Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Episode 2: Passkeys
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Hello, and welcome to The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 0:03SPEAKER_00: Each episode is 10 minutes on one security control or one breach from history.
- 0:08SPEAKER_00: This time it's a control, and it's one we mention in almost every weekly episode.
- 0:13SPEAKER_00: Pass keys.
- 0:14SPEAKER_00: I'm Carter, and I'm an intelligence analyst.
- 0:17SPEAKER_00: I look at what attackers are doing and why it works.
- 0:20SPEAKER_00: Joining me, as always, is Lizzie.
- 0:22SPEAKER_01: Thanks Carter.
- 0:23SPEAKER_01: I'm Lizzie and I'm a Blue Teamer.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: My angle is the practical one.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: What the lessons are for defenders and what it takes to get a control working in
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: a real organization.
- 0:33SPEAKER_00: Before we get going, a quick note.
- 0:35SPEAKER_00: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:40SPEAKER_00: So, why passkeys, and why now?
- 0:44SPEAKER_00: Start with the attacker's problem.
- 0:45SPEAKER_00: For years, phishing was simple.
- 0:48SPEAKER_00: Steal a password, log in.
- 0:50SPEAKER_00: Then, organizations rolled out MFA, and the attackers adapted.
- 0:54SPEAKER_00: Today, the dominant technique for getting past MFA is adversary-in-the-middle phishing, or AITM.
- 1:01SPEAKER_00: The victim clicks a link to what looks like their normal login page.
- 1:05SPEAKER_00: Behind it sits a proxy that passes everything through to the real site.
- 1:09SPEAKER_00: The victim types their password,
- 1:10SPEAKER_00: approves their MFA prompt, and the proxy quietly keeps the session cookie.
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: The attacker now has a logged in session, no password or second factor needed.
- 1:20SPEAKER_00: And this is commodity tooling now.
- 1:22SPEAKER_00: Kits like Evil Ginks and Evil Proxy are sold or given away as phishing as a service.
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: In January 2026,
- 1:29SPEAKER_00: Microsoft documented a multi-stage AITM campaign
- 1:33SPEAKER_00: against energy sector organizations.
- 1:35SPEAKER_00: It used SharePoint to deliver the lure and inbox rules to hide the activity.
- 1:40SPEAKER_00: Resetting passwords didn't stop it,
- 1:41SPEAKER_00: because the stolen sessions The
- 1:50SPEAKER_00: private key never leaves the user's device,
- 1:52SPEAKER_00: and the sign-in is bound to the real website's domain.
- 1:55SPEAKER_00: So a lookalike site, however perfect, simply can't use it.
- 2:00SPEAKER_00: There's no shared secret to type, relay, or steal.
- 2:03SPEAKER_00: And the service only stores a public key,
- 2:05SPEAKER_00: so a breach on their side doesn't leak anything reusable.
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: The good news is that support is now broad.
- 2:11SPEAKER_00: The big platforms – Apple, Google,
- 2:14SPEAKER_00: and Microsoft – all support passkeys,
- 2:16SPEAKER_00: and so do the main identity providers and password managers.
- 2:19SPEAKER_00: This has stopped being a niche technology for security teams.
- 2:23SPEAKER_00: It's something you can realistically ask a whole workforce to use.
- 2:27SPEAKER_00: It helps to picture what actually happens at sign-in.
- 2:29SPEAKER_00: The website sends your device a random challenge.
- 2:32SPEAKER_00: You unlock the passkey with your face,
- 2:34SPEAKER_00: fingerprint, or a pin, and that pin never leaves the device.
- 2:38SPEAKER_00: The device signs the challenge with the private key and only for the domain
- 2:42SPEAKER_00: the passkey was created for.
- 2:44SPEAKER_00: If the page in your browser is a lookalike with one letter different,
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: the device won't even offer the passkey.
- 2:50SPEAKER_00: The user doesn't have to spot the fake.
- 2:52SPEAKER_00: The cryptography does it for them.
- 2:54SPEAKER_00: That's why we call them phishing-resistant.
- 2:56SPEAKER_00: Not phishing proof.
- 2:57SPEAKER_00: Lizzie, where would you start?
- 2:59SPEAKER_01: With the people attackers want most, and with the front door.
- 3:03SPEAKER_01: My priority order would be admin and privileged accounts first.
- 3:07SPEAKER_01: That's domain admins, cloud admins, and anyone who can change your identity platform.
- 3:13SPEAKER_01: Then, straight after, every user for remote access.
- 3:16SPEAKER_01: Remote access is internet-facing, and AITM doesn't care whether you're an admin.
- 3:21SPEAKER_01: It happily takes a finance clerk's session.
- 3:24SPEAKER_01: So I wouldn't stop at admins.
- 3:26SPEAKER_01: Passkeys for all remote access is the goal.
- 3:29SPEAKER_01: The part people skip is enforcement.
- 3:32SPEAKER_01: Offering passkeys isn't the same as requiring them.
- 3:35SPEAKER_01: If attackers can still choose a weaker method, they will.
- 3:38SPEAKER_01: If you're an Entra shop,
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: authentication strengths and conditional access let you require
- 3:43SPEAKER_01: a phishing-resistant method, and that's included with the P1 license.
- 3:47SPEAKER_01: If you're not, the portable lesson is the same.
- 3:50SPEAKER_01: Use your identity provider's policy to make the phishing-resistant method mandatory,
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: not optional.
- 3:56SPEAKER_01: And enforcement has a second half that's easy to forget.
- 3:59SPEAKER_01: Once people have registered a passkey, go back and remove the weaker methods where you can.
- 4:04SPEAKER_01: If SMS codes and app approvals are still sitting there as fallbacks,
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: a phishing kit can simply steer the user towards them.
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: Some kits already try that by showing a fake try another way option.
- 4:15SPEAKER_01: Then there's the choice of passkey.
- 4:18SPEAKER_01: Device-bound passkeys,
- 4:19SPEAKER_01: stored in the laptop's chip or in an authenticator app,
- 4:22SPEAKER_01: are strong, but recovery is painful when the device is lost.
- 4:26SPEAKER_01: Synced passkeys live in a platform account or a password manager.
- 4:30SPEAKER_01: They survive a lost phone, but you're trusting that sync provider.
- 4:34SPEAKER_01: Hardware security keys are the most portable,
- 4:36SPEAKER_01: but they cost money, they get lost, and issuing them takes admin time.
- 4:40SPEAKER_01: In the rollouts I've seen,
- 4:42SPEAKER_01: passkeys in an authenticator app work reasonably well,
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: but you hit edge cases,
- 4:47SPEAKER_01: older phones that can't enroll, people who don't understand the new sign-in flow.
- 4:52SPEAKER_01: My advice is to take a firm line on supported devices early.
- 4:55SPEAKER_01: Issuing hardware keys to a small group of exceptions sounds easy,
- 4:59SPEAKER_01: but it becomes a lot of admin very quickly.
- 5:02SPEAKER_00: And that's the catch, isn't it?
- 5:04SPEAKER_00: Attackers don't give up.
- 5:05SPEAKER_00: They route around the control.
- 5:07SPEAKER_00: As passkeys spread, the phishing moves to places passkeys don't reach.
- 5:12SPEAKER_00: Device code phishing,
- 5:13SPEAKER_00: which we covered on the weekly show just last week,
- 5:15SPEAKER_00: sends the victim to a genuine login page.
- 5:18SPEAKER_00: The sign-in is real, so a passkey sign-in succeeds, and the attacker still gets a valid token.
- 5:24SPEAKER_00: Consent phishing tricks users into granting a malicious app access.
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: InfoStealer malware skips authentication entirely and steals session cookies from the device.
- 5:34SPEAKER_00: And groups like Scattered Spider,
- 5:36SPEAKER_00: a loose collective of mostly young,
- 5:38SPEAKER_00: English-speaking criminals,
- 5:39SPEAKER_00: became very good at simply phoning the help desk and asking for a reset.
- 5:43SPEAKER_00: We've seen that pattern before.
- 5:45SPEAKER_00: When organizations rolled out push MFA,
- 5:48SPEAKER_00: attackers started bombarding users with prompts until someone tapped approve.
- 5:52SPEAKER_00: Every strong control moves the attacker to the next weakest point.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: So, my assessment?
- 5:58SPEAKER_00: The more passkeys succeed, the more the recovery process becomes the target.
- 6:02SPEAKER_01: Which is exactly where I'd put the effort next.
- 6:32SPEAKER_01: If someone can phone up,
- 6:34SPEAKER_01: say they've lost their phone,
- 6:35SPEAKER_01: and get a new sign-in method in five minutes,
- 6:38SPEAKER_01: then you've built a very strong door with a flimsy side entrance.
- 6:42SPEAKER_01: I'd write down how a user proves who they are before anyone resets anything,
- 6:46SPEAKER_01: and make it hard to shortcut.
- 6:48SPEAKER_01: If you use a temporary access pass in Entra,
- 6:51SPEAKER_01: Only issue it once the user's identity has been validated.
- 6:55SPEAKER_01: And test that recovery path, because people will lose their devices.
- 6:59SPEAKER_01: It's also worth measuring progress properly.
- 7:02SPEAKER_01: Most identity platforms can report who's registered which method.
- 7:06SPEAKER_01: I'd track two numbers.
- 7:07SPEAKER_01: How many users have a passkey, and how many sign-ins still use something weaker.
- 7:12SPEAKER_01: The second one tells you whether the control is really doing its job.
- 7:16SPEAKER_01: Beyond that, remember what passkeys don't solve.
- 7:19SPEAKER_01: They protect the sign-in, not the session afterwards.
- 7:22SPEAKER_01: So for the token theft scenarios,
- 7:25SPEAKER_01: I'd layer shorter session lifetimes and token protection where it's supported.
- 7:29SPEAKER_01: Those reduce how far a stolen session can go.
- 7:32SPEAKER_01: And for the services that still don't support passkeys,
- 7:35SPEAKER_01: keep strong MFA with number matching and block legacy authentication.
- 7:39SPEAKER_01: Legacy protocols skip MFA entirely.
- 7:42SPEAKER_00: So, three takeaways.
- 7:44SPEAKER_00: Passkeys are the best defense we have against credential phishing,
- 7:48SPEAKER_00: including AITM, because they're bound to the real site.
- 7:51SPEAKER_00: Enforce them, don't just offer them.
- 7:54SPEAKER_00: Start with admins and remote access for everyone.
- 7:57SPEAKER_00: And as they work, expect attackers to go after recovery and sessions, so harden those too.
- 8:03SPEAKER_00: That's this episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 8:06SPEAKER_00: If you want the weekly version,
- 8:07SPEAKER_00: subscribe to The Defensive Line Weekly on Substack
- 8:10SPEAKER_00: and wherever you get your podcasts.
- 8:12SPEAKER_00: Until next time, stay defensive.