Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / Mega Edition: Ron Wyden’s Report on Wall Street and Jeffrey Epstein (Part 1-4) (10/19/26)

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Mega Edition: Ron Wyden’s Report on Wall Street and Jeffrey Epstein (Part 1-4) (10/19/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome to another episode of the
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're going to begin taking
• 0:07
  Speaker 1: a look at the report put together by Senator Wyden
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: discussing Jeffrey Epstein and his enabling by the banks. 1.
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: Executive Summary and Key Findings Senator Wyden's investigative staff on
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  Speaker 1: the Senate Committee on Finance conducted a multi-year investigation into
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: transactions that financed Jeffrey Epstein's sex trafficking activity. The investigation
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: revealed how major compliance failures at several Wall Street banks
• 0:36
  Speaker 1: enabled Epstein for years. By failing to report or choosing
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: not to report his suspicious financial transactions to federal law enforcement,
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  Speaker 1: these banks allowed Epstein to send cash payments and wire
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  Speaker 1: transfers to his victims, friends, and other collaborators around the world.
• 0:53
  Speaker 1: The bankers who need to be asking questions didn't ask them.
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: Jeffrey Epstein's crimes were hiding in plain sight. The investigation
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  Speaker 1: found significant evidence that JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, and Bank
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: of America violated federal anti-money laundering laws by failing to
• 1:09
  Speaker 1: screen and report Epstein's suspicious financial transactions in a timely manner.
• 1:14
  Speaker 1: A review by Senator Wyden's staff of records housed at
• 1:18
  Speaker 1: the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as well as internal
• 1:21
  Speaker 1: bank records, determined that top executives at major Wall Street
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: banks were aware of Epstein's suspicious financial activity for years.
• 1:30
  Speaker 1: but withheld the information from the U.S. government and protected
• 1:33
  Speaker 1: Epstein from federal scrutiny. Wall Street banks looked the other
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  Speaker 1: way as Epstein withdrew millions of dollars in cash with
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  Speaker 1: no clear business purpose and was party to thousands of
• 1:44
  Speaker 1: suspicious wire transfers worth more than a billion dollars. These
• 1:48
  Speaker 1: banks failed to conduct appropriate due diligence on more than
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  Speaker 1: $ 170 million in payments to Epstein from billionaire Leon Black.
• 1:56
  Speaker 1: In fact, documents reviewed during this investigation show demonstrate that
• 2:00
  Speaker 1: JPMC's senior leadership repeatedly protected Epstein as a client despite
• 2:05
  Speaker 1: repeated warnings from internal compliance personnel. The documents also show
• 2:11
  Speaker 1: that even after JPMC formally terminated Epstein as a client
• 2:15
  Speaker 1: due to human trafficking concerns, the bank still waited years
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  Speaker 1: to report his activity to regulators, and top bankers eagerly
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  Speaker 1: continued to work with him informally and through other channels,
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  Speaker 1: where he could continue to be a source of referrals
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  Speaker 1: for other ultra-wealthy clients. The Department of Justice, Treasury Department,
• 2:35
  Speaker 1: Federal Reserve, and Comptroller of the Currency must conduct thorough
• 2:39
  Speaker 1: investigations of the activities laid out in this report and
• 2:43
  Speaker 1: must levy fines or criminal penalties as appropriate. These investigations
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  Speaker 1: should include examination of the conduct of individual bankers involved
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  Speaker 1: in the handling of transactions through Epstein's accounts. Furthermore, This
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  Speaker 1: report outlines necessary legislative reforms to federal anti-money laundering laws
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  Speaker 1: intended to deter future compliance failures involving accounts held by
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: ultra-high net worth individuals. Federal anti-money laundering laws are in
• 3:12
  Speaker 1: place to require banks to notify the government in real
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  Speaker 1: time of financial activity that may be happening in support
• 3:18
  Speaker 1: of dangerous crimes like human trafficking, fentanyl trafficking, and the
• 3:23
  Speaker 1: financing of terrorism. banks cannot be allowed to ignore federal
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: law simply because they fear alienating wealthy clients. Finally, this
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  Speaker 1: report reveals that on March 26, 2026, Senator Wyden sat
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  Speaker 1: for a taped interview to discuss his investigation with then
• 3:40
  Speaker 1: 60 Minutes correspondent Sharon Alfonsi. The interview was part of
• 3:45
  Speaker 1: a broader segment being prepared by 60 Minutes regarding the
• 3:48
  Speaker 1: conduct of Wall Street banks and the government of the U.S.
• 3:51
  Speaker 1: Virgin Islands, with regard to Jeffrey Epstein and his associates. However,
• 3:56
  Speaker 1: shortly after taping of the interview, CBS News leadership fired
• 4:01
  Speaker 1: Sharon Alfonsi. As a result, the interview with Senator Wyden
• 4:05
  Speaker 1: will not be aired, and it's unclear whether CBS News
• 4:08
  Speaker 1: leadership will allow the broader segment to run. The evidence
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  Speaker 1: presented in this report supports the following findings. Bank of
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  Speaker 1: America likely violated... Federal anti-money laundering laws by failing to
• 4:21
  Speaker 1: properly screen and report $ 170 million in payments from Leon
• 4:24
  Speaker 1: Black to Jeffrey Epstein. 2. Billionaire Leon Black was Jeffrey
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  Speaker 1: Epstein's single largest source of funding. Epstein relied heavily on
• 4:33
  Speaker 1: large payments from Black to bankroll his sex trafficking activity,
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  Speaker 1: just like I told you. Remember all the people that
• 4:40
  Speaker 1: told you it was Les Wexner?
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  Speaker 2: Not me.
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  Speaker 1: He was part of it, but it was always Leon
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  Speaker 1: Black in the background. JPMC likely violated federal anti-money laundering
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  Speaker 1: laws by under-reporting Epstein's suspicious financial activity to the U.S.
• 4:55
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department. 4. Multiple top executives at JPMC are implicated
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  Speaker 1: in major compliance failures related to Jeffrey Epstein. Several of
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  Speaker 1: the bankers who were personally handled Epstein's accounts, spoke with
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  Speaker 1: Epstein regularly, and failed to report Epstein's suspicious transactions are
• 5:14
  Speaker 1: still employed in senior positions at the bank today. After
• 5:17
  Speaker 1: forcing Epstein to leave the bank, top executives at JPMC
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  Speaker 1: withheld information on Epstein from the U.S. government and continued
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  Speaker 1: working with Epstein as a source of referrals for business
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  Speaker 1: with other ultra-wealthy clients, including billionaire Leon Black. Top JPMC
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  Speaker 1: executives coached Epstein on how to withdraw cash through shell
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  Speaker 1: companies instead of his personal accounts, helping him conceal information
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  Speaker 1: from compliance personnel and government regulators. Top JPMC executives had
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  Speaker 1: knowledge of the pervasive presence of young women or underage
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  Speaker 1: girls at Epstein's homes. 8. Deutsche Bank ignored massive withdrawals
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  Speaker 1: of cash for questionable purposes for Epstein's accounts, protecting the
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  Speaker 1: bank's lucrative business interest in maintaining Epstein as a client. 9. JPMC,
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  Speaker 1: Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank did not appropriately request
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  Speaker 1: business records to substantiate or verify the business purpose of
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  Speaker 1: major suspicious transactions involving Epstein. 10. The conduct of individual
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  Speaker 1: bankers employed by JPMC, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank
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  Speaker 1: in relation to their handling of accounts held by Epstein
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  Speaker 1: and Leon Black merits investigation by federal prosecutors and financial regulators.
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  Speaker 1: This includes, but is not limited to the following bankers,
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  Speaker 1: Paul Morris, Mary Erdos, Jess Staley, Stephen Cutler, John Duffy,
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  Speaker 1: Justin Nelson, Paul Barrett, Mary Casey, David Brigstocke, Jeff Matusow,
• 6:50
  Speaker 1: Jane Heller, Karen Weiss, and Stuart Oldfield.
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  Speaker 2: 11.
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  Speaker 1: Epstein's accomplices Darren Nindyke and Richard Kahn and Harry Beller
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  Speaker 1: moved significant amounts of cash around the world on Epstein's
• 7:02
  Speaker 1: behalf in order to finance Epstein's operation. All three former
• 7:06
  Speaker 1: Epstein employees should be investigated for the key role they
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  Speaker 1: played in Epstein's sex trafficking activity. 2. Background and Methodology
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  Speaker 1: In 2022, Senator Wyden's investigative staff at the Senate Finance
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  Speaker 1: Committee began an investigation into transactions that financed Jeffrey Epstein's
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  Speaker 1: sex trafficking activity. This investigation examined large payments to Epstein
• 7:29
  Speaker 1: from various ultra-wealthy individuals and to the extent to which
• 7:33
  Speaker 1: compliance failures at major Wall Street banks enabled Epstein's crimes.
• 7:38
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden's investigation began after a report commissioned by the
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: Apollo Global Management Board of Directors that revealed that Leon
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: Black paid Epstein $ 158 million over five years for purported
• 7:51
  Speaker 1: tax and estate planning advice. Because this figure dwarfs typical
• 7:55
  Speaker 1: compensation for similar tax advisory service, Senator Wyden's Finance Committee
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  Speaker 1: staff conducted an extensive review of this extraordinary compensation scheme.
• 8:05
  Speaker 1: The tax strategies Epstein allegedly devised to help Black avoid
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  Speaker 1: future estate tax liability and other irregularities identified with respect
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: to Black's financial dealings with Epstein. As part of this investigation,
• 8:19
  Speaker 1: staff from the Senate Committee on Finance conducted an in-camera
• 8:23
  Speaker 1: review of suspicious activity reports filed with the U.S. Treasury
• 8:27
  Speaker 1: Department by various financial institutions related to Jeffrey Epstein. This
• 8:32
  Speaker 1: in-camera review of the Epstein-Sars occurred on February 14, 2024,
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  Speaker 1: at a Treasury Department reading room and included bipartisan staff
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  Speaker 1: of both the Chairman and ranking member of the Senate
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  Speaker 1: Finance Committee. Many of these SARS have not been made public.
• 8:50
  Speaker 1: During this in-camera review with Epstein SARS, Senator Wyden's staff
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  Speaker 1: identified a series of major compliance failures by Wall Street
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  Speaker 1: banks regarding the handling of Epstein's accounts. These banks included,
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: but were not limited to, J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and
• 9:05
  Speaker 1: Bank of America. But these three banks became the focus
• 9:10
  Speaker 1: of Senator Wyden's investigation. Epstein primarily banked at JPMC from
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: 1998 to 2013. In 2013, Epstein was forced to exit
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  Speaker 1: JPMC and transferred his assets to Deutsche Bank, where he
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: was a major client from 2013 until his death in 2019.
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  Speaker 1: Bank of America held accounts for Leon Black that were
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: used to pay Epstein approximately $ 170 million between 2012 and 2017.
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  Speaker 1: The Epstein-Sars included substantial evidence that several major Wall Street
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: banks likely violated federal anti-money laundering laws by failing to
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  Speaker 1: contemporaneously report most of Epstein's suspicious financial.
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  Speaker 2: Activity to the U.S. Treasury Department.
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  Speaker 1: This is not a matter of minor errors or occasional omissions.
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  Speaker 1: The investigation found that Wall Street banks failed to report
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  Speaker 1: thousands of suspicious transactions. They made repeated and intentional choices
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  Speaker 1: not to report the financial activity that enabled Epstein's crimes.
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  Speaker 1: The Epstein-Sarrs include damning evidence that the banks failed to
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  Speaker 1: report Epstein's suspicious financial activity to the Treasury Department in
• 10:19
  Speaker 1: a timely manner, as they're required to do so by law.
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  Speaker 1: JPMC terminated Epstein as a client in 2013, but the
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  Speaker 1: Epstein-Sarrs revealed that it was not until 2019, shortly after
• 10:30
  Speaker 1: Epstein was arrested on sex trafficking charges, that JPMC Bank
• 10:35
  Speaker 1: of America and Deutsche Bank retroactively flagged thousands of questionable
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: transactions moving more than $ 1. 4 billion in and out of
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  Speaker 1: his accounts over the course of nearly two decades. These transactions,
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  Speaker 1: including thousands of wire transfers, major withdrawals of cash, payments
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  Speaker 1: to women and girls, and correspondent banking in high-risk foreign jurisdictions,
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  Speaker 1: including Russia. They also include tens of millions in payments
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  Speaker 1: to his co-conspirator and convicted sex trafficker, Ghislaine Maxwell. The
• 11:07
  Speaker 1: retroactive flagging raises serious questions as to why these banks
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  Speaker 1: waited so many years before properly identifying and reporting Epstein's
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  Speaker 1: suspicious financial activity to the U.S.
• 11:17
  Speaker 2: Government.
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  Speaker 1: JPMC knew enough to terminate Epstein as a client in 2013,
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  Speaker 1: so the bank's failure to report until 2019 merits further investigation.
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  Speaker 1: Alright folks, we're going to wrap up right there, and
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  Speaker 1: in the next episode dealing with the topic we're going
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  Speaker 1: to pick up where we left off. All the information
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: that goes with this episode can be found in the
• 11:39
  Speaker 1: description box. What's up everyone and welcome to another episode
• 11:43
  Speaker 1: of the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're diving right
• 11:46
  Speaker 1: back in to the financial report on Jeffrey Epstein prepared
• 11:50
  Speaker 1: by Senator Wyden and the Senate. Following the review of
• 11:55
  Speaker 1: the Epstein-Sars, Senator Wyden's staff began reviewing bank records that
• 11:59
  Speaker 1: were unsealed during lawsuits against the banks filed by Epstein's
• 12:03
  Speaker 1: victims and USVI, and news organizations. After the passage of
• 12:07
  Speaker 1: the Epstein File Transparency Act, Senator Wyden's staff also reviewed
• 12:11
  Speaker 1: documents unsealed by the U.S. Department of Justice that revealed
• 12:15
  Speaker 1: information about Epstein's financial activities and those of his wealthy benefactors.
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  Speaker 1: These records included internal correspondence between bank employees, SARs related
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  Speaker 1: to Epstein's accounts, due diligence documents, estate planning structures, and
• 12:30
  Speaker 1: other business records. Taken together, they reveal the inner workings
• 12:34
  Speaker 1: of how Wall Street banks made decisions related to Epstein's accounts.
• 12:39
  Speaker 1: The records reviewed by Senator Wyden's staff demonstrated that top
• 12:43
  Speaker 1: executives at major Wall Street banks were aware of Epstein's
• 12:46
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial activity for years, but withheld information from the U.S. government,
• 12:51
  Speaker 1: protecting Epstein from federal scrutiny. The documents suggest there was
• 12:55
  Speaker 1: at least two reasons for the Wall Street banks to
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  Speaker 1: protect Epstein.
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  Speaker 2: One, his money.
• 13:01
  Speaker 1: Epstein was an ultra-wealthy individual who was among JPMC's largest
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  Speaker 1: private banking clients. He generated millions in fees for JPMC
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  Speaker 1: every year. Epstein was part of an elite group known
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  Speaker 1: within JPMC as the Wall of Cash. 2. His friend's money.
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  Speaker 1: Bankers sought to continue working with Epstein even after he
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  Speaker 1: was terminated as a JPMC client because they believed he
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  Speaker 1: had influence over a cadre of wealthy individuals like billionaire
• 13:27
  Speaker 1: Leon Black. This report outlines the findings of the investigation
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  Speaker 1: conducted by Senator Wyden's staff and proposes reforms to federal
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  Speaker 1: anti-money laundering laws to deter banks from looking the other
• 13:40
  Speaker 1: way with regard to suspicious activity involving ultra-wealthy clients. The
• 13:45
  Speaker 1: report also calls on federal bank regulators and the DOJ
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  Speaker 1: to promptly take action to hold banks and their employees
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  Speaker 1: responsible for significant compliance failures that enabled Epstein sex trafficking
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  Speaker 1: activity for nearly two decades. 3. Federal law requires timely
• 14:01
  Speaker 1: reporting of suspicious financial transactions. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, BSA,
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: financial institutions are required to maintain anti-money laundering programs that
• 14:12
  Speaker 1: conduct ongoing due diligence of its customers and promptly report
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  Speaker 1: suspicious transactions by filing SARs with the U.S.
• 14:19
  Speaker 2: Treasury Department.
• 14:21
  Speaker 1: Banks are legally required to monitor customer activity and flag
• 14:24
  Speaker 1: suspicious transactions contemporaneously in order to prevent the U.S. banking
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  Speaker 1: system from being used to facilitate criminal activity, including human trafficking.
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  Speaker 1: Legally mandated AML programs must utilize compliance departments, train to
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: screen and escalate potentially suspicious transactions, transaction monitoring software, and
• 14:45
  Speaker 1: robust know-your-customer and customer due diligence efforts, to identify patterns
• 14:50
  Speaker 1: indicative of potential illicit activity, such as large movements of cash,
• 14:55
  Speaker 1: unusual wire transfers or payments that lack a clear business purpose.
• 15:00
  Speaker 1: Under the BSA, banks are required to file SARs when
• 15:03
  Speaker 1: they detect a known or suspected violation of federal law
• 15:07
  Speaker 1: or a suspicious transaction related to a money laundering activity
• 15:11
  Speaker 1: or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. Specifically, a
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: bank must file a SAR if it knows, suspects, or
• 15:17
  Speaker 1: has reason to suspect that a transaction has no business
• 15:21
  Speaker 1: or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in
• 15:23
  Speaker 1: which a particular customer would normally be expected to engage,
• 15:27
  Speaker 1: and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the
• 15:30
  Speaker 1: transaction after examining the available facts, including the background and
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: possible purpose of the transaction. The BSA also requires financial
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: institutions to file SARs in a timely manner. A bank
• 15:44
  Speaker 1: must file a SAR within 30 days after the date
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: of initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: for filing a suspicious activity report. According to Treasury Department
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN, in no case shall reporting
• 16:00
  Speaker 1: be delayed more than 60 calendar days after the date
• 16:03
  Speaker 1: of initial detection of a reportable transaction. Additionally, the BSA's
• 16:08
  Speaker 1: Customer Due Diligence Rule requires financial institutions to maintain policies
• 16:13
  Speaker 1: and procedures in place to understand the nature and purpose
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: of customer relationships and conduct ongoing monitoring to identify and
• 16:21
  Speaker 1: report suspicious transactions. A key purpose of AML laws and
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: regulation is for banks to give law enforcement real-time information
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: to enable it to detect violations of law and protect
• 16:33
  Speaker 1: public safety. This is especially true when suspicious financial activity
• 16:38
  Speaker 1: involves human trafficking, dangerous narcotics like fentanyl, organized crime, and
• 16:43
  Speaker 1: the financing of terrorism. Failing to file a timely SAR
• 16:47
  Speaker 1: is both illegal and dangerous. It can deprive federal law
• 16:51
  Speaker 1: enforcement of the information needed to stop dangerous criminals because
• 16:55
  Speaker 1: JPMC terminated Jeffrey Epstein as a client in 2013 but
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: waited until 2019 to file thousands of SARs on his transactions.
• 17:04
  Speaker 1: No one could credibly claim that SARS were filed within
• 17:07
  Speaker 1: 30 days of detecting suspicious activity. Senator Wyden's investigators thus
• 17:13
  Speaker 1: believe that JPMC failed to comply with the Bank Secrecy
• 17:17
  Speaker 1: Act for the entire duration of its relationship with Jeffrey Epstein.
• 17:21
  Speaker 1: Part 4. Bank of America failed to properly screen and
• 17:25
  Speaker 1: report Leon Black's payments to Epstein. Between 2012 and 2017,
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: billionaire financier Leon Black paid Epstein $ 170 million for purported
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: tax advice and estate planning services. According to a settlement
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: agreement signed by Black in USVI, Epstein then used the
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: money and paid him to fund his sex trafficking activity
• 17:46
  Speaker 1: in USVI. As part of the investigation, Finance Committee investigators
• 17:51
  Speaker 1: reviewed SARS filed with the U.S. Treasury Department in 2020
• 17:55
  Speaker 1: by Bank of America regarding Leon Black's accounts. These SARS
• 17:59
  Speaker 1: were filed by Bank of America on February 7, 2020,
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: nearly eight months after Epstein was arrested and many years
• 18:07
  Speaker 1: after Black's cash had been deposited in Epstein's accounts, raising
• 18:12
  Speaker 1: questions about Bank of America's handling of large wire transfers
• 18:15
  Speaker 1: from Black to Epstein. The SAR suggests that Bank of
• 18:19
  Speaker 1: America waved through the $ 170 million Black wired Epstein without
• 18:23
  Speaker 1: conducting any meaningful due diligence or probing the purpose of
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: the payments. The SARS also show that Bank of America
• 18:31
  Speaker 1: waited five to seven years before flagging the payments to
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: the Treasury Department. In doing so, Bank of America may
• 18:38
  Speaker 1: have violated federal laws requiring financial institutions to conduct due
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: diligence on their customers and report suspicious financial activity to
• 18:46
  Speaker 1: the U.S. government in a timely manner. According to the
• 18:50
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department records, Leon Black, as well as related individuals
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: and entities, maintained accounts at Bank of America that were
• 18:58
  Speaker 1: used to pay Epstein approximately $ 170 million over a five-year period.
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: The payments to Epstein came from a series of accounts
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: at Bank of America, controlled by Black. The Black accounts
• 19:10
  Speaker 1: were made to two entities controlled by Epstein, Southern Trust
• 19:14
  Speaker 1: Company Incorporated, Southern Trust, accounts at Deutsche Bank and the
• 19:17
  Speaker 1: Financial Trust Company, accounts at JPMC. The payments were made
• 19:22
  Speaker 1: through 18 large wire transfers from the Black account to
• 19:26
  Speaker 1: Epstein's accounts. The wires were generally between $ 8 to $ 10 million,
• 19:30
  Speaker 1: but in some cases were substantially larger, including one payment
• 19:34
  Speaker 1: of $ 20 million in July of 2014. Most transactions occurred
• 19:39
  Speaker 1: between 2013 and 2015, when $ 140 million was transferred from
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: Black's accounts to Epstein's Southern Trust Company accounts at Deutsche Bank.
• 19:49
  Speaker 1: Despite the unusually large size of the payments and Epstein's
• 19:52
  Speaker 1: lack of credentials and licenses related to tax and estate
• 19:56
  Speaker 1: planning services, the Treasury Department records suggest that Bank of
• 20:01
  Speaker 1: America did not conduct significant due diligence on the payments
• 20:05
  Speaker 1: and did not report the transactions to the Treasury Department
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: until February 2020, eight months after Epstein was arrested and
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: seven years after the payments began. A. The wire transfer
• 20:18
  Speaker 1: activity does not have a verifiable business purpose. In Bank
• 20:22
  Speaker 1: of America's February 7, 2020 SAR filing, the bank flagged
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: $ 156 million paid by the black accounts to Epstein and
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: stated that the wire transfer activity does not have a
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: verifiable business purpose. The bank's 2020 filing also stated that
• 20:38
  Speaker 1: years-old transactions had no apparent economic, business, or lawful purpose.
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: Bank of America also filed a second SAR eight months
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: later in October of 2020, flagging two potentially unusual wires
• 20:52
  Speaker 1: from the black accounts to Epstein that the bank had
• 20:55
  Speaker 1: failed to identify, one for $ 5. 5 million in November of
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: 2012 and another for $ 8 million in 2017. This is
• 21:04
  Speaker 1: evidence of a significant compliance failure by Bank of America.
• 21:08
  Speaker 1: It's alarming that a major bank waved through $ 170 million
• 21:12
  Speaker 1: in wire transfers from a billionaire to a registered sex
• 21:15
  Speaker 1: offender only to conclude they had no verifiable business purpose
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: years later. It's also emblematic of a larger pattern across
• 21:23
  Speaker 1: Wall Street where financial institutions do not sufficiently scrutinize ultra-wealthy
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: clients like Leon Black for fear that the clients who
• 21:31
  Speaker 1: don't want to answer questions will simply take their business elsewhere.
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: Investigators into the crimes of Epstein have thus uncovered an
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: important finding that extends beyond Epstein himself. Wall Street banks
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: have been willing to turn a blind eye to the
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: suspicious transactions of ultra-wealthy clients, even if the failure to
• 21:51
  Speaker 1: scrutinize and report these transactions runs directly afoul of federal law.
• 21:56
  Speaker 1: If federal prosecutors are serious about preventing the next Jeffrey Epstein,
• 22:00
  Speaker 1: they must hold Wall Street accountable. It does not appear
• 22:04
  Speaker 1: that Bank of America ever asked Black or Epstein for
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: additional information or business records to substantiate the purported tax
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: and estate planning services Epstein claimed he was performing for
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: $ 170 million. Epstein was not a credentialed tax advisor, and
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: had Bank of America conducted thorough due diligence, it likely
• 22:24
  Speaker 1: would have resulted in a timelier determination that the wire
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: activity did not have verifiable economic, business, or lawful purposes.
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: Black's account at Bank of America were supervised by Jane Heller.
• 22:36
  Speaker 1: DOJ records identify Jane Heller as one of Mr. Black's
• 22:40
  Speaker 1: principal bankers at Bank of America during the period in
• 22:43
  Speaker 1: which the payments to Epstein occurred. One 2014 email by
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: employees at Leon Black's family office indicate that Jane Heller
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: is calling every day for this statement, making clear she
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: was running point on coverage of Black's accounts. Another internal
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: Bank of America document noted that BOFA Jane Heller, already
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: has a relationship with Black that includes a $ 400 million
• 23:07
  Speaker 1: art-secured line. Alright folks, we're going to wrap up right here,
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: and in the next episode dealing with the topic we're
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: going to pick up where we left off. All the
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: information that goes with this episode can be found in
• 23:18
  Speaker 1: the description box. What's up everyone, and welcome to another
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: episode of the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're going
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: to dive right back in to the Ron Wyden Report,
• 23:29
  Speaker 1: discussing Jeffrey Epstein and his ties to Wall Street. Bank
• 23:33
  Speaker 1: employees managing accounts for high net worth individuals develop deep
• 23:37
  Speaker 1: knowledge of their clients and their business interests. Heller and
• 23:41
  Speaker 1: Weiss were surely familiar with Epstein's background and the extraordinary
• 23:45
  Speaker 1: nature of his compensation scheme. Heller and Weiss likely understood
• 23:50
  Speaker 1: that payments of $ 170 million over five years for purported
• 23:55
  Speaker 1: tax and estate planning are not routine in the tax
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: or estate planning industries. Bank of America's failure to scrutinize
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: the purpose of the payments blade made to Epstein protected
• 24:07
  Speaker 1: the bank's interest in the lucrative business opportunities that came
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: with having Black as a client. Billionaire clients like Leon
• 24:15
  Speaker 1: Black can generate millions of dollars in fees for banks
• 24:18
  Speaker 1: every year across a variety of financial services, including private
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: wealth management, brokerage, and large lines of credit against assets
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: like stocks, art collections, yachts, Bank of America, as well
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: as the individuals assigning the Blacks accounts, had a large
• 24:38
  Speaker 1: incentive to protect this revenue stream. For example, Bank of
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: America made four loans worth more than $ 500 million related
• 24:45
  Speaker 1: to Leon Black's art collection, Yacht, and Private Jet. One
• 24:50
  Speaker 1: of those loans was a $ 484 million loan against his
• 24:54
  Speaker 1: art collection at a rate of 1.43%. Similarly, emails between
• 24:59
  Speaker 1: Epstein and Black's family office describe an $ 18 million loan
• 25:03
  Speaker 1: through the company that owns Black's yacht. In an email,
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: Eileen Alexandrinson, the head of Black's family office, told Epstein
• 25:11
  Speaker 1: that Jane Heller essentially set up a personal loan collateralized
• 25:15
  Speaker 1: by the boat. With an art collection, with an appraised
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: value exceeding $ 2. 6 billion, and more than 30 million Apollo
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: shares worth at least $ 4 billion, the financial opportunities for
• 25:26
  Speaker 1: Bank of America resulting from Black being a customer, were substantial.
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve must both conduct
• 25:35
  Speaker 1: investigations into Bank of America's handling of these payments from
• 25:39
  Speaker 1: Black to Epstein. These investigations must review 1. whether bank
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: systems flagged these payments for compliance officials, 2. whether the
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: payments were escalated to management for further review, and 3.
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: whether proper due diligence was conducted to verify the purpose
• 25:56
  Speaker 1: of the transactions. These investigations should also determine whether Bank
• 26:01
  Speaker 1: of America used the authority provided under Section 314B of
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: the Patriot Act, which provides a safe harbor to confidentially
• 26:11
  Speaker 1: request information from other banks on suspicious transactions. Billionaire Leon
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: Black was overwhelmingly the largest source of funding for Epstein
• 26:20
  Speaker 1: sex trafficking. As part of the investigation, Senator Wyden's investigators
• 26:25
  Speaker 1: obtained records of a settlement between billionaire Leon Black, and
• 26:29
  Speaker 1: the USVI. As part of the settlement, Black agreed to
• 26:33
  Speaker 1: pay $ 62. 5 million and avoided criminal prosecution in the USVI
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: in relation to matters concerning Jeffrey Epstein. This settlement included
• 26:43
  Speaker 1: a damning admission that Epstein used the money that Black
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: paid him to fund his sex trafficking activities in the USVI.
• 26:51
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden's investigators also reviewed the extent to which Epstein
• 26:56
  Speaker 1: relied on Black to as a source of income. This
• 26:59
  Speaker 1: review identified records unsealed in federal court indicating that Black
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: was Epstein's primary source of income between 2012 and 2017.
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: These documents also reveal that Epstein relied disproportionately on Black
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: to finance his activity. According to an expert report prepared
• 27:19
  Speaker 1: by a forensic accountant retained by USVI in connection with
• 27:23
  Speaker 1: a lawsuit against JPMC, From 2013 forward, the only Epstein-controlled
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: entity that generated any revenue was Southern Trust. In order
• 27:35
  Speaker 1: to obtain favorable tax treatment, Epstein represented to the government
• 27:40
  Speaker 1: of the USVI that the Southern Trust provided consulting services
• 27:44
  Speaker 1: in biomedical and financial informatics. Southern Trust also declared on
• 27:50
  Speaker 1: tax returns that Southern Trust was a database company in service. However,
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: These declarations are inconsistent with the Southern Trust's true primary
• 27:59
  Speaker 1: source of income, which was payments from Leon Black for
• 28:03
  Speaker 1: purported tax service. According to tax returns filed in the USVI,
• 28:09
  Speaker 1: Southern Trust reported revenues of approximately $ 184 million between 2013
• 28:12
  Speaker 1: and 2017. Out of the $ 184 million, $ 166 million came
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: from Leon Black's accounts at Bank of America. By these metrics,
• 28:26
  Speaker 1: Leon Black provided Epstein 90% of his income over a
• 28:30
  Speaker 1: five-year period. Senator Wyden's investigators believe that Epstein's reliance on
• 28:36
  Speaker 1: Black for cash at the height of his sex trafficking
• 28:38
  Speaker 1: scheme merits a full investigation from law enforcement and Congress.
• 28:44
  Speaker 1: Epstein used 134 accounts at JPMorgan Chase to facilitate thousands
• 28:50
  Speaker 1: of suspicious transactions. Epstein and his associates had 134 different
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: bank accounts at JPMC between 1998 and 2013. These accounts
• 29:03
  Speaker 1: included six accounts opened under Epstein's name, 59 accounts for
• 29:08
  Speaker 1: Epstein's corporations, LLCs or trusts, 100% owned by Epstein or
• 29:14
  Speaker 1: for which he served as a trustee, and 69 JPMC
• 29:18
  Speaker 1: accounts for associates of Epstein, including Glenn Maxwell, Richard Kahn,
• 29:22
  Speaker 1: Darren Indyke, Harry Beller, According to documents reviewed by Senator
• 29:29
  Speaker 1: Wyden's staff, Epstein engaged in thousands of suspicious financial transactions
• 29:34
  Speaker 1: during his time as a JPMC client. These transactions warranted
• 29:39
  Speaker 1: real-time red flags within the bank and additional scrutiny. Yet
• 29:44
  Speaker 1: JPMC did not report most of these suspicious transactions to
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: the Treasury Department until years later. These delays and lack
• 29:53
  Speaker 1: of scrutiny by JPMC allowed Epstein to have ready and
• 29:56
  Speaker 1: reliable access to cash necessary to recruit, entice, harbor, transport,
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: provide for, and maintain young women and underage girls for
• 30:06
  Speaker 1: the purpose of human trafficking and sexual abuse. Epstein's suspicious
• 30:10
  Speaker 1: transactions through JPMC included over 5,000 wire transfers totaling approximately $ 1. 1 billion.
• 30:19
  Speaker 1: This included the withdrawal of more than $ 7 million in
• 30:22
  Speaker 1: physical cash and more than $ 3 million in direct payments
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: to women or girls. Many of these transactions lacked a
• 30:29
  Speaker 1: clear or verifiable business purpose, and it does not appear
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: that JPMC conducted due contemporaneous diligence on most of these transactions.
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: Some transactions involved potential victims from Eastern Europe and the
• 30:44
  Speaker 1: use of correspondent bank accounts in high-risk countries for human trafficking.
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: including Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Latvia, and Lithuania. At the time,
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: an official U.S. State Department report on human trafficking considered Russia, Belarus,
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: and Lithuania as a source, transit, and destination country for men, women,
• 31:06
  Speaker 1: and children trafficked for the purpose of forced labor and
• 31:09
  Speaker 1: commercial sexual exploitation. Additionally, Epstein used his account at JPMC
• 31:16
  Speaker 1: to pay Glenn Maxwell more than $ 30 million. According to
• 31:20
  Speaker 1: internal JPMC account records, Epstein was designated as a high-risk
• 31:24
  Speaker 1: client by JPMC as early as 2008 due to his
• 31:28
  Speaker 1: connection to human trafficking and underage prostitution. These internal JPMC
• 31:34
  Speaker 1: records also note that decisions related to Epstein were elevated
• 31:38
  Speaker 1: to members of JPMC's operating committee, reporting directly to CEO
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: Jamie Dimon. In the early 2000s, Epstein was the target
• 31:49
  Speaker 1: of a federal criminal investigation into human trafficking by the U.S.
• 31:53
  Speaker 1: Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida. Instead of
• 31:58
  Speaker 1: prosecuting Epstein in 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office, led by
• 32:02
  Speaker 1: Republican appointee Alex Acosta, signed a sweetheart deal with Epstein
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: that allowed Epstein to bypass federal sex trafficking charges and
• 32:11
  Speaker 1: plead guilty to minor state prostitution charges. Had prosecutors in
• 32:16
  Speaker 1: Florida pursued the federal sex trafficking charges in 2008, Epstein
• 32:21
  Speaker 1: could have been sent to prison for the rest of
• 32:23
  Speaker 1: his life. The 2008 non-prosecution agreement with Epstein required Epstein
• 32:28
  Speaker 1: to plead guilty to two state-level prostitution charges, including soliciting
• 32:33
  Speaker 1: an underage person for prostitution. The deal required Epstein to
• 32:37
  Speaker 1: register as a sex offender and serve 13 months in
• 32:41
  Speaker 1: a Palm Beach County prison. As a result of his
• 32:44
  Speaker 1: designation as a sex offender and convicted felon, Epstein's accounts
• 32:48
  Speaker 1: were required to be subjected to enhanced scrutiny by JPMC
• 32:52
  Speaker 1: and other banks involved in his financial dealings. While the
• 32:56
  Speaker 1: full extent to which these transactions were used to facilitate
• 33:00
  Speaker 1: sex trafficking by Epstein and his co-conspirators remain unclear, there
• 33:05
  Speaker 1: was a near-constant movement of cash in and out of
• 33:07
  Speaker 1: Epstein's accounts at JPMC over the course of two decades.
• 33:12
  Speaker 1: The Pattern of transactions through Epstein's accounts was well outside
• 33:16
  Speaker 1: the ordinary course of business. All of Wall Street banks
• 33:20
  Speaker 1: financing Epstein's activities knew or should have known that his
• 33:24
  Speaker 1: transactions were suspicious. By failing to do exactly what the
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: Bank Secrecy Act requires, these Wall Street bankers enabled unspeakable
• 33:33
  Speaker 1: harm to hundreds of Epstein's victims. A. 5,000 suspicious wire
• 33:41
  Speaker 1: transfers totaling $ 1.
• 33:42
  Speaker 2: 1 billion.
• 33:43
  Speaker 1: Epstein was arrested by federal law enforcement in on-sex trafficking
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: charges on July 6, 2019. Although Epstein had been forced
• 33:51
  Speaker 1: to leave JPMC six years earlier, this new arrest finally
• 33:56
  Speaker 1: spurred the bank to retroactively file SARs related to Epstein's accounts.
• 34:01
  Speaker 1: Flagging more than 5,000 suspicious wire transfers totaling $ 1. 1 billion
• 34:07
  Speaker 1: moving in and out of Epstein's accounts, at JPMC. At first,
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: on August 13, 2019, JPMC filed a SAR reporting 469
• 34:13
  Speaker 1: wire transactions, totaling approximately 201 million. A month later, on
• 34:16
  Speaker 1: September 26, 2019, JPMC filed a SAR reporting an additional 4,725
• 34:18
  Speaker 1: wire transactions, totaling 1.8 billion, involving Epstein, and a range
• 34:38
  Speaker 1: of individuals and entities associated with them. The SARs filed
• 34:42
  Speaker 1: by JPMC included notes containing a litany of red flags,
• 34:47
  Speaker 1: potentially tying the transactions to sex trafficking. First, the SAR
• 34:51
  Speaker 1: noted that transactions involved a dozen entities owned or controlled
• 34:55
  Speaker 1: by Epstein that engaged in the movement or funds for
• 35:00
  Speaker 1: unknown purposes and staff payments, property upkeep and repairs, and
• 35:04
  Speaker 1: repairs to his airplane and helicopter. Epstein and Maxwell regularly
• 35:10
  Speaker 1: used Epstein's aircraft and multiple private residences to transport victims
• 35:14
  Speaker 1: to be abused, raising concerns that these transactions involved expenses
• 35:19
  Speaker 1: related to sex trafficking. Second, the SARS-flagged wires involved payments
• 35:24
  Speaker 1: to women in multiple high-risk jurisdictions for sex trafficking, including Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Turkey,
• 35:31
  Speaker 1: and Turkmenistan. A significant number of these payments were processed
• 35:35
  Speaker 1: using correspondent bank Services provided by state-owned Russian banks, now
• 35:40
  Speaker 1: under U.S. sanction, including Sperbank and Alphabank. Third, the unsealed
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: SARs filed by JPMC included redacted names of many women
• 35:51
  Speaker 1: on Epstein's payroll who may have been either victims or
• 35:54
  Speaker 1: enablers of Epstein's trafficking activity. These SARs included substantial redactions
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: related to the identities of women who were described as
• 36:03
  Speaker 1: having been in a relationship with Epstein or Epstein's were
• 36:07
  Speaker 1: procurers of women as part of trafficking. In other cases,
• 36:11
  Speaker 1: the SARS flagged payments to individuals that were potentially involving prostitution.
• 36:17
  Speaker 1: The SARS also note that Epstein's wire activity at JPMC
• 36:21
  Speaker 1: was consistent with negative media involving alleged sex trafficking of minors,
• 36:26
  Speaker 1: the use of multiple accounts, the misappropriation of funds as
• 36:30
  Speaker 1: a money manager, and the high-risk jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.
• 36:35
  Speaker 1: The scale of An unexplained nature of Epstein's wire transfer
• 36:38
  Speaker 1: activity through his accounts at JPMC is consistent with a
• 36:42
  Speaker 1: myriad of money laundering red flags identified by the Federal
• 36:46
  Speaker 1: Financial Institution Examination Council and Interagency Body of Financial Regulators
• 36:53
  Speaker 1: that prepares AML examination procedure for banks. These red flags
• 36:57
  Speaker 1: include a large number of incoming or outgoing fund transfers
• 37:01
  Speaker 1: that take place through a business account, where there appears
• 37:04
  Speaker 1: to be no logical business or other economic purpose for
• 37:07
  Speaker 1: the wire transfers. Funds transfer activity that is unexplained, repetitive,
• 37:12
  Speaker 1: or shows unusual patterns. Customers who establish multiple accounts in
• 37:17
  Speaker 1: various corporate or individual names and lack sufficient business purpose.
• 37:22
  Speaker 1: Funds transfer activity that occurs to or from a financial
• 37:26
  Speaker 1: secrecy haven or to or from a high-risk geographic location
• 37:31
  Speaker 1: without an apparent business reason. and unusual transfer of funds
• 37:36
  Speaker 1: that occur among related accounts or among accounts that involve
• 37:40
  Speaker 1: the same or related principles.
• 37:43
  Speaker 2: All right, folks, we're going to wrap up right there.
• 37:45
  Speaker 1: And in the next episode, we're going to pick up
• 37:48
  Speaker 1: with Section B, $ 7 million in cash withdrawals. All the
• 37:53
  Speaker 1: information that goes with this episode can be found in
• 37:56
  Speaker 1: the description box. What's up, everyone, and welcome to another
• 38:00
  Speaker 1: episode of the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're getting
• 38:04
  Speaker 1: right back to the Ron Wyden report about Jeffrey Epstein
• 38:08
  Speaker 1: and Wall Street. According to Treasury Department records reviewed by
• 38:17
  Speaker 1: Finance Committee investigators and an expert report prepared by a
• 38:22
  Speaker 1: forensic accountant retained by the Attorney General of USVI as
• 38:26
  Speaker 1: part of the federal lawsuit against JPMC, the Amador report,
• 38:31
  Speaker 1: Epstein withdrew more than $ 7 million in cash from his
• 38:34
  Speaker 1: accounts at JPMC from 2002 to 2013, the equivalent of
• 38:41
  Speaker 1: over $ 1, 700 in cash a day and $ 650, 000 in cash
• 38:47
  Speaker 1: every year. This is an extraordinary amount of cash, especially
• 38:51
  Speaker 1: considering Epstein was a registered sex offender for much of
• 38:55
  Speaker 1: this time and had a history of paying for sex
• 38:58
  Speaker 1: with underage victims in cash. Large cash transactions are a
• 39:02
  Speaker 1: significant indicator of criminal activity. The anonymity of cash makes
• 39:06
  Speaker 1: it a method of choice for criminal organizations to launder
• 39:09
  Speaker 1: money or engage in other illicit transactions, including payments for
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: human trafficking. C. 3 million in direct payments to women.
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: According to the Amador report, Epstein used his accounts at
• 39:23
  Speaker 1: JPMC to make over $ 3 million in payments to dozens
• 39:26
  Speaker 1: of women whose identities have been redacted. According to the
• 39:31
  Speaker 1: Amador Report, the transactions had no apparent business or other
• 39:35
  Speaker 1: lawful purpose. Some of these payments were to women in
• 39:39
  Speaker 1: high-risk jurisdictions like Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia. D. $ 31 million
• 39:45
  Speaker 1: in payments to Ghislaine Maxwell. According to testimony in federal
• 39:50
  Speaker 1: court by former JPMC executive Patrick McHugh, Epstein paid Ghislaine
• 39:55
  Speaker 1: Maxwell at least $ 31 million, including approximately $ 25 million from
• 40:00
  Speaker 1: his accounts at JPMC. Some of these wire transfers were
• 40:04
  Speaker 1: substantial and lacked a clear business purpose. For example, in 1999,
• 40:10
  Speaker 1: Epstein sold $ 18. 3 million worth of stock and then promptly
• 40:14
  Speaker 1: transferred the cash proceeds to Maxwell. Epstein also conducted transfers
• 40:19
  Speaker 1: of Maxwell's accounts of $ 5 million in 2002 and $ 7. 4
• 40:24
  Speaker 1: million in 2007. Maxwell is currently serving a 20-year prison
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: sentence after being convicted on federal sex trafficking charges, and
• 40:34
  Speaker 1: in some of these transfers appears to have facilitated that activity.
• 40:38
  Speaker 1: For example, on June 15, 2007, Epstein transferred Maxwell's $ 7. 4
• 40:43
  Speaker 1: million through JPMC accounts which Maxwell used to buy a
• 40:47
  Speaker 1: Sikorsky helicopter. Maxwell's conviction should trigger additional investigation into whether
• 40:53
  Speaker 1: JPMC conducted appropriate due diligence on large wire transfers between
• 40:59
  Speaker 1: Epstein and Maxwell. E. $ 1 million payment to MC2 Model
• 41:04
  Speaker 1: Management Public reports indicate that Epstein worked directly with certain
• 41:08
  Speaker 1: modeling agencies to help recruit and procure underage girls as
• 41:13
  Speaker 1: part of his sex trafficking scheme. This included MC2 Model Management,
• 41:19
  Speaker 1: an agency founded by French national Jean-Luc Brunel. Brunel was
• 41:24
  Speaker 1: found dead in a French prison while awaiting trial on
• 41:27
  Speaker 1: charges relating to the procurement of underage girls for Epstein.
• 41:32
  Speaker 1: According to federal court records, a 2011 report prepared by
• 41:36
  Speaker 1: JPMC's Global Corporate Security Division noted that MC2 received $ 1
• 41:42
  Speaker 1: million from Epstein in 2005. The report also noted that
• 41:46
  Speaker 1: it's unknown if the money was given as a secret
• 41:49
  Speaker 1: investment or a payment for services as a procurer, and
• 41:53
  Speaker 1: that MC2 had two federal tax liens totaling over $ 590, 000.
• 41:59
  Speaker 1: Public reports and internal JPMC correspondence also indicate that this
• 42:04
  Speaker 1: $ 1 million helped MC2 get started and that it was
• 42:07
  Speaker 1: backstopped by a line of credit provided to Epstein by JPMC. Additionally,
• 42:14
  Speaker 1: unsealed SARs filed by JPMC after Epstein's arrest retroactively flagged
• 42:19
  Speaker 1: additional payments from Epstein to MC2. Epstein's use of his
• 42:23
  Speaker 1: accounts at JPMC to help bankroll MC2 merits further investigation. 7.
• 42:31
  Speaker 1: JPMC failed to report Epstein's suspicious activity to the U.S. government.
• 42:36
  Speaker 1: According to SAR filings contained in unsealed court records between
• 42:40
  Speaker 1: 2002 and 2016, JPMC filed only seven SARs flagging only $ 4. 3
• 42:47
  Speaker 1: million in suspicious transactions from Epstein's accounts. Only after Epstein
• 42:52
  Speaker 1: was arrested on federal sex trafficking charges did JPMC report
• 42:57
  Speaker 1: the full extent of Epstein's suspicious financial activity. In August
• 43:02
  Speaker 1: and September of 2019, JPMC filed two SARs flagging more
• 43:08
  Speaker 1: than 5,000 suspicious wire transfers, moving approximately $ 1. 3 billion in
• 43:13
  Speaker 1: and out of Epstein's accounts. After reviewing unsealed internal JPMC emails,
• 43:20
  Speaker 1: due diligence reports, and reports by forensic accountants, there is
• 43:24
  Speaker 1: evidence to support the conclusion that JPMC underreported Epstein's suspicious
• 43:29
  Speaker 1: financial activity to protect Epstein as a client. The simple
• 43:34
  Speaker 1: fact that Epstein served 13 months in prison on prostitution
• 43:37
  Speaker 1: charges in Florida and should have subjected his transactions to
• 43:41
  Speaker 1: JPMC's highest level of scrutiny and oversight. Epstein was one
• 43:46
  Speaker 1: of the largest individual clients at JPMC and part of
• 43:50
  Speaker 1: a group of ultra-high net worth clients referred to as
• 43:53
  Speaker 1: JPMC's Wall of Cash. According to Unsealed Records, decisions related
• 43:59
  Speaker 1: to Epstein's accounts were closely monitored by high-profile JPMC executives
• 44:04
  Speaker 1: including Mary Erdos, Stephen Cutler, Jess Daly, and John Duffy.
• 44:09
  Speaker 1: For example, in 2011, an internal due diligence document noted
• 44:13
  Speaker 1: that Jeff Staley conferred with Stephen Cutler and the decision
• 44:17
  Speaker 1: was made to keep Epstein as a private banking client. Similarly,
• 44:21
  Speaker 1: in a 2013 internal due diligence report noted that senior
• 44:26
  Speaker 1: management are aware of the relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and
• 44:30
  Speaker 1: that the Epstein accounts had yearly monitoring as client sensitive. However,
• 44:35
  Speaker 1: despite this yearly check, JPMC failed to contemporaneously flag over 5,000
• 44:40
  Speaker 1: suspicious wire transfers. Recently released documents from 2013 show that
• 44:46
  Speaker 1: JPMC terminated Epstein as a client in 2013 because his
• 44:51
  Speaker 1: transactions raised money laundering concerns. JPMC believed that the repetitive
• 44:56
  Speaker 1: nature of Epstein's cash transactions, combined with his personal history,
• 45:01
  Speaker 1: created a great regulatory risk to keep Epstein as a client. However,
• 45:06
  Speaker 1: despite concerns about Epstein's transactions being serious enough to terminate
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: him as a client, JPMC waited six years before reporting
• 45:15
  Speaker 1: Epstein's activity to regulators. Emails raised the possibility that this
• 45:20
  Speaker 1: was due to JPMC's executives' desire to continue working with
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: Epstein as a source of referrals for business with other
• 45:28
  Speaker 1: ultra-wealthy clients. For example, in August of 2013, Mary Erdos
• 45:34
  Speaker 1: explicitly approved a request from JPMC bankers to continue working
• 45:39
  Speaker 1: with Epstein on projects for third-party clients, including billionaire Leon Black.
• 45:44
  Speaker 1: On August 14, 2013, after exiting Epstein from the bank,
• 45:49
  Speaker 1: JPMC executive John Duffy emailed Erdos and indicated that Epstein
• 45:54
  Speaker 1: would be Leon's primary advisor and that he told Epstein
• 45:58
  Speaker 1: that he would work with him as long as it
• 46:00
  Speaker 1: was through the client accounts.
• 46:02
  Speaker 2: JE entities would not be acceptable. That's okay, right?
• 46:06
  Speaker 1: Erdos responded affirmatively, yes. JPMC's filings also reveal multi-year gaps
• 46:13
  Speaker 1: where the activity in Epstein's accounts was not the subject
• 46:16
  Speaker 1: of a SAR, despite the fact that these windows possibly
• 46:20
  Speaker 1: coincided with key periods of Epstein's sex trafficking activity. For example,
• 46:25
  Speaker 1: JPMC did not file a single SAR on Epstein's actions
• 46:30
  Speaker 1: that occurred for a five-year period between May 2003 and
• 46:32
  Speaker 1: September 2008. even though Epstein withdrew more than $ 3. 5 million
• 46:38
  Speaker 1: in cash during that period. JPMC also did not file
• 46:42
  Speaker 1: a single SAR on Epstein's activity for four years between
• 46:46
  Speaker 1: 2009 and 2012, even though Epstein withdrew another $ 900, 000 in
• 46:51
  Speaker 1: cash in that period.
• 46:54
  Speaker 2: Part 8.
• 46:55
  Speaker 1: Top JPMC executives were aware of Epstein's problematic behavior and
• 47:00
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial activity. This investigation's review of records indicates that
• 47:05
  Speaker 1: JPMC's relationship with Epstein was managed by personnel at the
• 47:10
  Speaker 1: highest levels of the bank. The bank was contemporaneously aware
• 47:15
  Speaker 1: of his criminal behavior with a senior member of JPMC's
• 47:18
  Speaker 1: operating committee, testifying that as early as 2006, JPMC the
• 47:23
  Speaker 1: bank was aware that Epstein had been accused of used
• 47:27
  Speaker 1: of paying cash to underage girls and young women brought
• 47:31
  Speaker 1: to his home. Regardless of these allegations, Epstein was treated
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: as a star client. A. Epstein was a top JPMC
• 47:40
  Speaker 1: client and part of a group known as the Wall
• 47:42
  Speaker 1: of Cash. From 1998 to 2013, Jeffrey Epstein was a
• 47:47
  Speaker 1: client of JPMC's private bank, where he received a range
• 47:50
  Speaker 1: of financial services catered to ultra-high net worth individuals and
• 47:55
  Speaker 1: closely held business. Epstein's total balance at JPMC often exceeded
• 48:00
  Speaker 1: $ 140 million. and more than a billion in cash flows
• 48:04
  Speaker 1: moved through Epstein's accounts at JPMC between 2003 and 2013.
• 48:08
  Speaker 1: Unsealed records revealed that Jeffrey Epstein was one of JPMC's
• 48:14
  Speaker 1: single largest clients and top revenue generator for the bank.
• 48:18
  Speaker 1: Epstein was also regularly included in an elite list of
• 48:22
  Speaker 1: ultra-high net worth clients, referred to as the Wall of Cash.
• 48:27
  Speaker 1: In a May 28, 2003 due diligence report, JPMC indicated
• 48:31
  Speaker 1: that Epstein accounts generated one of the largest annual revenue
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: flows of private clients in the private bank. Similarly, in
• 48:40
  Speaker 1: September of 2009, JPMC's private bank included Epstein in its
• 48:45
  Speaker 1: list of top clients, indicating that Epstein's balances at JPMC
• 48:49
  Speaker 1: at the time were at least $ 142 million. JPMC executives
• 48:55
  Speaker 1: viewed Epstein as an essential client and eagerly continued to
• 48:58
  Speaker 1: pursue new business with Epstein, even after he pleaded guilty
• 49:02
  Speaker 1: to state charges related to sex crimes involving underage girls
• 49:06
  Speaker 1: in 2008. In fact, the day Epstein got out of prison,
• 49:11
  Speaker 1: in 2009, JPMC private banker Jeff Matusow emailed Mary Casey,
• 49:16
  Speaker 1: currently JPMC's vice chair of the private bank, asking her
• 49:21
  Speaker 1: to be his buddy on Epstein's accounts. Further investigation is
• 49:25
  Speaker 1: needed to determine whether Matusow, Casey, and others advocated internally
• 49:30
  Speaker 1: for JPMC to reduce monitoring, oversight, and reporting on Epstein's accounts.
• 49:37
  Speaker 1: All right, folks, we're going to wrap up right there.
• 49:39
  Speaker 1: And in the next episode, we're going to pick up
• 49:41
  Speaker 1: with after Epstein's release from prison. All the information that
• 49:45
  Speaker 1: goes with this episode can be found in the description box.