Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / Weapons in Space: The Strategic Defense Initiative
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome to Eye Spy, the intelligence history podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg. Every few
- 0:12weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians,
- 0:14practitioners, and scholars in the field of intelligence
- 0:17to explore some aspect of the past and what it
- 0:21can tell us about the present and future of intelligence
- 0:23studies. Professor Aaron Bateman is an assistant
- 0:27professor of history and international affairs
- 0:29at George Washington University. Prior to graduate
- 0:32school, he served as a U .S. Air Force intelligence
- 0:34officer. He studies how technology shaped international
- 0:37security during the Cold War. His first book,
- 0:40Weapons and Space, Technology, Politics, and
- 0:43the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative,
- 0:45is an international history of intensifying military
- 0:47space competition in the last two decades of
- 0:49the Cold War. His current book project explores
- 0:52the political and security dimensions of global
- 0:54information networks during the Cold War. His
- 0:57work has been published in several prestigious
- 0:59journals. such as Diplomacy and Statecraft, Intelligence
- 1:02and National Security, the Oxford Handbook of
- 1:04Space Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies,
- 1:07the International Journal of Intelligence and
- 1:09Counterintelligence, Science and Diplomacy, and
- 1:11the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Welcome
- 1:15to I Spy, the intelligence history podcast. It's
- 1:19such a pleasure to have you here today. How did
- 1:22your research in this field really begin? Well,
- 1:28I think that there were a number of different
- 1:29factors that led me to pursue this particular
- 1:32topic when I was in graduate school and then
- 1:34ultimately to write this book that's based on
- 1:37my dissertation. So when I was in Air Force Intelligence
- 1:42and working in the intelligence community, I
- 1:44had quite a lot of exposure to national security
- 1:46space issues, both the use of space technologies
- 1:51for reconnaissance, but also evaluating threats
- 1:53to those systems. And one of the things that
- 1:57surprised me when I left the intelligence community,
- 1:59left the Air Force and went to graduate school
- 2:01is how little was written on the national security
- 2:05aspects of space activities during the Cold War.
- 2:08The preponderance of the historiography was really
- 2:11focused on civil space activities, space exploration,
- 2:15space science. And so I really wanted to understand
- 2:19and unpack. how the United States and its allies
- 2:24leverage space technologies to secure all different
- 2:28kinds of advantages in the Cold War from an intelligence
- 2:31standpoint, from a military operations standpoint.
- 2:34So the book is really, it's that topic that I
- 2:39just described, but told through the lens of
- 2:41SDI. and sdi is also a topic that looms very
- 2:46large in the historiography of the cold war but
- 2:48there's not actually a lot written about the
- 2:50program um in much detail and and so what i do
- 2:55in the book is i i tell the story of sdi from
- 2:58the standpoint of u .s national security space
- 3:00activities so sdi obviously comes about the 1980s
- 3:05but the point that i make in the book is to understand
- 3:09where SDI came from, the debates concerning it,
- 3:12you really have to go farther back in time and
- 3:14look at the evolution of US national security
- 3:17space activities. And while researching your
- 3:20book, you worked in so many different archives
- 3:22throughout the world, ranging from Australia,
- 3:26Europe, New Zealand, former Soviet Union, and
- 3:29the US. Can you reflect on some of your experiences
- 3:33in these archives? which has been the most valuable
- 3:36or interesting archive you've worked at and why?
- 3:40And what are some of the most surprising sources
- 3:44that you've encountered that have significantly
- 3:47shaped your research? Yeah, so and I should say,
- 3:51so working in the Australian and New Zealand
- 3:55archives is really from my second book. I didn't
- 3:58really do any work in those areas for the first
- 4:01book. And the second book is really on the politics
- 4:05and security of information networks during the
- 4:07Cold War. So I think that what I discovered in
- 4:13writing the book on SDI is that when you deal
- 4:17with a topic like that, in which a lot has been
- 4:20declassified, but there's still a lot of pockets
- 4:24of the program that are really unknown and difficult
- 4:27to get into, you really have to patch together
- 4:30sources from a lot of different archival collections
- 4:33and so i remember when i was trying to really
- 4:38get a sense of just how did the strategic defense
- 4:41initiative evolve technologically why were certain
- 4:44concepts pursued over others and when did the
- 4:47department of defense make certain really key
- 4:50policy and acquisition decisions it was actually
- 4:53really difficult to unpack all of that and What
- 4:58I realized when I went to the Reagan Presidential
- 5:00Library is that a lot of the relevant material
- 5:04is not available. And the Reagan Presidential
- 5:06Library is about a decade behind on declassification
- 5:09review. So what really helped me develop the
- 5:15book in the form that it's in now, the form that
- 5:20was published, was the British National Archives.
- 5:23And what I discovered is that because Britain
- 5:26became involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative,
- 5:30the US shared a lot of information with the UK,
- 5:34both in terms of the technologies, but also the
- 5:36policy and strategy driving this program. And
- 5:39so the British National Archives kind of became
- 5:41a backdoor into the SDI program. And and then,
- 5:47you know, for the Soviet perspective, that was
- 5:49also very difficult. There is a collection of
- 5:52the Hoover Institution, the Kataev Archive. There
- 5:55was some material at the KGB Special Archives
- 5:57in Lithuania that provided some insight into
- 5:59KGB assessments on SDI. And so, again, it's just
- 6:03this. patchwork of different sources to try to
- 6:05put together a comprehensive picture. But like
- 6:07with any work of history, the SDI story is not
- 6:10really done. And what I hope with this book is
- 6:12that it opens up a whole new wave of scholarship
- 6:14on this topic. In terms of my work and other
- 6:18archives for my current book, because it's also
- 6:22an international history, but geographically
- 6:25much larger in scope from NATO all the way to
- 6:28US alliance commitments in the South Pacific
- 6:31with Australia and New Zealand. What I found
- 6:34is that, you know, when you're looking at U .S.
- 6:39allies that are also parts of the Commonwealth,
- 6:43there's also sometimes little bits and pieces
- 6:46in the archival record that are missing. And
- 6:49so what I found is really valuable is I would
- 6:51look at something in the UK National Archives
- 6:53and certain questions just weren't being answered.
- 6:58And so when I went to Australia, New Zealand.
- 7:01I was able to answer some of those questions
- 7:03because of documents that traveled from one place
- 7:05to another. And for whatever reason, they're
- 7:08not still within the possession of the UK National
- 7:10Archives, but copies of those documents are in
- 7:13Canberra and Wellington. And also, I think, gives
- 7:18just a very different perspective on some of
- 7:20the alliance dynamics, because one of the aspects
- 7:23of the book is looking at the nexus between information
- 7:25networks and alliances. And I think it's always
- 7:28really valuable to try to reconstruct both sides
- 7:32of any issue. And so looking at alliance issues
- 7:35just from the U .S. perspective is going to be
- 7:37a limited perspective. So just trying to draw
- 7:40on the perspective of these other. alliance members,
- 7:43I think, has been particularly enlightening.
- 7:46And could you tell us a little bit more about
- 7:49what exactly the Strategic Defense Initiative
- 7:52is? You know, it's popularly referred to as Star
- 7:55Wars. But can you tell us what the most significant
- 7:58political and technological factors that influenced
- 8:01its development over time? So the Strategic Defense
- 8:06Initiative, I think, like what it actually was,
- 8:08is not generally well -defined. And when you
- 8:14read books that deal with SDI, it's oftentimes
- 8:16presented as a space laser program or kind of
- 8:22directed energy weapons on land and in space.
- 8:24And in reality, what SDI was, was a multi -billion
- 8:29dollar set of research into a wide variety of
- 8:32technologies with missile defense applications.
- 8:35So everything from interceptors to physically
- 8:39destroy incoming ballistic missiles to the sensors
- 8:43on ground and in space to be able to detect and
- 8:45track them. There are a number of different forces
- 8:50that shaped SDI. The program would not have happened
- 8:53if Ronald Reagan did not buy into this idea that
- 8:56comprehensive missile defense was indeed possible.
- 8:59But I think what's really important to stress,
- 9:01because there's a direct relationship between
- 9:03SDI and current debates over this so -called
- 9:07Golden Dome missile defense project in the Trump
- 9:10administration. has initiated, is that perfect
- 9:13defense was never the objective. 100 % effective
- 9:16defense was never the objective. And one of the
- 9:20things that we see with SDI that's in continuity
- 9:24with efforts in prior presidential administrations
- 9:28is to use advanced technologies to obtain qualitative
- 9:32advantages over the Soviet Union. And ultimately,
- 9:36and I can go into more detail about this, Ultimately,
- 9:40what happens is with the Cold War winding down,
- 9:44improving relations between the United States
- 9:46and the Soviet Union, Congress ultimately appropriates
- 9:51less money for different aspects of SDI. And
- 9:55then moving into the 90s, the space -based interceptor
- 9:58component of it is killed. But I think what's
- 10:01also important to stress is that SDI gives birth
- 10:04to the modern U .S. missile defense infrastructure.
- 10:07The Missile Defense Agency grows out of SDI.
- 10:10The ground -based missile defense systems that
- 10:12the U .S. has deployed today grow out of the
- 10:14SDI program. So SDI is not something that just
- 10:19existed in the mind of Ronald Reagan. It's not
- 10:21something that was just a brief period of time
- 10:23in the Cold War. We still live with SDI just
- 10:27under a different name. And the contours of it
- 10:30have changed considerably since Reagan first
- 10:33made his March 1983 SDI speech. And the context
- 10:37of like this U .S.-Soviet military space competition
- 10:40also did that really influence? the mindset,
- 10:46I guess, around this whole initiative. Yeah.
- 10:50So in the 1970s, there was a growing group of
- 10:53people who both inside the government and outside
- 10:58who were advocating. development of advanced
- 11:01space technologies for a wide variety of national
- 11:04security applications. But one of the ideas was
- 11:07that space is an area in which the U .S. has
- 11:09considerable advantage over the Soviet Union.
- 11:13And so the United States should embrace space
- 11:16technologies to improve U .S. warfighting capacity.
- 11:22And so one of the things that's going on in the
- 11:231970s and moving to the 80s is you see more advanced
- 11:27technologies to support space technology support
- 11:30both conventional and nuclear operations and
- 11:33so sdi in many ways is shaped by this broader
- 11:37shift in the use of space technologies that's
- 11:40taking place in that period and can you reflect
- 11:43a little bit on the legal boundaries governing
- 11:46military activities in space The 1967 Outer Space
- 11:51Treaty, for instance, prohibits the deployment
- 11:53of nuclear weapons in space, but does not explicitly
- 11:56ban non -nuclear weapons. So how do current international
- 11:59laws and agreements regulate military use of
- 12:02space and what challenges or gaps remain in addressing
- 12:05emerging security concerns? So the Outer Space
- 12:09Treaty was fairly minimal in the constraints
- 12:12that it placed on signatories. And so the big
- 12:17one, as you say, is. No deployment of nuclear
- 12:19weapons in space. So if you look at what, well,
- 12:25if you look at during the Cold War, for example,
- 12:27the US and the Soviet Union both fielded anti
- 12:30-satellite weapons. The US had a nuclear tipped
- 12:32anti -satellite weapon, but it was a ground -based
- 12:34system. So the idea is that it would fire off
- 12:36and either destroy a satellite or incoming ballistic
- 12:40missile. It's called Program 437. which was perfectly
- 12:44allowable by the Outer Space Treaty. The Soviets
- 12:47had what was known as a co -orbital anti -satellite
- 12:50weapons program. So the idea is that you would
- 12:52fire the thing off into low Earth orbit in space.
- 12:56It would rendezvous with its target and then
- 12:58physically destroy it. That's perfectly allowable
- 13:00by the Outer Space Treaty. So one of the challenges
- 13:04is, since the Outer Space Treaty, there have
- 13:08been multiple efforts to strengthen the Outer
- 13:12Space Treaty to make it more comprehensive. But
- 13:16there are definitional disagreements on what
- 13:18is a space weapon. Is a missile that's fired
- 13:22off into space to destroy a satellite, is that
- 13:24a space weapon? Does it have to be, quote unquote,
- 13:25based in space? And so this has really impeded
- 13:29any kind of significant effort to have a more
- 13:33comprehensive treaty banning certain kinds of
- 13:36technologies that can attack space systems. uh
- 13:39putting aside the desirability of that from from
- 13:42various parties is a whole separate issue and
- 13:45then you also have what i show in the book the
- 13:46entanglement of missile defense and anti -satellite
- 13:49weapons technologies so any advanced missile
- 13:53defense capability that can destroy an incoming
- 13:55ballistic missile outside of earth's atmosphere
- 13:57could also be used to destroy a satellite so
- 14:00just categorizing the weapons that would fall
- 14:04under a comprehensive ban would be really difficult
- 14:06because it would bleed over into other areas.
- 14:09So to underscore what I'm talking about, in 2008,
- 14:13the U .S. Navy used a modified SM -3 missile
- 14:17defense interceptor sea -based platform to destroy
- 14:21a defunct U .S. satellite in low Earth orbit.
- 14:23The U .S. maintains this was not an anti -satellite
- 14:26weapons test. It was not a counter space activity,
- 14:28but it underscores that you can use missile defense
- 14:31systems. to attack space capabilities if you
- 14:34choose to it's it's technologically feasible
- 14:36to do that so all of this suggests that there
- 14:41are very limited or all of this reveals they're
- 14:43very limited constraints on military activities
- 14:47in space and the outer space treaty has kind
- 14:49of been seen as is this um this agreement that
- 14:55there is consensus that putting nuclear weapons
- 14:58in space is a bad idea But very recently, according
- 15:03to publicly available information, intelligence
- 15:06reporting shared by the Biden administration
- 15:08and subsequently by the Trump administration,
- 15:10the Russian Federation is planning to develop
- 15:15and field a space -based nuclear anti -satellite
- 15:19weapon. And if that is indeed accurate, then
- 15:22that would violate the Outer Space Treaty, which
- 15:24is one of the reasons why you've seen such a
- 15:26visceral and negative reaction to that reporting.
- 15:30How did STI shape American -Soviet relations?
- 15:35And why was it controversial among NATO allies
- 15:38specifically? How did Western European states
- 15:41perceive the space arms race, not only as a strategic
- 15:44military issue, but also an economic, industrial
- 15:47matter in the 1980s? And conversely, what role
- 15:51did it play in transatlantic defence and intelligence
- 15:54cooperation, particularly between the US and
- 15:57the UK? So I'll start with the Soviet piece.
- 16:03SDI was seen by the Soviet Union to be a move
- 16:09by the United States to develop a capability
- 16:12that would allow the U .S. to in effect launch
- 16:14a decapitating nuclear strike and then mop up
- 16:16any Soviet nuclear weapons that were fired back
- 16:19at the U .S., which was not the plan at all.
- 16:23But Soviet General Secretary At the time, Yuri
- 16:27Andropov, former chairman of the KGB, really
- 16:30saw SDI as just part of this concerted American
- 16:34campaign to undermine Soviet military power.
- 16:37So that's kind of the well -established narrative,
- 16:41which is true. That was a Soviet perspective.
- 16:45But if we peel back the layers a little bit more,
- 16:48what we find in the Soviet bureaucracy is there
- 16:49were a number of views on SDI. whether these
- 16:54technologies could come to maturity in the near
- 16:57term, whether the Soviets could field effective
- 16:59countermeasures. And then there are the applications
- 17:03of these technologies. under the SDI umbrella
- 17:06for conventional warfighting. So one of the things
- 17:08the Soviets are really worried about is the U
- 17:11.S. developing better space -based sensors, for
- 17:13example, that would allow the U .S. and NATO
- 17:16to track and target Soviet forces deep behind
- 17:19enemy lines and conduct precision strikes against
- 17:22those targets. So SDI was also seen as this tech
- 17:25incubator that would allow the U .S. and its
- 17:29allies to leap even farther ahead in sensor technologies,
- 17:32information networking. Things that were really
- 17:35core to the shift towards what was known as air
- 17:38-land battle in the 1980s U .S. military doctrine,
- 17:44which emphasized being able to conduct strikes,
- 17:47precision strikes, really deep behind enemy lines
- 17:50against your adversary and a lot more flexibility
- 17:52in terms of conventional and nuclear targeting.
- 17:56And so SDI was intimately linked. in the eyes
- 18:01of the Soviets, to this broader shift taking
- 18:03place in U .S. and allied defense strategy. For
- 18:07the allies in Europe, there were also a lot of
- 18:13concerns about SDI. One of the concerns was particularly
- 18:18for Britain and France, relatively small nuclear
- 18:20powers. that SDI would precipitate a massive
- 18:26Soviet buildup in missile defense, which would
- 18:30undermine the credibility of the relatively small
- 18:32French and British nuclear deterrence. We have
- 18:35to remember that Reagan makes his SDI speech
- 18:38March of 83. Britain is undergoing nuclear modernization
- 18:41at this time, procuring the Trident submarine
- 18:45launch ballistic missile system. And so Margaret
- 18:47Thatcher is in this really difficult position.
- 18:49She wants to maintain good relations with the
- 18:51U .S. She thinks nuclear deterrence is really,
- 18:54really important. She's put a lot of political
- 18:56capital behind nuclear modernization. And now
- 18:59Ronald Reagan is asking her to endorse a capability
- 19:02or a program that he says will lead to the elimination
- 19:05of nuclear weapons. That creates a really significant
- 19:08political problem. But the story is more complicated
- 19:11because Thatcher also believes that SDI is important
- 19:14as a research effort to stay ahead of. the Soviets
- 19:18in advanced missile defense technologies. So
- 19:22her views on SDI evolve over time, and she actually
- 19:26becomes amenable to the idea of deploying some
- 19:29kind of a limited space -based missile defense
- 19:31system. Other allies see SDI not only in military
- 19:37terms, but potentially as a tech incubator that
- 19:42is going to propel the United States even farther
- 19:45ahead in a range of technologies with civil applications.
- 19:48So information networking, for example, better
- 19:52computing, all of these are critical aspects
- 19:55of SDI. So the French. For example, French President
- 19:58Francois Mitterrand, he views SDI not just as
- 20:02a strategic military problem, but an economic
- 20:05and industrial one as well, and says when the
- 20:08U .S. invites allies to become involved, Mitterrand
- 20:10says, you know, we shouldn't have Europe even
- 20:13more dependent on U .S. advanced technologies.
- 20:16We need to pool our resources and do our own
- 20:19research and these kinds of technologies and
- 20:21come up with a European solution, which ultimately
- 20:23does not happen. But I think what this underscores
- 20:27is in a transatlantic alliance context sdi has
- 20:32a lot of implications and not all of them are
- 20:36viewed positively the uk as i said earlier becomes
- 20:40involved in sdi and is ultimately disappointed
- 20:44with the monetary value of the contracts that
- 20:47it's awarded. Originally, Margaret Thatcher hoped
- 20:49to secure over a billion dollars in SDI contracts,
- 20:53and the British ended up getting about $100 million,
- 20:55which is a pittance in comparison. But what we
- 20:59find in the archival record is that involvement
- 21:02in FDI did open up certain channels for sharing
- 21:04highly sensitive technical intelligence on Soviet
- 21:09missile defense developments. The British were
- 21:13able to test out some new capabilities for ensuring
- 21:19that warheads could get through Soviet missile
- 21:23defenses. It's a little difficult to just say
- 21:27outrightly that, well, British involvement in
- 21:29SDI was a failure from a monetary standpoint,
- 21:33perhaps. But from the standpoint of key officials
- 21:36in the British Ministry of Defense, there were
- 21:38significant benefits derived. And it was seen
- 21:41as opening up new channels for information exchange
- 21:44within the context of existing US -UK military
- 21:47cooperation. Something that you really highlight
- 21:53in your book is that space warfare is not really
- 21:57just a concern for the distant future, but a
- 21:59reality that's already unfolding. So how has
- 22:02Russia's war on Ukraine highlighted the urgency
- 22:05of space security, particularly with incidents
- 22:08like the reported hacking of Viasat and Ukraine's
- 22:11reliance on commercial satellite systems for
- 22:13defense? And given the increasing sophistication
- 22:16of counter space capabilities, how do you assess
- 22:19the US government's efforts to enhance space
- 22:22system resilience, including the Department of
- 22:25Defense's plan to deploy a national space defense
- 22:27architecture? So I think that when people hear
- 22:34the term space warfare, they think of Star Wars
- 22:38and Star Trek and this kind of futuristic depiction
- 22:41of conflict. But in reality, The United States
- 22:45has been preparing for conflict involving attacks
- 22:49on space systems since, I mean, the earliest
- 22:53preparations in the 1960s, but more so in the
- 22:561970s, 1980s. So this is not really a new thing.
- 23:00And in addition to fielding kinetic anti -satellite
- 23:04weapons to physically attack satellites for decades,
- 23:08the U .S. and the Soviet Union. And now the Russian
- 23:12Federation, China, other countries have fielded
- 23:15electronic warfare capabilities to jam the command
- 23:18and control links of satellites so you don't
- 23:20have to physically destroy them, but to render
- 23:23them inoperable. And then, as you say, there's
- 23:25also the cyber threats, as we saw with the Viasat
- 23:28hack in the lead up to the invasion of Ukraine.
- 23:31So what Ukraine has underscored is a number of
- 23:34different things. One. it's shown the really
- 23:39really important role of commercial space capabilities
- 23:41so during the cold war the u .s had very, very
- 23:47sophisticated satellite reconnaissance capabilities
- 23:50that were highly classified. And those capabilities
- 23:53are still highly classified today, which creates
- 23:57a challenge of sharing intelligence derived from
- 23:59those systems beyond the Five Eyes and perhaps
- 24:03a little bit larger ring of intelligence partners.
- 24:06So what commercial satellite imagery has allowed,
- 24:09for example, is the Ukrainian Defense Forces
- 24:11to leverage unclassified data for military operations,
- 24:17which it's done to great success. The other thing
- 24:20that we've seen is the really critical role of
- 24:22Starlink, developed by SpaceX, which is a commercial
- 24:25satellite communication system in low Earth orbit.
- 24:28But unlike during the Cold War, and even just,
- 24:33I would say, beyond a few years ago most satellite
- 24:36communications were deployed in geostationary
- 24:39orbit which is about 22 500 miles away uh starlink
- 24:44operates in low earth orbit so about 90 nautical
- 24:47miles to 1200 nautical miles much lower altitude
- 24:50which means you have to have a lot of systems
- 24:53to have persistent coverage and What that means
- 24:57is that you have lower latency. So if the signals
- 25:02are going really far away and then coming back,
- 25:04that means that there's a slight delay. You don't
- 25:06really have that with Starlink. The other thing
- 25:09is that you have a lot of systems, which means
- 25:11that's a lot of targets, which means that creates
- 25:14a great cost for your adversary if you try to
- 25:16attack them because you can just put more systems
- 25:19up. They're really cheap, so easy to replenish.
- 25:22and so this is one of the reasons why an adversary
- 25:25would want to develop a nuclear anti -satellite
- 25:27weapon is basically if you pop off a nuke in
- 25:29low earth orbit you're going to punch a big hole
- 25:31in that constellation aside from the other you
- 25:35know really negative consequences that would
- 25:37come from that that's basically what's happening
- 25:39here is during the cold war you had a small number
- 25:42of systems really sophisticated really vulnerable
- 25:45more recently much larger number of systems creates
- 25:49greater resiliency, but that vectors the threats
- 25:52in other directions. So the threats don't go
- 25:54away. So nuclear anti -satellite weapons potentially
- 25:56on the table, but also going after the information
- 25:59networks to make these systems operate. So hacking
- 26:02into the ground architecture, for example. Oftentimes
- 26:05the most readily accessible vulnerabilities are
- 26:08in the ground infrastructure, not the segment
- 26:10in space, which is why cybersecurity is really,
- 26:13really important. And then also having mechanisms
- 26:15to mitigate electronic warfare attacks against
- 26:18the command and controlling. So the Russians
- 26:21have used electronic warfare against Starlink.
- 26:23It just hasn't been that effective. And so what
- 26:25the war in Ukraine has shown is that having all
- 26:31of these commercial capabilities that are much
- 26:34larger in number, cheap and accessible, really
- 26:37does enhance your resiliency. We don't know,
- 26:39based on publicly available information, But
- 26:42we have seen a situation in which the Russians
- 26:45have not been willing to go beyond non -kinetic
- 26:48attacks on space systems, whether that's because
- 26:52physical attacks would not really be useful because
- 26:56you have so many systems in orbit, or whether
- 26:59it's because the Russians would see that as too
- 27:00escalatory, really difficult to know. But what
- 27:03Ukraine has underscored is the really vital role
- 27:06of space systems in modern conflict, particularly
- 27:11this commercial aspect. I will also say, because
- 27:14I'm a historian and I have to do this, that these
- 27:17characterizations of Ukraine as the first commercial
- 27:20space were a little bit problematic. Because
- 27:23during the first Gulf War, about 25 % of the
- 27:28coalition's communications came from commercial
- 27:30satellite communications. And also we saw the
- 27:33first instance of the use of early form of commercial
- 27:37satellite imagery supplied by the French in the
- 27:40form of spots. So Ukraine commercial space systems
- 27:44being used on a much larger scale in terms of
- 27:48their consequence, but not a totally new. And
- 27:53then to answer your question about what is the
- 27:56United States doing in response to adversary
- 28:00counter space developments? Well, the U .S. is
- 28:03now deploying proliferated constellations. So
- 28:05think Starlink, but for a wide variety of functions.
- 28:08The National Reconnaissance Office has announced
- 28:11that it is deploying proliferated constellations
- 28:14of reconnaissance systems, creates greater resiliency.
- 28:20missile warning and tracking architecture is
- 28:23based on a bunch of tracking systems in low Earth
- 28:25orbit, rather than a couple of what General John
- 28:29Hyten used to call juicy targets in geostationary
- 28:31orbit. And so all of this is intended to create
- 28:34more resiliency by having a lot more systems.
- 28:38Historically, space systems have been seen as
- 28:42an Achilles heel of the US, let's just call it
- 28:47national security. architecture, whether it's
- 28:51the intelligence community, the Department of
- 28:53Defense, whether it's for intelligence, whether
- 28:55it's for connectivity. But putting more systems
- 28:58in orbit obviously creates greater resiliency.
- 29:02But the space architectures aren't just in space.
- 29:05They're on the ground as well. And so, you know,
- 29:09for example, there's an extremely important US
- 29:13Space Force installation in Greenland. It's been
- 29:16there since the 1960s for command and control
- 29:19of US national security satellites. And so what
- 29:24we find is you can put all these systems in orbit,
- 29:27but you still have these critical nodes on the
- 29:30ground. different places in the world. And so
- 29:33the vulnerability, when people talk about space
- 29:35vulnerability, I always ask them, what segment
- 29:38of a space architecture are you talking about?
- 29:41Are we talking about the ground segment? Are
- 29:42we talking about the space segment? Are we talking
- 29:44about the command and control links between them?
- 29:46There's different levels of vulnerabilities and
- 29:50those vulnerabilities are shifting because of
- 29:53the way the architectures are changing, but they're
- 29:56not going away. Proliferated constellations are
- 29:58not a silver bullet. Going back to something
- 30:01we already discussed a little bit, but I'm just
- 30:03really curious about your recent research for
- 30:06your new book on the nuclear age and allied global
- 30:11information networks. Could you just tell us
- 30:13a little bit about your time in New Zealand and
- 30:15any documents that you found particularly interesting?
- 30:19Yeah, so the book looks at how the nuclear age
- 30:22shaped US global information networks from moving.
- 30:28national security data in support of its its
- 30:31foreign and defense policies and basically what
- 30:34the book shows is that information networks and
- 30:36i focus on the physical infrastructure satellites
- 30:39submarine cables worldwide radio networks that
- 30:43these were oftentimes a really significant constraint
- 30:46on US foreign policy, US defense policy, US grand
- 30:52strategy more broadly. But because connectivity
- 30:55with allies was such a core element of US national
- 31:00security. during the Cold War, I look at this
- 31:02information network issue from allied perspective
- 31:05as well. And so if we think about the Five Eyes,
- 31:08right, so US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
- 31:12physical connectivity is a really big challenge.
- 31:15And so New Zealand and Australia become members
- 31:18of what is later known as the Five Eyes in 1956.
- 31:24signing on to the UCUSA agreement. And so when
- 31:28I went to New Zealand and Australia, I spent
- 31:34a lot of time in Australia for personal reasons,
- 31:37but been diving into the archives more for this
- 31:41project. And it really gives you a sense of how
- 31:45connectivity and alliance dynamics really intersect
- 31:48and what a profound challenge that was and remains.
- 31:52If we think about security in the Indo -Pacific
- 31:55today, connectivity is a huge challenge. Australia,
- 31:58New Zealand, heavily dependent on submarine cables,
- 32:01for example, for connectivity with allies, including
- 32:04the United States. A lot of national security
- 32:06data has moved between the continental US and
- 32:09those two partners, those two allies through
- 32:12subsea cable networks. Although I don't look
- 32:15in Japanese archives, I do also look at connectivity
- 32:20with Japan. and how that became a critical issue
- 32:23after US and Japan become treaty allies as well.
- 32:26So in terms of interesting documents, I'll highlight
- 32:32one from New Zealand. So one of the challenges,
- 32:37and you're an intelligence historian, and so
- 32:39you appreciate this, I'm sure, is that there
- 32:43are certain things that we take for granted that
- 32:45aren't explicitly mentioned in archives. So for
- 32:48example, The term Five Eyes is not used until
- 32:52after the Cold War comes to an end. And a lot
- 32:57of the relevant material on the Five Eyes is
- 33:00still classified. And so what you have to do
- 33:04is you have to find documents that don't necessarily
- 33:10explicitly talk about the mechanics of what becomes
- 33:13known as the Five Eyes, but you get insights
- 33:15into critical issues like connectivity. that
- 33:18are intimately linked with this intelligence
- 33:20pact that becomes known as the Five Eyes. So
- 33:23anything involving signals intelligence during
- 33:26the Cold War is still, you know, a lot of it
- 33:29is still retained and redacted. But one of the
- 33:32things that I found was from the late 1950s and
- 33:37early 1960s, there was all of these for the Five
- 33:41Eye, what becomes known as the Five Eyes to talk
- 33:42about communications security. Connectivity is
- 33:47discussed as well. And so in one of the documents,
- 33:50I actually saw a discussion from New Zealand
- 33:53defense perspective on how are we going to move
- 33:58what was referred to as special intelligence
- 34:01to Canada, UK, and in the US. now special intelligence
- 34:10is the term that's used for signals intelligence
- 34:13and so you you get some insight into how do partners
- 34:16like new zealand and in australia become physically
- 34:19integrated with uh the the other three members
- 34:23of this intelligence pack that are really really
- 34:25far away and so you know ukusa is not mentioned
- 34:29in that document five eyes of course is not mentioned
- 34:32that would be anachronism but you get a sense
- 34:35of how our folks in New Zealand? How are folks
- 34:38in Australia grappling with this problem of how
- 34:40do we actually physically cooperate with our
- 34:43allies in the Northern Hemisphere in a secure
- 34:46manner, especially during crisis? And so that
- 34:49was a quite interesting and unexpected find.
- 34:53Absolutely. Yeah. And my final question for you
- 34:57is, What key historical insights or lessons do
- 35:02you hope readers take away from all of your work,
- 35:04both in an academic sense, but also in a practical
- 35:09way, influencing contemporary decision making
- 35:13policy and our understanding of space as the
- 35:16fifth domain of warfare? Yeah, so I would say
- 35:19that just kind of stepping really far back, you
- 35:23know, what is what is kind of my. my research
- 35:26agenda, what is my goal? And I'm trained as a
- 35:29historian of science and technology. My PhD is
- 35:31in history of science. And a lot of the work
- 35:34that I do is really. I would say, is in conversation
- 35:38with the security studies world, which is interdisciplinary
- 35:42history and political science. And one of the
- 35:46things that I aim to do is show the politics
- 35:49that are embedded in these large -scale technological
- 35:51systems that are used for national security purposes,
- 35:54but also how the technology imposes constraints
- 35:58on everything from U .S. national security strategy
- 36:03to U .S. alliance commitments that I think that
- 36:05there's a bit of a tendency, and I saw this when
- 36:09I was in the Department of Defense and in the
- 36:10intelligence community, and I see it among some
- 36:13of my academic colleagues, to really take the
- 36:15technology for granted. That, well, it just doesn't
- 36:19really matter. If the U .S. wants to, it will
- 36:21find a solution. But what we actually find is
- 36:25that technological constraints can impose really
- 36:28significant limits. on your national security
- 36:32strategy. And if I can offer just one very quick
- 36:34illustration of that. During the Cold War in
- 36:38the 1960s, the US was really trying to build
- 36:42a responsive early warning intelligence system
- 36:46to be able to detect Soviet buildup for an invasion.
- 36:51And Cuban Missile Crisis and Prague 68 shows
- 36:55the weaknesses of that system, that the U .S.
- 36:58really can't do this in near real time, look
- 37:00for indications on the scale that it needs to
- 37:02and wants to. And so it's not really until shifts
- 37:05in electronics in the late 60s moving into the
- 37:10early 70s that the US actually is just starting
- 37:13to be able to do this and you literally see this
- 37:15being grappled with this problem all the way
- 37:17up to the president and it's a really key instance
- 37:22of how technology technological limitations are
- 37:26really imposing serious boundaries on your national
- 37:29security strategy. And so really big picture,
- 37:33whether it's looking at SDI, whether it's my
- 37:35current book, that's one of the key things that
- 37:38I want people to think about is how technology
- 37:42really intersects with questions of national
- 37:46security strategy and policy, questions of grand
- 37:48strategy, and how technological limits place
- 37:52constraints on those broader questions and aspirations
- 37:55related to national security strategy and policy
- 37:59thank you very much for joining me today thank
- 38:03you