Latest / Dark Perimeter: Real Breaches, Real Stakes / The Breach Files: What Everybody Knows
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_02: On the nineteenth of july twenty twenty four, about eight and a half million Windows machines stopped working at the same time.
- 0:08SPEAKER_02: Airport departure boards went blue.
- 0:11SPEAKER_02: Hospitals fell back to paper.
- 0:13SPEAKER_02: Every news channel on Earth ran the story.
- 0:17SPEAKER_02: Within hours, CrowdStrike's chief executive said in public that it was not a security incident or a cyber attack.
- 0:26SPEAKER_02: Two weeks later, the company published a technical root cause analysis naming the defect.
- 0:33SPEAKER_02: Two months after that, a CrowdStrike senior vice president said the same thing again, under oath, to a House subcommittee.
- 0:42SPEAKER_02: And if you ask people today what happened to CrowdStrike in July of 2024, a great many of them will tell you the company got hacked.
- 0:52SPEAKER_02: That is what this episode is about.
- 0:54SPEAKER_02: Not one incident, but the gap between what the record says and what everybody knows.
- 1:01SPEAKER_02: Because the record on that one was clear, fast, public, and sworn to, and the story still won.
- 1:09SPEAKER_02: This is Dark Perimeter.
- 1:11SPEAKER_02: I'm Cold Draden with Dr.
- 1:12SPEAKER_02: Elliot Vance and Marcus Hale.
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: And I want to start by conceding something because it would be graceless to spend 20 minutes on other people's errors without it.
- 1:21SPEAKER_00: Two weeks ago on this show, we ran an episode on change healthcare.
- 1:25SPEAKER_00: In review, before it aired, we found three errors in our own script.
- 1:29SPEAKER_00: One of them was a cold open that stacked three incompatible figures to make the scale sound bigger than any single source supported.
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: We rewrote it and re-recorded.
- 1:38SPEAKER_00: Nobody heard the bad version, but we wrote it.
- 1:40SPEAKER_00: And we wrote it in an episode whose whole argument was about not doing that.
- 1:44SPEAKER_00: So the mechanism we are describing today is not something that happens to careless people.
- 1:49SPEAKER_00: It is something that happens to everyone, including us.
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: And the only defense is the boring one.
- 1:53SPEAKER_00: Go read the filing.
- 1:55SPEAKER_02: Let's take the most repeated false claim in our entire industry first.
- 2:00SPEAKER_01: SolarWinds 1 and 23.
- 2:02SPEAKER_01: Everyone knows this one.
- 2:03SPEAKER_01: The SolarWinds supply chain compromise happened because somebody said a password to SolarWinds 123, and depending on who is telling it, an intern did it.
- 2:10SPEAKER_01: Here is the record.
- 2:11SPEAKER_01: That password protected a file transfer and update distribution server.
- 2:15SPEAKER_01: It was not the Orion build system.
- 2:17SPEAKER_01: A researcher named Vinath Kumar found it in a public GitHub repository in November of 2019 and reported it, and SolarWinds fixed it within days.
- 2:25SPEAKER_01: Kamar himself said explicitly that he was not claiming it had played any role in the breach.
- 2:30SPEAKER_01: The SEC sued SolarWinds and its chief information security officer.
- 2:33SPEAKER_01: That litigation is where you would expect to find the causal claim if it existed, because the SEC had every incentive to make it.
- 2:40SPEAKER_01: The SEC never alleged the password caused sunburst.
- 2:43SPEAKER_01: The only initial access vector in the complaint is different.
- 2:46SPEAKER_01: Threat actors reached the corporate VPN in January of 2019, using stolen credentials and unmanaged third-party devices.
- 2:53SPEAKER_01: The federal judge did address the password, and what he said was narrow.
- 2:56SPEAKER_01: It was formulated in blatant violation of the company's password policy.
- 3:00SPEAKER_01: That is a policy finding.
- 3:02SPEAKER_01: It is not a finding of causation.
- 3:04SPEAKER_00: And the honest ending to that story is unsatisfying, which is exactly why the myth filled the vacuum.
- 3:10SPEAKER_00: SolarWind's own investigative update says they do not know precisely when or how the threat actor first gained access, and lists three candidates: a zero-day and third-party software, a brute force, or password spray, or targeted phishing.
- 3:24SPEAKER_00: The vector was never established.
- 3:26SPEAKER_00: The SEC dropped its remaining claims with prejudice in November of 2025 without a settlement.
- 3:31SPEAKER_00: So the most famous supply chain attack of the century has no confirmed point of entry, and the detail everybody remembers is from a different machine.
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: Not that the dates rule it out.
- 4:01SPEAKER_01: If you reach for the wrong reason, you have just built the next myth.
- 4:06SPEAKER_01: From SolarWind's executives at a House hearing in February of 2021.
- 4:10SPEAKER_01: They offered it up, a deflection that permanently welded the detail to the story.
- 4:17SPEAKER_02: May of 2021.
- 4:26SPEAKER_00: The operational technology network was never compromised.
- 4:30SPEAKER_00: Joseph Blount, Colonial's chief executive, testified to that under oath in June of 2021.
- 4:35SPEAKER_00: Asked directly whether the attack was confined to the information technology side.
- 4:39SPEAKER_00: He said that is correct.
- 4:40SPEAKER_00: He said Mandiant had not confirmed any evidence the attackers were in the OT system, and the shutdown was not something the malware did.
- 4:47SPEAKER_00: It was a person.
- 4:48SPEAKER_00: An employee found the ransom note on an IT system just before 5 in the morning on the 7th of May and notified the operations supervisor at the control center who issued a stopwork order.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: Blount's reasoning, in his words, if there was a 1% chance that the OT system was compromised, it was worth shutting the pipeline down.
- 5:06SPEAKER_00: That is a defensible judgment call made under uncertainty by a human being.
- 5:10SPEAKER_00: It is not a hijacking.
- 5:12SPEAKER_01: And now the part I actually want to flag, because this is where the corrective version of the story has its own bug.
- 5:17SPEAKER_01: Almost every retelling, including the ones written to debunk the OT myth, says the attackers got in with a single password from a dark web credential dump that an employee had reused.
- 5:27SPEAKER_01: That is not in the testimony.
- 5:28SPEAKER_01: Blount said under oath that they were still trying to determine how the attackers obtained the credentials, any pushback specifically on the framing.
- 5:35SPEAKER_01: It was a complicated password, he said.
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: I want to be clear on that.
- 5:38SPEAKER_01: The dark web detail comes from Mandiant's Charles Carmicall, speaking to Bloomberg.
- 5:43SPEAKER_01: That is credible reporting from someone with forensic access.
- 5:45SPEAKER_01: It is not sworn testimony, and it is not a filing.
- 5:48SPEAKER_01: And if you present it as established, you are doing the exact thing this episode is about.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: What is confirmed is more useful anyway.
- 5:55SPEAKER_00: It was a legacy VPN profile that was not intended to be in use, and it had single factor authentication.
- 6:01SPEAKER_00: The failure is asset inventory.
- 6:03SPEAKER_00: Somebody forgot a door existed, so nobody put the new lock on it.
- 6:07SPEAKER_02: Fix the ransom arithmetic for me too, because I have said this wrong myself.
- 6:13SPEAKER_00: About 75 Bitcoin went out on the 8th of May, roughly$4.4 million at the time.
- 6:19SPEAKER_00: On the 7th of June, the Justice Department seized 63.7 Bitcoin, which the department valued at approximately 2.3 million.
- 6:27SPEAKER_00: So law enforcement recovered about 85% of the coins and about 52% of the dollars.
- 6:32SPEAKER_00: The gap is not a partial seizure.
- 6:34SPEAKER_00: The gap is the price of Bitcoin falling in between.
- 6:37SPEAKER_00: People quote one number or the other and imply the other one.
- 6:41SPEAKER_02: Target 2013.
- 6:44SPEAKER_02: And here I want to change the question because I came into this thinking the myth was one thing and the research said otherwise.
- 6:53SPEAKER_01: The famous Target myth is the HVAC vendor, the air conditioning company that was somehow wired to the cash registers.
- 6:59SPEAKER_01: Fazio Mechanical was a refrigeration and HVAC contractor, so the label is accurate about the company, but Fazio put out a statement saying it did not perform remote monitoring or control of heating, cooling, or refrigeration systems for Target, and that its data connection was exclusively for electronic billing, contract submission, and project management.
- 7:18SPEAKER_01: The building automation story is invented.
- 7:20SPEAKER_01: It is an inference people drew from the vendor's line of business.
- 7:24SPEAKER_02: And the other famous claim that Target ignored the FireEye alerts.
- 7:44SPEAKER_00: Which brings us to the actual myth in the Target file, and it is a bigger one than either of those.
- 7:50SPEAKER_00: The myth is that we know what happened at Target.
- 7:52SPEAKER_00: Target never published a post-incident forensic report.
- 7:55SPEAKER_00: The document everyone cites as authoritative, the Senate Commerce Majority staff Kill Chain Analysis, states in its own text that it is based on media reports and expert analyses, and that the complete story of how the breach took place may not be known until Target completes its forensic examination.
- 8:13SPEAKER_00: That examination was never published.
- 8:15SPEAKER_00: So the canonical primary source on the defining retail breach of the decade is a literature review of journalism on Congressional Letterhead.
- 8:23SPEAKER_00: The letterhead is what fooled everybody, including a great many people who have taught this case.
- 8:41SPEAKER_02: Let's do Mirai, because this is the one where I had the myth wrong going in.
- 8:46SPEAKER_00: I assumed, and you assumed, that the world initially read the 2016 din outage as a nation-state operation and was later corrected.
- 8:55SPEAKER_00: That is not what happened.
- 8:56SPEAKER_00: The director of national intelligence publicly said a non-state actor was likely within five days.
- 9:02SPEAKER_00: Bruce Schneier, who is most associated with the nation-state framing, because of an essay he published five weeks earlier about entirely different probing activity, explicitly said the DIN attacks were probably not originated by a government.
- 9:15SPEAKER_00: There was no consensus to overturn.
- 9:18SPEAKER_00: There was a loud minority reading that outlived the official assessment.
- 9:22SPEAKER_01: But there is a much better myth sitting right next to it, and it is properly sourced.
- 9:26SPEAKER_01: The DIN attack was not aimed at DIN.
- 9:28SPEAKER_01: The Justice Department case establishes that the October 21, 2016 attacks came from someone who was a juvenile at the time, using a Mirai variant, and the goal was to take the Sony PlayStation Network offline.
- 9:39SPEAKER_01: Din was Sony's DNS provider.
- 9:41SPEAKER_01: Twitter, Amazon, PayPal, Tumblr, and Netflix went dark as bystanders to a gaming grudge, and it was not the original Mirai authors.
- 9:48SPEAKER_01: Those three, Paris Jaw, Josiah White, and Dalton Norman, built the botnet to run a protection racket in the Minecraft server hosting market.
- 9:55SPEAKER_01: Ja's own sentencing memorandum says he used the attacks to generate interest in obtaining DDoS mitigation protection, which was the service his company sold.
- 10:03SPEAKER_01: An FBI agent on the case said he would be more surprised if he did not see a Minecraft connection in a DDoS case.
- 10:08SPEAKER_01: Jaw released the source code publicly, and the variants are what did the damage afterward.
- 10:13SPEAKER_00: The magnitude is soft, too.
- 10:15SPEAKER_00: Din itself said it was unable to verify the widely reported 1.2 terabits per second figure, and revised its estimate of malicious endpoints, down from tens of millions to up to 100,000, because retry storms had created a false indicator of a much larger set of devices.
- 10:31SPEAKER_00: The company at the center of the event was the most skeptical voice about the number, and the number won anyway.
- 10:37SPEAKER_02: Not PET yet.
- 10:39SPEAKER_02: June 2017.
- 10:41SPEAKER_00: Two corrections and one number that should worry you.
- 10:44SPEAKER_00: First, it was not ransomware.
- 10:45SPEAKER_00: Kaspersky found that the installation ID displayed on the ransom screen was plain random data, so the attacker could not have derived any decryption key from it.
- 10:54SPEAKER_00: Victims who paid could not have recovered their files even in principle.
- 10:57SPEAKER_00: ESET reached the same conclusion independently.
- 11:00SPEAKER_00: It was a wiper wearing a ransomware costume, and the technical community established that within about 48 hours.
- 11:06SPEAKER_00: The label had already set.
- 11:07SPEAKER_00: Second, the initial vector was not Eternal Blue.
- 11:10SPEAKER_00: It was ME Doc, a Ukrainian accounting package.
- 11:12SPEAKER_00: Attackers had access to the update server and pushed a malicious update that applied automatically, and ESET recovered the PHP backdoor.
- 11:20SPEAKER_00: Eternal Blue and Eternal Romance were lateral movement only, alongside credential theft with Mimicats and PSX, which matters enormously for the lesson people draw, because credential-based lateral movement meant fully patched machines still fell.
- 11:34SPEAKER_00: So they should have patched MS 17010 as the wrong takeaway, and it is the most common one.
- 11:40SPEAKER_01: Attribution on this one is solid and stronger than it was when most of the coverage was written.
- 11:45SPEAKER_01: The White House attributed it to the Russian military in February of 2018, and in October of 2020, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh indicted six officers of GRU Unit 74455, charging conduct including the Notpetya attacks, with named victims including Heritage Valley Health System in Pennsylvania, and FedEx's TNT Express subsidiary.
- 12:06SPEAKER_01: That is a formal charging document, not just a policy statement.
- 12:10SPEAKER_00: And the number$10 billion.
- 12:13SPEAKER_00: You have heard it a thousand times.
- 12:15SPEAKER_00: It traces to a single source.
- 12:17SPEAKER_00: A White House assessment confirmed to a journalist by Tom Bossert, then the administration's most senior cybersecurity official.
- 12:24SPEAKER_00: One person, one conversation.
- 12:25SPEAKER_00: No published methodology, no itemization, no successor estimate, no competing figure.
- 12:31SPEAKER_00: Compare Mayersk's own disclosure, which is$250 to$300 million, covering lost revenue, IT restoration, and extraordinary operational costs.
- 12:40SPEAKER_00: That is a company reporting to its investors with accounting behind it.
- 12:44SPEAKER_00: Both numbers get quoted in the same breath as though they are the same kind of thing.
- 12:48SPEAKER_00: They are not remotely the same kind of thing.
- 12:50SPEAKER_00: And the 10 billion figure survives precisely because nobody ever published a rival estimate, so it became the fact by default.
- 12:57SPEAKER_02: Equifax, quickly, and then I want to get to why all of this happens.
- 13:02SPEAKER_01: Not a zero day.
- 13:03SPEAKER_01: The Apache Strutz vulnerability was disclosed on the 7th of March 2017.
- 13:08SPEAKER_01: U.S.
- 13:08SPEAKER_01: CERT notified Equifax the next day.
- 13:10SPEAKER_01: It circulated internally on the 9th, with a note that it required patching within 48 hours per policy.
- 13:15SPEAKER_01: Exploitation began on the 13th of May, 67 days after a patch existed.
- 13:20SPEAKER_01: A vulnerability scan on the 15th of March missed it because, per the interim chief security officer, the scan was run on the root directory and not the subdirectory where Strutz was listed.
- 13:29SPEAKER_01: And the admin slash admin password that everybody cites, real and on a different continent.
- 13:34SPEAKER_01: It was an Equifax employee portal in Argentina, found by researchers and published days after the U.S.
- 13:40SPEAKER_01: disclosure.
- 13:40SPEAKER_01: It had nothing to do with the 147 million records.
- 13:44SPEAKER_00: And here is my favorite thing in this entire episode, because it proves the thesis without any help from me.
- 13:49SPEAKER_00: There was an expired certificate that blinded traffic inspection on the affected environment.
- 13:55SPEAKER_00: The House Oversight Report says the certificate expired on the 31st of January 2016, and that Equifax had no visibility into that traffic for 19 months.
- 14:05SPEAKER_00: The Senate Homeland Security report says the certificate expired in November of 2016 and was not updated for another eight months.
- 14:13SPEAKER_00: Two congressional committees, same breach, same year.
- 14:16SPEAKER_00: Reports 11 months apart.
- 14:18SPEAKER_00: They do not agree, and both are primary sources.
- 14:21SPEAKER_00: I am not going to resolve that for you on a podcast.
- 14:23SPEAKER_00: I will tell you which one I would cite, which is the House report, and that the discrepancy is almost certainly where the various wrong durations in circulation came from.
- 14:32SPEAKER_00: But the point is that going to the primary source is necessary and it is not always sufficient.
- 14:37SPEAKER_00: Sometimes the primary sources disagree, and the honest answer is to say so.
- 14:42SPEAKER_02: So why does this happen consistently across every one of these?
- 14:47SPEAKER_00: There is real research on this, and the best of it is a paper by Ben Collier and Richard Clayton on the phrase sophisticated attack.
- 14:54SPEAKER_00: Their finding is that the label gets applied nearly universally, despite most attacks being routine, because four separate parties independently benefit from it.
- 15:03SPEAKER_00: Attackers gain status among peers, corporate victims deflect liability, law enforcement justifies unsolved cases, vendors sell severity, no conspiracy required, four incentive gradients that happen to point the same direction.
- 15:17SPEAKER_00: Their example is perfect.
- 15:18SPEAKER_00: After a breach caused by SQL injection, Talk Talk said the criminals were very smart, and their attacks were becoming ever more sophisticated.
- 15:26SPEAKER_00: Regulators later found the company had failed to implement basic security measures.
- 15:31SPEAKER_01: And in fairness, it is not universal.
- 15:33SPEAKER_01: Equifax's chief executive wrote in his prepared testimony that the breach appeared to result from both human error and technology failures in a chain of systems designed with redundancies.
- 15:43SPEAKER_01: That is a systemic account, and it is more honest than his reputation.
- 15:46SPEAKER_01: The blamed one employee version came out of oral questioning, not the written statement.
- 15:50SPEAKER_01: A soundbite displaced his own framing.
- 15:53SPEAKER_00: On attribution specifically, Thomas Ridd and Ben Buchanan's work reframes it as a graded judgment rather than a binary technical property.
- 16:01SPEAKER_00: And Florian Egloff and Max Smeets identify the mechanism directly.
- 16:05SPEAKER_00: Media pressure rises quickly and narrows the choices about how and when to attribute publicly.
- 16:11SPEAKER_00: The new cycle shapes the attribution itself, not merely its coverage.
- 16:15SPEAKER_00: The demonstration case is Olympic Destroyer in 2018, where early analysis pointed at North Korea, because the malware carried deliberately forged attribution artifacts, planted fingerprints.
- 16:26SPEAKER_00: Day one attribution is not merely uncertain, it is a surface the adversary can manipulate.
- 16:54SPEAKER_01: Three things happened in transmission.
- 16:56SPEAKER_01: Incidents became breaches, which is a different and much larger denominator.
- 17:00SPEAKER_01: Contributing factor became cause, which is the substantive error.
- 17:03SPEAKER_01: And one vendor's investigated caseload became all breaches everywhere.
- 17:06SPEAKER_01: The root cause analysis objection is the sharp one.
- 17:09SPEAKER_01: Human error is by definition where an investigation starts, not where it ends.
- 17:13SPEAKER_01: If you stop there, you have not found a cause.
- 17:15SPEAKER_01: You have found a place to stop looking.
- 17:16SPEAKER_01: If you want a defensible figure, Verizon's data breach investigations report says 68% of breaches involve a non-malicious human element and defines that term across more than 10,000 confirmed breaches.
- 17:28SPEAKER_00: And the average cost of a data breach.
- 17:31SPEAKER_00: My argument here is not with the report.
- 17:33SPEAKER_00: It is that the report's own methodology section disqualifies the way people use it.
- 17:38SPEAKER_00: The breaches in the sample range from about 3,400 to about 99,000 records.
- 17:44SPEAKER_00: Which means every breach you have heard of is excluded from the headline average.
- 17:48SPEAKER_00: The authors state that the sample is non-statistical, that margins of error and confidence intervals cannot be applied, and that the sampling frame is biased toward organizations with more mature security programs.
- 18:00SPEAKER_00: The cost figures come from interviews where participants mark ranges on a number line.
- 18:04SPEAKER_00: It is activity-based costing, not accounting data.
- 18:07SPEAKER_00: So when someone quotes the average cost of a breach next to the change healthcare example, they have anchored a board to a number drawn from a population that explicitly excludes events of that kind.
- 18:18SPEAKER_00: In a domain that is entirely tail risk, they have averaged the tail away.
- 18:23SPEAKER_01: There is an irony in this literature I cannot resist.
- 18:26SPEAKER_01: A group of economists studying the cost of cybercrime deliberately refused to publish a global total and wrote that it would be entirely misleading to provide totals, lest they be quoted, out of context.
- 18:36SPEAKER_01: Journalists added up their component figures and published the total anyway.
- 18:40SPEAKER_01: The distortion mechanism defeated an explicit, preemptive in-writing attempt to block it.
- 18:45SPEAKER_02: Marcus, close it.
- 18:47SPEAKER_02: And I want the warning, not the lesson.
- 18:50SPEAKER_01: The warning is that the corrective mode has its own failure state, and I watch smart people fall into it constantly.
- 18:56SPEAKER_01: It is substituting it was actually trivially simple, for it was sophisticated.
- 18:59SPEAKER_01: Two examples from tonight.
- 19:05SPEAKER_01: And Colonial's VPN password was, in sworn testimony, complicated.
- 19:09SPEAKER_01: The failure there was a forgotten profile, without MFA, which is an inventory problem, not a laziness problem.
- 19:14SPEAKER_01: Collier and Clayton's argument is that the label sophisticated is unearned.
- 19:18SPEAKER_01: It is not that attackers are stupid.
- 19:20SPEAKER_01: If you flip from one flattering story to the opposite flattering story, you have not gotten closer to the record.
- 19:25SPEAKER_01: You have just changed which comfortable thing you believe.
- 19:28SPEAKER_00: And the practical version for anyone building a program on these case studies.
- 19:33SPEAKER_00: Every one of these incidents is taught.
- 19:35SPEAKER_00: Every one of them appears in awareness training, board decks, and vendor pitches.
- 19:39SPEAKER_00: If the version you inherited is wrong, the control you derived from it is aimed at the wrong thing.
- 19:44SPEAKER_00: Patch Faster is the wrong lesson from not pitya.
- 19:47SPEAKER_00: Better passwords is the wrong lesson from Colonial.
- 19:49SPEAKER_00: And we know what happened is the wrong posture on Target, where the honest answer is that the forensics were never published, and we are all working from journalism.
- 20:00SPEAKER_02: That is the whole method.
- 20:02SPEAKER_02: Not because journalists are unreliable, some of the best sourcing in this episode is journalism, but because the filing is where you find out how confident anyone was actually entitled to be.
- 20:15SPEAKER_02: And when the primary sources disagree, as two congressional committees did, about one expired certificate, say that they disagree.
- 20:26SPEAKER_02: Uncertainty stated plainly is worth more to the person listening than confidence you have not earned.
- 20:33SPEAKER_02: This is dark perimeter.