Latest / The Voice of Corporate Governance / CII’s Monthly Governance and Capital Market Regulation Update (Sept 1 - Oct 9)
Transcript
- 0:11SPEAKER_01: Thank you for listening to the Council of Institutional Investors Voice of Corporate Governance, the number one corporate governance podcast in the U.S.
- 0:19SPEAKER_01: for 2026, as determined by Million Podcasts.
- 0:24SPEAKER_01: I'm your host, Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel of CII.
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: The purpose of these monthly episodes is to update CI members and the general public on significant developments in corporate governance and capital markets regulation and CII's related advocacy activities.
- 0:41SPEAKER_01: This update covers the period from September 1st to October 9th, 2026.
- 0:48SPEAKER_01: The following is my top ten list of events over that period.
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: Number 10.
- 0:55SPEAKER_01: On September 3rd, the Council of Institutional Investors sent a letter to the U.S.
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission opposing the New York Stock Exchange's proposal to extend from one to five years, the period in which newly listed companies must establish an internal audit function.
- 1:16SPEAKER_01: CIHM Lee agrees with the New York Stock Exchange that the internal audit function is a supplement to the investor protections provided by other existing safeguards, including independent audit committees, management assessments of internal controls, auditor attestations under Section 404B of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer certifications.
- 1:45SPEAKER_01: However, CII argues that the New York Stock Exchange failed to consider the impact of the SEC's concurrent filer status proposal that would exempt initial public offerings from the Section 404B auditor attestation requirement for five years and permanently exempt most other public companies from that requirement.
- 2:11SPEAKER_01: Without both a timely internal audit function and independent auditor attestation, CII believes investors may lack sufficient assurance about public companies' financial reporting controls.
- 2:26SPEAKER_01: CII therefore requests that the SEC not approve the proposed amendments.
- 2:33SPEAKER_01: Number nine, on September 10th, the Council of Institutional Investors sent a letter to the U.S.
- 2:39SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission in response to the Commission's semi-annual regulatory agenda.
- 2:47SPEAKER_01: Letter urges the agency to take a number of rulemaking actions, including the following nine items.
- 2:55SPEAKER_01: One, prioritize disclosure of class by class voting results.
- 3:00SPEAKER_01: Two, require reconciliation of non-GAAP measures used to determine executive compensation with GAAP reporting.
- 3:09SPEAKER_01: Three, set up a system to verify that shareholder votes are recorded and accounted for as directed.
- 3:16SPEAKER_01: Four, promote shareholder access to the proxy and a fair, predictable process for resolving shareholder proposal disputes under Rule 14A-8.
- 3:27SPEAKER_01: Five, retain required quarterly Form 10K reporting rather than permit semiannual reporting.
- 3:36SPEAKER_01: Six, simplify filer classifications without eliminating auditory attestations, executive pay disclosures, and other protections for sizable or newly public companies.
- 3:49SPEAKER_01: Seven, retain National Market System Rule six hundred and eleven, which protects investors from trades executed at prices worse than the best displayed price.
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: Eight, maintain decision useful, comparable, and reliable climate-related disclosures.
- 4:07SPEAKER_01: Nine, limit foreign private issuer accommodations to companies subject to meaningful home country protections and consider requiring companies trading exclusively in U.S.
- 4:19SPEAKER_01: markets to provide disclosures more comparable to domestic companies.
- 4:24SPEAKER_01: The letter emphasizes that CII wants the SEC to give these nine investor-focused priorities precedence over initiatives that would reduce shareholder rights, reduce disclosure requirements, and reduce market protections.
- 4:41SPEAKER_01: Number eight, at a September 10th meeting of the U.S.
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission's Investor Advisory Committee, yours truly advised the Commission not to finalize a proposal to rescind National Market System Rule 611.
- 5:00SPEAKER_01: I stated that repealing the National Market System Rule 611, the so-called trade-through rule, would impair the ability of some members of the Council of Institutional Investors and others from obtaining confirmation that brokers are pursuing best execution in their trading practices.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: Repealing the rule would remove the best price backstop that protects investors from having their orders traded at worse prices than readily available displayed prices.
- 5:31SPEAKER_01: I also attempted to explain that the proposed rescision of Rule 611 would increase the problem of conflicted broker routing, as brokers in the absence of the rule would have more flexibility to route to markets with worse prices based on rebates and other incentives.
- 5:51SPEAKER_01: I also added that with the proposed rescision of Rule 611, there would likely be no practical limits on how the national best bid and offer price benchmark is composed.
- 6:04SPEAKER_01: So investors would have less ability to determine whether they have obtained the best execution of their trade.
- 6:11SPEAKER_01: My prepared remarks have been posted to the Correspondence Legal Briefs and Testimony page on CII's website.
- 6:20SPEAKER_01: Number seven.
- 6:21SPEAKER_01: On September 24th, the Council of Institutional Investors published its updated U.S.
- 6:27SPEAKER_01: Securities Litigation Guide.
- 6:29SPEAKER_01: The guide explains how institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, can use securities litigation to recover losses, deter misconduct, and improve corporate governance.
- 6:40SPEAKER_01: The guide answers basic questions for those funds contemplating filing class action or derivative lawsuits or developing securities litigation policies and procedures.
- 6:51SPEAKER_01: Securities litigation gives investors a way not only to recover losses caused by fraud, but also to promote accountability by supplementing the U.S.
- 7:00SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement and discouraging future misconduct.
- 7:05SPEAKER_01: Although outcomes vary considerably, settlements can be substantial.
- 7:10SPEAKER_01: Over the past decade, the report cites roughly 90 class action settlements per year, with a median settlement of about 13 million and an average of about 50 million.
- 7:21SPEAKER_01: Institutional involvement can improve those outcomes.
- 7:24SPEAKER_01: In 2025, cases with an institutional lead plaintiff produced a median settlement of 38 million compared with 8 million in cases without one, in part because lead plaintiffs can select counsel, negotiate fees, and oversee the litigation.
- 7:41SPEAKER_01: Active participation demands staff time, discovery, monitoring, and risk management, while a lead plaintiff generally receives the same per share recovery as other class members and may incur expenses or liability if the litigation fails.
- 7:57SPEAKER_01: The publication says that investors seeking accountability may also consider derivative actions, which pursue claims on behalf of the company for fiduciary breaches, oversight failures, corporate waste, or unjust enrichment.
- 8:12SPEAKER_01: Settlements in those cases often strengthen boards, committees, internal controls, disclosure, and compliance systems.
- 8:19SPEAKER_01: Whatever level of involvement investor chooses, effective monitoring and timely claim filing remain essential.
- 8:26SPEAKER_01: Custodians, specialist monitors, securities counsel, or internal staff can identify eligibes.
- 8:34SPEAKER_01: Report notes that large amounts of settlement money go unclaimed when investors fail to submit proofs of claim or lose records while changing custodians or investment managers.
- 8:45SPEAKER_01: The publication explains that written policies can reduce that risk and support consistent fiduciary oversight.
- 8:52SPEAKER_01: Under Morrison v.
- 8:53SPEAKER_01: National Australia Bank, U.S.
- 8:55SPEAKER_01: federal securities laws generally do not apply to securities purchased on foreign exchanges.
- 9:01SPEAKER_01: The guide cautions that proceedings abroad may require investors to opt in and may expose them to fee shifting, third-party funding arrangements, and unfamiliar procedural rules.
- 9:14SPEAKER_01: The publication notes that even investors that remain passive can protect their interest by filing claims, monitoring proceedings, challenging excessive attorneys' fees, objecting to weak settlements, submitting letters or briefs, and seeking access to case information without becoming lead plaintiffs.
- 9:34SPEAKER_01: Recent developments related to mandatory arbitration, priest proxy litigation, reduced SEC enforcement, private investment in law firms, third-party litigation financing, and independent claim evaluation services are also highlighted in the guide.
- 9:53SPEAKER_01: Number six, on September 24th, the Council of Institutional Investors sent a letter to the U.S.
- 9:59SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission urging the Commission not to approve the Texas Stock Exchange's proposed amendments to Rule 13.003.
- 10:11SPEAKER_01: Those proposed amendments would require brokers to vote uninstructed shares in proportion to the instructions received from other customers.
- 10:21SPEAKER_01: Letter follows up on previous correspondence that CI sent the SEC on August 13th, opposing the proposed voting procedure.
- 10:31SPEAKER_01: CIA argues in its recent letter that the proposal conflicts with Section 6B10 of the Exchange Act of 1934.
- 10:40SPEAKER_01: That provision permits broker voting on covered matters only when the beneficial owner has provided instructions.
- 10:48SPEAKER_01: CII argues that a mandatory proportional arrangement cannot substitute for instructions from the owner whose shares are being voted.
- 10:58SPEAKER_01: Furthermore, the letter points out this type of voting could change outcomes on fundamental corporate matters.
- 11:06SPEAKER_01: By converting uninstructed shares into affirmative or negative votes, the proposal could allow instructions from a minority of outstanding shares to determine mergers, director elections, executive compensation votes, and other significant matters.
- 11:23SPEAKER_01: The letter warns that the effect of this type of voting would be amplified at controlled and dual-class stock companies where proportional voting may reinforce an already dominant voting block and reduce management's incentive to encourage actual shareholder participation.
- 11:42SPEAKER_01: CI's letter also includes three additional arguments in opposition to the proposal.
- 11:47SPEAKER_01: One, the proposal has no minimum participation threshold, so instructions for a very small number of shares could determine how much a larger block of uninstructed shares is voted.
- 12:00SPEAKER_01: Two, identically situated investors could have their uninstructed shares voted differently, depending upon their broker's customer base or the company's listing exchange.
- 12:11SPEAKER_01: And three, while genuine quorum and solicitation cost problems exist, particularly for funds, these concerns do not justify applying proportional voting to every proposal at every Texas stock exchange listed company, including incontested elections and major corporate transactions.
- 12:32SPEAKER_01: CI's letter concludes that the SEC should reject the amendments because the Texas Stock Exchange has not shown that the proposal is designed to protect investors and the public interest or prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices as is required under Section 6B5 of the Exchange Act of 1934.
- 12:55SPEAKER_01: Number five.
- 12:56SPEAKER_01: On October 8th, CI sent a letter to the U.S.
- 13:00SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission urging them to institute proceedings to determine whether proposed amendments to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's quality control standard should be disapproved.
- 13:14SPEAKER_01: CI's central objection is the removal of the external quality control function requirement.
- 13:22SPEAKER_01: Letter recommends retaining the requirement for firms that issued audit reports for more than 500 issuers during the prior calendar year, an approach the PCAOB acknowledges would apply to only five of the largest firms.
- 13:38SPEAKER_01: CI explains that many investors, including the PCAOB's own investor advisory group, opposed removing the external quality control function requirement because they believe, and many investors believe, independent challenge to decisions relating to the quality control system of the firms can guard against commercial pressures and support effective quality control assessments.
- 14:08SPEAKER_01: CII finds the PCAOB's cost rationale unpersuasive, pointing out that even using the PCAOB's higher annual compensation estimate of approximately$328,000, the external quality control function requirement would cost approximately 0.006% of the five largest firms annual average revenue.
- 14:38SPEAKER_01: Letter argues that this represents a small cost relative to the potential benefit of higher quality public company audits.
- 14:49SPEAKER_01: CI's position on this issue is built on several earlier comment letters, including in 2023, CI recommended requiring larger firms to establish a quality control committee composed of at least three persons independent of the firm.
- 15:03SPEAKER_01: And in 2025, CI issued a letter opposing using a postponement of the quality control standard as a basis for further revisions of the standard that excluded any consideration of revisions that CII had publicly supported.
- 15:23SPEAKER_01: Number four, on October 1st at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference, former U.S.
- 15:29SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Gary Gensler discussed the risks that the artificial intelligence infrastructure buildout presents to the capital markets during a keynote luncheon presentation.
- 15:43SPEAKER_01: Gensler explained that when looking at general investment technology booms in the past 200 years, history shows that U.S.
- 15:52SPEAKER_01: capital markets are remarkable at funding innovation.
- 15:56SPEAKER_01: But it is accompanied by exuberance, overfunding, and then a retrenchment.
- 16:00SPEAKER_01: Gensler warned that once the investment boom declines or even plateaus, that changes all kinds of things in the capital markets.
- 16:10SPEAKER_01: Gensler surmised that the market is approaching the plateau or retrenchment for AI, and it's just a question of whether it's going to be a soft or hard landing.
- 16:21SPEAKER_01: Gensler said all of the investment dollars going into AI are funneling into a tech stack, which is composed of everything from apps to turbines.
- 16:30SPEAKER_01: Gensler cautioned that while the nation is spending about$750 billion on AI, China is spending only about$90 billion and is only two to six months behind the U.S.
- 16:43SPEAKER_01: in its AI development.
- 16:45SPEAKER_01: Gensler said the Chinese are undercutting the AI market and already can provide AI models for about one-fifth of the cost of U.S.
- 16:56SPEAKER_01: models.
- 16:57SPEAKER_01: Number three, on September 30th at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference, two former commissioners of the U.S.
- 17:04SPEAKER_01: Securities and Exchange Commission, Kara Stein and Troy Perides, offered their perspectives on the Commission's work during their tenures.
- 17:13SPEAKER_01: And now, the plenary session was moderated by Melissa Duru, a partner in the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance Practice Group at Gibson Dunn.
- 17:24SPEAKER_01: When discussing disclosure materiality, Stein said legal certainty and market transparency are needed for investor protection and both come from disclosure.
- 17:34SPEAKER_01: As for materiality, Stein said it evolves over time and depends on who is making the decisions regarding it.
- 17:42SPEAKER_01: Pready's predicted decisions about materiality will soon be made by artificial intelligence.
- 17:49SPEAKER_01: When asked about the SEC's current initiatives, Stein said she likes the SEC's efforts to harmonize with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, but she's concerned about a number of SEC proposed rulemakings that she believes are reducing transparency and will have a deleterious effect.
- 18:09SPEAKER_01: Stein added that the quality, reliability, and consistency of data is suffering.
- 18:15SPEAKER_01: Preety said he did not have any major concerns about the SEC's rulemakings, but he's anxious to see what will happen if the commission allows companies to move from quarterly to semiannual reporting.
- 18:30SPEAKER_01: Pready's also bemoaned the lack of regulations' durability and stability with major shifts coming with administration changes.
- 18:40SPEAKER_01: Both commissioners emphasized the importance of commenting on the SEC's plans to rescind Rule 14A-8.
- 18:48SPEAKER_01: Stein recommended that comment letters provide suggestions for how the rule can be improved rather than eliminated and describe how its rescision would affect the commentator.
- 19:01SPEAKER_01: Preety said the letter should discuss the practical effects that will result if the rules are rescinded.
- 19:08SPEAKER_01: Number two.
- 19:10SPEAKER_01: On October 8th, CII filed an amicus brief urging the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to affirm the Indiana Federal District Court's ruling against Indiana law HB 1273.
- 19:25SPEAKER_01: The brief argues that the statute would burden proxy advisory firms and ultimately harm the institutional investors and individual beneficiaries that the law purports to protect.
- 19:38SPEAKER_01: The law, which was slated to go in effect July 1st, 2026, was temporarily blocked after both Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis filed suits, arguing that the statute violated the U.S.
- 19:51SPEAKER_01: Constitution.
- 19:52SPEAKER_01: On June 26th, U.S.
- 19:54SPEAKER_01: District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted a preliminary junction against enforcement of the statute.
- 20:01SPEAKER_01: HB 1273 subjects proxy advisors to broad state-mandated disclosure requirements whenever they provide proxy voting advice that contradicts management's recommendation on how shareholders should vote.
- 20:17SPEAKER_01: The law loosely tracks a model state bill introduced in approximately 12 states.
- 20:23SPEAKER_01: Courts in Texas and Kansas also granted preliminary injunctions blocking enactment of similar statutes.
- 20:31SPEAKER_01: CI's brief includes the following five arguments.
- 20:35SPEAKER_01: One, institutional investors do not need the law's consumer protection.
- 20:40SPEAKER_01: They are sophisticated purchasers of proxy research, frequently use customized voting policies, and retain final authority over their votes.
- 20:49SPEAKER_01: A CI survey of members found that no respondent follows proxy advisor recommendations completely.
- 20:56SPEAKER_01: Most view the underlying research, data, and analysis as more valuable than the voting recommendations.
- 21:02SPEAKER_01: Two, the law threatens independent advice.
- 21:05SPEAKER_01: HB 1273 imposes special requirements when a proxy advisor recommends voting against company management.
- 21:13SPEAKER_01: CII argues that this places a thumb on the scale for management, encourages self-censorship, and reduces the availability of critical independent resources.
- 21:24SPEAKER_01: 3.
- 21:25SPEAKER_01: Investors may legitimately consider more than narrowly defined financial factors, governance praxis, shareholder rights, management accountability, and other long-term considerations can be material to an investor's objectives.
- 21:38SPEAKER_01: The brief contends that Indiana should not dictate which considerations investors may incorporate in their voting policies.
- 21:46SPEAKER_01: Four, existing protections are sufficient.
- 21:49SPEAKER_01: Proxy advisors already face contractual obligations, common law liability, fiduciary requirements, market competition, and reputational discipline.
- 21:58SPEAKER_01: Nearly 70% Of members surveyed by CII opposed additional regulation of proxy advisors.
- 22:07SPEAKER_01: Five, increased costs would fall on workers and retirees.
- 22:11SPEAKER_01: Compliance obligations, litigation exposure, and differing state regimes would increase the cost of proxy research, discourage new market entrants, and could make independent advice unavailable.
- 22:24SPEAKER_01: CI reports that 76% of CIA members surveyed expect their proxy voting cost to rise substantially if proxy advisor services become unavailable.
- 22:36SPEAKER_01: CI's brief also argues that HB 1273 is a management-driven solution to a problem that institutional investors do not believe exists, and concludes that the law would impair investor choice, reduce independent scrutiny of corporate management, raise costs, and diminish returns for pension beneficiaries.
- 23:00SPEAKER_01: And my number one most significant development and U.S.
- 23:03SPEAKER_01: corporate governance and capital markets regulation for the period from September 1st to October 9th, 2026, occurred on September 16th, when, in a historic move that would significantly suppress shareholders' collective voices, the U.S.
- 23:20SPEAKER_01: Securities Exchange Commission issued proposed rules to rescind Rule 14A-8, the rule regulating inclusion of shareholder proposals in companies' proxy materials that was first implemented in 1942.
- 23:37SPEAKER_01: Commission's statement on the rescision says it is taking the action because the agency believes the rule exceeds the scope of the Commission's statutory authority and intrudes into matters of state law.
- 23:48SPEAKER_01: SEC Chairman Paul Atkins, in a statement, said rescision of Rule 14A-8 would help ensure that states are able to fully exercise their long-standing authority over shareholder proposals.
- 24:01SPEAKER_01: Under the proposed rescision, federal proxy rules no longer require companies to include in their proxy materials shareholder proposals on the basis that they satisfy procedural and substantive requirements established under Rule 14A-8.
- 24:16SPEAKER_01: Instead, state law, or if permitted by state law, a company's governing documents would determine whether a shareholder proposal would be required to be included in a company's proxy materials.
- 24:27SPEAKER_01: The proposed residion argues that Rule 14A-8 always specified that states should make determinations about the exclusion or inclusion of shareholder proposals on companies' proxies, but the SEC intervened increasingly over the years until the agency became the chief arbiter on these matters, a role that is beyond its authority.
- 24:51SPEAKER_01: The SEC proposal adds that absent clear congressional direction, to the contrary, state legislatures and courts interpreting state law are the appropriate bodies to develop and define the scope of shareholder rights.
- 25:07SPEAKER_01: At the same time, the SEC is calling on states and companies to take the lead on Rule 148-8.
- 25:12SPEAKER_01: It acknowledges that no states, with the exception of Texas, which recently adopted laws that are particularly unfriendly to shareholders, no states have passed legislation governing shareholder proposals.
- 25:25SPEAKER_01: Likewise, the Commission notes that most companies do not have provisions addressing shareholder proposals in their governing documents.
- 25:33SPEAKER_01: By bowing out of the process, the SEC says it is allowing states and companies to fill the void, hinting that state laws could be more restrictive, the proposed rule notes that state corporate codes are silent as to whether precatory proposals are proper to present for shareholder votes.
- 25:52SPEAKER_01: But the SEC has permitted the inclusion of these types of proposals.
- 25:58SPEAKER_01: Then SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce said in support of the proposal, disrupting this mechanism by which small shareholders gain disproportionate leverage over companies would mark a fresh start.
- 26:10SPEAKER_01: The transition period may be bumpy, but shareholders and companies will work to strike the right balance in state laboratories of experimentation.
- 26:20SPEAKER_01: The Council of Institutional Investors expressed strong opposition to the proposed rescision.
- 26:27SPEAKER_01: CII Executive Director Glenn Davis in a public statement said, Could Rule 148-8 be improved?
- 26:33SPEAKER_01: Sure.
- 26:34SPEAKER_01: But the SEC proposed rescinding the rule in its entirety with fingers crossed that state legislators and corporate directors will develop a patchwork of new rules, resulting in something better.
- 26:49SPEAKER_01: Spoiler alert, that patchwork will launch a new race to the bottom in state corporate law and result in a dramatic reduction in shareholders who qualify as proponents, notwithstanding smaller investors' history of putting forward many of the most highly supported proposals.
- 27:12SPEAKER_01: That completes my monthly update on significant developments in corporate governance and capital markets regulation.
- 27:19SPEAKER_01: Any questions regarding any of the issues discussed?
- 27:22SPEAKER_01: Please feel free to email me at Jeff, that's J E F F at CI dot or G.
- 27:31SPEAKER_01: Until next time, I'm Jeff Mahoney.
- 27:33SPEAKER_01: Thanks again for listening to the voice of corporate governance.
- 27:44SPEAKER_00: Thank you for listening to this episode of The Voice of Corporate Governance, brought to you by the Council of Institutional Investors.
- 27:51SPEAKER_00: The Voice of Corporate Governance is a free, non-sponsored podcast that highlights critical developments in corporate governance and other important issues affecting institutional investors.
- 28:01SPEAKER_00: The views expressed by those interviewed on the podcast do not necessarily reflect the views of CII or its members.
- 28:08SPEAKER_00: For more information on CII and its policies on corporate governance, please visit our website at www.cii.org.