Latest / The Team House / Fake Jobs, Real Spies: China’s Online Recruitment Machine | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Hey, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics.
- 0:03Speaker 1: I'm joined today with Jonathan Hackett, and our special guest
- 0:06Speaker 1: is Max Lesser. I'm going to give you the official
- 0:10Speaker 1: bio because that's what, like, professionals do, Max, so this
- 0:13Speaker 1: is what I'm going to do. Max is a senior
- 0:14Speaker 1: analyst on emerging threats at FDD Center on Cyber and
- 0:18Speaker 1: Technology Innovation. Max previously served as head of U.S. Policy
- 0:22Speaker 1: Analysis and Engagement at Darktrace Federal, a cybersecurity company that
- 0:26Speaker 1: specializes in AI. Max Research basically goes into forum-aligned influence,
- 0:33Speaker 1: and it's been referenced by OpenAI and featured in The
- 0:36Speaker 1: New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and NBC News.
- 0:39Speaker 1: And now he's in the big leagues with Eyes on
- 0:41Speaker 1: Geopolitics podcast. Max, thanks for joining us.
- 0:45Speaker 2: Thank you.
- 0:46Speaker 1: Also, I do have to say he's a Harvard guy,
- 0:48Speaker 1: so him and Jonathan had some words before we started
- 0:52Speaker 1: recording because, of course, Jonathan's a Yale guy. He doesn't
- 0:55Speaker 1: stop reminding us. Max, I mean, you sent over some
- 1:01Speaker 1: of your work and stuff like that. It's pretty incredible
- 1:04Speaker 1: what's been going on over the last few years specifically.
- 1:06Speaker 1: It's kind of like really scaled up it seems where
- 1:10Speaker 1: essentially espionage has– there's like a new domain of espionage
- 1:15Speaker 1: and it's like gig economy workers and getting people like–
- 1:20Speaker 1: it seems like the scale has increased significantly. dramatically, right?
- 1:25Speaker 1: Like it's not like an old crusty CIA case officer
- 1:28Speaker 1: or MSS officer trying to recruit somebody in some European,
- 1:33Speaker 1: you know, city or country. It's more online.
- 1:38Speaker 3: And the key thing.
- 1:39Speaker 1: That I saw that was very interesting to me was
- 1:41Speaker 1: back in February of 2025, when a bunch of like
- 1:45Speaker 1: federal workers were doged, essentially, you know, there was a
- 1:49Speaker 1: bunch of, you know, a ton more people looking on
- 1:50Speaker 1: the job market, obviously, after that. And it seems like
- 1:54Speaker 1: China really did really put a lot of bandwidth into
- 1:58Speaker 1: like trying to recruit those people as like consultants. And
- 2:01Speaker 1: then like, you know, maybe do a one-off kind of,
- 2:03Speaker 1: you know, rapport and then like kind of ask for
- 2:05Speaker 1: a little bit more. That's a little bit sketchy and
- 2:08Speaker 1: could be seen as you spying on your own country.
- 2:11Speaker 1: So yeah, I mean, I don't even have a question.
- 2:14Speaker 1: I just thought it was super interesting and stuff like that. Uh,
- 2:17Speaker 1: if you want to get into it, Max, and give
- 2:19Speaker 1: us like the actual informed, um, You know what you're
- 2:24Speaker 1: talking about. So just give us what you got, essentially.
- 2:28Speaker 2: Yeah, no, I mean, there are so many different angles
- 2:31Speaker 2: from which we could approach this conversation. I guess I'll
- 2:33Speaker 2: start with how I started researching this. So like you mentioned,
- 2:37Speaker 2: in February 2025, just coincidentally, that was when my wife
- 2:43Speaker 2: started looking for a job. And she wasn't affected by
- 2:47Speaker 2: layoffs or anything like that. And she was interested in
- 2:50Speaker 2: geopolitical risk. Um, so I was scrolling through LinkedIn, trying
- 2:54Speaker 2: to help her look for geopolitical risk consulting, uh, jobs. Um,
- 2:59Speaker 2: and I came across one that was offering good pay.
- 3:02Speaker 2: I seemed interesting. It was remote, which was obviously appealing. Um,
- 3:07Speaker 2: and I'd never heard about it before. And, um, the
- 3:12Speaker 2: LinkedIn presence was kind of sparse, right? Like there wasn't
- 3:15Speaker 2: a lot on its profile. And I looked at the
- 3:19Speaker 2: website and I was like, Hmm. There was just something
- 3:23Speaker 2: that felt a little bit off about the website. Like
- 3:25Speaker 2: my spidey senses went up. And as you mentioned, Dee,
- 3:30Speaker 2: like one of my main focus areas when I started
- 3:33Speaker 2: at the think tank where I now work, Foundation for
- 3:35Speaker 2: Defense of Democracies, was formalized influence. So a lot of
- 3:39Speaker 2: that's looking into covert networks on social media. But a
- 3:43Speaker 2: huge part of it is also looking at fake websites, right?
- 3:47Speaker 2: Fake news websites and things like that. Um, so I
- 3:51Speaker 2: sort of knew I had reflexes built to know how
- 3:55Speaker 2: to investigate these sorts of, or any sort of suspicious website. Um,
- 4:00Speaker 2: and you can read this in my report. It's no
- 4:02Speaker 2: big secret. Uh, they, uh, whoever created this website, um,
- 4:07Speaker 2: was not super mindful of operational security because when I
- 4:10Speaker 2: look at it, who is information, which is sort of
- 4:14Speaker 2: information that tells you about, tells you who registered a website.
- 4:19Speaker 2: it showed that the registrant's country was in China. Most
- 4:22Speaker 2: of the information was redacted, but you could see that
- 4:25Speaker 2: the registrant was based in China. And the consulting firm
- 4:28Speaker 2: said that it was dual headquartered in Colorado, interestingly, and Singapore.
- 4:33Speaker 2: So that didn't seem right. And that, you know, the
- 4:38Speaker 2: investigation continued, the thread started unspooling, and it took me
- 4:44Speaker 2: to a broader network of, I believe it was around
- 4:46Speaker 2: five or six different websites. Um, and this was a
- 4:50Speaker 2: sort of rare occasion with, even just with open sources,
- 4:52Speaker 2: I was able to trace it back to a Chinese
- 4:55Speaker 2: internet company. Um, which I pretty conclusively was able to
- 4:59Speaker 2: determine created that network. Um, and they, like you mentioned,
- 5:05Speaker 2: D they put up ads on Craigslist saying, you know,
- 5:08Speaker 2: have you been more or less I'm paraphrasing here. Have
- 5:11Speaker 2: you been affected by the layoffs? You know, if so,
- 5:13Speaker 2: like we're going to help you out.
- 5:14Speaker 3: Right.
- 5:16Speaker 2: Um, so they were, it was, they were, you know,
- 5:18Speaker 2: explicitly targeting people who were affected by the layoffs, uh,
- 5:21Speaker 2: interestingly on Craigslist, which I'm not sure what federal employee
- 5:24Speaker 2: is like for federal employees up on Craigslist, but it
- 5:28Speaker 2: was pretty funny. Um, so that's just what got me
- 5:31Speaker 2: started on this. I believe it was the first sort
- 5:34Speaker 2: of open source, uh, intelligence report, um, done by, you know,
- 5:40Speaker 2: like a, a nonprofit, someone outside of government covering the topic.
- 5:45Speaker 2: to my understanding. And since then, you know, a lot
- 5:48Speaker 2: of people have come to me with questions and I've
- 5:51Speaker 2: done six, you know, follow up reports. I've done a
- 5:54Speaker 2: lot of research on this topic, both investigative research and
- 5:58Speaker 2: also just sort of piecing together the, you know, putting
- 6:01Speaker 2: together all the pieces when you look at government reporting
- 6:04Speaker 2: and affidavits and things like that that have come out.
- 6:07Speaker 2: So that's just sort of My story is how I
- 6:09Speaker 2: started getting interested in this topic. And then, yeah, now
- 6:12Speaker 2: we can really go from anywhere because, again, I've kind
- 6:15Speaker 2: of looked at this from many different angles.
- 6:18Speaker 4: It's really interesting, Max, because you kind of bring together
- 6:20Speaker 4: there's like the wide net approach that some Chinese intelligence
- 6:24Speaker 4: officers have. And there's more targeted approach that others have,
- 6:27Speaker 4: depending on what the mission is. You know, I worked
- 6:29Speaker 4: a long time ago on an industrial espionage operation. I
- 6:33Speaker 4: was doing counterintelligence against the F-35 program. which back in 2010,
- 6:37Speaker 4: the Marine Corps got its first shipment of F-35s. And immediately,
- 6:40Speaker 4: MSS had people physically in the United States gathering intelligence
- 6:44Speaker 4: on the F-35s so they could build the J-31, of course,
- 6:48Speaker 4: which is like an older story. That was more targeted
- 6:50Speaker 4: than what they were doing. But I know they also do,
- 6:52Speaker 4: especially against Chinese nationals or people with Chinese connections back
- 6:55Speaker 4: to China that are in the United States, this is
- 6:56Speaker 4: a typical target of theirs. And I know you worked
- 6:59Speaker 4: on one research project for, I think it was June Weiyu,
- 7:02Speaker 4: who was recruited back in 2015 and then was run
- 7:06Speaker 4: as a source throughout from 2015 to 2020.
- 7:10Speaker 3: What do you see as why.
- 7:11Speaker 4: China would choose these Chinese nationals? Because for example, we
- 7:15Speaker 4: in the United States, CIA and Defense Human Intelligence, we
- 7:19Speaker 4: don't really care what the nationality of the person is.
- 7:20Speaker 4: We care more about what's their placement and access, what
- 7:23Speaker 4: is the susceptibility to their recruitment, what ways can we
- 7:26Speaker 4: access them if we need to get to them or
- 7:28Speaker 4: meet with them. You know, like we're more kind of
- 7:30Speaker 4: like pragmatic about the stuff they have and the stuff
- 7:33Speaker 4: they can do. Whereas it seems China is more interested
- 7:35Speaker 4: in first, are they connected to China? And then they
- 7:39Speaker 4: have more questions.
- 7:40Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, so I think one of the things
- 7:43Speaker 2: when we look at just specifically this sort of narrower tactic,
- 7:46Speaker 2: which is, you know, virtual targeting and virtual espionage. One
- 7:50Speaker 2: thing about the sort of like ethnic angle is they
- 7:53Speaker 2: often like oftentimes like to pose as Singaporean consulting firms.
- 7:58Speaker 2: And one of the people who was most famously involved
- 8:00Speaker 2: was Dixon Yeo, who is a Singaporean national, you know,
- 8:04Speaker 2: who appears to be of ethnic Chinese descent. And I
- 8:09Speaker 2: think they sort of realized that Americans might not be
- 8:13Speaker 2: able to tell the difference between somebody from Singapore and
- 8:15Speaker 2: somebody from mainland China, which like anybody who's familiar, like
- 8:19Speaker 2: there's significant cultural differences. You know, the Singaporean English dialect
- 8:24Speaker 2: sounds nothing like, you know, a mainland Chinese English accent. Um,
- 8:28Speaker 2: but that's sort of the ethnic component. And then the
- 8:31Speaker 2: broader topic, which you, which you mentioned, I mean, you know,
- 8:35Speaker 2: it's hard for me to say exactly. I'm not in
- 8:38Speaker 2: the mind of a PRC operative, but I do think
- 8:42Speaker 2: something that the PRC is very aggressive about is like harassing, um,
- 8:48Speaker 2: you know, family members or any connection that's in the
- 8:51Speaker 2: mainland to try to coerce people who are overseas. Um,
- 8:54Speaker 2: and they don't just do this for intelligence gathering. they
- 8:58Speaker 2: do this also for transnational repression, right? When we talk
- 9:02Speaker 2: about formalized influence, which is sort of an adjacent and
- 9:07Speaker 2: overlapping topic with espionage, there's a lot of cases I've
- 9:14Speaker 2: seen where they will harass family members to try and
- 9:17Speaker 2: get information or try and keep people from spreading information overseas.
- 9:23Speaker 2: And sometimes even, I mean, they will literally just go
- 9:27Speaker 2: after dissidents living overseas. Like there was one case that
- 9:31Speaker 2: was written where I think they were like harassing the daughter,
- 9:34Speaker 2: like the teenage daughter of a dissident living.
- 9:37Speaker 3: In, I think, Canada.
- 9:39Speaker 2: So obviously like anytime when there's a mainland connection there,
- 9:46Speaker 2: especially if there's like a family member or maybe financial
- 9:49Speaker 2: interests that, you know, intersect with mainland China, that just
- 9:53Speaker 2: gives them leverage, So I think that definitely is a
- 9:59Speaker 2: component of their broader espionage strategy and transnational repression strategy,
- 10:04Speaker 2: for sure.
- 10:06Speaker 4: And that's like the kind of inner workings of an operation.
- 10:08Speaker 4: And actually, I'm sure a lot of listeners are a
- 10:11Speaker 4: lot more familiar with Russian espionage, especially SVR and GRU.
- 10:14Speaker 4: And they're more familiar with Iran, just because it's kind
- 10:16Speaker 4: of in your face today. But I think Chinese espionage
- 10:19Speaker 4: is a little bit less understood, at least the nuts
- 10:21Speaker 4: and bolts level in the West, because it kind of
- 10:23Speaker 4: happens in a way that's very different than Russian or
- 10:25Speaker 4: Iranian espionage, very different purposes. And for a long time,
- 10:29Speaker 4: you know, for example, the Russian intelligence priorities, if you
- 10:32Speaker 4: looked at what was their number one priority collection priority
- 10:35Speaker 4: in any country, whether it's Argentina or Jordan or whatever,
- 10:39Speaker 4: number one collection activity target, what is the US doing
- 10:41Speaker 4: in this country? That was in every single country that
- 10:44Speaker 4: is Russia's top human priority, which is kind of fascinating
- 10:47Speaker 4: that Russia is collecting on the US in these countries.
- 10:49Speaker 4: And I'm curious if you have any insight on what
- 10:51Speaker 4: are China's collection priorities, not just in the United States,
- 10:53Speaker 4: but just kind of generally?
- 10:56Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, again, so quickly, like, so I think there's,
- 11:00Speaker 2: and I'm happy to discuss this, there are some experts
- 11:02Speaker 2: out there who are like, extremely well versed in just
- 11:04Speaker 2: the broader Chinese espionage threat. I feel like I've established
- 11:10Speaker 2: a narrower expertise, which is more of like this sort
- 11:13Speaker 2: of virtual targeting TTP. which I know super in depth,
- 11:17Speaker 2: but obviously I also studied the broader priorities. And I
- 11:22Speaker 2: think just to look at it from the angle from
- 11:25Speaker 2: which what I'm studying, right, which is like firsthand, like
- 11:28Speaker 2: when I look at these fake consulting companies, when I
- 11:32Speaker 2: look at these job listings, when I look at the
- 11:35Speaker 2: targeting profile in these campaigns that I'm studying, it's pretty fascinating, right?
- 11:41Speaker 2: Like I've seen websites that are looking for people with
- 11:45Speaker 2: expertise in psychological operations, right? So like more sensitive military, um, uh,
- 11:52Speaker 2: you know, areas of, of, of, of the military. I've
- 11:56Speaker 2: seen job listings looking a lot of times asking for
- 11:59Speaker 2: people with, uh, expertise in, um, you know, the Indo-Pacific
- 12:03Speaker 2: for obvious reasons. Um, Taiwan is a huge one. Um,
- 12:08Speaker 2: I would say that another huge thing that I've seen
- 12:12Speaker 2: is they'll just look for people who have experience at
- 12:15Speaker 2: international organizations, right? So any sort of broader foreign policy experience,
- 12:20Speaker 2: when you look at the specific campaigns that have involved
- 12:24Speaker 2: this virtual targeting dimension, I mean, it's not like it's really,
- 12:28Speaker 2: that's a tactic or a TTP that can be used
- 12:32Speaker 2: to pretty much achieve almost any objective, right? I mean,
- 12:35Speaker 2: they've gone after everything from people with only peripheral access
- 12:38Speaker 2: to government information, like people at think tanks, right. To
- 12:41Speaker 2: people who actually have clip hold clearances.
- 12:45Speaker 3: Right.
- 12:45Speaker 2: Um, but I'd say like you would, you would think
- 12:48Speaker 2: that maybe, oh, they're looking for classified information. And I
- 12:51Speaker 2: would say, I think that is even too narrow of
- 12:55Speaker 2: a scope in terms of what they're looking for. They're
- 12:57Speaker 2: also looking for valuable forms of non-public information. So famously,
- 13:03Speaker 2: Dixon Yeo, who was the Singaporean national who began working with,
- 13:08Speaker 2: you know, the PRC, I believe, around 2015. He asked
- 13:12Speaker 2: a State Department official to just give him a sort
- 13:16Speaker 2: of profile of the personality of a member of the
- 13:20Speaker 2: cabinet at the time.
- 13:21Speaker 3: Right.
- 13:23Speaker 2: So I think it's it's really just sort of a broad.
- 13:28Speaker 2: spectrum of different collection priorities that are reflected in the
- 13:32Speaker 2: campaigns that I have looked at firsthand. And I think
- 13:37Speaker 2: it's also, I mean, I've seen a lot of interesting
- 13:39Speaker 2: things and it's sort of hard to know what to
- 13:42Speaker 2: make of it exactly, but I've even seen some of
- 13:44Speaker 2: these websites that, you know, with a fairly high degree
- 13:47Speaker 2: of confidence, I believe are involved in this Chinese virtual
- 13:50Speaker 2: targeting or virtual espionage opportunity. asking people for political expertise,
- 13:54Speaker 2: asking for people to give insights into sort of elections
- 13:59Speaker 2: or US politics and to sort of look at elections.
- 14:03Speaker 2: So one could also suspect that maybe they're looking for
- 14:06Speaker 2: people to provide them with information that would inform their
- 14:11Speaker 2: influence operations. But again, like it really is like it's
- 14:16Speaker 2: just it runs the gamut from like, you know, everything
- 14:19Speaker 2: from just like, hey, can you give me sort of
- 14:23Speaker 2: gossip about what's going on in DC, right? To, hey,
- 14:28Speaker 2: can you hand over information about the F-35 program, which
- 14:32Speaker 2: Dixon Yeo, actually one of the most famous people involved
- 14:35Speaker 2: in this type of activity back in 2015, if you
- 14:40Speaker 2: read his guilty plea and everything, One of the first
- 14:45Speaker 2: cases they highlight is somebody giving over information, which I
- 14:48Speaker 2: believe is even public information, but writing a report about
- 14:51Speaker 2: how Japan had purchased F-35s. One other thing I'd mentioned
- 14:56Speaker 2: that I think is important, and I think especially if
- 14:59Speaker 2: there's anybody listening who's a former federal employee or whatever,
- 15:03Speaker 2: somebody who's currently or previously had access to sensitive information,
- 15:08Speaker 2: is they'll start by asking for less sensitive information And
- 15:14Speaker 2: then they'll begin escalating.
- 15:15Speaker 4: Right.
- 15:16Speaker 2: Which isn't, I think, unique to the virtual targeting tactic.
- 15:21Speaker 2: But I think that's something that if you read these cases,
- 15:24Speaker 2: you see again and again and again is they'll just
- 15:27Speaker 2: escalate and they'll escalate and they'll escalate.
- 15:30Speaker 3: So, yeah.
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- 16:05Speaker 1: would consider being one. So it's patreon.com slash the Teamhouse. Thanks, guys. John,
- 16:11Speaker 1: I got a question for you, right? You're a counterintel guy, right?
- 16:15Speaker 1: By trade, essentially.
- 16:17Speaker 3: I'll never tell.
- 16:18Speaker 2: Yes.
- 16:19Speaker 1: What happens if a former federal worker, like, you know,
- 16:22Speaker 1: establishes a relationship with a consulting company? They've done a
- 16:25Speaker 1: couple of, you know, benign reports about, like, something, you know,
- 16:30Speaker 1: using open source. And then their client essentially asks them
- 16:33Speaker 1: for more that they know that even for them starting
- 16:36Speaker 1: to ring alarm bells, like, I don't know if I
- 16:38Speaker 1: should fucking do this. What does somebody like that do?
- 16:41Speaker 4: Well, first of all, this is a classic elicitation technique
- 16:45Speaker 4: or campaign, which is a collection of tools used to
- 16:48Speaker 4: gain information that a person is not aware is the
- 16:51Speaker 4: information that's desired. And the technique they use is something
- 16:54Speaker 4: called the hourglass technique, where they start out very, very broadly.
- 16:58Speaker 4: There's usually one or two small bits of information that
- 17:00Speaker 4: are actually relevant that they want from you that they
- 17:02Speaker 4: won't ask, obviously, up front, maybe not even the same
- 17:04Speaker 4: first conversation, maybe not even conversation number five. And what
- 17:08Speaker 4: they're doing is slowly building trust and also distracting you
- 17:10Speaker 4: from what is the core information they want so that
- 17:12Speaker 4: when they do get that information, if you were debriefed afterward,
- 17:15Speaker 4: you wouldn't even remember that that's what they asked you
- 17:17Speaker 4: about or what you said. And people tend to remember
- 17:20Speaker 4: questions they were asked, but not statements that were said
- 17:22Speaker 4: to them. And a lot of these elicitation techniques, not
- 17:25Speaker 4: just Chinese, but in general espionage, if you're good at elicitation,
- 17:29Speaker 4: you will not ever ask the question about the information
- 17:32Speaker 4: you want. Instead, the person will almost be like erupting
- 17:35Speaker 4: with the desire to tell it to you.
- 17:37Speaker 3: That's good elicitation, right?
- 17:38Speaker 4: And I just want to put that out there because
- 17:40Speaker 4: it's not like there's some super smart people and then
- 17:42Speaker 4: there's dumb people and the dumb people are the targets.
- 17:44Speaker 1: No.
- 17:45Speaker 4: Good elicitation targets the smartest people and sometimes those are
- 17:48Speaker 4: the people that are the best targets because they think
- 17:49Speaker 4: they're smart enough to avoid elicitation and they'll never know
- 17:52Speaker 4: that it's actually happening to them. And that's really key
- 17:54Speaker 4: is to be very careful about these contacts because they
- 17:57Speaker 4: do start really slowly. There's a classic example of Sergeant
- 18:01Speaker 4: Lone Tree in Russia in the 1990s. He was a
- 18:04Speaker 4: Marine Corps embassy guard who had top secret security clearance
- 18:06Speaker 4: in Moscow. And he met a girl at the bar.
- 18:10Speaker 4: She was in a red dress. She was attractive.
- 18:14Speaker 3: You would not use that adjective to describe him. She
- 18:17Speaker 3: basically developed him over time and really actually drove a.
- 18:20Speaker 4: Wedge between him and the United States because he was
- 18:23Speaker 4: a Native American. She kept pulling on this thread that
- 18:25Speaker 4: other people in America look down upon you and you
- 18:28Speaker 4: could be part of something bigger and so on and
- 18:30Speaker 4: so on.
- 18:30Speaker 3: Never asked him a question.
- 18:32Speaker 4: And then one day, They were in the hotel room
- 18:34Speaker 4: together and there's a knock at the door and it's
- 18:37Speaker 4: Uncle Miro and Uncle Miro wants to talk to him.
- 18:41Speaker 4: But by then it was too late because the elicitation
- 18:43Speaker 4: had already worked and he had already given information about
- 18:45Speaker 4: the embassy unwittingly. Then he went and told the embassy
- 18:48Speaker 4: about it. And this is getting to your question, D.
- 18:49Speaker 4: He went to the embassy and told them about it,
- 18:51Speaker 4: but it was too late. He had already broken the
- 18:53Speaker 4: law and he did go to jail and serve time
- 18:56Speaker 4: in prison for this. And this is a classic example
- 18:58Speaker 4: that we teach at the counterintelligence course. A lot of
- 19:01Speaker 4: human intelligence courses teach this case.
- 19:03Speaker 3: Because it's classic. Like you don't realize it's happening to you.
- 19:05Speaker 3: It's too late. By the time you notice, like, you
- 19:08Speaker 3: know what?
- 19:09Speaker 4: That special access program radar system is a special access program.
- 19:13Speaker 4: I shouldn't have been discussing that, you know, but the
- 19:16Speaker 4: piece you discussed was so off of what you were
- 19:18Speaker 4: thinking that it's like, damn, it's too late. So basically
- 19:23Speaker 4: people sign nondisclosure agreements, both when they first have their
- 19:25Speaker 4: clearance and then when their clearance is taken off in
- 19:28Speaker 4: an inactive status. But they're beholden in that nondisclosure agreement
- 19:33Speaker 4: to never, ever say that stuff. So even if it's
- 19:35Speaker 4: like 50 years later, and they're in a rocking chair,
- 19:38Speaker 4: and they're on Facebook, and an MSS guy contacts them,
- 19:44Speaker 4: wants to reminisce with them about the old days back
- 19:46Speaker 4: when they were a pilot. As you've seen, there's been
- 19:48Speaker 4: some American piloting. who were recently implicated in Chinese espionage
- 19:51Speaker 4: activity with US aircraft and sharing information. That's how these
- 19:55Speaker 4: things start. It's people that are gone. They've left their job,
- 19:59Speaker 4: but the information is still in their brain. And they're
- 20:03Speaker 4: walking around as this juicy tomato that the MSS officer
- 20:06Speaker 4: wants to just pluck and The person just needs care
- 20:09Speaker 4: and feeding. They just need water and sunlight. And eventually
- 20:12Speaker 4: that tomato will be ripe enough to pick and the
- 20:14Speaker 4: person won't even realize it.
- 20:18Speaker 2: Yeah. Wow. I mean, it's funny, John, as you mentioned
- 20:22Speaker 2: that I haven't seen this directly, but I'm wondering, because
- 20:24Speaker 2: you see this in influence operations, well, they'll like the
- 20:28Speaker 2: profile photos of the Twitter pages will be like, you know,
- 20:31Speaker 2: all of these sexy ladies. I'm like, is there going
- 20:33Speaker 2: to be like virtual targeting via catfishing or something like that?
- 20:38Speaker 3: Like There is already.
- 20:40Speaker 2: I'm sure that already happens a lot. I mean, I
- 20:42Speaker 2: know that like in, you know, the Russia, you know,
- 20:46Speaker 2: the Ukraine war, like I know that Ukraine has apparently
- 20:49Speaker 2: used tactics like that, like catfishing to like get Russian
- 20:53Speaker 2: soldiers to reveal their information on dating apps and things
- 20:56Speaker 2: like that. But yeah, that isn't something I maybe I
- 20:58Speaker 2: should create some burner accounts on Tinder or something so
- 21:01Speaker 2: I can start exploring how they're using that tactic. But
- 21:04Speaker 2: that's not something I've looked at directly. But It is interesting,
- 21:07Speaker 2: like what you're saying, like that classic example you just described,
- 21:11Speaker 2: how could that be implemented in the virtual sphere? I'm
- 21:14Speaker 2: sure there's just like tons of opportunity. And I'm pretty
- 21:19Speaker 2: sure that stuff like that is probably already happening. But again,
- 21:22Speaker 2: I haven't been able to do an open source investigation
- 21:24Speaker 2: into it.
- 21:26Speaker 4: Back in the day, actually, there's a PLA unit 61398.
- 21:29Speaker 4: I'm not sure if you're familiar with that, but they
- 21:31Speaker 4: do a lot of signals intelligence and some offensive cyber activity.
- 21:35Speaker 4: And they were helping to enable another Chinese intelligence entity
- 21:40Speaker 4: to do source meetings inside of World of Warcraft. And
- 21:44Speaker 4: they were meeting with their assets in there, and they
- 21:46Speaker 4: were using World of Warcraft gold to pay their assets,
- 21:49Speaker 4: because that gold actually has a real tangible value. You
- 21:53Speaker 4: can sell that gold on eBay, for example, or could
- 21:54Speaker 4: back in the day.
- 21:55Speaker 3: It had value.
- 21:56Speaker 4: So they were actually able to do all of that
- 21:58Speaker 4: without any detection outside.
- 22:00Speaker 3: Of the server of the game, right?
- 22:01Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 22:03Speaker 4: Since we know it, since I'm talking about it, it
- 22:04Speaker 4: is now known, but for a while, it was not
- 22:08Speaker 4: totally like an obvious thing. And it was a very
- 22:10Speaker 4: kind of creative way to use the cyber environment a
- 22:13Speaker 4: long time ago. This is not now a long time
- 22:15Speaker 4: before any of us were talking about this, you know,
- 22:17Speaker 4: like on podcasts and stuff like that.
- 22:18Speaker 3: It's kind of fascinating. Wow.
- 22:21Speaker 2: That is fascinating. I haven't, I haven't dived into this myself,
- 22:25Speaker 2: but I've read that like I think there was literally
- 22:28Speaker 2: like Russian propaganda on Minecraft or something like that. So,
- 22:32Speaker 2: I mean, there's just a whole new world here of
- 22:34Speaker 2: interesting activity that's happening for sure.
- 22:39Speaker 1: So talk about new activity. I don't know if like,
- 22:42Speaker 1: if you guys have noticed, I don't know if John,
- 22:45Speaker 1: you're an Instagram guy or Max, you're an Instagram guy,
- 22:47Speaker 1: but if you scroll through Instagram long enough, you start
- 22:51Speaker 1: getting like, you know, cute, like animal videos. And it
- 22:54Speaker 1: always has like, it's a Russian influencer, right. And with Russian,
- 22:59Speaker 1: like a Russian caption and stuff like that. And I
- 23:01Speaker 1: don't know if it's an info, like a, uh, an
- 23:04Speaker 1: op or whatever, but it's to like make Russians look
- 23:07Speaker 1: like normal people. Like, you know, we're not like totally,
- 23:09Speaker 1: you know, a homicidal maniacs that invade, invade, uh, you know,
- 23:14Speaker 1: sovereign countries. Um, but I've noticed it more and more
- 23:17Speaker 1: that there is a ton of like Russian influences coming
- 23:21Speaker 1: to the top. And it's like, it's not like, you know, um,
- 23:24Speaker 1: only fan girls or like girl like influence it's more
- 23:27Speaker 1: like wholesome kind of content with like I look at
- 23:31Speaker 1: my sphinx cat that loves wearing turtlenecks or whatever you
- 23:34Speaker 1: know like I have noticed that more and more over
- 23:37Speaker 1: the last probably six months on Instagram specifically.
- 23:42Speaker 2: Yeah I don't I mean I feel like maybe my
- 23:44Speaker 2: algorithm is different than yours I am a cat owner
- 23:47Speaker 2: and cat lover myself but I'm not necessarily getting cat
- 23:51Speaker 2: videos on the top of my feed but To your point, Dee,
- 23:55Speaker 2: I haven't looked into this myself and I would be interested, like,
- 23:58Speaker 2: I think somebody could do a study where they create
- 24:01Speaker 2: different profiles and see like how quickly until, you know,
- 24:05Speaker 2: you start getting content that looks like propaganda that comes up.
- 24:08Speaker 2: And I've thought about doing that before because usually when
- 24:11Speaker 2: I look at influence operations, I'm looking kind of like
- 24:13Speaker 2: from the outside in, right? Like I'll find a network
- 24:16Speaker 2: and I'll expand the network and I'm not usually looking
- 24:18Speaker 2: as much from a user's perspective. But I did notice,
- 24:22Speaker 2: so like, I recently I'm like not the biggest personal
- 24:27Speaker 2: consumer of social media. Honestly, I like mostly consume it
- 24:30Speaker 2: in a work context. But I recently created a sort
- 24:33Speaker 2: of Instagram account to, you know, because one of my
- 24:38Speaker 2: friends was making music. And this friend was sort of
- 24:41Speaker 2: a more more sort of like alternative, you know, artist.
- 24:44Speaker 2: It was more sort of on not experimental, but, you know,
- 24:47Speaker 2: not mainstream. And I'm not even joking, like on Instagram.
- 24:52Speaker 2: I started getting like videos of people playing sort of
- 24:55Speaker 2: like experimental folk music in China. And like this kept happening.
- 25:00Speaker 2: And I was like, this can't just be like, why
- 25:02Speaker 2: is it just China over and over again? Like this
- 25:05Speaker 2: can't just be a coincidence. So I have I you know,
- 25:09Speaker 2: this is just speculation. But I guess, you know, this
- 25:11Speaker 2: is a place to speculate and things like that. I
- 25:14Speaker 2: think that and I've always known this to be true.
- 25:17Speaker 2: But it's hard to know, like, you know, the stuff
- 25:19Speaker 2: that I research and investigate and publish on like Spamiflage,
- 25:24Speaker 2: which is sort of this classic, long running, persistent Chinese
- 25:28Speaker 2: influence operation that's very spammy and on social media, like,
- 25:31Speaker 2: I really think that's the tip of the iceberg. And John,
- 25:34Speaker 2: you might know the specific numbers. But when you look
- 25:36Speaker 2: into like, the amount of money that that, you know, China,
- 25:40Speaker 2: or Russia is pouring into information warfare and influence operations, like,
- 25:45Speaker 2: I think the stuff that we catch is, again, just
- 25:47Speaker 2: a small fraction of it. So I wouldn't be surprised
- 25:51Speaker 2: if what you're saying is true and that if there
- 25:53Speaker 2: is something deeper going on, that's harder to detect. And
- 25:56Speaker 2: that would honestly be difficult for me as an open
- 25:59Speaker 2: source investigator to say definitively this is nation state backed activity.
- 26:03Speaker 2: But I wouldn't be surprised if that's going on.
- 26:06Speaker 4: That's exactly the problem with covert influence is that the
- 26:10Speaker 4: very definition of covert is that the sponsor is concealed.
- 26:13Speaker 4: So the activity is public or can be public, but
- 26:17Speaker 4: the person who sent the stuff to happen is not
- 26:20Speaker 4: public or is obfuscated or is misattributed on purpose. And
- 26:24Speaker 4: that's kind of interesting to think about how many things
- 26:26Speaker 4: do we see, especially on social media or other electronic means,
- 26:29Speaker 4: that we think is from X, but it's actually from Y,
- 26:32Speaker 4: and Y is China. And X is, let's say, Belgium
- 26:35Speaker 4: or some musician.
- 26:37Speaker 3: And you're like, oh, that's so nice. But actually, that was.
- 26:39Speaker 4: Intentionally put there in front of you by somebody else,
- 26:42Speaker 4: not by the person that you thought it was. And actually,
- 26:44Speaker 4: that kind of goes toward my thought about the crossover
- 26:47Speaker 4: between the real world and the virtual world. And for
- 26:51Speaker 4: a long time, China has had the Confucius Institutes. They've
- 26:54Speaker 4: had student organizations. There's a China center here that's actually
- 26:59Speaker 4: got funding from China, has students from China in it.
- 27:03Speaker 4: that are kind of promoting Chinese ideals and some other things.
- 27:07Speaker 4: And there are reading groups that focus on like specific
- 27:10Speaker 4: Chinese literature that is very much aligned with what is
- 27:13Speaker 4: the party line in China. And it's bringing in non-Chinese
- 27:15Speaker 4: students to hear it and all this. And I'm curious,
- 27:18Speaker 4: where do you see that? Like, do you see that
- 27:19Speaker 4: bleeding over into the virtual space that you're looking at?
- 27:23Speaker 2: I mean, a hundred percent. And again, like, it's funny,
- 27:26Speaker 2: I have a, former intern who became my research assistant.
- 27:30Speaker 2: And she's like, I guess I'm technically Gen Z, like
- 27:33Speaker 2: I'm on like the cusp, right? But she's like, I've
- 27:36Speaker 2: heard there's like Gen Z1 and Gen Z2. And she's
- 27:38Speaker 2: like Gen Z2. So she's like on social media. And
- 27:42Speaker 2: I feel like that just gives her like a level
- 27:44Speaker 2: of skill and talent and awareness and all of this
- 27:47Speaker 2: that I lack, right? So it's hard for me to
- 27:49Speaker 2: say because again, like I feel like you know, because
- 27:52Speaker 2: I studied this, I'm like, Oh, my gosh, this is
- 27:53Speaker 2: so toxic. It's like, I don't want to be putting
- 27:55Speaker 2: this into my own brain. You know what I'm saying?
- 27:58Speaker 2: But like, the thing is, is like, yes, 100%. And
- 28:02Speaker 2: it's funny, like, what you mentioned, John, about like the
- 28:05Speaker 2: Confucian Institute and stuff like that. And it's like, you know, like, I, before, before, like,
- 28:11Speaker 2: you know, it was really, I think, during like the
- 28:13Speaker 2: first Trump administration, when I think, like people who weren't
- 28:18Speaker 2: in sensitive spaces started becoming more aware of the China threat, right? Like,
- 28:24Speaker 2: I remember like growing up, like, you know, it was
- 28:27Speaker 2: like the sort of idea, at least that I had
- 28:29Speaker 2: and that everybody had, you know, like I learned Mandarin
- 28:31Speaker 2: for like six years in school. And it's like, I
- 28:34Speaker 2: feel like we were all like, oh, like China is
- 28:35Speaker 2: like a great business opportunity, right? And like, we weren't
- 28:38Speaker 2: necessarily seeing it as like a peer competition or, you know,
- 28:43Speaker 2: like a threat to us, you know, economic security, our
- 28:47Speaker 2: way of life, things like that. Um, but yeah, totally.
- 28:51Speaker 2: I mean, they, they invest heavily in online influence operations
- 28:54Speaker 2: and like, you know, it really depends like how deep
- 28:56Speaker 2: you want to go.
- 28:57Speaker 3: Right.
- 28:58Speaker 2: And this is a topic that people don't talk about
- 29:00Speaker 2: as often now, but just to sort of bring this
- 29:02Speaker 2: back up again, just for people to look into, um,
- 29:06Speaker 2: you know, there was a study put out by, um,
- 29:10Speaker 2: a group called the network contagion research Institute. Um, it
- 29:13Speaker 2: was a few years ago. And this is just the study.
- 29:16Speaker 2: This isn't me making any claim about anything. This is
- 29:19Speaker 2: me just communicating what the study is to the best
- 29:21Speaker 2: of my understanding. They looked at the time TikTok had
- 29:26Speaker 2: transparency features, which I think would allow you to see
- 29:28Speaker 2: like some breakdown of content. I forget whether or not
- 29:32Speaker 2: it was by hashtags or whatever, but like anybody who
- 29:35Speaker 2: was like advertising or doing digital marketing on TikTok would
- 29:38Speaker 2: have access to this tool, right? Because they would want
- 29:40Speaker 2: to know like what are trending topics, right? And Instagram
- 29:43Speaker 2: had a comparable tool and they looked at, you know,
- 29:50Speaker 2: topics that were sensitive to the CCP and like, you know,
- 29:53Speaker 2: like Uyghur genocide, right? And even things like, you know,
- 29:57Speaker 2: like Tibet, freedom and whatever and even some more like
- 30:00Speaker 2: interesting stuff like i think like cashmere independence like stuff
- 30:03Speaker 2: that's like kind of very niche and it was like
- 30:07Speaker 2: dramatically less likely to be uh happening on tiktok than
- 30:12Speaker 2: it was on instagram like it wasn't trending on tiktok
- 30:16Speaker 2: in the same way that it would on instagram right
- 30:17Speaker 2: and you could read their report to get more of
- 30:20Speaker 2: the details and And I know there were some critiques
- 30:24Speaker 2: like about the methodology of it and things like that,
- 30:27Speaker 2: which I haven't investigated myself, so I can't say. But
- 30:31Speaker 2: I believe if I'm remembering correctly, that TikTok responded by
- 30:36Speaker 2: taking away that transparency feature, like almost like the next day. Right.
- 30:40Speaker 2: So it's like regardless of whether or not you whatever
- 30:43Speaker 2: you think about that study, which I think it was
- 30:45Speaker 2: a fantastic study and a fascinating study. If you just
- 30:47Speaker 2: look at the response from TikTok, that should tell you. okay,
- 30:52Speaker 2: that's very concerning, right? Like if there was nothing to hide,
- 30:56Speaker 2: why would they do that? So it's just an interesting point, right?
- 31:01Speaker 4: Actually, why is that concerning or is that concerning question
- 31:04Speaker 4: is very interesting to me always to ask that, like,
- 31:07Speaker 4: why should we care about this? Because a lot of
- 31:09Speaker 4: Americans I talk to that are not in the intelligence
- 31:10Speaker 4: community and not in the government, they're like, well, why
- 31:12Speaker 4: does it matter that TikTok retains all my data and
- 31:14Speaker 4: sends it back to China?
- 31:15Speaker 3: Why does it.
- 31:16Speaker 4: Matter that little red book back when TikTok was temporarily offline?
- 31:20Speaker 4: Why is it bad for me to use Little Red Book?
- 31:22Speaker 4: Why is it bad for me to have WeChat on
- 31:23Speaker 4: my phone, for example? And maybe you can help some
- 31:26Speaker 4: listeners who are less familiar with the China-specific issue. Why
- 31:29Speaker 4: should they be concerned as private citizens?
- 31:33Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, so, I mean, there's the data privacy
- 31:36Speaker 2: issue and that, and it's like sometimes hard to sell
- 31:39Speaker 2: people on that because like, you know, as you know,
- 31:41Speaker 2: I'm not trying to make a political statement here, but
- 31:43Speaker 2: like when you see these stories about like how, you know,
- 31:48Speaker 2: Everything is constantly spying on you. You know what, like
- 31:50Speaker 2: your smart TV is spying on you. Your iPhone is spying. Like,
- 31:53Speaker 2: it's like, okay. Yeah, I guess that's kind of a
- 31:56Speaker 2: hard sell, right? Like consumer, you know, whatever they call it,
- 31:59Speaker 2: like surveillance capitalism or whatever. Like most people will be like, okay,
- 32:03Speaker 2: I gave up, you know, the personal privacy thing a
- 32:07Speaker 2: long time ago, obviously trying to sell them that look
- 32:10Speaker 2: when that information is in the hands of a hostile adversary,
- 32:13Speaker 2: that is a different conversation. Granted, if somebody is not,
- 32:16Speaker 2: you know, speaking out against the CCP or whatever, then
- 32:20Speaker 2: maybe that's not a concern. But I always try and
- 32:22Speaker 2: tell people is from a broader perspective, like, you know,
- 32:25Speaker 2: like John, you might, or Dee, you guys might know
- 32:28Speaker 2: more about this. This isn't something I've looked into too
- 32:31Speaker 2: deeply myself, but like, you know, the Chinese police station
- 32:34Speaker 2: that was in the United States. And again, like transnational repression,
- 32:38Speaker 2: like I think the concern is that if let's say
- 32:42Speaker 2: you were a private citizen and if China were to
- 32:45Speaker 2: sort of increase its repression apparatus, I don't think it's
- 32:48Speaker 2: so farfetched. They already do this to a lot of
- 32:49Speaker 2: Chinese dissidents who are living overseas. I've heard even some
- 32:54Speaker 2: cases anecdotally of them doing this to non-Chinese people who
- 32:57Speaker 2: are speaking out against the CCP, right? But like, to
- 33:00Speaker 2: what degree will they use your personal information to harass you?
- 33:04Speaker 2: Would they even use your personal information to dox you
- 33:07Speaker 2: in the future, right? I wouldn't be surprised about that.
- 33:10Speaker 2: We've seen nation states engaged in doxing type activity as
- 33:14Speaker 2: a form of information operations, right? I wrote a report
- 33:17Speaker 2: with a colleague of mine named Ari Ben-Om about an
- 33:21Speaker 2: Iranian operation that was targeting Israeli Air Force personnel, and
- 33:26Speaker 2: they essentially doxed them, right? Or they like, they were
- 33:29Speaker 2: actually not really doxing them. They were kind of more
- 33:32Speaker 2: just like taking public information and treating it as if
- 33:36Speaker 2: it was doxing. But yeah, you see like hacktivist groups
- 33:40Speaker 2: engaged in doxing campaigns often and things like that. So
- 33:45Speaker 2: that's one thing. But I think Just to answer your question, John,
- 33:47Speaker 2: like why should people care more than just the sort
- 33:50Speaker 2: of data privacy issue or the espionage issue? Because like, yeah,
- 33:53Speaker 2: your average person isn't necessarily going to care about that
- 33:56Speaker 2: per se, or they might not think that they're going
- 33:58Speaker 2: to be a target of that. But I think the
- 34:01Speaker 2: broader conversation, when we think especially about influence operations, which
- 34:04Speaker 2: is really like one of my main areas of focus,
- 34:07Speaker 2: it's just a question of like cognitive sovereignty, right? Like
- 34:10Speaker 2: if you frame it not, it's like, I'm not trying
- 34:12Speaker 2: to tell you to, you should vote Democrat or vote Republican.
- 34:16Speaker 2: or that you should be pro-China even, or anti-China, right? Like,
- 34:19Speaker 2: that's not what I'm trying to tell you, because people
- 34:21Speaker 2: will have different opinions about all of those things. I
- 34:24Speaker 2: myself have my own strong opinions, right? But it's like,
- 34:27Speaker 2: I'm not even, that's not even the conversation. Just in
- 34:30Speaker 2: a question of cognitive sovereignty, like, do you understand who
- 34:33Speaker 2: is shaping the way you think, feel, and behave, right?
- 34:37Speaker 2: And I'm not saying that there's some pure, like, you know,
- 34:40Speaker 2: uncontaminated space where one can, like, where those things can
- 34:44Speaker 2: be shaped just like in, you know, you go to
- 34:46Speaker 2: Yale and those things are being shaped by different people
- 34:49Speaker 2: and different people with different agendas, right? Not just the CCP, but,
- 34:52Speaker 2: you know, like we at FDD, you know, my think
- 34:56Speaker 2: tank has written, you know, really heavily about Qatari money
- 34:59Speaker 2: and Qatari money in higher education and how they're trying
- 35:01Speaker 2: to shape people's views, right? But I think it's very hard, right?
- 35:07Speaker 2: Like my entire job is essentially a huge part of
- 35:11Speaker 2: my job is trying to break the operational security of
- 35:15Speaker 2: covert campaigns, right? And there are different ways that I
- 35:18Speaker 2: can do that, right? Sometimes if I get lucky, there's
- 35:21Speaker 2: a clear indicator that something's based out of China, even
- 35:23Speaker 2: though they're posing as an American. Sometimes there's just sort
- 35:26Speaker 2: of indicators of coordinated behavior and indicators that of inauthenticity, right? Like, oh,
- 35:31Speaker 2: this isn't saying what it says it is. And it's
- 35:34Speaker 2: also coordinated. And then I can sort of make a
- 35:37Speaker 2: sort of low confidence assessment that it might be aligned
- 35:41Speaker 2: with the objectives of the CCP or Iran or whatever
- 35:45Speaker 2: based off of the narratives, right? Like sometimes it can
- 35:47Speaker 2: be pretty clear when you just look at the narratives
- 35:50Speaker 2: that it's advancing CCP interests. But there's so much that
- 35:53Speaker 2: we will never catch, right? And that's the thing, right?
- 35:55Speaker 2: And that's like Dee brought this up and that's a
- 35:57Speaker 2: great point. Like are those cat videos with Russian subtitles
- 36:01Speaker 2: or Russian op or is it something more innocent? Like
- 36:04Speaker 2: I don't know.
- 36:05Speaker 3: Right.
- 36:05Speaker 2: And I don't know if we will ever know. And like, hopefully,
- 36:09Speaker 2: you know, one day the U S government will take
- 36:12Speaker 2: this issue more seriously and, you know, doing it in
- 36:15Speaker 2: a way that protects free speech and protects, you know,
- 36:18Speaker 2: the privacy of, of, you know, of American citizens and stuff.
- 36:22Speaker 2: Hopefully they'll look into those cat videos, you know, and
- 36:24Speaker 2: they'll look into all these other things and actually try
- 36:26Speaker 2: and get a holistic picture about what's going on. But
- 36:30Speaker 2: there's so much that we will never know. And I
- 36:32Speaker 2: think that's just why, like, Again, people should be aware
- 36:35Speaker 2: that this type of stuff is happening. Like, you know, D,
- 36:38Speaker 2: obviously you are dramatically more informed than the average citizen.
- 36:41Speaker 2: So your spidey senses go up when you see something
- 36:44Speaker 2: like that. Like I study this issue for a living.
- 36:47Speaker 2: So like when I created the Instagram to follow my
- 36:49Speaker 2: friend's music and I started seeing, you know, all these like,
- 36:52Speaker 2: you know, folk artists like on the streets and in China,
- 36:55Speaker 2: I was like, okay, this is something that's maybe not
- 36:58Speaker 2: so innocent. But I think people just need to be
- 37:01Speaker 2: aware of it to begin with. Like that is already
- 37:04Speaker 2: going to cause people to have, again, their spidey senses
- 37:08Speaker 2: up and maybe be a little bit less susceptible to that.
- 37:11Speaker 2: Those types of like really like very covert and hard
- 37:14Speaker 2: to catch campaigns, which I and other researchers will likely
- 37:17Speaker 2: never catch.
- 37:21Speaker 3: Yeah.
- 37:22Speaker 1: Talking specifically to the Instagram stuff, it's weird. I don't
- 37:25Speaker 1: know if it's a. maybe algorithm hacking or whatever, but
- 37:28Speaker 1: like a lot of the, the, a lot of viral
- 37:32Speaker 1: videos of anything really, they, their captions are completely different
- 37:37Speaker 1: to what the actual video is about. Um, a lot
- 37:41Speaker 1: of times also it's in a different language, sometimes Chinese. Uh, it's,
- 37:48Speaker 1: it's interesting to see, you know, I guess people don't
- 37:50Speaker 1: really pay super a ton of attention to the captions
- 37:53Speaker 1: at the, at the bottom of the videos. Um, Because
- 37:56Speaker 1: like if you're just scrolling through reels, like you're not
- 37:58Speaker 1: going to stop and look at the caption really. And
- 38:00Speaker 1: if you do notice it, like there's a lot of
- 38:02Speaker 1: captions that are almost exactly the same. And a lot
- 38:06Speaker 1: of the times have nothing to do with what the
- 38:09Speaker 1: video is about. And a lot of the times also
- 38:12Speaker 1: it's like you can kind of tell it's like spit
- 38:14Speaker 1: out like AI, like an AI summary of something. It's interesting.
- 38:20Speaker 1: My guess is that's likely more just like people trying
- 38:23Speaker 1: to hack the algorithm. I think, but I wouldn't be
- 38:27Speaker 1: surprised if it was some Chinese operation or Russian operation
- 38:31Speaker 1: just trying to be like, no, see, we're great people.
- 38:35Speaker 1: It's okay that we're bulldozing Ukraine. I wanted to ask
- 38:39Speaker 1: you a question about the Dixon-Yo operation. That was back
- 38:45Speaker 1: in 2015, so 10 years earlier. That seemed to be
- 38:48Speaker 1: a lot more like, I guess, what's the best word
- 38:51Speaker 1: to say? Like targeted?
- 38:52Speaker 3: Targeted.
- 38:53Speaker 1: These are obviously the new version of stuff is obviously
- 38:55Speaker 1: pretty targeted as well. But like, I think the big
- 38:58Speaker 1: difference is like scale, right? Because you're talking like this
- 39:01Speaker 1: is being proliferated pretty quickly. And is it like the
- 39:04Speaker 1: only difference in this is just like the, you know,
- 39:07Speaker 1: AI becoming a thing and like making it a lot
- 39:09Speaker 1: easier to like make fake websites, make fake posts, make
- 39:13Speaker 1: fake companies and like get it out there as much
- 39:15Speaker 1: as possible, blanket it and see what we can reel in?
- 39:18Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, D, that's a great question. And yeah,
- 39:21Speaker 2: AI definitely plays a part. I think recently, the most
- 39:25Speaker 2: recent websites that I published on, I saw that they
- 39:28Speaker 2: were created with lovable. Are you guys familiar with lovable?
- 39:31Speaker 2: Or no, it's like a AI website generating platform, right?
- 39:35Speaker 2: So it's like uses AI to help you create a
- 39:39Speaker 2: website very quickly. Um, and I've seen AI tools used
- 39:44Speaker 2: for like web development in other similar websites in the past, right?
- 39:48Speaker 2: Like it might not be as obvious as lovable, but
- 39:50Speaker 2: there'll be little signatures and like HTML and stuff, or
- 39:53Speaker 2: like the backend of the website that shows, um, that
- 39:56Speaker 2: it was likely created using AI. I think, you know,
- 39:59Speaker 2: it's hard to say, right? Like I've been focusing on
- 40:02Speaker 2: this issue for several years, um, as I mentioned. And, uh, moreover,
- 40:07Speaker 2: I've only, I'm an open source researcher, right? So everything
- 40:10Speaker 2: I do is in the open source. So do I
- 40:12Speaker 2: have the most holistic picture about every single website that's
- 40:16Speaker 2: ever existed? And that's a Chinese targeting website. Um, and,
- 40:22Speaker 2: and can I like sort of create that map to
- 40:24Speaker 2: show the scale increasing? No, not necessarily, but what I
- 40:28Speaker 2: can say is like the scale now is like huge.
- 40:30Speaker 2: I'm talking like at least hundreds of websites. If not more,
- 40:34Speaker 2: if not thousands, quite frankly, I've myself uncovered. Hundreds of websites.
- 40:39Speaker 3: Right.
- 40:40Speaker 2: And there's, there's probably more. And what I would say
- 40:43Speaker 2: is this, like, um, you know, just to sort of
- 40:46Speaker 2: bring this back to like, you know, what John said earlier, like,
- 40:48Speaker 2: why does this matter? Um, so there's a couple of
- 40:51Speaker 2: things I would say here, first of all, like, you know,
- 40:54Speaker 2: the FBI recently seized, uh, 13 internet domains that were
- 40:58Speaker 2: associated with suspected Chinese, uh, espionage operations. And, you know, like,
- 41:03Speaker 2: I think this is good, right? Like, I think when
- 41:08Speaker 2: the U.S. government identifies these or, you know, comes to
- 41:11Speaker 2: its own determination that this is likely a suspected espionage operation,
- 41:15Speaker 2: they should totally do that. But the thing is, it's
- 41:18Speaker 2: like 13 domains is like a drop in the bucket, right? Like,
- 41:21Speaker 2: I mean, really, like, it's not putting a kibosh on
- 41:24Speaker 2: this type of activity. And it's the exact, it's like
- 41:27Speaker 2: the exact, sorry, John, did you want to say something
- 41:29Speaker 2: about that really quickly or no? It's like the exact
- 41:31Speaker 2: same issue that we see with like influence operations, right?
- 41:34Speaker 2: It's like, and even in cyber and, you know, more
- 41:37Speaker 2: conventional cyber attacks as well, right? You take down malicious infrastructure. Well,
- 41:42Speaker 2: I mean, malicious actors are just going to recreate that infrastructure, right?
- 41:47Speaker 2: So I think it's like, it's a broader problem where
- 41:51Speaker 2: it's just like, you know, the scale, like you said,
- 41:53Speaker 2: I believe is likely increasing because of AI and because
- 41:56Speaker 2: of You must assume, I don't know, but you must
- 41:59Speaker 2: assume that the reason they're doing this, this is another
- 42:01Speaker 2: important point, is that it's working, right? Like, why would
- 42:04Speaker 2: they be doing this so much if it wasn't working?
- 42:08Speaker 2: And you can see, like, if you look at different,
- 42:11Speaker 2: you know, sentencings and arrests and things like that in cases,
- 42:16Speaker 2: cases involving this specific TTP, you can see people who've
- 42:20Speaker 2: been arrested over the past few years who were targeted
- 42:23Speaker 2: by a fake consulting company. or via LinkedIn, or via,
- 42:27Speaker 2: like you mentioned at the beginning, D, gig working platform, right?
- 42:32Speaker 2: Like Upwork or whatever, right? Or even like weirder niche
- 42:36Speaker 2: ones that I've seen. So like it appears to be working.
- 42:42Speaker 2: And like, look, just seizing 13 domains isn't going to
- 42:45Speaker 2: make a huge difference. But to be honest with you,
- 42:48Speaker 2: even if they were to like take down every single
- 42:50Speaker 2: domain tomorrow, what's going to stop these services from... creating
- 42:55Speaker 2: new ones. And I've become more tight lipped over time
- 42:59Speaker 2: about how I identify these because I don't necessarily like
- 43:03Speaker 2: in the beginning, it's sort of hard, right? Because I
- 43:05Speaker 2: do public research, I don't have the authority of the
- 43:07Speaker 2: US government when I say, this is what I think
- 43:10Speaker 2: it is. And I have to prove my work, right?
- 43:12Speaker 2: Which is why I will show things like, oh, this
- 43:14Speaker 2: is how I identified it. This is why I think
- 43:16Speaker 2: it is what it is. But I've, you know, I've
- 43:18Speaker 2: become a little bit more tight lipped now. Because Also,
- 43:22Speaker 2: when you find them and even look, even if I
- 43:24Speaker 2: weren't to say how I discovered it, they can still
- 43:26Speaker 2: do their own assessment. Oh, this got taken down. Where
- 43:29Speaker 2: were our operational security lapses? Right. So it's just like,
- 43:33Speaker 2: there's just going to be more and more created. This
- 43:35Speaker 2: is just the reality of the internet, right? Like it
- 43:38Speaker 2: is an open environment. People can create things. People can
- 43:42Speaker 2: create websites, right? Like you don't necessarily need to show
- 43:45Speaker 2: somebody your social security number to create a website, right?
- 43:48Speaker 2: Different providers. have different know your customer practices. And that's
- 43:51Speaker 2: also interestingly why you sometimes see them going back to
- 43:54Speaker 2: the same hosting companies because they have sort of broken
- 43:58Speaker 2: their know your customer or their know your customer might
- 44:00Speaker 2: be more relaxed. It's sort of a long conversation, which
- 44:03Speaker 2: I can go on, but like, look, you're not going
- 44:05Speaker 2: to stop them from creating these websites. LinkedIn can really
- 44:08Speaker 2: crack down, but it's not only LinkedIn. It's also Craigslist.
- 44:11Speaker 2: It's also Upwork. Like what are we going to like,
- 44:14Speaker 2: are all of these platforms going to crack down? I mean, maybe,
- 44:18Speaker 2: maybe not.
- 44:18Speaker 3: Right.
- 44:19Speaker 2: And there's only so much that they can always do too.
- 44:21Speaker 4: Right.
- 44:21Speaker 2: Like you can also use stolen identities. Like some of
- 44:24Speaker 2: the domains that were seized by the FBI, they were
- 44:27Speaker 2: registered using stolen identities. Right. And obviously we know there's
- 44:31Speaker 2: a huge black market for, you know, identity theft and
- 44:34Speaker 2: things like that. So that's why I really think it's
- 44:36Speaker 2: like the same thing with, you know, like when we
- 44:37Speaker 2: think about influence operations. It's a very similar thing with
- 44:41Speaker 2: these sort of virtual espionage operations, like raising awareness. Like
- 44:44Speaker 2: that is like the first line of defense, right? Like
- 44:47Speaker 2: that is, and that is maybe the most that you,
- 44:50Speaker 2: one of the most powerful things you can do because
- 44:52Speaker 2: they're going to keep recreating the infrastructure. The infrastructure is
- 44:54Speaker 2: going to get harder to detect over time. You know,
- 44:57Speaker 2: I'm going to keep building my skills. I'm going to
- 44:59Speaker 2: keep looking at it. I know there's other researchers who
- 45:02Speaker 2: are looking at this, who are even more skilled than
- 45:04Speaker 2: I am, right? Like we're all going to keep looking
- 45:06Speaker 2: at this, but they're going to keep refining their tactics
- 45:08Speaker 2: and getting harder. I think that's why like this podcast
- 45:12Speaker 2: is really important and like conversations like this are really
- 45:15Speaker 2: important so that people know, you know, cause not every,
- 45:18Speaker 2: I know like, you know, clearance holders get counterintelligence training
- 45:21Speaker 2: and things like that, but not everybody might know about
- 45:24Speaker 2: this specific tactic. And like, honestly, like you don't have to,
- 45:27Speaker 2: you don't, you don't need to be a malicious person
- 45:30Speaker 2: to be susceptible to this.
- 45:31Speaker 4: Right.
- 45:31Speaker 2: I do think there are general, genuine, like unwitting victims
- 45:35Speaker 2: who like, why?
- 45:36Speaker 3: Yeah.
- 45:36Speaker 2: Like say you're a former state department person. let's say
- 45:38Speaker 2: you were unexpectedly laid off by Doge or whatever. Right.
- 45:42Speaker 2: And like, yeah, like maybe you're in a, like a seriously,
- 45:46Speaker 2: genuinely hard time. And if you get this benign request
- 45:48Speaker 2: for somebody to tell you about, Hey, can you like,
- 45:51Speaker 2: tell us about the geopolitical implications of, you know, the like,
- 45:55Speaker 2: you know, Russia, Ukraine conflict and whatever, why not?
- 45:59Speaker 3: Right.
- 45:59Speaker 2: So it's just like, I under, I think that like,
- 46:03Speaker 2: you really just have to raise awareness here. Cause like
- 46:05Speaker 2: you said, D the scale is just going to keep
- 46:07Speaker 2: increasing and And I think also it's shocking sometimes like
- 46:10Speaker 2: how poor quality these operations are, right? Where people will
- 46:13Speaker 2: be like, how, well, how is an intelligence service doing this?
- 46:15Speaker 2: Cause it's so sloppy. Like John, I don't know if,
- 46:17Speaker 2: you know, and I don't know how much you can
- 46:19Speaker 2: speak about, but it's like, sometimes like I've heard somebody
- 46:21Speaker 2: say recently, like, like PRC operations, whether they be influence
- 46:24Speaker 2: or SB knowledge can be remarkably sloppy, which is also
- 46:27Speaker 2: why they're really fun to like study and investigate. Um,
- 46:30Speaker 2: but it's like, you know, they're going to get better,
- 46:33Speaker 2: you know, eventually. probably, and they're going to just keep happening.
- 46:38Speaker 2: And there's no, I think, real way to stop the
- 46:42Speaker 2: flood and stop the deluge. So people's awareness is really
- 46:46Speaker 2: their first line of defense.
- 46:48Speaker 4: Yeah, actually, that casting a wide net has been an
- 46:51Speaker 4: MSS strategy for a very long time, where we see
- 46:54Speaker 4: a lot of the sloppier stuff, but there's a lot
- 46:56Speaker 4: of not sloppy stuff that we don't see. And it's
- 47:00Speaker 4: almost an intentional sloppiness.
- 47:02Speaker 3: Because we get.
- 47:03Speaker 4: Distracted by the easy cases and that takes resources away
- 47:07Speaker 4: from the harder cases.
- 47:09Speaker 3: So there are these more complex, deep, long-term.
- 47:12Speaker 4: Ops going on that we just might never know about
- 47:14Speaker 4: because it was so difficult to notice any indicator in
- 47:17Speaker 4: the first place, even if we were not paying attention
- 47:20Speaker 4: to the simpler, lower hanging fruit.
- 47:22Speaker 3: But because there's so much low hanging fruit, you can't
- 47:23Speaker 3: ignore it.
- 47:24Speaker 4: I mean, especially if you're in a law enforcement capacity,
- 47:26Speaker 4: like Department of Homeland Security or FBI counterintelligence, You have
- 47:30Speaker 4: to stop what you see. You know, if there is
- 47:32Speaker 4: an illicit activity going on, you're either going to exploit
- 47:34Speaker 4: it or neutralize it.
- 47:35Speaker 3: Those are your two options. Ignoring it is not an option.
- 47:38Speaker 3: So you have to.
- 47:39Speaker 4: Throw resources against a smaller thing like the handing off
- 47:42Speaker 4: of a USB thumb drive in a parking lot, which
- 47:44Speaker 4: is the old way, or the newer way, which is
- 47:46Speaker 4: talking to somebody on LinkedIn and sending them a research
- 47:49Speaker 4: paper that you wrote about a weapon system that's completely
- 47:52Speaker 4: open source and it's okay, but it's not okay.
- 47:56Speaker 3: The FBI has to pay attention to that too.
- 47:57Speaker 4: And now you've only got so many counterintelligence officers that
- 48:00Speaker 4: are running around and they cannot focus on this bigger thing.
- 48:02Speaker 4: They won't even notice the subtle, tiny indicators that are
- 48:05Speaker 4: kind of sparkling around in the ether on that deeper issue.
- 48:10Speaker 2: Yeah, John, that's like a fascinating point. And it's hard
- 48:13Speaker 2: for me to say whether or not this is intentional
- 48:15Speaker 2: or not. Sometimes one might think, right? But there is
- 48:19Speaker 2: a case, I know we keep switching back between like
- 48:21Speaker 2: espionage and influence operations. And those are distinct things. I
- 48:25Speaker 2: know there are sometimes overlapping in the tactics, which is
- 48:27Speaker 2: like what we're describing, which is fascinating, especially like, you know,
- 48:31Speaker 2: in the online space. But to go back to the
- 48:34Speaker 2: influence operation space, there's something known as operation overload, which
- 48:38Speaker 2: is a very well-researched, you know, operation. You can read
- 48:42Speaker 2: a lot about it. It's a Russian operation. And the
- 48:46Speaker 2: whole point of this is to intentionally... uh, overload the
- 48:51Speaker 2: capacity of like fact checkers and influence operations researchers, which
- 48:55Speaker 2: is also funny. Cause there's like, there's not a lot
- 48:57Speaker 2: of us, right? Like it's a small niche community. Um,
- 49:00Speaker 2: there's some private sector organizations that do this. Um, but
- 49:04Speaker 2: like the sort of, uh, private and nonprofit like sector
- 49:08Speaker 2: of people who do this type of research is like
- 49:10Speaker 2: not huge. Right. Um, and there was this operation they
- 49:13Speaker 2: would send, they would like create bogus stuff And then
- 49:16Speaker 2: they would send it to researchers to say like, oh, like,
- 49:18Speaker 2: can you look into this? Can you look into this? Like,
- 49:20Speaker 2: and journalists too right because journalists do their own investigative
- 49:23Speaker 2: work and they do their own debunking and they do
- 49:25Speaker 2: their own you know they expose operations too um so
- 49:28Speaker 2: like uh yeah like definitely i could i could imagine
- 49:32Speaker 2: that there could be a similar dynamic at play john
- 49:34Speaker 2: hopefully we're not giving anybody a bad idea here but
- 49:37Speaker 2: like you know we're like They're looking to overwhelm the
- 49:40Speaker 2: capacity of not just like nonprofit researchers who are looking
- 49:44Speaker 2: at influence operations, but even just like a country's own
- 49:47Speaker 2: like counterintelligence, you know, capabilities. And I think the other
- 49:51Speaker 2: thing is it's like, OK, like I don't think like
- 49:54Speaker 2: a country that is invested in its own reputation and
- 49:58Speaker 2: not being seen as an espionage threat would do this.
- 50:01Speaker 3: Right.
- 50:01Speaker 2: Like but I think the thing with China is it's
- 50:03Speaker 2: like they just I don't really think they care. Or
- 50:06Speaker 2: maybe they do care. Like, they're certainly on some level, like,
- 50:08Speaker 2: they're very sensitive about reputational stuff. That's why they, like,
- 50:12Speaker 2: you know, go after, like, Falun Gong and why they, like,
- 50:15Speaker 2: go after all these dissidents. And it's like, they're extremely, like,
- 50:19Speaker 2: sensitive about their reputation. So I guess maybe I wouldn't
- 50:23Speaker 2: say that that isn't a fair characterization to say that
- 50:25Speaker 2: they don't care. Like, when I've shared information with journalists,
- 50:28Speaker 2: sometimes they get responses from the embassy and they, like,
- 50:31Speaker 2: they sound pissed. I mean, I don't know if that
- 50:33Speaker 2: they just feel like they have to do that. But, like,
- 50:35Speaker 2: The thing is, is that it seems like, I don't
- 50:40Speaker 2: know why, like, but they just, they don't have the
- 50:42Speaker 2: same risk calculus that we do, right? Like, they aren't, like,
- 50:45Speaker 2: Russia doesn't, Russia certainly doesn't care. Like, Russia doesn't care
- 50:48Speaker 2: if its influence operation gets exposed, right? They've actually deliberately done, like,
- 50:53Speaker 2: it's sometimes called, like, perception hacking, where they, like, will
- 50:57Speaker 2: deliberately try and make it seem like they corrupted an
- 51:01Speaker 2: election through influence operations because they want people to fight
- 51:04Speaker 2: each other. Hey, and they want, you know, like I
- 51:06Speaker 2: remember there was like, I think it was like a
- 51:08Speaker 2: midterm election, like after 2016 and that got a lot of,
- 51:11Speaker 2: you know, the troll farms and everything got a lot
- 51:13Speaker 2: of attention. And then I think the internet research agency,
- 51:16Speaker 2: which is like the famous troll farm that was created
- 51:18Speaker 2: by Putin's chef, I believe if I remember correctly, they
- 51:22Speaker 2: created a website specifically like saying like, oh yeah, we're
- 51:25Speaker 2: the IRA. And we like, we compromised your election and like,
- 51:29Speaker 2: it's all bullshit. And like, you know, like your guy's
- 51:31Speaker 2: election is invalid.
- 51:32Speaker 3: Right.
- 51:32Speaker 2: So like, you know, Russia doesn't have the same risk calculus. Obviously,
- 51:36Speaker 2: Iran doesn't. I mean, and I say oftentimes, I feel
- 51:38Speaker 2: like they don't really have much to lose at this point. Like,
- 51:42Speaker 2: they don't even need to be covert. Like, you know,
- 51:44Speaker 2: you look at the Lego videos, like nobody was questioning
- 51:46Speaker 2: that that was coming from Iran. But you know, if
- 51:48Speaker 2: they said things that they felt like Americans would be
- 51:50Speaker 2: sympathetic towards, they thought that it would make them sympathetic
- 51:53Speaker 2: towards the regime. But with China, and specifically, again, my
- 51:57Speaker 2: sort of area of expertise, which is, again, admittedly, somewhat
- 52:00Speaker 2: more narrow, which is like these virtual targeting operations, like
- 52:04Speaker 2: I have literally exposed, like, the second report I wrote
- 52:07Speaker 2: on this, I exposed a website, I exposed a domain, right? This,
- 52:12Speaker 2: somebody who was claiming to be associated with the same website,
- 52:15Speaker 2: the same company, reached out to, like, I think of
- 52:18Speaker 2: either a current or a former State Department official. Like,
- 52:22Speaker 2: they don't, the infrastructure, they're going to keep using the
- 52:25Speaker 2: same infrastructure, the same front companies, even after it's exposed.
- 52:29Speaker 2: So I just don't know, again, like, What actually is
- 52:32Speaker 2: the calculus, the risk calculus? Do they actually care? How
- 52:36Speaker 2: much do they care? And are they sort of flooding
- 52:39Speaker 2: the zone intentionally to try and distract counterintelligence officials or
- 52:46Speaker 2: distract researchers, nonprofit researchers, different, you know, whatever? Who knows?
- 52:51Speaker 2: It's just speculation, but I really wouldn't be surprised if
- 52:56Speaker 2: that was part of the whole strategy here.
- 52:59Speaker 4: And actually, so we talked about Iran and Russia, but
- 53:01Speaker 4: we haven't mentioned North Korea. And I'm curious, in your work,
- 53:04Speaker 4: have you seen any kind of like joint work or
- 53:06Speaker 4: at least like adjacent work with North Korea and China?
- 53:09Speaker 4: Because North Korea has been in the news recently, if
- 53:11Speaker 4: people are reading the right news about using these North
- 53:16Speaker 4: Korea based workers that are remote workers that are working
- 53:19Speaker 4: and then generating income and then bringing that money to
- 53:21Speaker 4: North Korea, which is kind of an interesting use of
- 53:23Speaker 4: America's capitalist system that they're very much against.
- 53:27Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, I haven't seen any sort of collaboration
- 53:32Speaker 2: or evidence of things like that. I'm not saying that's
- 53:34Speaker 2: not happening. It's just not anything I've come across. One
- 53:37Speaker 2: of the most interesting things I saw, to your point, John,
- 53:41Speaker 2: and this brings up another point, which I'll get to
- 53:43Speaker 2: in a moment, about something Dean mentioned earlier. But I remember, like,
- 53:48Speaker 2: at the beginning of, you know, the current, you know,
- 53:50Speaker 2: the ongoing war with Iran at the time, I don't,
- 53:53Speaker 2: people don't use this term as much, but when they
- 53:55Speaker 2: called it, Operation, what was it, Epic Fury. And right
- 54:00Speaker 2: at the beginning of that, I found these accounts that
- 54:04Speaker 2: were posing as Chinese, like it was sort of weird,
- 54:09Speaker 2: it was sort of ambiguous. Like there were Twitter accounts
- 54:11Speaker 2: that were posing as like Chinese accounts, like official accounts
- 54:14Speaker 2: or like Chinese newspapers, Russian accounts and North Korean accounts.
- 54:20Speaker 2: And they were saying like, if you keep bombing Iran,
- 54:23Speaker 2: we're going to nuke you, right? And I'm like, what? Like, again,
- 54:27Speaker 2: like I was like, okay, is this like some, like,
- 54:29Speaker 2: and it's, this is your point D is it's like,
- 54:31Speaker 2: there's always this ambiguity.
- 54:33Speaker 1: Right.
- 54:34Speaker 2: Um, and especially when I, you know, again, I'm an
- 54:36Speaker 2: open source researcher, um, about like, well, who actually is
- 54:40Speaker 2: doing this? And, and, and this one, like we saw
- 54:42Speaker 2: that they were based in Western Asia, but like, that's
- 54:45Speaker 2: very vast. That could mean the accounts were based out
- 54:47Speaker 2: of Turkey or that they were based out of Yemen
- 54:49Speaker 2: or that they were based out of like, you know, um, Iran, right?
- 54:54Speaker 2: Like in Facebook's transparency features, people can switch. So instead
- 55:00Speaker 2: of showing the specific country, it shows the region, right?
- 55:02Speaker 2: That's not a secret. That's something that's well known, right?
- 55:05Speaker 2: And so if you're a savvy actor, well, if you're
- 55:08Speaker 2: a really savvy actor, right? And this is obvious thing,
- 55:10Speaker 2: so I don't feel like I'm making... you know, making
- 55:14Speaker 2: people's lives harder here, but it's like, you just use
- 55:16Speaker 2: the VPN.
- 55:17Speaker 1: Right.
- 55:17Speaker 2: But like, if you're not that savvy, you might just use, uh,
- 55:21Speaker 2: you know, this thing to mask your true location. So
- 55:23Speaker 2: we knew it was coming out of Western Asia. We
- 55:26Speaker 2: don't fully know where in Western Asia it was coming from,
- 55:28Speaker 2: but the question, like you said, D like, was this
- 55:31Speaker 2: a commercial actor? Was this just somebody trying to make
- 55:34Speaker 2: a buck?
- 55:35Speaker 1: Right.
- 55:35Speaker 2: Was this just somebody like trying to get the clicks
- 55:38Speaker 2: or was this a, uh, a nation state, right? Was
- 55:42Speaker 2: this Iran? And it was this somebody in Iran, like
- 55:46Speaker 2: working for the IRGC, or was this just a concerned
- 55:49Speaker 2: Iranian citizen who was, you know, trying to support the cause?
- 55:54Speaker 2: Like it's not always clear. And also I don't always
- 55:58Speaker 2: think it matters, right? Like it doesn't really always fully matter.
- 56:02Speaker 2: Like if it's, if you're seeing some sort of malicious
- 56:05Speaker 2: or deceptive activity, Um, it, does it really matter if
- 56:08Speaker 2: it's somebody working in like their equivalent of a skiff? Like,
- 56:12Speaker 2: you know, like whatever, does it matter if it's just
- 56:15Speaker 2: like an aligned cyber actor who's politically aligned? Does it
- 56:18Speaker 2: matter if it's a, you know, um, a commercial actor
- 56:23Speaker 2: who's just trying to make money or maybe it's a
- 56:25Speaker 2: commercial actor who's politically aligned or a commercial person who's
- 56:29Speaker 2: being contracted, right. By a foreign, like obviously in terms
- 56:32Speaker 2: of enforcement. And in terms of sanctions or legal proceedings,
- 56:38Speaker 2: that can matter. I'm not saying that doesn't matter. But
- 56:40Speaker 2: in terms of the effect that it's having in the
- 56:42Speaker 2: information environment, the effect that it's having on people's understanding,
- 56:47Speaker 2: I don't think that it always necessarily matters who's doing it.
- 56:51Speaker 2: If it's deceptive, if it's advancing the interests of an
- 56:55Speaker 2: adversarial country, I think that is enough grounds to warrant attention,
- 57:00Speaker 2: which is why... even though I didn't have clear attribution
- 57:03Speaker 2: as to who was doing this, I still published on it, right?
- 57:05Speaker 2: Because it was deceptive activity and it was fascinating activity.
- 57:10Speaker 2: But to go back to your original question, John, that
- 57:12Speaker 2: was an interesting place where I saw somebody posing as
- 57:15Speaker 2: North Korea and posing as China to sort of, it's
- 57:19Speaker 2: this like somewhat crude attempt to like, you know, have deterrence,
- 57:22Speaker 2: like cognitive deterrence, maybe to like scare Americans, you know,
- 57:25Speaker 2: to think like, oh, dang, like, you know, are we
- 57:28Speaker 2: going to get nuked because of this war? Do you
- 57:31Speaker 2: know what I'm saying?
- 57:35Speaker 3: Yeah.
- 57:35Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 57:36Speaker 3: It's incredible.
- 57:37Speaker 1: I mean, it's incredible to see how this is going
- 57:40Speaker 1: to continue to like evolve. Max, where can people find you?
- 57:46Speaker 4: Yeah.
- 57:46Speaker 1: If you want to be found.
- 57:47Speaker 2: So, yeah, I, I mean, I have a public profile
- 57:52Speaker 2: on FDD. My LinkedIn is not public. So, I should
- 57:57Speaker 2: create a Twitter eventually. I might eventually, but again, I'm
- 58:00Speaker 2: just like... I'm kind of... Have you guys... Did you
- 58:05Speaker 2: guys ever see... What was it called? Like, The Social Dilemma,
- 58:08Speaker 2: I think it was called back in the day.
- 58:09Speaker 3: Like, I just.
- 58:11Speaker 2: I pulled out of, like, social media for personal use
- 58:15Speaker 2: a long time ago. But yeah, I mean, you can follow...
- 58:18Speaker 2: You can check out my FDD profile. But yeah, I mean...
- 58:24Speaker 2: I yeah, that's where I post a lot of my research.
- 58:27Speaker 2: My colleague, I publish on my colleague's blog often. You
- 58:31Speaker 2: guys should check this out, too, if you haven't already.
- 58:33Speaker 2: It's called Mimetic Warfare Weekly. And he publishes a lot
- 58:37Speaker 2: about cyber activity, influence operations, Chinese espionage, things like that.
- 58:43Speaker 2: And I publish on there from time to time. So, yeah,
- 58:47Speaker 2: those are some places where you can read my work.
- 58:50Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm going to put some of the links down
- 58:51Speaker 1: in the description. You guys check it out. Check out
- 58:53Speaker 1: some of Max's work. Jonathan Hackett, we know you, we
- 58:58Speaker 1: love you. All his books and all his links are
- 59:00Speaker 1: down in the description as well. Max, before we go,
- 59:04Speaker 1: anything you want to leave us with?
- 59:06Speaker 2: I'll say um, if, uh, if, uh, Harvard is Coca-Cola,
- 59:11Speaker 2: then Yale is Pepsi.
- 59:12Speaker 3: No, just kidding.
- 59:13Speaker 4: We don't drink those low class drinks here.
- 59:18Speaker 2: No, I'm just kidding. But yeah, no, I mean, I mean,
- 59:20Speaker 2: just like, I mean, look, you guys, your listeners are like,
- 59:25Speaker 2: I would assume more informed, right. And they like know
- 59:27Speaker 2: what's up. Um, But so for the people who know
- 59:31Speaker 2: what's up, like tell other people what's up. Do you
- 59:33Speaker 2: know what I'm saying? Like, I mean, I cannot tell
- 59:36Speaker 2: you like, and it's pretty like remarkable, like people who
- 59:39Speaker 2: I knew from like past lives, right? Like people who
- 59:42Speaker 2: I knew from like college, even people who I knew
- 59:45Speaker 2: from high school. Like I've sat across the table from
- 59:47Speaker 2: people who say like, I remember when the war, you know,
- 59:50Speaker 2: broke out in Ukraine, like, oh, this isn't, this isn't
- 59:53Speaker 2: Putin's war. This is Biden's war. Like people I know, like,
- 59:57Speaker 2: and these aren't people who are dumb. These aren't people
- 59:59Speaker 2: who are like, you know, it's a much broader conversation
- 1:00:03Speaker 2: as to like, why are people susceptible to foreign propaganda
- 1:00:06Speaker 2: and things like that? And it's like, it's very complex, right?
- 1:00:10Speaker 2: Like it might be somebody's identity, right? They might like
- 1:00:12Speaker 2: be anti-American for various reasons, or they might not even
- 1:00:17Speaker 2: be anti-American, but they just want to sort of hot
- 1:00:19Speaker 2: take or like a sort of differentiated view, or they
- 1:00:23Speaker 2: want to feel like they're like, they're a seeker. you know,
- 1:00:25Speaker 2: which is funny, if you see, like, you know, RT,
- 1:00:28Speaker 2: which is, like, Russia's flagship state media thing, they'll, like, say, like, oh, like,
- 1:00:33Speaker 2: we're here for the seekers or something like that, right? Like,
- 1:00:35Speaker 2: they'll sort of appeal to people, like, oh, are you
- 1:00:38Speaker 2: a free thinker? Then, like, then listen, then, like, this
- 1:00:40Speaker 2: is all NATO's fault, right? But, like, just because, you know,
- 1:00:43Speaker 2: I know your listeners know what's up, but it's, like,
- 1:00:46Speaker 2: you know, and it's hard because it's, like, hard to
- 1:00:48Speaker 2: have this conversation, right? Like, you know, somebody you don't
- 1:00:51Speaker 2: want to be like, you know, john, like, oh, like me, like,
- 1:00:54Speaker 2: you know, a Yale man, I'm going to teach you
- 1:00:57Speaker 2: how to think, right? Like, I mean, that's obviously like,
- 1:01:00Speaker 2: a really not not probably going to go very far.
- 1:01:03Speaker 2: But like, just sort of like framing it, like, oh, hey,
- 1:01:05Speaker 2: have you like seen this research? Like, there's a lot
- 1:01:08Speaker 2: of great reporting out there. There's a lot of great
- 1:01:10Speaker 2: research out there, right? Like I mentioned, the TikTok report
- 1:01:13Speaker 2: from a few years back, like there's tons of stuff
- 1:01:15Speaker 2: coming out often, like just sharing it around with people like,
- 1:01:18Speaker 2: Now it's like my family members, like when they see
- 1:01:20Speaker 2: something about foreign influence or what, like they'll share it
- 1:01:23Speaker 2: with me. Um, like they're aware of the issue now,
- 1:01:27Speaker 2: obviously for them, it's like more personal because it's like
- 1:01:29Speaker 2: what I studied, but like just sharing it around with
- 1:01:32Speaker 2: people who, you know, like, again, like the people who
- 1:01:34Speaker 2: know what's up, like your listeners, I think it's sort
- 1:01:37Speaker 2: of incumbent upon us to share it with the people
- 1:01:40Speaker 2: in our circle of trust who maybe aren't as tuned in.
- 1:01:43Speaker 2: And like, it doesn't mean that they're dumb. And it
- 1:01:45Speaker 2: doesn't mean like they're busy working on their lives and
- 1:01:47Speaker 2: they have important things that they need to focus on.
- 1:01:49Speaker 2: They need to feed their families and whatever. But I
- 1:01:52Speaker 2: think it's like incumbent upon all of us to sort
- 1:01:54Speaker 2: of spread the word that, hey, like this is what's happening,
- 1:01:59Speaker 2: especially in like the influence space. And like, again, like,
- 1:02:02Speaker 2: you know, people like John or whatever, like people who
- 1:02:04Speaker 2: are connected to, you know, people who come from the
- 1:02:07Speaker 2: government space. I think they're like, you know, also just
- 1:02:09Speaker 2: sharing information about these tactics.
- 1:02:11Speaker 4: Right.
- 1:02:11Speaker 2: Because it's like, you know, people do. Try and do
- 1:02:14Speaker 2: the best job they can. Like Five Eyes, the Five
- 1:02:17Speaker 2: Eyes put out an advisory earlier this summer about this tactic. Like,
- 1:02:21Speaker 2: you know, the U.S. government has put out different things
- 1:02:23Speaker 2: like but I just don't think that people can be
- 1:02:26Speaker 2: reminded enough.
- 1:02:27Speaker 3: Right.
- 1:02:28Speaker 2: Because there could just be that one moment. When somebody
- 1:02:32Speaker 2: has a lapse and they don't realize what's happening, or
- 1:02:35Speaker 2: there could be a moment of weakness where they're like, oh,
- 1:02:37Speaker 2: I really need the money. You know, I don't know
- 1:02:40Speaker 2: it's China, blah, blah, blah. Like people should just be warned. Like, yo,
- 1:02:43Speaker 2: like this is like a, this is the don't touch
- 1:02:45Speaker 2: this with a 10 foot pole. Do you know what
- 1:02:47Speaker 2: I'm saying? Um, and also, you know, people should have
- 1:02:51Speaker 2: an understanding that like you said, John, like there could
- 1:02:53Speaker 2: be serious consequences, even for like, you know, information that
- 1:02:59Speaker 2: isn't even classified.
- 1:03:00Speaker 3: Right.
- 1:03:01Speaker 2: Um, or controlled unclassified information, which is a sort of another,
- 1:03:04Speaker 2: another thing that, you know, people can get in trouble
- 1:03:06Speaker 2: for sharing, but even stuff that's just completely public, um, or, or,
- 1:03:11Speaker 2: or sorry, not completely public, but non-public, but also just
- 1:03:14Speaker 2: something that. Isn't classified. That could also be a challenge
- 1:03:17Speaker 2: as well. Even just your insight as a former defense
- 1:03:21Speaker 2: or intelligence person, even you're just like public take on
- 1:03:24Speaker 2: the war in Ukraine. You don't necessarily want that getting
- 1:03:26Speaker 2: into the hands. of like a PRC operative, right? So
- 1:03:29Speaker 2: I think it's just, again, the last thing I'd say is, yeah,
- 1:03:31Speaker 2: people who know what's up, try and share it with
- 1:03:33Speaker 2: people who don't know what's up so that we can
- 1:03:36Speaker 2: all build a collective resilience here.
- 1:03:40Speaker 3: Yeah.
- 1:03:41Speaker 1: Well said, Max.
- 1:03:42Speaker 2: A pleasure, man.
- 1:03:42Speaker 3: Thanks again.
- 1:03:43Speaker 1: Let's do this again soon.
- 1:03:44Speaker 2: Okay.
- 1:03:44Speaker 3: Thanks, John. Thanks, D.
- 1:03:46Speaker 2: Cheers.