Latest / Kitco NEWS / Why Gold Can Fall When the Next Crisis Begins | Steve Keen
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_03: We I think we're about to see the bursting of a very large bubble uh on the scale of the rail the railway bubbles back in the nineteenth century.
- 0:07SPEAKER_03: I would give the bubble in AI less than a year to go.
- 0:10SPEAKER_03: And that's why I think people wall courts is a fairly sensible idea of how a lot of these data centers will end up being used.
- 0:16SPEAKER_03: Everything has tried for perfection, and we're not about to experience perfection.
- 0:20SPEAKER_02: All right, my guest today thinks the private debt cycle is close to a breaking point, and that if the losses spread far enough, they start eating through bank capital.
- 0:30SPEAKER_02: Back in 2010, more than 2,500 readers of the Real World Economics Review voted on who had warned earliest and most clearly about the financial crisis.
- 0:38SPEAKER_02: He was first, Nuriel Rubini came in second.
- 0:41SPEAKER_02: Now, obviously, Gold set its dollar record back in January.
- 0:44SPEAKER_02: Since then, we've had a war, a serious disruption to shipping, and it gained about 5% last week.
- 0:50SPEAKER_02: It still hasn't obviously taken out that January high.
- 0:52SPEAKER_02: So is Gold waiting for the crisis itself or for what governments do when it arrives?
- 0:58SPEAKER_02: Stay with me.
- 0:59SPEAKER_01: KitCo News in Focus with Jeremy Saffron.
- 1:03SPEAKER_02: All right, welcome back.
- 1:03SPEAKER_02: I'm Jeremy Saffron.
- 1:05SPEAKER_02: Joining me now, Professor Steve Keene.
- 1:06SPEAKER_02: He wrote Debunking Economics, he built the modeling software Minsky, and of course took the Revere Award for that 2008 warning.
- 1:15SPEAKER_02: He's now writing a new book with the title, How Economists Will Destroy Capitalism.
- 1:20SPEAKER_02: We'll get into that.
- 1:20SPEAKER_02: Steve, good to have you on KitCo News, and thanks for making the time.
- 1:24SPEAKER_03: Thank you for the invite.
- 1:25SPEAKER_02: I wanted to kind of start with what everyone on this channel, at least watching, kind of wants to know.
- 1:31SPEAKER_02: I mean, gold gained about 5% last week, and it's still short of its January record.
- 1:36SPEAKER_02: Incredible year, though.
- 1:37SPEAKER_02: And in the meantime, I mean, we've had a war, disrupted energy, inflation, more than a$40 trillion in gross federal debt.
- 1:44SPEAKER_02: If that wasn't enough, what is gold still waiting for?
- 1:48SPEAKER_03: Well, I've always regard gold as a speculative commodity that does well when people are worried about the financial system.
- 1:56SPEAKER_03: And so obviously the worries of the financial financial system are driving gold's price up right now.
- 2:01SPEAKER_03: And I think that'll go uh probably further up when we start seeing the real impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormones, which still hasn't really hit production systems around the world yet because of the existing stocks we had of all the things that have now been cut off from Australia.
- 2:16SPEAKER_03: But of course, there's two possibilities there, and you saw this earlier this year.
- 2:19SPEAKER_03: Gold can rise because people speculate uh based on the fragility they see in the financial system.
- 2:25SPEAKER_03: But gold can also fall if people actually find they've got calls coming in from other assets which they're losing money on, and they sell gold to cover uh those those uh positions.
- 2:36SPEAKER_03: So I did expect gold to rise earlier this year because of what was happening uh with the ridiculous war and so on and so forth.
- 2:43SPEAKER_03: But in fact, it fell.
- 2:44SPEAKER_03: And I think a lot of that was people being forced to liquidate because the down the performance of other assets meant they had to sell their safe one.
- 2:52SPEAKER_02: So uh is it kind of waiting for the crisis itself or for what comes after it?
- 2:57SPEAKER_02: I mean, is the failure kind of isn't bullish on its own?
- 3:00SPEAKER_02: The rescue is what's bullish?
- 3:02SPEAKER_02: Is that the kind of distinction?
- 3:04SPEAKER_03: No, it's really they take the markets take a hell of a long time to wake up to reality.
- 3:09SPEAKER_03: Uh one thing, like I'm I'm no fan of uh stock of stock markets and and uh speculative markets in general.
- 3:16SPEAKER_03: I think they're as as as Keynes called them, they're casinos, they're not uh predictive systems.
- 3:21SPEAKER_03: And uh the the basic way that that c conventional economists teach through our markets is they rationally anticipate future returns, and then your share price reflects the net present value of the discounted dividends and and and returns you expect to get out of your asset over time.
- 3:38SPEAKER_03: That's bollocks, and in fact the people who said it's bollocks are the people who developed that theory.
- 3:43SPEAKER_03: There's a paper I'd recommend people to check out by FAMA and French, are two of the main proponents of what's called the efficient markets hypothesis.
- 3:50SPEAKER_03: And in 2004 they wrote a paper uh called Theory and Evidence of the hypothesis and said it should be rejected because it's so badly uh is is so strongly contradicted by the data.
- 4:01SPEAKER_03: So the this this um the the extent to which the markets underestimate what's going to happen and then overestimate when it occurs is an opposite way to think about the markets.
- 4:12SPEAKER_03: That's the way Dalio thinks about the markets.
- 4:14SPEAKER_03: It's also the way that um Soros uh did, that you get Hathaway to some extent, Burkshow Hathaway, not not as much, obviously they don't play the ups and downs of the market.
- 4:24SPEAKER_03: But the the normal position for people who've made large gains in in the markets is to expect that markets under-react and use initially and then over-react when it becomes absolutely confirmed.
- 4:36SPEAKER_03: So I think we're still in the under-reaction phase and the over-reaction will phase will start when those shortages start turning up uh in global in Western economies, uh, given the closure of the strait uh that's finally exhausting all the stocks that exist of all the essential inputs we no longer get through the Strait of Homos.
- 4:56SPEAKER_03: Interesting.
- 4:56SPEAKER_02: Uh and I kind of want to test the other side of it too.
- 4:58SPEAKER_02: I mean, you brought it up there briefly, Professor, you're just talking about liquidity.
- 5:02SPEAKER_02: But you know, in 2008, and again in March of 2020, I mean, gold fell hard at the start.
- 5:07SPEAKER_02: People were selling anything liquid to raise cash.
- 5:09SPEAKER_02: Does that happen again?
- 5:12SPEAKER_03: Quite possibly.
- 5:13SPEAKER_03: I mean, it did happen a bit earlier this year.
- 5:15SPEAKER_03: Um, it certainly happened during the global financial crisis.
- 5:18SPEAKER_03: And this is one reason you go from a range of assets being negatively correlated with each other and therefore you think you're hedging your bets, to positively correlated when the crash occurs.
- 5:28SPEAKER_03: And so rather than hedging your bets, you amplify your risk.
- 5:31SPEAKER_03: So I think that's the sort of thing I'd be, you know, anybody who gets involved in speculating, you need to wash out against those effects.
- 5:38SPEAKER_03: Will a a crisis cause people to liquidate their safe assets?
- 5:41SPEAKER_03: And at what time will the correlations turn from negative so you can uh you know diversify your risk so they all go in the same direction and your risk gets amplified?
- 5:51SPEAKER_02: Now you've been warning about private debt obviously since before 2008.
- 5:55SPEAKER_02: And I kind of want to talk a little bit about that because obviously the system's kept running for the better part of those two decades.
- 6:00SPEAKER_02: What's held it up longer than you expected?
- 6:04SPEAKER_03: Well, I did expect it to hold it up because the um when when I saw the crisis coming, what I was looking at is the level of private debt.
- 6:11SPEAKER_03: Uh my work is based on Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, the exact opposite of the efficient markets hypothesis, and that focuses on the level of leverage people take out to buy non-financial assets.
- 6:24SPEAKER_03: In fact, when you look at uh at gold and houses and anything physical, we we think of them as financial assets, but a financial asset is something which is your asset and somebody else's liability.
- 6:34SPEAKER_03: Now, gold is your asset and nobody else's liability if you've got the the actual physical substance there, the same for houses and so on and so forth.
- 6:42SPEAKER_03: We gamble on their prices, and of course you don't actually get the money value until you sell it for actual actual uh dollars.
- 6:50SPEAKER_03: So I uh I focus on the level of private debt and its rate of growth and over time.
- 6:56SPEAKER_03: And when I looked at the data in 2005, I saw that the level of private debt in both Australia, which is my home to my home country, of course, at the time, and the United States was the highest it had been since World War II and rising extremely rapidly in both countries.
- 7:11SPEAKER_03: And I said at some point the rate of growth of private debt has to slow down.
- 7:15SPEAKER_03: When it slows down, it'll probably even go negative now.
- 7:17SPEAKER_03: When it goes negative, we'll have a recession, a serious one.
- 7:20SPEAKER_03: And of course, that's what happened.
- 7:22SPEAKER_02: Now, uh I was reading this morning uh uh the Z1.
- 7:25SPEAKER_02: I mean, you're familiar with that report.
- 7:27SPEAKER_02: The Fed tracks all of this in that quarterly report.
- 7:30SPEAKER_02: It's the closest thing, I guess, we've kind of got to a full picture of who owes what in America.
- 7:34SPEAKER_02: And on that data, household debt peaks near 98% of GDP around 2009.
- 7:39SPEAKER_02: More recently, it's been down near 68 percent.
- 7:41SPEAKER_02: That's a 30-point fall.
- 7:43SPEAKER_02: Households did deleverage.
- 7:45SPEAKER_02: So which measure tells you the vulnerability is still there?
- 7:48SPEAKER_02: Is it the debt stock?
- 7:49SPEAKER_02: Is it new lending debt service?
- 7:52SPEAKER_03: It's it's it's both.
- 7:53SPEAKER_03: I mean, if you've you're basically you're saying that it peaked back in 2008, now it's falling about 30 percent.
- 7:59SPEAKER_03: Uh the last time we had a crisis like this was the Great Depression.
- 8:02SPEAKER_03: And the peak level of private, aggregate private debt, both household and corporate, was about 140% of GDP in 1932.
- 8:10SPEAKER_03: That's when it peaked as a percentage of GDP.
- 8:12SPEAKER_03: It then fell both during the Great Depression and during World War II by 67%, roughly two-thirds fall.
- 8:19SPEAKER_03: So you went from, say, 50% of GDP as the private debt level, 150%, sorry, in 1932 to 50% in uh in the end of World War II.
- 8:29SPEAKER_03: We've got pr pretty much the same time period after the global financial crisis.
- 8:34SPEAKER_03: Households have delivered a fair amount, businesses haven't delivered as much.
- 8:38SPEAKER_03: So rather than having one-third as much uh private debt, which is what we had after the Great Depression, we've still got 85% of the private debt level that applied at the peak of the crisis.
- 8:48SPEAKER_03: And what that means in in general is that banks are unwilling, relatively unwilling to lend, borrowers uh relatively unwilling to borrow, so you don't get to get a great deal of credit demand out of the economy.
- 9:00SPEAKER_03: And I call what happened after the global financial crisis credit stagnation.
- 9:04SPEAKER_03: Whereas Larry uh Summers, you know, that well-respected uh member of the Harvard Harvard community, uh called it secular stagnation, as if there was a secular trend.
- 9:13SPEAKER_03: And I said, no, it's the fact that there's such an overhang of debt that you can't get the level of boom we got back in 2006 and 2007.
- 9:21SPEAKER_03: And when you can't get the boom, you can't f you don't fall off as large a cliff when the rate of uh growth of debt slows down.
- 9:27SPEAKER_03: Also, government spending uh has been much higher than people anticipated, and that has provided an alternative cash flow.
- 9:34SPEAKER_03: So you haven't needed as much private borrowed money given the level of government money creation going on.
- 9:40SPEAKER_03: There's a caveat there, but I'll come back to that.
- 9:42SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
- 9:42SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 9:43SPEAKER_02: Well, well, you you could I'll ask Louie too to bring up this chart, because you brought a chart that kind of takes this debt story back to the 1800s.
- 9:49SPEAKER_02: I mean, let's pull it up.
- 9:50SPEAKER_02: Before you walk us through it, which line should everybody kind of be watching and and is the danger the debt level itself for the moment new credit stops growing?
- 10:00SPEAKER_03: Well, you can see the the black line is the level of private debt and the red line is government debt.
- 10:05SPEAKER_03: And I think this might be a revelation for a lot of your viewers to begin with, because given all the obsession about the level of government debt and the fact that you only begin to find talking about private debt on myself and Michael Hudson and Richard Vega and a few others, uh people would normally think government debt must be bigger than private debt.
- 10:22SPEAKER_03: Now you can see historically there have only been a couple of periods where government debt exceeded private debt.
- 10:27SPEAKER_03: That was the big Civil War and World War II.
- 10:31SPEAKER_03: And apart from that, government debt has been below private debt.
- 10:35SPEAKER_03: So uh the conventional theories just obsess about the level of government debt and ignore private sector debt.
- 10:41SPEAKER_03: My point has always been that private sector debt is the one that matters.
- 10:45SPEAKER_03: When private debt starts to plunge, that's what causes serious downturns in the economy.
- 10:50SPEAKER_03: And you can see that that's the Great Depression, where the ratio continued rising after the beginning of the crisis.
- 10:57SPEAKER_03: Even though people were paying their debt down, GDP was falling faster than debt was falling.
- 11:01SPEAKER_03: So the debt ratio rose.
- 11:03SPEAKER_03: So you got to these these are the the figures are all uh a a bit uh mixed because the data after 1945 is the the the Z1 stuff you're looking at is collected by the Bank of International settlements.
- 11:15SPEAKER_03: This is using census data, and I've made the two time series or three time series actually consistent over time.
- 11:21SPEAKER_03: So this was actually higher in census data when you compare it to the way the Fed records private debt that's lower than we have now.
- 11:29SPEAKER_03: But you can see the the gigantic fall from a hundred and thirty percent there to thirty percent after the Great Depression, whereas we are up here, we're up a peak at 170%, and we're now at about 150%.
- 11:41SPEAKER_03: So we're still carrying a huge private debt burden, and it's the dynamics of private debt that matter far more, just say what's happening in the economy than the dynamics of government debt.
- 11:51SPEAKER_02: Aaron Powell This is what I was gonna ask you, because uh, you know, looking at their chart, and I just wanted to make sure that for our audience, I mean, why is private debt more dangerous, even if the totals were identical?
- 12:00SPEAKER_02: Is it because households and companies can run out of income and in default while the federal government can issue the currency?
- 12:06SPEAKER_03: Aaron Powell Yes, exactly.
- 12:08SPEAKER_03: I mean, uh the the great disadvantage of being a a household or a firm is you don't own your own pre government, you don't own your own bank.
- 12:15SPEAKER_03: Okay?
- 12:15SPEAKER_03: And this is I I hope a little point that most people are going to agree with me on that uh the difference between households and firms on one side and governments on the other is that households and firms don't own their own banks where the government does.
- 12:28SPEAKER_03: And that makes an enormous difference to the impact of debt.
- 12:31SPEAKER_03: And when you take a look at what drives the economy, it's actually private money which is far more volatile than government money.
- 12:38SPEAKER_03: So the booms and busts in private credit creation, I might just actually change my charts there to show uh another another chart on the same front.
- 12:47SPEAKER_03: According to the mainstream, this one down here, I'll just zoom in on this one here.
- 12:51SPEAKER_03: The according to conventional economists like Ben Bernanke, uh he didn't even bother looking at Erding Fisher's explanation for the Great Depression, which is he he called it a debt deflation, because he said uh uh pure redistributions, and that's what the mainstream textbooks regard private lending as, pure redistribution should have no significant macroeconomic effects.
- 13:12SPEAKER_03: Now, this is just saying forget about what he thinks then uh bank lending is.
- 13:17SPEAKER_03: What's the data tell you?
- 13:18SPEAKER_03: And you can see the black line is the level of credit, the red line is the unemployment rate.
- 13:23SPEAKER_03: This is between 1990 and 2015.
- 13:26SPEAKER_03: So from the beginning of uh the Clint uh the recession that got Clinton into office through to the end of uh uh post-Obama's and just before Trump's term, you can see the correlation between these two is simply off the scale.
- 13:40SPEAKER_03: Credit goes up, unemployment goes down.
- 13:42SPEAKER_03: Credit goes down, unemployment goes up.
- 13:45SPEAKER_03: That's the driving factor.
- 13:46SPEAKER_03: And then what tends to happen is the government actually comes over to like a band-aid and it spends when the private sector ceases spending.
- 13:54SPEAKER_03: So the one the one that drives the economy is the level of credit.
- 13:58SPEAKER_03: That's what you need to look at to see where the economy is going.
- 14:01SPEAKER_03: And the level of government spending tends to be a reaction to what's happening in the credit markets.
- 14:06SPEAKER_02: It's an interesting one if you think about it.
- 14:08SPEAKER_02: So the correlation isn't yet causation, I guess.
- 14:11SPEAKER_02: Does the change in credit consistently?
- 14:13SPEAKER_03: It's causation.
- 14:14SPEAKER_03: No, it is causation, if I can interrupt there.
- 14:16SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
- 14:16SPEAKER_03: Because again, uh the mainstream, the the reason the mainstream doesn't understand money, and this is ridiculous because economists you would think are experts on money, but in fact they re they leave money out of their macroeconomic models, they leave banks out, they leave private debt out.
- 14:29SPEAKER_03: And the reason is they have this fiction in their heads where they pretend that banks aren't actually banks.
- 14:34SPEAKER_03: They pretend that banks are credit rating agencies.
- 14:36SPEAKER_03: If you read Bernanke's and I had the misfortune of reading his 2022 Nobel Prize speech, he just treats them as being intermediaries, meaning that they enable savers to lend to borrowers.
- 14:47SPEAKER_03: That's that's the basic idea they have.
- 14:49SPEAKER_03: And therefore, when savers lend, they have less to spend, but borrowers have got more.
- 14:53SPEAKER_03: When borrowers repay it, they've got less, but savers have got more, so one counteracts the other.
- 14:58SPEAKER_03: That's the mental model they have in their heads.
- 15:00SPEAKER_03: In the real world, banks are not credit rating agencies, they are money creation systems.
- 15:06SPEAKER_03: And when they give you a loan, which is money in your bank account, that's money creation, it's mashed by an identical increase in debt.
- 15:12SPEAKER_03: So the mainstream is completely wrong.
- 15:15SPEAKER_03: The empirical data blows their arguments out of the water, but they won't change their minds because if they did, they'd need to write not just rewrite their textbooks, they'd need to go from effectively from a earth-centric, flat earth version of economics to the real world.
- 15:28SPEAKER_03: And that's uh a bit too big a big an ask for uh our mainstream economists.
- 15:32SPEAKER_02: Aaron Powell Interesting.
- 15:32SPEAKER_02: Uh you've also written uh, you know, a credit collapse can be kind of tempered or even reversed by fast central bank actions.
- 15:38SPEAKER_02: I mean, they they've done exactly that uh twice in 20 years, why not a third time?
- 15:44SPEAKER_03: Well, they probably will.
- 15:45SPEAKER_03: I mean, there's a certain amount to which government spending is automatically driven by a downturn in what's happening in the private sector.
- 15:51SPEAKER_03: So if you have uh, you know, if if you look at what happened with the global financial crisis before it, during the subprime, there was plenty of tax revenue to come out of the fact that people were paying property taxes, uh, you know, conversion taxes, they were making, they were selling their houses for a profit, they were buying goods and services to stock the houses.
- 16:10SPEAKER_03: So all this stuff gave you a large amount of monetary demand in the private sector.
- 16:14SPEAKER_03: And that meant that you got higher tax receipts and you had lower unemployment payments.
- 16:19SPEAKER_03: When the crisis hit, that completely went in reverse.
- 16:22SPEAKER_03: So the the incre increase in private debt in 2006 to seven was equivalent to 15% of GDP.
- 16:30SPEAKER_03: The change in private debt between 2007 and 2010 was equivalent to minus 5% of GDP.
- 16:37SPEAKER_03: So what you had was a 20% of GDP turnaround in credit financed spending, and that's what caused the severity of the downturn.
- 16:45SPEAKER_03: And of course, because that meant tax revenues fell, unemployment benefits rose, the government went into deficit spending, and that gave firms and households cash flows they wouldn't have otherwise have had, which meant the crisis wasn't as deep as it wouldn't have been without the scale of government deficits.
- 17:02SPEAKER_02: What is that kind of credit flow number right now?
- 17:04SPEAKER_02: And at what level would it become a recession signal?
- 17:08SPEAKER_03: Oh, it's uh currently them look, I've actually exchanged my data here.
- 17:11SPEAKER_03: I didn't shut down just to um the most recent.
- 17:15SPEAKER_03: Uh going to go to 2025, quarter one of the data here, unfortunately.
- 17:19SPEAKER_03: It's a bit of an old data point of mine.
- 17:21SPEAKER_03: Uh, but it's currently down at about six percent of GDP.
- 17:25SPEAKER_03: If you see that what was happening in 2005, credit-based demand got to be there's the peak of credit-based demand back in 2006.
- 17:33SPEAKER_03: So it was 15.4% of GDP in the third quarter of 2006.
- 17:38SPEAKER_03: You can see the plunge that gave us the global financial crisis, then the recovery coming through here, and this is when QE and government spending were uh heading in as well.
- 17:48SPEAKER_03: You then reached a you know, we within hit 2020, so welcome to COVID.
- 17:52SPEAKER_03: Uh there was a downturn followed by a bit of a boom in credit in the into 2021, but then it's been heading down since then.
- 18:00SPEAKER_03: I think it's now down to about the four four to six percent of GDP range.
- 18:04SPEAKER_03: So it's not adding a great deal of uh demand to the economy at the moment.
- 18:08SPEAKER_03: That's leading out the impact of data centers, of course, and the and the private uh lending that's going on and the leverage of private lending that I'm sure those so-called private credit institutions are doing at the moment.
- 18:20SPEAKER_03: So there is some credit-based demand, and I think it will fall over when the AI bubble bursts.
- 18:25SPEAKER_03: But it's nowhere near as overwhelming as it was back in 2006.
- 18:29SPEAKER_02: All right, let's talk a little bit about AI and and and borrowing.
- 18:32SPEAKER_02: I'll put something specific in core uh uh you know in front of you.
- 18:35SPEAKER_02: I mean, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, I'm looking at companies who borrowed more than$410 billion this year for data centers and other AI kind of investments.
- 18:44SPEAKER_02: Uh here's one of those deals.
- 18:46SPEAKER_02: QTS Realty sold$3.9 billion in bonds to build a facility in Georgia tied to Microsoft.
- 18:52SPEAKER_02: That paper's rated investment grade, the higher rated tier, not junk, and Bloomberg reported it yielded about 7.23% more than some mid-tier junk debt was paying.
- 19:03SPEAKER_02: Um the US obviously government borrows for 10 years at about 4.7%.
- 19:08SPEAKER_02: So a borrower rated safe is playing, I guess, paying two and a half points more than the Treasury.
- 19:14SPEAKER_02: I mean, what what risk is that yield kind of pricing?
- 19:17SPEAKER_02: Is it construction, the new technology going obsolete?
- 19:20SPEAKER_02: Is it refinancing or just how much more debt is coming behind it?
- 19:24SPEAKER_03: Look, I I think this is we I think we're about to see the bursting of a very large bubble on the scale of the ra the railway bubbles back in the 19th century, because so many firms have thrown large amounts of money into data centers and AI and and and so on.
- 19:39SPEAKER_03: Initially, a lot of it with cash reserves they'd built up.
- 19:41SPEAKER_03: So Google and Microsoft have enormous cash reserves, of course, Facebook the same, financing some of this investment.
- 19:48SPEAKER_03: And now I'm sure they're leveraging it up, and now because they've been losing money hand over fist, uh, they're now starting to borrow.
- 19:56SPEAKER_03: So we're seeing a sort of lagged credit-based level of demand uh for for money, uh money creation out of credit creation.
- 20:05SPEAKER_03: And that's both boosting the economy right now, but it's also racking up the losses.
- 20:10SPEAKER_03: So my feeling is that when uh the the bubble starts to burst, the number of companies that survive this will be trivial compared to the numbers that are there right now.
- 20:20SPEAKER_03: Uh all of them dived in believing they'd take over the entire market.
- 20:23SPEAKER_03: And this is a typical speculative investment bubble and in capitalism.
- 20:27SPEAKER_03: Uh everybody dives in thinking they're going to be the only survivor.
- 20:30SPEAKER_03: That means you get far more investment initially than the is actually warranted.
- 20:35SPEAKER_03: And then you have a bust coming out of that, only a handful survived.
- 20:38SPEAKER_03: But in that period after the bust occurs, that's when the technology permeates through society, and we all benefit in that sense.
- 20:45SPEAKER_03: So I think we're about sometimes I'd reckon I can't see this thing.
- 20:48SPEAKER_03: I could be wrong.
- 20:49SPEAKER_03: I'm not going to say I can time these things, obviously.
- 20:52SPEAKER_03: But I would give the bubble in AI less than a year to go.
- 20:55SPEAKER_03: And then when that comes through, a lot of those uh data centers are going to find it 7% looks damn good to compare to the losses you're going to make.
- 21:03SPEAKER_03: So uh I I saw somebody who's saying that they reckon a lot of the data centers, because there have been so many built over capacity, a lot of them are going to turn into pickleball courts.
- 21:12SPEAKER_02: So I mean the the the bubble doesn't kind of burst when companies lose money, it it bursts when lenders stop financing those losses.
- 21:19SPEAKER_02: You know, what makes them stop?
- 21:22SPEAKER_03: Well, basically the fact that they're losing money.
- 21:24SPEAKER_03: I mean, this is the classic about AI.
- 21:27SPEAKER_03: I mean, I've I haven't got everyone involved in AI.
- 21:29SPEAKER_03: I've got uh people done AIs of my research and so on, but I don't use AIs in my own uh writing.
- 21:36SPEAKER_03: So uh but if you if you look at the prices people are paying, it was all to basically encourage people to give it a try.
- 21:42SPEAKER_03: So, you know, it was pretty cheap to go and make a fun Father's Day card for your for your father using AI.
- 21:48SPEAKER_03: Uh that is those frivolous uses are disappearing, and the revenue from serious uses which which may be sustained over time looks like about one fifth of the cost levels that these firms are caught up in.
- 21:59SPEAKER_03: So I expect Massive losses to coming out of that.
- 22:01SPEAKER_03: And when the losses start to become obvious, that's when people will panic and get out of the out of the bonds that are involved.
- 22:08SPEAKER_03: And so those, you know, the prices of the bonds will fall and the yields will rise for the uh the very wrong reasons of a bursting bubble.
- 22:14SPEAKER_02: Aaron Powell So I wonder what it's going to become obvious, Professor.
- 22:17SPEAKER_02: I mean, because the other side of it, I mean, August set a record for August investment grade kind of issuance on the back of a record months in July and in June.
- 22:26SPEAKER_02: And the market absorbed it all.
- 22:27SPEAKER_02: So if the paper were genuinely mispriced, wouldn't buyers have stepped away by now or just not much.
- 22:32SPEAKER_03: No, because this is why I say I mean I remember g attending a presentation by Soros when he explained his the way he made his fortune.
- 22:41SPEAKER_03: And it was basically saying expects the market to unreact and underreact initially and then overreact later.
- 22:47SPEAKER_03: Bob Hagen made the same case in his inefficient markets hypothesis.
- 22:51SPEAKER_03: And I think this is what we're seeing.
- 22:53SPEAKER_03: Initially, people are still carried along by the euphoria.
- 22:56SPEAKER_03: And this again is one area in which mainstream is a load of garbage.
- 22:59SPEAKER_03: They talk about rational expectations.
- 23:01SPEAKER_03: When you look at how they define rational expectations, what they mean is they're assuming we all have the capacity for accurate prophecy.
- 23:09SPEAKER_03: Now that's garbage, obviously.
- 23:10SPEAKER_03: So what tends to happen instead of rather than uh rational expectations, we have expectations that move with the trade cycle, with the business cycle.
- 23:18SPEAKER_03: When you're in a boom, everybody has euphoric expectations, and therefore they overvalue everything.
- 23:23SPEAKER_03: Then when you start hitting the slump, and the slump happens because of income distribution changes and length of time, people have to hold an asset before they can sell it for a profit becoming too long so people collapse.
- 23:35SPEAKER_03: You get people who look like they're absolute financial geniuses and the next day they're bankrupt.
- 23:40SPEAKER_03: Uh the the this this my favorite is an Australian guy called Christopher Scate.
- 23:44SPEAKER_03: I'm sure you don't know him.
- 23:45SPEAKER_03: But uh you know Bernie Madoff was it was another look brilliant until after his uh machinations were exposed by the uh by the global uh by the global financial crisis.
- 23:55SPEAKER_03: So they get overvaluation and then they plunge on the other side.
- 23:58SPEAKER_03: I think we're still in the overvaluation phase, but the plunge is going to be ugly.
- 24:03SPEAKER_02: Interesting.
- 24:04SPEAKER_02: And you to your point, because you were talking a little bit about this loop.
- 24:06SPEAKER_02: I mean, I was looking at Bloomberg this morning.
- 24:08SPEAKER_02: They're talking about how Nvidia's biggest customers were told server prices go up more than 15% in many cases on systems shipping early next year.
- 24:17SPEAKER_02: I mean, does that change the arithmetic?
- 24:20SPEAKER_03: I think it does.
- 24:21SPEAKER_03: And also, I mean, one thing which happens with data centers, which people aren't factoring in compared to the subtrone bubble, is that homes they should, but they don't depreciate.
- 24:30SPEAKER_03: People pay a fortune for old homes.
- 24:32SPEAKER_03: Uh with see, but because the thing is you can still house your kids, even if the house is old, the kids can still sleep in the bedrooms.
- 24:38SPEAKER_03: Uh when you get data centers, after three or four years, the GPUs that drove their data center are no longer competitive.
- 24:44SPEAKER_03: So you're forced to renew the investment again.
- 24:47SPEAKER_03: Now, if you are not making the money that justifies it when you get to the renewal stage, you don't.
- 24:52SPEAKER_03: And so these things can depreciate extremely rapidly.
- 24:55SPEAKER_03: And that's why I think pickleball courts is a fairly sensible idea of how a lot of these data centers will end up being used.
- 25:02SPEAKER_02: You know, if if professional lenders understand this cycle, why are they repeatedly late?
- 25:06SPEAKER_02: I mean, what incentive to spending instead of the city?
- 25:08SPEAKER_02: They don't understand.
- 25:09SPEAKER_03: They don't understand the cycle.
- 25:10SPEAKER_03: This is what frustrates me so much, because like even Ray Dalia, whom I've got a lot of respect for in general, and he focuses on the role of credit, and so do I.
- 25:19SPEAKER_03: His understanding of the accounting of gut of how money is created both by the private sector and by governments is just wrong.
- 25:25SPEAKER_03: Uh people rely on textbooks, they've learned supply and demand curves, and they talk about loanable funds and other bizarre intellectual constructs like that.
- 25:34SPEAKER_03: When you look at the double entry bookkeeping, and my reveal software, which I showed a moment ago, uh is but is designed basically to show an integrated accounting view of an entire economy.
- 25:44SPEAKER_03: Uh they don't look at that.
- 25:46SPEAKER_03: They don't understand the accounting, and they come out with pronouncements about how money is created on the one side and pronouncements about the impact of money creation on the other, which are absolutely wrong.
- 25:56SPEAKER_03: They actually violate the rules of accounting.
- 25:58SPEAKER_03: So most of these so-called, I mean they're experts on a theory of money which is wrong.
- 26:04SPEAKER_02: Let's go back to that for a second, kind of where money comes from in the first place, because I think most people have this a little bit backwards.
- 26:10SPEAKER_02: Somebody takes out a mortgage, half a million dollars.
- 26:13SPEAKER_02: Where does that half a million come from?
- 26:15SPEAKER_03: It's created by the bank when it does the loan.
- 26:18SPEAKER_03: And this is the the thing which is unique about banks as institutions is they're allowed to change both their assets and their liabilities.
- 26:24SPEAKER_03: Uh you and I, we you and I can change our liabilities easily.
- 26:28SPEAKER_03: We can't change our assets easily.
- 26:30SPEAKER_03: Okay.
- 26:30SPEAKER_03: Now a bank is allowed to create a loan, and when it creates a loan, it puts that money in a depositor's account.
- 26:37SPEAKER_03: And so the asset rises and the lia and the which is the the bank's asset, which is the loan, rises.
- 26:43SPEAKER_03: The bank's liability, which is the deposit account, also rise.
- 26:46SPEAKER_03: So rather than having to transfer money from one pot to another, which is the way textbooks talk about lending, is that there's already a pot of money, and that has to go down for the both the b the the lent money to go up.
- 26:57SPEAKER_03: Instead, you what you have is and assets and liabilities rise at the same time.
- 27:01SPEAKER_03: So banks create money by lending more than they get back in repayments.
- 27:05SPEAKER_03: Now the government creates money by spending more than it takes back in taxation.
- 27:10SPEAKER_03: And this again, you can do this through the accounting.
- 27:12SPEAKER_03: Again, the mainstream gets that completely wrong.
- 27:15SPEAKER_03: Uh so they the government government will only create money in the first instance when it runs a deficit.
- 27:20SPEAKER_03: And then when it allows banks to sell the bonds that are sold as part of that money creation process, the bond sales by private banks to either non-bank financial institutions or wealthy individuals destroys money creation.
- 27:35SPEAKER_03: So when you look at the amount of money that's actually been created over the last uh uh since 2020, the best work, and this is done by Richard Vaig, by the way, in what's called the uh the debt economics project, and he found that uh if the money supply had risen from about five trillion in 2000 to about 25 trillion in 2024, and uh more than 90 percent of that increase was private money creation.
- 28:02SPEAKER_03: Only a tiny fraction was government money creation because most of it is reversed by the bond sales.
- 28:08SPEAKER_02: Now, let me kind of test that against something happening right now.
- 28:11SPEAKER_02: I mean, the Treasury keeps its cash in an account at the Federal Reserve, its own checking account essentially.
- 28:17SPEAKER_02: There's close to a trillion dollars sitting in it.
- 28:19SPEAKER_02: CNBC just this morning's reporting Treasury could use part of that to fund bigger purchases of long-dated government bonds as larger buyback operations begin September 9th.
- 28:28SPEAKER_02: If they draw the account down, that money lands in the banking system without anyone writing a new loan.
- 28:34SPEAKER_02: Does that fit your model or does it break it?
- 28:36SPEAKER_02: Yes, it does.
- 28:37SPEAKER_03: That does fit the model.
- 28:38SPEAKER_03: And this is this is you you if you if you don't do the accounting, you don't understand what's happening in either the private sector or the government.
- 28:45SPEAKER_03: And for that reason, I can rule out 99% of commentators.
- 28:48SPEAKER_03: The only three people that I know that do this regularly are myself, uh Richard Vaig, who's uh was the financial controller for Philadelphia for a while.
- 28:56SPEAKER_03: I don't think Richard has that role anymore, but he was on on the uh governing the uh financial part of the government sector is responsible for the finances of Philadelphia.
- 29:07SPEAKER_03: Uh he's done great work on this, and so has Richard Murphy in the UK.
- 29:11SPEAKER_03: When you do the accounting, it's it becomes obvious the private sector creates money by lending out more than it gets back in repayments.
- 29:18SPEAKER_03: The government creates money by spending more than it takes back in taxation.
- 29:22SPEAKER_03: So at the moment, because of the Iran war and other stupid activities of the Trump government, there's actually a large amount of government money creation going on.
- 29:31SPEAKER_03: But that that can then be cancelled, as I said, by enabling a bonds to be sold by the by the uh banks to non-banks, and and now non-banks are allowed to uh participate in the auctions as well.
- 29:42SPEAKER_03: So to a large degree, people are worrying about government money creation, and there is a large amount of it potentially happened because of the scale of the deficit, but most of it's being reversed out of existence by uh the bond sales at the other side.
- 29:54SPEAKER_02: Okay.
- 29:54SPEAKER_02: So uh just so I didn't lose anyone, I mean separate those two processes just a little bit clearly.
- 29:58SPEAKER_02: I mean, a bank loan creates a deposit and in and an equal private debt.
- 30:02SPEAKER_02: Government deficit spending uh adds a financial asset to the private sector without creating a matching private lil liability.
- 30:09SPEAKER_02: Is that kind of the crucial difference?
- 30:11SPEAKER_03: Exactly, and that's extremely important.
- 30:12SPEAKER_03: Again, this is why double entry is.
- 30:14SPEAKER_03: I mean, people every stroke accounting is boring.
- 30:16SPEAKER_03: And I certainly regard most accountants as boring uh part than they.
- 30:20SPEAKER_03: So I didn't study at university and I I've learned by building this my software package.
- 30:26SPEAKER_03: But double entry is actually like it's like a crucible.
- 30:29SPEAKER_03: If you can't show what you believe happens using double entry bookkeeping, then you can't show it at all.
- 30:34SPEAKER_03: It's a real giveaway.
- 30:35SPEAKER_03: So if you look at uh with private with private loans, what happens is people put uh the banks put say$100,000 in a loan account in your loan, they put an identical amount in your deposit.
- 30:47SPEAKER_03: So there's two entries, the loan goes up and the deposit goes up.
- 30:50SPEAKER_03: And of course, you as the recipient for the loan, you get the money, but you also get the debt.
- 30:55SPEAKER_03: So there's no increase in your net financial uh financial worth.
- 31:00SPEAKER_03: But if the government spends more than it takes back in taxation, it's putting more money in your deposit accounts.
- 31:05SPEAKER_03: And the matching entry there is not loans, it's reserves.
- 31:08SPEAKER_03: So the government deficit creates additional reserves, and that is a liability for the central bank, but it's not a liability to the people who receive the money.
- 31:17SPEAKER_02: So, I mean, w when taxes exceed government spending, is government effectively removing net money from the private sector while households and companies are trying to repay debt?
- 31:25SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
- 31:26SPEAKER_03: Yeah, then this this is this is this is one reason why the government decides to run a surface that actually destroys private finances.
- 31:32SPEAKER_03: Uh so you can actually, it's it's quite easy to work it through in your head because if you think about what taxation does that takes money out of your deposit account, well, that makes you worse off.
- 31:42SPEAKER_03: You look at the bank level, and to take it out of your deposit account, the matching entry is reserves fall.
- 31:47SPEAKER_03: You go to the central bank level, and reserves fall when taxation is levied because the amount of money in the government's account is going up.
- 31:54SPEAKER_03: That's the balance of operation there.
- 31:56SPEAKER_03: Then for the Treasury, the tax receipts increase its financial net worth.
- 32:00SPEAKER_03: So that's obvious.
- 32:01SPEAKER_03: Tax reduces the amount of money in your bank account, makes you worse off, increases that in the government's, makes the governments better off.
- 32:08SPEAKER_03: The spending works in exactly the reverse direction.
- 32:11SPEAKER_03: So going from the Treasury, the spending reduces the amount of money in the government's account, and that means the government's net worth falls.
- 32:18SPEAKER_03: At the level of the central bank, the account goes, the bank government accounts goes down, the reserves go up.
- 32:25SPEAKER_03: At the private banks, reserves go up, your deposits go up.
- 32:28SPEAKER_03: For your individual, your amount of money in your bank account goes up.
- 32:31SPEAKER_03: There's nothing else offsetting it.
- 32:33SPEAKER_03: So you have more money in your bank account if the government spends more than it takes back in taxation.
- 32:38SPEAKER_02: Now that that works when I think Treasury and Fed are kind of consolidated in the accounting, but institutionally they're separate and Treasury must finance authorized spending.
- 32:47SPEAKER_02: Does consolidation hide any real constraint?
- 32:50unknown: Yeah.
- 32:50SPEAKER_03: No.
- 32:50SPEAKER_03: I mean I don't consolidate.
- 32:52SPEAKER_03: That's one reason I wrote Ravel.
- 32:53SPEAKER_03: You know, people call themselves modern monetary theorists.
- 32:56SPEAKER_03: They tend to do the consolidation.
- 32:58SPEAKER_03: In my opinion, that's only because they haven't put the brain power in it needed to be able to do the disaggregated accounts that I can do with my Revell software.
- 33:07SPEAKER_03: So when you do it, I keep all these things separate.
- 33:09SPEAKER_03: And it turns out that the government money creation comes out of the fact that the Treasury authorizes spending.
- 33:16SPEAKER_03: And as soon as it authorizes that spending, the central bank is required to fund that operation.
- 33:22SPEAKER_03: So the actual creation of money is the decision to spend more than you get back on taxation.
- 33:29SPEAKER_03: That's what creates the money.
- 33:30SPEAKER_03: And then if the if as that only happened and there were no bond sales, then what would happen is the Treasury's account would go into overdraft and it would be identical to the level of reserves created at the same time.
- 33:41SPEAKER_03: Now that looks bad, and I agree that would look bad that money creation by the government in the private sector would require a permanent overdraft of the central bank, or the treasury at the central bank.
- 33:54SPEAKER_03: So what could happen, and this is ruled out by people who've people who drafted laws who don't understand money creation, said the Treasury can't sell those bonds to the central bank.
- 34:04SPEAKER_03: But in fact, if it did, then that would give you make sure the central, the government's account doesn't go into overdraft and there's no and there's money creation at the same time.
- 34:14SPEAKER_03: So it's it it's just we we have a system designed by people who don't understand how it works.
- 34:20SPEAKER_03: And therefore there's crazy elements to its behavior.
- 34:22SPEAKER_02: I mean it just sounds like a temporary reshuffling of liquidity.
- 34:26SPEAKER_02: And if if Treasury later issues new debt to rebuild that cash balance, does does it drain the liquidity it just added, effectively reversing the whole operation?
- 34:36SPEAKER_03: It depends on who buys it.
- 34:37SPEAKER_03: So if the bought by the banks, and this is again where double entry is so important, when you have the it's the balancing item to a government spending more than a tax back in taxation, which turns up on the liability side of the bank's ledger as an increase in the amount of money in the private sector.
- 34:53SPEAKER_03: When the banks are involved, and only banks and in in the uh buying of government bonds, and that used to be the used to be the case, uh when when the reserves go up, that's the funds they use to buy those bonds.
- 35:05SPEAKER_03: Because reserves used not to earn any interest.
- 35:07SPEAKER_03: So if you got reserves created by a deficit, uh, and you were then offered, would you like to use those reserves to buy bonds, the answer was yes, please, because you swapped a non-income earning, non-tradable asset for an income-earning tradable asset.
- 35:21SPEAKER_03: There was a you know a no-brainer that you'd do that.
- 35:24SPEAKER_03: Then what the banks would do, uh, and this is what gave us the bond market, is they on-sell those bonds to pension funds, to um not you know, uh, the vampire squids of the world, etc., etc.
- 35:36SPEAKER_03: Sure, quite a few of you has worked for vampire squids.
- 35:40SPEAKER_03: Um, and and that cancels the money creation, but it cancels it where the money, not necessarily where the money was spent.
- 35:46SPEAKER_03: So if you have a proposal to build a you know, a nuclear power station somewhere, for example, then that causes massive amounts of money for the firms and the workers involved and power systems and so on.
- 35:57SPEAKER_03: Uh the money that's cancelled is then cancelled for the financial sector, which wasn't necessarily involved.
- 36:02SPEAKER_03: So government money creation can still cause things to be built, but the money creation can then be reversed by selling the bonds uh to the non-bank private sector.
- 36:11SPEAKER_02: Now, I want to bring this back to gold with a different question here, just temporarily, because I mean you you you know the U.S.
- 36:17SPEAKER_02: holds about 261 million ounces of gold.
- 36:19SPEAKER_02: Under federal law, it's still carried at$42.22 an ounce, a price Congress set back in 1973.
- 36:27SPEAKER_02: Now, at today's market price, that same gold's well over a trillion dollars.
- 36:30SPEAKER_02: If Congress changed that statutory price, Treasury could raise the value of gold certificates held by the Fed and take a matching credit into its own account.
- 36:39SPEAKER_02: Would would that be money creation or just recognizing the value of something the government already owns?
- 36:44SPEAKER_03: Oh, they'd just be converting it from a non-financial asset into a financial asset, that's all.
- 36:49SPEAKER_03: I mean, this is why I it does sound strange to talk about non-financial assets.
- 36:53SPEAKER_03: But shares and houses and you know this drink container, they're all non-financial assets.
- 37:00SPEAKER_03: Uh that we put the value on them, uh, but we can't actually realize that value unless we sell them.
- 37:06SPEAKER_03: And there are assets to us and liabilities to no one.
- 37:08SPEAKER_03: And a lot of the appeal for gold to people is they think that should be the nature of money.
- 37:12SPEAKER_03: They believe that we should be using assets, we shouldn't be using financial claims to to go shopping.
- 37:18SPEAKER_03: But in fact, the way that capitalism and virtually all previous social systems have functioned as well is they run on credit.
- 37:25SPEAKER_03: And that tends not to be backed by anything physical in the terms of you know gold being match people think currency should be gold-backed.
- 37:34SPEAKER_03: In fact, currency is, I think, more likely lead-backed, in the sense that what backs the g backs money creation in each of the countries that do it is the army, the navy, the air force, the police, etc., etc.
- 37:46SPEAKER_03: People ask what's what stands behind government money?
- 37:49SPEAKER_03: It tends to be the government itself.
- 37:50SPEAKER_03: And that's an enormous non-financial asset.
- 37:53SPEAKER_03: You don't need to have uh the money linked to the value of gold, but this is a a perennial belief uh amongst uh people who are critical of banking in general, uh, without necessarily understanding it, that they think money should be backed by gold.
- 38:08SPEAKER_02: Now, here's the part I keep turning over.
- 38:10SPEAKER_02: I mean, a a higher market price on its own gives Treasury really nothing, but a political decision to recognize it would create enormous capacity.
- 38:18SPEAKER_02: So Washington monetized its gold to support the bond market.
- 38:22SPEAKER_02: Would gold still be a warning about debasement, or would it have to kind of become part of the rescue?
- 38:28SPEAKER_03: Oh, and I don't think it's it's not necessary to do it in the first place.
- 38:31SPEAKER_03: I mean, this is what throws me about the whole thing, because people do know, uh as the Binanke said it, and so did Greenspan at various times, that the Fed the said the Federal Reserve has an unlimited capacity to buy any assets that are offered for sale in American dollars.
- 38:48SPEAKER_03: So if you wanted to get rid of government debt tomorrow rather than selling your gold, what you should do is tell the treat the central bank to buy all the outstanding bonds, and that would mean it will put the number 40 trillion effectively in deposit accounts of the central at the central bank level and the reserve accounts of whoever's doing the buying, put the number 40 trillion in those accounts, put the number 40 trillion on the asset side of the central bank, and bang, hey, presto, there's no government debt owed by anybody except the government to the government.
- 39:16SPEAKER_03: Now, that's just one little way.
- 39:18SPEAKER_03: I mean I know it won't happen, and it would cause all sorts of chaos in financial markets because there'd be suddenly an enormous amount of money in financial institutions which they would be required to buy non-financial assets with.
- 39:31SPEAKER_03: Uh, but it could be done overnight.
- 39:33SPEAKER_03: If you wonder about the government debt level to get the central bank to buy it a lot, there's no more government debt.
- 39:38SPEAKER_02: So the United States cannot you know run out of dollars, but it can destroy what those dollars buy.
- 39:42SPEAKER_02: Is inflation and currency confidence the real constraint, not solvency?
- 39:47SPEAKER_03: This is partially the issue, but at the same time there's a knee-jerk reaction because people, as soon as you say government money creation, people say Zimbabwe, you know?
- 39:55SPEAKER_03: As soon as a single dollar is created, bang, we're hyperinflation.
- 39:59SPEAKER_03: No, you've got to look at what are the rates of growth of the money system, what is the rate of growth of the physical system.
- 40:04SPEAKER_03: If the rate of growth of the monetary system exceeds that of the physical, then you may get inflation.
- 40:10SPEAKER_03: I'm saying may because I'll come back to it later.
- 40:12SPEAKER_03: If it's lower, you may get deflation.
- 40:14SPEAKER_03: It's the ratio of the two rates of growth that matter.
- 40:16SPEAKER_03: And I guess I get so sick of people saying, oh, government money creation causes inflation.
- 40:21SPEAKER_03: That's why I like to point out that 90%, as it's from Richard Veg's work, 92% of the money created in the last 25 years has been created by the private sector.
- 40:30SPEAKER_03: So it's not the government creating the money that's maybe particular creating the inflation, it's the private sector.
- 40:35SPEAKER_03: And if I I'm going a bit long-winded here, but I'll finish off with this point.
- 40:38SPEAKER_03: People treat money as if it's a control mechanism.
- 40:42SPEAKER_03: It's actually an accommodating system.
- 40:44SPEAKER_03: The inflation tends to come before the money creation.
- 40:47SPEAKER_03: And the simplest example of that is if you, let's say you go, you want to go buy yourself a new uh sound system, and you've got a credit card and you get to the shop and you find the thing is twice as expensive as you thought it was going to be, you start you still want to buy it, damn or pay it.
- 41:01SPEAKER_03: You actually create money when you do that.
- 41:03SPEAKER_03: Your debt goes up with a credit card.
- 41:05SPEAKER_03: The money that's held by the retailer also goes up at the same time.
- 41:09SPEAKER_03: So rather than uh money creation causing inflation, it tends to go the other way.
- 41:15SPEAKER_03: Inflation causes money creation.
- 41:17SPEAKER_03: Interesting.
- 41:18SPEAKER_02: And I guess for the audience, too.
- 41:19SPEAKER_02: I mean, money expanded dramatically after 2008 without immediate consumer inflation.
- 41:23SPEAKER_02: What determines whether excess claims inflate financial assets instead of goods and and when you know that changes?
- 41:30SPEAKER_03: Well, that that's we we had a huge inflation of financial assets, of course, during the uh the subprime bubble.
- 41:36SPEAKER_03: So all that money which was being created was being created to buy houses.
- 41:40SPEAKER_03: And of course, making houses more expensive doesn't make the people in it more productive.
- 41:45SPEAKER_03: So what we were getting was making it more and more expensive to buy a house, increasing the leverage, and it meant the only way you could maintain those rising house prices was the next person had to borrow more money than you did.
- 41:56SPEAKER_03: You get to the point where that's prohibitive, or you get to the point where the person who's carrying the house, who's a ninja, remember them?
- 42:02SPEAKER_03: No income, no job, no assets.
- 42:04SPEAKER_03: They can only last until such time as the loan money runs out.
- 42:07SPEAKER_03: If they can't make the sale in the meantime, bang, they crash.
- 42:10SPEAKER_03: That's what gives us the booms and busts in the in the financial sector.
- 42:13SPEAKER_03: And I wish people paid more attention to the private sector than they do to the government, because that's the one that gives us both that volatility and those booms and crushes.
- 42:22SPEAKER_02: Well, let's kind of bring that gap between financial claims in the in the physical economy down to one company's balance sheet just for a moment.
- 42:29SPEAKER_02: I mean, start start me with a company that it has paid its debt on time for, say, 15 years.
- 42:34SPEAKER_02: I mean, what changes first?
- 42:35SPEAKER_02: Is it revenue, is it refinancing costs, collateral, or the lender's willingness to extend the next loan?
- 42:41SPEAKER_03: It tends to be a range of things.
- 42:42SPEAKER_03: When I first tried, I've modeled Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis mathematically.
- 42:48SPEAKER_03: Minsky never quite managed to pull off a mathematical model.
- 42:51SPEAKER_03: I did.
- 42:51SPEAKER_03: And so when you look at the the arguments Minsky made about what causes a crisis, he normally said you have a rising level of economic activity, meaning people would bid up the cost of money, interest rates would rise, and that would then be what caused the downturn.
- 43:04SPEAKER_03: I built models which had a constant rate of interest and I still got the same dynamic.
- 43:09SPEAKER_03: So what actually turns up is when the boom occurs, it starts to change the distribution of income.
- 43:14SPEAKER_03: And if you break the world into sort of three big groups, you know, workers, capitalists, and bankers, uh, then when a boom goes on, more and more money, of course, is being borrowed.
- 43:24SPEAKER_03: So bankers have more money and they're getting interest, earning interest off that.
- 43:28SPEAKER_03: As the boom continues, workers and also raw material producers start to get higher and higher demand.
- 43:34SPEAKER_03: So wage levels get bit up.
- 43:35SPEAKER_03: You start paying more for raw materials as well because of the increase in demand for inputs into production.
- 43:42SPEAKER_03: And that means that the amount of profit that capitalists make is less than they expected when they went into those debt commitments.
- 43:48SPEAKER_03: So they stop investing and then the economy slows down.
- 43:51SPEAKER_03: So it tends not to be interest rate movements, all the stuff we normally think about.
- 43:56SPEAKER_03: It's changing the distribution of income because of a boom.
- 43:58SPEAKER_03: And you get boom and Bus cycles coming out of it.
- 44:01SPEAKER_03: And my little metric as to why private debt tends to rise over time until you reach a crisis like the global financial crisis or the Great Depression is that firms borrow money during a boom and have to repay it during a slump.
- 44:14SPEAKER_03: Okay.
- 44:14SPEAKER_03: And then because there's less revenue than they expect, the debt level ratchets up over time.
- 44:19SPEAKER_03: We reach the peak like we did back in 2007.
- 44:22SPEAKER_02: And for I think you kind of mentioned it there, Professor, but for those watching at home, I mean, before the bank recognizes a loss, what does an employee at the company notice first?
- 44:32SPEAKER_03: Oh, well, the revenues are falling.
- 44:35SPEAKER_03: They're paying more for the suppliers.
- 44:36SPEAKER_03: And what people tend to do in that situation is they access their credit lines.
- 44:40SPEAKER_03: So, and this this is the research that showed that banks create money was first done by uh what are called post-Keynesian economists back in the 1980s.
- 44:50SPEAKER_03: And they only call it post-Keynesian because that's a label we attached to ourselves in the 1930s, my predecessors obviously, I hope obviously, um they identified with the biggest renegade at the time who was Keynes, saying uh the mainstream is completely misinterpreted, and we want to say we're different.
- 45:07SPEAKER_03: So we tend to be very focused on realism and say, what is actually the mechanism that goes on here?
- 45:12SPEAKER_03: So a guy called Basil Moore went and took a look at w what happened in terms of money creation.
- 45:18SPEAKER_03: And the basic story was large companies used to take out lines of credit.
- 45:22SPEAKER_03: So they had a company like General Motors would negotiate a couple of hundreds of billions of dollars of basically credit card headroom.
- 45:31SPEAKER_03: And then if they needed to pay more for suppliers or they needed to pay more for workers, they simply accessed the corporate credit card in that sense, and by doing it they created the money.
- 45:40SPEAKER_03: So the in the inflation occurs first when wage demands are made because workers have low levels of unemployment, uh, or or the rising cost for raw materials because the raw materials producers have more leverage as well.
- 45:53SPEAKER_03: Um so the the price tends to go up.
- 45:56SPEAKER_03: First of all, the money is accessed, and then the economy expands, the money supply expands at the same time.
- 46:01SPEAKER_03: But what you're seeing for these companies is they're being squeezed by the profitability at the same time.
- 46:06SPEAKER_03: So they're paying more to workers, they're paying more to uh suppliers, they've still got the same revenue coming in.
- 46:13SPEAKER_03: They've covered the extra debt by accessing a corporate credit card, but their cash flow is not sufficient to cover the interest payments.
- 46:20SPEAKER_03: And so that's when you start seeing distressed sales.
- 46:23SPEAKER_02: So, I mean, you know, the banks when they start writing off loans, um what does that do to the cushion?
- 46:29SPEAKER_02: I mean, uh give me the kind of plain version of bank capital before we kind of move on.
- 46:32SPEAKER_02: I mean, that's the shareholder money in the bank, the cushion that takes the losses before the depositors do.
- 46:37SPEAKER_02: Is that fair?
- 46:38SPEAKER_03: Yeah, I mean it's it's it's it's more than that.
- 46:40SPEAKER_03: Uh when I do my modeling, I'm basically modeling short-term equity.
- 46:43SPEAKER_03: So I in each of my tables I'll have uh assets, liabilities, and equity.
- 46:47SPEAKER_03: And the equity is the for the banks, that's the money that they uh the that's where their interest income comes from goes to.
- 46:54SPEAKER_03: That's where they make their payments out of.
- 46:56SPEAKER_03: So if you have bad loans, and again, this is the double entry point uh handles, you've got a a mortgagee who can't pay their mortgage or a firm that is lose well, you know, but an AI firm that can't pay its electricity bill anymore.
- 47:09SPEAKER_03: Uh what happens is first of all, those loans are transferred from performing to non-performing assets, but they're still reckoning them as part of the asset of the bank.
- 47:17SPEAKER_03: But then when they totally obviously the failed loans, they can transfer to failed loans.
- 47:21SPEAKER_03: At that point, the bank will try to sell whatever assets are mortgaged against that uh for for you know cents in the dollar, but at least get some money back, and they take the hit on their equity side.
- 47:33SPEAKER_03: Now, one of my favorite points of that was um, if you go back to the global financial crisis, I've got to remember the name, but uh on the brink, the guy who wrote on the brink, uh, who was the Secretary of the Treasury at the time, got a call, Hank Paulson got a call from his successor.
- 47:48SPEAKER_03: I think he came from Goldman Sachs, I forget which vampire squid he worked for, but he got a call from his successor and he said, You've got to do something.
- 47:55SPEAKER_03: Uh where if you don't do something, so many go bankrupt.
- 47:58SPEAKER_03: And Hol's Paulson asked him, How long have you got?
- 48:01SPEAKER_03: The answer was about three hours.
- 48:03SPEAKER_03: Now the reason for that was one of the things we did after the Great Depression was we banned banks from holding corporate shares because when the stock market crash happened back in 1929, the banks had massive shares at the time.
- 48:17SPEAKER_03: They actually went around trying to buy and drive the market up when the crash first hit.
- 48:21SPEAKER_03: When the market fell 10%, the assets of banks fell 10%, liabilities remain constant.
- 48:26SPEAKER_03: So many of those banks were technically bankrupt.
- 48:29SPEAKER_03: So the Glass-Steagall said banks cannot own shares anymore.
- 48:32SPEAKER_03: They can only buy fundamentally government bonds as the main thing they can buy with their the on the asset side of their books.
- 48:38SPEAKER_03: But of course, that's when we had the invention of the non-bank financial institutions, uh the Morgan Stanley's and all the rest now really took off after Glass-Steagall because that was the way that you could still upon corporate shares as a financial institution.
- 48:52SPEAKER_03: Uh so uh they can buy shares, and when then you know when when the shares price is falling at 10% in a day, and we saw that starting to happen in 2007 and 2008, then they can go bankrupt almost immediately.
- 49:05SPEAKER_03: And that's the real reason you don't want to have financial institutions owning owning shares because you and I can operate with negative financial equity.
- 49:13SPEAKER_03: If you look at your if you have a mortgage, then it's almost certain your net financial position is negative because the mortgage would be greater than the amount of money in your deposit account.
- 49:23SPEAKER_03: That's and that's the difference, you know, your cash asset, your cash liability versus your cash asset in that sense.
- 49:30SPEAKER_03: But banks are not allowed to do that.
- 49:32SPEAKER_03: Banks have to have positive financial equity.
- 49:35SPEAKER_03: So if they get to the point where their assets fall in values that liabilities exceed their assets, they're supposed to shut down.
- 49:41SPEAKER_03: They go bankrupt.
- 49:43SPEAKER_03: And that's uh, you know, we're trying we that's what we should try to avoid.
- 49:46SPEAKER_03: Well, we've set up a system now because this is the Federal Reserve regards its role as maintaining the non-financial, the non-bank institutions as well as the banks.
- 49:55SPEAKER_03: Uh, we we now have the Fed diving in to rescue uh the non-bank financial institutions during a downturn.
- 50:02SPEAKER_03: I think that's a mistake, but that's been the behavior of the fire ever since the out the Greenspan put back in 1987.
- 50:08SPEAKER_02: Right, right.
- 50:09SPEAKER_02: Um let me put a counter-argument here.
- 50:11SPEAKER_02: I keep looking at our time because it's fascinating.
- 50:13SPEAKER_02: I could keep going on forever.
- 50:14SPEAKER_02: But uh I gotta ask you this, because I mean, obviously every year the Fed runs what's called a stress test, right?
- 50:19SPEAKER_02: They model a severe recession, check whether the big banks would still be standing.
- 50:23SPEAKER_02: This June they tested 32 large banks against commercial property falling 39 percent, house prices down 30 percent, unemployment at 10 percent.
- 50:30SPEAKER_02: Now, everyone state above its minimum capital, aggregate capital, I think, dropped to but uh just uh 1.6 percentage points smallest since 2020.
- 50:39SPEAKER_02: What did that test miss, in your opinion?
- 50:41SPEAKER_03: I I think it missed my creation because I mean uh this is the the big mistake, and there's enormous numbers of main mistakes in mainstream economics.
- 50:51SPEAKER_03: That's a large part of my next book is explaining all the fallacies in mainstream economics.
- 50:56SPEAKER_03: But they still tend, academic economists will pretend that banks are intermediaries.
- 51:00SPEAKER_03: They'll pretend that banks actually don't make loans.
- 51:02SPEAKER_03: Now, I I don't know how that means they handle, you know, when you look at banks' asset, bank, bank asset levels, and it's full of private loans.
- 51:09SPEAKER_03: Uh but they they simply don't leave when, in my opinion, the extent to which the fragility of those of those prices, uh th those assets can can occur.
- 51:18SPEAKER_03: So I don't trust the stress testing.
- 51:20SPEAKER_03: And I remember again Richard's uh Richard Vague's a a a good example for me.
- 51:24SPEAKER_03: Richard uh was running a the uh retail wing of a large Texan bank after the um before the global financial crisis.
- 51:34SPEAKER_03: He managed to buy the bank during the eighties uh crash in oil prices.
- 51:39SPEAKER_03: And he said that he was looking at the level of mortgages and thinking, can people actually uh you know pay my credit card debt when they've got this huge mortgage debt?
- 51:49SPEAKER_03: And his decision that they can't is why he got out.
- 51:51SPEAKER_03: But he said he spoke to the chief economist, I won't mention which particular bank, but he spoke to some uh bank uh official uh high higher about what he thought about the level of leverage and the fragility of the household sector.
- 52:04SPEAKER_03: And the answer he got back was, well yes, their debts have their their liabilities have risen, meaning household debt, but their assets have risen as well.
- 52:11SPEAKER_03: And quote unquote, that's a trade I'll take any day.
- 52:14SPEAKER_03: Richard then sold his firm to the that bank and got out before the crash.
- 52:19SPEAKER_02: Now you put a timeline on this publicly.
- 52:21SPEAKER_02: Uh what's the narrowest kind of time fragile uh time frame that you'd kind of put on it in and and what would move it the other way?
- 52:28SPEAKER_03: Well, the main thing I'm looking at now is the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and what that's going to do to all the financial positions people are in right now.
- 52:36SPEAKER_03: Because you know, corporations have got you know debt, they've got a service, it takes time to produce output, and when they produce the output, they've got goods and services they can then sell to both make their profit and also to service their financial commitments.
- 52:49SPEAKER_03: Now, what we're having with the Strait of Hormons is at some point, and it's probably starting right now, it won't just be that things get more expensive, it'll be that things aren't available.
- 52:58SPEAKER_03: So you won't have you know, there's sulfuric acid, which you know, there's lots of stocks of that around, but at some point that'll start running down, so you can't make copper anymore and a whole range of other products.
- 53:08SPEAKER_03: The helium uh that's been cut off from the from the uh the uh the Gulf of uh the Persian Gulf, that is gonna mean that high-tech manufacturing isn't feasible to the same scale anymore.
- 53:20SPEAKER_03: Uh the lack of energy, the oil that's not uh coming out, all these things are going to mean that people can't make those goods and services.
- 53:27SPEAKER_03: And it's gonna be a patchwork of that across the entire economy.
- 53:30SPEAKER_03: You you uh so this is not that it's not a financial crisis like 2007.
- 53:36SPEAKER_03: It's a crisis of being able to service the financial sector debts because you've damaged the productive system.
- 53:41SPEAKER_03: Now we've never had this happen before, except during wars, and then of course, you know, everything is different during a war.
- 53:47SPEAKER_03: But at the moment, we're going to find companies which would normally be able to serve uh service their debts quite comfortably, suddenly find they won't be able to produce the inputs, uh, get the inputs to produce the outputs, or they put a price that they can no longer that the inflation means that they they put the prices up because they're forced to by the increase in the raw raw material, but they can't get the the sales volume they want.
- 54:09SPEAKER_03: So we're going to get bankruptcies coming out of that, and it's going to be a patchwork across the entire economy.
- 54:15SPEAKER_03: Um so it's the damage to the productive system that is going to uh you know hit us first.
- 54:21SPEAKER_03: And then we've got the biggest El Nino in history coming our way in the next couple of months.
- 54:26SPEAKER_03: So a combination of the straight off and was uh the impact of the El Nino.
- 54:31SPEAKER_03: I think we're gonna see a a crisis out of that at the same time as AI starts to fall over as well.
- 54:36SPEAKER_02: Professor, just just let's talk to the person who did everything right.
- 54:40SPEAKER_02: I mean, they paid the house off, they saved, they never took on debt, they couldn't handle.
- 54:43SPEAKER_02: Did they get through this?
- 54:45SPEAKER_03: They they're more likely to get through than somebody who's hardly levered.
- 54:48SPEAKER_03: Okay.
- 54:49SPEAKER_03: Um the most important thing in a crisis is not to be levered when it starts, uh, because then you're forced to sell assets in a distressed fashion.
- 54:57SPEAKER_03: And that's I think one reason why you see turnarounds and things like the uh you know the uh uh the K-Shiller index, the the cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, the booms and busts that occur on that.
- 55:08SPEAKER_03: And when I look at all this data, how like house prices are now higher than they were back in 2007.
- 55:14SPEAKER_03: They're flatlining at the moment in America.
- 55:17SPEAKER_03: Um, the the uh cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, it's only been higher once in history.
- 55:23SPEAKER_03: That was the 2000 bubble.
- 55:24SPEAKER_03: So I think everything is price for perfection, and we're not about to experience perfection.
- 55:29SPEAKER_02: Okay.
- 55:29SPEAKER_02: Let's make sure I got kind of the spine of this before we wrap up.
- 55:32SPEAKER_02: I mean, measured against the economy, private debt uh did come down after 2008, but your argument is it never fell far enough to take the vulnerability away.
- 55:40SPEAKER_02: The AI borrowing is kind of piled on top of it, and what turns into a crisis is banks writing off loans until the cushion is gone.
- 55:47SPEAKER_02: Have I got that right?
- 55:49SPEAKER_03: Yeah, pretty much.
- 55:50SPEAKER_03: And that's a and that's the that's the difference.
- 55:52SPEAKER_03: That um, you know, if we when you have to focus upon the private sector's fragility.
- 55:57SPEAKER_03: People are obsessed about the government as if the government is fragile.
- 56:00SPEAKER_03: It's got a fragile leader right now, but its finances are rock solid because it can pay for anything denominated in its own currency.
- 56:08SPEAKER_03: The private sector can't do that.
- 56:09SPEAKER_03: The private sector doesn't own its own bank.
- 56:11SPEAKER_03: So that means that the it's private sector fragility that tends to cause these crises, not what's happening with public debt.
- 56:18SPEAKER_02: Now, back to where we kind of started.
- 56:20SPEAKER_02: Ray Dalio, I mean, he wrote that uh note on LinkedIn, I think, on Friday, uh, that the government's finances are at an inflection point.
- 56:26SPEAKER_02: He put uh kind of he basically put a a debt crisis at three years out, give or take two, uh told investors to hold 10 to 15 percent of a portfolio in gold.
- 56:36SPEAKER_02: That's not a government debt story.
- 56:38SPEAKER_02: Yours is a private debt story.
- 56:39SPEAKER_02: Do you end the do the two end up in the same place or somewhere completely different?
- 56:44SPEAKER_03: Well, there there is a extent to which I I I do expect some of the same sorts of crises that Gallio is expecting, but it comes out of the private sector, not out of the government sector.
- 56:54SPEAKER_03: And the timing tends to be similar.
- 56:56SPEAKER_03: Uh the private sector, when the government delivers, and that's what happened during the 1920s, the private sector tends to lever at the same time and go up.
- 57:04SPEAKER_03: And then you have a debt crisis when the private sector tries to reduce its debt.
- 57:08SPEAKER_03: That's when the government debt increases, but that actually is a bit like a a stabilizer on a god, it stops the thing chipping over.
- 57:15SPEAKER_03: So that but the timing, the the dramatic moves in public debt and private debt tend to occur at the same, much the same time, but they're in opposite directions.
- 57:24SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 57:24SPEAKER_02: And here's the thing, though.
- 57:25SPEAKER_02: I mean, almost everybody watching this show already owns the metal.
- 57:29SPEAKER_02: Uh, most of them is uh you know, expecting the printing and the debasement.
- 57:33SPEAKER_02: What you've described as the opposite, I mean, debt deflation.
- 57:36SPEAKER_02: So for anyone who hasn't come across the term, uh, what is that in plain language before we go?
- 57:41SPEAKER_03: Yeah, well that that's it's a thank you for ending on an extremely important question, because this is what Irving Fisher saw as what caused the Great Depression.
- 57:49SPEAKER_03: And Fisher, people remember Irving Fisher for saying stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau.
- 57:55SPEAKER_03: He made that statement eight days before the market fell 30% the next week.
- 57:59SPEAKER_03: Um so he he had a he was worth about a hundred million in the an hour dollars, about a hundred million worth.
- 58:06SPEAKER_03: He was a very successful inventor as well as a speculator.
- 58:09SPEAKER_03: So he was highly leavid, and when the market collapsed, he was wiped out completely.
- 58:13SPEAKER_03: And then in the aftermath he was saying, What what misled me?
- 58:16SPEAKER_03: And he finally realized his belief in equilibrium is what misled him.
- 58:20SPEAKER_03: And he said, fundamentally, it's a it's an unstable system that does not reach equilibrium.
- 58:25SPEAKER_03: It's unstable to go to booms and busts.
- 58:28SPEAKER_03: And in the case of private debt, he said, when you have a a m a moderate level of private debt, then people and some people repay their debts, others are taking it out, so there's no overall change.
- 58:38SPEAKER_03: But when you have an event like the Great Depression and also the global financial crisis, everybody tries to liquidate at the same time.
- 58:45SPEAKER_03: So what happens is you reduce your prices, trying to encourage buyers in through your door rather than your next door neighbor.
- 58:52SPEAKER_03: Your next door neighbor is exactly the same thing.
- 58:54SPEAKER_03: The price level falls.
- 58:56SPEAKER_03: You pay your debt down in nominal terms, but the you've actually reduced total GDP by more.
- 59:02SPEAKER_03: So it's like in the 19th th in the 1930s, uh uh people were reducing their debt levels about 10% per annum, but GDP was falling at 20% per annum.
- 59:12SPEAKER_03: So therefore the debt ratio rose.
- 59:13SPEAKER_03: And you actually saw that in that charter you put up earlier, uh, which showed that the peak uh the crisis began and the debt ratio continued to rise, private debt.
- 59:22SPEAKER_03: The reason it was rising is that private debt was falling, but GDP was falling even faster.
- 59:27SPEAKER_03: So a debt deflation when you get caught in that trap.
- 59:30SPEAKER_03: And that's what myself and Michael Hudson, uh, another agreement, my my probably my best friend amongst renegade economists, and Michael and I both expect an inflationary surge to come out of the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but then a deflation, because it isn't going to be possible for workers to pass on the higher fuel costs they've got to pay because of the uh reduction in in petrol supplies.
- 59:55SPEAKER_03: So um you'll get an inflation temporarily and then no capacity to pass that price rise on, so you get deflation on the other side.
- 1:00:02SPEAKER_03: So he and I are both expecting an inflationary surge followed by deflation on the other side.
- 1:00:07SPEAKER_02: So everybody's trying to pay down debt at the same time and the economy is shrinking because of it.
- 1:00:13SPEAKER_02: So does does gold protect you against debt deflation or or against what governments do in response to it?
- 1:00:18SPEAKER_03: It uh it it can, okay, and that's one reason, you know, buying gold.
- 1:00:22SPEAKER_03: Uh at least as I said, it gold tends to do well when people don't trust the financial system.
- 1:00:27SPEAKER_03: Uh but the other weakness, of course, is that if you are leaving and you've got gold as an asset and you've got to pay debt you can't service, then you're likely to sell the gold.
- 1:00:35SPEAKER_03: So it's not a it's not a one-way bet.
- 1:00:38SPEAKER_02: Yeah, yeah, well said.
- 1:00:40SPEAKER_02: Um now obviously you've held this framework for a long time.
- 1:00:43SPEAKER_02: I have to ask you, just as a journalist, I mean, what would have to kind of happen for you to say publicly that you got it wrong?
- 1:00:49SPEAKER_02: What would you expect to change here?
- 1:00:52SPEAKER_03: Oh, well, if there's no bursting of the AI bubble, yeah, that would be a surprise.
- 1:00:56SPEAKER_03: Okay.
- 1:00:56SPEAKER_03: Um I don't expect I said I'm not expecting a a debt crisis this time around in the same way I did back in 2007, because the level of credit demand, as I've said, is quite low, relatively speaking, and the debt level is high enough that people aren't particularly encouraged back into debt again.
- 1:01:11SPEAKER_03: So we're still in the aftermath of what happened back in 2007.
- 1:01:16SPEAKER_03: So I'm now looking at what's happening uh so like in that front, I I can't be overruled by that one because it's already happened.
- 1:01:22SPEAKER_03: Uh but this time round, I expect the disturbances to come from the physical economy rather than the credit economy.
- 1:01:29SPEAKER_03: But then we'll see the impact of that in terms of firms may going bankrupt because they can't sell enough goods and services to get the income to cover their cover their debt levels.
- 1:01:39SPEAKER_03: Uh so I'd be proven wrong if the economy sailed on and nothing went particularly wrong.
- 1:01:44SPEAKER_03: But if I'm sure we're going to annoy some of your uh colleagues, your followers here.
- 1:01:48SPEAKER_03: I have a slight feeling that gold bugs are likely to be climate change deniers.
- 1:01:52SPEAKER_03: I think the next real fund's gonna come out of what climate does to the economy.
- 1:01:55SPEAKER_02: Interesting.
- 1:01:56SPEAKER_02: Uh well, last one and talk to them directly for a second.
- 1:01:59SPEAKER_02: I mean, somebody watching this does own physical gold, not a font, the metal in their hand.
- 1:02:03SPEAKER_02: So forget the markets.
- 1:02:04SPEAKER_02: What should they expect over the next few years, you think?
- 1:02:08SPEAKER_03: In terms of gold, I'm I'm really I I don't want to come across as an expert on that.
- 1:02:15SPEAKER_03: I know you've got to bring it back to gold.
- 1:02:16SPEAKER_03: I'm your climate.
- 1:02:17SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 1:02:18SPEAKER_03: Well, with the climate, one of the main sayings that I that I like that I've seen about gold over time is you think you need gold, you need lead more.
- 1:02:24SPEAKER_02: You're watching those.
- 1:02:25SPEAKER_02: You're watching those.
- 1:02:26SPEAKER_02: Um all right.
- 1:02:27SPEAKER_02: Well, listen, Steve, uh, we've run out of time.
- 1:02:29SPEAKER_02: I've I've kept you longer than I planned, but uh I appreciate it.
- 1:02:31SPEAKER_02: I think the audience will too.
- 1:02:32SPEAKER_02: Uh, where do people find your work?
- 1:02:34SPEAKER_02: But also the new book.
- 1:02:35SPEAKER_02: I know you're almost there.
- 1:02:37SPEAKER_03: Yeah.
- 1:02:37unknown: Yeah.
- 1:02:38SPEAKER_03: Books only published by Polity Press.
- 1:02:39SPEAKER_03: I hope to finish it by the end of this month, and it'll be hopefully be out by early next year.
- 1:02:44SPEAKER_03: So that's called How Capitalist How Economists Will Destroy Capitalism.
- 1:02:47SPEAKER_03: It's really saying that a false theory of economics is what's led us into many of the crises we're experiencing, including what we're going to get with global warming, because mainstream economists like William Nordhaus have completely misunderstood what it means and have encouraged us into a false sense of security.
- 1:03:03SPEAKER_03: So that's the main focus there.
- 1:03:05SPEAKER_03: Then I have a Thubstack and a Patreon site.
- 1:03:07SPEAKER_03: They're both with Prof Steve Keane in the name.
- 1:03:10SPEAKER_03: And the main thing I'm doing these days, I'm trying to establish an online course, uh, which you can find.
- 1:03:15SPEAKER_03: It's it's being stuffed up at the moment.
- 1:03:17SPEAKER_03: My marketing has gone, uh, my marketing firm's gone gone AWOL.
- 1:03:21SPEAKER_03: Uh so I'm actually caught in a bit of a quandary there.
- 1:03:24SPEAKER_03: But it's under schools.
- 1:03:25SPEAKER_03: So if you go to the school site, skol slash prof Steve Keen, you'll find my work there.
- 1:03:30SPEAKER_03: And it cost a bit to sign up, but uh uh that's where you get the detailed approach that I take to economics.
- 1:03:36SPEAKER_02: All right.
- 1:03:37SPEAKER_02: And a different one at that, especially from some of our guests.
- 1:03:40SPEAKER_02: Uh Professor Steve Keen.
- 1:03:41SPEAKER_02: Uh thanks for taking the accounting apart line by line.
- 1:03:44SPEAKER_02: We don't get to do that here very often.
- 1:03:45SPEAKER_02: I appreciate your time.
- 1:03:47SPEAKER_03: You're welcome.
- 1:03:48SPEAKER_03: Thank you.
- 1:03:48SPEAKER_02: Thanks, Steve.
- 1:03:49SPEAKER_02: Now, if you want more like this, subscribe and hit the like button.
- 1:03:52SPEAKER_02: It genuinely helps.
- 1:03:53SPEAKER_02: And one for the comments.
- 1:03:54SPEAKER_02: I mean, what breaks first?
- 1:03:55SPEAKER_02: AI credit, the banks, or the dollar?
- 1:03:57SPEAKER_02: One word below.
- 1:03:57SPEAKER_02: I'm Jeffrey Saffron for all of us at Kitco News.
- 1:04:00SPEAKER_02: We'll see you next time.
- 1:04:02SPEAKER_01: Kitco News in Focus with Jeremy Saffron.
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