Latest / The Team House / From Vietnam To Jumping Out Of Planes With Nukes | Bill Flavin | Ep. 258
Transcript
- 0:00Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today
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- 0:50us out at patreon dot com. Slash The Teamhouse, Special Operations, Covert
- 1:02SPI, and I The Team House with your hostess, Jack Murphy and David
- 1:11Park. Hey everyone, welcome to episode two hundred and fifty eight of The
- 1:18Team House. I'm Jack Murphy with Dave Park and our guest on tonight's show
- 1:23is Bill Flavin. Bill did several conventional combat tours in Vietnam when on a
- 1:27Serve intenth Special Forces Group. He ended his career working with the Sas and
- 1:34the Bulkans going after war criminals. And Bill is also a part of a
- 1:40recent article I wrote about the green Light program. This is the guys who
- 1:42jumped in with backpack nukes. That was a real thing, believe it or
- 1:47not. The article is up now. It's called Red Menace, Black Ops,
- 1:53green Light and you can find it up there now. Bill is a
- 1:56big part of it, amongst you know, maybe you know fifteen other members
- 2:00of the program that I was fortunate enough to speak to. Bill, Thank
- 2:04you for joining us on the show. Glad to be here. So Bill,
- 2:08just to kick it off, can you tell us a little bit about
- 2:12like what your upbringing was like where you came from, and how that kind
- 2:15of propelled you towards your military service. Sure, I had a different upbringing.
- 2:22I was out there and born of two actors in Hollywood, and so
- 2:28my father and mother were both actors in old Hollywood. My father made four
- 2:34hundred movies and numerous television shows, and my mother was worked with Rogers and
- 2:44the Stare and did other things. So I mean, they were movie people.
- 2:50And so I brought up in a very strange cocoon associated with all sorts
- 2:53of different people ideas, talents and others. And so my background was that.
- 3:01How did I get into the military. It was Vietnam War. My
- 3:07parents were concerned I was going to be drafted, so they said, why
- 3:10don't you go to a school that ensure if you won't be drafted at least
- 3:13till you get out of the school. And since my father had gone to
- 3:16West Point, I decided maybe I wanted to go there too, But I
- 3:22was too late and ended up going to the Virginia Military Institute. And I
- 3:28could go there because you mandatorily had to commission in the reserves. But if
- 3:32I didn't like the military, I could say, Okay, that's it.
- 3:37So that's what I did. I went to VMI, graduated, and my
- 3:43military career started then fifty five years ago, and so that's how I got
- 3:51into the military, originally in conventional forces mechanized forces. I went to Germany
- 3:59and the bomb holder Germany, and there I saw the detritus of the U.
- 4:05S Army. The US Army had been hollowed out to fight in Vietnam,
- 4:13and what was left, By goodness, if the Soviets ever had a
- 4:16mind in their head, that was the time, because we probably couldn't find,
- 4:21you know, two tents to sew together in order to do oppose them.
- 4:27So I looked at the military there, which was cold days in Motopoo's
- 4:32race riots, lack of equipment. In the brigade. The majority of the
- 4:41brigade were first and second lieutenants except for the brigade commander and the battalion commanders,
- 4:48and the NCOs were you know, most of the senior NCOs were East
- 4:54sixes. So it was a very very strange environment. And so I looked
- 4:59at that and I said, hmm, this doesn't look too good. I
- 5:03then went to Vietnam, and in Vietnam, I was since I was airborne
- 5:09in ranger. I was an advisor to the Vietnamese rangers for a year.
- 5:15And as the advisor to Vietnamese Rangers, I got to participate in several activities,
- 5:19most notably the invasion of Cambodia, and so that was a interesting experience.
- 5:29Also, I got notification that we're going to move out packed for three
- 5:32days, and two months later we came out of Cambodie. So that was
- 5:41that was always a little exciting. Bill. I'm sorry to interrupt. I
- 5:46just want to make sure we don't totally gloss over some things, because there's
- 5:48some really interesting details that you brought up there. You know. The first
- 5:54thing I just wanted to ask you real quick, is I mean, did
- 5:56you have any like did you begrudge the military at all? Going I'm just
- 6:00wondering if you saw yourself maybe following in your parents' footsteps and then you got
- 6:04sucked into the army into Vietnam, was that like a fork in the road
- 6:09for you or were you comfortable with that At the time. In the sixties,
- 6:14my parents decided that Hollywood was dead. You know, all of the
- 6:19old creative figures had gone. The nineteen sixties wasn't producing much. You know,
- 6:28we didn't get to Spielberg, we didn't get to you know, all
- 6:31of the new lights hadn't arrived yet. And my father, you know,
- 6:38he wasn't getting many jobs, as he told me in the nineteen sixties,
- 6:41that's because he looked so bad in the nude. So because because that was
- 6:47kind of you know, where we were, and so they were not encouraging
- 6:51me to get into show business. I remember my father would go into the
- 6:56cupboard and take out the Screen Actors Guild book, which is a book of
- 7:00all the members of the Screen Actors Guild, had their pictures, their agents
- 7:02and everything else in it. Now, of course you've got to have a
- 7:05computer bank to do it, but back then it was actually a big thick
- 7:10book, and he would go in the book, put his fingers in there,
- 7:14pulled the book up by two or three pages, and said, you
- 7:16know what that you know what that means. Those people on those two or
- 7:23three pages are the ones that have three meals a day. So if you
- 7:28want to get in the business, you know there it is. And so
- 7:32they were not encouraging me to go that way, even though you know,
- 7:39I was a professional dancer, believe it or not as a youth in Hollywood.
- 7:46But I said, well, you know, let's go in the military
- 7:51and see what it is like. And so that's where I stepped into the
- 7:55fray. That's incredible. And then when you when you land in uh in
- 8:01Vietnam, tell us about the Vietnamese rangers and and kind of like what they
- 8:05were about, what their mission was, and in your role there. Oh
- 8:09yeah, the Vietnamese Rangers were kind of a strikeforce. You know, they
- 8:13would be thrown in in order to uh, you know, seal up some
- 8:20flank or do a special mission. Uh. They were better trained than the
- 8:26normal Arvin forces were, uh and better officered and you know, therefore we're
- 8:33a much more reliable organization. Joining the Rangers was an interesting event. I
- 8:41arrived at what was called trains Compounds. Trains Compound was the place near Tons
- 8:46Airport in an old French officers mess. I went there and they said,
- 8:54oh, go next door to the field forces and we're going to do a
- 8:58briefing of where you eyes are going. So there's a bunch of guys myself
- 9:01go over there and get the briefing. They put up the big map.
- 9:05They say, okay, this unit's here, this unit's chair, we're going
- 9:07here. You're going to go to the Dad da da da. Thank you
- 9:09very much. Everybody leaves. Nobody said anything about the Rangers. So I
- 9:13said, hey, I'm here for the Vietnamese Strangers. Where are they?
- 9:18We don't know? What do you mean? You don't know? I mean,
- 9:22you're the operations center for Second Feel Force. Right, Yeah, Well,
- 9:26when's the last time you heard from them a couple of weeks ago?
- 9:30Really are you worried? Nah? They go out there and do things.
- 9:35You know. Once they do things, they come back and tell us what
- 9:37they did. Not a problem. Really, Well, how do I link
- 9:41up with them? He said? Go go have a drink in the club
- 9:45until somebody calls your name. So for a couple of days I laid around
- 9:48the club and suddenly this one guy walks in the front door and said,
- 9:54Vietnamese Rangers. I said, put up my hand, went out, jumped
- 9:58in the jeep, and we took off, and we left Civilization and drove
- 10:03to their compound on the edge of Benoi, and he said, okay,
- 10:09your sac pack, you're going in. Okay, where am I going to?
- 10:16Where the rangers are? But where are the rangers? Don't worry,
- 10:20you'll find out when they air airplane lands. I got a map, Now
- 10:24I don need a map. Don't worry about it. Everything's okay, you
- 10:28can tell. At this time I was not too bright. Okay, I
- 10:33didn't say I am not getting on that helicopter unless I got a map,
- 10:35because I know where we're going. That's what I got. Wasn't too bright,
- 10:39you know, So I jumped on the helicopter way. We went buckle
- 10:43buckle, buckle, buckle buckle out there toward toward the near NUIs bad Den,
- 10:50which was the Black Vergeant Mountain in uh in the three quarters how Hot
- 10:58area. And so we chop it out there and I'm coming in, and
- 11:05their heels all around, and then there's the landing field. I can see
- 11:09the landing field. I can see the hulks of a couple of US aircraft
- 11:13smoldering on the landing field. And the pilot turns around and said, we
- 11:18ain't stopping. We get low. You just jump I said, what,
- 11:26no, no, no, no, We're not gonna land. You just
- 11:28jump out. So, not being bright, I said, okay, And
- 11:31so sure enough it's skidded right along the runway. I leaped out and it
- 11:37left and there was silence. Me standing on the runway somewhere in Vietnam,
- 11:43smoldering aircraft, no map, and I said, man, I wonder if
- 11:52this is stupid or not. And suddenly from the side of the airfield this
- 11:56hand waved and said, quick, get over here. So I ran over
- 12:01there and jumped in the ditch right by the end of the airfield, and
- 12:03he said, welcome to the rangers. Here. Let's get in the jeep
- 12:07and we'll go up to the top of that little hill over there before they
- 12:11start shelling the airfield, which they'll do it pretty soon, and uh,
- 12:16we'll have a welcoming party. So that was my welcome to the Vietnam's rangers.
- 12:22H And so it was. It was an adventure there was on the
- 12:33invasion into Cambodia. Well, I was advising a battalion commander on that,
- 12:39along with providing firepower, close air support, the yeah integration between the the
- 12:50mech forces and the ground forces. I did achieve one objective, though I
- 12:58think I was hit by every piece of friendly fire that we owned. Before
- 13:03I got out of the Vietnamease Rangers, I got hit by an air strike.
- 13:09We had cleared a we had cleared a VC fortified area on the edge
- 13:18of a rice patty. The VC had gone and we said fine, And
- 13:24suddenly I saw a Woollie Pete round, white phosphor's round coming in from a
- 13:30forward air controller flying up there, and I said, anybody talked to those
- 13:35guys and said they're friendly. Is in here? Oh I don't think so,
- 13:39ha ha ha. And so I jumped in the bunker and we sustained
- 13:43an air strike. And you know what, the VC built better bunkers than
- 13:48we do now. It was an a frame affair, and it withstood the
- 13:54air strike pretty well before I could get on the phone and call it off.
- 14:00And the other thing was artillery. During the same Cambodian invasion, the
- 14:03US would run artillery raids, run the tubes up one seven, five,
- 14:09eight inch and just you know, shoot forward. Well, unfortunately, there
- 14:18was no real coordination where the Vietnamese rangers were because they weren't necessarily on the
- 14:22radar and where the artillery raid was going to take place. So I realized
- 14:28that we were in trouble when I heard this freight train coming in. And
- 14:33the next thing, middle of the night, I'm laying down by this tree.
- 14:37The next thing I know, I'm about five feet off the ground from
- 14:39the concussion of an eight inch shell by moon. So I said, I
- 14:43guess I better call them. And of course the CEOI, the book with
- 14:50all the codes and the CO signs in it for these people, was about
- 14:54two inches thick because they had to have call signs for the entire core area.
- 15:00I eventually called that off to Anyway, there's more. There's more stories
- 15:03about being hit by American artillery. We survived at all. The incursion into
- 15:11Cambodia was that in nineteen sixty eight. No, that was sixty nine sixty
- 15:16nine, before or after Tet. After Tet. The whole key because of
- 15:22Tet, the whole key was to cut Ho Chi Min trail off, the
- 15:26Ho Chi Min trails, cut them all the pieces, which we succeeded in
- 15:33doing and brought some peace to South Vietnam as a result of cutting those trails.
- 15:39But the conventional forces and the conventional mindset was a little bit of a
- 15:46problem. For example, we would go in and be a series of rice
- 15:52patties. You'd start at one end of the rice patty, you'd roll across,
- 15:54and of course they'd be defensive positions at the other end of the rice
- 15:58patties. So you'd fire oh day long out out in the open with the
- 16:02mech focus and the tank shooting up the defensive positions, taking casualties. Then
- 16:08the sun would go down next morning, get up attack the positions, and
- 16:15of course the VCS be gone. They boogied out at night and went to
- 16:21the next rice patty. So by mid afternoon, moving to the next rice
- 16:26patty. You repeat this right, defense and depth, you know, and
- 16:30uh and so I asked the armor advisor who was with me, to see
- 16:37whether or not he wanted to channel his inner patent. I said, why
- 16:41are we doing this? We got tanks, you know, we got a
- 16:45PC's. They don't have any of this stuff. Why don't we just break
- 16:48through at one part and keep going and get behind them. Don't you think
- 16:53that's an idea? He said, Oh, no, no, no,
- 16:56no, can't can't do that. I don't think the vietname could handle it.
- 17:00Sure they can. The Vietnamese soldiers that I saw, I was amazed
- 17:06because the commanders would say, attack that position, and they go, taking
- 17:11lots of casualties. I mean they were fearless, not too bright, but
- 17:15fearless in taking the fight to the enemy. Never happened. Could never convince
- 17:22my compatree over there on the cave side of the house to mount his steed
- 17:30and try something. So I found that little disconcerting. This is all building
- 17:34to why special forces becomes important, because I figured there's got to be a
- 17:38better way to do this stuff other than what I'm seeing here. So I
- 17:47spent a year there running around in Cambodia coming back, and then after that
- 17:53year I transferred to the hundred and first, went up there and commanded a
- 17:57company with one hundred and first for eight nine months, and then I tried
- 18:06to re up again, but the Infantry school wouldn't let me. They said,
- 18:11you need career development, and so I said, wait a second,
- 18:15now here, I am company commander in combat. This is what I'm supposed
- 18:23to do, is it not? You know, why don't you just let
- 18:26me stay here? No, we can't do that. It would be injurious
- 18:30to your career. You must come back to Fort Benning at this time and
- 18:38do the advance court so you could advance your career. So I said,
- 18:42okay, well there it is. Orders were cut and I left, and
- 18:48one hundred and first was a challenge. Though this was toward the end of
- 18:53the war, we're winding down. This is moving toward nineteen seventy here,
- 19:00and what is happening is that several of the units are contracting and leaving Vietnam,
- 19:07and the people who were still there are being redistributed among the other units,
- 19:15and many of these people were not quite willing to do that. So
- 19:22there were a lot of personnel problems. No person report to me and said,
- 19:27I'm on drugs. I'm not going to the field. Oh okay,
- 19:32go over there and dry out. Once you dry out, you go into
- 19:34the field, you know. And so this was a constant issue. Not
- 19:42a very capable organization when I was When I was there, at capable people,
- 19:49good capable NCOs. But you know, we were at the end of
- 19:55the food chain toward that era in Vietnam. And then of course the US
- 20:03military didn't want to take casualties. We don't want to take casualties. So
- 20:10if you were out there and you wanted to call artillery on suspected enemy positions,
- 20:15you had to say I'm taking effective fire. If you didn't say that,
- 20:21you wouldn't get artillery. I had that debate with them too. Don't
- 20:25you think it's good to shoot the enemy before they shoot us? You know,
- 20:30That's that's what I like. You know, I would hate to have
- 20:33them shooting us and then we shoot them. Why don't we do the other
- 20:36thing? No, no, no, no, no, you know,
- 20:38we got to watch out. You know, you never know, uh,
- 20:42you know, we conserve the ammunition here, you know, we don't want
- 20:47to. You know, you guys out there in the field are just using
- 20:49artillery as a crutch. And the answer is okay, yeah, well okay,
- 20:55I'll do that, you know, but I'm okay with it. Yeah.
- 21:00So, so there were some real problems coming out there. I'll just
- 21:07relate a small story. Sure, a brigade commander of the one hundred and
- 21:15first wants to go out and visit the troops while they're in the field.
- 21:21Okay, and of course there I am in the field. Well, to
- 21:23do that, you've got to secure a landing zone for the guy, you
- 21:27know, something I don't want to do because once you get out there clear
- 21:30a landing zone, everybody in the world knows where you are, you know,
- 21:36and so this is never good. We want them to not know where
- 21:40I am so we can sneak up on them and catch them. But there
- 21:45it is. So we cleared the landing zone. The brigade commander lands goes
- 21:52out there and speaks to the troops. Then he comes to me and said,
- 21:57Captain, you're not taking care area troops. I said, I'm not
- 22:03said absolutely not. Do you realize you haven't ordered ice cream in the field
- 22:07for these troops. And I said, you're absolutely right, I have not
- 22:14ordered ice cream in the field for these troops. He said, well that's
- 22:18changing now you're going to stay and secure this landing zone and we're sending ice
- 22:22cream into you and you better take better carry your troops. And he leaves.
- 22:30So I get the field first sergeant and I said, who told him
- 22:33that? Field first sergeant? Sort this out? So sure enough, a
- 22:37couple of hours later and airplanes lands with ice cream. Of course, the
- 22:41ice cream is melting. I mean, this is Vietnam. It's hot,
- 22:45you know. And so they take the ice cream out and the field first
- 22:48sergeant grabs the guy who told the commander that sat him down and said eat
- 22:52it. But I mean, how crazy is that? Yeah, that's like,
- 23:02uh, we had to establish a pizza hut on the firebase, a
- 23:07red and white pizza hut. You know, this is a firebase. This
- 23:12just helps the enemy, no way you are. Luckily, it didn't last
- 23:18too long because the typhoon came in from the South China Sea and took it
- 23:21took it away. But anyway, these wacky things. There are more wacky
- 23:26things than that. But anyway, I'm looking around. I said, you
- 23:30know, this is this is kind of nuts or it all the time when
- 23:36I coordinated with CORDS, the Cords program, uh, the Great Cords Program,
- 23:42Huh. One of the problems was the US viewed forces hated CORDS,
- 23:51and so the CHORDS coordinator there in the area wanted to speak to me before
- 23:57I go. My commander told me, number one, don't listen to anything
- 24:00he says. Number two, don't do anything he wants you to do.
- 24:06Now, this is the guy, of course, who is in connection connection
- 24:10with the local Vietnamese, who supposedly knows the local intel, who supposedly knows
- 24:15what's happening there. You know, who's got, you know, a state
- 24:19rep with him, an AID rep with him, all that stuff. And
- 24:23I'm not supposed to listen to him, and I'm not supposed to do what
- 24:26he says. So it's interesting, interesting stuff with one hundred and first.
- 24:32Yeah, but Bill, I'm gonna ask Dave just do an ad read real
- 24:37quick and then we'll get back into it and hear about the next step in
- 24:41your career. Sounds good, okay, Sorry, Bill, We'll get right
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- 26:11you after your experience with one hundred and first, what was the next stop
- 26:15for you? The next stop? After advanced course and a master's degree,
- 26:22I became a tactical officer at the Virginia Military Institute, a history instructor,
- 26:26the military history instructor, and so I did that for a while, and
- 26:32then I got a phone call from the Military Personnel Center that says, congratulations,
- 26:38you have volunteered for Special Operations Forces. We're so glad you have volunteered.
- 26:45Report to the qualification course. At the time, schy Meyer was trying
- 26:52to pump up special Operations because they were being disassembled at the end of the
- 26:56Vietnam War, and therefore he tried to revert and went out, looked at
- 27:02the personnel records and says that one, that one, that one, that
- 27:03one, that one. I was one of that one's. So I said,
- 27:08okay, sure, let's let's do it. So I went there and
- 27:12went through Charlie Beckwith's magical assessment course there at Fortress Brag and went directly to
- 27:22Germany. Bad Toldt, Germany, the first of the tenth Special Forces Battalion,
- 27:29and bad Toast, Germany, the home of the old s s Schule
- 27:34in bad Toos in Bavaria, which again was a unique experience because it was
- 27:40a completely self contained unit, the only special Forces unit left in Europe and
- 27:47so had our own airfield, aircraft, riggers, the whole, the whole
- 27:52shebang. It was a slice of the tenth Special Forces Group who was back
- 27:56at Fort Devons and the there was a commander forward there and so it was
- 28:03kind of a unique special unit. And that's where I became the team leader
- 28:08of the Sadom green Light Team, which was the direct action team in order
- 28:15to employ a nuclear weapon wherever they would think it needed to be employed.
- 28:23And so I did that and then stayed there because I was a senior captain.
- 28:30I was a captain for over ten years at the time because all the
- 28:34promotions. Froze became major there and went on to do staff work at the
- 28:44at that location and we we did some interesting, some interesting stuff there.
- 28:55The more interesting stuff would come a little bit later as were supporting other agent
- 29:00and see that the US government as the Wall was about to calm down.
- 29:03But it was a very mature organization. My team was a very special team.
- 29:11Everyone on the team had multiple tours in Vietnam. It was a very
- 29:18senior team. Matter of fact, two members of the team were lieutenant colonels.
- 29:23How did that happen? Well, these folks were commissioned in Vietnam,
- 29:33field commissioned in Vietnam. When the war came back, they were decommissioned,
- 29:41but they retained their reserve rank and they've advanced through the reserves. So in
- 29:47essence, they were lieutenant colonels in the reserves and E seven's in the regular
- 29:51force. So you could see that the team was more than the competent.
- 29:57A great deal was learned and with that team. Matter of fact, two
- 30:03members of the team became the sergeant majors of SF. You know, a
- 30:07couple of members of the team became senior officers. I mean, it was
- 30:10an amazing group that I just happened to fall into a lot of learning there
- 30:15because you could say, Okay, here's the target, here's the target folder,
- 30:21I'll see you tomorrow morning. Walk into tomorrow morning and everything would be
- 30:23laid out, the briefings would be ready to go, all the intel would
- 30:27be done. So in that regards, it was a pleasure. The other
- 30:33problem was we had significant ego individuals there, and so the challenge there was
- 30:41to balance all these egos, you know, so you could have a smooth
- 30:48running operation. But the fact that they were very proficient meant that if the
- 30:53team a couple of times it would go in. If it got broken up,
- 30:57I would be sure that one one of those individuals would finally find his
- 31:00way to the target and accomplished the task. And so and while we were
- 31:07there, of course, they were the old folks that were there. By
- 31:11the old folks, I mean people who had actually served in World War Two
- 31:18that were still around by toast, because many of those folks came and made
- 31:22a home in the area, several of them. One of them who wrote
- 31:26the demolition Manual for s F was there. I think he was a pole.
- 31:33And of course the Sergeant Major Julius Reimlanser, who was another one of
- 31:37the MM legends of special Forces because he was a Czechoslovakian youth, you know,
- 31:47who participated in the assassination of Heindrich in the Czech Republic ad yep,
- 31:56that was it. He escaped the course where others were caught, and then
- 32:05he went on from that to fight the Nazis, then fights the Soviets.
- 32:10Then you know, do cross border operations trying to evacuate people from the Iron
- 32:20Curtain. And then he was there in Special Forces and he was a fount
- 32:25of knowledge, a found abilities to evade, escape and make himself into something
- 32:32that nobody could notice because he had Slavic features and when you talk to him,
- 32:38you thought you would think that he wasn't too bright. That was his
- 32:43trick. He spoke five or six languages, and he was very savvy on
- 32:50being able to read people. And so all of these individuals that happened to
- 32:55be at Bodto's at the time added to, you know, the lore and
- 33:01the flavor of the Special Forces community. So it was a pleasure to be
- 33:07there at that time. Bill, Can I ask you, so around what
- 33:14year was it that you went on to your grad school and then taught before
- 33:19going into Special Forces. Let's see, I went into Special Forces in seventy
- 33:24six. Okay, so that time, and so you know you mentioned this,
- 33:30you know, you guys mentioned the Sodoms and the saydom and you know,
- 33:37can you give us and I know everybody's going to read Jack's article,
- 33:43but can you give us sort of your introduction how they laid it out for
- 33:47you and how they prepared you for it. And what did you think when
- 33:52they said, hey, we have nuclear bombs that we want you and your
- 33:55team to jump in behind enemy lines. My thought was okay, I mean
- 34:00I wasn't too you know, yeah, you got a nuclear bomb, I
- 34:05would jump it behind the lines. I mean. So the preparation was that
- 34:12that team was the key team to prepare itself. We did a lot of
- 34:15self preparation on the on the device, and there was an officer at the
- 34:22higher headquarters who oversaw that preparation. Actually learning how to use the device and
- 34:30everything was pretty simple, so that didn't take much effort at all. The
- 34:37effort that we put into it was to determine the you know, the targeting
- 34:43of it all, what's the best way to employ it and against what to
- 34:47employ it. There a lot of obstacles in employing the weapon. I always
- 34:54thought it was a psychological weapon, just so the Soviets knew we had special
- 35:00force of teams running around with a new in their pocket, you know,
- 35:05that would make them give them some pause. But there were lots of lots
- 35:12of coordination issues in actually getting the real device and actually getting to the departure
- 35:17airfield and getting out of the departure airfield and going to where you've got to
- 35:22go, wherever that was. And so we always had this running debate with
- 35:28the folks who were saying, you know, here's a likely target, here's
- 35:30a likely target, here's a likely target. The problem with that was,
- 35:35of course, that we were not going to initiate World War three, so
- 35:39we were going to jump in before the Soviets attacked, you know, and
- 35:45once the Soviet gets attacked, the whole shape of things changed dramatically. All
- 35:50of those target folders and everything were you know, probably not valid at that
- 35:54moment, right, And so now what's the plan. And of course I
- 35:59know I never got to now what's the plan because everybody says, when the
- 36:02time comes, we'll tell you. Well, right, you know, you
- 36:10know I mean to run a good mission. You've got to prepare significantly for
- 36:16that mission, as you well know, you know, like the Sante Raids,
- 36:22like any of the missions after Osama or anything else. You've got to
- 36:25really prepare to run that direct action mission if you hope it's going to be
- 36:31successful. But they were kind of blase about it. That's why I said,
- 36:37this is going to be a psychological weapon, because these folks are too
- 36:39blase about it. They don't think it's ever going to be used. I
- 36:43don't think the higher ups and Bill, you told me that when you got
- 36:49promoted to become I believe, the executive officer, and you had access to
- 36:52all of the targeting packets. There were like some revelations or like some conclusions
- 36:57that you came to from having access to more of the program. But the
- 37:01key is that one would think it would be put against a high value target,
- 37:07you know, or psychological value. But the targets that were presented were
- 37:12not high value targets. You know. They were part of air defense systems
- 37:17that had redundancy built into them. And so the question is why, you
- 37:24know, I mean, you blow up this tower and you know fifteen minutes
- 37:29later it's now covered by the redundancy of the other towers. What have I
- 37:32just done? And so you know, there was some real questions about that,
- 37:39and so what I planned to do, what I started to do as
- 37:44the executive officer and later is the commander of the unit when I went back
- 37:49and commanded it was to begin to emphasize unconventional warfare with the folks because we
- 37:55had been swept into direct action and lurps long range reconnaissance patrols because they wanted
- 38:04to find out where where the Soviet second echelon was going to deploy. And
- 38:08so you're gonna go hide in Heidi holes, which I thought was dumb,
- 38:13but anyway, that was me. And so I said, why don't we
- 38:15get back to the basics of special forces, which is unconventional warfare and train
- 38:22on all the unconventional tasks that are in the books. And so that's eventually
- 38:30where I went to with the Union. And as the folks later told me
- 38:36in the Balkans when they were there, that they thought that that training helped
- 38:39prepare them for what they would face in the Balkans several years later. So
- 38:45I was not a fan of, you know, direct action as part of
- 38:52unconventional warfare. Yes, uh, direct action for direct action itself is a
- 38:58waste of special forces in my opinion. It's going to be part of a
- 39:02larger unconventional irregular scheme. And of course that's at tension that's been going on
- 39:08in special forces for years in soft you know, the door banger versus the
- 39:15you know, let's ride on the horses and help the Northern Alliance folks.
- 39:22Bill correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe he told me that you
- 39:25spent like ten years as a captain because of how the army is structured and
- 39:30the changes that things were going through, which is I mean, you must
- 39:34have gotten a lot of time team time in special Forces, which is amazing.
- 39:38What was sort of like your career progression as you went to executive officer
- 39:42and then battalion commander, Well it went faster because then the promotions picked up,
- 39:47and so I went from the executive officer, then I went down and
- 39:53served on Central Commands sock Scent down in Tampa, and in that I was
- 40:01able to visit the Middle East and go in there and begin to you know,
- 40:07design, help train and prepare for operations in the Middle East, as
- 40:14well as participating in some there we say plandestine operations, which we'll say that
- 40:23that's all I'll say. And I imagine this is nineteen early nineteen eighty,
- 40:29so Lebanon was hot and heavy at the time. Yeah. Now, before
- 40:34that, one thing I did do at at Bodtost before I left as the
- 40:39executive officer was support Desert one, and so prior to Desert One, the
- 40:50CIA was supposed to go in and lay in the airfield as you know,
- 40:53and put in the beacons that would be activated by the planes coming in.
- 40:58But they had no escape plan, and so they asked us at Toads to
- 41:04put together a team and go rescue them if they needed to be rescued.
- 41:07So I commanded that team and we deployed. Here's this great story of why
- 41:14Jasock is needed. We got to the secret frog site in somewhere in Egypt
- 41:25to launch from there to thumb rate and launch from there onward. And my
- 41:34contact to higher headquarters was this, you know, Air Force major, which
- 41:38is fine. He had a satellite phone and I said, okay, you
- 41:44know here we are ready to go. Fine, okay, so where's my
- 41:49evasion and escape map? They got one? Okay, where's my evasion and
- 41:54escape plan? They got one? Mm hmm. We got any blood chips
- 42:00here? You know? We've got any little belts of gold and I can
- 42:05bribe the locals. We got any pointy talkies so I can dick to the
- 42:08locals. No, no, no, no, no no no no,
- 42:13just just go in. If something happens, you can pick them up and
- 42:15bring them out. They said, what if something AM's dos us and we're
- 42:17in there too. What do I do? And then came the revelation,
- 42:24just move south and we'll find you. And I said, you ever seen
- 42:30a map of Aran? Just moving south is putting me in the most arid
- 42:37desert on the face of the planet. What do you mean? Just move
- 42:42south and you'll find me there? It is? Thank you very much,
- 42:45have a good day. So luckily that Jaysakut put together as a result of
- 42:52this so that they could have some real planning, real oversight, and real
- 42:58focus on the these known these operations, because it was kind of alosy goosy,
- 43:06to say the least. But anyway, that's that's another story. Who
- 43:08can I can I ask you, like, who was because we know that
- 43:13Delta and the Rangers, you know that they had their sort of chain of
- 43:15command. I don't know who they had their mission commander, But who was
- 43:20telling you guys to go forward and do this? Was it the same people
- 43:23running them? Pentagon, the Pentagon squirrel shop in the bows of the Pentagon.
- 43:30Who was the one who was orchestrating the whole thing? Uh? But
- 43:35you know, the Pentagon's an organization that does policy, buys things, coordinates,
- 43:44equipment. I mean, the Pentagon is not really an operational headquarters.
- 43:50Yep. The squirrel shops in there grew up because there wasn't any other overarching
- 43:54place for that, you know. And so you know, this was kind
- 44:00of an ad hoc adventure, which of course is the results. After the
- 44:07problems and everything, they saidy, we need we need some organization here,
- 44:12we need a Special Operations Command, you know, we need to joint Special
- 44:16Operations Entity, we need all this other stuff. And that's when Special Forces
- 44:23begin to come into its own because of disaster, which always seems to be
- 44:29the thing that spurs innovation here. And then it sounds like anyway the time
- 44:37bouncing around the Middle East after that, Yeah, and then I end up
- 44:45in Headquarters Department of the Army, uh in the Force Development Section, Headquarters
- 44:51Department of the Army, where I get introduced to the low intensity conflict folks
- 44:58and help with Nordy Schwartz. It was a colonel with me up there,
- 45:04who, as you know, went on to command the Air Force arm of
- 45:07Special Operations Forces, then went on to finally become the Deputy Chief of Staff
- 45:15of the Air Force, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So
- 45:17he and I put together the charter for the Low Intensity Conflicts Center that was
- 45:23established down at Fort Monroe alongside of the Air Force folks at Langley, to
- 45:31take a look at all of these low intensity conflict activities and bring them some
- 45:37doctrine, bring them some lessons learned, bring them this, that and the
- 45:39other. And so I didn't know where that was going to head, but
- 45:44that was the beginning of something that would later murph morph into my later life,
- 45:52as in the Peacekeeping Instability Operations Institute up here in Carlisle. But anyway,
- 45:59initially that was us putting that thing together with the Chief of Staff of
- 46:02the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force and launching it and starting
- 46:07its progress. That lasted for several years, and then I got tagged for
- 46:12battalion command, went back to Batoles as the battalion commander and commanded there for
- 46:20a couple of years in bad Tools And that was, you know, when
- 46:25we began to emphasize unconventional warfare, began to I actually in Europe at the
- 46:32time too. Yeah, a complete unconventional exercise that included actually putting together a
- 46:43clandestine hospital and according to the things and got the Germans playing too. They
- 46:49love to play. And afterwards we would have some of the German farmers and
- 46:55everyone come and critique the teams as to whether or not they were successfully hiding
- 47:01or whether or not they were, you know, out there smoking when they
- 47:06shouldn't be smoking they you know, So it was interesting because we had the
- 47:10partisan eyes on them as well as the you know, special forces eyes on
- 47:15them. We in fact went to Luxembourg and organized the whole country of Luxembourg
- 47:21to hunt down our team with the Luxembourg Army, and the word went out
- 47:29on the radio and everything else to Luxembourg that if anyone sees parachutes, call
- 47:34this number. I didn't think Luxingburg even had an army yep, it has
- 47:37one battalion size. Battalion size army indeed is well, maybe a little larger
- 47:45than a battalion, but about that size. Nice bunch of folks, but
- 47:51they organized this thing for me, sent the teams in and as soon as
- 47:57they hit the ground, the heat was on them, of course, because
- 47:59they all the police and everything else. And you know, to the team's
- 48:02credit, a couple of folks did escape and actually accomplished the mission. All
- 48:09the teams hated me for this course. They said, oh, no,
- 48:14no, no, this this is unrealistic. And I said, wait a
- 48:15second, now, so you're going to jump into Russia and you don't think
- 48:20people are going to be looking for you, you know. I mean,
- 48:23you know, if you train very hard, then when the real thing comes,
- 48:30maybe you're going to survive, you know. So anyway, that was
- 48:37some of the innovative things that we put together with the help of Julius Rhymnitzer
- 48:42and others who would sick the entire sixty six m I group upon the teams
- 48:49as well and so and teach them how to fool the sixty six am I.
- 48:58And we did trade craft training in downtown Munich, you know, trying
- 49:01to lose tales, you know, leaving message the whole trade craft deal we
- 49:07would run through Munich. So it was a lot of activity that we did
- 49:15in the battalion. But and then I graduated from that battalion, and that's
- 49:27when I went on to the War College. Took the War College by correspondence
- 49:32and then went to the War College and became an instructor. Had the soft
- 49:36chair in the War College for several years where I sat down there and helped
- 49:43train folks that i'd later see again, like a general Jeffrey Lambert who later
- 49:50was the commander in the Balkans, went through there, later commander in in
- 50:00Afghanistan now in the Atlantic Council when everything came through the course. I can't
- 50:07even think of his name right now. He was there in four in Afghanistan.
- 50:15Barnhill, Barnhill. Yes. So those folks were all the students that
- 50:21I processed through my time at the at the Army War College. And then
- 50:28I got the call to go to shape Supreme An. I'd command Europe and
- 50:36be the senior US Special Operations Advisor along with a senior SAS Special Operations Advisor,
- 50:45two colonels and one warrant officer and one clerk. That's it okay to
- 50:53arrange like I mean, you tell me, Bill, But I mean that
- 50:58job entails like arranging like massive NATO training exercises, doesn't it. For the
- 51:05time, there was no NATO Special Forces. This was three Balkans, and
- 51:13so each of the countries trained their own. But lo and behold, when
- 51:19we got there, we realized that we're going to have to go in the
- 51:22Balkans. We're going to have to put together a NATO Special Forces of NATO
- 51:29countries of the French and the Germans and everybody, and there was no template
- 51:32for how to do that. So we began to putter away trying to figure
- 51:38out how to pull this together. It took a lot of travel, going
- 51:43to all the countries and convincing everybody that this was a good thing to do,
- 51:47because the abilities of the various countries who wanted to play were vastly different
- 51:53at the time. I mean, today there's a whole general officer and staff
- 52:00at NATO that does this stuff. Here it was two semi broken colonels and
- 52:05a warrant officer trying to do this stuff and also write the plans for the
- 52:09Balkans monitor the Balkans, monitor the you know, the war criminal, you
- 52:17know, catch and and sent to the Hague operation ah. And so it
- 52:25was a little bit, a little bit heptic. Eventually we asked and received
- 52:32some help. They sent us a US sub mariner, a nuke boat guy,
- 52:40which is the best person who ever arrived. Because the nukeboat guy was
- 52:45a genius really and so he we have had to be you know, he
- 52:49went through the nuke stuff, so you've got to be able to row with
- 52:52the punches, and so he was. He was excellent putting stuff together.
- 52:57But you know, this was very much putting things together and operating in an
- 53:05unconventional manner in the Balkans in order to you know, find out what was
- 53:09going on, understand where all the power brokers were, understand who was doing
- 53:15what to whom, getting the intelligence back to the commanders, preparing to do
- 53:21whatever little missions needed to be done. You know. It was very much
- 53:25an intensive affair, and it was difficult because when the balloon went up,
- 53:32we're going to the Balkans. That was the first operations order that NATO ever
- 53:37wrote. I mean, it was their first operation ever. And so rather
- 53:45than going back to you know, the wind Tech semics, which were the
- 53:50exercises that are supposed to exercise NATO, everybody forgot everything. And so the
- 53:58US was communicating with the US. They weren't using the NATO formats and sending
- 54:02the words to US, for example, the Special Forces. The US Special
- 54:07Forces movements were being understood at the log Command back in DC, but we
- 54:15weren't given where they will go, you know. So this took a couple
- 54:20of weeks of moaning and groaning to say, hey, you guys, now
- 54:23that you're in NATO, you're going to report to NATO. You know,
- 54:30that's who's your operational boss is That took go out to unsort that. There
- 54:36was a lot of unsorting going on. They had the big nuclear bunker there
- 54:43at shape head for It, which is where the special forces team was at
- 54:46the very bottom of this bunker, in the most secure place possible and the
- 54:53coldest place possible on the face of the earth, because under the bunker was
- 54:58this great big lake. Under the idea, when the nuclear weapon hit the
- 55:00top of the bunker, the lake would absorb a lot of the impact.
- 55:06Well, the lake was right under the cement floor, and the cold went
- 55:13right through the floor, through the balls, to your feet, and then
- 55:15up through your head. You know, it was terrible down there. I
- 55:19had to wear mucklops down there. Anyway, the idea was go to the
- 55:23bunker and we'll run everything out of the bunker. That lasted about four days
- 55:31when Sakure General Johwin said, this ain't work it. You know, we're
- 55:37not at war. I still got to run peacetime NATO, and I can't
- 55:39do it in this damn bunker, so put in operations room across the hallway
- 55:45from me. Let's get on with it. Well, unfortunately, all the
- 55:50calms were going in the bunker, so when you came and saw it,
- 55:54you had these huge compt cables coming out of the bunkers, snaking up over
- 55:59trees, going in windows, you know, in order to establish this command
- 56:06center and briefing center that we're now hewn out of the you know, the
- 56:10office space right across from Sacure. So, I mean, the whole thing
- 56:15was a real adventure for many times, but eventually what happened. Yeah,
- 56:22I just wanted to ask, you know, what year was this and what
- 56:24was the when that operations order was put together at NATO, Like, what
- 56:29was the mission that we were deploying the troops to. That was A ninety
- 56:35five and the idea was that we were supporting the Dayton Accords. The Dayton
- 56:42Accords were signed and therefore it allowed NATO to cross the Sava River, come
- 56:47in and provide the overall security force in accordance with Annex one Alpha of NATO
- 56:55of Dayton Rother of the Dayton Agreement, and that was, you know,
- 57:00to provide safe and secure environments demobilize the armies. Uh, you know,
- 57:07take the weapons away from the armies and start the process of securing the area
- 57:13so that the other actors could come in and provide what they needed to do.
- 57:17You got to clear the mind fields, et cetera, et cetera,
- 57:20et cetera. Okay, Uh, funny story of that. Uh. First
- 57:30units across the Sava River come up to a checkpoint, a Serb checkpoint,
- 57:37and the Serb checkpoint says, what are you doing? And of course it
- 57:40says, hey, we're dating ann X one A. Uh, we're supposed
- 57:45to be here and you've got to take the checkpoint down, okay. And
- 57:50they said, wait a second, have you had a copy of the dat
- 57:53and accords And the military said, well, no, we don't, say
- 57:59wait a second, I think we do. So they went there. This
- 58:00is a little checkpoint, two serbs. They take out this fact paper and
- 58:06there's the date in the cord. It was facts to them, and they
- 58:07say, let's look at it. They sat down and looked at it and
- 58:09said, oh, yeah, yeah, that's right. We've got to take
- 58:13down the down the checkpoint. Okay. The two guys two guys had fine
- 58:17walked away. So these two Serbs were able to get a facts of the
- 58:24date in the course you get our leading tank units had had no idea what
- 58:29they said anyway, just you know, just bizarre stuff in coordination and putting
- 58:35things together. But you know, eventually it got better. The special forces
- 58:39there, of course, were joint commissioned teams safe houses, would go to
- 58:46the communities and listen to them, gathering intelligence, provide you know, immediate
- 58:54response to various crises and the lie. But they were very much in the
- 59:02civil military world and did quite well in doing that. That included the Sas,
- 59:10the Italians and others. Eventually we were able to build a NATO Special
- 59:19Operations group of the Italians and Norwegians, and some of these folks had to
- 59:24go to their parliaments and get laws changed in order to participate. The Norwegians
- 59:30did, and so you know, it was a learning experience over a couple
- 59:37of years, ninety five, ninety six, ninety seven, ninety eight,
- 59:40you know, over a couple of years to get this thing oiled and get
- 59:45this thing on track. And then Kosovo comes and by then we had oiled
- 59:58the wheels. Knot that it was this's a bigger crisis uh in Kosovo as
- 1:00:04it was in uh Boston, in Bosnia because uh, you know, we
- 1:00:08had kind of oiled the machinery here and then of course it grew to where
- 1:00:15it is today, which is a three star command, you know, a
- 1:00:17whole staff, uh and all of these units therefore, you know, have
- 1:00:22a training regime, have policies, you know, and they deployed Afghanistan.
- 1:00:28So I mean it, we we started the we lit the candle between the
- 1:00:32two of us, and uh, you know, and of course you had
- 1:00:37to go to the field all the time and see what was happening. I
- 1:00:40visited the Kosovo, I'd visit the Bosnia, you know, walk around with
- 1:00:47the various you know folks, see what was going on, see what the
- 1:00:52problems were. We also had a CEO team sitting there in quick response there
- 1:00:59at in Bosnia who was getting totally bored because there wasn't much quick response.
- 1:01:06Uh they were going on. So anyone who's a quick response team, who
- 1:01:08doesn't have quick response gets in trouble usually so uh uh they were always,
- 1:01:15uh we had to watch our quick response forces at times. They were always
- 1:01:20trying to convince people to send me in coach you know, let's go,
- 1:01:23let's go do something. Uh, they actually did something. I mean,
- 1:01:28I mean we mention this day, decided to go in and blow one rail.
- 1:01:31Offer. Yes, I've heard this story. You have what. I
- 1:01:37was there for the whole adventure. Oh please tell us, I said.
- 1:01:40I was said this this is really stupid, you know, but but the
- 1:01:45Seas wanted to do it, you know. And I said, okay,
- 1:01:50why are they doing this. Well, they're going to go in and they're
- 1:01:52gonna blow this rail. And I said, you're going to blow the rail
- 1:01:55while the train is coming and it's going to be stuck in the tunnel.
- 1:01:59Right, Well, we really don't know the schedule of the train, you
- 1:02:04know, and that's gonna be Why what to blow the rail? Someone's just
- 1:02:07going to come and put a new rail in, you know, right that's
- 1:02:10strupid. Oh no, no, no, yeah, we got to do
- 1:02:15this, you know. And uh and so they convinced people to go do
- 1:02:17it, and the lo and behold. They didn't realize there were some guards
- 1:02:22there. Uh and uh, a long story short that they they in fact
- 1:02:30blew the rail. That meant nothing. Everybody who was cheering. Everybody thought
- 1:02:35this was a great deal. I was the black sheep in that family and
- 1:02:40h But anyways, you know, what was the intent behind blowing the rail?
- 1:02:45What were they hoping? Well, the intent tent was the rail went
- 1:02:47in and out of Kasovo, and so the rail line would sneak through Bosnia,
- 1:02:53and so since we owned Bosnia, it would be good to interduct the
- 1:02:58train. Why were they interdicting the train? Why don't you just take an
- 1:03:02airplane and blow the train up right there the tunnel. You know, nobody
- 1:03:07gets hurt, bomb drops on the on the engine there we are, but
- 1:03:13no, ah, no, I don't know. It was one of a
- 1:03:17number of odd and strange missions out of curiosity. You know. You mentioned
- 1:03:27that some of these special forces or special operations units had to go to their
- 1:03:30government to get it changed. Is that because some of them were law enforcement
- 1:03:36or because they were like mixed no? No. For example, in Norway,
- 1:03:39they were designed to defend Norway right, and so, okay, defending
- 1:03:45Norway did not necessarily mean leaving Norway right, and so that was part of
- 1:03:51the deal there that the idea of defending Norway also included going and supporting NATO
- 1:03:58at a distance right, And so there were various types of those laws on
- 1:04:05various countries books that had to be massaged. So the job was just not
- 1:04:12you know, the job was political as well, you know, going to
- 1:04:15the countries trying to massage him and say, hey, you know you really
- 1:04:18ought to do that. There was an Essays guy in Norway that actually pulled
- 1:04:23it off because he was married to a Norwegian who happened to be the daughter
- 1:04:29of some parliamentarian. Anyway, it was confusing, but he was able to
- 1:04:34pull the thing off and Norway jumped in the game. So so yeah,
- 1:04:43it was was What was it like working with the Brits with the Special Air
- 1:04:46Service? No, it was great. Ah, that was not a not
- 1:04:55a problem working with the Brits. The Brits and the Americans were the ones
- 1:04:59who actually would run the command and control. They had the ability to command
- 1:05:02and control. None of the other nations had developed that ability and so to
- 1:05:11really you know, do a multiple command control headquarters. And so the Brits
- 1:05:17in the US were the backbone and some of the nations we have told them,
- 1:05:23you know, you can beat the backbone too, but you gotta you
- 1:05:26know, develop, get more equipment, get more stuff. And they used
- 1:05:30the Balkans as a lever in order to improve their capacity and capability. But
- 1:05:36working with the Says was a pleasure as far as I could see. Uh.
- 1:05:42They had a lot of folks with Northern Iron experience which came in very
- 1:05:45handy in some of the operations that that was done. And because the d
- 1:05:53sack you or was a brit Uh, that was an advantage because the sa
- 1:05:59S could talk to de Sacure, who was either Randall Mackenzie or later Smith
- 1:06:12and to get the word to the Saccure, to tell the Saccure what was
- 1:06:16possible and what was not possible in certain ways. And the Brits were very
- 1:06:20much in the unconventional mode on how to you know, how to do things
- 1:06:27along with my thoughts, and so we met it and worked fairly well together.
- 1:06:34Remember the first unit that goes in is the ARC, the Allied Reaction
- 1:06:39Corps run by the Brits. So the first unit that runs in is britt
- 1:06:44and so the Brits pretty much take the bag from there because they had been
- 1:06:47engaged before from ninety two in the Balkans in doing various sundry things, so
- 1:06:55they had more on the ground experience than we did. And so we had
- 1:07:01to depend upon them and some of their expertise when we started. And you
- 1:07:06know, one of the things about Special Operations people, whether it's you know,
- 1:07:11whatever unit is, is they're generally, i would say, they're generally
- 1:07:15highly adaptable. And you know, you look at the SF mission and it's
- 1:07:20you know a to z uh you know, focused on asymmetrical or unconventional warfare,
- 1:07:25but you know it does a lot of stuff. With these other countries,
- 1:07:29particularly the smaller countries. Did you have to set up a sort of
- 1:07:32like a standardization for them? Did they need to get up that speed on
- 1:07:36the police? Yeah, that was one of the things we did. We
- 1:07:40established a standardization policy okay as to what it meant to be a NATO Special
- 1:07:46Operations okay person. And some of these countries were more than anxious, more
- 1:07:54than an adaptable, but you know, they they needed to here's what we
- 1:07:59need be a NATO Special operator that didn't exist, and so each of the
- 1:08:04countries kind of envisioned themselves what they thought, you know, would be the
- 1:08:13right mix fit. So, yeah, we had to put together a policy
- 1:08:17win coordination with all these countries to go ahead and and say okay, and
- 1:08:25then when we we we played around with certificate to certify the countries that they
- 1:08:32are NATO special operations. That was a little dodgy because NATO doesn't like to
- 1:08:39do that really because the countries complained. But anyway, and the special operators
- 1:08:46themselves were pretty good. Their governments, on the other hand, had agendas
- 1:08:55and so a lot of times you ran into the government agenda, which which
- 1:08:59you had to maneuver around, and the government declaring that, by goodness,
- 1:09:05my country ought to be the command to control for this operation because we're good.
- 1:09:13And then the special operator from the country had come to us and said,
- 1:09:15we're not that good. Don't don't do this, but we have to
- 1:09:21tell you this because our country told me that we had to tell you this.
- 1:09:26Okay. So there are just a lot of you know, hamming and
- 1:09:31hang and heeing and hoeing, which has been sorted out today with the way
- 1:09:38things happened. Are there any I'm just interested in the actual arrest operations where
- 1:09:45we detained some of the war criminals on us. Wonder if there are anything
- 1:09:46to stand out stand out in your mind. Well, the first one stands
- 1:09:50out in your mind when we shot the guy, you know that that stood
- 1:09:56out. Matter of fact, I was on the radio monitoring the whole thing
- 1:10:01when it went down, which is an interesting story. By the way,
- 1:10:08we had a special radio net set up approved by NATO in order to monitor
- 1:10:14the Special operations had separate compartmented radio in order to figure out what was going
- 1:10:21on. And we used one of the NATO frequencies in the bird flying up
- 1:10:27in the sky. And when we got on the frequency which was supposed to
- 1:10:30be nobody on it, guess who was using it? A Romanian taxi company,
- 1:10:42you know what I mean. It didn't last long because all we did
- 1:10:45is just powered up and blew them off. But there was a Romanian taxi
- 1:10:50company you had captured that frequency on the satellite and having a very good day
- 1:10:56with it. Anyway, we established the the link so we could, you
- 1:11:01know, find out what was going on and see what was what. But
- 1:11:05the first killing of the first criminal sent reverberations through the community, and by
- 1:11:15the code of the day, they must be retaliation against the special forces,
- 1:11:23and so the special Forces were retaliated against a cheap vehicle in front of one
- 1:11:30of my the safe houses was blown up, and some of the conventional folks
- 1:11:40said, Okay, we're going to have to respond in kind here because this
- 1:11:44is not right. Luckily, the sas ourselves talked the conventional commanders out of
- 1:11:49it, because we said, look, they have solved their bloodlust, they
- 1:11:57have solved their cultural issue. They blew up the g right, right,
- 1:12:00that's good. Forget about it. No one died and they'll forget about it.
- 1:12:04They didn't take out any of us because they didn't want to go that
- 1:12:10much higher, because they didn't want to see what was going to happen then.
- 1:12:15But if we now go after them, this will never stop. And
- 1:12:18so we talked them down from that, which was good. But yeah,
- 1:12:25so, and of course the transporting others to the Hague was always an adventure
- 1:12:31because first of all, you use the special ops aircraft to transport them to
- 1:12:35the Hague. But of course you had to have a you couldn't arrest them.
- 1:12:42You know, this is just like you know the drug operations you know
- 1:12:46in the Caribbellan, you know where the Navy can arrest. You know,
- 1:12:50you've got to have the coast Guard there and you gotta have you know,
- 1:12:57the whole thing to actually do the formal arresting. Same thing with the pifworks.
- 1:13:01The person's identified for war criminals, you have to have a prosecutor there
- 1:13:06at the plane side who would formerly arrest this person, you know, and
- 1:13:11then get on the plane and then fly to the Hague, deposit him in
- 1:13:15the Hague, fly back, and it worked pretty good. Every now and
- 1:13:20then we've got somebody stranded in the Hague. We had to figure out how
- 1:13:24to get him back because we escorted him as well on the airplane. But
- 1:13:29yeah, we had to work out the whole legal dance so that there could
- 1:13:34be no complaints. You know that the military, without any authorities, swept
- 1:13:40this person off the street, abused him, and therefore he gets acquitted because
- 1:13:45he was abused by you know. So it's very similar to the drug operations
- 1:13:50going on down you know, in the Caribbean for years. What you've got
- 1:13:54to do the same deal. But yeah, and so after that, I
- 1:14:01went back and became a professor at the War College for a while and then
- 1:14:08became the Actually I retired right out out of shape, and then I went
- 1:14:15back to Washington, d C. To figure out, you know, if
- 1:14:17I had enough money to you know, get a cardboard box on Fourteenth Street
- 1:14:23and panhandle, but instead got a contract with Booze Allen Hamilton, mainly because
- 1:14:30some of my seal friends were in Booze Allen and Hamilton knew I was around,
- 1:14:34and so I got a contract to go to the Army War College and
- 1:14:39joined the peace Keeping Institute at the Army War College and write peace doctrine.
- 1:14:46They asked me you know anything about peace operations. I said, well,
- 1:14:49I was in the Balkans. He said that qualifies. Go up, go
- 1:14:55up there and write this stuff. So I did, and from there the
- 1:15:01organization has several mutations, and I finally ended up at the end of my
- 1:15:04career as the Deputy director of the Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute, which allowed me
- 1:15:12to go to Afghanistan, Haiti, all of the places the UN and other
- 1:15:16ones operate and survey. That old side of the story. Interesting enough,
- 1:15:24some of my SAS friends ended up in the UN too, as the situation
- 1:15:32chief in the UN Peacekeeping Situation Center was one of the guys who hunted the
- 1:15:39Pifwicks with me. So it's interesting how the special ops get into these other
- 1:15:45jobs. And of course this job, you know, talks about conflict prevention,
- 1:15:50conflict resolution, UH talks about you know, how do you understand and
- 1:15:57assess. Folks, how do you you know, insert smart power, with
- 1:16:03diplomacy and with force. You know, how do you do you know all
- 1:16:08of the things that Special Forces knows about. So how did you take to
- 1:16:15all the doctrine writing? Well? I wrote it, you know, I
- 1:16:19sat down and wrote the thing. Eventually I wrote several of them, uh,
- 1:16:27you know, not only the Army's doctrine, but also the Joint doctrine.
- 1:16:31And then the getting into mass atrocity prevention got into uh, women in
- 1:16:41peace building, women peace and security got into uh, you know, then
- 1:16:50got into lessons learned from Afghanistan. Taking a look at the human terrain teams,
- 1:16:57taking a look at the the female engagement teams, the AGRA teams,
- 1:17:06try to assess if they were worth anything or not. Did our ad hoc
- 1:17:12approach work? And so a lot of lessons learned we were into and beginning
- 1:17:17to extract that before all those lessons were lost, as they would calm me
- 1:17:24out of this thing, just like after Vietnam, you know, where all
- 1:17:28of those lessons were just dumped and thrown in the basket somewhere and we had
- 1:17:33to go relearn them, rewrite the counterinsurgency manual, which I helped do with
- 1:17:40con Prane here at the Army War College on behalf of portrayals. So the
- 1:17:48old time when I established a Low Intensity Conflict Center, it now died and
- 1:17:54was replaced by the Peacekeeping Stability Institute. So it's interesting I created that with
- 1:18:00Nordy Sports and lo and Behote. I ended up in something very similar to
- 1:18:03that at the end of my career and so so Yeah, in about twenty
- 1:18:11eighteen I graduated from the Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute they needed new blood and took
- 1:18:18up teaching distance learning at the Army War College with my current course that I'm
- 1:18:27going to start teaching, which is post Conflict of Ukraine, can we win
- 1:18:31the victory? And so there we are kind of a quick thumbnail. Well,
- 1:18:38Bill, I'd be really interested to ask based on you know, the
- 1:18:42sort of the academic aspect of your career after the military, and you talk
- 1:18:46about these lessons learned if you have you know, what your conclusions were,
- 1:18:51what you came away. I mean it can a big picture, small picture,
- 1:18:55tactical, strategic. I'd be really interested to sort of like plumb your
- 1:18:59expertise on this topic. Well, we aren't real good in learning some lessons.
- 1:19:08Yeah, okay. Two thousand and two, two thousand and three Afghanistan,
- 1:19:13I went in to do a civil military operations assessment. Traveled the place.
- 1:19:18I was able to get access to all the headquarters, to you and
- 1:19:21everything else. And what I found out was there were some problems. I
- 1:19:30didn't discover the problems. The people on the ground told me what the problems
- 1:19:32were, the problems in coordination, the problems and paying attention to what the
- 1:19:38Afghans wanted, the problems not haveing enough this, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.
- 1:19:43Okay, And so what I found out is that for the most part,
- 1:19:47many of the folks engaged in these operations at the tactical and operational level
- 1:19:53kind of know what the issues are. The problem is how do you get
- 1:19:58an institution to respond to that. And when I reviewed my report that I
- 1:20:05did finally published into four, the problems twenty years later were the same.
- 1:20:12Yeah, you know, it was like the old Bust to Abilene deal.
- 1:20:17You know, where everybody gets on the bus to Abilene. Nobody wants to
- 1:20:19go to Abilene. Everybody thinks everybody else wants to go to Abilene. The
- 1:20:25bus says to Abilene. When it gets there, everybody has an argument,
- 1:20:29why do we go to Abilene? We didn't want to go to Abiline.
- 1:20:31And so the great bust to Abilene story was that everybody was there and said
- 1:20:35we shouldn't be doing this. We shouldn't be doing this, yet we continue
- 1:20:39to do it, which is kind of interesting and frustrating. One thing I've
- 1:20:44learned is there is no whole of government after action process right does not exist.
- 1:20:50They're trying to do one in Congress right now for Afghanistan, aren't they.
- 1:20:55Yeah, But I mean that's you know, I have no old of
- 1:20:59fat. But the Center for Complex Operations was established by Special Operations ASD in
- 1:21:10order to solve this problem, and it was established around twenty fifteen, eleven
- 1:21:23to fifteen, somewhere on there. It was supposed to be the marketplace,
- 1:21:28have support of Congress. It was supposed to establish an overall lesson learned for
- 1:21:31the interagency. Never got there from here, and it is folded. The
- 1:21:35only thing it did do was publish a glossy magazine. But it never got
- 1:21:43there from here. And so it's difficult to address these problems because they are
- 1:21:49more than a military problem. Yes, f problems in counterinsurgency EUW and all
- 1:21:55that stuff are more than just a military problem of government type of problem,
- 1:22:00and international folks as well. You got to include the folks together and get
- 1:22:06after that because there's skill sets that you don't own, and there's access to
- 1:22:11certain individuals and power brokers that you don't have. How do you do that?
- 1:22:16And so the you know, there's some examples out there of marginal successes,
- 1:22:25but there's no lessons learned process, and therefore there's no educational process.
- 1:22:31Other agencies come to the War College and National Defense University, but there's no
- 1:22:38place where there's a hole of government process to actually get education. Now,
- 1:22:45the Stability Assessment Review that was completed in twenty seventeen recommended such a thing.
- 1:22:55I'm still awaiting. It was a whole of government sponsored by McMaster run by
- 1:23:01the State Department. I participated in the in the process. It made some
- 1:23:09useful suggestions. It wasn't earth shattering, but it did propel Congress to adopt
- 1:23:15it and became the basis of the Global Fragility Act, which was passed,
- 1:23:20which then puts the State Department the Conflict Stabilization Office run by Ann with Kowski
- 1:23:28Assistant Secretary in charge of the aid and defense pieces of the process in order
- 1:23:35to prevent conflict and to build stability in five countries in the world, and
- 1:23:47that is ongoing now in order to see what that is. That's the latest
- 1:23:53iteration of an attempt at taking a look at whole of government approach to try
- 1:23:58to get these things done. But it's been a very checkered, very checkered
- 1:24:04approach because of course, our government is not designed that way. Our government
- 1:24:12is designed to divide power up among the various pieces of our executive and Congress
- 1:24:16and others. It's just not designed to come together unless there's a true,
- 1:24:24absolute, no you know, no kidding crisis. But most of these things
- 1:24:33that we're talking about never raised up high enough to be a crisis. Afghan
- 1:24:39understand, never got high enough to be a real, you know crisis.
- 1:24:43And then you have the all volunteer force. I think the old volunteer force
- 1:24:49can only handle one problem at a time, as evidenced by Afghanistan and Rock
- 1:24:55simultaneously. Couldn't handle them both. So I got a problem here in that
- 1:25:01regard. How are you going to fill the problem. Well, you know,
- 1:25:04some folks say we'll fill it with special forces. No, it's easy.
- 1:25:10You know, they hit themselves up on some mules and go out there
- 1:25:13and find the local and you know, oh, solve the problems. They
- 1:25:17tried that after Vietnam. You know, just let the special forces go handle
- 1:25:21the dirty the dirty trash on the mean streets of the world, you know,
- 1:25:27and everything will be okay. Just give them some money and let them
- 1:25:30do that. And you know at times that does work. But you know
- 1:25:38it's sort of like they're over there, you know, let them do that.
- 1:25:43Hopefully they do something good. Meanwhile, we're going to take a look
- 1:25:45at what China. Yeah, you know, and the question is, you
- 1:25:51know, guys, come on now. Yeah, I remember way back when
- 1:25:56we says never fight on land war in China and they But anyway, you
- 1:26:03know, if if you concentrate on, you know, stamping out the fires
- 1:26:09before they get going, you're probably going to be better off. But you
- 1:26:15know, there it is. And to uh, you know, kind of
- 1:26:21wrap things up, I guess you said you're you're starting a class at the
- 1:26:25War College now about kind of the end game in Ukraine. And I mean
- 1:26:29you're you're a cold warrior, so you've been around the block a few times.
- 1:26:32You've seen both the politics and the conflict in Europe. What did you
- 1:26:38see happening in Ukraine in the next couple of years? Ah, I have
- 1:26:43no idea. What I'm postulating here is that there's a ceasefire, no peace,
- 1:26:49and that Ukraine retains the dumb boss. That's the postulation for the end
- 1:26:58game that we're dealing with. That doesn't mean that Russia has quit. That
- 1:27:02means that Russia is using other methods uh to reach their goals by subversion,
- 1:27:10information, war warfare and other things inside the Ukraine. H And that you
- 1:27:17know, therefore, how do you how do you deal with that? You
- 1:27:23know, which is a more insidious way of you know, undermining the Ukraine
- 1:27:28than what they're trying to do now. And they have lots of allies inside
- 1:27:34the Ukraine right now, you know that can that are supporting their efforts,
- 1:27:41and so how do you deal with that problem? How do you well,
- 1:27:45who do you use? You know, it's just the special operations guys,
- 1:27:49how can you use them to understand subversion insurgency? Uh? What it's their
- 1:27:58playbook? You know, special forces are supposed to be able to take down
- 1:28:03a country and so they can mirror image. What would they do, you
- 1:28:10know, in order to take down a country from the inside and you know,
- 1:28:15and bring it over into Russia's circle and make it unstable. So that's
- 1:28:24kind of what kind of what they're looking at. How do you deal with
- 1:28:27the oligarchs, you know, the Klandish oligarchs who have reached out and got
- 1:28:32political contacts in the United States and Europe and are now reaching out to China
- 1:28:36and the Ghost States, you know, and are quite sophisticated in survival.
- 1:28:46And are we going to do the same thing there like we did in Afghanistan.
- 1:28:50We're going to go ahead and you know, just support those warlords as
- 1:28:55long as they give us stability. We're going to pump some money into the
- 1:28:59oligarchs to help them rebuild Ukraine, where in fact the money will immediately go
- 1:29:02offshore. You know, all these questions to so so the course of course
- 1:29:09is merely going to say, what are the planning issues, what are the
- 1:29:13planning considerations that you need to think about if that's the situation in the Ukraine,
- 1:29:20Because Putin isn't gonna stop. He is not going to give up unless
- 1:29:28he's no longer there, and there's a big change over in the Kremlin,
- 1:29:32which I don't see on the horizon now because he's you know, bunkering himself
- 1:29:39in. Yeah, he can't stop, you know, he has been embarrassed.
- 1:29:47When they first rolled into Kiev, the Russians were told to bring their
- 1:29:55dress uniforms with them because there was going to be a you know, a
- 1:30:00parade, and according to the economist desk officer in Moscow, he witnessed them
- 1:30:08gathering fireworks at Red Square, you know, so that in about two weeks
- 1:30:14they were going to have a celebration. Well that didn't happen. That didn't
- 1:30:19happen, you know, And so from that point on, Putin is hanging
- 1:30:26in the wind. He can't lose this. Yeah, it's emotional. There's
- 1:30:30no way he's going to lose this. He's going to try whatever he thinks
- 1:30:32is going to win now in order to keep going. And so we have
- 1:30:38to be aware of what's going on inside the Ukraine from various agents. Interesting,
- 1:30:46I attended the webinar of religious leaders inside you inside Kiev, and the
- 1:30:57head rabbi, which happens to be an American about twenty years said that the
- 1:31:02two FSB officers visited him and said that they would provide him all sorts of
- 1:31:10money to help the Jewish community if the Jewish community would start, you know,
- 1:31:15supporting Putin. Well, that's a rich story based upon the programs that
- 1:31:25Russia has put on against the Jews. That's a that's that's naturally the rabbi
- 1:31:30said, get out of here, bums. I thought that was an interesting
- 1:31:35tale. So I mean there's more more to the story. Yeah, Bill,
- 1:31:41out of curiosity, and again this might be asking you to you know,
- 1:31:46prognisticate, but the Soviet Union's dad, Russia is nominally is not a
- 1:31:54you know, communist country. It's it's uh. But we saw in Africa,
- 1:32:00in Latin America, in Vietnam, we saw the effectiveness of communist propaganda,
- 1:32:08uh, and how they're able to spread that. Are those lessons even
- 1:32:12though the KGB's gone, as you know, you have the FSB and the
- 1:32:15SBR now, But are those lessons still lessons that we need to be worried
- 1:32:20about? Are they? Is that knowledge? Certainly? Yeah? Yes,
- 1:32:26certainly. I mean Putin plays by the old book. Yeah, you know,
- 1:32:30he's the old time KGB. He plays by the old book, by
- 1:32:35wetworks and everything else. I mean we've seen that lots and so you know
- 1:32:41a lot of people you know, fail to secure their windows in this in
- 1:32:45Russia and keep falling out of them, you know, and so so yeah,
- 1:32:50I our problem is, I think we've forgotten it. We've forgotten what
- 1:32:57they used to do and how they used to do it. Now they've been
- 1:33:00enhanced by cyber But it's the same game as far as I can see,
- 1:33:06and so we need to go back and review the game of the Cold War
- 1:33:12that they put together and their previous game and see how that has you know,
- 1:33:17mutated in the current area. But their objectives and their approach and everything
- 1:33:24else I see is you know, same old stuff, you know. I
- 1:33:29mean, ah, I mean boots throwing just human beings at a problem.
- 1:33:36You know, it's very Russian. And you know, he's channeled the Great
- 1:33:43Patriotic War. He's channeled it to the you know, to the people of
- 1:33:49the heartland of Russia supported by the Orthodox Church. And so by channeling the
- 1:33:57Great Patriotic War, we need to go back, I think and see you
- 1:34:02know how you know what the mindset is, because I think the mindset is
- 1:34:11in another century. I think Putin is in another century. Yeah, So
- 1:34:16even if Ukraine achieves a ceasefire and regains you know, certain areas, how
- 1:34:26do you foresee or how would you foresee a lasting internal piece for Ukraine without
- 1:34:33Russian influence? Is that possible with Putin still alive? And it's going to
- 1:34:39be difficult. But what I see is that all of the friends of the
- 1:34:45Ukraine need to be smart and how they approach this problem and not in fact
- 1:34:50exacerbate it. And so you know, getting a good plan and a good
- 1:34:57idea of all of these very moving pieces is important, which is what we're
- 1:35:04thinking about here. Well, how do you do that? Rand Corporation just
- 1:35:09put out a handbook on how you reconstruct the Ukraine, which is which is
- 1:35:15good, but they don't go into the potential of Putin undermining the whole thing.
- 1:35:24And remember, the CIA had a big program in post World War two
- 1:35:30to ensure that the Marshall Plan wasn't undermined. Uh And so the CIA linkage
- 1:35:36to the Marshall Plan was what part of part and parcel of you know,
- 1:35:42the program built in Council intelligence mm hm. And so you know, I
- 1:35:48think you got to think along those lines. And the problem is would be
- 1:35:54difficult, very difficult, because everybody's going to be dealing. I mean,
- 1:35:58that's how do you unify something like that, you know, I have no
- 1:36:03idea, but it needs to be in order to give Ukraine a chance,
- 1:36:11provide it with some resiliency against the continuing onslaught of you know, other methods.
- 1:36:23Bill. I mean, you've had a really impressive, wide ranging career.
- 1:36:30Any like final thoughts, anything that I fail to ask, anything that
- 1:36:33you really want to talk about or put out there before we get going tonight.
- 1:36:39No, I think the only thing that after all of this is that
- 1:36:44the individual is important in special ops and everywhere else. A well prepared individual,
- 1:36:50educated and experienced can begin to you know, fight institutional drag and begin
- 1:36:59to innovate in order to address some of these problems. And individuals who are
- 1:37:08networked and who have you know, its experience is probably one of the ways
- 1:37:13ahead in order to you know, to address some of the issues. That's
- 1:37:20all I would say. Thank you so much. Bill. We have a
- 1:37:25couple questions on YouTube and then I'm not sure about patreonal chat one on Patrio
- 1:37:32okay, and Gordbyn, thank you very much. Do you think the green
- 1:37:40light teams is how the Soviets claim of having briefcase news and gr units to
- 1:37:45deploy them against the government to preempt US first strikes was cooked up as propaganda.
- 1:37:53They might have they might have used that as a propaganda tool. YEP.
- 1:37:58I don't know for sure. I never saw any intelligence on it,
- 1:38:01but it makes sense. Global Media thank you very much support the emouse via
- 1:38:10donations and likes. Hey, thanks Global We appreciate you, like uh,
- 1:38:14you know, cheerleading for us. John Ramsey, thank you very much.
- 1:38:17Uh. This is one of the best military military channels on YouTube. You
- 1:38:21two guys are so good at this and you let the guests talk and no
- 1:38:25one to ask questions. Well, thank you, but it's really our guests
- 1:38:29who are the starters show. So uh, Bill, we deeply appreciate it.
- 1:38:36Yet one Patreon question from Sean was there ever a mission you were not
- 1:38:43entirely skeptical of? Also? Where can you? Absolutely absolutely not. You've
- 1:38:55got to be skeptical of the missions right from the get go and try to,
- 1:39:00you know, deconstruct them to make sure that it's a valid mission that
- 1:39:08can be accomplished, because a lot of times missions get created at some higher
- 1:39:14or lesseron of headquarters. By the time they get down to the people who
- 1:39:17actually have to do it, you know, they see cracks in the thing.
- 1:39:23So there's got to be iterative process of the folks who were on the
- 1:39:28team planning the mission going back up to say, who's the yea who thought
- 1:39:31this thing up? Don't you think we are to do X rather than why?
- 1:39:36And so, yeah, you've got to be skeptical of every mission,
- 1:39:41and you've got to sort it out as much as you can, knowing full
- 1:39:44well that as soon as you hit the ground everything may change, you know.
- 1:39:47I mean, I mean I remember going to the OSS get togethers that
- 1:39:53have happened about every year around here several years ago. Two folks from the
- 1:40:00OSS to oh guys of course naturally who were going in there, said hey,
- 1:40:06you know, only thirty percent of the missions actually were heard from again,
- 1:40:15you know, and when we got on the ground and began to do
- 1:40:19something in order to guide us, they had developed the code back at headquarters
- 1:40:28that we couldn't figure out, and so we were responding to them in the
- 1:40:32code that they didn't understand. So eventually we decided, okay, let's look
- 1:40:38around and see what we can blow up, and so that's what they did,
- 1:40:42you know, because they they couldn't get any instructions because the communications had
- 1:40:47broken down. And oh, by the way, what they saw on the
- 1:40:50ground didn't relate to what they were telling them in the UK and the like.
- 1:40:55So, especially in the special operations world, when you get on the
- 1:41:00ground and begin to operate, things are not as they seem. Things are
- 1:41:06not like well, classic examples of Rock Iraq the first when a special operations
- 1:41:15team is going to go on the ground and the photo experts take a look
- 1:41:21at this and said, you know, everything looks okay. There's nobody around
- 1:41:27there, but there's these strange geological formations here on the ground and look kind
- 1:41:32of funny. Don't know what they are, but that's okay. Special ops
- 1:41:38teams hit the ground, look around and you know what those special geological formations
- 1:41:42were a bedouin camp. So they have to go in and get them out
- 1:41:46and extract them immediately. So you know, you just never know what's there.
- 1:41:54So being skeptical is what I like to do, and try to sort
- 1:41:59the things out beforehand so you can reduce the risk as much as possible and
- 1:42:05then innovate. You know when you add, you know, get on the
- 1:42:10ground and realize, well, maybe the intel really wasn't that good. You
- 1:42:15know, maybe there's some things that aren't this way or that way or the
- 1:42:18other. I mean, they had to innovate it both Osama bin Laden and
- 1:42:25then uh you know Sante and all the other things. You know, they
- 1:42:29had to innovate on the ground in both places. That's that's why the Special
- 1:42:33Operations Forces are trained and thoughtful and begin to think outside the box, because
- 1:42:42usually you end up outside the box a lot of times. There you go.
- 1:42:48One more question, is airborne cover insertions still possible in the face of
- 1:42:54modern air Defense's interesting question? The answer is, nah, come on out.
- 1:43:00You got to get there. If you don't get there doesn't count.
- 1:43:04And so we shouldn't be locked into leaping out of an airplane. If there's
- 1:43:11a better way to get there, let's use it. I mean. Julius
- 1:43:17Reimnitzer infiltrated into the Czech Republic on a railroad train. You know, that's
- 1:43:25the way you get in with fake papers on a railroad train. And there
- 1:43:29are Tenth Group teams that infiltrated Iraq in two thousand and three in the back
- 1:43:31of a high lux pickup truck. As I recall, yeah, I mean
- 1:43:35getting there. You know, are times we get fascinated jumping out of airplanes.
- 1:43:42Yeah, halo out of airplanes, laylo ulo whatever, scuba can get
- 1:43:47fascinated by the process of infiltration. I always said that this is not where
- 1:43:57the emphasis needs to be. The emphasis needs to be on the mission itself.
- 1:44:01When you get there, and you get there the easiest way possible with
- 1:44:06the least threat. You know, if that includes riding a donkey, then
- 1:44:12so be it. You know, if that includes you know, just becoming
- 1:44:17a truck driver on a truck and driving in so be it. You've got
- 1:44:23to get there. You don't get there, nothing happens, and so but
- 1:44:27you know, people love jumping out of airplanes. You know, they love
- 1:44:29flying in the sky. You know, that's okay, we could do that,
- 1:44:32but for an actual mission, that would be the last thing I would
- 1:44:38do unless there was no other possible way of getting there. Bill, you
- 1:44:43know, you know what the answer, though, is, is for the
- 1:44:45Army to designate donkey truck and railway badge and then give Musser stains. Then
- 1:44:53people would be fine with those infiltration I didn't tell you I was a donkey
- 1:44:58man, did I No? Okay? When I was in Department of the
- 1:45:02Army, we got a request that the Army or to adopt the mules again
- 1:45:15develop a mule corps. This this was from Center Dole, who was in
- 1:45:25the Tenth Mountain, and the Navy was just bringing up its battleship again and
- 1:45:30it was getting a lot of good press for the battleship. And they say,
- 1:45:32if the Army brings back the mules, it'll get good press. So
- 1:45:36here I am staff officers sitting in the Department of the Army, and they
- 1:45:41come to me and said, you are sink mule. Do it? Okay?
- 1:45:47Oh my goodness, what have I gotten into here? That was only
- 1:45:51one of the crazy things I got. So sure enough, you know,
- 1:45:57I investigate the mules. We got to write doctrine for the mules. You
- 1:46:01got to write a you know, an equipment plan for the mules, et
- 1:46:05cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Well, eventually this gets passed off
- 1:46:09to special forces, you know where they got their mule manual and everything else.
- 1:46:13But I, unfortunately was muleman who had to do this, and I
- 1:46:17got, you know, all of the equipment developers and everything that you assemble
- 1:46:24in the department of the Army and got them together in a room and I
- 1:46:30said, you know, we got to have an acronym for this thing.
- 1:46:31You know, you can't develop anything without an acronym. Because so I said,
- 1:46:39how about by set by set? Yeah, biologically integrated self with PEL
- 1:46:46system. You know, you guys laughed. Nobody in that room laughed.
- 1:46:56They said, ain't funny. McGee. Well, you know there is a
- 1:47:01captain or two figuring out how to put it all on a PowerPoint. Yeah,
- 1:47:04a bunch of humorless sticks. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And I
- 1:47:08mean I got I get invited into mule days out there, you know in
- 1:47:12California where you know, have mules drag out houses around. I could ride
- 1:47:15an out house, you know, I got, I got invited everything.
- 1:47:18Well, I hope they used all that stuff in Afghanistan when they needed it.
- 1:47:24Oh yeah, yeah, I mean it was they used it. The
- 1:47:28manual on how to pack a mule, the manual on how to tend a
- 1:47:31mew that was the manual they used in Afghanistan. So see, I was
- 1:47:35I was out of the box and ahead of the game. Yeah, Bill
- 1:47:43thank you so much for doing this interview and shared all of your experiences with
- 1:47:46us. Man, is there anything you want to plug anywhere, like people
- 1:47:50should come to find you, or where they should come to sign up for
- 1:47:53your class if they're in the War College. Yeah, it was internal in
- 1:47:58the Wark College, so it's a reservist up, so there's no outside sign
- 1:48:00up possible. But you can visit me on LinkedIn if you want to,
- 1:48:06and all my writings and everything are there on LinkedIn. Uh, if you
- 1:48:12want to look at what I've links in the description of this podcast, Yeah,
- 1:48:15I just put a link to your page at the Peacekeeping Agains Stability Operations
- 1:48:20Institute. For those of you listening, it's U p K s O I.
- 1:48:27Uh, that's Papakilo, Sierra October, India, dot Army War College
- 1:48:31dot ed U and then uh and then you can find just searched by his
- 1:48:38last name F L A V I n H. But yeah, yeah,
- 1:48:44there's not much there That LinkedIn site's probably better, okay, Okay, so
- 1:48:48yeah, people can go find you there. Bill, again, thank you
- 1:48:53so much for doing this. Well, I appreciate it. Hopefully I met
- 1:48:57your expectations. Yeah. Absolutely, this is awesome yea, and folks out
- 1:49:04there listening, We'll be back on Monday with a dude who served as a
- 1:49:09j tech in the Ranger Regiment. So hope to see all of you then.
- 1:49:14Bill again, thank you, and yeah, we'll see all of you
- 1:49:17soon. Thank you, Bill, thank you, thanks