Latest / The Plato Library / Theaetetus Section III
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Part three of Thetatus by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:12Speaker 1: Geoffrey Edwards. Socrates, in the first place, let us return
- 0:19Speaker 1: to our old objection and see whether we were right
- 0:22Speaker 1: in blaming and taking offense at Protagoras on the ground
- 0:26Speaker 1: that he assumed all to be equal insufficient in wisdom,
- 0:30Speaker 1: although he admitted that there was a better and worse,
- 0:33Speaker 1: and that in respect of this, some who, as he said,
- 0:37Speaker 1: were the wise, excelled others. Theodorus very true, Socrates. Had
- 0:44Speaker 1: Protagoras been living and answered for himself instead of our
- 0:48Speaker 1: answering for him, there would have been no need of
- 0:51Speaker 1: our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is
- 0:55Speaker 1: not here, and someone may accuse us of speaking without
- 0:59Speaker 1: authority on him, behalf, had we not better come to
- 1:02Speaker 1: a clearer agreement about his meaning? For a great deal
- 1:06Speaker 1: may be at stake? Theodoris true, Socrates. Then let us obtain,
- 1:13Speaker 1: not through any third person, but from his own statement,
- 1:17Speaker 1: and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.
- 1:21Speaker 1: Theodoras in what way Socrates? In this way? His words
- 1:27Speaker 1: are what seems to a man is to him Theodoras, Yes,
- 1:33Speaker 1: so he says Socrates. And are not we, Protagoras, uttering
- 1:39Speaker 1: the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when
- 1:43Speaker 1: we say that everyone thinks himself wiser than other men
- 1:46Speaker 1: in some things, and their inferior in others in the
- 1:51Speaker 1: hour of danger, when they are in perils of war,
- 1:54Speaker 1: or of the sea, or of sickness, did they not
- 1:57Speaker 1: look up to their commanders as if there were gods,
- 2:00Speaker 1: and expect salvation from them only because they excel them
- 2:03Speaker 1: in knowledge. Is not the world full of men, in
- 2:07Speaker 1: their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers
- 2:10Speaker 1: of themselves and of the animals. And there are plenty
- 2:14Speaker 1: who think that they are able to teach and able
- 2:18Speaker 1: to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance
- 2:22Speaker 1: and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own
- 2:25Speaker 1: opinion Theodoras certainly Socrates. And wisdom is assumed by them
- 2:32Speaker 1: to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion
- 2:35Speaker 1: Theodoras exactly Socrates. How then, Protagoras, would you have us
- 2:41Speaker 1: treat the argument? Shall we see that the opinions of
- 2:44Speaker 1: men are always true, or sometimes true, and sometimes false?
- 2:49Speaker 1: In either case the result is the same, and their
- 2:52Speaker 1: opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false.
- 2:57Speaker 1: For tell me, Theodorus, do you, Suppo, that you, yourself,
- 3:01Speaker 1: or any other follower of Protagoras would contend that no
- 3:05Speaker 1: one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion? Theodoris?
- 3:10Speaker 1: The thing is incredible, Socrates, Socrates, And yet that absurdity
- 3:15Speaker 1: is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to
- 3:18Speaker 1: be the measure of all things. Theodoris. How so, Socrates,
- 3:25Speaker 1: why suppose that you determine in your own mind something
- 3:28Speaker 1: to be true and declare your opinion to me. Let
- 3:32Speaker 1: us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now,
- 3:36Speaker 1: if so, you must either say that the rest of
- 3:39Speaker 1: us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment
- 3:42Speaker 1: of yours, or that we judge you always to have
- 3:45Speaker 1: a true opinion. But are there not thousands upon thousands who,
- 3:50Speaker 1: whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you,
- 3:53Speaker 1: and are of an opposite judgment an opinion, deeming that
- 3:56Speaker 1: you judge falsely Theodoras Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens
- 4:02Speaker 1: of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world
- 4:05Speaker 1: of trouble, Socrates. Well, but are we to assert that
- 4:10Speaker 1: what you think is true to you and false to
- 4:12Speaker 1: the ten thousand others? Theodoras, No other inference seems to
- 4:17Speaker 1: be possible, Socrates. And how about Protagres himself? If neither
- 4:22Speaker 1: he nor the multitude thought as indeed they do not
- 4:26Speaker 1: think that man is the measure of all things? Must
- 4:29Speaker 1: it not follow that the truth of which Protagus wrote
- 4:32Speaker 1: would be true to no one? But if you suppose
- 4:35Speaker 1: that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does
- 4:38Speaker 1: not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that,
- 4:41Speaker 1: in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in
- 4:44Speaker 1: that proportion, his truth is more untrue than true. Theodoras.
- 4:50Speaker 1: That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary
- 4:53Speaker 1: with individual opinion, Socrates. And the best of the joke
- 4:58Speaker 1: is that he acknowledges the truth of their lif opinion,
- 5:00Speaker 1: who believe his own opinion to be false? For he
- 5:03Speaker 1: admits that the opinions of all men are true. Theodoras,
- 5:08Speaker 1: certainly Socrates. And does he not allow that his own
- 5:12Speaker 1: opinion is false? If he admits that the opinion of
- 5:15Speaker 1: those who think him false is true? Theodoris, of course Socrates.
- 5:21Speaker 1: Whereas the other side, do not admit that they speak
- 5:24Speaker 1: falsely theodoras they do not Socrates, and he, as may
- 5:30Speaker 1: be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is
- 5:33Speaker 1: also true. Theodoris clearly Socrates. Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras,
- 5:41Speaker 1: will contend, or rather, I should say that he will
- 5:44Speaker 1: allow when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion. Protagoras,
- 5:49Speaker 1: I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor
- 5:52Speaker 1: any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he
- 5:55Speaker 1: has not learned? Am I not right? Theodoras yes, Socrates,
- 6:02Speaker 1: and the truth of Protagoras, being doubted by all, will
- 6:05Speaker 1: be true, neither to himself nor to any one else Theodors.
- 6:10Speaker 1: I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend
- 6:13Speaker 1: too hard, Socrates, But I do not know that we
- 6:18Speaker 1: are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older,
- 6:22Speaker 1: he may be expected to be wiser than we are.
- 6:24Speaker 1: And if he could only just get his head out
- 6:26Speaker 1: of the world below, he would have overthrown both of
- 6:29Speaker 1: us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you
- 6:33Speaker 1: for assenting to me, and have been off and underground
- 6:37Speaker 1: in a trace. But as he is not within call,
- 6:40Speaker 1: we must make the best use of our own faculties,
- 6:43Speaker 1: such as they are, and speak out what appears to
- 6:46Speaker 1: us to be true. And one thing which no one
- 6:49Speaker 1: will deny is that there are great differences in the
- 6:52Speaker 1: understandings of men Theodoras in that opinion, I quite agree Socrates,
- 7:00Speaker 1: and is there not most likely to be firm ground
- 7:02Speaker 1: in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of
- 7:05Speaker 1: Protagoras viz. That most things, and all immediate sensations, such
- 7:11Speaker 1: as hot, dry, sweet, are only such as they appear. If, however,
- 7:16Speaker 1: difference of opinion is to be allowed at all, surely
- 7:19Speaker 1: we must allow it in respect of health or disease,
- 7:22Speaker 1: For every woman, child, or living creature has not such
- 7:26Speaker 1: a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable
- 7:29Speaker 1: them to cure themselves. Theodorus, I quite agree Socrates. Or
- 7:35Speaker 1: again in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honorable
- 7:40Speaker 1: and disgraceful, holy and unholy are in reality to each state,
- 7:44Speaker 1: such as the state thinks it makes lawful, and that
- 7:48Speaker 1: in determining these matters, no individual or state is wiser
- 7:52Speaker 1: than another. Still, the followers of Protagoras will not deny
- 7:56Speaker 1: that in determining what is or is not expedient for
- 7:59Speaker 1: the community, one state is wiser and one counselor better
- 8:03Speaker 1: than another. They will scarcely venture to maintain that what
- 8:07Speaker 1: a city and acts in the belief that it is
- 8:09Speaker 1: expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case,
- 8:14Speaker 1: I mean, when they speak of justice and injustice, piety
- 8:18Speaker 1: and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have
- 8:22Speaker 1: no existence or essence of their own. The truth is
- 8:25Speaker 1: that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement,
- 8:28Speaker 1: and as long as the agreement lasts. And this is
- 8:31Speaker 1: the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along
- 8:34Speaker 1: with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodoris, which threatens
- 8:39Speaker 1: to be more serious than the last. Theodoras well, Socrates,
- 8:44Speaker 1: we have plenty of leisure, Socrates, that is true, And
- 8:49Speaker 1: your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I
- 8:52Speaker 1: have often made, that those who have passed their days
- 8:55Speaker 1: in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when
- 8:59Speaker 1: they have to a here and speak in court. How
- 9:02Speaker 1: natural is this, Theodoras, What do you mean, Socrates? I
- 9:08Speaker 1: mean to say that those who have been trained in
- 9:10Speaker 1: philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who, from
- 9:15Speaker 1: their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts
- 9:18Speaker 1: in such places as a freeman is in breeding unlike
- 9:21Speaker 1: a slave theodoras, And what is the difference, scene Socrates?
- 9:27Speaker 1: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman
- 9:30Speaker 1: can always command. He has his talk out in peace,
- 9:34Speaker 1: and like ourselves, he wanders at will, from one subject
- 9:37Speaker 1: to another, and from a second to a third. If
- 9:40Speaker 1: the fancy takes him, he begins again as we are
- 9:43Speaker 1: doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few.
- 9:47Speaker 1: His only aim is to attain the truth. But the
- 9:50Speaker 1: lawyer is always in a hurry. There is the water
- 9:53Speaker 1: of the Klepsydra driving him on and not allowing him
- 9:56Speaker 1: to expatiate at will. And there is his ac aniversary
- 10:00Speaker 1: standing over him, enforcing his rights. The indictment, which in
- 10:05Speaker 1: their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the time,
- 10:09Speaker 1: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant,
- 10:13Speaker 1: and is continually disputing about a fellow servant before his master,
- 10:17Speaker 1: who is seated and has the cause in his hands.
- 10:21Speaker 1: The trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always
- 10:24Speaker 1: concerns himself and often the race is for his life.
- 10:28Speaker 1: The consequence has been that he has become keen and shrewd.
- 10:33Speaker 1: He has learned how to flatter his master in word
- 10:36Speaker 1: and indulge him. Indeed, but his soul is small and unrighteous.
- 10:41Speaker 1: His condition, which has been that of a slave from
- 10:44Speaker 1: his use upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness
- 10:48Speaker 1: and independence. Dangers and fears which were too much for
- 10:53Speaker 1: his truth and honesty came upon him in early years,
- 10:56Speaker 1: when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and
- 11:00Speaker 1: he has been driven into crooked ways from the first.
- 11:03Speaker 1: He has practiced deception and retaliation, and has become stunted
- 11:08Speaker 1: and warped. And so he has passed out of use
- 11:11Speaker 1: into manhood, having no soundness in him, and is now,
- 11:15Speaker 1: as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the
- 11:18Speaker 1: lawyer Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the
- 11:22Speaker 1: philosopher who is of our brotherhood? Or shall we return
- 11:26Speaker 1: to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom
- 11:29Speaker 1: of digression which we claim theodoras nay Socrates, not until
- 11:35Speaker 1: we have finished what we are about. For you truly
- 11:37Speaker 1: send that we belong to a brotherhood which is free
- 11:40Speaker 1: and are not the servants of the argument, But the
- 11:43Speaker 1: argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who
- 11:47Speaker 1: is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any
- 11:51Speaker 1: right to censure or control us as he might? The
- 11:53Speaker 1: poets Socrates, Then, as this is your wish, I will
- 11:58Speaker 1: describe the leaders for their It is no use in
- 12:00Speaker 1: talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the
- 12:04Speaker 1: lords of philosophy have never, from their use upwards, known
- 12:08Speaker 1: their way to the angora, or the dicastery, or the council,
- 12:13Speaker 1: or any other political assembly. They neither see nor hear
- 12:16Speaker 1: the laws or decrees, as they are called of the
- 12:19Speaker 1: state written or recited. The eagerness of political societies in
- 12:24Speaker 1: the attainment of offices, clubs and banquets, and revels in singing
- 12:29Speaker 1: maidens do not enter even into their dreams whether any
- 12:33Speaker 1: event has turned out well or ill in the city.
- 12:36Speaker 1: What disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors,
- 12:40Speaker 1: male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no
- 12:43Speaker 1: more knows than he can tell. As they say how
- 12:46Speaker 1: many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he
- 12:49Speaker 1: conscious of his ignorance, for he does not hold aloof
- 12:53Speaker 1: in order that he may gain a reputation. But the
- 12:56Speaker 1: truth is that the outer form of him only is
- 12:59Speaker 1: in the city. His mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses
- 13:03Speaker 1: of human things, is flying all abroad, as Pinder says,
- 13:08Speaker 1: measuring earth and heaven, and the things which are under
- 13:11Speaker 1: and on the earth, and above the heaven, interrogating the
- 13:15Speaker 1: whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but
- 13:18Speaker 1: not condescending to anything which is within reach. Theodoras, what
- 13:23Speaker 1: do you mean, Socrates? Socrates? I will illustrate my meaning
- 13:28Speaker 1: Theodoras by the jest which the clever, witty Thracian handmade
- 13:32Speaker 1: is said to have made about Theales when he fell
- 13:35Speaker 1: into a well as he was looking up at the stars.
- 13:38Speaker 1: She said that he was so eager to know what
- 13:40Speaker 1: was going on in heaven that he could not see
- 13:43Speaker 1: what was before his feet. This is a jest which
- 13:46Speaker 1: is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is
- 13:50Speaker 1: wholly unacquainted with his next door neighbor. He is ignorant
- 13:54Speaker 1: not only of what he is doing, but he hardly
- 13:57Speaker 1: knows whether he is a man or an animal. He
- 14:00Speaker 1: is searching into the essence of man, and busy in
- 14:02Speaker 1: inquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or
- 14:06Speaker 1: suffer different from any other. I think that you understand me,
- 14:09Speaker 1: theodoras theodoras I do, and what you say is true Socrates,
- 14:16Speaker 1: and thus my friend on every occasion, private as well
- 14:19Speaker 1: as public, As I said at first, when he appears
- 14:23Speaker 1: in a law court, or in any place in which
- 14:25Speaker 1: he has to speak of things which are at his
- 14:27Speaker 1: feet and before his eyes, he is the jest not
- 14:31Speaker 1: only of Thracian hand meds, but of the general herd
- 14:34Speaker 1: tumbling into wells, and every sort of disaster through his inexperience.
- 14:39Speaker 1: His awkwardness is fearful and gives the impression of imbecility.
- 14:44Speaker 1: When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say
- 14:46Speaker 1: an answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he
- 14:49Speaker 1: knows no scandals of anyone, and they do not interest him.
- 14:53Speaker 1: And therefore he is laughed at for a sheepishness. And
- 14:57Speaker 1: when others are being praised and glorified in the the
- 15:00Speaker 1: simplicity of his heart, he cannot help going into fits
- 15:03Speaker 1: of laughter, so that he seems to be a downright idiot.
- 15:07Speaker 1: When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized. He fancies
- 15:10Speaker 1: that he is listening to the praises of some keeper
- 15:12Speaker 1: of cattle, a swineherd or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd,
- 15:17Speaker 1: who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he
- 15:20Speaker 1: squeezes from them. And he remarks that the creature whom
- 15:24Speaker 1: they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth,
- 15:27Speaker 1: is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then
- 15:31Speaker 1: again he observes that the great man is, of necessity
- 15:34Speaker 1: as ill mannered and uneducated as any shepherd, for he
- 15:38Speaker 1: has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall
- 15:41Speaker 1: which is his mountain. Pen hearing of enormous landed proprietors
- 15:45Speaker 1: of ten thousand acres and more. Our philosopher deems this
- 15:49Speaker 1: to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to
- 15:51Speaker 1: think of the whole earth. And when they sing the
- 15:54Speaker 1: praises of family and say that someone is a gentleman,
- 15:58Speaker 1: because he can show seven general rations of wealthy ancestors,
- 16:02Speaker 1: he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and
- 16:05Speaker 1: narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are
- 16:07Speaker 1: not educated enough to look at the whole nor to
- 16:11Speaker 1: consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands
- 16:14Speaker 1: of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor
- 16:19Speaker 1: kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians innumerable. And when people
- 16:25Speaker 1: pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty five ancestors,
- 16:29Speaker 1: which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphytrion, he
- 16:32Speaker 1: cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable
- 16:36Speaker 1: to calculate that Amphytrion had a twenty fifth ancestor, who
- 16:40Speaker 1: might have been anybody, and with such as fortune made him,
- 16:44Speaker 1: and he had a fiftieth and so on. He amuses
- 16:48Speaker 1: himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks
- 16:51Speaker 1: that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their
- 16:54Speaker 1: senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases, our philosopher is
- 16:58Speaker 1: derided by the vulgar, partly because he is thought to
- 17:01Speaker 1: despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what
- 17:05Speaker 1: is before him, and always at a loss. Theodorus, That
- 17:10Speaker 1: is very true, Socrates, Socrates, But oh, my friend, when
- 17:15Speaker 1: he draws the other into upper air and gets him
- 17:18Speaker 1: out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of
- 17:22Speaker 1: justice and injustice in their own nature and in their
- 17:26Speaker 1: difference from one another and from all other things, or
- 17:29Speaker 1: from the commonplaces, about the happiness of a king or
- 17:33Speaker 1: of a rich man, to the consideration of government, and
- 17:36Speaker 1: of human happiness and misery in general, what they are,
- 17:40Speaker 1: and how a man is to attain the one and
- 17:42Speaker 1: avoid the other. When that narrow, keen, little legal mind
- 17:47Speaker 1: is called to account about all this, he gives the
- 17:49Speaker 1: philosopher his revenge for dizzied by the height at which
- 17:53Speaker 1: he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which
- 17:57Speaker 1: is a strange experience to him. He, being dismayed and
- 18:01Speaker 1: lost in stammering broken words, is laughed at not by
- 18:05Speaker 1: Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have
- 18:10Speaker 1: no eye for the situation, but by every man who
- 18:13Speaker 1: has not been brought up a slave. Such are the
- 18:16Speaker 1: two characters theodoras the one of the freeman who has
- 18:20Speaker 1: been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the
- 18:22Speaker 1: philosopher him we cannot blame, because he appears simple and
- 18:27Speaker 1: of no account when he has to perform some menial task,
- 18:30Speaker 1: such as packing up bedclothes or flavoring a sauce or
- 18:35Speaker 1: fawning speech. The other character is that of the man
- 18:38Speaker 1: who is able to do all this kind of service
- 18:40Speaker 1: smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his
- 18:43Speaker 1: cloak like a gentleman. Still less with the music of discourse,
- 18:47Speaker 1: can he hymn the true life aright, which is lived
- 18:50Speaker 1: by immortals or men blessed of heaven. Theodoras, if you
- 18:55Speaker 1: could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of
- 18:59Speaker 1: the truth of your words, there would be more peace
- 19:01Speaker 1: and fewer evils among men, Socrates. Evils, Theodorus can never
- 19:06Speaker 1: pass away, for there must always remain something which is
- 19:10Speaker 1: antagonistic to good, having no place among the gods in
- 19:13Speaker 1: Heaven of necessity, they hover around the mortal nature and
- 19:18Speaker 1: this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from
- 19:21Speaker 1: earth to Heaven as quickly as we can. And to
- 19:25Speaker 1: fly away is to become like God, as far as
- 19:28Speaker 1: this is possible. And to become like him is to
- 19:31Speaker 1: become holy, just and wise. But, oh, my friend, you
- 19:36Speaker 1: cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or
- 19:40Speaker 1: avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may
- 19:44Speaker 1: seem to be good, which is the reason given by
- 19:47Speaker 1: the world, and in my judgment, is only a repetition
- 19:50Speaker 1: of an old wive's fable, whereas the truth is that
- 19:54Speaker 1: God is never in any way unrighteous. He is perfect righteousness,
- 19:59Speaker 1: And of us, who is the most righteous, is most
- 20:02Speaker 1: like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man,
- 20:06Speaker 1: and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to
- 20:10Speaker 1: know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of
- 20:13Speaker 1: this is manifest folly and vice. All other kinds of
- 20:17Speaker 1: wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom
- 20:21Speaker 1: of politicians or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse
- 20:25Speaker 1: and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer
- 20:29Speaker 1: of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in
- 20:33Speaker 1: the illusion that his roguery is clever. For men glory
- 20:37Speaker 1: in their shame. They fancy that they hear others saying
- 20:40Speaker 1: of them. These are not mere good for nothing persons,
- 20:43Speaker 1: mere burdens of the earth, but such as men should
- 20:47Speaker 1: be who mean to dwell safely in a state. Let
- 20:50Speaker 1: Us tell them that they are all the more truly
- 20:53Speaker 1: what they do not think they are, because they do
- 20:55Speaker 1: not know it. For they do not know the penalty
- 20:58Speaker 1: of injustice, which above all things they ought to know.
- 21:02Speaker 1: Not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil doers
- 21:06Speaker 1: often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped. Theodoras,
- 21:11Speaker 1: what is that, Socrates? There are two patterns eternally set
- 21:15Speaker 1: before them, the one blessed and divine, the other godless
- 21:19Speaker 1: and wretched. But they do not see them or perceive that,
- 21:23Speaker 1: in their utter folly and infatuation, they are growing like
- 21:26Speaker 1: the one and unlike the other, by reason of their
- 21:29Speaker 1: evil deeds. And the penalty is that they lead a
- 21:32Speaker 1: life answering to the pattern which they are growing like.
- 21:36Speaker 1: And if we tell them that unless they depart from
- 21:39Speaker 1: their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them
- 21:42Speaker 1: after death, and that here on earth they will live
- 21:45Speaker 1: ever in the likeness of their own evil selves and
- 21:49Speaker 1: with evil friends. When they hear this, they, in their
- 21:52Speaker 1: superior cunning, will seem to be listening to the talk
- 21:55Speaker 1: of idiots. Theodoras, very true, Socrates. Socrates, too true, my friend,
- 22:03Speaker 1: as I well know. There is, however, one peculiarity in
- 22:06Speaker 1: their case. When they begin to reason in private about
- 22:09Speaker 1: their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to
- 22:12Speaker 1: hear the argument out and do not run away, they
- 22:16Speaker 1: grow at last strangely discontented with themselves. The rhetoric fades away,
- 22:20Speaker 1: and they become helpless as children. These, however, are digressions
- 22:25Speaker 1: from which we must now desist, or they will overflow
- 22:29Speaker 1: and drown. The original argument to which, if you please,
- 22:32Speaker 1: we will now return theodoris. For my part, Socrates, I
- 22:37Speaker 1: would rather have the digressions, for at my age I
- 22:40Speaker 1: find them easier to follow. But if you wish, let
- 22:43Speaker 1: us go back to the argument Socrates. Had we not
- 22:47Speaker 1: reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux,
- 22:50Speaker 1: who say that things aren't as they seem to each one,
- 22:53Speaker 1: were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded
- 22:58Speaker 1: and thought just were just to the state which imposed
- 23:01Speaker 1: them while they were in force. This was especially asserted
- 23:04Speaker 1: of justice. But as to the good, no one had
- 23:08Speaker 1: any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which
- 23:12Speaker 1: the state thought and enacted to be good, that these,
- 23:15Speaker 1: while they were in force, were really good. He who
- 23:18Speaker 1: said so would be playing with the name good, and
- 23:21Speaker 1: would not touch the real question. It would be a mockery,
- 23:24Speaker 1: would it not, theodoris. Certainly it would Socrates, he ought
- 23:30Speaker 1: not to speak of the name, but of the thing
- 23:32Speaker 1: which is contemplated under the name. Theodoris right, Socrates, whatever
- 23:39Speaker 1: be the term used, the good or expedient is the
- 23:42Speaker 1: aim of legislation, And as far as she has an opinion,
- 23:46Speaker 1: the state imposes all laws with a view to the
- 23:48Speaker 1: greatest expediency. Can legislation have any other aim? Theodoris certainly not, Socrates.
- 23:57Speaker 1: But is the aim attained? Always? Do not mistakes often happen? Theodoris, yes,
- 24:03Speaker 1: I think that there are mistakes, Socrates. The possibility of
- 24:07Speaker 1: error will be more distinctly recognized if we put the
- 24:10Speaker 1: question in reference to the whole class under which the
- 24:13Speaker 1: good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do
- 24:17Speaker 1: with the future, and laws are past under the idea
- 24:20Speaker 1: that they will be useful in after time, which in
- 24:23Speaker 1: other words, is the future. Theodoris very true, Socrates. Suppose
- 24:30Speaker 1: now that we ask Protagoras or one of his disciples
- 24:33Speaker 1: a question. Oh, Protagoras, we will say to him, man
- 24:37Speaker 1: is as you declare the measure of all things white
- 24:41Speaker 1: heavy light, of all such things. He is the judge,
- 24:46Speaker 1: for he has the criterion of them in himself, And
- 24:50Speaker 1: when he thinks that things are such as he experiences
- 24:53Speaker 1: them to be. He thinks what is and is true
- 24:56Speaker 1: to himself? Is it not so? Theodoris, yes, Socrates. And
- 25:03Speaker 1: do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras, as we shall further say,
- 25:06Speaker 1: to the future as well as to the present. And
- 25:09Speaker 1: has he the criterion not only of what, in his
- 25:12Speaker 1: opinion is, but of what will be? And do things
- 25:16Speaker 1: always happen to him as he expected? For example, take
- 25:20Speaker 1: the case of heat. When an ordinary man thinks that
- 25:23Speaker 1: he is going to have a fever and that this
- 25:26Speaker 1: kind of heat is coming on, and another person who
- 25:28Speaker 1: is a physician thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely
- 25:32Speaker 1: to prove right? Or are they both right? He will
- 25:35Speaker 1: have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and
- 25:39Speaker 1: not have a fever in the physician's judgment. Theodoris, how
- 25:43Speaker 1: ludicrous Socrates. And the vine grower, if I am not mistaken,
- 25:48Speaker 1: is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of
- 25:51Speaker 1: the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp player.
- 25:54Speaker 1: Theodoris certainly Socrates. And in musical composition, the musician will
- 26:01Speaker 1: know better than the training master what the training master
- 26:04Speaker 1: himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse. Theodoris, of
- 26:09Speaker 1: course Socrates, and the cook will be a better judge
- 26:13Speaker 1: than the guest, who is not a cook, of the
- 26:15Speaker 1: pleasure to be derived from the dinner, which is in
- 26:18Speaker 1: preparation for of present or past pleasure. We are not
- 26:22Speaker 1: as yet arguing. But can we say that everyone will
- 26:26Speaker 1: be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which
- 26:28Speaker 1: will seem to be and will be to him in
- 26:31Speaker 1: the future. Nie, would not you Protagoras better guess which
- 26:35Speaker 1: arguments in a court would convince any one of us
- 26:39Speaker 1: than the ordinary man. Theodoras, certainly Socrates. He used to
- 26:43Speaker 1: profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior
- 26:47Speaker 1: of all men in this respect. Socrates, to be sure, friend,
- 26:51Speaker 1: who would have paid a large sum for the privilege
- 26:53Speaker 1: of talking to him if he had really persuaded his
- 26:56Speaker 1: visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was
- 27:00Speaker 1: better able to judge what will be and seem to
- 27:04Speaker 1: be in the future than everyone could for himself. Theodoras,
- 27:09Speaker 1: who indeed Socrates, and legislation and expediency are all concerned
- 27:15Speaker 1: with the future. And everyone will admit that states, in
- 27:19Speaker 1: passing laws must often fail of their highest interests. Theodoras
- 27:24Speaker 1: quite true, Socrates. Then we may fairly argue against your
- 27:29Speaker 1: master that he must admit one man to be wiser
- 27:32Speaker 1: than another, and that the wiser is a measure. But I,
- 27:36Speaker 1: who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept
- 27:39Speaker 1: the honor which the advocate of Protagoras was just now
- 27:42Speaker 1: forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being
- 27:45Speaker 1: a measure of anything. Theodoras, that is the best refutation
- 27:50Speaker 1: of him, Socrates, although he's also caught when he ascribes
- 27:54Speaker 1: truth to the opinions of others who give the line
- 27:57Speaker 1: direct to his own opinion, Socrates. There are many ways, Theodorus,
- 28:02Speaker 1: in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man
- 28:05Speaker 1: is true may be refuted. But there is more difficulty
- 28:08Speaker 1: in proving that states of feeling which are present to
- 28:11Speaker 1: a man and out of which arise sensations and opinions
- 28:15Speaker 1: in accordance with them, are also untrue. And very likely
- 28:19Speaker 1: I have been talking nonsense about them, for they may
- 28:22Speaker 1: be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear
- 28:25Speaker 1: evidence of them and that they are matters of knowledge
- 28:29Speaker 1: may probably be right, in which case our friend Thetetus
- 28:33Speaker 1: was not so far from the mark when he identified
- 28:35Speaker 1: perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as
- 28:39Speaker 1: the advocate of protagorast desires, and give the truth of
- 28:43Speaker 1: the universal flux a ring is the theory sound or not?
- 28:47Speaker 1: At any rate, no small war is raging about it,
- 28:51Speaker 1: and there are combatants, not a few, Theodoras, no small war. Indeed,
- 28:57Speaker 1: for in Ionia the sect makes rapid stride. The disciples
- 29:01Speaker 1: of Heraclitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine Socrates.
- 29:06Speaker 1: Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodoras, to
- 29:09Speaker 1: examine the question from the foundation, as it is set
- 29:12Speaker 1: for us by themselves, Theodoras, certainly we are about these
- 29:17Speaker 1: speculations of Heraclitus, which, as you say, are as old
- 29:21Speaker 1: as Homer, or even older. Still, the Ephesians themselves, who
- 29:25Speaker 1: profess to know them, are downright manned, and ye cannot
- 29:29Speaker 1: talk with them on the subject, for in accordance with
- 29:31Speaker 1: their text books, they are always in motion. But as
- 29:35Speaker 1: for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly
- 29:38Speaker 1: asking and answering in turn, they can no more do
- 29:41Speaker 1: so than they can fly. Or rather, the determination of
- 29:45Speaker 1: these fellows not to have a particle of rest in
- 29:48Speaker 1: them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express.
- 29:52Speaker 1: If you ask any of them a question, he will produce,
- 29:55Speaker 1: as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them, matteu.
- 30:00Speaker 1: And if you inquire the reason of what he has said,
- 30:02Speaker 1: you will be hit by some other new fangled word,
- 30:05Speaker 1: and will make no way with any of them, nor
- 30:08Speaker 1: they with one another. Their great care is not to
- 30:11Speaker 1: allow of any settled principle, either in their arguments or
- 30:15Speaker 1: in their minds, conceiving as I imagine that any such
- 30:19Speaker 1: principle would be stationary, for they are at war with
- 30:22Speaker 1: the stationary, and do what they can to drive it
- 30:25Speaker 1: out everywhere. Socrates, I suppose Theodoras that you have only
- 30:30Speaker 1: seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed
- 30:33Speaker 1: with them in time of peace, For they are no
- 30:35Speaker 1: friends of yours, and their peace doctrines are only communicated
- 30:40Speaker 1: by them at leisure. As I imagine to those disciples
- 30:43Speaker 1: of theirs, whom they want to make like themselves theodoras disciples,
- 30:48Speaker 1: my good sir, they have none. Men of their sort
- 30:52Speaker 1: are not one another's disciples, but they grow up at
- 30:54Speaker 1: their own sweet will, and get their inspiration anywhere. Each
- 30:58Speaker 1: of them, saying of his name that he knows nothing
- 31:01Speaker 1: from these men. Then, as I was going to remark,
- 31:04Speaker 1: you will never get a reason, whether with their will
- 31:07Speaker 1: or without their will, we must take the question out
- 31:10Speaker 1: of their hands and make the analysis ourselves, as if
- 31:14Speaker 1: we were doing a geometrical problem. Socrates quite right too,
- 31:19Speaker 1: But as touching the aforesaid problem. Have we not heard
- 31:22Speaker 1: from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many
- 31:25Speaker 1: in poetical figures, that Oceanus in teethys the origin of
- 31:30Speaker 1: all things are streams, and that nothing is at rest.
- 31:34Speaker 1: And now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared
- 31:38Speaker 1: the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and
- 31:41Speaker 1: learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some
- 31:44Speaker 1: things are at rest and others in motion, having learned
- 31:48Speaker 1: that all his motion he will duly honor his teachers.
- 31:52Speaker 1: I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus alone being
- 31:57Speaker 1: remains unmoved, which is the name for the all. This
- 32:02Speaker 1: is the language of Parmenides, Melissos and their followers, who
- 32:06Speaker 1: stoutly maintain that all being is one and self contained,
- 32:10Speaker 1: and has no place in which to move. What shall
- 32:14Speaker 1: we do friend with all these people, for advancing step
- 32:18Speaker 1: by stemp, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and
- 32:22Speaker 1: unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the
- 32:25Speaker 1: penalty of our rashness, like the players in the Palestra,
- 32:29Speaker 1: who are caught upon the line and are dragged different
- 32:31Speaker 1: ways by the two parties. Therefore, I think that we
- 32:35Speaker 1: had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted,
- 32:40Speaker 1: the river gods, And if we find any truth in them,
- 32:43Speaker 1: we will help them to pull us over and try
- 32:46Speaker 1: to get away from the others. But if the partisans
- 32:50Speaker 1: of the whole appear to speak more truly, we will
- 32:53Speaker 1: fly off from the party which would move the immovable
- 32:56Speaker 1: to them. And if we find that neither of them
- 32:59Speaker 1: have any anything reasonable to say, we shall be in
- 33:02Speaker 1: a ridiculous position, having so great a conceit of our
- 33:05Speaker 1: own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men. Oh, Theodorus,
- 33:12Speaker 1: do you think that there is any use in proceeding
- 33:14Speaker 1: when the danger is so great? Theodoris nay, Socrates. Not
- 33:19Speaker 1: to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say
- 33:22Speaker 1: would be quite intolerable. Socrates, then examine we must, since you,
- 33:28Speaker 1: who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to proceed,
- 33:32Speaker 1: the nature of motion appears to be the question with
- 33:35Speaker 1: which we begin. What do they mean when they say
- 33:38Speaker 1: that all things are in motion? Is there only one
- 33:41Speaker 1: kind of motion? Or? As I rather inclined to think too,
- 33:46Speaker 1: I should like to have your opinion upon this point,
- 33:48Speaker 1: in addition to my own that I may air if
- 33:51Speaker 1: I must err in your company. Tell me, then, when
- 33:55Speaker 1: a thing changes from one place to another, or goes
- 33:57Speaker 1: round in the same place, is not that what is
- 34:00Speaker 1: called motion? Theodoris, yes, Socrates. Here then we have one
- 34:06Speaker 1: kind of motion. But when a thing remaining on the
- 34:10Speaker 1: same spot grows old, or becomes black from being white,
- 34:14Speaker 1: or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change,
- 34:18Speaker 1: may not this be properly called motion of another kind? Theodoris?
- 34:23Speaker 1: I think so? Socrates? Say, rather that it must be
- 34:27Speaker 1: so of motion. Then there are these two kinds change
- 34:31Speaker 1: and motion in place. Theodoris. You are right, Socrates. And
- 34:38Speaker 1: now having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to
- 34:41Speaker 1: those who say that all is motion, and ask them
- 34:44Speaker 1: whether all things, according to them, have the two kinds
- 34:47Speaker 1: of motion, and are changed as well as move in place.
- 34:52Speaker 1: Or is one thing moved in both ways and another
- 34:55Speaker 1: in one only? Theodoris Indeed. I do not know what
- 34:59Speaker 1: to answer, but I think they would say that all
- 35:02Speaker 1: things are moved in both ways Socrates, Yes, comrade, For
- 35:07Speaker 1: if not, they would have to say that the same
- 35:10Speaker 1: things are in motion and at rest. And there would
- 35:13Speaker 1: be no more truth in saying that all things are
- 35:15Speaker 1: in motion than that all things are at rest. Theodoris
- 35:19Speaker 1: to be sure, Socrates. And if they are to be
- 35:23Speaker 1: in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion,
- 35:26Speaker 1: all things must always have every sort of motion. Theodoris
- 35:31Speaker 1: most true, Socrates. Consider a further point, did we not
- 35:35Speaker 1: understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or
- 35:39Speaker 1: anything else in some such manner as the following? Were
- 35:43Speaker 1: they not saying that each of them is moving between
- 35:45Speaker 1: the agent and the patient together with a perception, and
- 35:49Speaker 1: that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and
- 35:53Speaker 1: becomes a precipient, and the agent a quality instead of
- 35:56Speaker 1: a quality. I suspect that quality may have pure a
- 36:00Speaker 1: strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do
- 36:03Speaker 1: not understand the abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances.
- 36:09Speaker 1: I mean to say that the producing power or agent
- 36:12Speaker 1: becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and
- 36:17Speaker 1: the like of other things. For I must repeat what
- 36:21Speaker 1: I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have
- 36:24Speaker 1: any absolute existence. But when they come together and generate
- 36:28Speaker 1: sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of
- 36:32Speaker 1: a certain quality, and the other a precipient. You remember, theodoris,
- 36:38Speaker 1: of course, Socrates. We may leave the details of their
- 36:42Speaker 1: theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them
- 36:45Speaker 1: the only question with which we are concerned. Are all
- 36:49Speaker 1: things in motion and flux? Theodoris, yes, they will reply, Socrates.
- 36:56Speaker 1: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished,
- 37:00Speaker 1: that is to say, they move in place and are
- 37:03Speaker 1: also changed. Theodoris, of course, if the motion is to
- 37:07Speaker 1: be perfect, Socrates. If they only moved in place and
- 37:12Speaker 1: were not changed, we should be able to say, what
- 37:15Speaker 1: is the nature of the things which are in motion
- 37:17Speaker 1: and flux? Theodoris exactly, Socrates. But now, since not even
- 37:24Speaker 1: white continues to flow white and whiteness itself is a
- 37:28Speaker 1: flux or change, which is passing into another color, and
- 37:32Speaker 1: is never to be caught standing still. Can the name
- 37:34Speaker 1: of any color be rightly used at all? Theodoris How
- 37:38Speaker 1: is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this
- 37:42Speaker 1: or of any other quality. If while we are using
- 37:46Speaker 1: the word, the object is escaping in the flux, Socrates.
- 37:50Speaker 1: And what would you say of perceptions such as sight
- 37:53Speaker 1: and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there
- 37:57Speaker 1: any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing? Theodoris
- 38:01Speaker 1: certainly not. If all things are in motion, Socrates, then
- 38:06Speaker 1: we must not speak of seeing any more than of
- 38:09Speaker 1: not seeing, nor of any other perception more than of
- 38:12Speaker 1: any non perception. If all things partake of every kind
- 38:16Speaker 1: of motion, theodoris certainly not, Socrates. Yet perception is knowledge.
- 38:24Speaker 1: So at least Thetatus and I were seeing. Theodoris very true, Socrates.
- 38:31Speaker 1: Then when we were asked what is knowledge? We no
- 38:34Speaker 1: more answered what is knowledge? Then what is not knowledge?
- 38:37Speaker 1: Theodoris I suppose not? Socrates? Here then is a fine result.
- 38:44Speaker 1: We corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove
- 38:47Speaker 1: that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest,
- 38:50Speaker 1: every answer upon whatever subject is equally right. You may
- 38:54Speaker 1: say that a thing is or is not. Thus, or
- 38:58Speaker 1: if you prefer, becomes thus, and if we say becomes,
- 39:02Speaker 1: we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.
- 39:06Speaker 1: Theodoris quite true, Socrates. Yes, theodoris, except in saying thus
- 39:13Speaker 1: and not thus. But you ought not to use the
- 39:16Speaker 1: word thus, for there is no motion in thus or
- 39:20Speaker 1: in not thus. The maintainers of the doctrine have as
- 39:24Speaker 1: yet no words in which to express themselves, and must
- 39:28Speaker 1: get a new language. I know of no word that
- 39:31Speaker 1: will suit them, except perhaps know how, which is perfectly indefinite. Theodoris. Yes,
- 39:38Speaker 1: that is a manner of speaking in which they will
- 39:40Speaker 1: be quite at home, Socrates. In so Theodorus, we have
- 39:44Speaker 1: got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine
- 39:47Speaker 1: that every man is the measure of all things. A
- 39:50Speaker 1: wise man only is a measure. Neither can we allow
- 39:54Speaker 1: that knowledge is perception, certainly not in the hypothesis of
- 39:58Speaker 1: a perpetual flux, unless perchance our friend Thetatus is able
- 40:03Speaker 1: to convince us that it is. Theodoris very good, Socrates.
- 40:07Speaker 1: And now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras
- 40:11Speaker 1: has been completed, I am absolved from answering, for this
- 40:15Speaker 1: was the agreement Thetatus, not theodoris. Until you and Socrates
- 40:20Speaker 1: have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all
- 40:23Speaker 1: things are at rest as you were proposing, Theodoras, you, Thetatus,
- 40:29Speaker 1: who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders
- 40:31Speaker 1: to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer
- 40:34Speaker 1: Socrates in the remainder of the argument. Thetatus, yes, if
- 40:39Speaker 1: he wishes, But I would rather have heard about the
- 40:42Speaker 1: doctrine of rest. Theodoras invite Socrates to an argument, invite
- 40:48Speaker 1: horsemen to the open plaine. Do but ask him and
- 40:51Speaker 1: he will answer Socrates. Nevertheless, theodoris, I am afraid that
- 40:57Speaker 1: I shall not be able to comply with the request
- 40:59Speaker 1: of Thetatus. Theodoras not comply for what reason? Socrates? My
- 41:06Speaker 1: reason is that I have a kind of reverence, not
- 41:09Speaker 1: so much for Melissos and the others who say that
- 41:12Speaker 1: all is one and at rest, as for the great
- 41:15Speaker 1: leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language
- 41:21Speaker 1: he may be called him, I should be ashamed to
- 41:24Speaker 1: approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him
- 41:28Speaker 1: when he was an old man, and I was a
- 41:30Speaker 1: mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a
- 41:33Speaker 1: glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we
- 41:37Speaker 1: may not understand his words, and may be still further
- 41:41Speaker 1: from understanding his meaning. Above all, I fear that the
- 41:45Speaker 1: nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion,
- 41:48Speaker 1: may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests,
- 41:51Speaker 1: who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse
- 41:55Speaker 1: if we let them in. Besides, the question which is
- 41:59Speaker 1: now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated
- 42:02Speaker 1: unfairly if only considered by the way, or if treated
- 42:06Speaker 1: adequately and at length, will put into the shade the
- 42:09Speaker 1: other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other
- 42:13Speaker 1: can be allowed. But I must try, by my art
- 42:16Speaker 1: of midwifery to deliver Thetatus of his conceptions about knowledge.
- 42:21Speaker 1: Thetatus very well do so, if you will, Socrates, Then
- 42:27Speaker 1: now Thetatus take another view of the subject. You answered
- 42:31Speaker 1: that knowledge's perception thetatus i did, Socrates. And if anyone
- 42:37Speaker 1: were to ask you, with what does a man see
- 42:40Speaker 1: black and white colors? And with what does he hear
- 42:43Speaker 1: high and low sounds? You would say, if I am
- 42:46Speaker 1: not mistaken, with the eyes and with the ears, thetatus
- 42:51Speaker 1: I should Socrates the free use of words and phrases
- 42:56Speaker 1: rather than minute precision is generally characteristic of a liberal
- 42:59Speaker 1: edge dcation, and the opposite is pedantic. But sometimes precision
- 43:04Speaker 1: is necessary. And I believe that the answer which you
- 43:08Speaker 1: have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness.
- 43:12Speaker 1: For which is more correct to say that we see
- 43:14Speaker 1: or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or
- 43:18Speaker 1: through the eyes and through the ears, thetatus I should
- 43:22Speaker 1: say through Socrates rather than with Socrates, Yes, my boy,
- 43:28Speaker 1: for no one can suppose that in each of us,
- 43:31Speaker 1: as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perched
- 43:34Speaker 1: a number of unconnected senses, which do not all meet
- 43:37Speaker 1: in someone nature, the mind, or whatever we please to
- 43:41Speaker 1: call it, of which they are the instruments, and with
- 43:44Speaker 1: which through them we perceive objects of sense. Thetatus I
- 43:50Speaker 1: agree with you in that opinion, Socrates. The reason why
- 43:55Speaker 1: I am thus precise is because I want to know whether,
- 43:59Speaker 1: when we perceive block black and white through the eyes,
- 44:02Speaker 1: and again other qualities through other organs, we do not
- 44:05Speaker 1: perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves.
- 44:09Speaker 1: And if you were asked, you might refer all such
- 44:12Speaker 1: perceptions to the body. Perhaps, However, I had better allow
- 44:16Speaker 1: you to answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then,
- 44:20Speaker 1: are not the organs through which you perceive warm and
- 44:23Speaker 1: hard and light and sweet organs of the body thetatus
- 44:29Speaker 1: of the body, certainly, Socrates, And you would admit that
- 44:34Speaker 1: what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another.
- 44:38Speaker 1: The objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight,
- 44:42Speaker 1: or the objects of sight through hearing thetatus, of course, not, Socrates.
- 44:48Speaker 1: If you have any thought about both of them, this
- 44:50Speaker 1: common perception cannot come to you either through the one
- 44:54Speaker 1: or the other organ thetatus, it cannot, Socrates. How about
- 45:00Speaker 1: sounds and colors in the first place, you would admit
- 45:04Speaker 1: that they both exist thettus, yes, Socrates, and that either
- 45:10Speaker 1: of them is different from the other, and the same
- 45:13Speaker 1: with itself thetetus, certainly, Socrates, and that both are two,
- 45:20Speaker 1: in each of them one thetetus, yes, Socrates. You can
- 45:26Speaker 1: further observe whether they are like or unlike one another thetatus,
- 45:31Speaker 1: I dare, say, Socrates. But through what do you perceive
- 45:35Speaker 1: all this about them? For neither through hearing, nor yet
- 45:38Speaker 1: through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in
- 45:41Speaker 1: common let me give you an illustration of the point
- 45:44Speaker 1: at issue. If there were any meaning in asking whether
- 45:48Speaker 1: sounds and colors are saline or not, you would be
- 45:51Speaker 1: able to tell me what faculty would consider the question.
- 45:55Speaker 1: It would not be sight or hearing, but some other thetatus,
- 45:59Speaker 1: certainly the faculty of taste. Socrates, very good, and now
- 46:05Speaker 1: tell me what is the power which discerns not only
- 46:08Speaker 1: in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such
- 46:13Speaker 1: as those which are called being and not being, and
- 46:16Speaker 1: those others about which we were just asking. What organs
- 46:20Speaker 1: will you assign for the perception of these notions? Thetitus.
- 46:26Speaker 1: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness,
- 46:31Speaker 1: sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers
- 46:35Speaker 1: which are applied to objects of sense. And you mean
- 46:38Speaker 1: to ask through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd
- 46:42Speaker 1: and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions. Socrates, you follow
- 46:48Speaker 1: me excellently, Thetatus. That is precisely what I am asking. Thetatus. Indeed, Socrates,
- 46:55Speaker 1: I cannot answer. My only notion is that these, unlike
- 46:59Speaker 1: object of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind,
- 47:03Speaker 1: by a power of her own contemplates the universals in
- 47:06Speaker 1: all things, Socrates, you are beauty Thetatus, and not ugly,
- 47:12Speaker 1: as Theodorus was saying, For he who utters the beautiful
- 47:16Speaker 1: is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you
- 47:20Speaker 1: have done me a kindness in releasing me from a
- 47:22Speaker 1: very long discussion. If you are clear that the soul
- 47:26Speaker 1: views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs,
- 47:30Speaker 1: For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you
- 47:33Speaker 1: to agree with me. Thetatus I am quite clear, Socrates.
- 47:39Speaker 1: And to which class would you refer being goor essence?
- 47:43Speaker 1: For this, of all our notions is the most universal. Thetatus.
- 47:48Speaker 1: I should say to that class which the soul aspires
- 47:51Speaker 1: to know of herself, Socrates. And would you say this
- 47:55Speaker 1: also of like and unlike, same and other Thetatus, Yes, Socrates.
- 48:02Speaker 1: And would you say the same of the noble and base,
- 48:04Speaker 1: and of good and evil Thetitus. These I conceive to
- 48:09Speaker 1: be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul
- 48:13Speaker 1: also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present
- 48:17Speaker 1: with the future, Socrates. And does she not perceive the
- 48:21Speaker 1: hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and
- 48:24Speaker 1: the softness of that which is soft equally by the
- 48:27Speaker 1: touch Thetitus, yes, Socrates. But their essence and what they are,
- 48:34Speaker 1: and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature
- 48:38Speaker 1: of this opposition, the soul herself endeavors to decide for
- 48:41Speaker 1: us by the review in comparison of them, Thetitus, certainly, Socrates.
- 48:48Speaker 1: The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body
- 48:51Speaker 1: are given at birth to men and animals by nature,
- 48:55Speaker 1: But the reflections on the being and use of them
- 48:58Speaker 1: are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained
- 49:02Speaker 1: by education and long experience. Thetitus, assuredly, Socrates, And can
- 49:09Speaker 1: iman attain truth? Who fails of attaining being? Thetitis impossible, Socrates.
- 49:16Speaker 1: And can he who misses the truth of anything have
- 49:19Speaker 1: a knowledge of that thing? Thetitus, He cannot, Socrates. Then
- 49:25Speaker 1: knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in
- 49:28Speaker 1: reasoning about them. In that only, and not in the
- 49:32Speaker 1: mere impression, truth and being can be attained Thetitus, clearly, Socrates.
- 49:40Speaker 1: And would you call the two processes by the same
- 49:42Speaker 1: name when there is so great a difference between them? Thettus,
- 49:47Speaker 1: that would certainly not be right, Socrates. And what name
- 49:52Speaker 1: would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and
- 49:56Speaker 1: being hot? Thetitis, I should call all of them perceiving.
- 50:01Speaker 1: What other name could be given to them? Socrates? Perception
- 50:06Speaker 1: would be the collective name of them, thetitas certainly Socrates, which,
- 50:12Speaker 1: as we say, has no part in the attainment of
- 50:15Speaker 1: truth any more than of being. Thetitis certainly not Socrates,
- 50:21Speaker 1: and therefore not in science or knowledge. Thettus no Socrates.
- 50:28Speaker 1: Then perception thettus can never be the same as knowledge
- 50:31Speaker 1: or science. Thettus clearly not Socrates, and knowledge has now
- 50:37Speaker 1: been most distinctly proved to be different from perception Socrates.
- 50:42Speaker 1: But the original aim of our discussion was to find
- 50:44Speaker 1: out rather what knowledge is than what it is not.
- 50:48Speaker 1: At the same time, we have made some progress, for
- 50:52Speaker 1: we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all,
- 50:55Speaker 1: but in that other process, however, called, in which the
- 50:58Speaker 1: mind is alone and in aged with being. Thetetus you mean, Socrates,
- 51:04Speaker 1: If I am not mistaken, what is called thinking or opining?
- 51:08Speaker 1: Socrates you conceive truly, And now, my friend, please to
- 51:13Speaker 1: begin again at this point, and having wiped out of
- 51:16Speaker 1: your memory all that has preceded, see if you have
- 51:19Speaker 1: arrived at any clearer view, And once more, say what
- 51:23Speaker 1: is knowledge? Thetetus? I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion
- 51:27Speaker 1: is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion. But
- 51:31Speaker 1: I will venture to assert that knowledge is true opinion.
- 51:34Speaker 1: Let this then be my reply. And if this is
- 51:37Speaker 1: hereafter disproved, I must try to find another Socrates. That
- 51:42Speaker 1: is the way in which you ought to answer Saetetus,
- 51:45Speaker 1: and not in your former hesitating strain. For if we
- 51:49Speaker 1: are bold, we shall gain one of two advantages. Either
- 51:53Speaker 1: we shall find what we seek, or we shall be
- 51:56Speaker 1: less likely to think that we know what we do
- 51:58Speaker 1: not know. In either case, we shall be richly rewarded.
- 52:03Speaker 1: And now what are you saying? Are there two sorts
- 52:05Speaker 1: of opinion, one true and the other false? And do
- 52:09Speaker 1: you define knowledge to be the true Thetitus? Yes? According
- 52:14Speaker 1: to my present view, Socrates, is it still worth our
- 52:18Speaker 1: while to resume the discussion touching opinion Thetitus? To what
- 52:23Speaker 1: are you alluding? Socrates? There is a point which often
- 52:27Speaker 1: troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both
- 52:31Speaker 1: in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out
- 52:34Speaker 1: the nature or origin of the mental experience to which
- 52:37Speaker 1: I refer Thetitus. Pray, what is it, Socrates? How there
- 52:43Speaker 1: can be false opinion? That difficulty still troubles the eye
- 52:47Speaker 1: of my mind? And I am uncertain whether I shall
- 52:50Speaker 1: leave the question or begin over again in a new
- 52:53Speaker 1: way the Titus. Begin again, Socrates, at least if you
- 52:59Speaker 1: think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so.
- 53:02Speaker 1: Were not you in Theodorus just now remarking very truly
- 53:06Speaker 1: that in discussions of this kind we may take our
- 53:08Speaker 1: own time. Socrates, you are quite ranked, and perhaps there
- 53:13Speaker 1: will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again.
- 53:17Speaker 1: Better a little which is well done than a great
- 53:20Speaker 1: deal imperfectly Thetitas certainly, and of Part three of Thetitus
- 53:29Speaker 1: Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards