Latest / Beyond The Horizon / The United States Governments Brief In Response To Ghislaine Maxwell's Appeal Request (Part 6)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:04In this episode, we're going to pick up where we
- 0:05left off with the United States response in brief to
- 0:10Glad Maxwell's attempt to get an appeal two section thirty
- 0:15two eighty three reaches counts three and four. Maxwell separately
- 0:20argues that section thirty two eighty three does not apply
- 0:23it counts three and four because neither is an offense
- 0:26involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child. Maxwell
- 0:30contends at these counts, which charged her with transporting a
- 0:33minor with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual
- 0:36activity and conspiracy to do the same, are not offenses
- 0:40involving the sexual abuse of a child because a completed
- 0:43sex acts is not an essential element of either charge.
- 0:47But Maxwell does not dispute that the evidence at trial
- 0:50established that her commission of counts three and four involved
- 0:54completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims, nor
- 0:58could she, as Jane, testify that she was in fact
- 1:01sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York,
- 1:06as a minor. Instead, Maxwell insists that counts three and
- 1:09four do not involve sexual abuse of a child because
- 1:12a completed sex act is not an element of those crimes.
- 1:15This argument misreads the relevant statutes and legislative history and
- 1:20runs contrary to the decision of this Court and other
- 1:23courts of appeals. A. Counts three and four are offenses
- 1:27involving the sexual abuse of a child. Maxwell's entire argument
- 1:32is based on a mistaken premise that the phrase offense
- 1:35involving the sexual abuse of a child US Code eighteen,
- 1:39section thirty two eighty three only encompasses crime in which
- 1:43unlawful sexual activity actually took place. This flawed proposition ignores
- 1:48relevant statutory definitions, which make clear that section thirty two
- 1:52eighty three reaches more broadly to include offenses in which
- 1:56there were no completed illegal sex act as described above.
- 2:00Section thirty two eighty three was originally codified at US
- 2:04Code eighteen, section thirty five oh nine K. The definition
- 2:08of the term sexual abuse is located within the same section.
- 2:13For purposes of this section, the term sexual abuse includes
- 2:17the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a
- 2:22child to engage in or assist another person to engage
- 2:26in sexually explicit conduct, or the rape, molestation prostitution or
- 2:31other form of sexual exploitation of children or incest with children.
- 2:36US Code eighteen, Section thirty five oh nine A eight.
- 2:40The term sexually explicit conduct is in turn defined to mean,
- 2:44among other things, sexual intercourse, including sexual conduct, and the
- 2:48term sexual contact means the intentional touching, either directly or
- 2:52through clothing of the genitilia anous grind, breast, inner, thigh,
- 2:56or buttocks of any person with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
- 3:02or arouse a gratifying sexual desire of any person id
- 3:07Section thirty five oh nine A nine and A. Courts
- 3:10have looked into the definition of sexual abuse set forth
- 3:13in section thirty five oh nine A to determine whether
- 3:17the statute of limitations of Section thirty two eighty three
- 3:20applies to an offense. United States Versus Carpenter six't eighty
- 3:24f dot three D eleven oh one, eleven oh three,
- 3:27and four nine Circuit twenty twelve. We join our sister
- 3:31circuits in looking at subsection thirty five oh nine A
- 3:35for a definition of sexual abuse under federal law and
- 3:38find it the appropriate definition to use in applying Section
- 3:42thirty two eighty three is extended Statute of limitations. The
- 3:46definition of sexual abuse includes not only actual sexual contact,
- 3:51but also the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion
- 3:56of a child to engage in or assist another person
- 3:59to anen gauge in sexual contact. US Code eighteen, Section
- 4:03thirty five oh nine A. The breath of the definition
- 4:07is underscored by Congress's use of the word includes in
- 4:11section thirty five oh nine a's text, which is significant
- 4:14because it makes clear that the examples enumerated in the
- 4:17text are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Christopher versus
- 4:23Smith Klein Beachamcorp. Five sixty seven US one forty two,
- 4:27one sixty two, twenty twelve, citing Burges First, United States
- 4:31five point fifty two US one twenty four, one thirty
- 4:35one and three, two thousand and eight, and the text
- 4:37of Section thirty two eighty three goes even further beyond
- 4:41the definition provided in section thirty five oh nine by
- 4:44covering any crime involving the sexual abuse of a child.
- 4:48Congress therefore did not require that a particular statute have
- 4:52actual sexual contact with a minor as an element of
- 4:55its offense, but rather swept broadly to cover any crime
- 4:59that in any way involves sexual abuse as broadly defined.
- 5:04Given this expanse of language, sexual abuse has defined here
- 5:07encompasses a wider set of behavior than just rape or
- 5:10other unwanted sexual touching. United States verse Schneider eight oh
- 5:14one f dot three, D one eighty six one ninety seven,
- 5:18Third Circuit, twenty fifteen. Thus, courts throughout the country have
- 5:22concluded that Section thirty two eighty three applies to a
- 5:25variety of offenses that do not require a sexual act
- 5:29between a defendant and a specific child. United States versus
- 5:33Vickers Number thirteen CR one twenty eight r JA twenty fourteen,
- 5:38w L one eighty three eighty two fifty five at
- 5:41eleven W D N y May eight, twenty fourteen, or
- 5:46physical contact with the victim Carpenters six eighty f dot
- 5:50three d at eleven oh three. According to the United
- 5:53States versus Deal seven seventy five seven fourteen seven twenty
- 5:57fifth Circuit twenty fifteen, Section thirty two eighty three's definition
- 6:03thus captures crimes of intent where a perpetrator seeks to
- 6:06have a minor engage in sexual contact, even if such
- 6:09sexual contact does not occur. Transportation of a minor with
- 6:13intent to engage in illegal sex act as charged in
- 6:16Count four and conspiracy to commit the same as charged
- 6:20in Count three, fall comfortably within that definition, even though
- 6:24a completed sex act is not required to commit those
- 6:27two crimes. Count four has sexual abuse as an element
- 6:30because it requires the defendant to induce a child to
- 6:34engage in illegal sexual activity by transporting the minor across
- 6:38state lines with an intent that the child engage in
- 6:42an illegal sex act. US Code eighteen, Section thirty five
- 6:46oh nine A eight and count three as a conspiracy
- 6:50to commit Count four is an offense involving such sexual
- 6:53abuse ID at thirty two eighty three. See United States
- 6:57Versus Sense number zero eight CR two five fifty three
- 7:00WWE twenty ten, w L two three five one four
- 7:05eight four at two and three, Connecticut, June seventh, twenty ten.
- 7:10Collecting cases interpreting the term sexual abuse to encompass all
- 7:14crimes that would logically relate to the common understanding of
- 7:18sexual abuse, even when found in chapters one ten sexual
- 7:22Exploitation and other Abuse of Children and one seventeen Transportation
- 7:27of illegal sexual activity and related crimes of Title eighteen
- 7:31Schneider eight oh one ft three d at one, ninety
- 7:34six and ninety seven, holding that Section thirty two eighty
- 7:37three applied to defendant convicted of traveling with the purpose
- 7:41of engaging in sex with a minor victim in violation
- 7:44of US Code eighteen, Section twenty four to twenty three B. Accordingly,
- 7:49even considering only the elements of the offenses, counts three
- 7:53to four falls squarely within Section thirty two eighty three's
- 7:56definition of an offense involving sexual abuse of child B.
- 8:02Maxwell's argument for use of a categorical approach lacks merit
- 8:06because counts three and four qualify as offenses involving the
- 8:10sexual abuse of a child. US Code eighteen, Section thirty
- 8:13two eighty three. Even without resort to the facts of
- 8:16the case, the court need not to address Maxwell's claim
- 8:20that the categorical approach applies in this context, but the
- 8:23arguments Maxwell advances in support of her claims are meritless.
- 8:27In any event, Maxwell first relies on Section thirty two
- 8:31eighty three's use of the phrase offense involving the sexual
- 8:35abuse of a child, which she contends dictates looking only
- 8:38to the elements of the offense, but, as this Court
- 8:41has already recognized, Section thirty two eighty three's texts reaches
- 8:45beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct
- 8:48involved in the offense, a linguistic expansion that shows Congress's
- 8:53intent for courts to look beyond the bare legal charges
- 8:56in deciding whether Section thirty two eighty three applied Wingarten
- 9:00eight sixty five ft three d at fifty nine and
- 9:03sixty See also Nija Win versus Holder, five point fifty
- 9:07seven US twenty nine thirty two thirty eight, two thousand
- 9:10and nine, holding that a statute that includes an offense
- 9:13involves phrase is consistent with the circumstance specific approach. Indeed,
- 9:19the Third Circuit has expressly rejected an essential ingredient test
- 9:23comparable to the categorical approach and instead applied case specific
- 9:28analysis to determine that Section thirty two eighty three applied
- 9:31to travel with intent to commit an illegal sex act
- 9:34with a minor in violation of US Code Section twenty
- 9:38four to twenty three b. Schneider eight oh one f
- 9:41dot three d at one ninety six and one ninety seven.
- 9:45Maxwell also argues that the clearer weight of authority holds
- 9:48that statutes employing similar language should be read through a
- 9:51categorical rather than case specific lens, but the decision she
- 9:55cites involves statutes with other features favoring the categorical app
- 10:00which are notably absent here. Some cases involve statutes that
- 10:04define the crime of violence as an offense that either
- 10:07has an element the use of physical force, or by
- 10:11its nature involves a substantial risk of force, language that
- 10:15invokes an elements based approach. United States versus Davis, one
- 10:19thirty nine, Supreme Court two three one nine, two three,
- 10:22two eight and twenty nine, twenty nineteen, Leakel versus Ashcroft,
- 10:27five forty three US one in seven, two thousand and four.
- 10:31Some cases concerned the definition of an aggravated felony under
- 10:35federal immigration law Kaweshima versus Holder, five sixty five US
- 10:40four seventy eight, Leakel. Five forty three U. S at seven,
- 10:44a context in which the categorical approach traditionally applies because
- 10:48the inquiry is whether the alien's prior conviction meets the
- 10:52definition Winingarten eight sixty five FT three d at fifty
- 10:56nine and United States versus Morgan three ninety three three
- 11:00d one ninety two d C. Circuit two thousand and
- 11:04four is likewise distinguishable, as it involved a venue statute
- 11:08presenting significantly different concerns than those presented here. Maxwell also
- 11:14relies on a trio of cases, chief among them Bridges
- 11:17versus United States three forty six US two nine, nineteen
- 11:21fifty three. In Bridges, the Supreme Court applied an essential
- 11:25ingredient test to determine whether an offense qualified for a
- 11:28provision that extended the criminal limitations period for certain fraud
- 11:32offenses Winingarten, eight sixty five ft three d At fifty
- 11:36nine ten. But, as this Court has explained, Bridges is
- 11:40distinguishable because the Supreme Court, they're believed, applying the restrictive
- 11:45essential ingredient test to determine if an offense involved the
- 11:49defrauding of the United States effectuated Congress's specific intent to
- 11:53limit the extended limitations period to only a few offenses,
- 11:57while Congress have the opposite intention four Section thirty two
- 12:01eighty three ID. The other two cases, United States versus
- 12:05Sharten two eighty five US five eighteen, nineteen thirty two
- 12:09and United States versus Novak two seventy one US two
- 12:12oh one nineteen twenty six are distinguishable on similar grounds.
- 12:17In any event, the essential ingredient test does not help Maxwell.
- 12:21As discussed above, an offense involving the sexual abuse of
- 12:24a child. US Code eighteen, Section thirty two eighty three
- 12:27must be read in light of the definition of sexual
- 12:30abuse set forth in section thirty five oh nine A,
- 12:33which encompasses a wide range of conduct that is not
- 12:36limited to actual sexual contact with the child. Counts three
- 12:40to four each have an essential ingredient that fits with
- 12:43the broad definition. See super A point two B two A. Finally,
- 12:49neither Deal nor United States Versus Contentos six fifty one FT.
- 12:53Three d eighth nine eight Circuit twenty eleven supports the
- 12:57use of a categorical approach. In each decision, the court
- 13:01concluded that Section thirty two eighty three applied to the
- 13:04subject offenses without considering the specific facts of the crime.
- 13:08But in neither case did the court consider whether a
- 13:10categorical approach was required, let alone hold that it was.
- 13:14As noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence at
- 13:18trial established that Maxwell's commission of counts three and four
- 13:22involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims.
- 13:26Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when
- 13:29transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Accordingly,
- 13:34Counts three and four qualify as offenses involving the sexual
- 13:38abuse of a child, both by their statutory terms and
- 13:41based on the specific facts of this case. All right, folks,
- 13:45we're going to wrap up right here, and in the
- 13:46next episode we're going to pick up with zero point three.
- 13:49The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
- 13:53that jur of fifty could be fairer and impartial, notwithstanding
- 13:56his inadvertent mistakes on his jur questionnaire. All of the
- 14:00information that goes with this episode can be found in
- 14:03the description box.