Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / 2025 Insurance Year in Review: Major California Insurance Coverage Decisions and What’s Ahead in 2026
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome to the 2025 insurance year in review,
- 0:07major California insurance coverage decisions
- 0:09and what's ahead in 2026. I'm Belinda McCauley,
- 0:13executive director and CEO of the Beverly Hills
- 0:15Bar Association. I am always happy to kick off
- 0:18this annual program because I get to introduce
- 0:20not one, but two former presidents of the BHBA.
- 0:24Stephen Roucher is a partner at Rubin Roucher
- 0:26& Blum, whose practice focuses on general business
- 0:29litigation, including real estate, contract disputes,
- 0:32and insurance coverage matters. He has tried
- 0:34and arbitrated numerous cases to decision and
- 0:37brings extensive experience at both the trial
- 0:39and appellate levels. Deeply committed to advancing
- 0:42the legal profession, Steve has held multiple
- 0:44leadership roles with the BHBA, including president,
- 0:47and continues to advocate on matters of public
- 0:50interest as chair of our amicus committee. Michael
- 0:53Sohigian is an attorney in sole practice in Los
- 0:57Angeles, specializing in the litigation of business
- 0:59disputes with particular emphasis in the areas
- 1:02of insurance coverage, employment, and real estate.
- 1:05He is also a past president of the Beverly Hills
- 1:07Bar Association and served on the executive committees
- 1:10of the state bars, solo and small firm and litigation
- 1:14sections. Mike and Steve are the co -authors
- 1:16of the insurance law chapter of CLA's litigation
- 1:20sections annual California litigation review.
- 1:24And now let's get started. Okay, great. Thank
- 1:27you, Belinda. It's great to see you. Great to
- 1:29be with everyone this Friday afternoon. Thanks
- 1:31for joining us. Longtime attendees may know Mike
- 1:38and I have been doing this annual program for
- 1:41over 10 years at this point. I think we only
- 1:43missed one year in 2020 when we were overtaken
- 1:48by COVID and in that year we did a program that
- 1:50focused specifically on COVID insurance issues.
- 1:56There's always a lot to talk about in California
- 1:59when you're talking about insurance coverage.
- 2:03That being said, 2025, as we'll see, was a relatively
- 2:08quiet year as these things go. For one thing,
- 2:10there were no California Supreme Court cases
- 2:13on insurance coverage in 2025. That followed.
- 2:21a couple big Supreme Court cases in 2024 on COVID
- 2:25and a slew of coverage cases in the courts of
- 2:28appeal on COVID. And thankfully we don't have
- 2:31to, those issues have been resolved. We don't
- 2:32have to hear about them too much anymore. But
- 2:35no California Supreme Court cases. Although as
- 2:38we'll see at the end, as we look ahead to 2026,
- 2:41there are three that are currently pending before
- 2:44the California Supreme Court. So we may have
- 2:45some more action from the California Supreme
- 2:48Court this year. And we could go ahead to the
- 2:52next slide. We're going to start, as we often
- 2:57do, by going over some cases that involve first
- 3:00-party insurance issues, property damage, and
- 3:02other kinds of first -party claims. Next slide,
- 3:06please. And we don't know who our audience is,
- 3:09Steve. So can you just briefly explain the difference
- 3:11between a first -party claim and a third -party
- 3:14claim or policy? Sure, the easiest way to think
- 3:18about it, I think, is a third party claim responds
- 3:22when somebody has been sued, when the policyholder
- 3:25has been sued, typically for a form of negligence
- 3:28or it can be other kinds of claims, errors and
- 3:30omissions, professional negligence claims, employment
- 3:33claims, depending on the policy that is purchased.
- 3:36And in those cases, the insurance company needs
- 3:38to defend and in some cases indemnify you for
- 3:44that covered claim. The first party claim is
- 3:47there's no third parties lawsuit involved. It's
- 3:51simply your property has suffered a form of property
- 3:54damage or there can be other first party policies
- 3:57to like life insurance that we're going to talk
- 3:59about. That's the primary distinction. And the
- 4:04first subset of that that we're going to talk
- 4:06about has to do with fire insurance and in particular
- 4:10coverage for smoke damage. We actually talked,
- 4:14so we have three cases to go through. We actually
- 4:17talked about two of them last year. They were
- 4:21brand new at the time of the program last year.
- 4:24And of course, the whole issue of fire insurance
- 4:27coverage and smoke damage, coverage for smoke
- 4:29damage was extremely relevant to a lot of people,
- 4:32unfortunately, because of the Palisades and the
- 4:35Altadena fires. And also, We talked last year
- 4:41about a California Supreme Court case called
- 4:43Another Planet, which was the definitive COVID
- 4:46case, but it had some important definitions for
- 4:50what constitutes property damage that became
- 4:52relevant, as we'll see for when and whether smoke
- 4:56damage is covered. So even though we've talked
- 4:59about a couple of them, I think it's worth a
- 5:02refresher and kind of recontextualizing them
- 5:04and also to talk about them in the context of
- 5:07the third case that we'll get to, which has to
- 5:10do with smoke damage coverage under the California
- 5:13Fair Plan. We can go on to the next slide. The
- 5:18first case, which really set off a lot of alarm
- 5:20bells a year ago this time was this Caribbean
- 5:23case. The good news, I think, from homeowners
- 5:28and policyholder perspective is that it seems
- 5:31that the Griebian case, which found no coverage,
- 5:36is probably going to be limited to its facts.
- 5:39And it's, to me, to my mind, kind of a situation
- 5:42or a case of bad facts making bad law, or if
- 5:45not bad law, unnecessary law, kind of question
- 5:48whether this case really needed to be published.
- 5:50But in any event, The situation in this case
- 5:54was that the homeowner was about a half a mile
- 5:57away from a wildfire and smoke and debris from
- 6:03the wildfire alighted around the house and even
- 6:08got into the house. But there was a finding that
- 6:13there was no coverage for anything relating to
- 6:15that because there was no direct physical loss
- 6:18to property. There was no burn damage. no heat
- 6:23damage to the property. Nonetheless, even though
- 6:27there was none of that kind of damage, the insurance
- 6:29company did pay for cleaning and even increased
- 6:35its payment after the insurer got a second opinion
- 6:40from an expert, a consultant. But that consultant
- 6:45importantly conceded that the mere presence of
- 6:48soot without exposure to water does not actually
- 6:51physically damage a structure. And I think another
- 6:55fact that certainly worked against this policy
- 6:59holder was that they took the money, but they
- 7:01didn't actually do the work. Go on to the next
- 7:03slide, please. Even though they took the money
- 7:08and didn't do the work, they sued the insurance
- 7:10company for breach of contract and bad faith,
- 7:13because while Wenisu refused to pay for anything
- 7:16other than the cleaning. That is the insured
- 7:18wanted to have painting and replacement of insulation
- 7:21and other work done. And the insurance company
- 7:24filed a summary judgment motion and they won.
- 7:28And that brings us to the court of appeal, which
- 7:32as I mentioned earlier, looked to the then very
- 7:36recent case of another planet, which. held that
- 7:42direct physical loss or damage to property requires
- 7:45a distinct demonstrable physical alteration to
- 7:48property. And although the physical alteration
- 7:51does not need to be visible to the naked eye
- 7:54or structural, it still has to result in some
- 7:58injury to or impairment of the property as property.
- 8:04So go on to the next page, please. And as I mentioned
- 8:08here, there was no evidence of direct physical
- 8:11loss. You had the consultant conceding that unless
- 8:14there's water, the soot doesn't damage the structure.
- 8:17You had the policy holder testifying at deposition
- 8:21that the smoke smell had dissipated. And the
- 8:25finding was that wildfire debris did not alter
- 8:29the property itself in a lasting and persistent
- 8:31manner. Rather, all evidence indicates that the
- 8:35debris was easily cleaned or removed from the
- 8:37property. And that does not constitute direct
- 8:39physical loss to property. Next slide. So it's
- 8:43interesting, Steve, that you had said that the
- 8:46COVID cases are resolved, and we're not having
- 8:48to deal with them. But this is kind of like night
- 8:52of the living COVID case, right? I mean, it's
- 8:54a COVID case that is intruding into fire insurance
- 8:58coverage. Right. So even though we're not dealing
- 9:01with COVID claims anymore, the holding of the
- 9:06COVID cases, the teachings of the COVID cases
- 9:09are not limited to COVID. That's right. So now
- 9:15the interesting argument that the plaintiff made
- 9:18was, well, but what if the cleaning compromises
- 9:24the integrity of the building? they submitted
- 9:30an expert declaration that it might do that.
- 9:33But the court said, well, that's too speculative.
- 9:37Again, that doesn't constitute damage, nor did
- 9:40the fact that the insurance company paid something
- 9:44for the cleaning, that did not constitute a waiver
- 9:47of their arguments. And interestingly, they noted
- 9:50insurance companies often adjust claims for reasons
- 9:53entirely unrelated to the merits. That's interesting.
- 9:59If we go on to the next slide, this was followed
- 10:02or actually proceeded by a few couple weeks by
- 10:05a federal district court case, which kind of
- 10:10restored, I think some hope or some good feelings
- 10:14for the policyholders. This is a, and we'll see
- 10:18here today, several examples of cases that just
- 10:21go on and on and on. The thing, the case came
- 10:24out three days after the Palisades Fire, but
- 10:31it was relating to a fire that had taken place
- 10:33in 2017. So it took that long to work its way
- 10:36to this point. Bottega LLC owned a restaurant
- 10:41in Northern California which had to close for
- 10:43several days in October 2017 due to the North
- 10:47Bay fires having been inundated with smoke, soot,
- 10:51ash, and char. And they submitted a first -party
- 10:56claim for loss business income wasn't a property
- 10:58damage coverage, but rather the lost income as
- 11:02a result of having to shut down. But the lost
- 11:05business income still has to be as a result of
- 11:10direct physical loss of or damage to the property.
- 11:14So they still had to establish direct physical
- 11:16loss in order to collect their lost income, among
- 11:20other things. And so a summary judgment motion
- 11:23was filed and the court found for the policyholder
- 11:27on some things or some damages and against them
- 11:30on others, but most importantly, the court found
- 11:35that there had been, or at least there'd been
- 11:37evidence submitted of direct physical loss or
- 11:40damage so as to trigger the lost business income
- 11:44coverage. So even though it was not fire, it
- 11:46was not heat, we had... like in the other case,
- 11:49we had smoke and ash and other debris, and that
- 11:52could constitute direct physical loss. And interestingly,
- 11:59that court quoted a different COVID case, a court
- 12:04of appeal COVID case, but up until another plan
- 12:07is sort of the seminal. COVID case in California
- 12:11and one that was approved of by the case, the
- 12:15Supreme Court in another planet. For the proposition
- 12:19that contamination of a structure that seriously
- 12:22impairs or destroys its function may qualify
- 12:25as direct physical loss. So again, if you can
- 12:30show that the contamination is actually impairing
- 12:33or affecting the structure, then that can be
- 12:36enough to constitute physical loss. Next slide,
- 12:40please. And the court noted that there are some
- 12:45distinctions between the COVID -19 situation
- 12:48and noxious substance resulting from fire, where
- 12:53the substances and fumes that come from a fire
- 12:56can actually physically alter a property. And
- 13:00pointed to the comment in the Inns by the Sea
- 13:04case that the presence of COVID did not actually
- 13:08cause damage necessitating rehabilitation or
- 13:11restoration and that the fire damage situation
- 13:17was more similar to where there was action needed
- 13:20to abate asbestos or remove poisonous fumes which
- 13:25permeate a property. Now there was a factual
- 13:30dispute as to whether the smoke ash and or soot
- 13:33damage actually caused The suspension of operations
- 13:37at Bottega and so that was left for determination
- 13:40at trial, but I checked the docket this morning.
- 13:44Actually, in this case, settle a couple months
- 13:46after this after this decision came down, so
- 13:50that's good. But it's it's only a federal district
- 13:55court decision, and it's not even like officially
- 13:58in the official public F sub publication, so
- 14:01it's only Alexis or Westlaw site. Okay, next
- 14:06slide. So I think this might be a first for our
- 14:12program, Mike, that where we're talking about
- 14:14a superior court case decision, but this was
- 14:19really important and got a lot of attention.
- 14:22Not, I guess, technically citable, but I guess
- 14:27the way I think about it is even if you can't
- 14:30cite the case, you can certainly cite the reasoning
- 14:32or copy, you know. plagiarize the reasoning of
- 14:35the case. This was a situation where the plaintiff
- 14:42policy holder had had a plan from the California
- 14:45Fair Plan and the question was, okay, how can
- 14:51smoke damage constitute direct physical loss
- 14:54and whether or not the limitations on smoke damage
- 14:59specifically in the California Fair Plan complied
- 15:02with the law. And specifically, the plaintiff
- 15:09said the fair plan's policy does not comply with
- 15:12insurance code section 2071, which specifies
- 15:16the minimum requirements for fire insurance in
- 15:20California. So policies issued in California
- 15:24have to provide substantially equivalent or more
- 15:27favorable coverage than is called for by section
- 15:292071. Next slide, please. You see at the bottom
- 15:36that what the law requires is all loss by fire
- 15:40has to be covered. Exactly, exactly. So yeah,
- 15:44I'll get to that in a second. But right, the
- 15:46requirement of 2071 just says loss by fire. In
- 15:51contrast to that, the fair plan defined direct
- 15:54physical loss as any actual loss or physical
- 15:57damage evidenced by permanent physical changes.
- 16:00So that's a limitation right there. And specifically
- 16:03with respect to smoke damage, it talks about
- 16:08sudden and accidental direct physical loss from
- 16:11smoke that is visible to the unaided human eye
- 16:14or odor from smoke or ash that is detected by
- 16:17the unaided human nose of an average person and
- 16:21not by your subjective. I guess someone who has
- 16:26a particularly good sense of smell doesn't count.
- 16:29and laboratory testing doesn't count. Next slide,
- 16:34please. So on summary adjudication, Judge Stuart
- 16:40Rice in our LA Superior Court first went through
- 16:47a really long opinion and went through all the
- 16:50different reasons why that language. did not
- 16:53comply with Section 2071. One of them was that
- 16:57there was a memorandum that had been sent by
- 17:00the Fair Plan to various insurance brokers about
- 17:03this new language when it was enacted, and they
- 17:05acknowledged that the requirement of permanent
- 17:09physical changes actually was a reduction in
- 17:12coverage. And the court also noted that the requirement
- 17:17that the smoke damage caused permanent physical
- 17:21changes ran afoul of both another planet and
- 17:25Section 2071, and similarly the requirement that
- 17:29the smoke damage actually has to be visible to
- 17:31the unaided human eye. Next page. And indeed,
- 17:36that's directly contrary to another planet. The
- 17:41picture here is supposed to be of something microscopic.
- 17:45Another planet specifically said a change or
- 17:47alteration need not be visible. to the naked
- 17:49eye to constitute direct physical damage to property,
- 17:53and that things like saturation, ingraining,
- 17:55or infiltration of a substance that requires
- 18:00remediation is sufficient to meet the physical
- 18:03damage requirement. Next page. The court also
- 18:09distinguished Garibian, that pesky case that
- 18:11we talked about at the beginning, on the ground
- 18:14that, well, in that case, there was no evidence
- 18:16of physical damage that was presented. And here
- 18:20there was some evidence of at least some minimal
- 18:22physical damage. Now the case is still not over,
- 18:27although I checked the docket and it is looks
- 18:30like they are. Moving towards ending the case,
- 18:35including by dismissing without prejudice, the
- 18:37class claims that had been brought. That was
- 18:39recently approved, so I expect that this case
- 18:41will go to judgment soon. The interesting question
- 18:44is whether or not the fair plan will appeal this
- 18:46ruling. or whether they'll concede that the court
- 18:49was right seems one of the questions that i think
- 18:51is interesting first of all point of personal
- 18:53privilege this case the plaintiff in this case
- 18:55was represented by dylan schaefer class of 1990
- 18:58uc hastings college of the law uh who's a personal
- 19:01friend of mine was a classmate of mine but uh
- 19:04the more interesting thing i think is that this
- 19:07case when you compare it to garibyan creates
- 19:11a situation where the where fair plan coverage
- 19:13might actually be more generous to the policy
- 19:16holder than than a policy written by a commercial
- 19:21insurer. I mean, generally, I think people view
- 19:25Fair Plan coverage as inferior to what you would
- 19:28get from State Farm or Allstate, you know, one
- 19:30of the big insurance companies. But this seems
- 19:34to, particularly when you look at a Caribbean,
- 19:36Caribbean has narrowed, it seems to me, the scope,
- 19:39and that's really the only sightable. uh california
- 19:43authority on that subject it's narrowed the coverage
- 19:46that's available under a standard policy this
- 19:49case if it if i mean that's kind of why you think
- 19:53maybe fair plan has got to consider whether to
- 19:55appeal or not because if they if if the court
- 19:58of appeal affirms this case fair plan would have
- 20:01would be forced to provide coverage which is
- 20:03broader than coverage from the from the commercial
- 20:07for -profit insurers And I should add that there
- 20:12was an effort to have the Supreme Court look
- 20:14at the Caribbean case that was denied. And de
- 20:19-publish, which was also denied. Right, right,
- 20:22exactly. OK, so next case, and then we'll move
- 20:26to some other cases for Mike to talk about. One
- 20:31more slide. OK, so this is a fair plan related
- 20:37case, but neither first party nor third party
- 20:40coverage, but still I think relevant to this
- 20:43whole question of fire damage and the fair plan.
- 20:48This was an insurance broker negligence case.
- 20:53And what happened was the plaintiff Hughes sued
- 20:57farmers because its agent, insurance agent Hartnett,
- 21:05had placed insufficient fire coverage under the
- 21:08fair plan. And as often happens in these, especially
- 21:12in the fire zones, both before and after the
- 21:17fires last year, the regular carriers will not
- 21:21write fire coverage. And so the only way you
- 21:24can get fire coverage is to get a fair plan policy
- 21:27and then a policy to cover other kinds of claims
- 21:31and losses from a more traditional insurance
- 21:35company like farmers. That's what happened here.
- 21:38The Hartnett was an agent for farmers, but as
- 21:45we'll see, was not actually acting in that capacity
- 21:47when she placed the Fair Plan policy. In fact,
- 21:53the farmers policy contained a Fair Plan companion
- 21:57endorsement, which specifically excludes coverage
- 21:59for anything that could be covered under the
- 22:01Fair Plan. And so Hughes's Malibu home suffered
- 22:06a fire loss of almost $3 million, but was only
- 22:09insured for 1 .2 million dollars. Next slide
- 22:12please. And so Hughes sued the agent or broker
- 22:19for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty,
- 22:21but also sued farmers, claiming that farmers
- 22:25had failed to properly train her, supervise her,
- 22:29and that farmers was vicariously liable for her
- 22:32conduct. Farmers moved for summary judgments
- 22:35saying Hartnett was not acting as our agent for
- 22:40purposes of obtaining the fair plan policy, and
- 22:43that summary judgment motion was granted. And
- 22:46it's important for people who work in this area
- 22:48to remember and understand the difference between
- 22:50an insurance agent under Insurance Code Section
- 22:5431 and an insurance broker under Insurance Code
- 22:57Section 33. Next slide. Generally speaking, an
- 23:03insurance agent is working on behalf of the insurer,
- 23:07whereas an insurance broker acts on behalf of
- 23:09an insurer. Sometimes the person might be doing
- 23:12both, but the broker owes duties of care to the
- 23:18policyholder, whereas an insurance agent does
- 23:21not necessarily. In any event, this agent's appointment
- 23:26did not include the sale of fair plan policies,
- 23:29and it was notable that the fair plan policy
- 23:33itself described Hartnett as Hughes insurance
- 23:36broker and there was nothing indicating that
- 23:40farmers had done something to make the policyholder
- 23:43think that Hartnett was was acting as farmers
- 23:46agent in procuring the fair plan policy. And
- 23:50then the last note is a footnote in the decision
- 23:54is that the insurance broker apparently settled
- 23:59with the plaintiff. Of course, people settle
- 24:02all the time. So I guess not too much can be
- 24:05read into that. But other than that, somebody
- 24:07thought that maybe there was a viable claim against
- 24:09this person for, you know, not getting enough
- 24:12insurance under the California Fair Plan. Next
- 24:16slide. We can go on to some other first party.
- 24:19Okay, so next slide, please. So I use a lot more
- 24:25illustrative aids maybe than Steve does. This
- 24:27is one that appealed to me because the next slide
- 24:29please. This case Murphy versus AAA auto insurance
- 24:33is about a cannabis delivery driver. He worked
- 24:37for grass store full time and he but he was using
- 24:40his personal vehicle and he had an accident during
- 24:42delivery and he made a claim on his own policy
- 24:45because his employer was insolvent and the claim
- 24:50was denied. based on the compensated carrying
- 24:53exclusion of his policy that excluded damage
- 24:57to any automobile while used to carry persons
- 25:00or property for charge, any form of compensation,
- 25:03voluntary payment or benefit, or the promise
- 25:06or agreement for any form of compensation. Next
- 25:08slide. So Murphy represented himself, at least
- 25:13in the Court of Appeal. There was a summary judgment
- 25:18entered against him, and the Court of Appeal
- 25:20affirmed it. They analyzed the exclusion, not
- 25:23ambiguous. This is always the test for ambiguity
- 25:27of an exclusion in insurance cases. Conspicuous,
- 25:31plain, and clear, they found that it was. Interestingly,
- 25:34I was not familiar with Labor Code 2802. which
- 25:38requires an employer to indemnify the employee
- 25:41for all necessary expenditures. Actually, I was,
- 25:44but not in this context. Usually it comes up
- 25:47when you represent an employee and you try to
- 25:49get the employer to pay your fees. That's how
- 25:53it's come up in my practice in the past. But
- 25:56the Court of Appeals cited that to say, well,
- 26:00look, Murphy could have gone against Grassdoor.
- 26:03Just because Grassdoor is insolvent, that doesn't
- 26:06mean that Murphy automatically can go against
- 26:10his insurer. So next slide, please. It was not
- 26:16a very surprising result, frankly. All right,
- 26:19this one is a different one. Next slide, please.
- 26:21This is a worker's compensation case. We don't
- 26:24usually handle worker's compensation cases, but
- 26:26this one involves the going and coming rule.
- 26:30And we thought that it was analogous to these
- 26:34cases where an employee is driving and the employer
- 26:39is found vicariously liable for damages suffered
- 26:43by the plaintiff. This case involved an agricultural
- 26:48worker who worked for a company that assigned
- 26:51workers on a job site. And I think we all know
- 26:57that injury arising out of in the course of employment,
- 27:01is covered under workers' compensation. But the
- 27:03going and coming rule within workers' compensation
- 27:06says that, look, if you're commuting, if you're
- 27:08going back and forth to the job, absent special
- 27:11circumstances, you're not an employee at that
- 27:14point. You're only an employee when you show
- 27:16up at the site, and that's when the coverage
- 27:19attaches. Hernandez worked for a contractor and
- 27:24he was carried in an employee operated van pool
- 27:2850 or 60 miles from his home to the work site
- 27:32and they got into a wreck and the poor fellow
- 27:36lost his leg. The carrier denied the claim on
- 27:39the going and coming rule, but the Workers' Comp
- 27:42Appeals Board applied special risk and dual purpose
- 27:45exceptions to award the benefits. The carrier
- 27:47appealed, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
- 27:49reversed, so we can go to the next slide. There
- 27:53was a long analysis of the special risk rule,
- 27:56which requires certain proximity to the employer's
- 28:00premises, and a but -for test regarding why the
- 28:06employee is there. The dual purpose rule applies
- 28:13where the commute involves both travel to or
- 28:18from the job site, but also some kind of purpose
- 28:22that benefits the employer. And they found in
- 28:29this case, what the claimant had said was we
- 28:34get assignments for the job when we get the contractor
- 28:40can address us all in the van to give us our
- 28:44assignments. And the workers compensation appeals
- 28:48board felt that that was sufficient to apply
- 28:52dual purpose, but the court of appeals said not.
- 28:55And as I say, the labor code and the California
- 28:59Supreme court say that these workers' compensation
- 29:02statutes shall be liberally construed to protect
- 29:04the injured and any doubts should be resolved
- 29:07in favor of coverage. But the Third Circuit Court
- 29:10of Appeals said they had no doubt that an unidentified
- 29:14point within 50 or 60 miles of the workplace
- 29:16was too far to approve a board decision awarding
- 29:20benefits to a farm laborer who lost his leg riding
- 29:23in a van returning home from work. You can probably
- 29:26tell by the way that I phrase this, that I felt
- 29:29this was unjust, even if it might have been supported
- 29:32by the law. But they didn't ask me. Next slide,
- 29:36please. These are yours. OK. Yes. So at the risk
- 29:43of sending everyone to sleep, we're going to
- 29:45talk a little bit about life insurance. Not the
- 29:47most exciting topic, but there's some interesting
- 29:51wrinkles here, hopefully. So the background for
- 29:56this series of Ninth Circuit cases that came
- 29:59out in 2025 is that in 2020, in 2012, the California
- 30:05legislature enacted a series of new notice requirements
- 30:10to prevent people who had life insurance policies
- 30:13from inadvertently losing them due to non -payment.
- 30:17One of the provisions requires a grace period
- 30:20of 60 days. from the premium due date and that
- 30:24a notice of pending lapse be provided at least
- 30:2630 days prior to the effective date of termination.
- 30:31And then there's another provision that also
- 30:34requires that the insured be given a right to
- 30:36designate an additional person, a third person,
- 30:38to receive notice of lapse. Next slide. So the
- 30:44question then becomes what happens where the
- 30:46life insured doesn't comply? with those notice
- 30:49provisions and the policy ends up being canceled.
- 30:52And a monkey wrench, a further monkey wrench
- 30:54was thrown in here in 2021 because the California
- 30:58Supreme Court held in a case called McHugh versus
- 31:02protective life insurance company that the statute
- 31:06applied to policies that were enforced at the
- 31:09time this the these new provisions went into
- 31:11effect in 2013. So you had you know, maybe it's
- 31:17becoming less common now, but you had a huge
- 31:21amount of compliance that was necessary all of
- 31:24a sudden in 2021 because the insurance companies
- 31:27had been assuming that these requirements didn't
- 31:30apply to earlier policies. And, you know, guess
- 31:34what? Some of them, I don't know if it was conscious
- 31:37or unconscious or both, but they didn't comply.
- 31:39So, for example, they didn't give notice to folks
- 31:42of their right to designate a third person. And
- 31:46so what ended up happening is a number of lawyers
- 31:50attempted to create class action lawsuits that
- 31:54got removed or were filed in federal court. And
- 31:58where they would try to represent people who
- 32:02were either seeking reinstatement of their life
- 32:05insurance policies if they were still alive or
- 32:08where someone had died in the interim. and the
- 32:12beneficiary did not receive the lost death benefit,
- 32:16though they were suing on behalf of those people.
- 32:18And then the question that was developing in
- 32:21the district courts was that there was a split.
- 32:24Some were saying that, hey, it's essentially
- 32:26strict liability. If you can show that there
- 32:29was a violation of the notice requirements, then
- 32:34you win. And they reasoned that an insurer's
- 32:38noncompliance automatically meant that the policy
- 32:41remained in force. Then there were other cases
- 32:44that adopted the causation theory, which said,
- 32:46well, but the plaintiff still has to show that
- 32:49the non -compliance actually caused harm. And
- 32:53as we'll see in a trio of cases, the Ninth Circuit
- 32:56found that the California Supreme Court case,
- 33:00in their opinion, would require causation in
- 33:03order to prevail on these claims, which were
- 33:07breach of contract claims. Next slide. The first
- 33:13one and probably the most important was Small
- 33:15versus, is that Allianz? I guess it's Allianz
- 33:19life insurance. So Small, the name plaintiff
- 33:25was a beneficiary under her deceased husband's
- 33:28life insurance policy and it was terminated when
- 33:30they missed a payment after 26 years. And Small's
- 33:35husband, Died and and the insurance company denied
- 33:39the death benefit. But. They had never provided
- 33:44notice of the right to designate a third party.
- 33:47To receive the notice of unpaid premiums, so
- 33:50small filed a class action. Alleging breach of
- 33:53contract. Next slide. And the district court
- 33:57actually certified two sub classes, the living
- 34:00insureds. Seeking to have their policies reinstated
- 34:04and. the beneficiaries, like small, of policies
- 34:08with deceased insurers. And that's what Allianz
- 34:15appealed from, the class certification order.
- 34:18So it went to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth
- 34:22Circuit, in order to determine whether the class
- 34:24could be certified, had to first figure out,
- 34:27okay, what is it the plaintiff needs to show
- 34:30in order to recover under the relevant cause
- 34:33of action, which was breach of contract. And
- 34:35that's why it needed to resolve the dispute between
- 34:39violation only and causation theories. So the
- 34:44court found that causation is an element for
- 34:49breach of contract. Next slide. And that there
- 34:55are situations where the lack of notice is not
- 35:00actually the reason why the policy was canceled.
- 35:03And interestingly, in support of that notion,
- 35:05expert testimony was submitted in the district
- 35:09court that there's a certain number of policyholders
- 35:13who intentionally let their policies lapse. Maybe
- 35:17they can't afford it anymore or maybe for whatever
- 35:20reason. And in fact, the expert examined 100
- 35:23files and found evidence in 43 of them that the
- 35:27policy holder was actually aware that the policy
- 35:31would lapse. and did let it lapse. And so that
- 35:35meant that there was an individualized determination
- 35:38that would be necessary in order to resolve these
- 35:41claims. Not that it was impossible to win on
- 35:43them, but there would be an individualized analysis
- 35:47required, and therefore class certification was
- 35:50inappropriate. But the net effect of that is
- 35:54that it's not enough just to show that the insurer
- 35:57failed to comply with the notice statutes. You
- 36:00actually have to show that the failure to comply
- 36:02caused the policies to lapse. Next slide. The
- 36:09next case had just a couple of wrinkles on the
- 36:13prior case. This is someone who was still alive
- 36:16and had her life insurance policy canceled. The
- 36:23district court denied class certification as
- 36:26to the monetary relief, presumably because that
- 36:29would require an individualized determination,
- 36:32but granted certification for purposes of declaratory
- 36:35and injunctive relief. Next slide. And that ruling
- 36:43on the class certification order was similarly
- 36:46appealed and a different panel of the Ninth Circuit
- 36:48also found that the causation requirement applied
- 36:52and cited to the small case. And as in small,
- 36:56they presented similar expert testimony. So again,
- 36:59it was not possible to meet the typicality requirement
- 37:02for class certification. Next slide. And then
- 37:06the last one had, again, a somewhat different
- 37:10wrinkle. It shows maybe a different form of causation.
- 37:16This plaintiff sued after her life insurance
- 37:18policy was canceled. But the reason that she
- 37:24didn't receive any notices was because she had
- 37:29moved and she had actually submitted a change
- 37:32of address request to the insurance company,
- 37:34but did not sign it. And the insurance company
- 37:37rejected it as a result of not complying with
- 37:41their requirements. Next slide. So she was not
- 37:49able to get a class certified, but she was continuing
- 37:53to pursue her own individual claims. And on summary
- 37:57judgment, the district court found that there
- 38:00had been a failure to comply with the notice
- 38:02statutes. I think it was undisputed that they
- 38:04had never given her the notice, for example,
- 38:05to designate a third party. And luckily for her,
- 38:11once that summary adjudication or partial summary
- 38:14judgment ruling was came down, the party stipulated
- 38:17that. that they would give her an opportunity
- 38:19to reinstate the policy to pay the premiums.
- 38:22But they still, the insurance company still was
- 38:25unhappy with the declaratory relief judgment
- 38:27and appealed it. Next slide. And the Ninth Circuit
- 38:35found that the District Court had erred in finding
- 38:38that the policy remained valid and enforceable,
- 38:41again, because of the causation issue. And it
- 38:46was undisputed that CEO would not have recovered
- 38:50or not received any notices from the insurance
- 38:52company since she failed to update her new address.
- 38:55So therefore the termination was not causally
- 38:58related to the failure to provide the notice.
- 39:04Okay, next slide. There are a couple of interesting
- 39:09points here. One is that the Ninth Circuit appears
- 39:13to have decided this issue without certifying
- 39:16it to the California Supreme Court for a decision.
- 39:22Maybe that the feds believe that the McHugh case
- 39:27kind of decided it already. But the other question
- 39:32I wonder about is Sino, the plaintiff in that
- 39:37particular case, it seems like she would have
- 39:38a very strong argument on causation because if
- 39:42they had notified her of her right to designate
- 39:46a third party, that third party might have received
- 39:48the notice that was not sent to her because of
- 39:52the problem with the forwarding order. Yeah,
- 39:57it's a chicken and egg problem a little bit,
- 39:59but I think the I think that the reason they
- 40:03ruled that way is because in order to take advantage
- 40:07of the ability to designate the third party,
- 40:09you first have to receive the notice from the
- 40:11insurance company. And by the time, I guess it
- 40:15was their obligation to send that notice. I'm
- 40:17not positive about the timing here, but I'm assuming
- 40:19that by the time it was their obligation to do
- 40:23that, presumably that she had, her change of
- 40:28address had been rejected. So she wouldn't have
- 40:30received it anyway. That's how it could make
- 40:32sense, but yeah, I'm not sure about that. All
- 40:36right, these are my cases, I think, so let's
- 40:38go to the next. Yeah, third party. All right,
- 40:41Gordon, next slide, please. This is a massage
- 40:44abuse case, so that's why I have that slide there.
- 40:48Gordon versus continental casualty, molestation,
- 40:51exclusion. The suit was against the owner of
- 40:55the spa who was alleged to have, and I guess,
- 40:58found to have sexually assaulted clients and
- 41:03the manager and the tender was rejected based
- 41:08on a couple of exclusions, a molestation exclusion
- 41:12in subsection A and a negligent employment or
- 41:15supervision of a molester in subsection B. The
- 41:22case turned on the distinction on the issue of
- 41:25what care, custody, or control means. You can
- 41:28see that's in subsection A. And the insureds
- 41:32argued on appeal that the exclusions only applied
- 41:35where the insured had exclusive or complete control,
- 41:38not shared control, over the property that is
- 41:40damaged. Next slide, please. That was a property.
- 41:45The authority had to do with with actual property
- 41:47claims, not with personal injury claims. And
- 41:50so the Court of Appeal rejected that citation
- 41:53and cited instead to foreign jurisdiction cases,
- 41:58because this had not been decided. I guess it
- 42:01was a matter of first impression in California,
- 42:03but they cited to these cases in District of
- 42:06Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri
- 42:09and Wyoming that construed this care custody
- 42:13or control language in favor of the insurer in
- 42:19those cases. So that certainly applied to the
- 42:25molester, the owner of the spa. The question
- 42:28then became, what about the manager? who it was
- 42:35alleged to have negligently trained the owner.
- 42:39And that was the cause of the assault. The court
- 42:44rejected an attempt to distinguish those exclusions,
- 42:49even though neither of the exclusions listed
- 42:52training. The court found that the bodily injury
- 42:55flowed from the owner's sexual assault molestation.
- 42:58So the manager's alleged negligent training fell
- 43:01within subsection A. They also went beyond that
- 43:05to say subsection B applied to the claim for
- 43:08negligent hiring, training, and supervision,
- 43:10even though negligent training was not listed
- 43:13in subsection B. But it's encompassed within
- 43:16negligent employment and supervision, which are
- 43:19expressly concluded. And I think that this could
- 43:23affect a lot of claims that involve similar insuring
- 43:27language or exclusions, rather, for negligent
- 43:30training. Even if you don't have an exclusion
- 43:34for negligent training, it seems like Gordon
- 43:36could be applied to say, well, it's included
- 43:38within negligent employment and supervision.
- 43:43We can go to the next slide, please. Yes, this
- 43:46is Diblin. Next slide, please. And I don't mean
- 43:51to make light of this. That's kind of a funny
- 43:53image. But the facts of this case are really
- 43:56pretty terrible. They involved a defendant who
- 44:01had assaulted a female housemate by hitting her
- 44:07over the head with a mallet. And in fact, as
- 44:10you can see, the insured was held liable on a
- 44:15jury verdict for two and a half million dollars
- 44:18for the damages that were caused. Now, it's been
- 44:22well settled for 20 years now that there's no
- 44:26coverage when all of the acts and the manner
- 44:28in which they were done and the objective accomplished
- 44:32occurred as intended. And an accident has to
- 44:36be unexpected, unforeseen, undesigned, happening,
- 44:39or consequence. So the holding in Diblen affirmed
- 44:47the summary judgment in Diblen's coverage case.
- 44:52And that's not a surprise. What's interesting
- 44:55about this case is that the the defendant, who
- 45:00then became the plaintiff under an assignment
- 45:03of rights, seemed to recognize that they had
- 45:08an issue here. And so they filed, after the case
- 45:11was resolved, after the judgment, they filed
- 45:14a second amended complaint that alleged that
- 45:16Diblin, the insured, had negligently failed to
- 45:19warn his housemate about the fact that he was
- 45:23taking testosterone, which made him violent.
- 45:30And next slide, please. And they tried to argue
- 45:34a number of things. But what stuck out to me
- 45:39was that second amended complaint, because, of
- 45:42course, that was an attempt to what we call plead
- 45:45into coverage. And so I see actually in our audience
- 45:53is the lawyer who represented, I guess, Diblin.
- 45:56Oh, no, it represented the policyholder in Gordon,
- 45:59which is a case that I just discussed. In Diblin,
- 46:06the court of appeal dismissed the second amendment
- 46:09complaint, they said, because it had been filed
- 46:11without leave after the judgment was entered.
- 46:15Diblin also argued that there were concurrent
- 46:19causes, that his negligence was an independent
- 46:23concurrent cause. Remember, and I guess I didn't
- 46:25tell you this, Well, I did. I told you there
- 46:27was a jury verdict for $2 .5 million. So there
- 46:30was a verdict form where the jury answered all
- 46:35of these questions. And on appeal, the insured
- 46:39tried to argue that negligence was an independent
- 46:43concurrent cause. And the Court of Appeals said,
- 46:45no, it's not an independent cause. Because just
- 46:51failing to address the side effects of the medication
- 46:56wouldn't have caused harm to the housemate, absent
- 47:00Diblin's violent and intentional conduct. So
- 47:04that's Diblin. Like I say, the law about intentional
- 47:11acts and whether there's coverage for intentional
- 47:13acts is pretty solidly against policyholders
- 47:16by now. But this second amendment complaint is
- 47:20an interesting sort of detail. And it shows that
- 47:25if you're trying to plead into coverage, think
- 47:27it through before you ever file your original
- 47:29complaint to see if you can allege some kind
- 47:33of negligent conduct. I don't know if that would
- 47:34have gotten Diblin coverage, but it was an interesting
- 47:41strategy. Next slide, please. OK, bad faith.
- 47:46Not a ton of law on bad faith this year. But
- 47:50there are two cases that we're going to talk
- 47:51about. This Bartel case is my favorite case of
- 47:55the year as a policyholders lawyer, especially
- 47:57one who likes to deal with third party claims
- 48:02and cases, because it really reaffirmed the broadness,
- 48:08the breadth of the duty to defend. In this case,
- 48:11it was under a title insurance policy, which
- 48:14is less common. But nonetheless, for certain
- 48:16kinds of claims, title insurance has to provide
- 48:18a defense. similar to other kind of third party
- 48:22claims. The situation here was that Mr. Bartel
- 48:29had purchased a rural retirement property in
- 48:331998. And in 2005, traffic started developing
- 48:41on the road right outside the front of his house.
- 48:44And it turned out that what was going on is that
- 48:47a nearby property was being utilized to grow
- 48:50marijuana. And so there were a lot of traffic
- 48:53at all times of the day. Bartel was sued by that
- 49:01neighbor twice, the neighbor trying to assert
- 49:07an easement over Bartel's property. And so that
- 49:13the first case was filed in 2010, asserting a
- 49:16prescriptive easement and. Although it attached
- 49:22a grant deed, which became very important later,
- 49:25the theory of liability or the theory of the
- 49:27easement was not actually based on that grant
- 49:30deed. In fact, there was some disclaiming of
- 49:32the grant deed as a basis for the prescriptive
- 49:34easement, at least in the beginning. The complaint
- 49:39also. referenced a road maintenance agreement
- 49:42that had been recorded on September 2nd, 1970.
- 49:46So Bartell tendered the complaint to Chicago
- 49:49Title for Defense, but the neighbor dismissed
- 49:51the case without prejudice before a coverage
- 49:53position was entered. Next page. The neighbor
- 49:59then refiled essentially the same complaint again
- 50:01in 2011, attaching the grant deed once again.
- 50:06Next slide. Now this time Chicago title affirmatively
- 50:12refused to defend because there was an exclusion
- 50:16in the policy for easements which were not shown
- 50:18on the public record and also an exclusion for
- 50:21claims based on that 1970 road maintenance agreement.
- 50:26So after about a year of litigation, the neighbor
- 50:30dismissed the complaint again without prejudice.
- 50:33Next page. So Mr. Bartel decided to take matters
- 50:39into his own hands and he filed an action for
- 50:41quiet title and nuisance in 2013, at which point
- 50:45the neighbor filed a cross complaint. But this
- 50:49time alleging a new theory that the prescriptive
- 50:51easement or that the easement was actually included
- 50:54in the recorded grant deeds. Nonetheless, Chicago
- 50:58title still refused to defend. arguing that the
- 51:03gravamen of the cross complaint was still concern
- 51:05and easement created under the 1970 road maintenance
- 51:08agreement. We see this happening sometimes with
- 51:11insurance companies. You know, once they've taken
- 51:13a position, they can harden into that position.
- 51:17And even though they're presented with different
- 51:19facts or different pleadings, they don't like
- 51:22to change their initial denial. So they litigated
- 51:29the case for a while and Bartel tendered again
- 51:32when the neighbor filed a motion for summary
- 51:33judgment, which was explicitly reliant on that
- 51:38grantee that had been attached all the way back
- 51:40to the very first complaint. And at that point,
- 51:42finally, they agreed to defend, but only as of
- 51:46the date that the motion for summary adjudication
- 51:50had been tendered, which was nearly five years
- 51:52after the original complaint had been filed.
- 51:55Next slide. And unfortunately for Mr. Bartel,
- 52:00the neighbor ultimately prevailed, proving that
- 52:04it had an express easement based on that grantee
- 52:08from when the properties were subdivided way
- 52:10back in 1971. Chicago title at that point modified
- 52:14their acceptance of the tender back through the
- 52:17date of the cross complaint that had been filed
- 52:19in case number three and also paid Bartel for
- 52:23diminution. a value of his property in the amount
- 52:27of $170 ,000. At that point, Mr. Bartel in 2017,
- 52:34or actually 2016 shortly before this judgment
- 52:36came down in 2017, sued Chicago title. Next slide.
- 52:42And that case went to a phase one bench trial
- 52:46in 2019 where The trial court found that Chicago
- 52:50title did have a duty to defend that went all
- 52:53the way back to the initial tender because the
- 52:56original complaint had attached that deed that
- 52:59ultimately formed the basis for the judgment.
- 53:02But in 2023. In a second phase. The trial court
- 53:08found that while Chicago title should have performed
- 53:12a better investigation, it had not acted in bad
- 53:15faith because the situation. was so complex.
- 53:19Next slide. So the 6th District Court of Appeal
- 53:25affirmed that Chicago Title breached the duty
- 53:27to defend, but it reversed the finding that Chicago
- 53:31Title had not acted in bad faith. And as to the
- 53:34duty to defend, you know, it found that even
- 53:37though the original complaint only sought a prescriptive
- 53:39easement, the attachment of the grant deed was
- 53:42enough to create a mere possibility that facts
- 53:45extrinsic to the complaint. might reveal a claim
- 53:48that could be covered, and that was sufficient
- 53:49to trigger the duty to defend. And if anyone
- 53:52ever is in need of a series of quotes about the
- 53:56breadth of the duty to defend, I commend this
- 53:59case to you because it goes through all of them
- 54:01and they're very helpful. Next slide. And so
- 54:06although Chicago title. was let off the hook
- 54:09by the trial court due to the complexity, the
- 54:12court of appeal found that the complexity actually
- 54:15weighed against the insurer because that means
- 54:17that, you know, there was the potential for coverage
- 54:19and that the repeated rejections and its narrow
- 54:25investigation and consideration were objectively
- 54:28unreasonable. constituting bad faith, although
- 54:31the Court of Appeal did uphold the denial of
- 54:34punitive damages. So the case was remanded so
- 54:36that Bartel could go back and seek additional
- 54:39damages for bad faith. Next slide. I find it
- 54:43interesting. One of the bans of the policyholder
- 54:48bar is the genuine dispute doctrine. And this
- 54:52idea that the court in Bartel said that the very
- 54:57complexity of the issues Militated in favor of
- 55:01a duty to defend is kind of the turning the genuine
- 55:04dispute doctrine on its head typically when there
- 55:07when there are confused facts Or law the genuine
- 55:12dispute doctrine is applied to favor the insurer
- 55:14and this time it favored the the policyholder
- 55:17I Think the answer to that Mike is because The
- 55:24genuine dispute jock doctrine can can immunize
- 55:28an insurance company in a first party claim,
- 55:31but a third party claim is analyzed differently,
- 55:34especially when you're dealing with the duty
- 55:36to defend, which is broad. I think that's why
- 55:39we have that seeming disparity. Well, so thank
- 55:44you. So every year, next slide please, there
- 55:50are a few cases that deal with attempts by plaintiffs'
- 55:56lawyers to get, to use the insurer's failure
- 56:00to comply with conditions of a policy limit demand
- 56:02to blow the lid off the policy. There are two
- 56:04of those cases in this one. I don't think we're
- 56:06gonna get to the second one. In Birdsell versus
- 56:10Helfett, it was a sort of textbook case where,
- 56:13the plaintiff's lawyer sent a demand letter for
- 56:16policy limits. And USAA accepted the policy limits
- 56:20demand and sent a payment of $100 ,000 with a
- 56:24few other required bits of information, which
- 56:28are typical, was the insured defendant operating
- 56:33in the course and scope of his employment, which,
- 56:36of course, could, if the answer is yes, you could
- 56:38get the employer's policy as well. And is there
- 56:43any other insurance, which is kind of the same
- 56:45question, right? But applies to the driver personally.
- 56:49So USAA did all that stuff, but they sent a release
- 56:52that listed the wife who was a loss of consortium
- 56:55plaintiff as a releasee instead of the releaseor.
- 56:58Then USAA sent a letter saying, okay, we've done
- 57:03everything, right? And the plaintiff's lawyer
- 57:05was mom about that. They finally, the USA finally
- 57:09realized it's a mistake and sent a letter with
- 57:11a corrected release about an hour after the 3
- 57:14p .m. deadline. The plaintiff went ahead and
- 57:18sued and in the answer, the defendant included
- 57:21an affirmative defense that they had, you know,
- 57:23made a settlement. And the plaintiff filed a
- 57:27motion for summary adjudication, eliminating
- 57:30that defense. The case went to trial and the
- 57:33jury awarded five million dollars to the plaintiffs.
- 57:38And the Court of Appeal reversed. They said,
- 57:42all that we hold is that the outward manifestations,
- 57:45meaning the USAA sending the letter and the check
- 57:47and the release, even though there was the mistake,
- 57:51were such that they presented a tribal issue
- 57:52of material fact, getting back to the granting
- 57:54of the motion for summary adjudication. A reasonable
- 57:57person could find that there was a mutual consent
- 58:01and a settlement was made. And so they reversed
- 58:05on the basis that the grant of summary adjudication,
- 58:07which eliminated the defense, was error. Next
- 58:10slide, please. Mike, do you mind if we skip ahead
- 58:14just for the last two minutes to talk about the
- 58:16Supreme Court cases for a sec? Sure. Go back.
- 58:17Okay. Jose, if you wouldn't mind forwarding to
- 58:20where it says coming attractions. So, yeah, I
- 58:23mentioned at the beginning that there are three
- 58:25pending Supreme Court cases. Mike, you might
- 58:30want to talk about this first one and what's
- 58:32at issue here. Yeah, this is a condo case where
- 58:36they were having roof repairs and while the roof
- 58:40repairs were going on, water entered the structure.
- 58:44Their policy was an all risk policy that provided
- 58:48coverage for water damage to the interior of
- 58:50the building or structure caused by or resulting
- 58:52from rain. If the damages are sustained through
- 58:57the roof and walls, And it's a very, I mean,
- 59:03the thing that stuck out to me in reading the
- 59:05case and writing about it is that the discussion
- 59:10of coverage was extremely granular. And it's
- 59:16really sort of a textbook case by a very competent
- 59:20policyholder counsel to argue for coverage. And
- 59:23the Superior Court agreed as did Actually, I
- 59:29think the Superior Court ruled against the policyholder,
- 59:31and the Court of Appeal ruled for the policyholder.
- 59:35And the Farmers has now filed a petition for
- 59:39review, which was granted by the Supreme Court
- 59:42on the question that you see before you. OK,
- 59:45and then very quickly, next slide. The two other
- 59:48cases, this one is the one I think that's furthest
- 59:50along. I think it's fully briefed. In this one,
- 59:55this one has to do with the issue of excess policies
- 59:57and when you can sue them. Without getting into
- 1:00:02too much detail, this policy holder. Exhausted
- 1:00:08a first level primary and was into the first
- 1:00:11level excess, but claimed that its loss would
- 1:00:14would reach the levels of the higher excess policies
- 1:00:18and sued those excess policies and that the case
- 1:00:22was dismissed because. the policyholder was not
- 1:00:26able to allege actual exhaustion of the lower
- 1:00:30level policies and therefore it was premature
- 1:00:33to sue the excess policies. And as you can see,
- 1:00:37the Supreme Court has granted review to look
- 1:00:40at the question of whether it's ever possible
- 1:00:42to sue an excess policy where there's not yet
- 1:00:46been exhaustion, even though there may be a question
- 1:00:49of whether the loss should. exhaust those other
- 1:00:53policies. And also under what circumstances can
- 1:00:57an excess carrier be sued for bad faith? So that
- 1:01:00should be interesting. That's an area where there's
- 1:01:01not a ton of law in California. And lastly, next
- 1:01:07slide. There's a case stemming from the long
- 1:01:10running Montrose dispute about not so much about
- 1:01:14how to properly interpret a provision about sudden
- 1:01:18discharge of pollutants and whether that actually
- 1:01:21means sudden or does it mean gradual or does
- 1:01:23it mean something else, but how prior appellate
- 1:01:28decisions which found that language to be unambiguous
- 1:01:31should be treated, especially where the policyholders
- 1:01:35attempting to introduce evidence relevant to
- 1:01:40a particular policy. about drafting history and
- 1:01:44so forth, whether that needs to be considered
- 1:01:46or not. And that gets into issues that perhaps
- 1:01:51have somewhat more general importance about parole
- 1:01:52evidence and policy and contract interpretation.
- 1:01:57So it may have a little bit of, it may have an
- 1:02:00impact beyond this particular issue. So data,
- 1:02:04I wanna be respectful of everybody's time. Mike,
- 1:02:07do you have anything else before we bring it
- 1:02:09to a close? I do not thank you everybody for
- 1:02:13being with us and for giving us a couple of extra
- 1:02:15minutes of your time. I guess we'll see you next
- 1:02:18year. Exactly. Take care, everyone. Bye -bye.