Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / Iran Nuclear Program Part 2/3: Natanz Inspections, Stuxnet Cyberattack, Covert War Escalates
Transcript
- 0:16In the summer of 2002, a man stood at a podium in Washington,
- 0:20DC, and told the world the secret.
- 0:23He was not a spy. He was not a defector.
- 0:27He was a spokesman for an Iranian opposition group with
- 0:30its own contested history and its own political agenda.
- 0:34But the information he carried was real, and what he revealed
- 0:38that day set off a chain of events that would consume 2
- 0:41decades of global diplomacy, produce some of the most
- 0:44extraordinary covert operations in modern intelligence history,
- 0:48and bring the world to the brink of the confrontation it had
- 0:50spent 20 years trying to prevent.
- 0:53The National Council of Resistance of Iran announced the
- 0:55existence of two nuclear facilities.
- 0:57The Iranian government had never disclosed to the International
- 1:00Atomic Energy Agency a massive underground uranium enrichment
- 1:05complex at a place called Natanz, buried beneath the
- 1:08desert in central Iran. In a heavy water production
- 1:11plant at Iraq, a facility whose purpose pointed directly toward
- 1:15a potential path to weapons grade plutonium.
- 1:18Iran had been building both for years.
- 1:21The IEA had no idea either one existed.
- 1:24The revelation detonated at the center of the international non
- 1:27proliferation system. The entire framework of the
- 1:30Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty rested on a single foundational
- 1:34assumption that states which signed it would declare their
- 1:37nuclear activities, accept inspections, and operate in good
- 1:40faith. Iran had signed the NPT, Iran
- 1:44had hosted IAA inspectors, and Iran had been lying the entire
- 1:48time. What followed was not a swift,
- 1:51decisive international response. It was something far messy, far
- 1:56more revealing about the limits of collective action, and
- 2:00ultimately far more consequential.
- 2:03It was a decade long test of whether the world's most
- 2:05powerful nations could agree on anything before a threshold was
- 2:09crossed that could not be uncrossed.
- 2:11To understand what the 2002 disclosure actually meant, you
- 2:15have to understand the specific nature of the deception
- 2:18involved. Iran had not simply omitted 2
- 2:21facilities in a bureaucratic oversight, it had constructed
- 2:25large scale industrial infrastructure in secret over an
- 2:28extended period, a considerable expense, with a deliberate and
- 2:32sustained effort to avoid detection.
- 2:35The underground halls at Natan's had not appeared overnight.
- 2:38They represented years of engineering work, procurement of
- 2:41specialized equipment through front companies and 3rd party
- 2:44intermediaries, and the careful management of a workforce large
- 2:48enough to build a facility of that scale without the knowledge
- 2:51leaking in ways that would have triggered an international
- 2:53response. This was not an accident.
- 2:56It was not ambiguity. It was a systematic state level
- 3:00program of deception carried out at the highest levels of the
- 3:03Iranian government. That factory shaped everything,
- 3:07because once the deception was confirmed, the entire basis on
- 3:11which Iran's nuclear program had previously been assessed was
- 3:14undermined. Every assurance Iran had given
- 3:17to the IEA, every declaration it had made about the scope and
- 3:20purpose of its activities, now had to be re evaluated against a
- 3:23new baseline. Iran had lied comprehensively
- 3:26when it believed it could get away with doing so.
- 3:29The question was no longer simply what Iran had built, it
- 3:33was what else Iran might have built that the 2002 disclosure
- 3:37did not yet revealed. That second question would prove
- 3:40harder to answer and more important.
- 3:44The IAEA's director general at the time was Mohamed Al Burdi,
- 3:47an Egyptian diplomat of extraordinary patience and
- 3:50political skill, who would later win the Nobel Peace Prize for
- 3:53his work on nuclear disarmament. Albert I understood immediately
- 3:57that what had just surfaced could not be managed through
- 4:00normal channels. He pushed for urgent access to
- 4:03Natanz. Iran, after initial resistance,
- 4:07agreed to allow inspectors in what they found exceeded even
- 4:10the most alarming preliminary assessments.
- 4:13Natan's was not a pilot project. It was an industrial facility,
- 4:18underground halls designed to house thousands of centrifuges,
- 4:22the fast spinning machines used to enrich uranium by separating
- 4:25its isotopes. The infrastructure suggested
- 4:28Iran had been planning for a program of significant scale,
- 4:31not the modest civilian energy operation it had publicly
- 4:34claimed. Inspectors also found traces of
- 4:37highly enriched uranium on equipment inside the facility,
- 4:41enriched to levels consistent with weapons grade material.
- 4:44Iran's explanation was that the contamination had come from
- 4:47imported equipment and was not of Iranian origin.
- 4:50The IAEA was not satisfied. The questions multiplied faster
- 4:55than the answers. Simultaneously, intelligence
- 4:58agencies across Europe and North America were racing to
- 5:01understand the full scope of what Iran had constructed.
- 5:05What they found pointed somewhere unexpected.
- 5:08The centrifuge technology at Natan's was identified as
- 5:11matching designs associated with the network of Abdul Kadir Khan,
- 5:15the Pakistani scientist whose proliferation enterprise had
- 5:18already been flagged as one of the gravest threats to global
- 5:20security. The connection was now
- 5:22confirmed. Iran had not developed
- 5:25enrichment technology independently.
- 5:28It had purchased it from a black market that had also supplied
- 5:31Libya and North Korea. The Islamic Republic had been
- 5:34operating not merely in violation of its IA obligations
- 5:38but as a client of the most dangerous proliferation network
- 5:41in modern history. The European response was
- 5:44diplomacy. Britain, France and Germany, the
- 5:47group that would become known as the EU 3, launched A sustained
- 5:50effort to negotiate a suspension of Iran's enrichment activities
- 5:53in exchange for economic incentives and political
- 5:56engagement. The talks ran from 2003 to 2005.
- 6:01They produced a temporary agreement under which Iran
- 6:04voluntarily paused enrichment. European officials called it a
- 6:07breakthrough, A demonstration that Iran could be brought back
- 6:11into compliance through dialogue rather than confrontation.
- 6:14It was not a breakthrough. It was a pause.
- 6:17The man who ended it was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became
- 6:20president of Iran in 2005 after an election that stunned
- 6:24reformist and alarmed the international community in equal
- 6:27measure. Ahmadinejad was a hardliner with
- 6:30no interest in the careful diplomatic dance his
- 6:32predecessors have performed. He had a political constituency
- 6:36that demanded defiance, a worldview built on confrontation
- 6:39with the West and a relationship with the Revolutionary Guards
- 6:43that made him the instrument of factions who had always regarded
- 6:46the enrichment suspension as a humiliation rather than a
- 6:48strategic choice. Within months of taking office,
- 6:52Iran announced it was ending the suspension and returning to
- 6:55enrichment. The European talks were over.
- 6:58The crisis entered a new and more dangerous phase. the United
- 7:02Nations Security Council became the primary arena.
- 7:06Between 2006 and 2010, the Council passed a series of
- 7:10resolutions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the chapter that
- 7:14authorizes binding international obligations and, ultimately, the
- 7:17use of force. The resolutions demanded Iran
- 7:20suspend enrichment, cooperate fully with IA inspectors, and
- 7:25answer a growing list of questions about the possible
- 7:27military dimensions of its program.
- 7:29Iran refused. Each refusal triggered
- 7:32additional sanctions. Each round was tightened
- 7:35further. And through all of it, Iran's
- 7:38centrifuges kept spinning. The numbers told the story more
- 7:41clearly than any diplomatic communique.
- 7:44When the EU Three talks began in 2003, Iran had fewer than 200
- 7:49centrifuges in operation. By 2006, that number had grown
- 7:54to several 1000. By 2010, it was in the 10s of
- 7:58thousands. The sanctions had not slowed the
- 8:01program in some periods. They appear to have accelerated
- 8:04it, as if Iran was determined to demonstrate that coercion would
- 8:07not produce concession and that each new resolution would be
- 8:11answered with a corresponding expansion of capability.
- 8:14The pressure was real, it just was not working.
- 8:17The sanctions that accumulated over this period were genuinely
- 8:20severe. They targeted Iran's oil sector,
- 8:24which generated the majority of government revenue.
- 8:27They cut Iranian banks off from the international financial
- 8:30system. They made industrial imports
- 8:32increasingly difficult. The Iranian rial lost a
- 8:36significant portion of it value Inflation climbed.
- 8:40Unemployment rose. Ordinary Iranians felt the
- 8:43consequences in ways that were direct and daily, and the
- 8:46program continued. This is the fact that confounded
- 8:50Western policy makers more than any other.
- 8:53The model they were operating from assumed A straightforward
- 8:56calculation applies sufficient economic pain and the Iranian
- 9:00government would eventually decide that the cost of the
- 9:02nuclear program outweighed its benefits.
- 9:05It was a rational actor model. It was wrong not because Iranian
- 9:10decision makers were irrational, but because the calculation they
- 9:13were making was not primarily economic.
- 9:16The leadership of the Islamic Republic had watched what
- 9:19happened to states that surrender their strategic
- 9:21programs under Western pressure. They had drawn their
- 9:24conclusions. No amount of inflation or
- 9:27currency depreciation was going to change, a decision rooted in
- 9:31an entirely different kind of logic.
- 9:34There was also a domestic dimension that Western analysts
- 9:37consistently underweight. The nuclear program had become,
- 9:40over a decade of international pressure, something more than a
- 9:44technical project. It had become a symbol of
- 9:47Iranian sovereignty, a marker of national dignity in the face of
- 9:51what Iranian political culture framed as Western bullying.
- 9:54Ahmadinejad had turned enrichment into a populist
- 9:57cause, framing it as Iran's legal right under international
- 10:01law. Whatever the actual purpose of
- 10:03the program, the political cost of visibly capitulating to
- 10:06Western demands had become in itself a serious constraint on
- 10:10any Iranian leader who might otherwise have been inclined
- 10:13toward compromise. Consider what that meant in
- 10:16practice. An Iranian president who agreed
- 10:19to suspend enrichment under Western pressure was not simply
- 10:22making a technical concession. He was handing his domestic
- 10:25opponents a weapon. He was confirming, in the eyes
- 10:29of the hardline factions who had always opposed engagement, that
- 10:32Western pressure worked, that the correct response to external
- 10:35coercion was resistance, not compromise, and that any leader
- 10:39who chose otherwise was a collaborator rather than a
- 10:41statesman. The political dynamics inside
- 10:44Iran were not incidental to the nuclear crisis.
- 10:47They were structural to it. The sanctions were not just
- 10:51failing to stop the program. In some respects, they were
- 10:55strengthening the domestic coalition that sustained it.
- 10:58That was the moment the calculation in Washington
- 11:00shifted, because what sanctions cannot accomplish, some argued,
- 11:05covert operations might. In the late 2000s, a program of
- 11:09extraordinary ambition was launched jointly by the United
- 11:12States and Israel to physically degrade Iran's nuclear
- 11:15capabilities through means short of open military conflict.
- 11:19The most dramatic element of that program was a cyber weapon
- 11:22that would later become known to the world as Stuxnet.
- 11:25Stuxnet was a piece of malicious software designed to infiltrate
- 11:29the control systems of Iran's centrifuges and cause them to
- 11:32spin at irregular speeds, damaging the machines.
- 11:35While the monitoring systems reported everything functioning
- 11:38normally, It was the first cyber weapon ever deployed against
- 11:41physical industrial infrastructure at scale.
- 11:44Getting the code into Natan's air gap networks required human
- 11:47intelligence operations of considerable sophistication.
- 11:51The precision of the targeting and the years of preparation it
- 11:54implied, pointed to a covert program that had been running
- 11:57well before the world knew anything about it.
- 12:00When Stuxnet was discovered and analyzed by security researchers
- 12:03in 2010, it was immediately recognized as qualitatively
- 12:07different from any cyber attack previously seen.
- 12:10The technical sophistication, the specificity of the
- 12:13targeting, the evidence of prolonged testing on actual
- 12:16centrifuge equipment, all that pointed to state actors with
- 12:19substantial resources. Iran confirmed that centrifuges
- 12:23at Natan's had been damaged. Independent assessments
- 12:26suggested the program have been set back by somewhere between
- 12:29one and two years. One to two years was not
- 12:32nothing, but it was not decisive either.
- 12:36Stuxnet had a consequence its architects had not planned for.
- 12:40When it escaped the Natan's network and spread onto the
- 12:43broader Internet, it became publicly analyzable.
- 12:47Security researchers reverse engineered it, dissected it, and
- 12:51in some respects admired it as a feat of engineering.
- 12:55But the public exposure meant that Iran and every state with
- 12:58an interest in offensive cyber capabilities could study exactly
- 13:02how it had been built and began developing countermeasures.
- 13:05The weapon, designed to operate in total secrecy, had become,
- 13:09inadvertently, a tutorial. The covert campaign extended
- 13:13beyond cyber attacks. Between 2010 and 2012, four
- 13:18Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in targeted
- 13:21killings bearing the hallmarks of Israeli intelligence
- 13:24operations. 1/5 survived an attempt.
- 13:27The killings generated international condemnation.
- 13:31They also generated a debate inside the intelligence
- 13:33community about whether targeting scientists hardened
- 13:36Iranian resolve and caused the program to be further dispersed
- 13:39and protected. The evidence suggested it had
- 13:43none of this was happening in isolation.
- 13:46The same period that produced sanctions and Stuxnet and
- 13:48assassinations also produced a parallel track of diplomatic
- 13:52activity that was for much of this period, invisible to the
- 13:55public. Back channel communications
- 13:57between American and Iranian officials, conducted through
- 14:00intermediaries and in carefully chosen neutral venues, explored
- 14:04whether any basis for a negotiated resolution existed.
- 14:08These conversations were halting, frequently derailed by
- 14:11domestic politics on both sides, and never quite abandoned.
- 14:15The Obama administration had come to office in 2009 with a
- 14:18stated commitment to direct engagement with Iran, a
- 14:21deliberate departure from the Bush era framework of
- 14:24preconditions and ultimatums. Obama sent a personal video
- 14:27message to the Iranian people on the occasion of Noras.
- 14:31The gesture was genuine. The response from Ayatollah
- 14:35Khamenei was cold. He dismissed the outreach as
- 14:38words without action, listed grievances about American
- 14:41behavior, and made clear that engagement was not going to be
- 14:45simple or swift. But the channel had been opened,
- 14:49and it was not entirely closed. What complicated every attempt
- 14:53at direct diplomacy was the structure of power inside Iran
- 14:56itself. The Iranian system was not a
- 14:59simple hierarchy in which the supreme leader decided policy
- 15:03and everyone else implemented it.
- 15:05It was a competition between multiple power centers, the
- 15:08office of the President, the Revolutionary Guards, the
- 15:11judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Supreme Leader's inner
- 15:14circle, each with its own institutional interests and
- 15:18political constituencies. Reformists and pragmatists who
- 15:21might have been inclined toward engagement were consistently
- 15:24constrained by hardliners who saw any contact with the West as
- 15:27a threat to the ideological foundations of the Islamic
- 15:30Republic. This structural reality meant
- 15:32that every diplomatic opening that appeared on the surface was
- 15:35more complicated beneath it. An Iranian negotiator who sat
- 15:39down at a table in Geneva was not necessarily empowered to
- 15:42make decisions that will hold once he returned to Tehran.
- 15:46The Revolutionary Guards had their own views.
- 15:49The supreme leader's office had its own red lines.
- 15:52A deal that the president's team could accept might still be
- 15:55vetoed by institutions that the president did not control.
- 15:58Reaching A durable agreement required not just persuading
- 16:01Iran's negotiators, but creating conditions under which those
- 16:05negotiators could actually deliver on what they agreed to.
- 16:08That was never a given, and Western negotiators for much of
- 16:12this period did not fully appreciate how constraining
- 16:16those internal dynamics actually were.
- 16:18Beneath all of it ran a question that nobody could fully answer.
- 16:22What was Iran's program actually for?
- 16:24The IEA had been documenting what called possible military
- 16:28dimensions for years, a body of evidence suggesting Iran had not
- 16:31simply been enriching uranium for civilian energy, but had
- 16:34conducted research directly relevant to the design of a
- 16:37nuclear weapon. Documents obtained by
- 16:40intelligence agencies described experiments with high explosive
- 16:43lenses, research into neutron initiators, work on reentry
- 16:47vehicles for ballistic missiles. Iran's response to each piece of
- 16:51evidence was denial or claims of forgery or silence.
- 16:55A formal IAA report in 2011 laid out the evidence in
- 16:59unprecedented detail, describing a structure program that had
- 17:02worked systematically on components relevant to a weapon.
- 17:06Iran called the report fabricated and politically
- 17:09motivated. The combination of accelerating
- 17:12enrichment, sustained obstruction of IA
- 17:14investigations, and the mounting evidence of weaponization work
- 17:18brought the crisis to its most dangerous moment yet.
- 17:20Around 2011 and 2012, Israeli officials spoke openly about the
- 17:26possibility of a military strike.
- 17:28American officials, including President Obama, stated publicly
- 17:32that all options remained on the table.
- 17:35Iran's program had by this point produced stockpiles of uranium
- 17:38enriched at 20% a level with no credible civilian justification,
- 17:43placing Iran within a manageable technical distance of weapons
- 17:46grade material. The world was not yet at the
- 17:49brink, but serious people in multiple capitals were drawing
- 17:53up serious plants. What a military strike would
- 17:56look like, what it would cost, and whether it could actually
- 17:59solve the problem it was designed to address.
- 18:02The answer to that last question was consistently troubling.
- 18:05Strikes could destroy known facilities.
- 18:08They could set the program back, but they could not destroy the
- 18:12knowledge that existed inside the people who had built it.
- 18:16They could not erase the institutional memory embedded in
- 18:19a network of scientists, engineers and officials who
- 18:22understood every dimension of what Iran had constructed.
- 18:25And they would almost certainly harden domestic opinion around
- 18:28the program in ways that would make any future diplomatic
- 18:31resolution vastly more difficult.
- 18:34The military option was not a solution, it was a delay with
- 18:39severe geopolitical consequences attached.
- 18:42The people planning it knew that.
- 18:44It was this recognition, shared by key figures in both
- 18:47Washington and Tehran, that opened a narrow window for
- 18:50something different. Both sides had concluded,
- 18:53through different reasoning that the path they were on was not
- 18:56going to end well. Iran had built a significant
- 18:59capability but was being slowly strangled economically and faced
- 19:03A credible military threat. the United States had applied
- 19:07maximum pressure and watched Iran enrich more uranium than
- 19:10when the pressure began. The Europeans had exhausted
- 19:13their diplomatic formula. The IAEA had documented the
- 19:16problem in exhaustive detail without resolving it.
- 19:20Something had to give in the back channels that had never
- 19:23fully closed, The first tentative steps towards
- 19:26something genuinely new were beginning to take shape.
- 19:29Not a capitulation by either side.
- 19:31Not a simple exchange of enrichment for sanctions relief.
- 19:35Something more complicated, more fragile and more ambitious than
- 19:39either side was prepared to admit publicly.
- 19:42The change in Iran's posture that made serious negotiations
- 19:45possible came with the election of Hassan Rouhani as president
- 19:49in 2013. Rouhani was not a reformist in
- 19:52the mold of the figures who had briefly energized Iranian
- 19:55politics in the late 1990s. He was a regime insider, a
- 20:00cleric who had spent his career within the system and had served
- 20:03as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in the early 2000s.
- 20:07He understood the technical details of the program with a
- 20:10precision most politicians lacked.
- 20:12But he had campaigned on a platform that acknowledged the
- 20:15economic damage from sanctions was real and that Iran needed a
- 20:18different approach to the outside world.
- 20:20He had one with a mandate that amounted to a clear public
- 20:23instruction. Find a way out of this without
- 20:26surrendering the program entirely.
- 20:28That mandate aligned, for the first time in years, with
- 20:32corresponding shift in American political will.
- 20:35The Obama administration had concluded that maximum pressure
- 20:38extended over years had produced a situation in which Iran had
- 20:41more centrifuges, more enriched uranium and a more advanced
- 20:45program than when the pressure began.
- 20:47The logic of pure coercion had reached its practical limit.
- 20:51If a deal was possible, this was the moment to find out the
- 20:55negotiations that would eventually produce the most
- 20:58significant arms control agreement.
- 21:00The 21st century we're about to begin.
- 21:02They would take years. They would require concessions
- 21:05that domestic audiences on both sides found deeply
- 21:08uncomfortable. They would involve 6 world
- 21:11powers and a government still governed by revolutionary
- 21:14ideology, attempting to construct a technical agreement
- 21:17of extraordinary complexity, satisfying competing political
- 21:20imperatives in Washington, Tehran, Jerusalem, Riyadh, and a
- 21:24dozen other capitals simultaneously.
- 21:26They would produce an agreement simultaneously praised as a
- 21:29landmark achievement and condemned as a fatal compromise.
- 21:33And they would, in the end, hold for less time than anyone had
- 21:36hoped. The centrifuges have been
- 21:39spinning for years. The world had spent a decade
- 21:42trying to stop them, with sanctions and sabotage and the
- 21:45constant threat of force. None of it had worked.
- 21:49Now came the attempt to negotiate what pressure had
- 21:51failed to produce. Every tool the world had reached
- 21:54for inspections, resolutions, sanctions, cyber weapons,
- 21:58assassinations, military threats, had either failed
- 22:01outright or produced consequences nobody had
- 22:04anticipated. The lesson of the previous
- 22:06decade was not that Iran could be stopped.
- 22:09It was that stopping Iran was harder than anyone had been
- 22:13prepared to admit. When a man stood at that podium
- 22:15in Washington and set all of this in motion, what came next
- 22:19would test whether diplomacy could accomplish what coercion
- 22:22had not. And if it failed, if the
- 22:25agreement was reached and then lost, the world would arrive
- 22:28exactly where it eventually did. Fewer options, less time, the
- 22:33weight of every missed opportunity carried into a
- 22:35confrontation nobody had designed and nobody could easily
- 22:39end. If this podcast is helping you
- 22:41make sense of what is happening, please take 30 seconds to leave
- 22:44a review on Spotify or Apple Podcasts.
- 22:47It makes an enormous difference to how many people find the
- 22:50show. This is Epic fury.
- 22:53The US Iran war podcast, the deal, it's collapse and
- 22:57everything that followed that is the next chapter, and it is
- 23:01where the distance between diplomacy and war finally ran
- 23:04out.