Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Entertainment Law Year In Review: The Cases that “Rocked” the Entertainment World in 2025!
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome to the entertainment law year in review,
- 0:07the cases that rock the entertainment world in
- 0:092025. I'm Keith Kelly, chair of the Beverly Hills
- 0:13Bar Association's entertainment law section.
- 0:16The entertainment law section is sponsored by
- 0:18Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company. For five decades,
- 0:22Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company has been the
- 0:25only California based company to continuously
- 0:28provide lawyers throughout the state with professional
- 0:31liability insurance coverage. Their experience
- 0:34and expertise are complimented by the fact that
- 0:36Lawyers Mutual is directed by a group of dedicated
- 0:39lawyers. They offer special rates with competitive
- 0:42premiums for a wide range of areas of practice,
- 0:45including entertainment law. Learn more at lawyersmutual
- 0:48.com. I'm delighted to introduce our speakers,
- 0:52Christine LaPera, Erin Moss, Peter Anderson,
- 0:56and moderator Peter Pine. Christine LaPera is
- 0:59a partner at Mitchell, Silverberg, and Nupp,
- 1:01and chair of the firm's Music Litigation Practice
- 1:04Group, representing leading entertainers and
- 1:07media companies in high -stakes copyright, trademark,
- 1:11contract, and right of publicity disputes. A
- 1:14nationally recognized trial lawyer and strategic
- 1:16advisor, she has been repeatedly honored as one
- 1:19of the industry's top music and entertainment
- 1:21litigators. Thank you for joining us. Thank you
- 1:24very much. Very kind. Peter Anderson is a partner
- 1:27at Davis Right Tremaine with more than 40 years
- 1:30of experience in copyright and entertainment
- 1:32litigation. He represents leading artists, record
- 1:35labels and media companies in high stakes intellectual
- 1:38property disputes, including landmark cases before
- 1:41the US Supreme Court and federal appellate courts.
- 1:45Thank you, Peter. Thank you. Aaron Moss is partner
- 1:49at Mitchell Silbert ended up where he represents
- 1:52leading media and entertainment technology clients
- 1:54and high stakes copyright trademark First Amendment
- 1:58and complex intellectual property disputes. A
- 2:01nationally recognized authority on copyright
- 2:04copyright law, he also publishes the widely read
- 2:07blog Copyright Lately and is frequently cited
- 2:10by court scholars and major news organizations.
- 2:14Thank you. is a partner at McPherson LLP with
- 2:21more than two decades of experience handling
- 2:23complex entertainment and intellectual property
- 2:26litigation. Since beginning his career in 2020,
- 2:29or excuse me, 2001, he represents clients in
- 2:33high stakes copyright, trademark, contract, and
- 2:36business disputes in both state and federal courts.
- 2:40Now let's get started. Over to you, Peter. Great.
- 2:44Thanks, Keith. Appreciate it. Thank you guys.
- 2:47Welcome to everybody who's tuning in for this
- 2:51program. Happy to have you here. Just before
- 2:54we get started, excuse me, I just wanted to thank
- 2:57Loeb and Loeb for their continued allowing us
- 3:00to use their case summaries for our program materials
- 3:04and I also want to, as part of our program materials,
- 3:06and I also want to thank Emma Aistrop who has
- 3:10been a great help to us in helping to organize
- 3:14and put together those case materials. Those
- 3:17of you who've looked at the materials know that
- 3:19there's a lot of cases. Obviously, we're not
- 3:21going to cover everything there, but it's great
- 3:24for people to have as a reference point for all
- 3:28the important cases that have come down in the
- 3:30last year. We've got a lot to cover, so why don't
- 3:33we get started, Aaron? I know we've got some
- 3:36copyright AI cases that everybody wants to hear
- 3:39about. Great. Thank you for having me. So obviously
- 3:44a lot to cover. And I think notwithstanding that
- 3:48we're only a few weeks into the new year, there's
- 3:50already enough for a 2026 year in review. And
- 3:52we're gonna cheat a little bit. Christine and
- 3:55Peter are gonna slip in a couple of the new cases,
- 3:58but I'll go through just a few of the key AI
- 4:02cases that were decided last year. Most of them
- 4:07are still ongoing. We got three federal court
- 4:10rulings on fair use in the training context.
- 4:13There's one historic settlement and then a couple
- 4:16cases that remind us that not every legal issue
- 4:20involving AI is a copyright issue. So the first
- 4:24case is on training and actually on this issue,
- 4:29the courts are split on whether training AI on
- 4:34copyrighted works is fair use and How you got
- 4:38the works matters, maybe, depending upon which
- 4:41judge you have. So let me start with Thomson
- 4:45Reuters versus Ross Intelligence. This is the
- 4:49first case where a court rejected a fair use
- 4:53defense in the context of AI training. Ross built
- 4:57a legal research tool to compete with Westlaw.
- 5:00It used Westlaw's headnotes to train the system.
- 5:04And the procedural history of this one is kind
- 5:08of wild. So back in 2023, Judge Beavis denied
- 5:13summary judgment, set the case for trial, and
- 5:17literally just a couple of days before trial
- 5:20was set to begin in August of 2024, he withdrew
- 5:24his opinion. Last February, he came back with
- 5:28a new ruling, this time granting summary judgment
- 5:30for the plaintiff. And there were two issues.
- 5:34The first one was whether Westlaw headnotes are
- 5:37even copyrightable in the first place, including
- 5:39headnotes that were just verbatim quotes from
- 5:42judicial opinions, which of course themselves
- 5:45aren't protectable. He said yes, and his reasoning
- 5:48was that the editorial expression in selecting
- 5:52which words to quote cleared the originality
- 5:55threshold. And so he compared headnote writers
- 5:58to sculptors who choose what to cut away what
- 6:01to leave in place. The analogy is questionable.
- 6:05I think that there's a fundamental difference
- 6:08between sculptors that have virtually unlimited
- 6:12expressive choices and headnote writers whose
- 6:15job it is to faithfully convey what a court held
- 6:19as opposed to being creative. So it'll be interesting
- 6:23to see whether that aspect of the case holds
- 6:26up on appeal. It is up now at the Third Circuit
- 6:30via an interlocutory appeal. On the fair use
- 6:34issue, which is the one that most people are
- 6:37focused on, the court ruled for Thomson Reuters,
- 6:40found that Ross's use was commercial, non -transformative,
- 6:44and aimed at building a direct competitor. The
- 6:49caveat here is that As Judge Bevis emphasized,
- 6:53this is not generative AI. So the ROS tool does
- 6:56not create new content. It essentially just retrieves
- 7:00existing judicial opinions. Court said generative
- 7:03AI may be different. So bottom line is that Thomson
- 7:07Reuters, it's an important case, but it may not
- 7:09travel well. And as I said, it's up on appeal
- 7:12to the Third Circuit. Getting to generative AI,
- 7:16we have Barts versus Anthropic, where Judge Alsup
- 7:20found that Anthropic's training on lawfully purchased
- 7:24books was quintessentially transformative. But
- 7:27where Anthropic ran into trouble was downloading
- 7:31over seven million books from shadow libraries
- 7:34and keeping them in a centralized repository.
- 7:38So that, the judge found, was a separate act
- 7:40of infringement. found that maintaining a library
- 7:44of pirated books was not fair use. And so that
- 7:48distinction between the training and how you
- 7:51got the training is what really created the massive
- 7:54exposure in that case. There were statutory damages
- 8:00theoretically of up to 150 ,000 per work with
- 8:05exposure potentially in the tens of billions
- 8:07of dollars and Anthropic ended up settling for
- 8:121 .5 billion, which was the largest copyright
- 8:14settlement in US history. So the expensive lesson
- 8:19here is that fair use might protect the training,
- 8:22but it won't launder the piracy. That's one court.
- 8:26Two days after Barts came out, Judge Chabria,
- 8:31same district, Northern District of California,
- 8:34he reached a similar bottom line. Training is
- 8:36fair use. But he got there differently. So unlike
- 8:40Judge Alsup, he did not carve out the piracy
- 8:43issue. He treated the whole thing, downloading
- 8:47from shadow libraries, building the training
- 8:49set, the intermediate copying piece. All that
- 8:53was a single transformative process. So under
- 8:58Qadri, fair use potentially covers the entire
- 9:01pipeline, including the piracy. What keeps content
- 9:07owners in the game in this case is Judge Chabria
- 9:11warning that a market dilution theory could have
- 9:14changed the calculus and could change the calculus
- 9:16in future cases if the plaintiffs can show that
- 9:19AI generated works are flooding the market and
- 9:22competing with the originals then even highly
- 9:25transformative training might not be fair use.
- 9:28The problem according to Chabria was that the
- 9:31authors didn't put on that evidence what he said
- 9:34was a potentially winning argument. To be fair
- 9:37for the plaintiff's lawyers, it is an argument
- 9:41that no court has ever accepted. It is an entirely
- 9:46untested theory that the judge spent 30 or 40
- 9:51pages in dicta talking about. and potentially
- 9:55providing a roadmap for future cases, but it
- 9:58really remains to be seen whether that is viable.
- 10:02And I'll be interested to see what Christine
- 10:05and Peter have to say about that. But the takeaway
- 10:07from cadre is that it does not bless all training.
- 10:11It blesses training with a record that does not
- 10:14show harm. And the last note I'll say about cadre
- 10:18is that He pushed back on an analogy that Judge
- 10:22Alsop made that training AI is like teaching
- 10:25children or children learning how to write. And
- 10:30he said, when it comes to market effects, using
- 10:33books to teach children to write is not remotely
- 10:36like using books to create a product that a single
- 10:39individual could employ to create countless competing
- 10:42works with a minuscule fraction of the time and
- 10:46creativity it would otherwise take. So I'm going
- 10:49to move now quickly to the output cases and Concord
- 10:54Music versus Anthropic. That deals with some
- 10:59interesting secondary liability theories that
- 11:01may come into play when models are capable of
- 11:04reproducing protected content. So here music
- 11:07publishers allege that Claude outputs nearly
- 11:10word -for -word copies of copyrighted lyrics
- 11:14when prompted. And after a few early wins for
- 11:17Anthropix, the publishers amended their complaint.
- 11:20And in October of last year, the court denied
- 11:23Anthropix's motion to dismiss the amended secondary
- 11:27infringement in DMCA claims. And the key issue
- 11:32was knowledge with respect to contributory infringement.
- 11:36And because Anthropix had built guardrails to
- 11:39prevent Claude from outputting lyrics, that cut
- 11:43both ways. So if you're scanning for infringing
- 11:45outputs and you're blocking them, you arguably
- 11:48know infringement is happening. And so the court
- 11:50found that that was enough to plead actual knowledge
- 11:53at the pleading stage. And since then, Anthropic
- 11:57has cut a deal with the publisher to keep those
- 12:00guardrails in place for existing and future Claude
- 12:04models with the court stepping in if there are
- 12:08disputes. There's also a DMCA claim for stripping
- 12:11copyright management information, things like
- 12:14author names and notices out. And they, publishers
- 12:18allege that Anthropic used a text extraction
- 12:21method that removed all that metadata. And the
- 12:25court found that that theory, there was enough
- 12:28to plead intent and allowed that to go forward.
- 12:31So that case is going forward. Dow Jones versus
- 12:35perplexity is about rag retrieval augmented generation.
- 12:41Perplexity is self -avowed answer engine. It
- 12:46has an index of content from different sources
- 12:50like the Wall Street Journal and the New York
- 12:52Post. And the publishers allege infringement
- 12:56at two points, both the copying of the articles
- 12:58into the database and then outputting these verbatim
- 13:02chunks, they say, of copyrighted content. And
- 13:06here, the market harm theory is pretty straightforward
- 13:09because if you use perplexity, you get the information
- 13:12without having to visit the paywalled sites.
- 13:16And the idea is that if your product delivers
- 13:18the substance of an article so that users don't
- 13:21need to click the links, the publishers say that's
- 13:25substitution. There's also a Lanham Act angle
- 13:28because perplexity, as many LLMs do, sometimes
- 13:34hallucinates, attributes made up information
- 13:36to their publications using their trademarks.
- 13:40And the court found that that stated a false
- 13:42designation of origin claim. And finally, Lerman
- 13:47versus Lovo. That is a case that illustrates
- 13:51the limits of federal law for AI -generated content.
- 13:55And this was a case involving voice actors who
- 13:58discovered that this tool, Lovo, had cloned their
- 14:02voices. They essentially gave up recordings of
- 14:08their voices under false pretenses. These guys
- 14:10signed up for Fiverr, were told that the recordings
- 14:14would be used only for internal academic research
- 14:17and then later found them marketed as AI products.
- 14:21And the federal claims here largely failed. On
- 14:25copyright, the problem was that the Copyright
- 14:28Act protects recordings, not voices. So imitating
- 14:32how somebody sounds, even with AI, is not copying
- 14:36a fixed work. This has to do with this, if you
- 14:40look at section 114 of the Copyright Act, imitation
- 14:43as opposed to actual duplication of a recording.
- 14:48The Lanham Act claims also failed because the
- 14:51voice was not being used as a trademark to identify
- 14:54a source. It was the product itself. But the
- 14:57plaintiffs did get some traction under state
- 15:00law. the New York right of publicity statute,
- 15:02breach of contract, and consumer protection claims
- 15:05all survived. So the takeaway here is that federal
- 15:09IP law, not particularly well suited for voice
- 15:12cloning, but state of right publicity law, at
- 15:16least until there's a potential federal analog,
- 15:20could provide a stop gap. In 2026, look for the
- 15:27Third Circuit's decision in Ross potentially,
- 15:30which would be the first appellate word on AI
- 15:32training fair use, and then whether other courts
- 15:36or whether other plaintiffs could build the market
- 15:38dilution record that Judge Chabria talked about.
- 15:43So that is AI in a nutshell. Thanks, Aaron. Christine,
- 15:49Peter, did you guys have any comments you wanted
- 15:51to make on any of those cases? Anything to add?
- 15:54I just want to mention really briefly because
- 15:56I do think it's important to see that we're still
- 15:59really sort of stuck in the phase where we're
- 16:03looking at the fair use on the training as opposed
- 16:05to the output and whether there's infringement
- 16:07that's occurring. There's really not any cases
- 16:10that really are addressing that situation yet.
- 16:13But on the fair use side of things, what's interesting
- 16:16is this market dilution because The first factor
- 16:20of fair use, the transformative factor, has always
- 16:23been given, you know, such an important, and
- 16:25should be, you know, focus. But then the fourth
- 16:28factor is somewhat got lost in the sauce over
- 16:30the years, I think, and now it's coming more
- 16:33centralized to focus, but in a different way,
- 16:36potentially. And the Copyright Office had mentioned
- 16:38this theory, a potential theory about market
- 16:41dilution. So it's an interesting. new way of
- 16:45looking at the fourth factor and maybe giving
- 16:47it some more power. My only thought was that
- 16:55Aaron's initial point about how everything's
- 16:57changing and he's got enough to talk about already
- 17:00in 2026. I'm really looking forward to where
- 17:02it goes next because it just seems so all in
- 17:05flux. Absolutely. That's what's going to happen
- 17:09next. Christine, you want to start us off on
- 17:14the copyright, substantial similarity cases,
- 17:16please? That'd be great. Yeah. Yes. And again,
- 17:18thank you to the association and thank you Pierre
- 17:21and Loeb for giving us these summaries. I'm focusing
- 17:26on, if you're looking at the materials, four
- 17:29cases under six, which is the substantial similarity
- 17:33section. I'm looking at 6 .4, 6 .6, 6 .7 and
- 17:386 .10. And probably in that order because that
- 17:42is actually chronological. And looking at the
- 17:46substantial similarity and how the courts have
- 17:49handled that concept, you know, going and looking
- 17:52at this from the big picture, everyone is well
- 17:55aware of how things have developed over the years
- 17:59with respect to the concept of protectability,
- 18:03musical building blocks, protectability, not
- 18:05just in music cases, but generally. And it's
- 18:09been evolving. you know, with some seminal cases,
- 18:12there was a lot, you know, talker after blurred
- 18:14lines, then some cases came down, particularly
- 18:17in the Ninth Circuit that dealt with this issue
- 18:19of protectability, up to the Ninth Circuit, Skidmore,
- 18:24Peter's case for Zeppelin, the Dark Horse case,
- 18:28Gray versus Hudson that we handled. And in the
- 18:32Second Circuit, we had the Ed Sheer case. So
- 18:35you've got this movement forward on courts looking
- 18:40at, I think more carefully in that space, what
- 18:43is protectable expression versus what is unprotectable
- 18:48and can't be monopolized by the plaintiffs. In
- 18:51the theories that have been developing in these
- 18:54cases, you start looking at a focus on selection
- 18:58and arrangement. The first case, the larval case,
- 19:03my case, which ended at the district court level
- 19:05in a summary judgment win for the defendants,
- 19:09involved the dual lipid levitating. There were
- 19:12two songs that the plaintiffs claimed were infringed
- 19:15by levitating. One that was authored by the plaintiff,
- 19:19plaintiffs and the other were sort of bought
- 19:20in a litigation where they own the copyright.
- 19:23And both of those two plaintiff cases involved
- 19:26a descending, ultimately admitted, 20 note scale
- 19:31progression, five groupings of 16th notes in
- 19:35a descending minor scale, different B minor and
- 19:39levitating and D minor and the others. And what
- 19:41was important here is getting ultimately and
- 19:45winning summary judgment on that, a recognition
- 19:47not just by the court, but by virtue of the plaintiff's
- 19:51experts not being able to really... get away
- 19:55from the fact that with this really, even though
- 19:58it's a lot of notes, it's a scale. And it's a
- 20:01scale that simply progressed down. And so the
- 20:04court said, according to the plaintiffs, their
- 20:07actionable copying distills to one descending
- 20:09scale plus one additional identical note. So
- 20:13bringing in the selection and arrangement concept
- 20:15that had been adopted in Sheeran and I think
- 20:19fleshed out more from. the Ninth Circuit's original
- 20:22Satava case was that that's not enough. Two elements
- 20:26is not gonna make a selection and arrangement.
- 20:29It's not sufficiently numerous or original enough
- 20:32to constitute a selection and arrangement that's
- 20:36protectable expression. And so that was the result
- 20:38in that case. And I think the next three cases
- 20:44coming after that, not reviewing that at all,
- 20:48but it come out of a Ninth Circuit And other
- 20:51than the last one, which is not a music case,
- 20:54and I think that's an important distinction,
- 20:57don't go in the way of, as a matter of law, there's...
- 21:04No protectable selection and arrangement. So
- 21:06the first one Sound Color versus Sam Smith, Ninth
- 21:09Circuit 429, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
- 21:14court grant of summary judgment that there was
- 21:16no substantial similarity as a matter of law
- 21:19under the extrinsic test, which I'm presuming
- 21:20everyone knows what that is. And there was two
- 21:24songs and the lyric was, the title was the same.
- 21:27So there was a lyric commonality. And then there
- 21:30were, you know, a number of musical. elements
- 21:34that plaintiffs claimed were common between the
- 21:37two works. And so in this particular case, the
- 21:41court sort of backed into a little bit of distinguishing
- 21:46our course and distinguishing some other cases
- 21:49and saying in this particular situation, we're
- 21:52not going to say the selection and arrangement
- 21:54as alleged is going to be unprotectable as a
- 21:57matter of law. Jury could consider. that the
- 22:01number of elements that have been placed in common
- 22:04weather and clearly unprotectable in themselves.
- 22:07So again, the selection arrangement theory has
- 22:10developed because the original attack a lot of
- 22:14the times, oh well, there's a number of elements
- 22:18and they may be all over the work, but ultimately,
- 22:22if they're not. in one particular section, you
- 22:25know, you're looking almost like a constellation.
- 22:27This is not what courts are doing really anymore.
- 22:30They're looking at when you have a focus of infringement,
- 22:33if you have unprotectable elements themselves,
- 22:36if they're arranged in a particular way, that
- 22:41essentially is the same and substantial part
- 22:43between the defendants and the plaintiffs work.
- 22:46So this is not just random similarities throughout
- 22:49the work. Call it a combination. You can't. You
- 22:51have to show that there's some thought behind
- 22:54this arrangement. So that was the outcome in
- 22:57that case. And it also rejected the thin copyright
- 23:00doctrine. It didn't want to look at that. And
- 23:02that was something that the district court had
- 23:05adopted, I think, one of the first times ever
- 23:07in a music case, in the Dark Horse case. But
- 23:10the Ninth Circuit didn't reach that issue, didn't
- 23:12have to, because it found the selection arrangement.
- 23:14In that case, was unprotectable expression. I
- 23:20guess, you know, looking how courts are now,
- 23:22you know, somewhat struggling with or trying
- 23:25to understand how to best apply the selection
- 23:29and arrangement doctrine in a music case. And
- 23:32the next one, which is also out of the Ninth
- 23:36Circuit in August, Ambrosetti versus Oregon Catholic
- 23:40Press, this was a niche music case in the sense
- 23:44that both of the parties came out of a Christian
- 23:47liturgical background. So court focused a lot
- 23:50on access issues. I'm not going to talk about
- 23:52that too much, but ultimately the reason why
- 23:56it reversed the district court grant of summary
- 24:00judgment was because it didn't agree with the
- 24:03access and the striking similarity conclusions
- 24:06that the district court had made. So it found
- 24:08that the case could proceed. And again, looking
- 24:12at, in this case, there were 23 similarities
- 24:15that were highlighted throughout the work by
- 24:18the plaintiff's expert. And this was a situation
- 24:22where the court was, again, looking to find whether
- 24:26or not under the selection and arrangement doctrine,
- 24:29there was sufficient grounds to throw it out.
- 24:31And I think there's some meaningful discussion
- 24:33in that. So let me just pull that case out. Yeah.
- 24:50While defendants would have us break down the
- 24:52works into pitch sequences, rhythms, and metrical
- 24:55placements and analyze each element alone, doing
- 24:58so would be improper. Now, this is where it ultimately
- 25:01gets confusing, because in the extrinsic test,
- 25:04you're supposed to be isolating the elements
- 25:07to determine whether or not there's substantial
- 25:09similarity in protectable expressions. So you've
- 25:11got to first understand that with each one. And
- 25:14then, if you're now at the selection and arrangement
- 25:16concept, OK. you could have a selection arrangement
- 25:20of protectable and unprotectable, but oftentimes
- 25:22it boils down to just a selection arrangement
- 25:25of unprotectable. And now you are looking at
- 25:28whether or not those unprotectable elements have
- 25:32any role any longer in a filtering process. And
- 25:36this is where the Sam Smith case said, They're
- 25:39two distinct concepts. We're not going to look
- 25:41at, you know, filtering any longer when you're
- 25:45dealing with selection and arrangement. I'm going
- 25:46to talk about the next case in the Ninth Circuit.
- 25:48You can see there's some tension there, but in
- 25:51a non -music case. because it's courts in the
- 25:53Ninth Circuit and the Yanay Top Gun case said,
- 25:56they're not distinct concepts, filtering and
- 25:58selection and arrangement. Because the whole
- 26:00concept of all of this is to get to figure out
- 26:03whether or not what's being sued over is sufficiently
- 26:06protectable expression. And it's literally a
- 26:10new way of highlighting how a combination, what
- 26:15are the contours of this combination. What does
- 26:18a plaintiff have to do to prove that, in fact,
- 26:22the combination itself is protectable, whether
- 26:25everything inside of it is not? Prior art is
- 26:28relevant still, obviously, on that, looking to
- 26:30see whether or not there are other works that
- 26:33relate. And I think in the Ambrosetti case, one
- 26:36of the challenges there was because there were
- 26:38so many similarities, there was not an ability
- 26:42to find compelling prior art. So in that case,
- 26:48we see that one moving forward, and no summary
- 26:52judgment. Now, in the last case that I'm gonna
- 26:55talk about on this topic, which is, as I think
- 26:58Aaron said, coming into 2026, it's January 2,
- 27:022026, the Yanne versus Paramount Pictures case,
- 27:07and again, up to the Ninth Circuit, and here,
- 27:10summary judgment was granted below and now it's
- 27:13affirmed and this involved a case with a plaintiff
- 27:16who had written an article about Top Gun Navy
- 27:20fighters and this article had a lot of discussion
- 27:24about you know particular fighters and and how
- 27:27they Handled matters and so they brought a suit
- 27:30against Paramount and others claiming that Top
- 27:34Gun Maverick the movie infringed the article
- 27:37and in this case Again, because it's not a music
- 27:42case and we're dealing with essentially a selection
- 27:46arrangement analysis, we're looking at a different
- 27:49approach because you've got facts in the article
- 27:53that the court heavily focused on. We're looking
- 27:56at a situation now where we're looking at not
- 27:59just an expressive work, but expressive work
- 28:02that contains certain facts. So if the facts
- 28:04in the article are parallel to some extent in
- 28:08the movie, That's not going to help you play,
- 28:10too. And you also have a different analysis with
- 28:15literary works, you know, for the extrinsic test.
- 28:19For literary works, the test focuses on articulable
- 28:22similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue,
- 28:25mood, setting, pace, character, and sequences
- 28:27of events in the two works. So you've got only
- 28:29certain specific areas that can be looked at.
- 28:33And so the court went through its analysis, it
- 28:34went through the plot, it went through the characters,
- 28:37the dialogue, and it literally came to the conclusion
- 28:39that no, we cannot provide the plaintiff with
- 28:44assistance here because there is no similarity
- 28:47in the overall expression individually or as
- 28:53a matter of accommodation. Here, the court also
- 28:56excluded the plaintiff's expert because it didn't
- 28:58filter out the unprotectable elements. And that
- 29:01is an interesting thing because in some of the
- 29:03music cases, it goes both ways. Sometimes they
- 29:05get excluded, sometimes they don't. But again,
- 29:10in the selection and arrangement issue now that's
- 29:13the focus of many music cases, Is it going to
- 29:17be something where there's going to be any kind
- 29:20of relationship to the unprotectable elements
- 29:24and the combination in the nature of a thin copyright
- 29:27perhaps or in the nature of they're still relevant
- 29:29because you don't want to block and have monopolies
- 29:32on creative expression? So when you're dealing
- 29:34with a combination of unprotectable expressions,
- 29:38arguably you're ready below the scale because
- 29:40you don't have protectable expression. in the
- 29:45interior part of this combination. So that's
- 29:48why the Sianet case, when it turned around and
- 29:51it said that filtering and selection and arrangement
- 29:56are not distinct concepts, truly distinct tests,
- 30:03they're not. They are looking to determine whether
- 30:06the similar elements are protectable or unprotectable.
- 30:09I would submit that there's some relevance still
- 30:11to the lower level of protectability in the contours
- 30:16of the combination that has relevance, whether
- 30:18it's filtered out or not, it's still a relevant
- 30:21potential thing to be looking at in the hierarchy
- 30:26of protectability and the strength of the protection
- 30:29of the particular passage. And because music
- 30:32cases have always been second class citizens
- 30:34in the terms of getting that music building block
- 30:38understood, I think there's potentially even
- 30:41more relevance there. Great. Thanks, Christine.
- 30:45Aaron, Peter, any comments on that before we
- 30:47move on to Biani? I think just real quick, the
- 30:51cases that Christine talked about really do highlight
- 30:54the importance of expert testimony, getting the
- 30:58right experts, having them say the right things.
- 31:00This is something that Judge Wardlaw has reversed
- 31:03cases in the central district that have decided
- 31:07these substantial similarity cases on the pleading
- 31:09stage, saying that experts are needed. What's
- 31:12interesting in the Top Gun case is that Paramount's
- 31:16expert was actually a former Top Gun instructor,
- 31:21somebody who was a commanding officer who basically
- 31:23opined that the article accurately described
- 31:27the Top Gun program, the court found all that
- 31:30helpful in doing the filtering. So it's, you
- 31:33know, contrast that to the other expert who didn't
- 31:36do the filtering. But yeah, ultimately, I think
- 31:40this trying to figure out where we draw the lines
- 31:45with respect to selection arrangement filtering.
- 31:48And, you know, Peter, we'll talk a little bit
- 31:49about that in the context of the Kat Von D case,
- 31:55I think, as well. And I think that Aaron's comment
- 32:00really leads into the next case that we're going
- 32:03to talk about, which is Bianni versus Showtime.
- 32:05Because of this, what's been going on in the
- 32:09Ninth Circuit, where you have these unpublished
- 32:11decisions that either affirm a 12b6 dismissal
- 32:15at the pleading level of a copyright infringement
- 32:17case, or the Ninth Circuit reverses them. And
- 32:20for example, the Judge Wardlaw unpublished opinions
- 32:24where they reversed because there was no expert
- 32:26available at a 12b6. In Biondi versus Showtime,
- 32:31the plaintiff sued over the Showtime show Penny
- 32:35Dreadful claiming copyright infringement. The
- 32:38plaintiff was a member of a Role Playing Forum
- 32:41set in Victorian times in London and claimed
- 32:46that three of the characters in the Penny Dreadful
- 32:49television series had been copied from her postings
- 32:53on the forum. The interesting part and I think
- 32:57very important part about this case is it was
- 33:00dismissed at the pleading level. Now there's
- 33:02a long history going back to I think a map case
- 33:05in the 1940s in the Ninth Circuit that if the
- 33:08works are in front of the court at the pleading
- 33:10level it can compare them. That really kind of
- 33:14like doesn't really work often if at all in music
- 33:17cases because music is unique but this wasn't
- 33:21a music case and the district judge compared
- 33:23the works and concluded well first of all concluded
- 33:27that the plaintiff had failed to prove access
- 33:29and Because the plaintiff couldn't prove access
- 33:33to establish an inference of copying, the plaintiff
- 33:35alleged striking similarity. The district court
- 33:38found as a matter of law that the words were
- 33:40not strikingly similar. And the district court
- 33:42went on to say that under the extrinsic test,
- 33:45where you have dissection and objective analysis,
- 33:49that it didn't pass muster either. Importantly,
- 33:53the Ninth Circuit, and on either side that you're
- 33:56on, in terms of guidance, importantly, the Ninth
- 33:58Circuit actually affirmed a 12b6 dismissal of
- 34:03a copyright infringement case without any experts.
- 34:09The Ninth Circuit agreed that the works were
- 34:11not strikingly similar. Strikingly similar requires
- 34:14that they be so similar that copying is the only
- 34:19possible explanation, in effect. And the court
- 34:22looked at the differences in the works and said,
- 34:24well, that doesn't pass muster there. The court
- 34:27then went on on the issue of substantial similarity
- 34:31to protected expression. Without any expert analysis,
- 34:34it was comfortable going through, pointing out
- 34:36the differences, and concluding that the characters
- 34:40were not substantially similar. So it is, you
- 34:44know, it may not be the end because technically
- 34:48the substantial similarity conclusion may be
- 34:51dictus since the plaintiff had already lost on
- 34:53an inability to plead copying. But it is a sign
- 34:57that there are at least some judges who are willing
- 35:00to, in a published decision, say if the court
- 35:03has the works in front of it, then it can decide
- 35:07whether they're substantially similar or not
- 35:09under the extrinsic test at the pleading level.
- 35:13Otherwise, you have to go through the discovery,
- 35:15summary judgment, and everything else. The next
- 35:19case I was going to talk about is Eden Film Productions
- 35:22versus Lockjaw. And that was a claim against
- 35:25the television show Yellow Jackets. The plaintiff
- 35:28had a movie about a US men's soccer team that
- 35:31crashes on a deserted island after a match. The
- 35:35Yellow Jackets television series involves a girls
- 35:39soccer team that crashes in the Canadian wilderness
- 35:42on the way to a match. It also has two separate
- 35:48timelines, the past and the present. and the
- 35:50plaintiff limited their claim to the one that
- 35:52was applicable to the claim similarities. Once
- 35:56again, now this is a district court decision,
- 35:59but the motion to dismiss was granted under the
- 36:02extrinsic test. The analysis going back to Shaw
- 36:07versus Lindheim in this circuit of comparing
- 36:10plot characters and all that, it found some of
- 36:15the similarities were just too abstract. One
- 36:18example was that in Yellow Jacket's, a character
- 36:23escapes to a cave after setting fire to something.
- 36:26And in the plaintiff's movie, a character commits
- 36:30suicide. And the plaintiff argued, well, they're
- 36:32both about escape. Escape from people chasing
- 36:35you and escape from life. And the court said,
- 36:37well, any similarity there is just at the abstract
- 36:40level. And we know from cases like Three Boys
- 36:43Music that the similarities have to be concrete.
- 36:47Some of the similarities weren't to court held,
- 36:50weren't even similarities at all. The plaintiff
- 36:54had argued that the movie alludes to cannibalism.
- 37:00While in Yellow Jackets, there's a discussion
- 37:02about whether to keep food from survivors and
- 37:06store the food, which hardly has anything to
- 37:08do with cannibalism. And it was just overreach
- 37:11by the plaintiff and probably didn't do themselves
- 37:13any good on it. And the other similarities were
- 37:17commonplace to the survival genre. Now that,
- 37:20to me, is interesting. And I don't know the record
- 37:22in the case. But there was no expert to testify
- 37:26as to what the survival genre was. I think the
- 37:29kinds of things that were described, I think
- 37:32any person, any reasonable person, would agree
- 37:35that they're commonplace to a survival thriller.
- 37:39One example was that the plaintiff claimed, well,
- 37:44Both shows demonstrate that people are capable
- 37:49of violence when they're trying to survive. And
- 37:52in the 12b6 standard, the case law tells us that
- 37:57plausibility talks about what is in the normal
- 38:00experience of people and the judge and all that
- 38:02kind of stuff. And I think you don't need an
- 38:04expert to conclude that the fact that there's
- 38:09violence in a survival thriller is just common
- 38:12to survival. thriller genres. But it is, again,
- 38:16interesting because it is a 12b6 dismissal. The
- 38:21next case is actually different from all of this.
- 38:24It's a tattoo case, so it's an image case. It's
- 38:27Sedlik versus von Drockenberg, and the defendant
- 38:33is a tattooist, a very well -known one apparently,
- 38:36and was sued because she did a tattoo on someone
- 38:40that was based on a well -known photograph of
- 38:45Miles Davis. Now, I think it's fair to say, if
- 38:50you look at them, it's clear, and there's no
- 38:52dispute, that she created the tattoo based on
- 38:56the photograph. It's a little bit more complex
- 38:58than that insofar as there's no copyright in
- 39:02Miles Davis's face. Anyone can depict that, you
- 39:06know. Usually photographs, we're talking about
- 39:10similarity in pose, lighting, film speed, and
- 39:13all that kind of stuff, little of which, if anything,
- 39:16actually ended up in the tattoo. The only thing
- 39:19that really seems to stand out from the face
- 39:22is Miles Davis is depicted putting his finger
- 39:25on his lips as if to say shush or something,
- 39:28and that's in both, but that's hard to distinguish
- 39:32between the idea of putting your finger to your
- 39:34lips and saying shush and the expression of it.
- 39:36So it's actually a fairly complicated kind of
- 39:39analysis. It did go to trial. And the defendant
- 39:46won. Now, Christine referred to the extrinsic
- 39:50test. That's the objective test. The intrinsic
- 39:53test or the subjective test is the one that is
- 39:57reserved for the jury. And we've got that statement
- 40:01in 40 plus years, I think, of case law that the
- 40:05intrinsic test is reserved for the jury and the
- 40:09judge can't decide it unless he's sitting as
- 40:12a fact finder, I suppose. But the panel had a
- 40:16real problem with this because the jury decided
- 40:18that there was no similarity under the intrinsic
- 40:22test when they're basically identical. And the
- 40:26panel was kind of flummoxed by it if you watched
- 40:29the whole argument. They say, what do we do?
- 40:31I mean, this is reserved for the jury and they
- 40:34said something that makes absolutely no sense
- 40:35to us because they're basically the same image.
- 40:38And what they ended up doing was the panel affirmed
- 40:45on the grounds that the jury had found it. And
- 40:48there was a fair use issue as well on some drawings
- 40:51that were used in the tattoo process. But there
- 40:55was two concurrences. And together, they argue
- 41:00that we should abandon the intrinsic test in
- 41:02the Ninth Circuit. That is a very interesting,
- 41:06to put it mildly, proposition. It would change
- 41:10law going back to the 1980s, maybe even earlier.
- 41:15And I'm not going to tell you what I think, because
- 41:18I'm still working through it. I think the intrinsic
- 41:21test, the idea of subjective similarity has some
- 41:24appeal. I know Aaron has written and I thought
- 41:27it was a very thoughtful observation on his blog,
- 41:30that what this really comes down to is who does
- 41:33the jury believe when it comes down to experts?
- 41:36And sorry, Aaron, if I muffed that. But basically,
- 41:39if you get testimony as to what the objective
- 41:42similarities are, does that necessarily mean
- 41:46that the plaintiff wins or loses? If they're
- 41:48objectively similar, but maybe not in total concept
- 41:52and feel, which the The concurrences point out
- 41:56aren't copyrightable elements, you know, and
- 42:00so it's it's just an interesting decision because
- 42:02it opens the door to a discussion about whether
- 42:05the intrinsic test should even exist You know
- 42:09what's really important about it though Peter
- 42:10and I think it is interesting because second
- 42:12circuit play listener test total concept and
- 42:15fielding set the ninth circuit thinks they have
- 42:17this the problem themselves all by themselves
- 42:19on that it's not they're very similar right and
- 42:22in the in the second circuit you also have the
- 42:25you know the objective test it's not called the
- 42:28extrinsic test was pro similarities probative
- 42:30of copying ultimately and you know that is where
- 42:34the gatekeeping function is supposed to happen
- 42:36so if you get past the extrinsic test as a planet
- 42:40and then what you have protectable expression
- 42:43supposedly right and then the fact finder is
- 42:47supposed to determine whether it's enough of
- 42:49protectable expression to rise to the level of
- 42:51improper taking so i mean to me it's nothing
- 42:53really how else would one do it um because you
- 42:57have to look at them both in tandem the extrinsic
- 43:00and the intrinsic well what do you do if you've
- 43:03got two songs that objectively are the same but
- 43:06one has a very slow tempo, one has a very upbeat
- 43:09tempo, so the feel of it is, the subjective feel
- 43:13of it is different. So they got past the extrinsic
- 43:15test, the plaintiff? They get past the extrinsic
- 43:18test. They get past it. And the defendant argues,
- 43:21but the feel is completely different. Can you
- 43:24lose just on tempo? I mean, but you don't have
- 43:28to answer that. You know what, here's the question
- 43:31in my mind, right? Ultimately, there's the question
- 43:34of what is the relevance of tempo to all of this?
- 43:37Is that in the extrinsic test or the intrinsic
- 43:40test? Because a lot of people try to fit it in
- 43:41the extrinsic test on the plaintiff too. I'm
- 43:47sure you know this, but this whole idea in the
- 43:49Ninth Circuit about not wanting judges to decide
- 43:52the intrinsic or subjective similarity goes back
- 43:56to, I think, an Oliver Wendell Holmes opinion
- 43:59where he said that judges shouldn't be the ones
- 44:01who decide things like, you know, Music pop culture,
- 44:04you know similarity whatever that their training
- 44:07doesn't give them that expertise But and and
- 44:10it's always interesting to me I see these second
- 44:12circuit decision and there was a district court
- 44:14decision in a music case within the last couple
- 44:16of months Where the judge just said I listened
- 44:18to him. They don't sound similar to me. Yeah,
- 44:20I've had one of those happen at a 12b6 motion
- 44:25where the court listened to the two songs and
- 44:27threw it out Because there's no reasonable jury
- 44:29a person could have heard in Anything, you know
- 44:34that and even if they're in the same genre, it
- 44:36doesn't matter, you know different different
- 44:38song So they can do it. I mean, it's just rare.
- 44:41Yeah But I think what's even more rare than having
- 44:49a judge say that no reasonable juror could find
- 44:52these to be similar is a jury saying they're
- 44:56not similar and then a judge Taking that away
- 44:59or reversing it which is where? I think these
- 45:02judges were felt hamstrung, and we'll see whether
- 45:06Kev Vondee goes up and bonk, and the total concept
- 45:12and feel is revisited by the Ninth Circuit as
- 45:15a whole. But me. Yeah. Aaron, why don't we move
- 45:19on? Tell us about the Atticus case. Yeah, so
- 45:23this one is interesting. It involves one of my
- 45:28favorite. books, To Kill a Mockingbird, but actually
- 45:31the adaptation, the stage adaptation. So in 1969,
- 45:38Harper Lee granted Dramatic Publishing the exclusive
- 45:42license, right to license stock and amateur productions
- 45:46of her novel. And Dramatics President Christopher
- 45:49Sergal wrote a stage adaptation. And this is
- 45:55the version that has been used you know, for
- 45:58generations of high schools who put on to kill
- 46:03a mockingbird. It's been used for over 50 years.
- 46:08But in 2011, Harper Lee, you know, while she's
- 46:11still alive, exercised her termination right
- 46:14under 304C to recapture the copyright, to terminate
- 46:19the grant to dramatic effective 2016. And after
- 46:25the termination, her estate cut a new deal with
- 46:30Scott Rudin and Aaron Sorkin to develop a new
- 46:34version, which opened on Broadway in 2018, became
- 46:39a really big hit. So where it gets interesting
- 46:45is that Atticus LLC, the company that held the
- 46:48rights to the Sorkin play, wanted to then license
- 46:51that version for stock in amateur productions
- 46:55like high school um plays and this is of course
- 46:59the same market that dramatic had dominated for
- 47:02for decades and dramatic said you can't do that
- 47:06we have a derivative works exception under 304c
- 47:10and because our right was exclusive that exclusivity
- 47:15survived termination under the derivative works
- 47:18exception um so For those who may not be familiar,
- 47:25the derivative works exception says that after
- 47:27termination, the owner of a derivative work can
- 47:30keep exploiting it, quote, under the terms of
- 47:33the grant. So dramatic's position was that the
- 47:37terms of the grant included exclusivity, including
- 47:41the 1969 promise that Lee made to uh, dramatic
- 47:47that the circle play would be the only one that
- 47:50was licensed for those amateur productions. So
- 47:53they argued that they can block competing stage
- 47:56versions, uh, forever. So creative argument,
- 48:01but ultimately, um, not a good one and shot down,
- 48:05um, correctly in my opinion by the second circuit
- 48:09court held that the derivative works exception
- 48:11does of course let dramatic keep licensing the
- 48:15servo play, but it does not let dramatic fence
- 48:18out new adaptations. The right to authorize new
- 48:22derivative works is part of the copyright in
- 48:24the underlying novel. And that reverted to Lee.
- 48:28So in essence, dramatic was conflating the rights
- 48:31that it had in the play with Lee's rights in
- 48:35To Kill a Mockingbird itself. And the upshot
- 48:38of the theory was that if These guys were right
- 48:42termination rights would be meaningless because
- 48:44an author could never authorize a new adaptation
- 48:46if the original grantees License had been exactly
- 48:50so today both can be licensed for stock and amateur
- 48:54The circle play lives on under the derivative
- 48:56works exception, but it no longer has the market
- 48:59to itself Interesting case. I think yeah, I agree
- 49:03with you and I think the Second Circuit got it
- 49:04right and and you know as I was reading it The
- 49:08word absurd came out of my mouth before the before
- 49:11I read it in the court's own decision that it
- 49:13would just be an absurdity I mean it would have
- 49:15I think the allowing the exclusive rights to
- 49:17remain With the dramatic it essentially would
- 49:20have just gutted the whole termination and the
- 49:23whole purpose of the termination So I yeah, I
- 49:25think I think they got it right. It was a good
- 49:27decision Peter why don't you tell us about the
- 49:32the Enos versus Walt Disney case? Absolutely
- 49:36There, the plaintiff had, there were actually
- 49:41multiple plaintiffs, and one of them had prepared
- 49:44a whole bunch of musical compositions. They developed
- 49:48this sort of show that they would put on, and
- 49:52in the show, and in books and other things, they
- 49:56included a blue -eyed turtle. with a ukulele.
- 50:01And they had a relationship with Disney, and
- 50:03so access wasn't really an issue. And then Disney,
- 50:07in Hawaii at one of its resorts, started using
- 50:10a blue -eyed turtle with a ukulele. So, you know,
- 50:14understandably the district court denied Disney's
- 50:17motion to dismiss since, you know, the characters
- 50:22were pretty much, you know, they were both blue
- 50:25-eyed turtles with a ukulele. The interesting
- 50:28thing I thought was that discovery turned up
- 50:31that Disney had actually come up with artwork
- 50:35on its own for a turtle with a ukulele, not with
- 50:40blue eyes, but a turtle with a ukulele. And it
- 50:45wasn't until after that that the plaintiff who
- 50:49had a turtle with blue eyes added a ukulele.
- 50:52So if you take the ukulele out of this equation,
- 50:56The only similarity that Disney might have copied,
- 51:00in theory, was a turtle with blue eyes. And the
- 51:04district court just said, no, you can't copyright
- 51:06a turtle with blue eyes. That just doesn't work.
- 51:10The turtles themselves were both turtles, cartoonish,
- 51:15but not really clones of each other in any way.
- 51:19And so the judge granted the motion for summary
- 51:24judgment. All right, so should be creating turtles
- 51:29and other Well, you know, I didn't see the ukulele
- 51:36musical instrument Well supposed to indicate
- 51:42music, you know awareness of the turtle or something
- 51:45but I didn't really see it in the opinion But
- 51:48you know all of us who have been to Hawaii and
- 51:50I'm sure all of us have you know That's where
- 51:52ukuleles I think come from basically and there's
- 51:55turtles And so the idea of a turtle with a ukulele,
- 51:59who, by the way, in one of them, also surfs.
- 52:02But it just seemed, Christine used the phrase
- 52:07earlier about granting a monopoly. I mean, does
- 52:09anyone really, are they entitled to monopoly
- 52:12on blue -eyed turtles? Right. No, I don't think
- 52:18so. Christine, why don't you tell us about the
- 52:21Woodland Hill case. It's a copyright access case.
- 52:25Yes, and nude photographs, which I love. So this
- 52:29is, actually, it's Peter's case. Great job getting
- 52:33it summary judgment. Oh, motion dismissed actually
- 52:36was affirmed at the Ninth Circuit level. So what
- 52:40you have here in this case is some photographs
- 52:45of a plaintiff who poses semi -nude. Lil Nas,
- 52:49the defendant, Instagram photos posted. semi
- 52:54-nude, and they're supposedly substantially similar
- 52:57to each other. Plaintiff Sue's Lil Nas, and again
- 53:04the support notes as one apparently does these
- 53:06days, quote unquote, posted on Instagram. So
- 53:10the focus in this case, and why we're talking
- 53:12about this outside of the potential similarity,
- 53:14although the court does go through all of that
- 53:16as well, and compares the photos. I'm not going
- 53:19to do that. I'm going to talk about the access
- 53:22discussion. Because if we've all noticed, the
- 53:27access cases or most of the access cases that
- 53:30we have been dealing with for decades are related
- 53:33to the brick and mortar world. So the two theories
- 53:36of access, the doctrine being providing the defendant
- 53:39with a reasonable possibility or opportunity
- 53:42to view or hear the subject plaintiff work usually
- 53:46comes down to two arguments. One, that somehow
- 53:49the defendant had an opportunity through a chain
- 53:52of events. Usually it's someone gave it to someone
- 53:55who gave it to someone or some other chain of
- 53:58events because the plaintiff doesn't have the
- 54:00second option which is widespread dissemination.
- 54:05So now that we're in the internet era and we
- 54:06have been for quite a while trying to find some
- 54:10guidance from the courts on what is sufficient
- 54:13in terms of widespread dissemination. of a plaintiff
- 54:17work that is either posted or streamed or downloaded
- 54:21on the internet is an exercise that is frustrating
- 54:25because the cases are not developing in that
- 54:28area. They will eventually because they have
- 54:32to. And in this particular case, you read the
- 54:36case because on the one hand, the plaintiff admitted
- 54:40he only had like eight to 75 likes. So he said,
- 54:43I don't have widespread dissemination. And then
- 54:45he said, OK, I have a chain of events. But then
- 54:47the court went through a whole analysis of effectively
- 54:51widespread dissemination nonetheless. And it
- 54:54is about how on the internet there's actually
- 54:58more ability. And it's easier to have access
- 55:01potentially because of algorithms and the like.
- 55:06So then there's also the flip side of that. The
- 55:09court then somehow goes too well, but it's all
- 55:11speculative because you still have some searching
- 55:14issues and you still have the issues with respect
- 55:17to proving that if there's an algorithm that
- 55:20somehow or another that particular defendant
- 55:22was given the content. So I think that the issue
- 55:27with respect to widespread dissemination on the
- 55:30internet is going to become a larger question
- 55:34mark here. The court shut it down on both theories.
- 55:36Chain of events, no. widespread dissemination,
- 55:39no. And then again, also address substantial
- 55:41similarity, but threw the case out on access
- 55:43as well. And I think in reading the discussion,
- 55:47which I encourage everyone to do, you can see
- 55:50that the court was really struggling and kind
- 55:51of going back and forth itself on whether or
- 55:55not there is, you know, posting on the internet
- 55:57and up. Alone there's plenty of cases that say
- 56:00that's not enough but but it's the dissemination
- 56:02and the likes and the streaming and the numbers
- 56:05and all of this stuff that and we had this in
- 56:08the Dark Horse case and it didn't wasn't the
- 56:10result of the decision, but we ultimately Demonstrated
- 56:14that you could have millions millions of streams
- 56:16or downloads and that's like a bucket with a
- 56:19sand at the bottom That's what that means. It's
- 56:22not a lot in this universe. So we have to look
- 56:26now. What does it mean brick and mortar? 17 ,000
- 56:29copies of a book or an album in a store, not
- 56:32enough. How does that translate to the digital
- 56:36platform world? We don't know. To me, the decision
- 56:38is very interesting because this is something
- 56:42that, of course, they're going to have to wrestle
- 56:44with, and it'll be fact -based, I'm sure. Okay.
- 56:50Peter, you want to talk about the Shelby versus
- 56:52Halicki case? This is a copyrightability. case.
- 56:55I got to mention that I still can't believe this
- 56:57dispute is still going on for so long. Back in
- 57:012005, I wrote the motion for summary judgment
- 57:05when I was still at my at my first firm, first
- 57:08law firm for on behalf of actually the company
- 57:11that Shelby had hired to make these cars, unique
- 57:15motor cars and It was the winning summer judgment
- 57:18at the time. I think I got I left the firm before
- 57:21I think the appeal. So I can't remember how that
- 57:23all went. I just had to throw that out. I saw
- 57:26this name and I'm like, this continues. This
- 57:28case just keeps going and going. It's like the
- 57:30Energizer Bunny. That's crazy. That's two decades
- 57:32later. It's still they're still fighting very
- 57:35quickly because I know we're getting close to
- 57:37the end of the time. But the defendant, Halleke,
- 57:41had the rights to a 1974 original version of
- 57:45Gone in 60 Seconds. which was remade with Nick
- 57:49Cage in 2000. And it's basically about these
- 57:53people who are challenged to steal a certain
- 57:57number of cars, 4850, in one night. And one of
- 58:01the cars in both the movie and in two other movies
- 58:05that the plaintiff, excuse me, the defendant
- 58:07had before the remake. And in the remake, one
- 58:11of the cars, a Ford Mustang, was referred to
- 58:14as Eleanor. All the cars had female names as
- 58:16codenames. And Carol, Shelby, and Halleke had
- 58:21a couple of... Well, first of all, apparently
- 58:23the defendant, Halleke, had authorized the remake
- 58:26since she owned the movie, and there wasn't a
- 58:28case over it. And she had retained or obtained
- 58:31merchandising rights on the remake, which meant,
- 58:34in theory, she could sell merchandise that was
- 58:36based on the movie. And so... She felt that Carroll
- 58:42shall be licensing by licensing Ford Mustangs
- 58:46that looked like Elinor had breached. There was
- 58:50a settlement agreement, then there was another
- 58:51breach, and then again, the litigation. This
- 58:55litigation hopefully isn't the same one that
- 58:57Pierre was on, but the principle question was
- 59:01whether Elinor is a copyrightable character.
- 59:06The copyrightability of characters has sort of
- 59:09a mixed kind of background. Learned Hand said
- 59:12it had to be the story itself. I think he referred
- 59:14to Falstaff. The Ninth Circuit, in a ruling that
- 59:18was largely thought to be protective of, I forget
- 59:23that the Sam Spade author said you can't protect
- 59:26a character, so he's having granted exclusive
- 59:28rights to one story. He couldn't be barred from
- 59:31doing another Sam Spade book or something like
- 59:33that. It came Then there was the James Bond case,
- 59:38where James Bond was held to be a protectable
- 59:39character. Then there was the Batmobile case,
- 59:42where the Batmobile was held to be a copyrightable
- 59:45character. And what the court did in the Eleanor
- 59:48case was it applied the test from the Batmobile
- 59:53case. And one of the requirements is that the
- 59:56character to be protectable must have both physical
- 59:59and conceptual qualities. For example, the Batmobile
- 1:00:03does certain things that, you know, it's well
- 1:00:05actually that was a bad example but James Bond
- 1:00:08that character has conceptual qualities such
- 1:00:11as and so a physical character like the the car
- 1:00:16would have to have some agency or personality
- 1:00:19or something some something conceptual beyond
- 1:00:21just his physical existence it would also have
- 1:00:24to and it doesn't the the eleanor car is driven
- 1:00:27and crashed and driven and crashed and that's
- 1:00:29about it It doesn't make any decisions. It doesn't
- 1:00:32have any personality. It has no conceptual qualities
- 1:00:35beyond being a Ford Mustang. And they were two
- 1:00:38different cars, Peter. The original movie had
- 1:00:41a different Ford Mustang. It was an older model.
- 1:00:44And then the Nick Cage one, it was a Shelby.
- 1:00:47So there was a differentiation there as well
- 1:00:49that it didn't necessarily denote to the same
- 1:00:52type of vehicle even. Not even the same type
- 1:00:55of vehicle, but also different coloring. including
- 1:00:59in the 2000 movie apparently. And so yes, you're
- 1:01:02absolutely right. And another requirement in
- 1:01:07the Batmobile case test was the character has
- 1:01:13to be sufficiently delineated with traits and
- 1:01:16attributes that you would recognize it anywhere
- 1:01:19as being the same. So whether it's Michael...
- 1:01:21Daniel Craig or someone else playing James Bond.
- 1:01:24You know, it's James Bond, you know, when he
- 1:01:25asked for martini and he's got a tuxedo and the
- 1:01:28same thing with the Batmobile. Picking up skirt.
- 1:01:34I didn't say that. And then and then finally
- 1:01:38it has to be especially distinctive, not a stereotypical
- 1:01:43character. And look, it's a Ford Mustang. I mean,
- 1:01:45come on. It's a beautiful car. Looks like a lot
- 1:01:48of fun, but. But it's just a car. So it didn't
- 1:01:53pass any of the three requirements. And so the
- 1:01:56court ruled that Eleanor is not a copyrightable
- 1:02:00character. Well, we're at our time. We have one
- 1:02:04case left. I don't know if, Aaron, if you want
- 1:02:06to jump through it real fast, the Santos versus
- 1:02:08Kimmel, or we could switch to questions. Yeah,
- 1:02:13maybe switch to questions. I don't know. Whatever.
- 1:02:16Let me see what we got. I think this is an AI
- 1:02:26question from Jay Doherty. How can courts possibly
- 1:02:30rule there's no potential to harm potential markets
- 1:02:36when there are so clearly evolving markets for
- 1:02:39licensing for training AI? Yeah. I mean, that
- 1:02:43certainly has been developed much more in 2025
- 1:02:50than had in 2024. In the Westlaw case, Judge
- 1:02:58Bibas did give that some credence saying that
- 1:03:08Ross intended to create a market substitute for
- 1:03:11Westlaw and did not disprove the existence of
- 1:03:15a potential market for training data, which has
- 1:03:22been licensed and is licensed in other contexts
- 1:03:26as well. I think where there's some tension is
- 1:03:29that some courts think of this as more of a circularity
- 1:03:34issue because if copyright holders could defeat
- 1:03:37fair use just by saying we would have licensed
- 1:03:40this, then it would swallow, fair use would swallow
- 1:03:43itself. So every fair use would be infringing
- 1:03:46because every use is theoretically licensable.
- 1:03:49I do think that there will be a lot more evidence
- 1:03:53coming in of the licensing market, but we do
- 1:03:57need to distinguish that from just a market dilution
- 1:04:01theory where it's not a issue of substitution
- 1:04:05so much with respect to this particular work,
- 1:04:08but rather the genre overall. Thanks, Aaron.
- 1:04:13We have another question. This is from Greg Raymer.
- 1:04:16Generally speaking, with respect to similarities,
- 1:04:19strikingly or otherwise, to what degree would
- 1:04:21you say that scenes of fare is coming into play,
- 1:04:24especially given the vast and increasing library
- 1:04:27of scenarios? Will I take it Peter or I could
- 1:04:32take it? I don't care. I defer to you Well, a
- 1:04:36sense of fair has always been a doctrine that
- 1:04:38essentially is about unprotectable expression
- 1:04:42and it's you know Not used so much in the music
- 1:04:46context more in the literary film center You
- 1:04:50know English speaking imperative models to see
- 1:04:53whether something's a sense of fair or not in
- 1:04:55the context of a music You know case we talked
- 1:04:59more or less about just unprotectable expression.
- 1:05:02And we talk more about, you know, building blocks
- 1:05:05is becoming very current because people understand
- 1:05:08cores. They understand, you know, certain things
- 1:05:11that are, you know, in lesson books that they
- 1:05:14can't monopolize. So I think it's always been
- 1:05:16there. It's just the application of it. And again,
- 1:05:20all of this really comes down to the core of
- 1:05:23this. What can someone monopolize? I would add
- 1:05:28that that To me, Sans Affaire is sort of a subset
- 1:05:32of commonplace. It has the additional element
- 1:05:35that it flows from the idea that's being depicted.
- 1:05:37And so if you have a western, there's going to
- 1:05:39be cowboys and all that kind of stuff. And musically,
- 1:05:42I think Swirsky talked about, the district judge,
- 1:05:44who was reversed, talked about how certain parts
- 1:05:48of the music, the same similarities, were actually
- 1:05:50Sans Affaire. And the kind of thing you see is
- 1:05:53like, well, if you have a musical phrase, you
- 1:05:55want to end on the tonic because otherwise it
- 1:05:57just sounds... crazy or something. You know,
- 1:05:59there are certain things that happen in music.
- 1:06:01Music is very, very complex, and there are certain
- 1:06:04things that happen, and I can see Christine's
- 1:06:07laughing. It's not so much anymore, though. That's
- 1:06:09the problem. There's so many people using very
- 1:06:12similar things and, you know, the pop music world
- 1:06:16or hip -hop music world. Things are not, you
- 1:06:18know, the level of originality, I think, in some
- 1:06:21respects. There's a lot of use of commonplace.
- 1:06:23Yeah, my point was different. My point was different
- 1:06:26that You know, you have a limited number of notes,
- 1:06:29only some of them actually work. There are things
- 1:06:32that go on in music, you know, with chords or
- 1:06:35whatever, and that just naturally flow from how
- 1:06:39the human brain works and music works. There
- 1:06:41are things that are discordant. You wouldn't
- 1:06:43do something that's discordant. And so the complexities
- 1:06:47basically limit your choices. And so things become
- 1:06:51commonplace even when we might not think. that
- 1:06:53they're commonplace. It may not be the same five
- 1:06:57notes, but it may be some, in effect, structural
- 1:06:59thing that makes them commonplace. Yes, and Dark
- 1:07:02Horse, actually, that was an issue because there
- 1:07:04was a concession that there was a natural tension
- 1:07:07to resolve down to the one, the tonic, and that's
- 1:07:11a lot. Yeah, exactly, exactly. So we have a question
- 1:07:15from Richard Jefferson. This is something actually,
- 1:07:17if we would have had time, I would have liked
- 1:07:19to touch on it. But since there's a question,
- 1:07:20might as well bring it up. Does anyone have thoughts
- 1:07:22on whether the Fifth Circuit decision in Vedder
- 1:07:24versus Resnick, affirming a global copyright
- 1:07:27termination right, will survive? We touched on
- 1:07:31this case when the lower court made the decision
- 1:07:34last year. And I don't think we thought that
- 1:07:39this would get affirmed. This is a long conversation.
- 1:07:44It is a long conversation. Do a whole panel on
- 1:07:49this. If anybody has any quick comments they
- 1:07:53want to make. I hope not. I mean, it's nuts,
- 1:07:58in my opinion. With the other dark inception
- 1:08:00rule, people are going to start writing letters
- 1:08:05saying, oh, never mind, you can't exploit there
- 1:08:07anymore. This is going to be... It's going to
- 1:08:11take a while to sort out. I mean, I think a lot
- 1:08:13of these, the termination cases, we don't see
- 1:08:16them go to court as much. I mean, I think a lot
- 1:08:20of them settle because nobody wants to split
- 1:08:22up the rights. So this could be like an atomic
- 1:08:26explosion where, you know, now, you know, there's
- 1:08:29going to be a lot more of these claims coming
- 1:08:31down the pipe. So we'll see what happens. To
- 1:08:35me, the irony is that no one thought this was
- 1:08:38the law. There isn't a circuit decision that
- 1:08:42says that what everyone thought was the obvious,
- 1:08:46that termination doesn't affect rights under
- 1:08:48foreign law. That's what the statute says. And
- 1:08:50I'm not taking a position one way or the other,
- 1:08:53but you're not going to get to the Supreme Court
- 1:08:56unless one of two things happens. One is you
- 1:08:59have a circuit conflict, which you don't have
- 1:09:02because no one thought this was the law. Or two,
- 1:09:05you get you know, an incredible amount of amicus,
- 1:09:09you know, coming in and talking about the horrors
- 1:09:13that Pierre's kind of referring to of people
- 1:09:16coming in and saying, look, I bought a catalog
- 1:09:18base. I sold a catalog, you know, based on the
- 1:09:21assumption I did or didn't have these rights.
- 1:09:24And, you know, there's going to be this disruption.
- 1:09:28Yeah. Yeah. I mean, the plaintiff in his complaint,
- 1:09:33you know, I think Himself characterized it as
- 1:09:36an admittedly novel argument and I think the
- 1:09:39reason that there's no circuit split is that
- 1:09:41nobody really had thought to make it before but
- 1:09:43I just if I just spend a Minute because I've
- 1:09:47gotten a lot, you know, obviously I have views
- 1:09:49on this you can you can read them on my blog
- 1:09:52But I have heard people say well, you know Isn't
- 1:09:55this good for creators your anti creator if you
- 1:09:58are if you are not for this case and This is
- 1:10:02really about territoriality. So if you have a
- 1:10:06situation where copyright truly arises in the
- 1:10:09country, only in the country of origin, then
- 1:10:12that would also have the converse effect where
- 1:10:14foreign works never require independent copyrights
- 1:10:18under US law at all. And so under that situation,
- 1:10:24US termination provisions would not apply, for
- 1:10:26example, to A French composer who assigns worldwide
- 1:10:31rights to a US publisher, in that situation,
- 1:10:35US law was never the source of the right under
- 1:10:38the logical implication of the Fifth Circuit's
- 1:10:41decision, which, of course, makes no sense at
- 1:10:45all. This is a territoriality issue. This is
- 1:10:47not a pro artist or an anti artist situation.
- 1:10:52It is. the inherent in Bern and explicit in Bern
- 1:10:57that that convention expressly forbids treating
- 1:11:01foreign authors worse than domestic ones. It
- 1:11:05does provide for national treatment and this
- 1:11:06is just a violation of it without really frankly
- 1:11:10much engagement at all by the judges in these
- 1:11:14really complicated international law issues.
- 1:11:20as opposed to simply saying, well, it's a plausible
- 1:11:24legal theory that then snowballed into a summary
- 1:11:26judgment rule and that has now snowballed into
- 1:11:30an affirmance. It's a crazy case. I would add
- 1:11:36one thing in terms of historical context. In
- 1:11:39the 1960s, when they were talking about a revision
- 1:11:41to the Copyright Act, the 1909 Act, there was
- 1:11:44this fight about authors wanted to retain renewal
- 1:11:49rights structure where all rights ended and copyright
- 1:11:53users, licensees, wanted some kind of relief
- 1:11:56from that. And this was the compromise. This
- 1:11:58was the compromise where you can get back your
- 1:12:01US rights, but someone who invested millions
- 1:12:05of dollars to make a movie retains the right
- 1:12:07to continue to use and they can retain foreign
- 1:12:10rights. That was a negotiated compromise. It
- 1:12:13may not mean anything at this point. But historically,
- 1:12:16you know, there was a reason why it was done.
- 1:12:20Yeah. And Aaron, to your question about does
- 1:12:21it really is it is it not pro artists to be pro
- 1:12:24this decision? Well, I mean, if we thought the
- 1:12:27labels and studios fought hard before, I mean,
- 1:12:32I don't know that, you know, if they think they're
- 1:12:35going to lose it all, then it could be even harder
- 1:12:37for artists to to get their rights back. You
- 1:12:41know, just they're going to throw the kitchen,
- 1:12:42the kitchen sink and everything else. So Yeah,
- 1:12:47I'm not taking a position on this call either
- 1:12:49like as Peter said, yeah. No, no, it's just interesting
- 1:12:51There's gonna be a lot more to Unravel and digest
- 1:12:56here than what meets the eye. Yeah Okay, everybody
- 1:13:01well, we're definitely well over and thank you
- 1:13:04guys again. It's been it's been great Thanks.
- 1:13:07Thank you. Nice to chat with you and handle with
- 1:13:10you guys. Yes, absolutely