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05 - The Prince - Machiavelli · Logic Library

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Chapter four, why the kingdom of Drius, conquered by Alexander did not rebel
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against the successors of Alexander at his death. Considering the difficulties which men have
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had to hold a newly acquired state, some might wonder, how, seeing
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that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years and died
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whilst it was scarcely settled, whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire
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would have rebelled. Nevertheless, his successors maintained themselves and had to meet no
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other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions. I answer
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that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two
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different ways, either by a prince with a body of servants who assist him
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to govern in the kingdom as ministers by his favor and permission, or by
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a prince and barons who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by
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the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects who
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recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are
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governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because
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in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him,
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and if they yield obedience to another, they do it as to a
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minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection. The
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examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of
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France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord. The
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others are his servants, and dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends their
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different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King
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of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged
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by their own subjects and beloved by them. They have their own prerogatives,
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nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, who
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considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the
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Turk, but once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The
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causes of the difficulties in seizing the Kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper
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cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope
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to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the Lord has
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around him. This arises from the reasons given above, for his ministers,
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being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and
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one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they
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do not carry the people with them. For the reasons assigned, Hence,
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he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united,
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and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the
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revolt of others. But if once the Turk has been conquered and routed to
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the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is
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nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and this being exterminated,
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there remains no one to fear, the others, having no credit with the
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people, And as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory,
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so he not ought to fear them after it. The contrary happens in kingdoms
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governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining some
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baron of the kingdom. For one always finds malcontents and such a desire a
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change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into
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the state and render the victory easy. But if you wish to hold it
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afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you
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and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have
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exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the
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head of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable to either satisfy
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or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. Now,
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if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Derias,
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you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk. And therefore it
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was only necessary for Alexander at first to overthrow him in the field, and
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then to take the country from him, after which victory dryas being killed.
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The state remains secure to Alexander for the above reasons, and if his successors
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had been united, they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease,
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for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
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But it is impossible to hold with such tranquility states constituted like that of France.
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Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France and Greece,
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owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which as
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long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession.
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But with the power and long continuance of empire, the memory of them
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passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards
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among themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of
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the country according to the authority he had as assumed there and the family of
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the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged. When
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these things are remembered, no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander
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held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to
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keep an acquisition, such as Pirus and many more. This is not occasioned
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by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want
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of uniformity in the subject state. Chapter five concerning the way to govern cities
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or principalities which lived under their own laws before they were annexed. Whatever,
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those states which have been acquired, as stated, have been accustomed to live
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under their own laws and in freedom. There are three courses for those who
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wish to hold them. The first is to ruin them. The next is
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to reside there in person. The third is to permit them to live under
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their own laws, drawing a tribute and establishing within it an oligarchy, which
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will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by
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the Prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and
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does its utmost to support him. And therefore he who would keep the city
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accustomed to freedom, will hold it more easily by means of its own citizens
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than in any other way. There are, for example, the Spartans and
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the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy.
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Nevertheless, they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua,
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Carthage and Numatia, dismantled them and did not lose them. They wished to
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hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws,
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and did not succeed so to hold it were compelled to dismantle many cities
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in the country, for in truth, there is no safe way to retain
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them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city
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accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it may expect to be destroyed by it.
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For in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and the ancient privileges
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as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to
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forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that
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name or their privileges, unless they are disunited or dispersed. But at every
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chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had
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been held in bondage by the Florentines. But when cities or countries are accustomed
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to live under a prince and his family is exterminated, they, being on
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the one hand accustomed to obey him, and on the other hand not having
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the old prince, cannot agree in making one from among themselves, and they
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do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason, they are very
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slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and
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secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater
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hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow
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the memory of their former liberty to rest, So that the safest way is
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to destroy them or to reside there. Chapter six concerning new principal which are
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acquired by one's own arms and ability. Let no one be surprised if Finn,
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speaking of entirely new principalities, as I shall do, I adduce the
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highest examples, both of prince and of state. Because men, walking almost
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always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are
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yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others, or to attain the
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power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths
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beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so
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that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savor of
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it. Let him act like the clever archers, who, designing to hit
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the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which
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the strength of their bow attain, take aim much higher than the mark not
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to reach by their strength or arrow. To so great a height, but
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to be able to reach, with the aid of so high an aim,
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to hit the mark they wish to reach. I say therefore, that in
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entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty
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is found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in
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him who has acquired the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a
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prince from a private station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that
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one or other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless,
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he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Further,
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it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to
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re de there in person, but to come to those who, by their
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own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes. I may
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say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such the like are
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the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having
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been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he ought to be
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admired, if only for that favor which made him worthy to speak with God.
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But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all
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will be found admirable, and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered,
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they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had
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so great a perceptor, and in examining their actions and lives, one cannot
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see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material
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to mold into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity,
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their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity
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would have come in vain. It was necessary, therefore to Moses that he
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should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians,
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in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered
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out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,
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and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
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become king of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus
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should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Meds, and the Meds
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soft and effeminate. Through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his
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ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities therefore made those men
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fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country
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was ennobled and made famous. Those who by valorous ways become princes. Like
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these men acquire a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease.
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The difficulties they have been acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and
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methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security.
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And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in
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hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than
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to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because
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the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions,
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and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
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coolness arises partially from fear of the opponents, who have laws on their side,
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and partly from the incredulity of men who do not readily believe in new
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things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that
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whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack, they do it like
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partisans, whilst the others defend luke warmly, in such wise that the prince
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is endangered along with them. It is necessary, therefore, if we desire
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to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
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or have to depend on others, That is to say, whether to consummate
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their enterprise they have to use prayers or can they use force. In the
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first instance, they always succeed badly and can never compass anything. But when
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they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered.
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Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been
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destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable,
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and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them
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in that persuasion, and thus it is necessary to take such measures that,
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even when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe
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by force. If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus had been unarmed,
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they could not have enforced their constitutions for long as happened in our time to
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Fra Giolamo Savonarola, who is ruined with his new order of things. Immediately
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the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping
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steadfast those who believed, or or of making the unbelievers to believe. Therefore,
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such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprises, for all their
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dangers are in the ascent. Yet with ability they will overcome them. But
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when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,
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they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards, powerful,
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secure, honored, and happy. To these great examples, I wish to
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add a lesser one. Still it bears some resemblance to them, and I
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wish it to suffice me for all of the little kind. It is Hiero
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the Syracusan. The man rose from a private station to be the prince of
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Syracuse. Nor did he either owe anything to fortune but opportunity. For the
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Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain. Afterwards he was rewarded
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by being made their prince. He was of so great ability even as a
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private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a
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kingdom. To be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized
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the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones. And as he
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had his own soldiers and allies on such foundations, he was able to build
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any edifice. Thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he
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had but little in keeping. End of Chapter six