Latest / The Epstein Chronicles / Jane Doe # 1 And The Unredacted Order Remanding Her Case Against Epstein To State Court (10/2/26)

Transcript

Jane Doe # 1 And The Unredacted Order Remanding Her Case Against Epstein To State Court (10/2/26) · The Epstein Chronicles

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 0:05
  Speaker 1: In today's episode, we're going to continue looking behind the
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  Speaker 1: curtain and into the dark shadowy room known as the
• 0:12
  Speaker 1: Jeffrey Epstein Criminal Enterprise. And to do that, we have
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: the motion to proceed anonymously by Jane Doe number one.
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  Speaker 1: Case number ST-19-PB-80. Notice the filing of motion to proceed
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  Speaker 1: anonymously in filing a notice of claim... for unliquidated and
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  Speaker 1: unsecured damages. Comes now... the undersigned counsel... on behalf of
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  Speaker 1: claimant Jane Doe No. 1... a victim of the estate
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  Speaker 1: of Jeffrey E. Epstein... and submit for the consideration of
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  Speaker 1: the court... the attached motion... to proceed anonymously in filing
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  Speaker 1: a notice of claim... for unliquidated and unsecured damages. This
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  Speaker 1: was signed by Melody D. Westfall... and it was signed
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  Speaker 1: on January 31st of 2020. 1. This motion and the
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  Speaker 1: subsequent notice of claim are timely and properly filed pursuant
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  Speaker 1: to Virgin Islands Probate and Fiduciary Rule 11, titled Notice
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  Speaker 1: to Creditors and Persons Indebted to the Estate, which notes
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  Speaker 1: that all persons having claims against the estate are to
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  Speaker 1: present or deliver to the executor or administrator their claims
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  Speaker 1: verified by affidavit to a place within the territory specific
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  Speaker 1: in the notice, within six months from the date of
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  Speaker 1: the notice, as such as the notice was dated September 13, 2019,
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  Speaker 1: and filed on September 18, 2019, and directed such claims
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  Speaker 1: to be presented to the offices of their attorneys or
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  Speaker 1: the clerk of this court. See also, Virgin Island Code 15,
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  Speaker 1: Section 391, Publication of Notice of Administration. Number 2. The
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  Speaker 1: undersigned currently represents 12 victims, including claimant, who has a
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  Speaker 1: claim to be made against the estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein.
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  Speaker 1: On December 3rd, 2019, nine of those 12 victims, including claimant,
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  Speaker 1: filed suit against the above-referenced estate and its executors in
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  Speaker 1: the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County
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  Speaker 1: of New York. See Jane Doe, 1, versus Darren K. Indyke,
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  Speaker 1: index number 9502302. 2019, Honorable George J. Silver, JSC. A
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  Speaker 1: true and correct copy of the summons and verified complaint
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  Speaker 1: are attached here too as Exhibit 1. Number three, it's
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  Speaker 1: important to note that in that complaint, claimant filed anonymously
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  Speaker 1: using the Jane Doe pseudonym. Number four, furthermore, on December 5th, 2019,
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  Speaker 1: Bennett J. Moskowitz of Troutman Sanders, LLP, attorneys for the
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  Speaker 1: executors of the estate, filed a stipulation with a request
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  Speaker 1: to so order claimant's request for anonymity on consent from
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  Speaker 1: all parties involved in that litigation. Attached here too, as
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  Speaker 1: Exhibit 2, is a true and correct of the fully
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  Speaker 1: executed stipulation. Number 5. The only reason that this stipulation
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  Speaker 1: has not been so ordered at this time is due
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  Speaker 1: to the current administrative stay placed on the case and
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  Speaker 1: all other cases of similar nature pending in the Supreme Court.
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  Speaker 1: Attached here to, as Exhibit No. 3, is a true
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  Speaker 1: and correct copy of the Administrative Order of Honorable George J. Silver, JSC. No. 6. Accordingly,
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  Speaker 1: the undersigned respectfully requests that this court also grant claimant
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  Speaker 1: the ability to present her notice of claim anonymously under pseudonym. No. 7.
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  Speaker 1: If the fact that both of the parties in this
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  Speaker 1: proceeding have already agreed for claimant to file anonymously is
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  Speaker 1: not persuasive enough, Courts in this circuit have also granted
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  Speaker 1: such relief, even when it's opposed. Number 8. First and foremost,
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  Speaker 1: this sort of decision is within the direct purview of
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  Speaker 1: this court. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. 527 F. 3D
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  Speaker 1: 358 371 3rd Circuit Court 2008. The decision whether to
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  Speaker 1: allow a claimant to proceed anonymously rests within the sound
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  Speaker 1: discretion of the court. 9. Indeed, in making such decisions,
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  Speaker 1: courts in this circuit have continually applied a balancing test
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  Speaker 1: type approach using several factors outlined by the Third Circuit
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  Speaker 1: in the case of Doe v. Meglis and its progeny.
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  Speaker 1: See Doe v. Meglis 654, F. 3d, 404, Third Circuit, 2011, Meglis.
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  Speaker 1: See also DM vs. City of Berks, 929F. SUPP. 2D, 390E. D, PA. 2013.
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  Speaker 1: Doe vs. Rutgers, 2019, U.S. District, Lexus, 75139, DNJ, 2019, Rutgers. 10.
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  Speaker 1: In this case, it's clear. that when applying the nine
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  Speaker 1: Meglis factors, six that favor anonymity and three that disfavor anonymity,
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  Speaker 1: an overwhelming majority of them support claimant's use of a pseudonym,
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  Speaker 1: while the few that do not are either not applicable
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  Speaker 1: to the case or do not do enough to tip
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  Speaker 1: the scales. See Meglis 654 F. 3d at 409. 11. Regarding
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  Speaker 1: the first factor, in favor of anonymity, the facts of
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  Speaker 1: this case stand in sharp contrast, to instances where the
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  Speaker 1: court have found that anonymity would be futile because the
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  Speaker 1: move-in's name was already widely known. See Rutgers at 5
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  Speaker 1: and 6, citing Meglis at 410, move-in's name, picture, and
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  Speaker 1: home address had been disclosed on a publicly circulated flyer. Here,
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  Speaker 1: the facts align more with Rutgers, as claimant has gone
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  Speaker 1: above and beyond to maintain her confidentiality, which has never
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  Speaker 1: been made public, including by filing her lawsuit as a
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  Speaker 1: Jane Doe and stipulating with the estate to do the same.
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  Speaker 1: See Meglis at 410. See also Rutgers 2019, U.S. District
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  Speaker 1: Court Lexus 75139 at 5. 12. Second, as for the
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  Speaker 1: reasonableness of the harm the litigant is seeking to avoid here,
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  Speaker 1: similar to the facts of Rutgers, claimant wishes to proceed
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  Speaker 1: anonymously in order to protect her mental and physical health
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  Speaker 1: and right to fully and fairly litigate this action. See
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  Speaker 1: Rutgers at 6 and 7. See also Doe v. Roman
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  Speaker 1: Catholic Archdiocese of New York, 64 Miscellaneous, 3D, 1220A, Superior Court,
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  Speaker 1: Westchester County, 2019, 13. Indeed, as opposed to using a
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  Speaker 1: pseudonym merely to avoid the annoyance of criticism that may
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  Speaker 1: attend any litigation, Klayman seeks to proceed anonymously to preserve
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  Speaker 1: her privacy in this matter of a sensitive and highly
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  Speaker 1: personal nature, and will have a lifelong impact on her
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  Speaker 1: and her family's lives. See Rutgers at 6 and 7.
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  Speaker 1: See also Doe vs. Zool Jewelry Incorporated, 2008, New York Miscellaneous, Lexus, 8733,
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  Speaker 1: Superior Court, New York City, 2008. Doe vs. New York University,
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  Speaker 1: 6 Miscellaneous, 3D, 866, Superior Court, New York City, 2004.
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  Speaker 1: Sealed Plaintiff vs. Sealed Defendant, 537 F. 3D 185 2nd Circuit 2008. 14. Third,
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  Speaker 1: unlike Meglis where the district court recognizes there is no
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  Speaker 1: allegation that falsely creates suspicious personal alert or a widespread problem,
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  Speaker 1: here the facts are more similar to Burke's in that
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  Speaker 1: disallowing anonymity would likely deter those who have falsely accused
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  Speaker 1: of sexual abuse from vindicating their rights due to the
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  Speaker 1: stigma that invariably attaches to from having one's name publicly
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  Speaker 1: attached to such a deplorable act. See Meglis at 410.
• 8:13
  Speaker 1: See also Burks at 929. F.Supp.2d at 402. 15. Fourth,
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  Speaker 1: similar to Rutgers, there is a strong chance that this
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  Speaker 1: claim will not be resolved on its merits if the
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  Speaker 1: litigant is denied the opportunity to proceed using a pseudonym
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  Speaker 1: as a claimant will potentially sacrifice a potentially valid claim
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  Speaker 1: simply to preserve her anonymity. See Rutgers at 7 and 8.
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  Speaker 1: The court here should decide in conformity with the court
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  Speaker 1: in Rutgers, where they agreed with the move-in's argument that
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  Speaker 1: the public is harmed when alleged abuse goes unchallenged because
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  Speaker 1: move-ins fear litigating publicly. 16. As for the final factor
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  Speaker 1: weighing in favor of anonymity, claimant is not seeking to
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  Speaker 1: use a pseudonym for nefarious reasons, nor has there been
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  Speaker 1: any allegations that claimant has an illegal or ulterior motive
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  Speaker 1: in her desire to hide her name. See Meglis at 4.11.
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  Speaker 1: See also Rutgers at 10. As opposed to simple public
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  Speaker 1: humiliation and embarrassment, which have been determined not to be
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  Speaker 1: sufficient grounds for allowing a claimant to proceed anonymously, in
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  Speaker 1: this case there is no illegitimate ulterior motive because as
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  Speaker 1: referenced above, identification of claimant's true identity poses a risk
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  Speaker 1: of mental or physical harm and the case involves information
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  Speaker 1: of the utmost intimacy. See Meglis at 411. See also
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  Speaker 1: Rutgers at 10. Doe, 2008, New York Miscellaneous, Lexus, at
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  Speaker 1: 16 and 17. Doe, 6, Miscellaneous,. 3d, at 879. Sealed Plaintiff, 537, f. 3d,
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  Speaker 1: at 189 and 90. 1991, McKinney's Session Laws of New York,
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  Speaker 1: at 2211 and 2212. Sexual assault victims have unfortunately had
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  Speaker 1: to endure a terrible invasion of their physical privacy. They
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  Speaker 1: have a right to expect that this violation will not
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  Speaker 1: be compounded by a further invasion of their privacy. 17. Furthermore,
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  Speaker 1: even when turning to the other side, Of the scale
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  Speaker 1: and the factors disfavoring anonymity, claimant still comes out ahead. 18.
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  Speaker 1: While claimant acknowledges that there is a thumb on the
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  Speaker 1: scale that is the universal interest in favor of open
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  Speaker 1: judicial proceedings, she is not asking the record to be sealed,
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  Speaker 1: rather simply to proceed anonymously. 19. Next, the court must
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  Speaker 1: consider whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation,
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  Speaker 1: the status of a litigant as a public figure or
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  Speaker 1: otherwise is There is a particularly strong interest in knowing
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  Speaker 1: the litigant's identities. See Meglis at 411. See also Rutgers
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  Speaker 1: at 12. Here the claimant is not a public figure. 20.
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  Speaker 1: This litigation also involves a member of a particularly vulnerable
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  Speaker 1: class or the subject matter is highly personal. The public
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  Speaker 1: has an interest in protecting the identity of the litigant.
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  Speaker 1: See Rutgers at 12. Citing Doe v. Rider University, 2018, U.S.
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  Speaker 1: District Lexus, 133-146-DNJ-2019. Here, Klayman alleges that she is a
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  Speaker 1: victim of sexual assault, so allowing her to proceed as
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  Speaker 1: a Jane Doe while preserving the public's right to access
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  Speaker 1: the docket and the proceedings in this case strikes the
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  Speaker 1: appropriate balance between these competing interests. See Rutgers at 12,
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  Speaker 1: citing the L.A. v. Hoffman, 2015 U.S. District, Lexus, 94564-DNJ-2015.
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  Speaker 1: granting move-ins motion to proceed anonymously and observing that although
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  Speaker 1: the identities of the move-ins will not be included in
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  Speaker 1: the filings in this matter, the public will maintain access
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  Speaker 1: to the docket and the filings in this case. 21. Finally,
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  Speaker 1: the last factor weighing against disclosure is not applicable as
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  Speaker 1: there is no party opposing the use of a pseudonym. 22.
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  Speaker 1: Applying the factors referenced in the litany of case law
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  Speaker 1: to the specific facts of the claimant's case makes clear
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  Speaker 1: that that she should be permitted to proceed anonymously. She
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  Speaker 1: is a victim of sexual abuse, a matter of highly
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  Speaker 1: sensitive and personal nature. She is not seeking to avoid
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  Speaker 1: mere embarrassment, but rather to protect her physical and mental well-being.
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  Speaker 1: It is well known that victims of sexual crimes are
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  Speaker 1: often not believed and have their reputations put into question. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: identification of her poses serious risk of retaliatory harm to her.
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  Speaker 1: and thus the estate will not be prejudiced because her
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  Speaker 1: identity will be known to it and their counsel, and
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  Speaker 1: thus they will be able to properly investigate her claim,
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  Speaker 1: as such the court here should find that the totality
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  Speaker 1: of the factors and circumstances favor anonymity. Wherefore, claimant prays
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  Speaker 1: that the court grant her a. her motion, seeking the
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  Speaker 1: right to proceeding in this action under pseudonym in its entirety,
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  Speaker 1: and all other relief as this court may deem just
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  Speaker 1: and proper. This document was signed by Melody D. Westfall,
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  Speaker 1: and it was signed on January 3rd of 2020. In
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  Speaker 1: this episode, we're going to dive right back into those
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  Speaker 1: court documents. But this time, we're going to take a
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  Speaker 1: look at Jane Doe number one and the order to
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  Speaker 1: remand her case back to the state level. So let's
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  Speaker 1: get to it. Case number 08-80804-CIV-MaraJohnson. Jane Doe No. 1
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  Speaker 1: Plaintiff vs. Jeffrey Epstein, Haley Robson, and Sarah Kellan, the defendants.
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  Speaker 1: Opinion and order remanding case to the state court. This
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  Speaker 1: cause is before the court on plaintiff's motion to remand,
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  Speaker 1: DE 11, filed August 18, 2008. Defendant filed a response,
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  Speaker 1: DE 21, and plaintiff subsequently replied, DE 22. The motion
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  Speaker 1: is now fully briefed and is ripe for review. The
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  Speaker 1: court has carefully reviewed all of the briefs and the
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  Speaker 1: entire record and is otherwise advised in the premise. Background.
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  Speaker 1: Plaintiff Jane Doe, a.k.a. Jane Doe 1, filed a four-count
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  Speaker 1: complaint in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit
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  Speaker 1: in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, on June 25, 2008,
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  Speaker 1: bringing actions for sexual assault against defendant Jeffrey Epstein, and
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  Speaker 1: civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil remedy
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  Speaker 1: for violation of Florida Statute Section 772.103 against all three defendants, DE1.
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  Speaker 1: The facts, as alleged in the complaint, are as follows.
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  Speaker 1: At all relevant times, Epstein was an adult male. Epstein
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  Speaker 1: engaged in a plan, scheme, and or enterprise in which
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  Speaker 1: he gained access to primarily economically disadvantaged or minor girls
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  Speaker 1: in his home, sexually assaulted these girls or coerced or
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  Speaker 1: attempted to coerce them to engage in prostitution and then
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  Speaker 1: gave them money. In or about 2005, plaintiff, then 14
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  Speaker 1: years old, became a victim of this scheme. Defendant Sarah
• 15:28
  Speaker 1: Kellen and Haley Robson recruited girls ostensibly to give a
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  Speaker 1: wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm
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  Speaker 1: Beach mansion. Under the plan, Robson was contacted shortly before
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: or soon after Epstein was at his Palm Beach residence. Epstein, Kellan,
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  Speaker 1: or someone on their behalf directed Robson to bring one
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  Speaker 1: or more underage girls to the residence. Robson generally sought
• 15:53
  Speaker 1: out economically disadvantaged underage girls from Loxahatchee and surrounding areas.
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  Speaker 1: Upon arrival at Epstein's mansion, Robson would introduce each victim
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  Speaker 1: to Kellan, who gathered the girls' personal information. Defendant Kellen
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  Speaker 1: would then bring the girl up a flight of stairs
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  Speaker 1: to a bedroom that contained the massage table. Kellen would
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  Speaker 1: then leave the girl alone in the room, whereupon Epstein
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  Speaker 1: would enter wearing only a towel. Epstein would then remove
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  Speaker 1: his towel, lay down naked on the massage table, and
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  Speaker 1: direct the girl to remove her clothes. Epstein would then
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  Speaker 1: perform one or more lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts, including masturbation,
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  Speaker 1: touching the girl's vagina with a vibrator, or digitally penetrating
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  Speaker 1: the girl's vagina, and coerce or attempt to coerce the
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  Speaker 1: girl to engage in either lewd acts or prostitution or both.
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  Speaker 1: Consistent with the foregoing plan, Robson recruited Plaintiff to give
• 16:49
  Speaker 1: Epstein a massage for monetary compensation. Robson brought Plaintiff to
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  Speaker 1: Epstein's mansion in Palm Beach. Plaintiff was introduced to Kellan,
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  Speaker 1: who led her upstairs to the room with a massage table.
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  Speaker 1: Kellan set up the massage table, laid out the massage oils,
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  Speaker 1: told plaintiff that Epstein would be in shortly, and then
• 17:08
  Speaker 1: left the room. Plaintiff was alone in the room when
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: Epstein arrived. Epstein told her to remove her clothes and
• 17:15
  Speaker 1: left the room. Epstein returned wearing only a towel. Epstein
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: removed his towel and laid down on his stomach on
• 17:22
  Speaker 1: the massage table. Epstein again told plaintiff to remove her clothes.
• 17:27
  Speaker 1: In shock, fear, and trepidation, plaintiff complied. removing her clothes
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: except for her panties and bra. Shortly after starting to
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: rub Epstein's back, Epstein told Plaintiff to sit on his back. Plaintiff,
• 17:40
  Speaker 1: out of fear and trepidation, complied. After a period of time,
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: Epstein got up from the table and went behind the door.
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  Speaker 1: For several moments, Plaintiff heard loud noises and moans and
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: believes that Epstein was masturbating. Thereafter, Epstein, naked, returned to
• 17:57
  Speaker 1: the massage table and laid face up on the table.
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  Speaker 1: Epstein then told Plaintiff to continue with the massage and
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: told her to sit on top of him. Out of
• 18:07
  Speaker 1: fear and trepidation, she complied. As Plaintiff rubbed Epstein's chest,
• 18:12
  Speaker 1: Epstein began to use a vibrator on Plaintiff's vagina. Thereafter,
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: Epstein began to digitally stimulate and attempt to penetrate Plaintiff's vagina.
• 18:23
  Speaker 1: At this same time, Epstein was masturbating. Upon reaching orgasm,
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: Epstein began got up from the massage table, told plaintiff
• 18:30
  Speaker 1: to write down her name and phone number, and then
• 18:33
  Speaker 1: left the room. Plaintiff was then able to get dressed,
• 18:37
  Speaker 1: leave the room, and go back downstairs into the kitchen. Epstein, Robson,
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: and Kellen were waiting for plaintiff. Epstein paid plaintiff $ 300.
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: Epstein paid Robson $ 200 for bringing plaintiff to him. Robson
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: took plaintiff home. As a result of this encounter, the
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: 14-year-old plaintiff experienced confusion, shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, and the
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: assault sent her life into a downward spiral. Defendants filed
• 19:05
  Speaker 1: a notice of removal with this court on July 18, 2008.
• 19:09
  Speaker 1: Defendants assert that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.S.
• 19:13
  Speaker 1: Code 28, Section 1332. The amount in controversy exceeds $ 75, 000.
• 19:19
  Speaker 1: Defendant Epstein is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands,
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: and Defendant Sarah Kellen Vickers is a citizen of New York,
• 19:27
  Speaker 1: A plaintiff is a citizen of Florida, complete diversity exists,
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: and this court's jurisdiction alleged to be proper. As for
• 19:34
  Speaker 1: Haley Robson, defendants claim that Robson was fraudulently joined to
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: defeat diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have moved to remand the action,
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: claiming that Robson was not fraudulently joined to the action.
• 19:47
  Speaker 1: As such, plaintiff asserts that complete diversity does not exist,
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: and this court does not have jurisdiction over this case.
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: Standard of Review A defendant may remove any civil action
• 19:59
  Speaker 1: brought in a state court over which a federal court
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: would also have original jurisdiction. U.S. Code 28-1441-A However, the
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: burden of establishing federal jurisdiction under Section 1441 rests with
• 20:13
  Speaker 1: the party seeking removal. Carson v. Dunham, 121, U.S. 421, 425, 1887.
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: Diaz v. Shepard, 85F. 3D, 1502, 1505, 11th Circuit, 1996. The
• 20:17
  Speaker 1: right of removal is strictly construed. as it is considered
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: a federal infringement on a state's power to adjudicate disputes
• 20:37
  Speaker 1: in its own courts. See Shamrock Oil and Gas Company,
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: Burr Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-9, 1941. Thus, when the
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: court's jurisdiction over a case is doubtful, doubts are resolved
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: in favor of remand. See Crow v. Coleman, 113 F. 3D, 1536-1539,
• 20:55
  Speaker 1: 11th Circuit, 1997. Discussion. Fraudulent Joiner. A defendant's statutory right
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy.
• 21:14
  Speaker 1: Wilson v. Republic Iron and Steel Company, 257 U.S. 92-97-1921. Thus,
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: courts have established the doctrine of fraudulent joinder to allow
• 21:26
  Speaker 1: the removal of a case to a federal court despite
• 21:29
  Speaker 1: the presence of a non-diversive or forum citizen defendant. The
• 21:34
  Speaker 1: 11th Circuit has provided substantial guidance for the district courts
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: in situations where a party removes a case from state
• 21:41
  Speaker 1: court alleging fraudulent joinder of the non-diverse parties. In a
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: removal case alleging fraudulent joinder, the removing party has the
• 21:50
  Speaker 1: burden of proving that either 1. there is no possibility
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the
• 21:56
  Speaker 1: resident defendant, or 2. the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: facts to bring the resident defendant into state court. The
• 22:04
  Speaker 1: burden of removing party is a heavy one. To determine
• 22:08
  Speaker 1: whether the case should be remanded, the district court must
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: evaluate the factual allegations in the light most favorable to
• 22:14
  Speaker 1: the plaintiff and must resolve any uncertainties about state substantive
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: law in favor of the plaintiff. Crow 113 F. 3d at
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  Speaker 1: 1538 In this case, defendants do not allege that plaintiff
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts. Instead, defendants argue that plaintiff has
• 22:35
  Speaker 1: no cause of action against Robson. The amended complaint alleges
• 22:39
  Speaker 1: three causes of action against Robson, civil conspiracy, count two,
• 22:43
  Speaker 1: intentional infliction of emotional distress, count three, and civil remedy
• 22:48
  Speaker 1: for violation of Florida statute section 772.103. The court, in
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: considering the remand motion, must not weigh the merits of
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether any of the alleged
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: causes of action is an arguable one under state law.
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: See Crow 113 F. 3D at 1538. If there is even
• 23:10
  Speaker 1: a possibility that a state court would find the complaint
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: states a cause of action against any one of the
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: resident defendants, the federal court must find that Joinder was
• 23:21
  Speaker 1: proper and remand the case to state court. The Florida
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: Fifth District Court of Appeals set forth the elements of
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: a civil conspiracy as follows. The elements of a civil
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: conspiracy are a. A conspiracy between two or more parties. B.
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: To do an unlawful act or to do a lawful
• 23:50
  Speaker 1: act by unlawful means. C. The doing of some overt
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: act in pursuance of conspiracy. And D. Damage to plaintiff
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: as a result of the act performed pursuant to the conspiracy.
• 24:02
  Speaker 1: Walters v. Blankenship, 931, Southern District, 137-140, Florida, 5-DCA-2006. Citing
• 24:12
  Speaker 1: Florida Fern Growers Association, Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616-137.
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: Southern 2nd District 562, Florida 5th, DCA 1993. Here, a
• 24:25
  Speaker 1: plaintiff has alleged that each of the required elements in
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: her amended complaint as follows. A. Conspiracy between three defendants,
• 24:33
  Speaker 1: including Robson. B. To do an unlawful act, that is,
• 24:37
  Speaker 1: to commit the tort of sexual assault of a minor.
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: And C. Robson committed an overt act in pursuance of
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: the conspiracy, that is, Robson Use false pretenses to lure
• 24:50
  Speaker 1: plaintiff to Epstein's home so that Epstein could sexually assault plaintiff. N.D.
• 24:55
  Speaker 1: Severe and permanent traumatic injuries include mental, psychological, and emotional damages. Additionally,
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: an actionable conspiracy requires an actionable underlying tort of wrong.
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: Ramey v. Forlong, 702 Southern District, 1273-1284, 3D DCA, 1997, C.E.G. Walters, 931.
• 25:19
  Speaker 1: The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: the conspiracy itself, but the civil wrong which is done
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: pursuant to the conspiracy and which results in damage to
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: the plaintiff. Citations omitted. Thus, a cause of action for
• 25:36
  Speaker 1: civil conspiracy exists only if the basis for the conspiracy
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: is an independent wrong or tort which would constitute a
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: cause of action if the wrong were done by one person.
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: Rivers v. Dillard's Department Store, Inc., 698, Southern 2nd District, 1328, Florida,
• 25:50
  Speaker 1: 1 DCA, 1997. Quoting Blatt v. Green, Rose, Kahn, and Piertkowski, 456,
• 25:53
  Speaker 1: Southern District, 949, Florida, 3D, DCA, 1984. The alleged underlying wrong,
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: or tort in this case, is sexual assault of a
• 26:12
  Speaker 1: 14-year-old minor. Sexual assault is considered tortious conduct under Florida law.
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: Malachi v. Doe, 814, SO. 2D, 347, 358, Florida, 2002. See
• 26:21
  Speaker 1: also Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394, F. 3D, 891, 917.
• 26:33
  Speaker 1: 11th Circuit Court, 2004. Florida law equates sexual battery with
• 26:39
  Speaker 1: an intentional tort. At the very least, plaintiff's complaint states
• 26:42
  Speaker 1: a cause of action for the underlying tort of battery
• 26:45
  Speaker 1: as a 14-year-old child cannot consent to the alleged vaginal
• 26:49
  Speaker 1: penetration by Epstein. Florida Statute, Section 800.04. Based on the foregoing,
• 26:58
  Speaker 1: the court cannot say with certainty that no possibility exists
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: that plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: resident Robson in State Court, Secro 113 F. 3d at 1538.
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: As such, the Court concludes that defendants have not met
• 27:14
  Speaker 1: their heavy burden of demonstrating that joinder of the claims
• 27:17
  Speaker 1: against Robson was fraudulent, justifying denial of the motion to remand.
• 27:21
  Speaker 1: Conclusion Accordingly, it is hereby ordered 1. Plaintiff's motion to
• 27:26
  Speaker 1: remand is granted 2. This case shall be remanded to
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: the Circuit Court for the 15th Judicial Circuit In and
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: for Palm Beach County, Florida, case number 502008CA006596, for lack
• 27:42
  Speaker 1: of subject matter jurisdiction. 3. The clerk of this court
• 27:46
  Speaker 1: is hereby directed to forward a certified copy of this
• 27:49
  Speaker 1: order to the clerk of the circuit court for the
• 27:52
  Speaker 1: 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County. 4.
• 27:57
  Speaker 1: All pending motions are hereby denied. Without prejudice is moot.
• 28:01
  Speaker 1: And 5. This case is closed. done and ordered in
• 28:04
  Speaker 1: chambers at West Palm Beach County, Florida, this third day
• 28:08
  Speaker 1: of October 2008. This was signed by Judge Mara. All right, folks,
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: just another document in the underbelly of the sewer known
• 28:18
  Speaker 1: as the Jeffrey Epstein Criminal Enterprise. All of the information
• 28:22
  Speaker 1: that goes with this episode can be found in the
• 28:25
  Speaker 1: description box.