Latest / Philosophy / 020 - XX Consciousness
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The Sleeprivox recording
- 0:05Speaker 1: is in the public domain. Consciousness. Twenty three years have
- 0:11Speaker 1: elapsed since William James startled the world with his article
- 0:15Speaker 1: entitled does Consciousness Exist? In this article reprinted in the
- 0:20Speaker 1: volume called Essays in Radical Empiricism, he set out the
- 0:24Speaker 1: view that there is only one primal stuff or material
- 0:28Speaker 1: in the world, and that the word consciousness stands for
- 0:31Speaker 1: a function, not an entity. He holds that there are
- 0:36Speaker 1: thoughts which perform the function of knowing, but that thoughts
- 0:39Speaker 1: are not made of any different stuff from that of
- 0:42Speaker 1: which material objects are made. He thus laid the foundations
- 0:46Speaker 1: for what is called neutral monism, a view advocated by
- 0:50Speaker 1: most American realists. This is the view advocated in the
- 0:55Speaker 1: present volume. In this chapter, we have to ask ourselves
- 0:59Speaker 1: whether there is anything that we can call consciousness in
- 1:03Speaker 1: any sense involving a peculiar kind of stuff, or whether
- 1:07Speaker 1: we can agree with William James that there is no
- 1:10Speaker 1: inner duplicity in the stuff of the world as we
- 1:12Speaker 1: know it, and that the separation of it into knowing
- 1:16Speaker 1: and what is known does not represent a fundamental dualism.
- 1:21Speaker 1: There are two very different meanings attached to the word
- 1:24Speaker 1: consciousness by those who use it. On the one hand,
- 1:28Speaker 1: we are said to be conscious of something. In this sense,
- 1:33Speaker 1: consciousness is a relation. On the other hand, consciousness may
- 1:37Speaker 1: be regarded as a quality of mental occurrences, not consisting
- 1:41Speaker 1: in their relation to other things. Let us take the
- 1:46Speaker 1: first view first, since in discussing it we shall find
- 1:49Speaker 1: reasons for rejecting the second view. What is the relation
- 1:54Speaker 1: we call being conscious of something? Take the difference between
- 1:59Speaker 1: a person away in a person asleep. The former reacts
- 2:03Speaker 1: to all kinds of stimuli to which the latter does
- 2:06Speaker 1: not react. We therefore say that the latter is not
- 2:09Speaker 1: conscious of what is happening in his neighborhood. But even
- 2:13Speaker 1: if the sleeper does react in a fashion, for example,
- 2:17Speaker 1: by turning away from the light, such a reaction does
- 2:20Speaker 1: not fall within what is commonly regarded as knowledge or awareness.
- 2:25Speaker 1: We should say that the sleeper turned over unconsciously. If
- 2:31Speaker 1: he wakes up sufficiently to speak intelligently, for instance, to
- 2:35Speaker 1: address the disturber by name, we consider him conscious. So
- 2:39Speaker 1: we do if we find that he remembers the incident
- 2:42Speaker 1: next morning. But common sense does not regard any and
- 2:46Speaker 1: every bodily movement in response to a stimulus as evidence
- 2:50Speaker 1: of consciousness. There is no doubt I think that common
- 2:55Speaker 1: sense regards certain kinds of response as evidence of some
- 2:59Speaker 1: mental process caused by the stimulus, and regards the consciousness
- 3:04Speaker 1: as residing in the inferred mental occurrence. Sometimes, however, as
- 3:09Speaker 1: in hypnotism and sleepwalking, people refuse to admit consciousness even
- 3:15Speaker 1: where many of the usual marks of it are present.
- 3:19Speaker 1: For this, there are certain reasons. One of them is
- 3:22Speaker 1: subsequent lack of memory. Another is lack of intelligence in
- 3:26Speaker 1: what is being done. If you offer a hypnotized patient
- 3:31Speaker 1: to drink of ink, telling him it is port wine,
- 3:34Speaker 1: and he drinks it up with every sign of enjoyment,
- 3:37Speaker 1: you say that he is not conscious because he does
- 3:40Speaker 1: not react normally to the nasty taste. It would seem better, however,
- 3:46Speaker 1: to say that he is conscious of the hypnotist and
- 3:49Speaker 1: what he commands, though not of other things of which
- 3:52Speaker 1: he would be conscious in a normal condition. And lack
- 3:56Speaker 1: of subsequent memory is a very difficult criterion, since we
- 4:00Speaker 1: normally forget many things that have happened to us, and
- 4:04Speaker 1: the sleep walker's forgetting is only unusually complete. This is
- 4:09Speaker 1: obviously a matter of degree. Take next morning's memories. In
- 4:13Speaker 1: the case of a man who was drunk overnight. They
- 4:17Speaker 1: become more and more vague as he reviews the later
- 4:20Speaker 1: hours of the evening, but there is no sharp line
- 4:23Speaker 1: where they cease abruptly. Thus, if memory is a test,
- 4:27Speaker 1: consciousness must be a matter of degree. I think that
- 4:31Speaker 1: here again common sense regards a certain amount of memory
- 4:35Speaker 1: as necessary evidence to prove that there were mental processes
- 4:39Speaker 1: at the time of the acting question. Acts in sleeps
- 4:43Speaker 1: being regarded as not involving mind, and other acts in
- 4:47Speaker 1: certain abnormal conditions being supposed to resemble those of sleep.
- 4:52Speaker 1: In this respect, it follows that if we are to
- 4:56Speaker 1: find out what is commonly meant by consciousness, we must
- 4:59Speaker 1: ask our ourselves what is meant by a mental occurrence.
- 5:03Speaker 1: Not every mental occurrence, however, is in question. The only
- 5:07Speaker 1: kinds concerned are those which seem to have a relation
- 5:10Speaker 1: to an object. A feeling of pleasant drowsiness would commonly
- 5:15Speaker 1: count as mental, but does not involve consciousness of an object.
- 5:20Speaker 1: It is this supposed peculiar relation to an object that
- 5:24Speaker 1: we have to examine. We may take as the best
- 5:28Speaker 1: example an ordinary act of perception I see. Let us
- 5:32Speaker 1: say a table, and I am convinced that the table
- 5:36Speaker 1: is outside me, whereas my scene of it is a
- 5:39Speaker 1: mental occurrence which is inside me. In such a case,
- 5:44Speaker 1: I am conscious of the table. So at least common
- 5:47Speaker 1: sense would say, and since I cannot see without seeing something,
- 5:52Speaker 1: this relation to an object is of the very essence
- 5:55Speaker 1: of seeing. The same essential relation to an object, it
- 6:00Speaker 1: would be said, is characteristic of every kind of consciousness.
- 6:05Speaker 1: But when we begin to consider this view more closely,
- 6:08Speaker 1: all sorts of difficulties arise. We have already seen that,
- 6:12Speaker 1: on grounds derived from physics, the table itself, as a
- 6:16Speaker 1: physical thing, cannot be regarded as the object of our perception.
- 6:21Speaker 1: If the object is something essential to the existence of
- 6:24Speaker 1: the perception, in suitable circumstances, we shall have the same
- 6:29Speaker 1: perception although there is no table. In fact, there is
- 6:33Speaker 1: no event outside the brain which must exist whenever we
- 6:37Speaker 1: see a table. It seems preposterous to say that when
- 6:41Speaker 1: we think we see a table, we really see emotion
- 6:44Speaker 1: in our own brain. Hence, we are led to the
- 6:47Speaker 1: conclusion that the object which is essential to the existence
- 6:51Speaker 1: of an act of perception, is just as mental as
- 6:54Speaker 1: the perceiving In fact, so this theory runs, the mental
- 6:59Speaker 1: occurrence called perceiving, is one which contains within itself the
- 7:03Speaker 1: relation of perceiver and perceived, both sides of the relation
- 7:07Speaker 1: being equally mental. Now, however, there seems no longer any
- 7:13Speaker 1: reason to suppose that there is any essentially relational character
- 7:17Speaker 1: about what occurs in us when we perceive. The original
- 7:22Speaker 1: reason for thinking so was the naively realistic view that
- 7:25Speaker 1: we see the actual table. If what we see is
- 7:30Speaker 1: as mental as our scene, why distinguish between the two.
- 7:34Speaker 1: The colored pattern that we see is not really out there,
- 7:37Speaker 1: as we had supposed, it is in our heads if
- 7:40Speaker 1: we are speaking of physical space. True, more than a
- 7:44Speaker 1: colored pattern occurs when we see a table. There are
- 7:48Speaker 1: tactual expectations or images. There is probably belief in an
- 7:53Speaker 1: external object, and afterwards there may be memory or other
- 7:58Speaker 1: mnemic effects. All this may be taken as representing what
- 8:03Speaker 1: the above theory took to be the subject side of
- 8:06Speaker 1: an active perception, while the colored pattern is what the
- 8:09Speaker 1: theory took to be the object side. But both sides
- 8:12Speaker 1: are on a level as regards being mental, and the
- 8:15Speaker 1: relation between the two sides is not of such a
- 8:18Speaker 1: kind that the existence of the one logically demands the
- 8:22Speaker 1: existence of the other. On the contrary, the relation between
- 8:26Speaker 1: the two sides is causal, being dependent upon experience and
- 8:30Speaker 1: the law of association. If this is correct, what really
- 8:34Speaker 1: happens when, as common sense would say, we are conscious
- 8:38Speaker 1: of a table is more or less as follows. First,
- 8:42Speaker 1: there is a physical process external to the body, producing
- 8:46Speaker 1: a stimulus to the eye, which occurs rarely not never
- 8:50Speaker 1: in the absence of an actual physical table. Then there
- 8:54Speaker 1: is a process in the eye, nerves, and brain, and
- 8:58Speaker 1: finally there is a colored pattern. This colored pattern, by
- 9:02Speaker 1: the law of association, gives rise to tactual and other
- 9:06Speaker 1: expectations and images, also perhaps to memories and other habits.
- 9:12Speaker 1: But everything in this whole series consists of a causally
- 9:16Speaker 1: continuous chain of events in space time, and we have
- 9:20Speaker 1: no reason to assert that the events in us are
- 9:23Speaker 1: so very different from the events outside us. As to
- 9:27Speaker 1: this we must remain ignorant, since the outside events are
- 9:31Speaker 1: only known as to their abstract mathematical characteristics, which do
- 9:36Speaker 1: not show whether these events are like thoughts or unlike them.
- 9:43Speaker 1: It follows that consciousness cannot be defined either as a
- 9:46Speaker 1: peculiar kind of relation or as an intrinsic character belonging
- 9:51Speaker 1: to certain events and not to others. Mental events are
- 9:55Speaker 1: not essentially relational, and we do not know enough of
- 9:58Speaker 1: the intrinsic care character of events outside us to say
- 10:02Speaker 1: whether it does or does not differ from that of
- 10:05Speaker 1: mental events. But what makes us call a certain class
- 10:09Speaker 1: of events mental and distinguish them from other events is
- 10:13Speaker 1: the combination of sensitivity with associative reproduction. The more markedly
- 10:19Speaker 1: this combination exists, the more mental of the events concerned.
- 10:24Speaker 1: Thus mentality is a matter of degree. There is, however,
- 10:29Speaker 1: a further point which must be discussed in this connection,
- 10:33Speaker 1: and that is self consciousness, or awareness of our own
- 10:37Speaker 1: mental events. We already had occasion to touch on this
- 10:41Speaker 1: in chapter sixteen in connection with Descartes. I think therefore,
- 10:46Speaker 1: I am, but I want to discuss the question afresh
- 10:49Speaker 1: in connection with consciousness. When the plain man sees a
- 10:54Speaker 1: table in the presence of a philosopher, the plain man
- 10:58Speaker 1: can be driven by the arguments we have have repeatedly
- 11:00Speaker 1: brought forward to admit that he cannot have complete certainty
- 11:05Speaker 1: as to anything outside himself. But if he does not
- 11:09Speaker 1: lose his head or his temper, he will remain certain
- 11:13Speaker 1: that there is a colored pattern which may be in him,
- 11:16Speaker 1: but indubitably exists. No argument from logic or physics even
- 11:22Speaker 1: tends to show that he is mistaken in this. Therefore,
- 11:25Speaker 1: there is no reason why he should surrender his conviction.
- 11:30Speaker 1: The argument about knowledge in chapter eight showed that accepting
- 11:34Speaker 1: the usual views of physicists as to causal laws, our
- 11:38Speaker 1: knowledge becomes more certain as the causal chain from object
- 11:42Speaker 1: to reaction is shortened, and can only be quite certain
- 11:46Speaker 1: when the two are in the same place in space time,
- 11:49Speaker 1: or at least contiguous. Thus, we should expect that the
- 11:53Speaker 1: highest grade of certainty would belong to knowledge as to
- 11:56Speaker 1: what happens in our own heads, and this is exactly
- 12:00Speaker 1: what we have when we are aware of our own
- 12:03Speaker 1: mental events, such as the existence of a colored pattern
- 12:06Speaker 1: when we thought we were seen a table. We might, therefore,
- 12:10Speaker 1: if we were anxious to preserve the word mental, define
- 12:14Speaker 1: a mental event as one that can be known with
- 12:16Speaker 1: the highest grade of certainty, because in physical space time,
- 12:21Speaker 1: the event and the knowing of it are contiguous. Thus,
- 12:25Speaker 1: mental events will be certain of the events that occur
- 12:28Speaker 1: in heads that have brains, They will not be all
- 12:31Speaker 1: events that occur in brains, but only such as cause
- 12:34Speaker 1: a reaction of the kind that can be called knowledge.
- 12:39Speaker 1: There are, however, still a number of difficult questions to which,
- 12:43Speaker 1: as yet a definitive answer cannot be given. When we
- 12:48Speaker 1: know a thought of our own, what happens? And do
- 12:51Speaker 1: we know the thought in a more intimate way than
- 12:54Speaker 1: we know anything else. Knowledge of external events, as we
- 12:59Speaker 1: have seen, consists of a certain sensitivity to their presence,
- 13:03Speaker 1: but not in having in or before our minds anything
- 13:07Speaker 1: similar to them, except in certain abstract structural respects. Is
- 13:13Speaker 1: knowledge of our own minds equally abstract and indirect? Or
- 13:18Speaker 1: is it something more analogous to what we ordinarily imagine
- 13:22Speaker 1: knowledge to be. Take the first question, what happens when
- 13:27Speaker 1: we know a thought of our own? Taking the definition
- 13:32Speaker 1: of knowing that we adopted in chapter eight, we shall
- 13:35Speaker 1: say we know a thought of our own when an
- 13:38Speaker 1: event in our brain causes a characteristic reaction, which is
- 13:42Speaker 1: present when the event occurs, and not otherwise. In this sense,
- 13:47Speaker 1: whenever we say I see a table, we are knowing
- 13:51Speaker 1: a thought, since an event in our brain is the
- 13:54Speaker 1: only invariable antecedent of such a statement, Assuming it to
- 13:58Speaker 1: be made truthfully. We may think we are knowing a table,
- 14:02Speaker 1: but this is an error. Thus the difference between introspective
- 14:06Speaker 1: and other knowledge is only in our intention and in
- 14:09Speaker 1: the degree of certainty. When we say I see a table,
- 14:14Speaker 1: we may intend to know an external object, but if so,
- 14:18Speaker 1: we may be mistaken. We are, however, actually knowing the
- 14:23Speaker 1: occurrence of a visual percept. When we describe the same
- 14:27Speaker 1: occurrence in the words, a certain colored pattern is occurring,
- 14:31Speaker 1: we have changed our intention and are much more certain
- 14:34Speaker 1: of being right. Thus, all that differentiates our reaction when
- 14:39Speaker 1: it gives introspective knowledge from our reaction when it gives
- 14:43Speaker 1: knowledge of another kind is the elimination of a possible
- 14:46Speaker 1: source of error. I come now to the question do
- 14:51Speaker 1: we know our own thoughts in a more intimate way
- 14:54Speaker 1: than we know anything else. This is a question to
- 14:59Speaker 1: which it is difficult to give precision. It describes something
- 15:02Speaker 1: that one feels to be a problem, without being able
- 15:06Speaker 1: to say exactly what the problem is. However, some things
- 15:11Speaker 1: can be said which may serve to clear up our feelings,
- 15:14Speaker 1: if not our ideas. Suppose you are asked to repeat
- 15:18Speaker 1: after a man whatever he says as a test of
- 15:21Speaker 1: your hearing he says how do you do? And you repeat,
- 15:25Speaker 1: how do you do? This is your knowledge reaction. And
- 15:29Speaker 1: you hear yourself speaking, you can perceive that what you
- 15:33Speaker 1: hear when you speak is closely similar to what you
- 15:36Speaker 1: hear when the other man speaks. This makes you feel
- 15:40Speaker 1: that your reaction reproduces accurately what you heard. Your knowledge
- 15:45Speaker 1: reaction in this case is the cause of an occurrence
- 15:48Speaker 1: closely similar to the occurrence that you are knowing. Moreover,
- 15:52Speaker 1: our inveterate naive realism makes us think that what we
- 15:56Speaker 1: said was what we heard while we were speaking. This is,
- 16:00Speaker 1: of course an illusion, since an elaborate chain of physical
- 16:04Speaker 1: and physiological causation intervenes between speaking and hearing oneself speak. Nevertheless,
- 16:11Speaker 1: the illusion reinforces our conviction that our knowledge in such
- 16:15Speaker 1: a case is very intimate, and it is in fact
- 16:19Speaker 1: is intimate as it can hope to be when our
- 16:22Speaker 1: knowledge reaction reproduces the very event we are knowing, or
- 16:26Speaker 1: at least an event extremely similar to it. This may
- 16:30Speaker 1: be the case on other occasions, but we can only
- 16:33Speaker 1: know with any certainty that it is the case when
- 16:36Speaker 1: what is known is a percept. This accounts for the
- 16:40Speaker 1: fact that our most indubitable and complete knowledge is concerning percepts,
- 16:45Speaker 1: not concerning other mental events or events in the external world.
- 16:50Speaker 1: Our reaction to a sound can be to make a
- 16:52Speaker 1: similar sound, and if we are clever enough, we can
- 16:56Speaker 1: paint something very like what we see. But we cannot
- 16:59Speaker 1: show our knowledge of a pleasure by creating for ourselves
- 17:03Speaker 1: another very similar pleasure, nor of a desire by creating
- 17:08Speaker 1: a similar desire. Thus, percepts are known with more accuracy
- 17:12Speaker 1: and certainty than anything else, either in the outer world
- 17:17Speaker 1: or in our own minds. The conclusion we have reached
- 17:21Speaker 1: in this chapter is that William James was right in
- 17:25Speaker 1: his views on consciousness. No mental occurrence has in its
- 17:30Speaker 1: own intrinsic nature that sort of relational character that was
- 17:34Speaker 1: implied in the opposition of subject and object, or of
- 17:38Speaker 1: knower and known. Nevertheless, we can distinguish mental events from others,
- 17:44Speaker 1: and our most indubitable knowledge is concerned with a certain
- 17:48Speaker 1: class of mental events. We have arrived at this result
- 17:52Speaker 1: by following out to its logical conclusion the behaviorist definition
- 17:57Speaker 1: of knowledge which we gave in chapter eight. We have
- 18:00Speaker 1: had to modify considerably the point of view which originally
- 18:04Speaker 1: led us to that definition, the modification having been forced
- 18:08Speaker 1: upon us by the physical knowledge, which, starting from a
- 18:12Speaker 1: common sense realism, has been gradually driven through the causal
- 18:16Speaker 1: theory of perception to a view of cognition far more
- 18:20Speaker 1: subjective than that from which physicists, like the rest of mankind,
- 18:25Speaker 1: originally set out. But I do not see how there
- 18:29Speaker 1: can be any escape from this development. End of Chapter
- 18:33Speaker 1: twenty