Latest / Tech Talks With Kinsoft / Stake - A Breach at the Broker Behind the Broker, and the Closed Accounts Still on File

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Stake - A Breach at the Broker Behind the Broker, and the Closed Accounts Still on File · Tech Talks With Kinsoft

• 0:00
  I want you to think about the last time you signed
• 0:02
  up for a financial product online. Right, which
• 0:05
  for most of us is pretty often these days. Yeah,
• 0:07
  exactly. Maybe it was a sleek new trading app,
• 0:10
  or a high -yield savings account, or one of those
• 0:13
  platforms for transferring currency overseas.
• 0:16
  You tap a few buttons, you check a box that says
• 0:19
  you agree to the terms and conditions, which
• 0:20
  no one reads, and you hand over your name, your
• 0:23
  home address, and your tax details. All in a
• 0:26
  matter of seconds. Right. And in your mind, you've
• 0:29
  established a relationship with exactly one company.
• 0:32
  But here is the million -dollar question. How
• 0:35
  many companies actually got that data? Well,
• 0:38
  I mean, it's an illusion, right? That one -to
• 0:40
  -one relationship? Yeah. When you hit submit,
• 0:43
  your personal information doesn't just sit in
• 0:45
  a single database. It gets fragmented. cascades
• 0:48
  across an entire ecosystem of third -party vendors,
• 0:52
  compliance checkers, infrastructure providers.
• 0:54
  And that hidden ecosystem is the exact focus
• 0:57
  of today's Deep Dive. We are analyzing a massive
• 1:00
  data breach involving a company that you have
• 1:03
  probably never even heard of. I'd be surprised
• 1:05
  as many people outside the industry have. Right.
• 1:08
  They are called DriveWealth, but... While their
• 1:10
  name might not ring a bell, they sit right behind
• 1:13
  some incredibly popular financial platforms.
• 1:15
  I'm talking about brands like Stake, Revolut,
• 1:18
  and Hatch. Some heavy hitters in the fintech
• 1:20
  space. Definitely. So we are going to explore
• 1:23
  what happens when the vendor behind the vendor
• 1:25
  gets compromised and what that actually means
• 1:28
  for your personal information. It's a fascinating
• 1:30
  chain reaction. It really is. To put this in
• 1:33
  perspective, imagine ordering delivery from your
• 1:36
  absolute favorite local restaurant. You love
• 1:39
  their branding. You trust their quality. You've
• 1:41
  been eating there for years. Yeah. You know what
• 1:43
  you're getting. Exactly. But you are completely
• 1:46
  unaware that, like, a year ago, they quietly
• 1:48
  outsourced all their food prep to a massive ghost
• 1:51
  kitchen all the way across town. Right. You place
• 1:53
  your order on the restaurant's slick app, but
• 1:56
  the ghost kitchen is actually the one handling
• 1:58
  your food. Handling the actual raw ingredients,
• 2:00
  yeah. Then you wake up and read the news that
• 2:02
  the ghost kitchen just got robbed. You didn't
• 2:04
  even know they existed. But because they had
• 2:07
  your order details and your address, suddenly
• 2:09
  you are very much involved in the fallout. That's
• 2:12
  a great way to look at it. The modern financial
• 2:14
  product is really just a stack of companies and
• 2:17
  your data flows down through all of them. So
• 2:20
  we really need to understand how these companies
• 2:22
  are structurally connected before we can make
• 2:25
  sense of how this breach unfolded. Let's look
• 2:27
  at Stake as our primary example here. Sure. Stake
• 2:30
  is a massively popular Sydney -based online investing
• 2:33
  platform. They have around half a million customers
• 2:36
  worldwide, and they built their whole brand on
• 2:38
  letting Australians easily buy U .S. shares right
• 2:41
  from their phones. Right. They made it very accessible.
• 2:43
  Yeah. The interface is beautiful. It feels totally
• 2:46
  seamless. But Stake isn't actually a registered
• 2:48
  U .S. broker. No, far from it. I mean, becoming
• 2:51
  a registered broker dealer in the United States
• 2:53
  involves a staggering amount of regulatory compliance.
• 2:56
  Like mountains of paperwork. Mountains, massive
• 2:58
  capital requirements, highly complex infrastructure.
• 3:01
  For a fintech startup in Sydney, building a Wall
• 3:04
  Street clearinghouse from scratch simply doesn't
• 3:06
  make sense. So what do they do instead? So they
• 3:09
  utilize what we call a brokerage as a service
• 3:12
  model. They partner with a New York -based broker
• 3:14
  dealer called DriveWealth. DriveWealth is the
• 3:17
  plumbing hidden behind the drywall. The plumbing.
• 3:19
  Yeah. They execute the trades. They hold the
• 3:22
  assets and they actually clear the transactions
• 3:24
  on the American side. The broker behind the broker.
• 3:27
  So when you open that stake account in Australia
• 3:29
  or, you know, a hatch account in New Zealand,
• 3:32
  your details are actively flowing down the API
• 3:35
  chain to drive wealth so they can legally open
• 3:38
  your account in New York. Exactly. Which brings
• 3:41
  us to the timeline of the incident. And this
• 3:44
  is where things get a bit messy. According to
• 3:47
  the public notices. Unknown attackers breached
• 3:50
  DriveWell's network on Friday, September 4th
• 3:52
  and Saturday, September 5th, 2026. Right. A weekend
• 3:56
  attack. Very common. DriveWell's internal security
• 3:59
  teams managed to contain the compromise by that
• 4:02
  Saturday. But Stake didn't publish an incident
• 4:05
  page until Monday, September 21st. Hatch told
• 4:08
  its customers on the 22nd. Revolut emailed people
• 4:12
  on the 24th. And Stake's direct emails to their
• 4:15
  customers didn't go out until Friday the 25th.
• 4:18
  That is a significant delay. It's a near three
• 4:20
  week gap. Why does it take so long to tell a
• 4:24
  user their data is gone? Well, it highlights
• 4:27
  the agonizingly complex chain of communication
• 4:29
  in business to business breaches. When containment
• 4:33
  happens on the 5th, the real work is actually
• 4:35
  just starting. Really? Oh, absolutely. The primary
• 4:39
  vendor, DriveWealth in this case, has to bring
• 4:42
  in external forensic teams to analyze server
• 4:44
  logs. They have to determine the actual blast
• 4:47
  radius of the attack. To see what got hit. Yes.
• 4:50
  They have to figure out exactly which files were
• 4:52
  accessed. And once they map that out, they realize
• 4:55
  they have compromised data belonging to dozens
• 4:58
  of different corporate partners globally. Wow.
• 5:01
  So they can't just send out a mass email. Not
• 5:03
  at all. They have to notify the legal teams at
• 5:05
  stake at Revolut. And then what? Those companies
• 5:09
  have to figure it out on their end. Exactly.
• 5:11
  Then those secondary companies have to conduct
• 5:13
  their own internal audits. They have to coordinate
• 5:15
  with regulators in their respective jurisdictions
• 5:18
  like Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and carefully
• 5:21
  draft public communications that won't trigger
• 5:23
  a massive panic. So the communication lag isn't
• 5:27
  necessarily a cover -up? No, it's mostly a byproduct
• 5:30
  of a deeply entangled supply chain trying to
• 5:32
  untangle a forensic mess. Okay, let's unpack
• 5:35
  this because the nature of the breach itself
• 5:37
  is what I find most confusing. How so? Well,
• 5:40
  Tribewell's notice to the California Attorney
• 5:42
  General described it as a sophisticated social
• 5:45
  engineering campaign. Right. The reports explicitly
• 5:48
  state there was no CVE, meaning the hackers didn't
• 5:52
  exploit some undocumented software flaw or zero
• 5:55
  -day vulnerability in the code. No technical
• 5:57
  exploit, yeah. And no criminal ransomware group
• 6:00
  has stepped up to claim the attack on the dark
• 6:02
  web. I'm having trouble picturing this. Are we
• 6:05
  talking about a simple phishing email? Or does
• 6:07
  this just mean someone with high -level access
• 6:10
  got sweet -talked on the phone into handing over
• 6:12
  the keys? The term sweet -talked dramatically
• 6:15
  understates the psychological manipulation involved
• 6:17
  in modern social engineering. Really? Oh, it's
• 6:20
  that intense. Oof. Attackers aren't just sending
• 6:23
  poorly spelled emails from foreign princes anymore.
• 6:25
  They are exploiting the fact that the weakest
• 6:27
  link in any enterprise security architecture
• 6:30
  isn't the firewall. It's the people. It's the
• 6:33
  human being managing it. Walk me through how
• 6:36
  that actually works, because if a financial institution
• 6:38
  has two -factor authentication, VPNs, and zero
• 6:42
  -trust security models, how does a phone call
• 6:44
  bypass all of that? Okay, so attackers will meticulously
• 6:49
  research an organization's hierarchy using platforms
• 6:52
  like LinkedIn. Oh, wow. They look for new hires
• 6:55
  in the IT or HR departments, people who are still
• 6:58
  trying to be helpful and might not know all the
• 7:01
  internal protocols yet. So they target the new
• 7:03
  guy. Exactly. The attacker will spoof an internal
• 7:05
  phone number so the caller ID looks completely
• 7:08
  legitimate. They'll call that employee late on
• 7:10
  a Friday afternoon, perhaps posing as a senior
• 7:13
  executive who is locked out of their account.
• 7:15
  Oh, man. And they say they urgently need to execute
• 7:17
  a critical task before the weekend. So they manufacture
• 7:20
  a crisis. They manufacture urgency and they leverage
• 7:23
  corporate authority. Or conversely, the attacker
• 7:26
  poses as the IT help desk calling the employee.
• 7:29
  Saying something's wrong with their computer.
• 7:30
  Yes, claiming there is suspicious activity on
• 7:32
  the employee's workstation and insisting they
• 7:35
  need the employee to read back a one -time passcode
• 7:37
  to secure the system. And people fall for that.
• 7:40
  They do. Once the employee hands over that code,
• 7:42
  the attacker defeats the two -factor authentication
• 7:44
  and just walks right through the front door.
• 7:47
  That is wild. They didn't hack the software.
• 7:49
  They hacked the human's natural inclination to
• 7:51
  trust authority and resolve a crisis. That is
• 7:54
  terrifying. Mostly because it's so incredibly
• 7:57
  difficult to defend against. And it naturally
• 7:59
  leads to the next big question. Once these attackers
• 8:02
  bypassed the human element and got inside Tribe
• 8:05
  Wealth's environment, what did they actually
• 8:08
  get? Right, the data itself. Yeah. The list of
• 8:12
  what was stolen is highly specific. For state
• 8:14
  customers, the attackers took names, email addresses,
• 8:17
  phone numbers, and postal addresses. Standard
• 8:20
  PII, yeah. Right. But they also took the W -8
• 8:23
  or W -9 tax status, which is that required IRS
• 8:26
  paperwork for foreign investors. They got the
• 8:29
  DriveWealth account numbers, which correlate
• 8:31
  directly to the Stake Wall Street account numbers.
• 8:33
  And perhaps most concerning, they got portfolio
• 8:35
  snapshots. Meaning they saw the aggregate portfolio
• 8:39
  value, the cash balance, and the purchasing power
• 8:42
  at that exact moment in time. So they know exactly
• 8:45
  how much money a specific user has in play. Exactly.
• 8:49
  Now, Stake was very clear about what was not
• 8:52
  taken. The attackers did not get Stake logins
• 8:55
  or passwords. They didn't get bank account routing
• 8:58
  details, government ID numbers, or full trading
• 9:00
  histories. That's a crucial distinction. Yeah.
• 9:03
  And there have been no unauthorized trades, transfers,
• 9:06
  or withdrawals reported. Stake also heavily emphasized
• 9:09
  that their own systems, their primary app, and
• 9:11
  their internal website were completely unaffected.
• 9:14
  The incident was entirely contained within DriveWealth's
• 9:17
  environment. Which is a technically accurate
• 9:19
  defense, but frankly, it offers very little comfort
• 9:22
  to the end user. Not at all. Stakes perimeter
• 9:24
  security could be flawless, but to make the product
• 9:27
  function, the data still had to leave their fortress.
• 9:30
  It reminds me of a burglar breaking into your
• 9:32
  house. You've got this incredibly secure safe
• 9:35
  in the wall, and the burglar doesn't even try
• 9:37
  to crack it. Right. They ignore the jewelry.
• 9:39
  They leave the expensive TV on the wall. Instead,
• 9:41
  they just walk into your home office, open a
• 9:43
  filing cabinet, and steal your bank statements
• 9:45
  and your personal address book. They aren't trying
• 9:47
  to rob you today. No, they are gathering the
• 9:50
  intelligence required to run a highly personalized
• 9:52
  long con on you tomorrow. If we connect this
• 9:55
  to the bigger picture, you have perfectly described
• 9:57
  why this specific data haul is so alarming. Because
• 10:01
  of what they can do with it later. Exactly. In
• 10:04
  cybersecurity circles, this particular combination
• 10:06
  of stolen data, contact info, administrative
• 10:09
  tax details, and exact financial balances is
• 10:12
  referred to as a scammer's starter kit. A scammer's
• 10:15
  starter kit. Because it allows them to manufacture
• 10:19
  an incredibly convincing illusion of legitimacy.
• 10:21
  Right. Think about how a typical scam call operates.
• 10:25
  Usually it's a numbers game. They call thousands
• 10:27
  of people with a generic script hoping someone
• 10:30
  bites. Right. The whole your car warranty has
• 10:32
  expired routine. Exactly. But with this data,
• 10:35
  the attack is spear phishing. Imagine your phone
• 10:39
  rings. The caller ID is spoofed to read stake
• 10:42
  fraud prevention. The person on the line is calm,
• 10:45
  professional, and speaks with total authority.
• 10:47
  Okay. They know your full name and your home
• 10:50
  address. They casually mention your W -8 tax
• 10:53
  status, which immediately implies they have deep
• 10:55
  administrative access to your account. Yeah,
• 10:58
  that would definitely catch me off guard. And
• 11:00
  then the psychological kicker. They quote your
• 11:03
  exact portfolio value and cash balance down to
• 11:06
  the cent. If someone calls me and knows exactly
• 11:09
  how much uninvested cash is sitting in my brokerage
• 11:11
  account, My brain is hardwired to assume they
• 11:14
  must be an official representative. Like, how
• 11:17
  else could they possibly know that? You fall
• 11:19
  into the trap of established trust. And once
• 11:22
  they have you believing they are legitimate,
• 11:23
  they introduce the threat. Ah. They tell you
• 11:27
  your account has been compromised by hackers,
• 11:29
  which is a brutal irony, and that you need to
• 11:32
  take immediate action to protect your assets.
• 11:34
  Right, they create that panic again. They might
• 11:36
  instruct you to transfer your funds to a quote
• 11:39
  -unquote safe holding account they control. Or
• 11:42
  they might ask you to verify a security code
• 11:43
  they just texted you. But that text message is
• 11:46
  actually them trying to trigger a password reset
• 11:48
  on your real account. Precisely. And they just
• 11:51
  need you to read the code out loud so they can
• 11:52
  finalize the takeover. Which is why Stake's specific
• 11:56
  warning to their customers following this breach
• 11:58
  is just... So vital. We have to relay this directly
• 12:00
  to you listening right now. It's the most important
• 12:03
  takeaway. Stake explicitly stated, quote, we
• 12:06
  will never ask for your password, PIN, or one
• 12:09
  -time codes. And we will never ask you to move
• 12:11
  your money to keep it safe, unquote. Furthermore,
• 12:15
  they are strongly advocating for users to switch
• 12:18
  to an authenticator app for two -factor authentication.
• 12:21
  rather than relying on SMS text messages. Which
• 12:24
  is fantastic advice. SMS is incredibly vulnerable
• 12:27
  to interception or SIM swapping attacks. An authenticator
• 12:31
  app generates the codes locally on your device,
• 12:33
  making it significantly harder for a remote social
• 12:35
  engineer to compromise. When a company's data
• 12:38
  leaks, telling the customer exactly what a fake
• 12:40
  phone call will sound like is the absolute best
• 12:43
  piece of practical mitigation they can offer.
• 12:45
  So here's where it gets really interesting. And
• 12:48
  honestly, for a lot of people, deeply infuriating.
• 12:51
  Oh, I know where you're going with this. The
• 12:53
  scariest part of this breach isn't just the specific
• 12:55
  data that was taken. It's whose data was taken.
• 12:59
  Stake admitted in their incident report that
• 13:01
  DriveWealth is required by law to retain customer
• 13:04
  records for an extended period. Yes. This means
• 13:07
  that even if a user's account was entirely inactive,
• 13:10
  their information was still caught up in the
• 13:12
  breach database. The persistence of historic
• 13:15
  data is a massive issue. Revolut actually faced
• 13:18
  a very similar situation in this same breach.
• 13:20
  Really? Yeah. They stated publicly that they
• 13:23
  had actually stopped sending Australian customer
• 13:25
  data to DriveWealth by the middle of last year
• 13:28
  as they transitioned away from that specific
• 13:30
  vendor relationship. But the historic records
• 13:33
  were still sitting on DriveWealth servers. Exactly.
• 13:35
  Wait, so I can try out a new fintech app, decide
• 13:40
  the interface isn't for me, delete the app from
• 13:42
  my phone. formally request to close my account,
• 13:46
  and my personal data is still legally trapped
• 13:48
  in a database on another continent that I didn't
• 13:51
  even know existed in the first place? That is
• 13:54
  the reality, yes. How is that justifiable? Well,
• 13:57
  this raises an important question, and it highlights
• 14:00
  a massive unresolved clash between two entirely
• 14:03
  different regulatory frameworks. Okay. On one
• 14:06
  side, you have strict financial record -keeping
• 14:08
  laws, anti -money laundering regulations, and
• 14:11
  counterterrorism financing laws. frequently referred
• 14:13
  to as AML and CTF, require financial institutions
• 14:17
  to hold on to customer records for years. For
• 14:20
  how long? Sometimes up to seven years after an
• 14:22
  account is formally closed. Wow. Why do they
• 14:25
  need it for that long? Because financial crimes
• 14:27
  aren't always discovered immediately. If investigators
• 14:30
  uncover an international money laundering syndicate,
• 14:33
  they need to trace the layered transactions back
• 14:35
  through time. Right. That makes sense. DriveWealth,
• 14:38
  as a regulated entity, has... Absolutely no choice
• 14:40
  but to comply with those retention laws. If they
• 14:43
  delete the data, they face massive federal fines.
• 14:46
  But on the other side of the ring, you have privacy
• 14:49
  and data minimization principles. Exactly. The
• 14:52
  golden rule of data privacy is that every record
• 14:55
  you keep past its active functional purpose is
• 14:59
  a record you will eventually lose. It's just
• 15:01
  a matter of time. The Office of the Australian
• 15:03
  Information Commissioner the OAIC is aggressively
• 15:06
  policing this tension right now. For context
• 15:09
  they recently launched an investigation into
• 15:11
  Latitude Financial following their massive data
• 15:14
  breach. Oh I remember that one. They are specifically
• 15:16
  focusing on whether that company took reasonable
• 15:19
  steps to destroy or de -identify personal information
• 15:22
  that was no longer actively required for business
• 15:24
  purposes. It just feels like an impossible paradox
• 15:27
  for these companies. Like the anti -money laundering
• 15:29
  laws demand that they stockpile the data to prevent
• 15:32
  financial crime. But stockpiling that data creates
• 15:35
  a massive, irresistible honeypot for cyber criminals
• 15:38
  to exploit. It is a systemic vulnerability built
• 15:41
  directly into the fabric of modern finance. And
• 15:43
  it fundamentally changes how consumers need to
• 15:46
  think about their digital footprint. In what
• 15:47
  way? You aren't just trusting a brand with your
• 15:50
  data for the duration of your usage. You are
• 15:52
  implicitly trusting them and their entire web
• 15:55
  of unseen vendors for as long as the law mandates
• 15:58
  the data must exist. Which transitions us perfectly
• 16:01
  into the broader business implications of all
• 16:03
  this. The supply chain domino effect. It's a
• 16:06
  huge problem. We mentioned earlier that one single
• 16:09
  incident at one shared provider ended up hitting
• 16:11
  three major brands across three different countries.
• 16:14
  Stake in Australia, Revolut globally, and Hatch
• 16:18
  in New Zealand. None of those three consumer
• 16:20
  -facing brands were attacked directly. But all
• 16:22
  of them had to wake up, manage the fallout, brief
• 16:25
  their national regulators, and deal with furious
• 16:28
  customers. It is the harsh reality of the modern
• 16:31
  vendor ecosystem. I mean, the phrase supply chain
• 16:34
  risk. Sounds incredibly dry and academic until
• 16:37
  your company is the one dealing with the brand
• 16:39
  damage. Seriously. And what is truly alarming
• 16:43
  is how poorly prepared most standard business
• 16:45
  contracts are for this exact scenario. Are you
• 16:48
  referencing the recent Queensland audit office
• 16:50
  report? Yes. The QAO published a fascinating
• 16:53
  audit on third party cyber risk. They reviewed
• 16:56
  36 different third party vendor contracts used
• 16:59
  by government and corporate entities. OK. Out
• 17:02
  of those 36. How many do you think actually required
• 17:05
  the third -party vendor to legally report their
• 17:08
  cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities back
• 17:11
  to the primary company? The number is staggeringly
• 17:13
  low. Out of 36 contracts, it was two. Two? Two
• 17:18
  contracts actually forced the vendor to pick
• 17:20
  up the phone and say, hey, we got hacked. Your
• 17:22
  customer's data might be compromised. It's a
• 17:24
  massive contractual blind spot. Companies are
• 17:27
  rushing to outsource their core operations to...
• 17:30
  payroll providers, practice management systems,
• 17:32
  CRM platforms, because it's cheaper and faster.
• 17:35
  Of course. But they aren't writing in the rigorous
• 17:37
  legal clauses that guarantee they will be notified
• 17:40
  when things go wrong at those providers. The
• 17:43
  vendors often dictate the boilerplate terms of
• 17:45
  service, and the primary companies just accept
• 17:47
  the risk. So what does this all mean for the
• 17:50
  company whose logo is actually glowing on your
• 17:52
  phone screen? Let's say you hire a general contractor
• 17:55
  to come and completely redo the roof of your
• 17:58
  house. Okay. That general contractor realizes
• 18:00
  they are overbooked, so they secretly hire a
• 18:03
  terrible, unqualified subcontractor to do the
• 18:06
  actual labor. The subcontractor is up on your
• 18:08
  roof, slips and drops a heavy hammer straight
• 18:10
  through your neighbor's incredibly expensive
• 18:12
  stained glass window. Ouch. Well, the neighbor
• 18:15
  doesn't care that a subcontractor dropped the
• 18:17
  hammer. Right. They don't even know who the subcontractor
• 18:19
  is. Exactly. The neighbor is going to march across
• 18:22
  the lawn and yell at you. You hired the general
• 18:24
  contractor. It was your roof. You are the face
• 18:27
  of the disaster. And in the eyes of privacy law,
• 18:30
  that is exactly how data breaches work. To their
• 18:33
  credit, Stake did the right thing here. They
• 18:34
  didn't just sit back and wait for DriveWealth
• 18:37
  to deal with the Australian regulators. No, they
• 18:39
  didn't. Stake proactively notified the OAIC themselves.
• 18:43
  Under Australia's notifiable data breaches scheme,
• 18:46
  if your organization is covered by the Privacy
• 18:48
  Act and personal information you are responsible
• 18:51
  for is exposed, you have an obligation to assess
• 18:54
  the harm and report it within a strict 30 -day
• 18:57
  window. Even if the actual exposure happened
• 18:59
  on a server in New York that you don't own. Stating
• 19:02
  it happened at our vendor is necessary context
• 19:05
  for the regulatory notification, but it is absolutely
• 19:08
  not an exemption from it. Right. You can't just
• 19:11
  pass the buck. The legal obligation, the potential
• 19:14
  regulatory fines, and most importantly, the severe
• 19:17
  reputational damage stays securely anchored to
• 19:20
  the front -facing brand. The customer placed
• 19:22
  their trust in stake, not drive wealth. Therefore,
• 19:25
  stake has to own the communication and the cleanup.
• 19:27
  And as we've discussed, they did step up and
• 19:30
  own it. They were highly transparent in their
• 19:32
  incident reporting about what was taken, what
• 19:34
  wasn't, and the mechanics of how it happened.
• 19:37
  They handled it well, given the circumstances.
• 19:39
  But zooming out, this entire situation really
• 19:42
  peels back the curtain on how modern digital
• 19:44
  services actually function. When you use a financial
• 19:47
  app today, your data is embarking on a journey
• 19:50
  down a deep, hidden stack of interconnected vendors,
• 19:53
  brokers, and cloud infrastructure providers.
• 19:56
  It really is an ecosystem. Stake handled this
• 19:59
  specific incident well, but it leaves us looking
• 20:02
  at a terrifying lack of visibility for the average
• 20:04
  user who just wants to buy a few shares of stock.
• 20:07
  It forces a profound re -evaluation of how we
• 20:10
  view our digital lives. Definitely. Consider
• 20:13
  this. If our digital identities are constantly
• 20:17
  being fragmented and dispersed across dozens
• 20:19
  of invisible vendors, and those hidden vendors
• 20:22
  are legally mandated by the government to keep
• 20:24
  our ghost data for years after we leave their
• 20:27
  platforms, is the concept of deleting your account
• 20:30
  actually a complete illusion? Who really owns
• 20:33
  your digital footprint if you can never truly
• 20:35
  erase it? That is a deeply unsettling thought
• 20:38
  to leave on. The Ghost Kitchen might keep your
• 20:40
  recipe. your address, and your order history
• 20:43
  forever, even if you never order from the restaurant
• 20:46
  again. Thank you all for joining us on this deep
• 20:48
  dive. Take a moment to check your app permissions,
• 20:51
  maybe download that authenticator app. Stay curious,
• 20:54
  and we will catch you next time.