Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Association, Accommodation, and Ambiguity: Navigating FEHA’s Gray Area
Transcript
- 0:03Everyone, my name is Andy Fields. I am a partner
- 0:06at the Jeannie Harrison Law Firm and the chair
- 0:08of the BHBA's employment law section. I'm delighted
- 0:11to introduce our speakers for this afternoon,
- 0:14Noah Lebowitz, Katie Mola, and Wendy Musel. Noah
- 0:18Lebowitz brings nearly three decades of exclusive
- 0:22focus on employment law to his work as a mediator
- 0:25at Signature Resolution with a career that spans
- 0:28plaintiff side litigation. arbitration and nine
- 0:31years as a judge pro tem for the San Francisco
- 0:33Superior Court. He co -founded Duckworth Peters
- 0:37Lebowitz Olivier LLP and has served as an adjunct
- 0:41professor at the UC Law San Francisco, a AAA
- 0:45arbitrator and court appointed discovery referee,
- 0:48earning recognition as a Northern California
- 0:50super lawyer since 2009 and a fellowship in the
- 0:54College of Labor and Employment Lawyers. Known
- 0:57for his direct, patient and candid Noah draws
- 1:00on his deep understanding of the legal, emotional,
- 1:03and practical dimensions of workplace conflict
- 1:06to guide parties towards resolutions that are
- 1:08both practical and durable. Katie Mola is a Deputy
- 1:13General Counsel at PRISM, where she leads the
- 1:16Employment Practices Legal Advice Service. She
- 1:19is a trusted advisor to California public agencies
- 1:22on reasonable accommodations, leaves of absence,
- 1:25performance management, and compliance -driven
- 1:28policy development. Before joining PRISM, Katie
- 1:31served in senior legal roles at the California
- 1:34State Auditor and CalPERS. Katie has served on
- 1:38the executive committee of the California Lawyers
- 1:40Association's Labor and Employment Law Section
- 1:42since 2021. She is currently the section's secretary
- 1:46and co -editor -in -chief of the Law Review and
- 1:49past chair of the Education and Public Sector
- 1:51Conference Committees. She is also named the
- 1:54author of the section's California Public Sector
- 1:56Employment Law Publication. Last but not least,
- 2:00we have Wendy Musel, who is the founder of the
- 2:03law offices of Wendy Musel PC. She has dedicated
- 2:06her career since 1999, holding employers accountable
- 2:10for civil rights violations, representing employees
- 2:12and matters ranging from wage theft and discrimination
- 2:15to whistleblower actions. With particular expertise,
- 2:20in involving federal and public sector employees.
- 2:23A nationally recognized leader in employment
- 2:26law, she has earned honors, including The Daily
- 2:28Journal's top 75 labor and employment lawyers
- 2:31in California, top 100 women attorneys in California
- 2:35by Northern California Super Lawyer Magazine,
- 2:38and membership in the Fellows of the American
- 2:41Bar Foundation, a distinction limited to 1 %
- 2:44of licensed attorneys. She also serves as a past
- 2:47president of the California Employment Lawyers
- 2:49Association. and has been recognized for her
- 2:51legislative advocacy, pro bono work, and commitment
- 2:55to advancing workers' rights across the state
- 2:58and nation. I am very happy to turn this over
- 3:01to the speakers. You guys are in for a treat.
- 3:03Go ahead, Katie. Great. Thank you very much.
- 3:08I'll go ahead and share my screen here. Okay,
- 3:12thank you very much, Andy, and thank you everyone
- 3:15for joining us today. We are here to talk about
- 3:18associational discrimination and accommodation.
- 3:22So with that, some intro slides that we don't
- 3:26need to go over now. I'm going to turn it over
- 3:29to Noah to kick us off with today's key question.
- 3:33Thank you, Katie, and thanks for everyone for,
- 3:36excuse me, for joining us. So here, what we're
- 3:39talking about today, this is really the key question.
- 3:42It's going to take some time to get through,
- 3:43but this is really it. Does the FIHA require
- 3:46employers to engage in the interactive process
- 3:49and provide reasonable accommodation for an employee
- 3:52who does not themselves have a disability, but
- 3:55is associated with someone who does? So why does
- 4:00this issue matter? Well, we know, and it's pretty
- 4:04much undisputed, that the FIHA does prohibit
- 4:09associational discrimination. So when we talk
- 4:11about discrimination as distinct from reasonable
- 4:14accommodation or interactive process, what we're
- 4:16talking about is government code section 12940
- 4:20subsection A, the kind of standard thou shalt
- 4:24not discriminate against, take adverse employment
- 4:27actions against people for the various listed
- 4:32characteristics, including disability. and included
- 4:37in that are these associational claims. There's
- 4:41no dispute about that. However, there is no published
- 4:46precedential case talking about whether or not
- 4:50there is in fact a duty to provide reasonable
- 4:53accommodation and engage in the interactive process
- 4:55for these associational disability claims. What
- 5:00we see is that these types of claims are almost
- 5:04always brought in the context of caregiving responsibilities
- 5:08where the employee needs an accommodation such
- 5:11as remote work, flexible scheduling, or reduced
- 5:14hours and in a situation where either the FMLA
- 5:18or CFRA does not apply or their time banks have
- 5:22been exhausted. Okay, so with that we're going
- 5:30to start by talking about the ADA and We need
- 5:34to talk about the ADA because although the bulk
- 5:36of our discussion today is going to be about
- 5:38the FIHA and cases interpreting the FIHA, this
- 5:40is a helpful starting point so we can highlight
- 5:42some of the differences between the ADA and the
- 5:44FIHA. So the ADA recognizes multiple separate
- 5:48but related concepts. There's disability discrimination,
- 5:52there's associational discrimination, and reasonable
- 5:54accommodation. So the ADA, like the FIHA, prohibits
- 5:58discrimination on the basis of a disability.
- 6:00It also separately prohibits discrimination against
- 6:04an employee based on their relationship with
- 6:08someone who has a disability or the relationship
- 6:11or association with someone who has a disability.
- 6:14And then unlawful discrimination under the ADA
- 6:16also includes failing to accommodate the employee
- 6:20who has a disability. So looking at those obligations
- 6:24one at a time, another important distinction
- 6:27that falls between the ADA and the FEHA here
- 6:30is interactive process, right? We all know that
- 6:32under the FEHA, the duty to engage in the interactive
- 6:35process is a standalone obligation. This is not
- 6:38true under the ADA. It is not a standalone obligation.
- 6:41It certainly comes up. It's a concept that's
- 6:43talked about, and it's a means to an end under
- 6:46the ADA. So duty to accommodate. So the federal
- 6:54courts have been pretty consistent on this issue,
- 6:56at least under Title I. Two out of three panelists
- 6:59agree. You'll hear from the one who disagree
- 7:01in a couple of slides here. But two out of three
- 7:03panelists disagree that the federal courts have
- 7:06been pretty consistent, that there is not a duty
- 7:08to accommodate the non -disabled employee based
- 7:12on their association with a person with a disability,
- 7:15at least under Title I of the ADA. The EEOC takes
- 7:19that same position. They've had this question
- 7:22and answer up on their website. As long as I
- 7:24can remember, there's been this FAQ saying, is
- 7:26there a duty to accommodate the person who, based
- 7:29on their association with someone with a disability?
- 7:31And the EEOC's answer is no. You know, and the
- 7:37ADA provides this framework for what an associational
- 7:41discrimination claim is, right? You can't discriminate
- 7:44against someone because they have a relationship
- 7:46with someone with a disability. So that would
- 7:48mean failing to hire, firing, failing to give
- 7:52a promotion, and kind of the typical concern
- 7:55that comes up is, you know, oh, that person is
- 7:58going to need a lot of time off because of their
- 7:59caregiving responsibilities, or maybe they won't
- 8:01be able to focus so much at work because of they're
- 8:04distracted at home by their caregiving responsibilities.
- 8:07That's kind of the classic associational discrimination
- 8:10claim. And under both the ADA and the FIHA, of
- 8:13course, that is prohibited. So before we move
- 8:17on to the FIHA, I'm going to turn it over to
- 8:19Wendy, though, to talk about why one panelist
- 8:22disagrees. Well, I think that this is not a completely
- 8:28resolved issue. And the reason for that is there's
- 8:32a number of cases, and you see some of those
- 8:34on your screen here, the Cortez case and the
- 8:37Proctor case, which did rule that under Title
- 8:40II of the ADA, which covers governmental entities
- 8:45but also includes employment, there is an associational
- 8:50disability claim under the ADA. And what these
- 8:55courts looked at was the broad remedial purposes
- 8:59of the ADA and the enforcement provisions and
- 9:04the implementing regulations. And as we'll see,
- 9:08as it relates to California's Fair Employment
- 9:10and Housing Act, which is the law that governs
- 9:14discrimination and employment, including disability
- 9:17accommodation issues in California, some of the
- 9:22same arguments could be made for the ADA. Now,
- 9:25I think this is an emerging issue, and there
- 9:29are cases under Title I which say the opposite,
- 9:32as Katie has indicated, but I think this is an
- 9:35area to watch. So, the first thing we want to
- 9:47do is just give an overview of the Fair Employment
- 9:50and Housing Act, California's law that governs
- 9:53non -discrimination and employment. It does differ
- 9:56in certain ways from the ADA, but first we start
- 10:00with the general prescription against discrimination,
- 10:03and that includes protected characteristics such
- 10:06as physical and mental disabilities. Both are
- 10:09explicitly covered under Cal Government Code
- 10:12101. A. And there is a definitional provision,
- 10:19and that definitional provision is found under
- 10:22government code section 12926. Oh, three. Actually,
- 10:29all of O is the definitional system section,
- 10:31but three is the subsection that we're going
- 10:34to be talking about today. And this is key for
- 10:37the construction in these cases of how courts
- 10:40have looked at this. Either they've taken one
- 10:42position or another. You can guess as a plaintiff's
- 10:46attorney which one that I think is the right
- 10:47one. But in any event, under subsection 12926
- 10:53-03, it indicates that protected characteristics
- 10:58definition is a perception that the person is
- 11:02associated with a person who has or is perceived
- 11:06to have any of those characteristics or a combination
- 11:12of those characteristics. And so the argument
- 11:14in how certain courts have looked at this is
- 11:17they've taken the definitional section under
- 11:2012926 -O and read it into the other provisions
- 11:26of the FIHA having to do with reasonable accommodation
- 11:29and the duty to engage in the interactive process.
- 11:33Specifically, under Cal Government Code section
- 11:3612940M requires employers to make reasonable
- 11:43accommodation for the known physical or mental
- 11:47disability of an applicant or an employee and
- 11:50under 12940M N requires employers to engage in
- 11:56a timely good faith interactive process with
- 12:00the employer applicant to determine effective
- 12:03reasonable accommodations. The FIHA, the Fair
- 12:07Employment and Housing Act, does have a separate
- 12:10cause of action, unlike the ADA, for failing
- 12:14to engage in good faith in the interactive process.
- 12:17So that can be a standalone claim, unlike under
- 12:21the ADA, where that claim is subsumed under the
- 12:25duty to reasonably accommodate. So that's one
- 12:29change. Additionally, the definition of disability
- 12:32is different under the Fair Employment and Housing
- 12:35Act. versus the ADA. And I think this is important
- 12:38for how this looking in the future, how these
- 12:42cases might be perceived under the Fair Employment
- 12:45and Housing Act, its limits. of major life activity,
- 12:49the definition of disability, whereas under the
- 12:52ADA, it substantially limits California law,
- 12:56that's very broad. So there's going to be a very
- 12:59broad swath of medical conditions that are included
- 13:03under the definition of disability, which is
- 13:05something to remember when we're talking about
- 13:07how is this going to work out on the ground in
- 13:10the workplace. Additionally, under the preamble
- 13:18to government code 12920, it does state, as used
- 13:25in this part in connection with unlawful practices,
- 13:28unless a different meaning clearly appears from
- 13:31the context. So this worker rights advocates
- 13:35have indicated that this indicates that there
- 13:38should be a broad approach, a remedial approach.
- 13:42And I think that's also consistent with the legislative
- 13:44history. And so really the fight here is whether
- 13:49there's a multiple characteristic definition,
- 13:52meaning do you use subsection O and look at that
- 14:00in conjunction with the duty to accommodate and
- 14:03duty to engage in the interactive process? Or
- 14:06do you use a singular definition and looking
- 14:10at the duty to engage in the interactive process
- 14:13and the duty to accommodate singularly without
- 14:16considering the preamble and the definitional
- 14:20system? So that's where the fight is happening
- 14:24in these cases. Some of the key differences that
- 14:31we've talked about is arguably there is no duty
- 14:37under the Americans with Disabilities Act to
- 14:39prohibit associational discrimination, but arguably,
- 14:43excuse me, it does prohibit associational discrimination.
- 14:46So for example, if you are discriminated against
- 14:50because you have a family member who has a disability,
- 14:56that's covered. Whereas the duty to accommodate,
- 15:01you need time off of work in order to address
- 15:04the needs of a family member with a disability,
- 15:07for example. That is arguably not covered. Now,
- 15:11of course, we have those cases under Title II,
- 15:13which I think is an emerging area. And so I encourage
- 15:16plaintiffs, attorneys, and worker rights advocates
- 15:19everywhere to keep pushing that envelope. But
- 15:21arguably, that is a differential under the ADA.
- 15:25Whereas the FEHA has broader statutory language,
- 15:29which has created this open question and the
- 15:32series of cases that we're going to be going
- 15:33over today. All right. So with that, Noah. Thank
- 15:40you. So let's talk about the case that started
- 15:43all of this, the Castro Ramirez versus Dependable
- 15:46Highway Express case. So this was a 2016 case.
- 15:50And as you'll see, it spawned two different or
- 15:53two similar. but different opinions. So basic
- 15:59background facts. We have an employee, Mr. Castro
- 16:03Ramirez, who was hired on as a driver, as a delivery
- 16:08driver for the defendant. When he was hired,
- 16:12he put them on notice that his son requires often
- 16:17daily kidney dialysis treatment. He's on waiting
- 16:22for a kidney transplant. and that he, Mr. Castro
- 16:27Ramirez, is the only one in the household who's
- 16:29trained how to use the machine and therefore
- 16:33he needs to be home every evening essentially
- 16:35to be able to administer the dialysis for his
- 16:40son. So because of that he requested that his
- 16:44shift be such that he is able to be home in the
- 16:47evening at by a certain point in time. Like I
- 16:51said, he peed. made this request when he was
- 16:53hired. There was no problem. They hired him on.
- 16:56Apparently, there are several start times throughout
- 16:58the day at this particular workplace. And he
- 17:01was always assigned to the earlier start time
- 17:03so that he could be home in the evening to administer
- 17:05the dialysis. This was great. Worked for three
- 17:09years. No issues. There's no indication that
- 17:14there's any performance issues or anything else.
- 17:17And then we have what we see often. frankly,
- 17:21in disability cases, you have a new supervisor
- 17:23come into picture. This new supervisor, for reasons
- 17:27that are not explained in the cases, decides
- 17:30that he doesn't like this arrangement and starts
- 17:34to assign Mr. Castro Ramirez to shifts that start
- 17:39later and therefore end later into the evening.
- 17:43Mr. Castro Ramirez says, hey, you know, I've
- 17:45got this issue, goes through the whole thing.
- 17:47It says, everybody knows about this. This has
- 17:50never been a problem. A new supervisor says,
- 17:56no, this is the way it's going to be, essentially.
- 17:58And then finally assigns him to a shift that
- 18:01absolutely puts him at an end time that is too
- 18:05late, and he won't be able to be home in time
- 18:07to administer the dialysis for his son. He refuses
- 18:11the shift. Supervisor says, if you're refusing,
- 18:15that means you're refusing to work and you're
- 18:17terminated. So Mr. Castro Ramirez files a complaint,
- 18:23several different theories under FIHA, including
- 18:26both associational disability discrimination
- 18:29and failure to accommodate. The trial court granted
- 18:34a summary judgment motion filed by the employer,
- 18:39and Mr. Castro Ramirez appealed. So, we go to
- 18:43the appeal. On appeal, what's important to know
- 18:47about the appeal is that for reasons that are
- 18:50not explained or I guess not necessarily relevant,
- 18:54Mr. Castro -Ramirez did not pursue the argument
- 18:58and the theory for failure to accommodate on
- 19:01appeal and essentially abandoned that theory.
- 19:05Instead, only pursuing the association of disability
- 19:09discrimination claim. Regardless, the court issued
- 19:14its first opinion in April of 2016. It noted
- 19:20very early on in the discussion that, in fact,
- 19:24the plaintiff had abandoned the accommodation
- 19:29claim, but observed that the question of accommodation
- 19:38is intertwined with the question of discrimination.
- 19:42And therefore, it was relevant to answer the
- 19:45question, does the fee require and have it express
- 19:51a duty of employers to provide these reasonable
- 19:54accommodations and engage in the interactive
- 19:56process in the accommodation situation? And they
- 20:01expressly held the majority expressly held it
- 20:04does. And to reach that conclusion, what the
- 20:08court did was, or I should say the majority did,
- 20:12was evaluated what Wendy was talking about before,
- 20:16the difference between or the incorporation of
- 20:20Section 129 .260 into the unlawful practices
- 20:26section of 129 .4 .0. And in particular, what
- 20:32the court observed was that The way the language
- 20:38of 129 .260 read and still reads is that disability
- 20:46includes, the definition of disability includes
- 20:52the association with the person with a disability.
- 20:57In other words, as the court expressly held,
- 21:01an association with a physically disabled person
- 21:05is itself a disability. And based on that outcome
- 21:10of that reading of the statute, the majority
- 21:14reasoned that the use of the singular physical
- 21:18disability and mental disability within 12940M
- 21:22and 12940N included an employee in this situation,
- 21:29because that employee for status purposes under
- 21:32the definition of 12926 themselves would be considered
- 21:36to have the disability, even though in reality
- 21:39they did not. And so based on that reading of
- 21:44the statute, the majority held that in fact the
- 21:48duty exists. Now this majority opinion garnered
- 21:52a very illustrative, I should say, dissent by
- 21:57Justice Grimes. who delved into some Star Trek
- 22:01allusions and talking about going where no court
- 22:03has ever gone before and how she believed this
- 22:07was something for the legislature to latch onto
- 22:10instead. And Justice Grimes, in the dissent,
- 22:16explained that the employers' argument, which
- 22:23relied exclusively or primarily on ADA cases,
- 22:27that had ruled that there was no duty in these
- 22:31situations, that those cases should be given
- 22:35a lot of weight in this decision and in this
- 22:38determination, and that despite the structural
- 22:41differences between the ADA and FIHA, that those
- 22:46cases and the reasoning should be adopted and
- 22:49therefore would dissent from the case. Now, those
- 22:54of us who were practicing in that time period,
- 22:56We'll remember that this case caused quite the
- 22:59stir. List serves blew up, so to speak. Lots
- 23:04of management -side firms' advisory newsletters
- 23:09went out with screaming headlines about this
- 23:11case. All kinds of activities were scheduled
- 23:14and seminars and whatnot. But all that was put
- 23:19on hold just six or eight weeks later when the
- 23:22court issued its decision to grant the petition
- 23:25for rehearing. and then took the case back and
- 23:30issued a second opinion in August of 2016, vacating
- 23:33the first opinion and expressly acknowledging,
- 23:38yeah, okay, we get it. The plaintiff abandoned
- 23:44this claim. So really it's not before us. So
- 23:46we're not gonna hold expressly that there is
- 23:49this duty, but the court observed, and this is
- 23:54a quote, observed, quote, that the accommodation
- 23:58issue is not settled and that it appears significantly
- 24:02intertwined with the statutory prohibition against
- 24:05disability discrimination and therefore said,
- 24:09well, so we still have to look at it. And then
- 24:11they went through the same reasoning and ended
- 24:14up holding that government code 12940 subsection
- 24:19M may, quote, reasonably be interpreted to require
- 24:23accommodation based on an employee's association
- 24:26with a physically disabled person. So that's
- 24:30essentially what they held, although, of course,
- 24:33it was dictum. Justice Grimes was not satisfied
- 24:37with what she essentially called logical gymnastics,
- 24:41and by the majority, and again, dissent. All
- 24:48right. So. After Castro came out, we get a smattering
- 24:54of cases with very inconsistent results where
- 24:57other courts are grappling with this issue. So
- 25:00the first one, another Castro case, not to be
- 25:03confused with Castro Ramirez, this Castro versus
- 25:05Classey. This is an unpublished decision out
- 25:09of the Southern District of California from March
- 25:11of 2020. And in this case, the employee requested
- 25:16a reasonable accommodation of remote work due
- 25:18to caretaking needs of her newborn son who had
- 25:23a disability. So not surprisingly, the argument
- 25:27in this case was about individual characteristic
- 25:29definition versus multiple characteristic definition.
- 25:32That's kind of always the argument when we're
- 25:34talking about this. And in this case, the court
- 25:36rejected the argument. They observed that none
- 25:39of the sections in section 12940 contain the
- 25:42phrase associational discrimination and concluded
- 25:46that 12940 M and N, which I recall are about
- 25:50reasonable accommodation and duty to engage,
- 25:53are equally a subject to the same broad definition
- 25:55as the other subsections found in 12940 and on
- 25:59that basis denied the employer's motion to dismiss.
- 26:02I do think it's important to note that They certainly
- 26:05did not conclude that there was a failure to
- 26:09accommodate here. They just said that there was
- 26:11enough to proceed past the motion to dismiss
- 26:13phase. Then there was the Montoroso case. And
- 26:20this is an interesting one. It's an unpublished
- 26:24case. It's from the Court of Appeal. The original
- 26:27case was out of LA. And in this case, The employee
- 26:35had filed the complaint in that he had asserted
- 26:41a number of causes of action. Many of them were
- 26:43kicked out at summary judgment, including punitive
- 26:45damages, failure. The duty to prevent was kicked
- 26:53out among some other claims. What was left, however,
- 26:58was a SIFRA claim. California Family Rights Act
- 27:02claim, as well as an associational disability
- 27:06claim. And those went to trial. So the facts
- 27:11were that the employee learned that his mother
- 27:14had suffered from a stroke. She lived out of
- 27:16the country. He obtained authorization in advance
- 27:20from his employer upon hearing that his mom had
- 27:24suffered a stroke and he indicated that he needed
- 27:27to travel to her and assist her and take care
- 27:31of her. He received a month leave that was approved
- 27:35by his supervisor. He indicated he would be back
- 27:38on a certain day. And there was some back and
- 27:43forth at the trial level as to whether the employer
- 27:47had made the decision as of the day that Mr.
- 27:53Montroso was supposed to be back from his leave
- 27:56or they made the decision a different day. There
- 27:59was inconsistent evidence on that issue. Nonetheless,
- 28:04it's clear that Mr. Montoroso was fired approximately
- 28:09one week after he indicated that he would be
- 28:12back under citing job abandonment. The employer
- 28:18had a three -day policy that if you didn't come
- 28:21to work for three days, you were deemed to have
- 28:23abandoned your job and he was found to be AWOL.
- 28:27One of the things that I thought was really interesting
- 28:31in this case is that the jury had awarded $1
- 28:35.29 million for the SIFRA and the associational
- 28:39claim, and the court had awarded $625 ,000 in
- 28:44attorney's fees. So both parties had appealed.
- 28:50The defendant had appealed on the basis that
- 28:54the amount was not supported by substantial evidence
- 29:00that there was no associational disability claim
- 29:02and also complained about the fee award. The
- 29:07plaintiff raised the issue that they didn't receive
- 29:10a multiplier enhancement. The court of appeals
- 29:15held that on an unpublished case that there was
- 29:19no duty under the associational disability claim.
- 29:23And so while there was no duty on that claim,
- 29:27the court did uphold the CFRA under the substantial
- 29:31evidence framework. And so the plaintiff did
- 29:36retain his $1 .29 million verdict and retained
- 29:41his $625 ,000 in attorney's fees. So while this
- 29:47didn't go perhaps the way legally, that on the
- 29:52plaintiff's bar, we would hope, it is, I think,
- 29:54a lesson that these cases that you're going to
- 29:58be bringing SIFRA claims, retaliation claims,
- 30:01disability claims, failure to prevent claims,
- 30:04for example, and these are overlapping claims
- 30:08and must be understood as such. So even where
- 30:11one of those claims under the exact same facts
- 30:14may not will ultimately be successful. You can
- 30:17have seven -figure verdicts in these types of
- 30:20cases. And that's something that employers should
- 30:22be aware of when they're denying the sort of
- 30:25leave for an employee who's taking care of their
- 30:28sick mother. All right. And then we come to the
- 30:34one case that is actually published in this entire
- 30:37series of cases. But of course, it is only a
- 30:41district court opinion. This is the McVeigh versus
- 30:43DXP Enterprises case. What we have here is an
- 30:48employee who was terminated after requesting
- 30:50leave to attend to his children who have serious
- 30:53respiratory illnesses. The employee brought several
- 30:59claims and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
- 31:03a 12 -by -6 motion. specifically argued that
- 31:09the FIHA does not create a duty to engage in
- 31:12interactive process or accommodate for associational
- 31:15disability claims. This court had a really interesting
- 31:22opinion and way of getting to its decision from
- 31:24my perspective. It started by saying because
- 31:28there is no published California presidential
- 31:31opinion on this matter, because Castro Ramirez
- 31:35is not actually a presidential opinion as far
- 31:40as the question goes. The court noted that its
- 31:45job was to try to make its, quote, best prediction
- 31:50of how the California Supreme Court would decide
- 31:54the issue. And in doing so, because there's no
- 31:57presidential decision, the court is entitled
- 32:00to, and under other precedent, consider or look
- 32:06to, quote, well -considered dicta, unquote. Now,
- 32:09that's a phrase, before I read this case, I was
- 32:12not familiar with. I mean, I'm not an appellate
- 32:15lawyer. I'm not an appellate specialist. But
- 32:16that certainly is a concept I've never heard
- 32:20of before. The McVeigh judge cites a 1980 Ninth
- 32:24Circuit case for the proposition. Interesting,
- 32:27I thought. In any event, and also noted that
- 32:33A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
- 32:36may not summarily disregard a court of appeal
- 32:40decision from California from a state court just
- 32:42because it's unpublished. And so may look to
- 32:47those types of decisions for what it's engaging
- 32:51in this exercise of trying to make its best prediction
- 32:54of what the California Supreme Court would do.
- 32:57And to get to its answer, the McVeigh court determined
- 33:02that the dicta in Castro -Ramirez was persuasive.
- 33:09And particularly in the finding that under the
- 33:14Castro -Ramirez reasoning that the associational
- 33:18disability definition in 12 .926 .0 meant that
- 33:26A person who is associated, an employee who is
- 33:29associated with a person with a disability, that
- 33:33disability is itself a disability in regard to
- 33:36the employee. They also noted, again, the structural
- 33:41differences between the ADA and FIHA. Interesting
- 33:47to me also is that the McVeigh court relied on
- 33:51Castro -Ramirez, but there's no mention of the
- 33:54Monterosso case. The Monterosso case was decided
- 33:57several months prior. And as the McVeigh court
- 34:03noted, they weren't supposed to really summarily
- 34:08disregard the opinion just because it's unpublished.
- 34:12So it's an interesting question as to why the
- 34:15Monterosso case was not analyzed or discussed
- 34:17by McVeigh. Obviously, maybe the parties didn't
- 34:20bring it up. Maybe nobody saw it. Who knows?
- 34:23Just an interesting side note from my perspective.
- 34:27And then in the end, something we'll talk about
- 34:28later, the concept is one of the things the employer
- 34:31was arguing was they had, quote, pragmatic concerns
- 34:36about what would happen if, in fact, the court
- 34:39determined that there was a duty under these
- 34:42situations. And in so far as who are they supposed
- 34:47to communicate with when they're it's not the
- 34:50employee who has the disability, but the associated
- 34:52person and several other kind of follow up questions
- 34:56to that. The court brushed those aside and brushed
- 35:00those concerns aside, saying you're in the wrong
- 35:03forum. You got to go to the legislature if you
- 35:05got problems with that, not me. Right. So then
- 35:12we get to. the next case, which is the Shaheen
- 35:16versus Kaiser case. Now, here we go again. We've
- 35:18got another California Court of Appeal case that's,
- 35:22again, unpublished. And in this case, what we
- 35:25have is an employee who, for years, many years,
- 35:33worked remotely, what they called telework in
- 35:36this situation. It's important to note this is
- 35:38all pre -COVID, all of the... the facts in this
- 35:41case, so the language that they use and things.
- 35:44Even though the opinion came out after COVID,
- 35:46the underlying facts all took place prior to
- 35:48COVID. So there's some different concepts than
- 35:50maybe we would consider kind of more normalized
- 35:53now. Over the 10 -year period where the employee,
- 36:00or more than 10 -year period, where the employee
- 36:03worked remotely three days a week and in person
- 36:06two days a week, which allowed her to care for
- 36:09her son and provide care for her son who had
- 36:11autism. She was promoted twice. There was no
- 36:20issue with performance again. And then here we
- 36:22go again. We've got a new supervisor coming into
- 36:24the picture. They're not happy with the situation
- 36:27of the remote work. And the stated reason for
- 36:33Why the supervisor did not like the remote work
- 36:36was because the employee was now a manager. And
- 36:41the supervisor, quote, did not believe managers
- 36:47should telecommute because they should be visible
- 36:49in the workplace each day to respond to staff
- 36:52needs and ensure the fulfillment of productivity
- 36:55expectations. Now, side note query. Does a supervisor's
- 37:02quote belief meet the standard of an essential
- 37:05job function? Good question. I don't know. I
- 37:10know the arguments on both sides of that. I think
- 37:12things have changed since COVID on that question,
- 37:15but it's an interesting question. I'd like to
- 37:17see an updated duty statement, Noah. I'm sure
- 37:21you would. But that was what happened. And the
- 37:27employee decided that, the plaintiff decided
- 37:29that this was not something that was sustainable.
- 37:32And then for both her own, she also got diagnosed
- 37:37and had some issues of her own that were related,
- 37:40that were disability related. And so ended up
- 37:44taking a leave of absence. And then while on
- 37:47the, and continued to request the remote work
- 37:50accommodation while on the leave of absence.
- 37:52It continued to be rejected, and while she was
- 37:55on leave, filed a lawsuit, which included failure
- 37:59to accommodate claims for the associational disability
- 38:03as well as her own. And again, the Shaheen court
- 38:11followed essentially the identical theory and
- 38:15reasoning of the Monterosso court and determined
- 38:19that the definition in 12 .9 .2 .6 .0 only applied
- 38:27in 12 .9 .4 .0, where in 12 .9 .4 .0, the subdivisions
- 38:34also listed the multiple characteristics. So
- 38:40specifically, 12 .9 .4 .0 A, B, C, and D, as
- 38:45well as J1, each of those provisions in 12 .9
- 38:49.4 .0 contain the multiple characteristic listing.
- 38:56But then if you look at 12 .940 .m and n, they
- 38:59only use the singular characteristic, physical
- 39:02or mental disability, as opposed to the entire
- 39:07multiple characteristic definition or language
- 39:10that's in 12 .926. Therefore, this court, as
- 39:13well as Monterey, so determined that the intent
- 39:18of the legislature was not or to not incorporate
- 39:22the associational duty into the accommodation
- 39:26and interactive process provisions. And part
- 39:30of what they did in reaching that decision is
- 39:33rely on AB 1670, which was the 1999 legislation
- 39:38that first brought the associational language
- 39:41into the FIHA. They pulled a sentence out of
- 39:47the Judiciary Committee analysis on that bill,
- 39:52which said, the purpose of this amendment was,
- 39:57whether FIHA should be amended to strengthen
- 40:00discrimination protections or clarify ambiguities
- 40:03in the law. Just by that use of discrimination
- 40:07and not using accommodation and interactive process,
- 40:10the theory would go that the legislative intent
- 40:14did not cover those other sides. Now, they did
- 40:17not address the 2000 legislative amendments in
- 40:22AB 2222, the Poppink Act that greatly expanded
- 40:26the overall language of the disability provisions
- 40:30of FIHA. And then in particular, in regard to
- 40:36Castro -Ramirez, and the holding and the discussion
- 40:39in Castro Ramirez, the Shaheen Court said, it's
- 40:43dicta, end quote, we disagree, unquote, as to
- 40:47their outcome. All right. So we didn't really
- 40:56hear much about this issue after the, you know,
- 40:59that smattering of cases, which not that I'm
- 41:01keeping score, but I think it was two to two,
- 41:03right? Two saying duty, two saying no duty. But
- 41:08it's quiet for a little bit. At least two of
- 41:10them were decided correctly. Right. But then
- 41:14last year, 2025, all of a sudden the issue comes
- 41:18back up again. So we start the unpublished trilogy.
- 41:23So we'll start with Acosta versus NAS Insurance
- 41:27Services. This is again a motion to dismiss case.
- 41:30So as much as I wish I had. very detailed facts
- 41:34for you. I don't have a lot, it's a pretty short
- 41:35opinion, but we have an employee who requested
- 41:39a reduced hours flexible work schedule and a
- 41:42fully remote schedule to allow her to care for
- 41:45her child who had severe developmental delays.
- 41:48The employer refused noting that the accommodations
- 41:51accommodation requirement just does not extend
- 41:53to an employee's dependent and here this federal
- 41:58court, again in an unpublished decision, said
- 42:00that the fee hop permits accommodation claims
- 42:02based on association and therefore denied the
- 42:05motion to dismiss. The case referred to the McVeigh
- 42:09decision that we just talked about, also curiously
- 42:12didn't refer to the decisions that came out the
- 42:15other way out of California appellate courts.
- 42:18And there we are. All right. And then the next.
- 42:24Yeah. So the next of this trilogy is the Head
- 42:26versus Costco case. And this was decided by Judge
- 42:33Ed Chen in the Northern District. And those who
- 42:36are familiar with practicing in his court know
- 42:38that his opinions often become very long and
- 42:42detailed. And this is no exception. This is a
- 42:48scenario where the employee, 30 year sales employee
- 42:51at Costco, had taken multiple leaves over the
- 42:55years, both for his own disability and for his
- 42:58wife to care for his wife who had cancer in multiple
- 43:02bouts of cancer. And in the end, the employer
- 43:12denied his final request for some additional
- 43:15leave. because as the employers said, the FMLA
- 43:19and CFRA banks, leave banks had been exhausted
- 43:23and there was no obligation to provide accommodation
- 43:27for the associational disability regarding his
- 43:32wife. So this court went through a very lengthy
- 43:37analysis because the Costco, the defendant specifically
- 43:44argued on summary judgment that there is no duty
- 43:47to accommodate in these situations. And the court
- 43:51went through a very long analysis and included
- 43:55very long excerpts from Castro Ramirez, from
- 44:00Acosta, which we just spoke about, and from Shaheen
- 44:02and Montoroso, and concluded that there was a
- 44:10viable claim. for accommodation in the associational
- 44:13disability scenario, and specifically held that
- 44:17the Castro Ramirez and its progeny were more
- 44:20persuasive than Shaheen and Montoroso in this
- 44:25regard. And it did so in reaching that conclusion.
- 44:29It was based on four reasons. And these four
- 44:33reasons that are listed here, starting again
- 44:36with what we were talking about previously with
- 44:40the statutory structure of 12 .926. The preamble
- 44:45of 12 .926 states that all definitions are to
- 44:48apply in all instances where the defined terms
- 44:51appear within the statute, and that all definitions
- 44:56are to be used, quote, unless a different meaning
- 44:59clearly appears from the context. And that's
- 45:02in 12 .926. Secondly, or thirdly, I should say
- 45:09the single characteristic definition of mental
- 45:11and physical disability that's within 12926 does
- 45:16not use the word association, but are written
- 45:19to be non -exclusive. And so that allows for
- 45:23the expansion and the expanded definition that
- 45:25includes 12926 -O. And then finally, the fee
- 45:28has a remedial statute intended to be construed
- 45:31liberally. And in line with that public policy
- 45:34that's provided within the statute in 12920 and
- 45:37other places that, in fact, this is the correct
- 45:42conclusion in the decision and the opinion of
- 45:45Judge Chen. The next one was the DeWitt case
- 45:51versus Amazon dot com services LLC. And I note
- 45:56that there was a. a different Amazon case about
- 45:59the exact same leave policy that I think got
- 46:02some action in the last two days. So if you want
- 46:05to look at what that looks like, where an individual
- 46:09claim was allowed to proceed, but the class claim
- 46:13was not. But for this particular Amazon case,
- 46:17the DeWitt case, the court in an unpublished
- 46:21case, this is again the Central District of California,
- 46:25found that there was an associational disability
- 46:29claim that could be asserted, however, that in
- 46:36this particular case, the plaintiff lost at summary
- 46:40judgment. One of the things that I thought was
- 46:43very interesting about this case is here the
- 46:46employer had approved leave, intermittent leave,
- 46:49in order to care for a mother who had dementia
- 46:51and also for a child with a disability. However,
- 46:55Amazon has a very particular leave policy and
- 47:00allowed only the leave policy that was in the
- 47:03leave banks. the employee had time on their leave
- 47:08bank, then they were allowed the intermittent
- 47:10leave. If they didn't, then they were not. The
- 47:15employee ultimately exceeded the amount of leave
- 47:19in their bank and was fired. Where I found this
- 47:24a puzzling case is that an employer's internal
- 47:28policies regarding leaves don't thwart the duties
- 47:33under the Fair Employment and Housing Act or
- 47:35the ADA. So I found the result in this puzzling,
- 47:40although, of course, that the fact that there
- 47:42is an associational disability claim I thought
- 47:44was well considered. All right. So. Now what?
- 47:55Now what? Good question. So we start with back
- 48:06in 2020, what was then known as the Fair Employment
- 48:11and Housing Council did something that, as far
- 48:15as I was aware, is unprecedented. And for those
- 48:18who are unaware, I worked on regulations on behalf
- 48:24of the California Employment Lawyers Association
- 48:26for a good 13 plus years or so, diving deeply
- 48:30into all of the over the massive overhaul of
- 48:33the FIHA employment regulations that took place
- 48:35over that period of time. And so I attended,
- 48:40gosh, probably dozens of meetings and testified
- 48:43dozens of times and presented all kinds of written
- 48:46comments on proposed regulations and in none
- 48:50of that time was there ever this thing called
- 48:53a request for public input except this time in
- 48:562020 where the council issued this request regarding
- 49:01reasonable accommodations for associational disabilities
- 49:05under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and
- 49:07posed the primary question that we've been talking
- 49:10about today namely is there a duty and then asked
- 49:13several follow -up questions that would Assuming
- 49:19that the answer to question number one is yes,
- 49:22meaning that there is a duty, here's some sub
- 49:24-questions and follow -up questions. Now the
- 49:27council received more than dozens of written
- 49:32responses, detailed written responses to this
- 49:35request, representing more than 50 stakeholder
- 49:39organizations. which is an unprecedented amount
- 49:43of participation and involvement in regulations,
- 49:47these FIHA regulations, at least from my experience.
- 49:51But despite all that, the issue died and it never
- 49:54resulted in any rulemaking. There was never any
- 49:56public explanation as to why, but this is where
- 50:00we are. But we thought it would be interesting
- 50:03as part of our discussion to go through some
- 50:06of those follow -up questions. And so these are
- 50:10the questions, we've modified them slightly,
- 50:12but really these are the kind of practical implications
- 50:15of this. And starting with, should there be a
- 50:18limit on the types of relationships that would
- 50:20warrant an accommodation for an associational
- 50:23disability? And Katie, why don't you take a crack
- 50:26at that? Yeah, so, you know, of course, assuming
- 50:30a duty exists without conceding one does, but
- 50:33for purposes of these questions, we'll assume
- 50:35that. I think there have to be some clear limiting
- 50:38principles, right? This concept of associated
- 50:41with is really broad. And the fee does not provide
- 50:45us with any guidance about what relationships
- 50:47would qualify. And I think the broader a duty
- 50:50becomes, the more difficult it is for an employer
- 50:52to administer it consistently. And we want employers
- 50:56to be able to enforce. policies consistently,
- 51:00and I get a little worried about the idea of
- 51:03employers making subjective judgments about the
- 51:05significance of personal relationships. So, absolutely,
- 51:09some guidance would be very helpful about what
- 51:11types of relationships would, in fact, qualify.
- 51:16Not surprising. I have a different take on it.
- 51:21I think where courts may look, is what has happened
- 51:26in cases looking at associational discrimination,
- 51:30meaning what sort of relationships were considered
- 51:33viable for those claims. So not in the accommodation
- 51:36context, but in the discrimination context. And
- 51:39if we look at those cases, there have been found
- 51:43father -in -laws qualified. co -workers qualified
- 51:47and friends qualified. So I think if a court
- 51:51is looking for what has happened in cases looking
- 51:55at this issue of association previously, then
- 52:00there was not a limit solely to, for example,
- 52:04the relationships that were in the SIFRA or FEMLA.
- 52:10Additionally, If we look at where legislation
- 52:14has been going, and I know this is a legislative
- 52:16issue as opposed to what exists already within
- 52:18the statute, there has been an opening up under
- 52:22CIFRA for a designated person, for example, and
- 52:26the concept of chosen family. The family structure
- 52:31is not these days solely the nuclear family,
- 52:35but rather the concept of chosen family is a
- 52:37lot more accepted and reflects the realities
- 52:42of Californians and how they construct their
- 52:46families. And so further Nothing in the statute
- 52:51has limiting language. So if a court is going
- 52:54to read in limiting language, they would be writing
- 52:57that in whole cloth. So I don't think the statute
- 53:00currently would support such limiting language.
- 53:03We may see legislative changes on this, and I
- 53:08could make predictions as to how that would look.
- 53:11looking at the CFRA and the expansion and limitation
- 53:16of certain of those relationships. As it stands
- 53:20in the statute today, there is no such limitation.
- 53:25The next question that the council asked was,
- 53:29would the employer be permitted to ask for proof
- 53:31that the person requesting the accommodation
- 53:34does, in fact, have a qualifying association?
- 53:38with the person with the disability and kind
- 53:40of, if so, what does that look like? Wendy, why
- 53:43don't you start with that one? I do think an
- 53:46employer can ask for a certain level of proof.
- 53:49I think where the rubber hits the road is how
- 53:51much proof and what's the type of proof. If we
- 53:56look to Cal Government Code section 129... for
- 54:015 .2, for example, that would allow a certification
- 54:05which indicates the nature of the accommodation
- 54:07needed. It would allow for a healthcare certification
- 54:11like the like CIFRA allows for. I think where
- 54:15it's going to get a lot more problematic is if
- 54:19the employer is asking for the third party's
- 54:22medical records or wants to do some sort of medical
- 54:26examination. I don't think that's going to be
- 54:29allowed. I think that a certification such that's
- 54:33already permitted under law is where it's going
- 54:37to be headed. Katie? I agree with Wendy. I think
- 54:45some certification would make sense. I think
- 54:48that is consistent with how we treat other things
- 54:51in the interactive process and reasonable accommodation
- 54:53space. Although we certainly encourage employers
- 54:56and employees to talk to each other, communicate,
- 54:58try and figure this out, that there is a bit
- 55:00of a trust but verify undertone, right? Where,
- 55:03you know, your employee can tell you the accommodations
- 55:06they need and the restrictions they have, but
- 55:07when reasonable, it's okay for the employer to
- 55:10ask them to provide a medical certification to
- 55:13verify that there actually is a need for it.
- 55:15So I think if we're borrowing from that framework,
- 55:18it certainly would make sense to also requires
- 55:21some kind of verification of the relationship
- 55:26with the person who they're saying they need
- 55:29an accommodation for. I don't know what that
- 55:30proof looks like, though, right? I mean, are
- 55:32we asking for marriage certificates? I don't
- 55:34know. What if we adopt the designated person
- 55:37designation, as Wendy argued with the last question,
- 55:40right? What does that look like, though? But
- 55:42yes, I think the concept of asking for verification
- 55:46would be consistent with how we handle other
- 55:49things. And so really, Katie, the really, I think
- 55:53the toughest part of this is how does the interactive
- 55:57process work in these associational accommodation
- 56:01scenarios, especially when we talk about medical
- 56:04documentation and privacy rights of the third
- 56:07party, the employer's obvious concerns about
- 56:11what documents they have, how to maintain them,
- 56:14how to make sure that they're not violating anybody's
- 56:18privacy rights or medical privacy rights or otherwise.
- 56:23So Katie, how would you expect that to be navigated?
- 56:27I agree with you. I think that is one of the
- 56:29most challenging parts of this because traditionally
- 56:32when we think of the interactive process, it's
- 56:34designed to evaluate what are the employees restrictions,
- 56:37what are their job duties, and what accommodations
- 56:40can we bring together to try and marry these
- 56:43two, right? Those things kind of go by the wayside
- 56:46when we're talking about caregiving, right? It's
- 56:48really more akin to a CEFRA, you know, certification
- 56:53of healthcare provider, right? Where, you know,
- 56:55I have this family member, they have a disability
- 56:58and therefore I need X. And I agree with you,
- 57:02I think as someone who represents employers and
- 57:05provides advice in this space all the time, employers
- 57:08should be really worried about what to do with
- 57:10private medical information that belongs to their
- 57:13employees' family members, right? They already
- 57:16don't want the private medical information involving
- 57:18their employees. So I think this is an area where
- 57:22some guidance would be helpful if this is the
- 57:25direction it's going. And I don't think that
- 57:30it's all that different, honestly, because the
- 57:33types of accommodations for caregiving that are
- 57:36commonly seen, for example, is intermittent leave,
- 57:40working from home, scheduling adjustments. Policy
- 57:46exemptions, for example, like being able to have
- 57:48a cell phone so you know if there's a medical
- 57:51emergency or having a regular day off. That's
- 57:56not unusual, for example, for religious accommodations
- 57:59for Sabbath observance. Often people have a designated
- 58:02day off and that's one of the most simple accommodations
- 58:06that an employer can provide. So I think. in
- 58:10the interactive process, it would look the same.
- 58:13What does the employee need? Maybe they need
- 58:16time off of work on a particular day to take
- 58:20their family member to chemotherapy. And that
- 58:23may be a few hours on one day a week or. one
- 58:28day every couple of weeks. I think it looks the
- 58:31same as if the employee themselves needed that
- 58:34chemotherapy. I think it's the same type of interactive
- 58:37process. So I think that I understand the fear
- 58:41that employers may have that this opens things
- 58:44up. But I think on the ground, it's actually
- 58:48the same process that they should already be
- 58:51following as it relates to accommodations for
- 58:55employees. own disabilities. So, Katie, I think
- 59:01we've covered quite a bit of these. I think we
- 59:03can go ahead and skip off to the policy debate,
- 59:07as it were, if you want to go ahead with that.
- 59:12There you go. All right. We are on the policy
- 59:20debate slide. Wendy? I feel like this one's for
- 59:25you to start. Well, in terms of recognizing the
- 59:29duty, one, I think it's already the law. I think
- 59:32the Castro -Omeras hit the nail on the head.
- 59:35I think that this already exists under the FIHA.
- 59:40And the FIHA is broader in many respects than
- 59:43the ADA. It protects caregivers from discrimination.
- 59:49It reflects the modern caregiving realities.
- 59:51We saw this hugely when COVID happened, where
- 59:54a lot of employees needed, particularly, statistically,
- 59:59women needed to take care of children or elders
- 1:00:02and their medical care in the workplace. And
- 1:00:05we all made it out OK with those caregiving realities
- 1:00:10and being able to perform their job duties. It's
- 1:00:13consistent with FIHA's remedial purpose, and
- 1:00:16it's consistent with the statutory construction.
- 1:00:18And I understand that this is for employers,
- 1:00:21but I think this is a really important point
- 1:00:24for employees. And employees who are provided
- 1:00:28with accommodations in the workplace, there are
- 1:00:31studies that demonstrate that they're more loyal,
- 1:00:34they're more likely to stay. And individuals
- 1:00:37who are provided with accommodations, they actually
- 1:00:41save money for employers. So I think if employers
- 1:00:45actually look at those statistics and think about
- 1:00:51whether they want a workplace that's employees
- 1:00:55who feel loyal and who will stay and not jump
- 1:00:59to other employers, they really should consider
- 1:01:02this duty and the modern realities that are happening
- 1:01:05in the California workplace. Well, you know,
- 1:01:11not surprisingly, I see things a little bit differently
- 1:01:13in Wendy on this point. But I do want to go back
- 1:01:16to something Wendy said earlier that I think
- 1:01:18really highlights one of my core issues with
- 1:01:22this. The language is drafted, just says associated
- 1:01:26with. There is no limiting principle, right?
- 1:01:29And when we compare that to other laws that address
- 1:01:32caregiving, like the CEFRA or paid sick leave,
- 1:01:35we do have some definitions up about what types
- 1:01:39of family relationships qualify and things like
- 1:01:41that. So I think California law does contemplate
- 1:01:46guardrails and limiting principles around caregiving
- 1:01:49responsibilities. So without some kind of change
- 1:01:52to make that match, I think this potentially
- 1:01:54could really balloon and expand accommodation
- 1:02:00obligations dramatically for employers and in
- 1:02:03a way that before Castor Ramirez we all kind
- 1:02:06of accepted wasn't required, right? And now for
- 1:02:08the past decade, we've been arguing about it.
- 1:02:11And again, California has lots of leave laws
- 1:02:15and accommodations and things in place for caregivers.
- 1:02:18We have lots of options available to caregivers
- 1:02:21that address a lot of needs. So with that, looks
- 1:02:28like we're a little over, but we wanna leave
- 1:02:30you with some practice tips. So from the employer
- 1:02:34perspective, I would recommend that you carefully
- 1:02:38analyze requests tied to caregiving responsibilities
- 1:02:41and always consider whether a request can or
- 1:02:44should be addressed through FMLA, CFRA, or your
- 1:02:47existing leave policies, like Wendy very astutely
- 1:02:50pointed out and gave a big old warning to any
- 1:02:53employer representatives on this call, right?
- 1:02:56You may ultimately win the question. on associational
- 1:03:00discrimination, but lose on a CFRA or FMLA claim,
- 1:03:04right? So make sure when you're getting requests
- 1:03:07in, you're looking at FMLA, CFRA, or if you have,
- 1:03:10if your client has a broader leave policy, lots
- 1:03:12of clients go above and beyond what FMLA and
- 1:03:15CFRA provide, lots of employers do. So certainly
- 1:03:18take a look at that. consider consistency with
- 1:03:22remote work and flexible scheduling policies
- 1:03:24and practices. As Noah mentioned, the landscape
- 1:03:26has changed quite a bit since COVID, right? A
- 1:03:29lot of that case law that we talked about, the
- 1:03:31facts predate COVID when people weren't working
- 1:03:34remotely as much. Now, a lot of employers have
- 1:03:38certainly expanded their minds and options when
- 1:03:41it comes to remote work. This is really important.
- 1:03:46I think document your interactive process efforts,
- 1:03:48even if the legal duty is unclear. Now that we
- 1:03:51have a growing pile of unpublished cases that
- 1:03:56tell us how unsettled this is, you should engage
- 1:03:59in the interactive process and document those
- 1:04:01efforts. That would be a very advisable thing
- 1:04:05to do because we simply don't know which case
- 1:04:07is going to ultimately become published and answer
- 1:04:10the question. And then, of course, be cautious
- 1:04:12about perceived retaliation if someone makes
- 1:04:14a request. And even if ultimately there is no
- 1:04:19duty, that could still be a protected activity
- 1:04:21anyway if they believed in good faith that they
- 1:04:23were making a legitimate request. So always be
- 1:04:26cautious about perceived retaliation. Another
- 1:04:29one of Wendy's favorite claims, I'm sure. Exactly
- 1:04:32right. In terms of employee takeaways, one of
- 1:04:37the things, it's really important to frame your
- 1:04:39request clearly and specifically. If you say,
- 1:04:42I want off from work early because somebody's
- 1:04:45sick, that's not going to be as strong to say,
- 1:04:48I need off from work at three o 'clock because
- 1:04:51my spouse needs to attend chemotherapy and it's
- 1:04:56of two hour duration. The second request is far
- 1:05:01more likely to be successful both without needing
- 1:05:05litigation, but if you unfortunately find yourself
- 1:05:09in litigation, that's gonna be a much more winning
- 1:05:13request in front of a jury. Tie the request to
- 1:05:17concrete workplace modifications. So for example,
- 1:05:20if you need one intermittent leave, Be very specific
- 1:05:24if you need to have your cell phone, but the
- 1:05:26policy says you can have a cell phone. Be very
- 1:05:29specific. So tie it to specific workplace modifications.
- 1:05:33If other people are allowed flexibility and you're
- 1:05:36not, Let's say to take care of a child who has
- 1:05:40a disability but somebody else can take off to
- 1:05:42do their bowling league or some other issue like
- 1:05:46that. Preserve that evidence that individuals
- 1:05:50with disabilities are being treated differently
- 1:05:52or those that associate with those with disabilities
- 1:05:55are being treated differently. You would have
- 1:05:57probably a viable discrimination association
- 1:06:00claim even if there's no reasonable accommodation
- 1:06:03claim. Expect disputes over documentation and
- 1:06:07scope. So this is the question of what do you
- 1:06:09need to show if you say that I have a person
- 1:06:14I need an accommodation for to assist with caregiving.
- 1:06:18Maybe talk to that person to say, look, I'd love
- 1:06:20to take care of you, but this may mean I need
- 1:06:23to provide some information about your medical
- 1:06:25situation because I do think the employer is
- 1:06:29going to ask for some proof and verification
- 1:06:32and it's good to. consider that up front internally
- 1:06:34with your family member or the person you're
- 1:06:38helping with. In terms of looking at the full
- 1:06:41picture, though, I think any person representing
- 1:06:44workers needs to assert multiple causes of action.
- 1:06:48So I would consider the associational discrimination
- 1:06:51claim as well as the accommodation claim. And
- 1:06:54as Katie very specifically and astutely indicated,
- 1:06:58retail claims, because if you ask for an accommodation,
- 1:07:02that is a protected activity. And even if you're
- 1:07:06wrong, if you thought that it was protected,
- 1:07:08and you're retaliated, for example, you're terminated
- 1:07:11as a result, then that is a viable claim. So
- 1:07:15when you're considering these claims, I would
- 1:07:17be looking at CIFRA, FEMLA, discrimination, associational
- 1:07:21discrimination, retaliation claims, as well as
- 1:07:27accommodation claims, because one of them is
- 1:07:30likely to get past summary judgment and onto
- 1:07:34trial. And I'll add that when I'm looking at
- 1:07:41these cases from a neutral perspective and I'm
- 1:07:44looking at, excuse me, imagine a mediation where
- 1:07:51these claims are central and we have this type
- 1:07:55of history with the cases and unsettled area
- 1:07:59in particular, what I'm looking at is risk. Right?
- 1:08:03Risk on both sides of the equation here. And
- 1:08:07if you've got an employer who's arguing and making
- 1:08:10a case, especially in mediation, that they're
- 1:08:14going to win summary judgment, there is not going
- 1:08:16to be any cause of action for the accommodation,
- 1:08:20the associational accommodation claim. And that's
- 1:08:25either primary claim or the exclusive claim.
- 1:08:29That's a pretty risky position. given the status
- 1:08:32of the current case law, I would argue to them.
- 1:08:37On the other side of the equation, and I'm talking
- 1:08:39to plaintiff's counsel, it's still a significant
- 1:08:43risk because the dynamic here is so interesting
- 1:08:48because we have a flip of the normal dynamic
- 1:08:52between the federal courts and the state courts
- 1:08:54when it comes to interpreting California state
- 1:08:56law. Typically, what we see is the federal courts
- 1:09:00are more restrictive in their analysis in respect
- 1:09:05to employee coverage and expansion of rights
- 1:09:08for employees. The federal courts have traditionally
- 1:09:12been a bit more restrictive in those analyses
- 1:09:15when there's an open question than the state
- 1:09:17courts. And often you see Cases go all the way
- 1:09:20up to the California Supreme Court, especially
- 1:09:21in the labor code provisions, where they are
- 1:09:24correcting, so to speak, the federal court's
- 1:09:27interpretation. This time, you've got the reverse.
- 1:09:30You've got two court of appeal unpublished decisions
- 1:09:33that say it's a more restrictive analysis under
- 1:09:38the statutory definitions. So if I'm talking
- 1:09:42to the plaintiff's counsel and talking to plaintiffs
- 1:09:44in their room, intermediation, this is This is
- 1:09:47an interesting dynamic, and there's no clear
- 1:09:51outcome at this point. So you're each weighing
- 1:09:53really significant risks, which means this is
- 1:09:57a great case to settle, right? And so that's,
- 1:10:01to me, the definition of a great case to settle,
- 1:10:03because nobody really knows the outcome. And
- 1:10:06if you're banking on a summary judgment outcome,
- 1:10:09that means you know that it's kind of a bet the
- 1:10:12case motion on one hand or the other. As Wendy
- 1:10:17described from the Monteroso outcome, those are
- 1:10:20significant verdicts, even though in that case,
- 1:10:24it wasn't an associational claim, but it was
- 1:10:26a CIFRA claim. But still, these cases, when you
- 1:10:29just read the facts, are, I would argue, pretty
- 1:10:35sympathetic in the fact of the case. Forget about
- 1:10:39legal technicalities and legal rights. To me,
- 1:10:43these are things that juries can identify with
- 1:10:46and latch onto because they are talking about
- 1:10:50primarily family caregiving scenarios, close
- 1:10:54association, primarily, again, primarily family
- 1:10:57members, but others who may be included in providing
- 1:11:02care for them, providing kidney dialysis for
- 1:11:05your son, providing palliative care for your
- 1:11:08wife who's undergone multiple bouts of cancer.
- 1:11:12claims I think Wendy would agree that a plaintiff's
- 1:11:15attorney would be very eager to bring before
- 1:11:17a jury. So these cases are really, really interesting
- 1:11:21and tricky. And when you're trying to resolve
- 1:11:23them, you really have to consider all of these
- 1:11:26risks. And it's just, again, it's just a very
- 1:11:31interesting, from an intellectual point of view,
- 1:11:34scenario and how it plays out in any particular
- 1:11:37situation. Now we do have a couple of questions
- 1:11:41in the question and answer segment if we want
- 1:11:45to look at those. The first question, we're going
- 1:11:49to stick around for folks who are out there.
- 1:11:50I think we're going to stick around for as long
- 1:11:52as people want to ask questions. So feel free
- 1:11:54to keep dialing those in into the Q &A box. The
- 1:12:00first one is, would it benefit the associated
- 1:12:03person to be listed as an in -home helper? Any
- 1:12:09thoughts on that? I mean, I don't really see
- 1:12:15that as a determinative fact myself. I think
- 1:12:20you'd be looking at the totality of the circumstances.
- 1:12:24If you're the only one who can take care of,
- 1:12:27for example, in the case where the only one to
- 1:12:30take care of the child who needed dialysis, I
- 1:12:33think that is a fact that at least a jury, if
- 1:12:38it gets to a jury, is going to be looking at
- 1:12:41very closely. But I haven't seen any case where
- 1:12:45they took that particular factor into account.
- 1:12:51Katie, any additional thoughts on that? No, I
- 1:12:55agree with Wendy there. But I'm curious about
- 1:12:58Wendy's, I'm curious about everyone's thoughts
- 1:13:00on this next question. So the next question is,
- 1:13:04Can the denial of the employee's request for
- 1:13:07an associated reasonable accommodation itself
- 1:13:10be considered retaliation? I think the answer
- 1:13:14is yes because asking for an accommodation is
- 1:13:17a protected activity and for the the case law
- 1:13:21regarding retaliation claims is you can be wrong.
- 1:13:25on your underlying complaints. So for example,
- 1:13:28taking a more traditional complaint, you could
- 1:13:31be wrong about being subject to discrimination
- 1:13:34or harassment in the workplace. meaning that
- 1:13:37you could lose those claims and still have a
- 1:13:39viable retaliation claim. I think the same is
- 1:13:42true here, so long as the employee had a good
- 1:13:45faith reasonable basis to believe that that was
- 1:13:48covered. And clearly there's a good faith, I
- 1:13:51think, given that even the courts can't seem
- 1:13:54to agree. I can appreciate how employees would
- 1:13:57think it was covered. that I do think it's a
- 1:14:01protected activity. And if the employer were
- 1:14:05to take an adverse employment action against
- 1:14:07the employee, I think that's cognizable. Further,
- 1:14:12for retaliation complaints, the definition of
- 1:14:15an adverse employment action looks at the totality
- 1:14:18of the circumstances and it's broad. It's not
- 1:14:20just ultimate employment actions. And so I think
- 1:14:24the employers out there need to also consider
- 1:14:26that. Not surprising, I'm gonna take a somewhat
- 1:14:32different view than Wendy here. I think, although
- 1:14:35I do agree with Wendy, certainly the request
- 1:14:37itself, I'm not gonna argue with Wendy, requesting
- 1:14:40the accommodation is certainly a protected activity.
- 1:14:43I don't know if I feel as strongly though that
- 1:14:46a denial in and of itself is the adverse employment
- 1:14:50action, right? I mean, I agree with Wendy that
- 1:14:52it certainly doesn't have to be something as
- 1:14:54extreme as a termination, right? But typically
- 1:14:59when we think about denial of a request, what
- 1:15:02claim flows from that, that claim is typically
- 1:15:05failure to accommodate, right? That to me is
- 1:15:08the legal claim that flows from denying the request
- 1:15:12versus that being a form of retaliation. Now,
- 1:15:15do I think that an employer needs to be very
- 1:15:17careful after denying someone's request for legitimate
- 1:15:20business reasons? Should they be very, very careful
- 1:15:24about everything that happens afterwards because
- 1:15:27certainly the employee is going to be on high
- 1:15:29alert after they've talked with Wendy. They're
- 1:15:31going to be on high alert for potential retaliation,
- 1:15:34yes. But I don't think a denial in and of itself
- 1:15:37is the adverse employment action. Yeah, it's
- 1:15:40tricky, isn't it? Because, you know, there is
- 1:15:43case law, Wendy, correct me if I'm wrong, but
- 1:15:45I think there's case law that says that a denial
- 1:15:51of accommodation is not an adverse action under
- 1:15:56a discrimination claim. It's a failure to accommodate.
- 1:15:58And you can't graft the failure to accommodate
- 1:16:01into a discrimination claim per se, as that's
- 1:16:04the actual, using that same kind of theory. I
- 1:16:07mean, there's some parsing of language and of
- 1:16:11actions in those cases. But I think the theory
- 1:16:13has been rejected, at least in ADA cases that.
- 1:16:17that say that that's not itself an adverse action
- 1:16:20that supports a discrimination claim. It supports
- 1:16:23a failure to accommodate claim potentially, but
- 1:16:26not the accommodate, not the adverse action claim.
- 1:16:29I think this is one where we're gonna see cases
- 1:16:32where the facts are gonna drive the results.
- 1:16:35So for example, if you have someone who, in these
- 1:16:39cases, they're a long -term employee, they've
- 1:16:41been allowed to provide these caregiving, say,
- 1:16:45intermittently for the last 10 years, suddenly
- 1:16:48you get a new boss who's... perhaps not the nicest
- 1:16:52person, comes off pretty horribly in light of
- 1:16:57the long -term employee who's been able to do
- 1:16:59a fantastic job with those accommodations. Suddenly
- 1:17:02they're requesting the intermittent leave and
- 1:17:05that's taken away from them and perhaps other
- 1:17:10comments or actions happen. I think that's going
- 1:17:13to be a good case to test this. Whereas I think
- 1:17:18if you don't have that sort of change, that's
- 1:17:23going to be a harder road on the worker advocate
- 1:17:26side. Well, that's all the questions we have
- 1:17:31in our Q &A. It is. Well, thank you, everyone.
- 1:17:37And thank you, Noah and Wendy, for talking about
- 1:17:42this fun subject with me. Always such a pleasure.
- 1:17:45And you are my favorite defense attorney, Katie.
- 1:17:51Yeah, this allows us to really geek out on some
- 1:17:55really interesting areas of law. Those of us
- 1:17:57who practice in disability discrimination law
- 1:17:59or have practiced in disability discrimination
- 1:18:01law, which I did for 28 years, it's really just
- 1:18:06a great topic and it's so much fun to talk about
- 1:18:09with both of you. Thank you. Thank you, Noah.
- 1:18:12Thank you everyone for joining us. Have a wonderful
- 1:18:15evening.