Latest / Saladin: The Muslim Leader Who Defeated Crusaders — Fexingo History / Saladin's Oasis Diplomacy: The Water Politics of Desert Warfare
Transcript
- Lucas: So we've talked a lot about Saladin's battles and sieges, but one thing that rarely gets attention is how he fought with the desert itself. Water was as strategic as cavalry in this conflict. Luna: I never thought about it that way. How do you even control water in a desert? Lucas: Well, Saladin's engineers were masters of hydrology. They could redirect springs, dig new wells, and even poison existing ones to deny resources to the Franj armies. The key was understanding the network of oases and seasonal wadis that crisscrossed the Levant. Lucas: Take the 1187 campaign, for example. The Battle of Hattin was essentially a water war. Saladin's forces controlled the springs of Tiberias, and he lured the Crusader army into the dry plateau of Hattin, where they were cut off from water. Many of them died of thirst before a single sword was drawn. Luna: Wait, so the battle was won before it even started? Lucas: In a sense, yes. The contemporary chronicler Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani describes how the Crusaders were driven mad by thirst, even cutting open their horses to drink blood. Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, Saladin's own biographer, notes that the sultan had ordered the wells along the route to be filled or poisoned. Lucas: But this wasn't just about denying water. It was also about securing it for his own troops. The Ayyubid army had a dedicated logistical corps, the Diwan al-Insha, that managed water supply. They used camels to carry water skins, and they knew exactly where every spring and cistern was located. Luna: That's incredible logistical planning. Did Saladin have to negotiate with local Bedouins for access? Lucas: Absolutely. The Bedouin tribes controlled many of the desert wells, and Saladin was careful to maintain good relations with them. He often paid them for access or granted them grazing rights. There's a famous letter from al-Qadi al-Fadil, his vizier, that details a treaty with a Bedouin shaykh over the use of the well at al-Muqawwasa. Lucas: This kind of water diplomacy was essential. If the Bedouin turned hostile, they could poison wells or guide enemy armies to hidden sources. So Saladin made sure they were on his side, often through a combination of bribes and threats. Luna: It's like a whole hidden layer of the war that doesn't show up in the big battle narratives. Lucas: Exactly. And it's something we try to uncover in these episodes — the everyday logistics and politics that made the grand campaigns possible. You know, if you enjoy digging into these details, you can help us keep doing that. A couple of dollars a month is genuinely what keeps these going — buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo, if you've gotten something out of them. Luna: Yeah, it really does make a difference. And we appreciate everyone who chips in. Lucas: Now, back to the water. One of the most contested water sources was the spring at Tiberias. The city itself was a major strategic point because it controlled the Sea of Galilee and the surrounding agricultural land. In 1187, Saladin besieged Tiberias specifically to draw the Crusader army out into the dry hills. Lucas: His brother al-Malik al-Adil played a key role in securing the water supply for the Ayyubid army. He personally oversaw the digging of new wells along the march route, and he stationed guards at every water source to prevent contamination or overuse. Luna: It sounds almost like modern military logistics, with water purification and supply lines. Lucas: Yes, and they had to be extremely careful. If a well went dry or was poisoned, it could cripple an entire army. There's a story from the siege of Acre in 1189-91 where Saladin's own camp suffered from a water shortage because the Franj had cut off the spring that fed his supply. He had to send al-Adil to negotiate with a local monastery for access to their cistern. Lucas: On the other side, the Crusaders also used water as a weapon. At the siege of Acre, they poisoned the river Belus with dead animals, making it undrinkable for the Ayyubid forces. Saladin's engineers had to dig new wells inside the camp, but the water was brackish and caused disease. Luna: So water could be a weapon of mass destruction in a way, causing illness and death without a fight. Lucas: Exactly. And it's not just about poisoning. There's also the matter of timing. Saladin often campaigned in the summer, when water was scarce, to maximize the advantage of his knowledge of local sources. He knew that the Crusader armies, dependent on heavy armor and horses, would suffer more in the heat. Lucas: The well of Hittin itself became a symbol of the battle. According to tradition, Saladin's forces controlled that well, and when the Crusaders tried to reach it, they were cut down. The modern name of the well, Bir Hittin, still marks the spot. Luna: I've heard that name before. It's near the Horns of Hittin, right? Lucas: Yes, exactly. The Horns of Hittin are the twin hills that overlook the plain. The well lies at the foot of the northern hill. After the battle, Saladin had the area fortified to ensure it remained under his control. It became a key stop on the route between Damascus and Jerusalem. Lucas: But water politics wasn't just about war. Saladin also invested in peacetime water infrastructure. He built aqueducts and cisterns in Cairo and Damascus, and he restored the ancient irrigation canals in the Jordan Valley. His chronicler Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani boasts that under Saladin, the land became green again. Luna: It's fascinating that the same man who poisoned wells also built them. Lucas: It's a paradox, but it makes sense. For Saladin, water was a tool of statecraft. He used it to win battles, but also to win hearts and minds. By providing clean water to cities, he earned the loyalty of the population. And by denying it to his enemies, he weakened them without risking his own troops. Lucas: This dual use of water — as a resource and a weapon — is something that scholars like Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad noted in their works. They were very aware of the moral implications, especially when it came to poisoning wells, which could harm civilians and animals alike. Luna: Did Saladin ever get criticized for that? Lucas: There were debates. Some Islamic jurists argued that poisoning wells was permissible against enemy combatants, but only if it didn't affect non-combatants. Others disagreed. Saladin himself seems to have been pragmatic. He used it when necessary, but he also tried to avoid indiscriminate harm. His letters, preserved by al-Qadi al-Fadil, show that he ordered his commanders to spare women and children when denying water. Lucas: So it's a complex legacy. On one hand, he's remembered for the 'peaceful' capture of Jerusalem, but on the other, he engaged in ruthless tactics like water denial. The reality is that he was a military commander fighting a long war, and he used every tool at his disposal. Luna: I think that's what makes him so fascinating. He's not a simple hero or villain. Lucas: Exactly. And understanding the water dimension helps us see the practical challenges of medieval warfare. It wasn't just about who had the better knights or more siege engines. It was about who could keep their army hydrated and who could dry out the enemy. Lucas: Next time, we might look at Saladin's use of fire — Greek fire, torches, and burning fields — another overlooked aspect of his campaigns. But for now, I think we've given you a new perspective on the Crusades. Luna: Definitely. I'll never look at a desert well the same way again.