Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / ASOS's own app became the ransom note: who can speak in your name?
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Wednesday, the seventh of October.
- 0:07A S O S's own app became the ransom note: who can speak in your name?
- 0:13.
- 0:23It wasn't meant for them. It was addressed to the retailer's data protection officer and I T team.
- 0:30It claimed the sender had "fully compromised the Snowflake instance".
- 0:35A S O S shares fell by more than 10% that day.
- 0:40The alarming part isn't the claim, which remains unproven.
- 0:44It's the channel it arrived through.
- 0:47The one customers trust most.
- 0:49Next.
- 0:55The message went out through A S O S's own app.
- 1:00It linked to a Telegram channel run by a previously unknown extortion group calling itself Xuanye Group.
- 1:07A S O S confirmed that an unauthorised customer notification was sent.
- 1:12It said it was investigating "unauthorised activity involving third-party platforms that we use to communicat
- 1:20e with customers".
- 1:25The group named Snowflake, which is a data warehouse.
- 1:30A S O S named a customer messaging platform.
- 1:33Those are different systems.
- 1:36And the group has so far offered no evidence that it holds any data.
- 1:40Until someone shows otherwise, the Snowflake line is a claim.
- 1:45A S O S also said basic personal information, including names and contact details, may have been accessed.
- 1:54It said payment card details and account passwords were not believed to be affected.
- 1:59That's an initial assessment, not a final one.
- 2:03It follows a separate incident disclosed in August, reported as involving compromised credentials and custome
- 2:10r account access. Nobody has publicly linked the two.
- 2:14And also.
- 2:18Picture a shop's tannoy. Whoever holds the microphone doesn't need the stockroom keys to cause a panic.
- 2:25They only need to reach the microphone.
- 2:27A push notification system is that microphone, with a twist.
- 2:33It speaks from the phone's home screen, with the retailer's name on it, to everyone who installed the app.
- 2:39Even if no database was touched, the attacker got what extortion needs most.
- 2:45An audience, delivered by the victim.
- 2:47The same threat on a million lock screens is a share-price event, a regulatory problem and a phishing opportu
- 2:55nity, because customers now expect odd messages from the brand.
- 2:58And finally.
- 3:03The design question isn't "is our database safe?
- 3:07" It's "who can speak in our name?
- 3:09" That usually includes a marketing platform, an email service, an S M S gateway and a mobile messaging tool.
- 3:17Each one is run by a supplier.
- 3:19Each one is reachable with a login or an A P I key.
- 3:23If you're a UK director, there are five questions worth asking this week.
- 3:28Which platforms can send customers a message in our name, and who holds the keys?
- 3:33Is access protected by phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, with keys that expire and can be revo
- 3:40ked?
- 3:48Can we shut every channel off within minutes, and have we practised it?
- 3:52And who tells the D P O, the board and the I C O, and when does the 72 hour UK G D P R clock start?
- 4:01None of this is expensive.
- 4:03A second approver adds minutes to a campaign.
- 4:06Key rotation is a calendar entry.
- 4:09What is costly is discovering, in front of customers, that nobody owned the microphone.
- 4:15That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:20Thanks for listening.