Latest / The Plato Library / Sophist Section II
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Part two of Sophist by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:13Speaker 1: Jeffrey Edwards. Stranger, do you not see that when the
- 0:19Speaker 1: professor of any art has one name and many kinds
- 0:23Speaker 1: of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The multiplicity of
- 0:27Speaker 1: names which is applied to him shows that the common
- 0:30Speaker 1: principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending
- 0:34Speaker 1: is not understood Thetatus. I should imagine this to be
- 0:39Speaker 1: the case, Stranger. At any rate, we will understand him,
- 0:44Speaker 1: and no indolence shall prevent us. Let us begin again, then,
- 0:49Speaker 1: and re examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist.
- 0:53Speaker 1: There was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic
- 0:57Speaker 1: of him, Thetatus to what are you referring, Stranger? We
- 1:03Speaker 1: were saying of him. If I am not mistaken that
- 1:07Speaker 1: he was a disputer Thetatus, we were, Stranger. And does
- 1:13Speaker 1: he not also teach others the art of disputation? Thetatus?
- 1:19Speaker 1: Certainly he does, Stranger. And about what does he profess
- 1:24Speaker 1: that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning?
- 1:28Speaker 1: Does he make them able to dispute? About divine things
- 1:31Speaker 1: which are invisible to men in general? Thetatus. At any rate,
- 1:36Speaker 1: he is said to do so, stranger. And what do
- 1:41Speaker 1: you say of the visible things in heaven and earth
- 1:43Speaker 1: and the like? Thetatus, certainly he disputes and teaches to
- 1:49Speaker 1: dispute about them stranger. Then again, in private conversation, when
- 1:55Speaker 1: any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we
- 2:00Speaker 1: know that such persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able
- 2:04Speaker 1: to impart their own skill to others. Theatatus undoubtedly stranger.
- 2:12Speaker 1: And do they not profess to make men able to
- 2:14Speaker 1: dispute about law and about politics in general? Theatitus? Why
- 2:21Speaker 1: no one would have anything to say to them if
- 2:23Speaker 1: they did not make these professions stranger? In all and
- 2:28Speaker 1: every art, what the craftsmen ought to say in answer
- 2:31Speaker 1: to any question is written down in a popular form,
- 2:35Speaker 1: and he who likes may learn Thetatus. I suppose that
- 2:40Speaker 1: you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling
- 2:44Speaker 1: and the other arts stranger, yes, my friend, and about
- 2:48Speaker 1: a good many other things. In a word, is not
- 2:52Speaker 1: the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?
- 2:56Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly there does not seem to be much which
- 3:00Speaker 1: is left out, Stranger. But, oh, my dear youth, do
- 3:06Speaker 1: you suppose this possible? For perhaps your young eyes may
- 3:09Speaker 1: see things which to our duller site do not appear
- 3:13Speaker 1: Thetatus to What are you alluding? I do not think
- 3:17Speaker 1: that I understand your present question, Stranger? I ask whether
- 3:22Speaker 1: anybody can understand all things Thetatus? Happy would mankind be
- 3:29Speaker 1: if such a thing were possible? Stranger? But how can
- 3:33Speaker 1: anyone who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against
- 3:36Speaker 1: him who knows Thetatus? He cannot? Stranger? Then why has
- 3:43Speaker 1: the sophistical art such a mysterious power Thetatus? To what
- 3:48Speaker 1: do you refer, Stranger? How do the sophists make young
- 3:52Speaker 1: men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if
- 3:56Speaker 1: they neither disputed, nor were thought to dispute rightly, or
- 4:01Speaker 1: being thought to do so, were deemed no wiser for
- 4:04Speaker 1: their controversial skill than, to quote your own observation, no
- 4:08Speaker 1: one would give them money or be willing to learn
- 4:11Speaker 1: their art Thetitus. They certainly would not, Stranger, But they
- 4:17Speaker 1: are willing thettus. Yes they are Stranger. Yes, And the
- 4:25Speaker 1: reason as I should imagine, is that they are supposed
- 4:29Speaker 1: to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute.
- 4:33Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly stranger, and they dispute about all things Thetitus
- 4:41Speaker 1: true stranger, And therefore to their disciples they appear to
- 4:46Speaker 1: be all wise Thettus certainly stranger. But they are not,
- 4:53Speaker 1: for that was shown to be impossible, Thetatus impossible, of course,
- 5:00Speaker 1: stranger than the Sophist has been shown to have a
- 5:04Speaker 1: sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things,
- 5:08Speaker 1: which is not the truth Thetitus exactly. No better description
- 5:13Speaker 1: of him could be given stranger. Let us now take
- 5:18Speaker 1: an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature, Thetitus.
- 5:23Speaker 1: What is it, Stranger? I will tell you, and you
- 5:28Speaker 1: shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that
- 5:32Speaker 1: a person were to profess not that he could speak
- 5:35Speaker 1: or dispute, but that he knew how to make and
- 5:38Speaker 1: do all things by a single art, Thetatus all things stranger.
- 5:45Speaker 1: I see that you do not understand the first word
- 5:48Speaker 1: that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning
- 5:51Speaker 1: of all Thetitus. No I did not, stranger. Under all
- 5:58Speaker 1: things I include you and me and also animals in
- 6:02Speaker 1: trees Thetitus. What do you mean, stranger. Suppose a person
- 6:09Speaker 1: to say that he will make you and me and
- 6:12Speaker 1: all creatures? Thettus? What would he mean by making? He
- 6:18Speaker 1: cannot be a husbandman, For you said that he is
- 6:21Speaker 1: a maker of animals, Stranger. Yes, and I say that
- 6:26Speaker 1: he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth,
- 6:29Speaker 1: and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things.
- 6:33Speaker 1: And further that he can make them in no time
- 6:37Speaker 1: and sell them for a few pence Thetitus. That must
- 6:41Speaker 1: be a jest, Stranger. And when a man says that
- 6:45Speaker 1: he knows all things and can teach them to another
- 6:48Speaker 1: at a small cost and in a short time, is
- 6:52Speaker 1: not that a jest? Thetitus? Certainly stranger. And is there
- 6:58Speaker 1: any more artistic or graceful form of just and imitation?
- 7:02Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly not. And imitation is a very comprehensive term
- 7:08Speaker 1: which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things. Stranger.
- 7:14Speaker 1: We know, of course, that he who professes, by one
- 7:17Speaker 1: art to make all things is really a painter, and
- 7:21Speaker 1: by the painter's art makes resemblances of real things which
- 7:24Speaker 1: have the same name. With them, and he can deceive
- 7:28Speaker 1: the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he
- 7:31Speaker 1: shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that
- 7:34Speaker 1: he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
- 7:38Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly stranger, and may there not be supposed to
- 7:44Speaker 1: be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible
- 7:48Speaker 1: to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured
- 7:51Speaker 1: through their ears, when they are still at a distance
- 7:54Speaker 1: from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious
- 7:58Speaker 1: arguments and making them think that they are true, and
- 8:02Speaker 1: that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things? Thetatus, Yes,
- 8:08Speaker 1: why should there not be another such art? Stranger? But
- 8:12Speaker 1: as time goes on and their hearers advance in years
- 8:16Speaker 1: and come into closer contact with realities and have learnt
- 8:21Speaker 1: by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things,
- 8:25Speaker 1: are not the greater part of them compelled to change
- 8:27Speaker 1: many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great
- 8:32Speaker 1: appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all
- 8:36Speaker 1: their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life. Thetitis.
- 8:42Speaker 1: That is my view, as far as I can judge,
- 8:44Speaker 1: although at my age, I may be one of those
- 8:47Speaker 1: who see things at a distance only stranger, And the
- 8:52Speaker 1: wish of all of us who are your friends is
- 8:55Speaker 1: and always will be to bring you as near to
- 8:57Speaker 1: the truth as we can without the sad reality. And
- 9:01Speaker 1: now I should like you to tell me whether the
- 9:04Speaker 1: Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being?
- 9:09Speaker 1: Or are we still disposed to think that he may
- 9:12Speaker 1: have a true knowledge of the various matters about which
- 9:15Speaker 1: he disputes Thetitas? But how can he stranger? Is there
- 9:20Speaker 1: any doubt after what has been said, that he is
- 9:23Speaker 1: to be located in one of the divisions of children's play. Stranger,
- 9:28Speaker 1: then we must place him in the class of magicians
- 9:31Speaker 1: and mimics Thetitus. Certainly we must, Stranger. And now our
- 9:38Speaker 1: business is not to let the animal out, for we
- 9:41Speaker 1: have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and
- 9:44Speaker 1: there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape, thettus.
- 9:49Speaker 1: What is that, stranger, the inference that he is a juggler?
- 9:54Speaker 1: Thettus precisely my own opinion of him. Stranger. Then clearly
- 10:01Speaker 1: we ought, as soon as possible to divide the image
- 10:04Speaker 1: making art and go down into the net, and if
- 10:08Speaker 1: the sophie does not run away from us, to seize
- 10:11Speaker 1: him according to orders, and deliver him over to Reason,
- 10:14Speaker 1: who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the
- 10:17Speaker 1: capture of him. And if he creeps into the recesses
- 10:21Speaker 1: of the imitative art and secrets himself in one of them,
- 10:25Speaker 1: to divide again and follow him up until in some
- 10:28Speaker 1: sub section of imitation he is caught. For our method
- 10:32Speaker 1: of tackling each and all is one which neither he
- 10:36Speaker 1: nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph, Theaetetus
- 10:41Speaker 1: well said, and let us do as you propose, Stranger. Well, then,
- 10:47Speaker 1: pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that
- 10:51Speaker 1: I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but
- 10:55Speaker 1: I am not as yet able to see in which
- 10:58Speaker 1: of them the desired form is to be found. Thetitus,
- 11:02Speaker 1: will you tell me first, what are the two divisions
- 11:05Speaker 1: of which you are speaking, Stranger. One is the art
- 11:10Speaker 1: of likeness making. Generally, a likeness of anything is made
- 11:14Speaker 1: by producing a copy, which is executed according to the
- 11:17Speaker 1: proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth,
- 11:22Speaker 1: each thing receiving also its appropriate color, thetatus. Is not
- 11:28Speaker 1: this always the aim of imitation stranger, not always in
- 11:33Speaker 1: works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of
- 11:37Speaker 1: any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception. For
- 11:41Speaker 1: if artists were to give the true proportions of their
- 11:44Speaker 1: fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would
- 11:48Speaker 1: appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower,
- 11:51Speaker 1: which is nearer. And so they give up the truth
- 11:54Speaker 1: in their images and make only the proportions which appear
- 11:58Speaker 1: to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones. Thettus quite true stranger,
- 12:05Speaker 1: and that which being other is also like. May we
- 12:09Speaker 1: not fairly call a likeness or image thettus yes stranger?
- 12:16Speaker 1: And may we not, as I did just now, call
- 12:20Speaker 1: that part of the imititive art which is concerned with
- 12:23Speaker 1: making such images, the art of likeness making thetitus. Let
- 12:29Speaker 1: that be the name stranger? And what shall we call
- 12:34Speaker 1: those resemblances of the beautiful which appear such owing to
- 12:38Speaker 1: the unfavorable position of the spectator. Whereas if a person
- 12:42Speaker 1: had the power of getting a correct view of works
- 12:44Speaker 1: of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that
- 12:48Speaker 1: to which they profess to be like. May we not
- 12:51Speaker 1: call these appearances, since they appear only and are not
- 12:54Speaker 1: really like Thetitus certainly stranger. There is a great deal
- 13:01Speaker 1: of this kind of thing in painting and in all imitation, thetatus,
- 13:07Speaker 1: of course stranger. And may we not fairly call the
- 13:11Speaker 1: sort of art which produces an appearance and not an
- 13:14Speaker 1: image fantastic art, thettus most fairly stranger. These, then, are
- 13:21Speaker 1: the two kinds of image making, the art of making
- 13:25Speaker 1: likenesses and fantastic or the art of making appearances. Thetatus
- 13:32Speaker 1: true stranger. I was doubtful before in which of them
- 13:36Speaker 1: I should place the sophist, Nor am I even now
- 13:40Speaker 1: able to see clearly verily he is a wonderful and
- 13:43Speaker 1: inscrutable creature, and now in the cleverest manner he has
- 13:48Speaker 1: got into an impossible place. Thetatus, Yes, he has stranger.
- 13:55Speaker 1: Do you speak advisedly or are you carried away at
- 13:58Speaker 1: the moment by the habit of a send into giving
- 14:01Speaker 1: a hasty answer Thetitis, May I ask to what you
- 14:05Speaker 1: are referring stranger, My dear friend, we are engaged in
- 14:10Speaker 1: a very difficult speculation. There can be no doubt of that,
- 14:14Speaker 1: For how a thing can appear and seem and not be,
- 14:18Speaker 1: Or how a man can say a thing which is
- 14:21Speaker 1: not true has always been and still remains a very
- 14:24Speaker 1: perplexing question. Can anyone say or think that falsehood really
- 14:29Speaker 1: exists and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, thetatus
- 14:35Speaker 1: the task is a difficult one, thettus, Why, stranger, he
- 14:41Speaker 1: who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert
- 14:45Speaker 1: the being of not being, for this is implied in
- 14:48Speaker 1: the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days
- 14:52Speaker 1: when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against
- 14:56Speaker 1: this doctrine, and to the end of his life he
- 14:59Speaker 1: continued to inculcate the same lesson, always repeating both in
- 15:03Speaker 1: verse and out of verse. Keep your mind from this
- 15:06Speaker 1: way of inquiry, for never will you show that not
- 15:10Speaker 1: being is such? Is his testimony, which is confirmed by
- 15:15Speaker 1: the very expression, when sifted a little, Would you object
- 15:19Speaker 1: to begin with the consideration of the words themselves? Thettus?
- 15:25Speaker 1: Never mind about me. I am only desirous that you
- 15:27Speaker 1: should carry on the argument in the best way, and
- 15:31Speaker 1: that you should take me with you. Stranger, Very good,
- 15:35Speaker 1: And now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden
- 15:38Speaker 1: word not being thetitis certainly we do stranger. Let us
- 15:46Speaker 1: be serious, then, and consider the question neither in strife
- 15:50Speaker 1: nor play. Suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides
- 15:54Speaker 1: was asked to what is the term not being to
- 15:57Speaker 1: be applied? Do you know what sort of a subject
- 16:00Speaker 1: he would single out in reply? And what answer he
- 16:03Speaker 1: would make to the inquirer thetitus. That is a difficult question,
- 16:08Speaker 1: and one not to be answered at all by a
- 16:11Speaker 1: person like myself, Stranger. There is, at any rate no
- 16:16Speaker 1: difficulty in seeing that the predicate not being is not
- 16:20Speaker 1: applicable to any being. Thetitus none certainly stranger, and if
- 16:27Speaker 1: not to being, then not to something thettus, of course
- 16:32Speaker 1: not stranger. It is also plain that in speaking of something,
- 16:37Speaker 1: we speak of being. For to speak of an abstract
- 16:41Speaker 1: something naked and isolated from all being is impossible thetitus impossible, Stranger,
- 16:49Speaker 1: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says
- 16:53Speaker 1: something must say some one thing thetitus, yes, stranger. Some
- 17:00Speaker 1: In the singular t you would say, is the sign
- 17:03Speaker 1: of one some, in the duel tine of two some,
- 17:09Speaker 1: in the plural tines of many thetatus exactly stranger. Then
- 17:16Speaker 1: he who says not something must say absolutely nothing theatatus
- 17:23Speaker 1: most assuredly stranger. And as we cannot admit that a
- 17:27Speaker 1: man speaks and says nothing, he who says not being
- 17:31Speaker 1: does not speak at all thetatus. The difficulty of the
- 17:36Speaker 1: argument can no further go stranger. Not yet, my friend,
- 17:41Speaker 1: is the time for such a word, For there still
- 17:44Speaker 1: remains of all perplexities, the first and greatest, touching the
- 17:48Speaker 1: very foundation of the matter, thetitus. What do you mean,
- 17:53Speaker 1: did not be afraid to speak? Stranger? To that which
- 17:57Speaker 1: is may be attributed some other thing which is is
- 18:01Speaker 1: thettus certainly stranger. But can anything which is be attributed
- 18:06Speaker 1: to that which is not thetitis impossible? Stranger, And all
- 18:12Speaker 1: number is to be reckoned among things which are thetitis? Yes,
- 18:18Speaker 1: surely number. If anything has a real existence stranger, then
- 18:24Speaker 1: we must not attempt to attribute to not being number,
- 18:27Speaker 1: either in the singular or plural thetitus. The argument implies
- 18:32Speaker 1: that we should be wrong in doing so. Stranger. But
- 18:36Speaker 1: how can a man either express in words or even
- 18:39Speaker 1: conceive in thought things which are not or a thing
- 18:44Speaker 1: which is not without number? Thetitis. How indeed, stranger. When
- 18:51Speaker 1: we speak of things which are not, are we not
- 18:53Speaker 1: attributing plurality to not being? Thetitis? Certainly stranger. But on
- 19:00Speaker 1: the other hand, when we see what is not, do
- 19:04Speaker 1: we not attribute unity thettus manifestly stranger. Nevertheless, we maintain
- 19:12Speaker 1: that you may not and ought not to attribute being
- 19:15Speaker 1: to not being Thetitus most true? Stranger. Do you see
- 19:21Speaker 1: then that not being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered,
- 19:26Speaker 1: or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable
- 19:33Speaker 1: Thetitus Quite true, Stranger? But if so, I was wrong
- 19:38Speaker 1: in telling you just now that the difficulty which was
- 19:42Speaker 1: coming is the greatest of all Thetitus? What is there
- 19:47Speaker 1: a greater still behind, Stranger? Well, I am surprised, after
- 19:52Speaker 1: what has been said already, that you do not see
- 19:54Speaker 1: the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion
- 19:57Speaker 1: of not being is involved, for he is compelled to
- 20:01Speaker 1: contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt Thetitus.
- 20:06Speaker 1: What do you mean, speak more clearly, Stranger? Do not
- 20:11Speaker 1: expect clearness from me? For I who maintain that not
- 20:14Speaker 1: being has no part either in the one or many
- 20:18Speaker 1: just now spoke and am still speaking of not being
- 20:21Speaker 1: as one? For I say, not being? Do you understand Thetitus? Yes, stranger?
- 20:30Speaker 1: And a little while ago I said that not being
- 20:33Speaker 1: is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable. Do you follow Thetitus I do,
- 20:41Speaker 1: after a fashion, stranger? When I introduced the word is,
- 20:46Speaker 1: did I not contradict what I said before Thetitus clearly stranger?
- 20:52Speaker 1: And in using the singular verb, did I not speak
- 20:55Speaker 1: of not being as one Thetitus? Yes, stranger? And when
- 21:01Speaker 1: I spoke of not being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable,
- 21:07Speaker 1: in using each of these words in the singular, did
- 21:10Speaker 1: I not refer to not being as one? Thettus certainly stranger.
- 21:16Speaker 1: And yet we say that strictly speaking, it should not
- 21:19Speaker 1: be defined either as one or many, and should not
- 21:23Speaker 1: even be called it, for the use of the word
- 21:26Speaker 1: it would imply a form of unity. Thettus quite true, stranger.
- 21:33Speaker 1: How then, can anyone put any faith in me? For now,
- 21:37Speaker 1: as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not being.
- 21:41Speaker 1: And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to
- 21:44Speaker 1: me for the right way of speaking about not being.
- 21:48Speaker 1: But come, let us try the experiment with you, Thetitus,
- 21:52Speaker 1: What do you mean, Stranger, Make a noble effort, as
- 21:57Speaker 1: becomes youth, and endeavor with all your might to speak
- 22:00Speaker 1: of not being in a right manner without introducing into
- 22:04Speaker 1: it either existence or unity or plurality, Thettus, It would
- 22:10Speaker 1: be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task.
- 22:13Speaker 1: When I see you thus discomfited, Stranger, say no more
- 22:18Speaker 1: of ourselves. But until we find someone or other who
- 22:22Speaker 1: can speak of not being without number, we must acknowledge
- 22:26Speaker 1: that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not
- 22:29Speaker 1: be got out of his hole Thettus most true, Stranger.
- 22:35Speaker 1: And if we say to him that he professes an
- 22:38Speaker 1: art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and
- 22:41Speaker 1: retort our argument upon ourselves. And when we call him
- 22:45Speaker 1: an image maker, he will say, pray, what do you
- 22:48Speaker 1: mean at all by an image? And I should like
- 22:52Speaker 1: to know, Thettus, how we can possibly answer the younger's question, Thetitus.
- 22:58Speaker 1: We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are
- 23:01Speaker 1: reflected in water or in mirrors, also of sculptures, pictures,
- 23:05Speaker 1: and other duplicates. Stranger, I see Thetitus, that you have
- 23:11Speaker 1: never made the acquaintance of the sophist Thetitus. Why do
- 23:16Speaker 1: you think so stranger? He will make believe to have
- 23:20Speaker 1: his eyes shut, or to have none, Thetitus. What do
- 23:24Speaker 1: you mean, stranger? When you tell him of something existing
- 23:28Speaker 1: in a mirror or in sculpture, and address him as
- 23:32Speaker 1: though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn,
- 23:35Speaker 1: and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams,
- 23:39Speaker 1: or of sight at all. He will say that he
- 23:41Speaker 1: is asking about an idea, Thetitus. What can he mean, stranger?
- 23:48Speaker 1: The common notion pervading all these objects which you speak
- 23:52Speaker 1: of as many, and yet called by the single name
- 23:54Speaker 1: of image, as though it were the unity under which
- 23:57Speaker 1: they were all included? Will you maintain your ground against him? Thetitis?
- 24:04Speaker 1: How stranger? Can I describe an image except as something
- 24:07Speaker 1: fashioned in the likeness of the true? Stranger? And do
- 24:12Speaker 1: you mean this something to be some other true thing?
- 24:15Speaker 1: Or what do you mean? Thetitis? Certainly not another true thing,
- 24:21Speaker 1: but only a resemblance, stranger? And you mean by true
- 24:25Speaker 1: that which really is Thetitus? Yes, stranger. And the not
- 24:32Speaker 1: true is that which is the opposite of the true
- 24:35Speaker 1: Thetitus exactly, Stranger. A resemblance, then, is not really real if,
- 24:42Speaker 1: as you say, not true Theatitus. Nay, But it is
- 24:47Speaker 1: in a certain sense, Stranger. You mean to say, not
- 24:51Speaker 1: in a true sense, Theatitus. Yes, it is in reality
- 24:56Speaker 1: only an image. Stranger. Then what we call an image
- 25:01Speaker 1: is in reality really unreal? Thetitus. In what a strange
- 25:06Speaker 1: complication of being and not being? We are involved, Stranger, Strange,
- 25:13Speaker 1: I should think. So. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites,
- 25:17Speaker 1: the many headed sophist has compelled us, quite against our will,
- 25:21Speaker 1: to admit the existence of not being Thetitus. Yes, indeed,
- 25:27Speaker 1: I see Stranger. The difficulty is how to define his
- 25:31Speaker 1: art without falling into a contradiction Thetetus. How do you mean?
- 25:37Speaker 1: And where does the danger lie? Stranger? When we say
- 25:42Speaker 1: that he deceives us with an illusion and that his
- 25:45Speaker 1: art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is
- 25:48Speaker 1: led by his art to think falsely? Or what do
- 25:51Speaker 1: we mean? Thetitus? There is nothing else to be said, Stranger. Again,
- 25:58Speaker 1: false opinion is that form of appearinion which thinks the
- 26:01Speaker 1: opposite of the truth. You would assent Thetitus. Certainly Stranger.
- 26:07Speaker 1: You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not? Thetitus.
- 26:12Speaker 1: Of course, Stranger does false opinion think that things which
- 26:17Speaker 1: are not are not, or that in a certain sense
- 26:20Speaker 1: they are Thetitus. Things that are not must be imagined
- 26:26Speaker 1: to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of
- 26:29Speaker 1: falsehood is to be possible. Stranger and does not false
- 26:33Speaker 1: opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do
- 26:37Speaker 1: not exist at all? Thettus, Yes, Stranger, And here again
- 26:44Speaker 1: is falsehood Thetitus falsehood, Yes, Stranger, And in like manner,
- 26:51Speaker 1: a false proposition will be deemed to be one which
- 26:54Speaker 1: asserts the non existence of things which are and the
- 26:57Speaker 1: existence of things which are not Thetitus. There is no
- 27:02Speaker 1: other way in which a false proposition can arise, Stranger,
- 27:06Speaker 1: There is not. But the Sophist will deny these statements,
- 27:10Speaker 1: And indeed, how can any rational man assent to them,
- 27:14Speaker 1: when the very expressions which we have just used were
- 27:17Speaker 1: before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable.
- 27:24Speaker 1: Do you see his point? Thetatus Thetitus. Of course, he
- 27:29Speaker 1: will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard
- 27:33Speaker 1: the assertion that falsehood exists in opinion and in words.
- 27:37Speaker 1: For in maintaining this we are compelled over and over
- 27:41Speaker 1: again to assert being of not being, which we admitted
- 27:44Speaker 1: just now to be an utter impossibility. Stranger, how well
- 27:49Speaker 1: you remember? And now it is high time to hold
- 27:52Speaker 1: a consultation as to what we ought to do about
- 27:55Speaker 1: the Sophist, For if we persist in looking for him
- 27:58Speaker 1: in the class of false works and magicians, you see
- 28:02Speaker 1: that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will
- 28:06Speaker 1: arise are very numerous and obvious. Thetitus. They are, indeed, Stranger.
- 28:13Speaker 1: We have gone through but a very small portion of them,
- 28:16Speaker 1: and they are really infinite Thettus. If that is the case,
- 28:21Speaker 1: we cannot possibly catch the Sophist, Stranger, Shall we then
- 28:26Speaker 1: be so fainthearted as to give him up? Thetitus? Certainly not,
- 28:32Speaker 1: I should say, if we can get the slightest hold
- 28:34Speaker 1: upon him, Stranger, will you then forgive me? And, as
- 28:39Speaker 1: your words imply, not be altogether displeased if I flinch
- 28:43Speaker 1: a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument Thetitus.
- 28:47Speaker 1: To be sure, I will, Stranger. I have a yet
- 28:51Speaker 1: more urgent request to make Thettus which is, Stranger, that
- 28:57Speaker 1: you will promise not to regard me as a parricide Thettus.
- 29:02Speaker 1: And why Stranger, Because in self defense I must test
- 29:07Speaker 1: the philosophy of my father Parmenides and try to prove
- 29:11Speaker 1: by main force that in a certain sense, not being is,
- 29:15Speaker 1: and that being, on the other hand, is not. Thetitus.
- 29:21Speaker 1: Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed. Stranger. Yes,
- 29:26Speaker 1: a blind man, as they say, might see that. And
- 29:30Speaker 1: unless these questions are decided in one way or another,
- 29:34Speaker 1: no one, when he speaks of false words or false opinion,
- 29:38Speaker 1: or idols or images, or imitations or appearances, or about
- 29:43Speaker 1: the arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling
- 29:46Speaker 1: into ridiculous contradictions. Thettus most true, Stranger, And therefore I
- 29:53Speaker 1: must venture to lay hands on my father's argument, for
- 29:57Speaker 1: if I am to be overscrupulous, I shall have to
- 30:00Speaker 1: give the matter up Thetitus. Nothing in the world should
- 30:04Speaker 1: ever induce us to do so, Stranger. I have a
- 30:08Speaker 1: third little request which I wish to make Thetitas. What
- 30:13Speaker 1: is it, Stranger? You heard me say what I have
- 30:17Speaker 1: always felt and still feel that I have no heart
- 30:20Speaker 1: for this argument Thetitus. I did, Stranger, I tremble at
- 30:26Speaker 1: the thought of what I have said, and expect that
- 30:29Speaker 1: you will deem me mad when you hear of my
- 30:31Speaker 1: sudden changes and shiftings. Let me therefore observe that I
- 30:35Speaker 1: am examining the question entirely out of regard for you, Thetitas.
- 30:41Speaker 1: There is no reason for you to fear that I
- 30:43Speaker 1: shall impute any impropriety to you if you attempt this
- 30:46Speaker 1: refutation and proof. Take hearts therefore, and proceed, Stranger, And
- 30:53Speaker 1: where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that
- 30:56Speaker 1: the road which I must take is Titus, which let
- 31:02Speaker 1: me hear, Stranger. I think that we had better, first
- 31:06Speaker 1: of all, considered the points which at present are regarded
- 31:10Speaker 1: as self evident. Last, we may have fallen into some confusion,
- 31:14Speaker 1: and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying
- 31:17Speaker 1: that we are quite clear about them. Thetitus say more distinctly,
- 31:22Speaker 1: what you mean, Stranger. I think that Parmenides and all
- 31:28Speaker 1: who ever yet undertook to determine the number and nature
- 31:31Speaker 1: of existences talked to us in rather a light and
- 31:34Speaker 1: easy strain. Thettus hell stranger, as if we had been children,
- 31:40Speaker 1: to whom they repeated each his own mythus or story.
- 31:44Speaker 1: One said that there were three principles, and that at
- 31:48Speaker 1: one time there was war between certain of them, and
- 31:52Speaker 1: then again there was peace, and they were married and
- 31:55Speaker 1: begot children and brought them up. And another spoke of
- 31:59Speaker 1: two principles, a moist and a dry, or a hot
- 32:02Speaker 1: and a cold, and made them merry and cohabit. The Eleatics, however,
- 32:08Speaker 1: in our part of the world, say that all things
- 32:11Speaker 1: are many in name, but in nature one. This is
- 32:15Speaker 1: their myth us, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is
- 32:18Speaker 1: even older. Then there are Ionian and in more recent
- 32:22Speaker 1: times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that
- 32:27Speaker 1: to unite the two principles is safer, and to say
- 32:31Speaker 1: that being is one and many, and that these are
- 32:34Speaker 1: held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting,
- 32:39Speaker 1: as the severe muses assert, while the gentler ones do
- 32:42Speaker 1: not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit
- 32:46Speaker 1: a relaxation and alternation of them, peace and unity, sometimes
- 32:52Speaker 1: prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality
- 32:57Speaker 1: and war by reason of a principle of strife. Whether
- 33:00Speaker 1: any of them spoke the truth in all this is
- 33:03Speaker 1: hard to determine. Besides antiquity and famous men should have
- 33:08Speaker 1: reverence and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet
- 33:13Speaker 1: one thing may be said of them without offense. Thetetus.
- 33:17Speaker 1: What thing stranger? That they went on their several ways,
- 33:21Speaker 1: disdaining to notice people like ourselves. They did not care
- 33:25Speaker 1: whether they took us with them or left us behind them. Thettus,
- 33:30Speaker 1: how do you mean stranger? I mean to say that
- 33:34Speaker 1: when they talk of one, two, or more elements which
- 33:38Speaker 1: are or have become, or are becoming, or again, of
- 33:43Speaker 1: heat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of
- 33:46Speaker 1: their works, separations and mixtures. Tell me, thetatus, do you
- 33:51Speaker 1: understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was
- 33:55Speaker 1: a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood
- 33:57Speaker 1: quite well what was meant by the term not being,
- 34:01Speaker 1: which is our present subject of dispute. And now you
- 34:04Speaker 1: see in what a fix we are about it? Thetatus,
- 34:09Speaker 1: I see stranger, And very likely we have been getting
- 34:14Speaker 1: into the same perplexity about being. And yet may fancy
- 34:18Speaker 1: that when any body utters the word we understand him
- 34:21Speaker 1: quite easily, although we do not know about not being,
- 34:26Speaker 1: but we may be equally ignorant of both status. I
- 34:31Speaker 1: dare say stranger, And the same may be said of
- 34:35Speaker 1: all the terms just mentioned, thetatus true stranger. The consideration
- 34:42Speaker 1: of most of them may be deferred. But we had
- 34:45Speaker 1: better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them,
- 34:48Speaker 1: thetatus of what are you speaking? You clearly think that
- 34:53Speaker 1: we must first investigate what people mean by the word
- 34:56Speaker 1: being stranger. You follow close at my heels, Satatus. For
- 35:01Speaker 1: the right method, I conceive, will be to call into
- 35:04Speaker 1: our presence the dualistic philosophers, and to interrogate them. Come,
- 35:09Speaker 1: we will say, ye, who affirm that hot and cold
- 35:12Speaker 1: or any other two principles are the universe? What is
- 35:16Speaker 1: this term which you apply to both of them? And
- 35:19Speaker 1: what do you mean when you say that both in
- 35:21Speaker 1: each of them are? How are we to understand the
- 35:25Speaker 1: word are upon your view? Are we to suppose that
- 35:29Speaker 1: there is a third principle over and above the other two?
- 35:33Speaker 1: Three in all, and not two? For clearly you cannot
- 35:37Speaker 1: say that one of the two principles is being and
- 35:40Speaker 1: yet attribute being equally to both of them. For if
- 35:43Speaker 1: you did, whichever of the two is identified with being
- 35:47Speaker 1: will comprehend the other, and so they will be one
- 35:50Speaker 1: and not two, Thetatus very true stranger. But perhaps you
- 35:57Speaker 1: mean to give the name of being to both of
- 35:59Speaker 1: them together, Thetitus quite likely stranger. Then, friends, we shall
- 36:06Speaker 1: reply to them. The answer is plainly that the two
- 36:10Speaker 1: will still be resolved into one, Thetitus most true stranger.
- 36:16Speaker 1: Since then we are in a difficulty, please to tell
- 36:19Speaker 1: us what you mean when you speak of being, For
- 36:23Speaker 1: there can be no doubt that you always, from the
- 36:25Speaker 1: first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that
- 36:29Speaker 1: we understood you. But now we are in a great strain.
- 36:33Speaker 1: Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and
- 36:37Speaker 1: let us no longer fancy that we understand you when
- 36:39Speaker 1: we entirely misunderstand you. There will be no impropriety in
- 36:44Speaker 1: our demanding an answer to this question, either of the
- 36:47Speaker 1: duellists or of the pluralists. Thetatus certainly not stranger. And
- 36:54Speaker 1: what about the asserters of the oneness of the all?
- 36:57Speaker 1: Must we not endeavor to ascertain from them what they
- 36:59Speaker 1: mean by being? Thetitus by all means stranger. Then let
- 37:06Speaker 1: them answer this question. One you say alone is yes.
- 37:11Speaker 1: They will reply Thetitus true stranger, and there is something
- 37:16Speaker 1: which you call being? Thetitus, yes, stranger, and is being
- 37:23Speaker 1: the same as one? And do you apply two names
- 37:26Speaker 1: to the same thing? Thetitus, what will be their answer? Stranger? Stranger?
- 37:33Speaker 1: It is clear, Thettus that he who asserts the unity
- 37:36Speaker 1: of being will find a difficulty in answering this or
- 37:40Speaker 1: any other question. Theatitus, why so stranger? To admit of
- 37:45Speaker 1: two names and to affirm that there is nothing but
- 37:48Speaker 1: unity is surely ridiculous, Thetitus, certainly stranger, and equally irrational
- 37:56Speaker 1: to admit that a name is anything? Thetitis, how so stranger?
- 38:02Speaker 1: To distinguish the name from the thing implies duality. Thetitus, yes, stranger.
- 38:10Speaker 1: And yet he who identifies the name with the thing
- 38:13Speaker 1: will be compelled to say that it is the name
- 38:15Speaker 1: of nothing, Or if he says that it is the
- 38:18Speaker 1: name of something, even then the name will only be
- 38:21Speaker 1: the name of a name and of nothing else. Theatatus, true, stranger,
- 38:28Speaker 1: and the one will turn out to be only one
- 38:31Speaker 1: of one, and being absolute unity will represent a mere name. Thetitus,
- 38:37Speaker 1: certainly stranger. And would they say that the whole is
- 38:42Speaker 1: other than the one that is or the same with it?
- 38:46Speaker 1: Theatitus to be sure they would, and they actually say so. Stranger.
- 38:52Speaker 1: If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings every way
- 38:58Speaker 1: like unto the fullness of a well rounded, evenly balanced
- 39:02Speaker 1: from the center on every side, and must needs be
- 39:06Speaker 1: neither greater nor less in any way, neither on this
- 39:10Speaker 1: side nor on that, then being has a center and extremes,
- 39:16Speaker 1: and having these must also have parts. Thetatus true stranger.
- 39:23Speaker 1: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of
- 39:26Speaker 1: unity in all the parts, and in this way, being
- 39:30Speaker 1: all in a whole may be one. Thetatus certainly stranger.
- 39:36Speaker 1: But that of which this is the condition cannot be
- 39:39Speaker 1: absolute unity. Thetatus why not stranger, because according to right reason,
- 39:46Speaker 1: that which is truly one must be affirmed to be
- 39:49Speaker 1: absolutely indivisible. Thetatus certainly stranger. But this indivisible, if made
- 39:57Speaker 1: up of many parts, will contradict reason, as I understand, stranger.
- 40:03Speaker 1: Shall we say that being is one and a whole
- 40:07Speaker 1: because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we
- 40:10Speaker 1: say that being is not a whole at all? Thetitus.
- 40:14Speaker 1: That is a hard alternative to offer. Stranger, most true,
- 40:19Speaker 1: for being having in a certain sense the attribute of
- 40:22Speaker 1: one is yet proved not to be the same as one,
- 40:26Speaker 1: and the all is therefore more than one. Thetitus, yes, stranger.
- 40:32Speaker 1: And yet if being be not a whole through having
- 40:36Speaker 1: the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing
- 40:39Speaker 1: as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature,
- 40:44Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly stranger. Upon this view, again, being having a
- 40:50Speaker 1: defect of being will become not being, Thetitus true stranger.
- 40:57Speaker 1: And again the all becomes more than one, for being
- 41:01Speaker 1: and the whole will each have their separate nature. Theatatus, yes, stranger.
- 41:08Speaker 1: But if the whole does not exist at all, all
- 41:11Speaker 1: the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be
- 41:14Speaker 1: the further difficulty that, besides having no being, being can
- 41:18Speaker 1: never have come into being. Thetatus why so, stranger, Because
- 41:25Speaker 1: that which comes into being always comes into being as
- 41:28Speaker 1: a whole, so that he who does not give hole
- 41:31Speaker 1: a place among beings cannot speak either of essence or
- 41:35Speaker 1: generation as existing status. Yes, that certainly appears to be true. Stranger. Again,
- 41:44Speaker 1: how can that which is not a whole have any quantity?
- 41:47Speaker 1: For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily
- 41:51Speaker 1: be the whole of that quantity. Theatatus exactly Stranger, and
- 41:58Speaker 1: there will be innumerable other points, each of them causing
- 42:01Speaker 1: infinite trouble to him who says that being is either
- 42:05Speaker 1: one or two Thetatus. The difficulties which are dawning upon
- 42:10Speaker 1: us prove this, for one objection connects with another, and
- 42:15Speaker 1: they are always involving what has preceded in a greater
- 42:18Speaker 1: and worse perplexity. Stranger. We are far from having exhausted
- 42:23Speaker 1: the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not being.
- 42:27Speaker 1: But let us be content to leave them and proceed
- 42:30Speaker 1: to view those who speak less precisely. And we shall find,
- 42:34Speaker 1: as the result of all that the nature of being
- 42:37Speaker 1: is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not
- 42:40Speaker 1: being Thetatus. Then now we will go to the others, Stranger.
- 42:46Speaker 1: There appears to be a sort of war of giants
- 42:49Speaker 1: and gods going on amongst them. They are fighting with
- 42:52Speaker 1: one another about the nature of essence theatatus. How is that, Stranger.
- 42:59Speaker 1: Some of them are bragging down all things from heaven
- 43:02Speaker 1: and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp
- 43:06Speaker 1: in their hands rocks and oaks. Of these they lay
- 43:09Speaker 1: hold and obstinately maintain that the things only which can
- 43:14Speaker 1: be touched or handled, have being or essence, because they
- 43:18Speaker 1: define being and body as one, and if anyone else
- 43:22Speaker 1: says that what is not a body exists, they altogether
- 43:26Speaker 1: despise him, and will hear of nothing but body. Thetatus
- 43:31Speaker 1: I have often met with such men and terrible fellows.
- 43:34Speaker 1: They are stranger, and that is the reason why their
- 43:38Speaker 1: opponents cautiously defend themselves from above out of an unseen world,
- 43:43Speaker 1: mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and
- 43:48Speaker 1: incorporeal ideas the bodies of the materialists, which by them
- 43:53Speaker 1: are maintained to be the very truth, they break up
- 43:56Speaker 1: into little bits by their arguments and affirm them to
- 44:00Speaker 1: be not essence but generation and motion. Between the two
- 44:05Speaker 1: armies Thetitus, there is always an endless conflict raging concerning
- 44:09Speaker 1: these matters, Thetitus true stranger. Let us ask each party
- 44:15Speaker 1: in turn to give an account of that which they
- 44:18Speaker 1: call essence Theatitus. How shall we get it out of them? Stranger?
- 44:24Speaker 1: With those who make being to consistent ideas, there will
- 44:27Speaker 1: be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough. But
- 44:31Speaker 1: there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility,
- 44:36Speaker 1: in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything
- 44:39Speaker 1: down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must
- 44:42Speaker 1: do Theatitus what, stranger? Let us if we can really
- 44:48Speaker 1: improve them. But if this is not possible, let us
- 44:52Speaker 1: imagine them to be better than they are, and more
- 44:55Speaker 1: willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument,
- 44:58Speaker 1: And then their opinion and will be more worth having.
- 45:02Speaker 1: For that which better men acknowledge has more weight than
- 45:05Speaker 1: that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover, we are
- 45:09Speaker 1: no respectors of persons, but seekers after truth. Thetitus very good, Stranger. Then, now,
- 45:18Speaker 1: on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask
- 45:22Speaker 1: them to state their views, and do you interpret them?
- 45:25Speaker 1: Thetitus agreed, Stranger. Let them say whether they would admit
- 45:31Speaker 1: that there is such a thing as immortal animal Thetitus.
- 45:35Speaker 1: Of course they would, Stranger. And do they not acknowledge
- 45:39Speaker 1: this to be a body having a soul? Thettus, certainly
- 45:44Speaker 1: they do, Stranger, meaning to say that the soul is
- 45:48Speaker 1: something which exists, Thetitus true, Stranger. And do they not
- 45:54Speaker 1: say that one soul is just and another unjust, and
- 45:58Speaker 1: that one soul is one and another foolish Fattus certainly stranger,
- 46:05Speaker 1: and that the just and wise soul becomes just and
- 46:09Speaker 1: wise by the possession of justice and wisdom, and the
- 46:12Speaker 1: opposite under opposite circumstances. Satatus, Yes they do stranger, But
- 46:19Speaker 1: surely that which may be present or may be absent,
- 46:23Speaker 1: will be admitted by them to exist, sattus, certainly stranger,
- 46:29Speaker 1: and allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and their
- 46:34Speaker 1: opposites exist as well as a soul in which they adhere.
- 46:38Speaker 1: Do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible?
- 46:42Speaker 1: Or are they all invisible? Satatus? They would say that
- 46:46Speaker 1: hardly any of them are visible, Stranger. And would they
- 46:50Speaker 1: say that they are corporeal Fatatus, They would distinguish the
- 46:55Speaker 1: soul would be said by them to have a body.
- 46:57Speaker 1: But as to the other qualities of justice, justus, wisdom,
- 47:01Speaker 1: and the like about which you asked, they would not
- 47:04Speaker 1: venture either to deny their existence or to maintain that
- 47:08Speaker 1: they were all corporeal stranger. Fairly, thetaitis I perceive a
- 47:13Speaker 1: great improvement in them. The real Aborigines children of the
- 47:17Speaker 1: dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all,
- 47:21Speaker 1: but would have obstinately asserted that nothing is which they
- 47:24Speaker 1: are not able to squeeze in their hands, Thetitus. That
- 47:29Speaker 1: is pretty much their notion, Stranger. Let us push the question,
- 47:34Speaker 1: for if they will admit that any even the smallest
- 47:37Speaker 1: particle of being is incorporeal, it is enough. They must
- 47:41Speaker 1: then say what that nature is which is common to
- 47:44Speaker 1: both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have in
- 47:49Speaker 1: their mind's eye. When they say of both of them
- 47:51Speaker 1: that they are, perhaps they may be in a difficulty.
- 47:56Speaker 1: And if this is the case, there is a possibility
- 47:58Speaker 1: that they may accept an of ours respecting the nature
- 48:02Speaker 1: of being, having nothing of their own to offer Thettus,
- 48:07Speaker 1: what is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see, Stranger.
- 48:12Speaker 1: My notion would be that anything which possesses any sort
- 48:15Speaker 1: of power to affect another or to be affected by another,
- 48:19Speaker 1: if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause
- 48:22Speaker 1: and however slight the effect, has real existence. And I
- 48:26Speaker 1: hold that the definition of being is simply power. Thetitus,
- 48:32Speaker 1: they accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their own
- 48:35Speaker 1: to offer, Stranger, very good. Perhaps we as well as they,
- 48:41Speaker 1: may one day change our minds. But for the present
- 48:44Speaker 1: this may be regarded as the understanding which is established
- 48:48Speaker 1: with them. Thetitus agreed, Stranger. Let us now go to
- 48:54Speaker 1: the friends of ideas of their opinions too. You shall
- 48:57Speaker 1: be the interpreter Thettus, I will, Stranger to them, we say,
- 49:04Speaker 1: you would distinguish essence from generation, Satitus, Yes, they reply, Stranger,
- 49:11Speaker 1: and you would allow that we participate in generation with
- 49:14Speaker 1: the body and through perception, but we participate with the
- 49:19Speaker 1: soul through thought. In true essence and essence you would
- 49:23Speaker 1: affirm to be always the same and immutable, whereas generation
- 49:28Speaker 1: or becoming varies. Thettus, Yes, that is what we should affirm, Stranger. Well,
- 49:36Speaker 1: fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation
- 49:39Speaker 1: which you assert of both? Do you agree with our
- 49:42Speaker 1: recent definition? Thetitus? What definition, Stranger? We send that being
- 49:49Speaker 1: wasn't active or passive energy arising out of a certain
- 49:52Speaker 1: power which proceeds from elements meeting with one another. Perhaps
- 49:57Speaker 1: your ears Theatatus may fail to catch their answer, which
- 50:00Speaker 1: I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it, Thetitus.
- 50:05Speaker 1: And what is their answer, Stranger. They deny the truth
- 50:09Speaker 1: of what we were just now saying to the Aborigines
- 50:12Speaker 1: about existence. Thettus what was that, Stranger, Any power of
- 50:18Speaker 1: doing or suffering in a degree, whoever slight was held
- 50:22Speaker 1: by us to be a sufficient definition of being thettus
- 50:27Speaker 1: true Stranger, They deny this and say that the power
- 50:31Speaker 1: of doing or suffering is confined to becoming, and that
- 50:35Speaker 1: neither power is applicable to being Thetitus. And is there
- 50:40Speaker 1: not some truth in what they say, Stranger? Yes, but
- 50:44Speaker 1: our reply will be that we want to ascertain from
- 50:47Speaker 1: them more distinctly whether they further admit that the soul
- 50:50Speaker 1: knows and that being or essence is known Thetitis. There
- 50:56Speaker 1: can be no doubt that they say so, Stranger, and
- 51:00Speaker 1: is knowing and being known doing or suffering or both?
- 51:05Speaker 1: Or is the one doing and the other suffering, or
- 51:08Speaker 1: has neither any share in either? Thetetus clearly neither has
- 51:13Speaker 1: any share in either, for if they say anything else,
- 51:16Speaker 1: they will contradict themselves, Stranger, I understand, but they will
- 51:22Speaker 1: allow that if to know is active, then of course
- 51:25Speaker 1: to be known is passive. And on this view, being
- 51:29Speaker 1: in so far as it is known, is acted upon
- 51:32Speaker 1: by knowledge, and is therefore in motion. For that which
- 51:36Speaker 1: is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon.
- 51:39Speaker 1: As we affirm thettus true stranger and O heavens. Can
- 51:46Speaker 1: we ever be made to believe that motion in life,
- 51:49Speaker 1: and soul and mind are not present with perfect being?
- 51:53Speaker 1: Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and
- 51:56Speaker 1: mind and exists in awful, unmeaningness and everlasting fixture Thetitus?
- 52:02Speaker 1: That would be a dreadful thing to admit stranger, stranger.
- 52:06Speaker 1: But shall we say that being has mind and not
- 52:09Speaker 1: life Thetitus? How is that possible? Stranger? Or shall we
- 52:15Speaker 1: say that both in here in perfect being, but that
- 52:18Speaker 1: it has no soul, which contains them Thettus? And in
- 52:22Speaker 1: what other way can it contain them? Stranger? Or that
- 52:27Speaker 1: being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed
- 52:31Speaker 1: with soul, remains absolutely unmoved Thetitus. All three suppositions appear
- 52:37Speaker 1: to me to be irrational stranger under being. Then we
- 52:42Speaker 1: must include motion and that which is moved Sattus certainly stranger,
- 52:49Speaker 1: then thettus. Our inference is that if there is no motion,
- 52:53Speaker 1: neither is there any mind anywhere or about anything, or
- 52:58Speaker 1: belonging to any one thettus quite true stranger. And yet
- 53:04Speaker 1: this equally follows if we grant that all things are
- 53:07Speaker 1: in motion. Upon this view, too, mind has no existence. Thetatus,
- 53:14Speaker 1: how so stranger? Do you think that sameness of condition
- 53:18Speaker 1: and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle
- 53:22Speaker 1: of rest? Thetitus certainly not stranger. Can you see how
- 53:28Speaker 1: without them mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?
- 53:33Speaker 1: Thettus no stranger, And surely contend we must in every
- 53:39Speaker 1: possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason
- 53:43Speaker 1: and mind, and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything Thetitus, yes,
- 53:49Speaker 1: with all our might stranger. Then the philosopher who has
- 53:53Speaker 1: the truest reverence for these qualities cannot possibly accept the
- 53:57Speaker 1: notion of those who say that the is at rest,
- 54:01Speaker 1: either as unity or in many forms, And he will
- 54:05Speaker 1: be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As
- 54:09Speaker 1: children say, entreatingly, give us both. So he will include
- 54:13Speaker 1: both the movable and immovable in his definition of being,
- 54:17Speaker 1: and all Thetitus most true stranger. And now do we
- 54:23Speaker 1: not seem to have gained a fair notion of being Thetitus, yes,
- 54:29Speaker 1: truly stranger. Alas Satatus methinks that we are now only
- 54:34Speaker 1: beginning to see the real difficulty of the inquiry into
- 54:37Speaker 1: the nature of it. Thetitus. What do you mean, Stranger, O,
- 54:43Speaker 1: my friend? Do you not see that nothing can exceed
- 54:46Speaker 1: our ignorance? And yet we fancy that we are saying
- 54:49Speaker 1: something good Thetitus. I certainly thought that we were, and
- 54:55Speaker 1: I do not at all understand how we never found
- 54:57Speaker 1: out our desperate case. Reflect after having made these admissions,
- 55:03Speaker 1: may we not be justly asked the same questions which
- 55:06Speaker 1: we ourselves for asking of those who said that all
- 55:09Speaker 1: was hot and cold? Thetitus? What were they? Will you
- 55:14Speaker 1: recall them to my mind? Stranger? To be sure, I will,
- 55:18Speaker 1: and I will remind you of them by putting the
- 55:20Speaker 1: same questions to you which I did to them, And
- 55:23Speaker 1: then we shall get on Thetitus. True, Stranger, Would you
- 55:29Speaker 1: not say that rest and motion are in the most
- 55:32Speaker 1: entire opposition to one another? Thetitus? Of course, Stranger. And
- 55:38Speaker 1: yet you would say that both and either of them
- 55:40Speaker 1: equally are Thetitus? I should, Stranger. And when you admit
- 55:46Speaker 1: that both or either of them are, do you mean
- 55:49Speaker 1: to say that both or either of them are in
- 55:51Speaker 1: motion Thetitus? Certainly not, Stranger? Or do you wish to
- 55:57Speaker 1: imply that they are both at rest? When you say
- 56:00Speaker 1: that they are sattus, of course not stranger. Then you
- 56:05Speaker 1: conceive of being as some third and distinct nature under
- 56:09Speaker 1: which rest and motion are alike included, and observing that
- 56:14Speaker 1: they both participate in being, you declare that they are Thetitus. Truly,
- 56:20Speaker 1: we seem to have an intimation that being is some
- 56:22Speaker 1: third thing. When we say that rest and motion are stranger,
- 56:27Speaker 1: then being is not the combination of rest and motion,
- 56:30Speaker 1: but something different from them, thettus, So it would appear stranger. Being, then,
- 56:37Speaker 1: according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor
- 56:40Speaker 1: at rest, thettus. That is very much the truth. Stranger.
- 56:46Speaker 1: Where then is a man to look for help, who
- 56:49Speaker 1: would have any clear or fixed notion of being in
- 56:52Speaker 1: his mind? Thettus? Where indeed stranger? I scarcely think that
- 56:58Speaker 1: he can look anywhere, for that which is not in
- 57:01Speaker 1: motion must be at rest, and again that which is
- 57:04Speaker 1: not at rest must be in motion. But being is
- 57:07Speaker 1: placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible, Satitus,
- 57:13Speaker 1: utterly impossible? Stranger? Here, then, is another thing which we
- 57:18Speaker 1: ought to bear in mind, thetatus what stranger? When we
- 57:23Speaker 1: were asked to what we were to assign the appellation
- 57:26Speaker 1: of not being, we were in the greatest difficulty. Do
- 57:30Speaker 1: you remember thettus to be sure stranger? And are we
- 57:35Speaker 1: not now in as great a difficulty about being Satitus,
- 57:40Speaker 1: I should say stranger, that we are in one, which is,
- 57:43Speaker 1: if possible, even greater stranger. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty,
- 57:50Speaker 1: and as being and not being are involved in the
- 57:53Speaker 1: same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears
- 57:56Speaker 1: more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear. And
- 58:01Speaker 1: if we aren't able to see neither, there may still
- 58:04Speaker 1: be a chance of steering our way in between them
- 58:06Speaker 1: without any great discredit Thetatus very good and of part
- 58:13Speaker 1: two of Sophist Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards