian government and yet and yet they chose not to and I think that shows just how tunnel visioned the Israelis are right now.
• 17:45
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that television speaks to a lot of these sort of like issues that we're discussing.
• 17:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, like they're doesn't seem to be a sort of extreme view that like they can't really make peace with many of their neighbors.
• 17:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, I mean, I think they were made quite close to the UAE and really a distress of diplomacy and it's sort of like a maybe like a view that you always have to be on the offense.
• 18:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that gets to maybe some of the larger issues as you said, like Trump has this instinct to make deals.
• 18:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: So that's maybe his natural framework.
• 18:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: But like I think he's constantly been dragged into these conflicts and also has trouble ending these conflicts.
• 18:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: And like I think to some degree, we can't understate like the role of Israel, like the degree which this kind of hyper-vigilant, go on the offensive strategy of Israel, bics any sort of deal making impossible.
• 18:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I do think the Trump administration could put pressure on Israel and the day happened and willing to deny there was the Biden administration matter.
• 18:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: And in fact, the rhetoric that the Biden administration used was much stronger in support of Israel.
• 18:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: They'd say that there should be no daylight between the Israeli position and the U.S. position.
• 19:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, at least the Trump administration is willing to have daylight.
• 19:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: But at the end of the day, they're not willing to take risks that they feel would damage that relationship such as reducing or ending weapons transfers and things like that.
• 19:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: And now they're talking about essentially talking about integrating these rally and US military, which would be unprecedented in terms of the proposal that exists.
• 19:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't want to use the word dragged though because the Trump administration really does have agency here They're more like a child getting distracted at a candy shop.
• 19:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, it's just so easy for distract them.
• 19:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: Is real acting as a spoiler?
• 19:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, Israel is acting as a spoiler, but Israel is acting as a spoiler because the Trump administration keeps rewarding it for doing so
• 19:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, well, I mean, what's your thoughts on why there's such a reluctance to use the sort of pressure powers that the U.S. does have?
• 19:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, under Biden, what could sort of seem like a kind of like an ideological underprivileged, like Biden, I think really was a as he claimed to be a scoop Jackson Democrat, you know, who have like a strong ideological affinity for Zionism and felt that Israel was a pillar of American power in the Middle East.
• 20:19
  [SPEAKER_01]: from that point of view that this no-day strategy makes sense.
• 20:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: Trump, he has some Zionist supporters and donors.
• 20:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: We'll once we've seen as like strong force of release.
• 20:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, he's never had that like ideological commitment in the same way.
• 20:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, one of the, and certainly, there are parts of his coalition.
• 20:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: that are become much more critical of Israel at a calling for the U.S. to be have a more assertive for policy.
• 20:49
  [SPEAKER_01]: So why have we seen a change?
• 20:53
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, what's the reluctance coming from?
• 20:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I mean, I would point you to my colleague, you like Clifton's new book, Israel's lobby, he wrote it, co-wrote it with Ian Lostick.
• 21:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: You might have already had him on.
• 21:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, yeah, yeah, hosted the booklots that the head that he should spot, so, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah,
• 21:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: The lobbying and the money behind it is no small thing.
• 21:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: I also think that President Trump, I mean, assuming that he is going to follow the constitution and also just the reality of age, he doesn't have to run for election again.
• 21:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: He doesn't have to care about, he doesn't have to, he doesn't have those concerns in a way he's a lame duck except a very powerful one.
• 21:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: So, so not really actually that I would be incorrect to call on the lambda.
• 21:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: We'll see, I guess we'll see after midterms whether that's true or not.
• 21:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: But I think there's still, yes, he said more like, I think president's traditionally have a lot of free hand in terms of foreign policy.
• 22:05
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think Trump even more so because his coalition is like very beholden to him, more so than any ideological consistency.
• 22:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: So I
• 22:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think he's betting on the evangelicals, I think he's betting on the silent conservative.
• 22:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: If we can use that over use, what is the silent majority of the conservatives?
• 22:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: Are they actually anti-Israel or are the traditional evangelical pro-Israel voices still going to come out on top when it comes to going to the voting booth?
• 22:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't know.
• 22:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: what I do know is that if you pull younger Republicans and younger conservatives, they're fed up with the US's real relationship as it exists today.
• 22:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: So, but again, President Trump isn't necessarily known for listening to people, and I don't know that he has the same commitment
• 22:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: to the future of the Republican Party as maybe a traditional president would.
• 23:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, Trump is about Trump, please, he's not really loyal to the Republican Party and its ability to win elections in the future.
• 23:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I'll also add this, which is that I think he genuinely believes he can remake the Middle East.
• 23:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I think he has this sort of fantastical idea that he can just dictate things.
• 23:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: He's supposed to just lay down their weapons.
• 23:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Iranians are going to just agree to give up any nuclear enrichment and he can just demand things and it's turning out not to be true.
• 23:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think the Israelis have at times encouraged that thinking within him.
• 23:39
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that makes sense.
• 23:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, certainly like Trump's own personal rhetoric has been, you know, a good claiming power as that he doesn't have.
• 23:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, like I think, well, recently he was a certain that the United States will control the state of our moves, which is like, you know, like self-wire from the actual military reality right now.
• 23:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm not sure what to say, but I mean, at some point like reality has to sort of catch up with him.
• 24:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Every the fact that the U.S. is, you know, not controlling the strength of the fact that the war continues.
• 24:10
  [SPEAKER_01]: The fact that like oil prices are they have a concept of tactically high, but they are quite high.
• 24:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: The fact that the U.S. is military is clearly overstayed as, you know, reset the discussion of the condition of the U.S. S. Lincoln and whether the U.S. has interceptors.
• 24:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: So so like to what extent do you see Trump as someone who like at some point will have to acknowledge these realities?
• 24:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I don't know when that ship gets back to San Diego he might have to because I think those salaries are going to tell stories that the Trump administration is not going to want to hear and some of them are going to be getting, I'm surely some of them are going to be getting out of the military because their contract is up and they may tell stories to the media.
• 24:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: that aren't great for the Trump administration, but he doesn't seem to be listening.
• 24:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, if you listen to his rhetoric, he says, oh, the US military is happy to die, to prevent Iran from having any nuclear capability.
• 25:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: the general public supports what he's doing vis-à-vis Israel.
• 25:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: And by the way, any of the naysayers from maga movement, they're all just freaks and criminals, and we shouldn't listen to them, and maga should listen to them.
• 25:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think maga is looking from the outside end.
• 25:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: It appears to be fracturing of it.
• 25:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: No, I'm clearly there as they're like, you know, prominent pro Trump voices that are now like outside the coalition.
• 25:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: And the Iran war seems to be like the major driver of that.
• 25:44
  [SPEAKER_01]: I guess to some of you may have to wait till the midterms to see how this like plays open.
• 25:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, to the extent that Trump is carrying out a sort of fantastical foreign policy based on, you know, like kind of make assertions into reality.
• 25:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, that can only carry you so far, even if you're president of the United States.
• 26:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I guess my question is, like, what's going to make a wake up to reality?
• 26:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: And then, like, if Congress does change hands, like, does the new sort of political dynamic?
• 26:19
  [SPEAKER_01]: great opportunities.
• 26:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, for more, we'll stick forward policy.
• 26:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think midterms might wake him up to reality.
• 26:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: We'll see.
• 26:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, but but but it generally like you don't see like very confident that that Any other stuff that that you know, we're all watching the news is gonna like change Trump's thinking at any time soon Before it was unpredictable he could he could make he could have a change of heart and really make
• 26:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: a serious effort to getting a deal with Iran.
• 26:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: He could.
• 26:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: But if you look at the history of this conflict, and if you look at the history of a second administration, his first administration for that matter, he self sabotages all the time, and he allows
• 27:07
  [SPEAKER_00]: uh... Israel to sabotage him which is a form of self-sabotage because it really does have some agency there yeah um... and he doesn't give diplomacy the amount of time and seriousness that is required to actually get a deal yeah look at the way he negotiated with the Taliban not to take a completely off force yeah but the way he negotiated with the Taliban was was kind of sloppy uh... he he doesn't have he just
• 27:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: He'll give up leverage, he'll undermine his own efforts, he'll quit diplomacy, and ultimately his biggest mistake is that he treats diplomacy as if he's negotiating a real estate deal in 1980s New York at a steakhouse.
• 27:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that's not how international diplomacy works.
• 27:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: It doesn't work with threats.
• 27:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, he uses an almost mafia-like style in his diplomacy, and that doesn't work with other countries.
• 28:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, yeah.
• 28:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, particularly, I think it could possibly work with like weaker countries, especially sort of like allies that are dependencies on you.
• 28:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I do actually think that I mean, I'm recording care for Canada and I like I do think that he's able to get consistent or Canada, but that's because Canada is weak.
• 28:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: But like, you know, like, I want cost.
• 28:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: I want cost.
• 28:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
• 28:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: He is just destroying decades and decades of goodwill.
• 28:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, the price is not worth what he's getting in return.
• 28:33
  [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, no, absolutely, I totally agree with that, I mean, but I wanted to do a contrast between, like, so, like, Canada and Iran and, you know, like, also, we do, you know, like, Canada and Turkey.
• 28:45
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, like, if you're dealing with, like, you know, other countries that, you know, have serious military, and serious military concerns, you know, if you're going to get serious, you're actually, the consequences of a much more serious.
• 28:58
  [SPEAKER_01]: But on that diplomacy point, like, also, I mean, do you have any thoughts on the people who are like doing the diplomacy?
• 29:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: Because as you said, like there's a Trump's own personal patience, but there is also the fact that, you know, he's relying on people like his cellular gerrit Kushner to be connecting these negotiations.
• 29:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, is that also a kind of like a problem that
• 29:23
  [SPEAKER_01]: that the sort of work triggered short for diplomats have a sidelight.
• 29:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, it's a problem that they've got at the State Department and the people they put in charge of negotiating things are uninformed people with no diplomatic experience.
• 29:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: You're right, you're right.
• 29:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: You had a problem.
• 29:38
  [SPEAKER_00]: And by the way, it's funny what you say about Canada versus Iran.
• 29:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: They have the exact same problem, but has
• 29:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: One is a problem and one is a benefit.
• 29:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, it's geography.
• 29:49
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 29:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: It has the misfortune in this case of being bordering the United States and being reliant on the U.S. economy in many ways.
• 29:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: And Iran has the fortune of being on the street of Hermuz, and the geography and the willingness of the Iranian regime to eat pain is the advantage that they have.
• 30:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I didn't know.
• 30:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that's right.
• 30:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: And like for the rated point of view as well, like I would share your thoughts on some of their serious statements because I think they have sort of given up on diplomacy or at least they think that.
• 30:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: the trapper administration, it is current form, is not something that they can negotiate with.
• 30:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: And then, they have full justification for that, because there's been multiple occasions where the US was negotiating with the Iranians and then, you know, like with lots of military strike or, you know, there were also threats to assassinate diplomats.
• 30:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: So for the Iranian point of view, like it seems like they have certainly included that there is no diplomatic solution for them.
• 30:53
  [SPEAKER_01]: is a short term.
• 30:54
  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that could change after the bid terms.
• 30:56
  [SPEAKER_01]: I could certainly change after Trump is out of office, but how much of it is a problem that the Iranians themselves have sort of sourdough diplomacy?
• 31:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I think they have sourdough diplomacy.
• 31:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: Part of we can't blame them.
• 31:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: They negotiated the JCPOA.
• 31:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
• 31:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then even while the Obama administration was still in office,
• 31:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: They were doing things that were very stressful to the JCPOA, which was ultimately a political agreement, and they were doing things so far as sanctions that put a lot of stress on a very fragile and new agreement.
• 31:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then the Trump administration took office and ripped it up.
• 31:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: Then the Biden administration takes office.
• 31:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: And of course, as you know, he's the vice president of the president, who negotiated the JCPOA.
• 31:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: And on day one, he could have used
• 31:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: an executive order to reinstate the JCPOA and begin to build good will back into the relationship with not just the United States and Iran, but the other countries that help negotiate the JCPOA.
• 32:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: You could have done that, it would have been a little bit of controversy and it would have blown over.
• 32:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's something that the Trump administration seems to understand that the Democrats don't.
• 32:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: Instead, his team thought, oh, well, since we've already left the Iran nuclear deal, let's see how much more we can get from Iran in exchange for re-entering it.
• 32:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: And as a result, they created the conditions that tying the Trump administration for this war of choice.
• 32:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: I just think that's very unfortunate and I don't blame the Iranians.
• 32:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: And remember, even during summer, when the Iranians were set to negotiate with the United States, the very next day, that's when the Trump administration shows to bomb Iran.
• 32:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I understand that.
• 32:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: You know, the danger from the Iranians is hubris.
• 32:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think they
• 32:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: The regime itself doesn't want to make an easy deal because the last thing they want is that they make an easy deal and then sick months later they're being bombed again.
• 33:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: They need to show strength.
• 33:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: Both for the legitimacy and stability of their government and system.
• 33:12
  [SPEAKER_00]: But also, also, so that whatever deal comes into place is respected by the Trump administration.
• 33:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: On the other hand, the damage that we've done to Iran is going to take years and potentially decades to recover from.
• 33:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: I know that that's right.
• 33:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: Although as you said, I think like one big factor is that they're more willing to like sort of like eat pain that also gives them a certain amount of like leverage and you know even though like you're continuing this war is damaging to them.
• 33:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: as well.
• 33:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I think we kind of have to have a sort of like pessimistic note to like everything that we're discussing.
• 33:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like it's like there's no this seems like no immediate chart term we out of Iran and it's also seems to be the case that Netanyahu is having the same sort of a sort of humoristic military policy and expanding it and you know possibly escalating with like Turkey
• 34:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, the only question I have is like, what are the sort of political forces in the U.S. that can come, can come up close to that?
• 34:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you think that like, you know, the splintering of bag that we're talking about could actually coalesce as a pressure point, and also like, you know, within the Democratic Party, you know, certainly some of the defeats of that APAC has suffered.
• 34:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: uh... is going to change the dynamic there like you think that there's there's a possibly a political change of the united that could lead to a change of course against what i think you and i can both agree on is a is a very bad road that uh... the u.s. currently on long term yes uh... uh... apacas has been challenged in ways that has never been challenged before
• 34:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: The Israel lobby have a hand in where we are today, yes.
• 35:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: But it's not just them.
• 35:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's the act that, as a country, the United States itself has done, the lessons of the war and care.
• 35:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: We still believe that we can conduct the gene change from the air and engage and build quick military operations and bully other countries into some kind of total capitulation rather than doing the harder work.
• 35:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: of diplomacy and we see the rhetoric that has occurred when it comes to Cuba.
• 35:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I don't think it's in, I think Venezuela and the ease of the operas and to capture Maduro was a factor in Trump's hubris as well.
• 35:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: So has the United States-lined lessons?
• 35:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think that the current leadership has, but I do think
• 35:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: There's a shift in thought going on in the United States that when we look at U.S. foreign policy 10 and 20 years So now I think it's going to look dramatically different than what we see today Now what does that do for us in the short-term?
• 36:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't know if the midterms were to produce serious losses for Republicans and I think that would put pressure on the
• 36:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: administration and the Republican Party, and hopefully, if the Democrats were to achieve success in those midterms, they would connect the dots between some of the economic planning, Americans are failing, this war of choice in Iran that has disrupted the economy, and they realize that
• 36:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: the U.S. is real, the status quo of the U.S. is real, relationship isn't working.
• 36:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's not even working for Israel for that matter.
• 36:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: Let alone mean that in states, and hopefully they learn the right, the right lessons, and they don't talk at all up to Trump.
• 36:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think one of the Democrats tend to make is whenever they have a victory over Trump in any way, they talk it up to Trump, they're the person.
• 36:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: And we don't look at what were the policies that
• 37:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: on that was popular.
• 37:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was no more wars in the Middle East.
• 37:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was a economic development.
• 37:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: And yes, there were other platforms that we don't have to get into that I think fell into the realm of culture war and were ideological and I don't want to discount those.
• 37:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: But two of the
• 37:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: uh... we're economic development and uh... bringing cost down for an area of americans and avoiding new wars and i really think that democrats should internalize that
• 37:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, absolutely, and I think that's a good no-tender because I do think like the short term things are still looking pretty bleak, but I think there's also many promising developments in the long term, especially people can learn lessons from these failed words.
• 37:52
  [SPEAKER_01]: So on that note, I want to thank Adam Weinstein, who's the deputy director that would at least program with the Quincy Institute for this very enlightening discussion.
• 38:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: Thanks a lot for having me.