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Transcript
- 0:00Good evening and welcome back to Sleep Wise.
- 0:04Tonight we drift into one of the strangest and quietest puzzles
- 0:10in the modern world. It is a puzzle hidden inside
- 0:15something most people would consider a blessing.
- 0:19Imagine a country waking one morning to learn that beneath
- 0:23its soil lies a treasure beyond easy counting Vast oceans of
- 0:29oil, mountains of copper, veins of gold threaded through ancient
- 0:34rock, diamonds resting in old river beds.
- 0:39By every reasonable expectation, such a discovery should mean
- 0:45lifted lives, gentler futures, stronger schools, calmer
- 0:51streets, and the slow easing of hardship.
- 0:56Wealth, after all, is meant to help.
- 0:59And yet across the past century, economists, historians and
- 1:05travelers have noticed something unsettling.
- 1:09Again and again, countries blessed with extraordinary
- 1:14natural riches have struggled in ways their neighbors did not.
- 1:19They have grown more slowly than poorer nations next door.
- 1:25They have built fewer roads, weaker schools, less reliable
- 1:30institutions. Their currencies have wobbled.
- 1:35Their politics have grown brittle.
- 1:39Some have descended into conflict.
- 1:44A few have collapsed altogether. Despite sitting atop reserves
- 1:49worth hundreds of billions of dollars, the pattern was so
- 1:53persistent that scholars began giving it a name.
- 1:58They called it the Paradox of Plenty.
- 2:02Later, more bluntly, the resource curse to night.
- 2:07We will move slowly through this idea.
- 2:11We will trace its mechanisms gently, without rushing.
- 2:15We will visit a country that lived through one of its most
- 2:19painful versions. And then we will travel to two
- 2:24very different places that received the same kind of gift
- 2:29and chose in their own way, to make it a blessing rather than a
- 2:35wound. There is no need to memorize the
- 2:38figures we encounter, no need to keep up with every twist.
- 2:43The names, the dates, the policies.
- 2:46They are anchors of curiosity, not assignments to be
- 2:51remembered. Let your breath settle a little.
- 2:55Let the day begin to loosen from your shoulders like a coat
- 2:59slowly slipping from the back of a chair.
- 3:03For there is something quietly compelling about this story.
- 3:07It is not really about oil or copper or diamonds.
- 3:12It is about what happens to a society when sudden wealth
- 3:17arrives without preparation, about the small daily habits
- 3:23that hold a country together, and how easily they can be
- 3:27undone by something as simple as a windfall.
- 3:32If these quiet journeys help you rest, you can follow Sleep Wise
- 3:38and share it with someone who might enjoy drifting off while
- 3:42learning something new. And tonight, before we visit any
- 3:47country or examine any policy, there is one question worth
- 3:53holding close, a question that has puzzled economists for
- 3:59nearly 50 years, and one that still does not have a single
- 4:05simple answer. Why is it that the richest
- 4:09ground so often yields the poorest nations?
- 4:15The term resource curse entered the language of economics in
- 4:201993 when a British scholar named Richard Autie used it to
- 4:28describe a pattern he had been studying for years.
- 4:32Autie had noticed that mineral rich developing countries were
- 4:37performing worse than their resource poor neighbors, often
- 4:42by surprisingly wide margins. The name was new, but the
- 4:48observation was older. As far back as the 1600s,
- 4:55thinkers had remarked on Spain's strange fate, how the silver
- 5:00flowing in from the Americas had not made Spain stronger, but had
- 5:06quietly drained its workshops and left it poorer than smaller
- 5:11neighbors. A few years after Audie's book,
- 5:152 American economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner studied
- 5:21nearly 100 countries over several decades and found that
- 5:27nations whose exports leaned heavily on natural resources
- 5:32grew more slowly than those whose economies were more
- 5:36diversified. The relationship was not
- 5:40destiny, but it was strong enough to demand explanation.
- 5:46The data was, in its quiet way, startling.
- 5:51By the late 20th century, some of the most resource rich
- 5:55nations on Earth had per capita incomes below those of countries
- 6:01with almost no natural endowments at all.
- 6:05South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan, none blessed with
- 6:10significant oil or minerals, had built some of the most
- 6:15prosperous societies in human history.
- 6:19Meanwhile, Venezuela, sitting atop the largest proven oil
- 6:24reserves on the planet, had seen its economy contract again and
- 6:29again. Nigeria, with vast oil wealth,
- 6:34struggled to keep its cities lit.
- 6:37The Democratic Republic of the Congo, holding rich deposits of
- 6:42cobalt and copper, remained one of the poorest places on earth.
- 6:48There were exceptions. Norway, Botswana, the United
- 6:53Arab Emirates and a few others had turned natural wealth into
- 6:57broad prosperity, but these were the minority.
- 7:03The general pattern leaned the other way.
- 7:06The puzzle deepened when researchers looked at history.
- 7:11The countries that had industrialized earliest Britain,
- 7:16Germany, the United States had built their wealth largely on
- 7:21manufacturing, trade and innovation.
- 7:25Natural resources had been one ingredient among many, not the
- 7:31centerpiece of the economy. So the question sharpened.
- 7:36It was not that natural resources caused harm directly.
- 7:41Oil does not corrode a country the way salt corrodes iron.
- 7:47Something else was happening, some invisible mechanism, or
- 7:52perhaps several working together, that seemed to convert
- 7:57blessing into burden. How did a gift become a wound?
- 8:05To begin understanding, we must turn from the broad pattern to
- 8:10the quiet machinery beneath it, starting with a phenomenon
- 8:14named, curiously, after a small country in northern Europe that
- 8:20experienced it first hand. But before we go there, consider
- 8:26this. Of the 50 most resource rich
- 8:30nations measured at the start of the 21st century, the majority
- 8:35were poorer, more unstable or more unequal than the global
- 8:41average. What had gone so quietly, so
- 8:44persistently wrong? In 1959, in a quiet stretch of
- 8:52farmland near the village of Slochteren in the northern
- 8:57Netherlands, engineers discovered something unexpected.
- 9:03Beneath the soil lay one of the largest natural gas fields ever
- 9:08found in Europe. The Groningen field held
- 9:12trillions of cubic feet of gas. Almost overnight, the
- 9:17Netherlands became a major energy exporter.
- 9:21By every visible measure, the country had been gifted a
- 9:26windfall. And yet in the years that
- 9:29followed, something puzzling happened.
- 9:32Dutch manufacturing, long a backbone of the economy, began
- 9:38to decline. Factories struggled.
- 9:42Exports of finished goods slipped against international
- 9:46competitors. Unemployment in manufacturing
- 9:50rose even as gas revenues climbed.
- 9:54Economists traced the source. As foreign buyers paid for Dutch
- 9:59gas, they had to acquire Dutch currency to do so.
- 10:04That demand pushed the value of the guilder upward.
- 10:08A stronger guilder meant that everything else the Netherlands
- 10:12sold abroad became more expensive for foreign buyers.
- 10:18A Dutch made machine that had been competitive in Germany now
- 10:23cost more than its rivals. Orders slowed, workshops shrank.
- 10:30The country's industrial base began to hollow out, not because
- 10:34anything was wrong with Dutch factories, but because the
- 10:38currency had been lifted by the gravity of gas.
- 10:42The phenomenon was given a name by The Economist magazine in
- 10:481977. They called it Dutch Disease.
- 10:54A booming resource sector can quietly damage the rest of the
- 10:59economy by raising the currency's value and pulling
- 11:04labor and capital toward extraction.
- 11:08This is the first mechanism of the resource curse.
- 11:12A country discovers oil or copper or gas, and the wealth
- 11:17that pours in begins to undercut the industries that might have
- 11:22provided steady jobs for generations.
- 11:25But there is a second mechanism layered atop the first.
- 11:30It has to do with the prices themselves.
- 11:34Oil prices, like most commodity prices, do not move gently.
- 11:40They swing. They climb steeply during years
- 11:44of global demand and crash without warning when supply
- 11:49outruns appetite. In the 1970s, oil prices
- 11:55quadrupled in months. In the mid 1980s, they collapsed
- 12:01by more than half. In 2008, they reached nearly
- 12:06$150.00 a barrel before plunging below 40 within months.
- 12:14In 2020, oil futures briefly traded below 0.
- 12:21For a country whose budget depends on oil revenue, these
- 12:26swings are not abstractions. They are the difference between
- 12:31building hospitals and closing them, between hiring teachers
- 12:36and dismissing them, between calm streets and unrest.
- 12:42And so the second mechanism reveals itself, quietly but
- 12:50firmly. Resource rich economies live at
- 12:55the mercy of prices they cannot control, set by markets they
- 13:00cannot see. But even Dutch disease and price
- 13:05volatility, taken together, do not fully explain why some
- 13:12nations escape and others fall. There is a deeper force at work,
- 13:19one that touches not the economy but the very foundations of the
- 13:24state itself. In most countries, governments
- 13:30are funded by their citizens. People earn wages, sell goods,
- 13:36run businesses, and pay taxes on what they make.
- 13:40The money that flows into the treasury comes, in a sense, from
- 13:45the daily labor of the population.
- 13:48And because citizens pay for the state, they tend to ask things
- 13:53of it. They want roads where their
- 13:56children walk. They want schools that work.
- 14:01They want courts they can trust. The relationship between the
- 14:06taxed and the taxing is one of the oldest and quietly most
- 14:12important arrangements in human history.
- 14:16Now imagine a different arrangement.
- 14:19A country discovers vast oil reserves beneath its territory.
- 14:25The government signs contracts with foreign companies or builds
- 14:30a national oil firm of its own, and revenue begins to flow
- 14:35directly into the Treasury from the ground itself.
- 14:39The state no longer depends on its citizens for its income.
- 14:44It depends on geology and on global markets.
- 14:49The old conversation between taxpayer and government grows
- 14:54quieter. This is the third mechanism of
- 14:58the resource curse, and many economists consider it the most
- 15:03consequential. It is sometimes called the
- 15:07rentier effect. A rentier state is one that
- 15:12earns its keep not from production but from rent, the
- 15:17income derived from owning a resource and letting others
- 15:22extract it. When such rents become large
- 15:26enough, the entire shape of governance begins to shift.
- 15:31The first effect is on accountability.
- 15:35When citizens do not fund the state, the state has less reason
- 15:39to answer to them. Tax collection requires
- 15:43negotiation, record keeping, and public trust.
- 15:48Resource revenue requires only contracts and pipelines.
- 15:54Governments funded by oil can, if they choose, ignore the
- 15:58demands of ordinary people for years at a time.
- 16:03The second effect is on institutions.
- 16:06Strong institutions, independent courts, free media, professional
- 16:10civil services. Honest auditors are expensive
- 16:15and slow to build. They emerge over decades, often
- 16:20through difficult struggles between rulers and citizens.
- 16:25In countries where the state lives on resource rents, the
- 16:30pressure to build such institutions weakens.
- 16:35The third effect is on corruption.
- 16:38Vast pools of resource revenue create vast opportunities for
- 16:43theft, kickbacks and patronage. A minister who overseas oil
- 16:49contracts may control more money in a single signature than most
- 16:54citizens will see in a lifetime. The temptation is enormous, and
- 17:00the safeguards are often the very institutions that resource
- 17:04wealth has quietly eroded. Studies have found that resource
- 17:10rich countries, on average, score lower on measures of
- 17:15governance, transparency and rule of law than countries of
- 17:20similar income that lack such resources.
- 17:25The pattern is not absolute, but it is consistent enough to
- 17:30suggest that the wealth itself is shaping the politics around
- 17:35it. And once politics is shaped this
- 17:38way, the resource curse becomes harder to escape.
- 17:44The wealth meant to lift the country has begun instead to
- 17:49lift the few who control it. The word rentier comes from the
- 17:55French. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
- 18:00A rentier was someone who lived off the income of land or
- 18:04property without needing to work.
- 18:08They were often modest figures, retired teachers or small
- 18:13landlords, who had arranged their lives around a quiet,
- 18:18dependable flow of rent. The word implied a life shaped
- 18:24not by daily effort but by the steady arrival of someone else's
- 18:30payments. When scholars of political
- 18:33economy borrowed the term in the 1970s, they applied it to entire
- 18:38nations. A rentier state, they argued, is
- 18:431 whose government does not produce its income but receives
- 18:48it. Oil, gas, mineral royalties or
- 18:53sometimes foreign aid flow into the treasury without the country
- 18:59having to build factories, train workers or develop competitive
- 19:04industries. The state becomes, in effect, a
- 19:08landlord on a national scale. The scholar most closely
- 19:13associated with the idea was Hossein Mahdavi, an Iranian
- 19:19economist who in 1970 wrote a study of Iran's oil driven
- 19:24economy. Mahdavi noticed that the
- 19:28structure of Iranian government had shifted in subtle ways.
- 19:33Once oil revenue dominated the budget, spending decisions were
- 19:39made without much consultation. Public services expanded in some
- 19:44places and stagnated in others according to political loyalty
- 19:51rather than economic logic. In the decades that followed,
- 19:55scholars extended the analysis to other oil rich states across
- 20:01the Middle East Africa. And Latin America.
- 20:06The pattern was not identical everywhere, but certain features
- 20:11kept recurring. Taxes on citizens were often low
- 20:15or nonexistent, which sounded like a gift but came with a
- 20:20hidden cost. Without taxes, there was no
- 20:24broad civic conversation about how revenue should be spent.
- 20:29Public sector employment grew as a way of distributing oil
- 20:34wealth. Subsidies on fuel and food made
- 20:38daily life cheaper, yet also distorted markets.
- 20:42There is something almost gentle in how this happens.
- 20:47No single official decides 1 morning to weaken the bond
- 20:51between citizen and state. The change unfolds slowly, in
- 20:58budget meetings and personnel decisions, in the quiet
- 21:02expansion of one ministry and the quiet neglect of another.
- 21:07Over time, the architecture of governance leans toward the
- 21:12wellhead rather than toward the workshop or schoolhouse.
- 21:16And the strangest thing about a rentier arrangement is that it
- 21:21can feel for a while like prosperity.
- 21:26Salaries arrive, roads get built, new airports rise from
- 21:31the desert. The visible signs of wealth are
- 21:35real, but beneath them the deep machinery of society may be
- 21:41quietly stalling. By now we have walked through
- 21:45three mechanisms of the resource curse, Dutch disease, which
- 21:50lifts the currency and hollows out manufacturing, price
- 21:56volatility, which makes budgets hostage to global swings, and
- 22:03the rentier effect, which loosens the bond between
- 22:07governments and the people they govern to see how they can act
- 22:12together. We turn now to a country that
- 22:15lived through all three and vivid, painful detail.
- 22:21Venezuela sits on the northern shoulder of South America, where
- 22:27the Andes Mountains slope down toward the Caribbean Sea.
- 22:33Its geography is varied and beautiful, Jungle in the South,
- 22:40Savannah in the middle, mountains in the West, and a
- 22:45long coastline. For most of its history after
- 22:50independence from Spain in 1821, it was a poor agricultural
- 22:56country. Coffee, cacao, and cattle were
- 23:01its main exports. Power rotated among regional
- 23:06strongman, and the economy depended on the rhythms of
- 23:10harvests and the prices set in distant European markets.
- 23:15Then, in the early 20th century, the ground itself began to
- 23:20change the country's story. Geologists had long suspected
- 23:25that oil lay beneath the basin of Lake Maracaibo in the
- 23:29country's northwest, a shallow inland sea ringed by villages of
- 23:35fishermen and farmers. In 1914, a well drilled near the
- 23:42lake's Eastern Shore struck oil and commercial quantities.
- 23:47The transformation that followed was extraordinarily fast.
- 23:52In 1922, a well called Barroso 2 blew out, spewing oil into the
- 24:00air for 9 days before it could be contained.
- 24:04The image travelled across the world and brought a wave of
- 24:08foreign companies into Venezuela.
- 24:12Within a decade the country had become one of the largest oil
- 24:17exporters on earth, second only to the United States in
- 24:21production by the late 1920's. The man who ruled Venezuela
- 24:27during these formative years was Juan Vicente Gomez, a long
- 24:33serving authoritarian who governed from 19 O 8 until his
- 24:39death in 1935. Gomez offered foreign oil
- 24:44companies extraordinarily generous terms.
- 24:49Taxes were low, regulations were minimal, and the laws governing
- 24:54the industry were written in part by representatives of the
- 24:58companies themselves. Oil revenue flowed into the
- 25:03Treasury, but Gomez used much of it to pay off the country's
- 25:07foreign debt, enrich his family and build an army loyal to his
- 25:14rule. For ordinary Venezuelans, the
- 25:18early oil years brought a peculiar mixture of change and
- 25:22stagnation. Around Lake Maracaibo, new towns
- 25:27sprang up almost overnight, filled with foreign engineers,
- 25:32drillers and the Venezuelan workers who served them.
- 25:37Wages in the oil zones were higher than anywhere else in the
- 25:42country, drawing people from the countryside.
- 25:47But outside the oil zones, agriculture declined.
- 25:51Workers left the fields for the wells.
- 25:55The currency, the Bolivar, strengthened as oil exports
- 26:00grew, making imported food cheaper than domestically grown
- 26:05food. Within a few decades, a country
- 26:08that had once fed itself was importing much of what it ate.
- 26:14The pattern would have been familiar to any student of Dutch
- 26:18disease. Although the term did not yet
- 26:21exist, Venezuela was becoming a country with a single dominant
- 26:29export, and the rest of its productive economy was quietly
- 26:34shrinking in the shadow of 1 gleaming product.
- 26:39And yet, on the surface, the country was getting richer.
- 26:44Roads were paved. New buildings rose in Caracas,
- 26:49the oil had begun its long work. After Gomez died in 1935,
- 26:56Venezuela began a long, uneven process of trying to claim more
- 27:03of its own oil wealth as series of governments gradually rewrote
- 27:10the laws governing foreign companies.
- 27:13In 1943, a new hydrocarbons law required that the government and
- 27:19the oil companies share profits roughly equally, a principal
- 27:25Venezuelans. Called 5050, it was one of the
- 27:29most progressive arrangements between an oil producing country
- 27:35and the international firms that drilled there.
- 27:40The 5050 principle would later spread across the world,
- 27:45influencing oil agreements from the Persian Gulf to Indonesia.
- 27:52Venezuela had become a model for how a developing country might
- 27:58assert itself against the powerful firms that had once
- 28:03written its laws. In 1945, a brief democratic
- 28:08opening brought to power a reformed government led by
- 28:13Romulo Betancourt. It expanded public spending and
- 28:18tried to use oil revenue to build a broader economy.
- 28:23But the experiment was short lived.
- 28:26In 1948, a military coup ended the democratic period and a
- 28:33decade of authoritarian rule followed under Marcos Perez
- 28:38Jimenez, who used oil money to build highways and showcase
- 28:44projects in Caracas while suppressing opposition.
- 28:49When democracy returned in 1958, Venezuela entered its longest
- 28:55period of stable civilian government. 2 main political
- 29:00parties alternated peacefully in power.
- 29:04For decades, the country was considered one of the most
- 29:09stable democracies in Latin America.
- 29:14A pivotal moment came in 1960 when Venezuela's oil minister,
- 29:20Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, helped found the Organization of the
- 29:25Petroleum Exporting Countries, known as OPESI.
- 29:31Together with representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq
- 29:36and Kuwait, he argued that producing countries needed to
- 29:41coordinate to prevent international companies from
- 29:46playing them against one another.
- 29:49OPEC would become one of the most influential cartels in
- 29:53modern history. Perez Alfonso himself was a
- 29:57thoughtful and curiously skeptical figure.
- 30:02Even as he helped build Opecs, he warned his countrymen that
- 30:07oil was not really a blessing. He called it the devil's
- 30:12excrement and predicted that an excess of oil wealth would
- 30:17corrupt institutions and leave Venezuela worse off than it
- 30:22might have been without it. Few listened at the time.
- 30:27The 1970s seemed to vindicate the cartel strategy.
- 30:32After the 1973 Arab Israeli war, oil prices quadrupled and
- 30:39Venezuela's revenues exploded. In 1976, the government
- 30:46nationalized the oil industry, creating a state owned company
- 30:51called Petroleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA.
- 30:58For a while, PDVSA was considered one of the best run
- 31:02national oil companies in the world.
- 31:06The country felt rich, import surged.
- 31:10Consumer goods filled the shelves.
- 31:13Public spending expanded dramatically.
- 31:16Caracas became a glittering city of new towers and busy
- 31:21restaurants. The future seemed to belong to
- 31:25those who owned the wells. The boom did not last.
- 31:31By the mid 1980s, oil prices had crashed and Venezuela's economy
- 31:37contracted. The peaceful democracy that had
- 31:41once seemed so stable began to fray.
- 31:45Public debt rose. Inflation climbed.
- 31:49Inequality became increasingly visible.
- 31:53The political class dependent on oil revenue struggled to adjust.
- 32:00By the early 1990s, ordinary Venezuelans had grown
- 32:05disillusioned with the parties that had governed for decades.
- 32:09Into this disillusionment stepped a former army officer
- 32:14named Hugo Chavez. In 1992, he led a failed
- 32:20military coup against the elected government.
- 32:24The coup collapsed within hours and he was jailed.
- 32:29Before being taken into custody, he was permitted to make a brief
- 32:34televised statement urging his fellow conspirators to
- 32:39surrender. In that short address, he became
- 32:45a national figure. His blunt style resonated with
- 32:49millions who felt forgotten by the country's elite.
- 32:54Pardoned in 1994, Chavez turned to electoral politics.
- 33:00He campaigned as an outsider, promising to dismantle a corrupt
- 33:05system and use the country's oil wealth for the poor.
- 33:11In 1998 he was elected president, taking office the
- 33:16following year. He remained in power until his
- 33:21death in 2013. The Chavez era coincided with
- 33:27one of the longest oil booms in modern history.
- 33:32Between 1999 and 2014, oil prices rose from around $10 a
- 33:39barrel to well over 100. Venezuela's revenues swelled.
- 33:47Chavez used them to fund ambitious social programs called
- 33:51missions, which expanded health care, literacy and food
- 33:57subsidies in poor neighborhoods. Many Venezuelans who had felt
- 34:03invisible began to see the state taking interest in their lives.
- 34:08Yet beneath the visible spending, the deeper structures
- 34:12of the economy were weakening. Chavez restaffed PDVSA, the
- 34:18national oil company, replacing experienced engineers with
- 34:23political loyalists. After a strike in 2002,
- 34:28production began a slow decline. Investment and maintenance
- 34:33shrank. The currency was kept
- 34:36artificially strong through controls that made import cheap
- 34:41and domestic industry uncompetitive.
- 34:45Price controls discouraged local agriculture.
- 34:49The country imported more and produced less, while oil masked
- 34:53the imbalance. Chavez also weakened the
- 34:56institutions that might have provided checks on his policies.
- 35:01Courts were packed. Media outlets faced harassment
- 35:05or closure. State spending was directed
- 35:09through opaque funds outside normal oversight.
- 35:13Each move had a political logic, but together they hollowed out
- 35:19the institutional architecture any country needs when its
- 35:23primary revenue is as volatile as oil.
- 35:28For a while, the model appeared to work.
- 35:31Poverty rates fell. Literacy improved.
- 35:35Chavez was celebrated by some abroad as a champion of the
- 35:40poor. But the entire edifice rested on
- 35:44one assumption no government can guarantee.
- 35:48It rested on the assumption that oil prices would stay high
- 35:53forever. When Chavez died of cancer in
- 35:562013, his chosen successor, Nicolas Maduro, narrowly won an
- 36:03election to take his place. The political project continued,
- 36:09but the economic foundation beneath it was already cracking.
- 36:15Oil production, once nearly three and a half million barrels
- 36:19a day, was drifting downward. PDVSA was carrying enormous
- 36:25debts. Then, in 2014, the global price
- 36:31of oil collapsed. What had been a barrel of crude
- 36:35worth more than $100 in mid 2014 fell to under 50 by early 2015
- 36:44and below 30 within another year.
- 36:48For a country whose budget depended almost entirely on oil
- 36:52exports, the effect was catastrophic.
- 36:57Roughly 95% of Venezuela's export earnings came from
- 37:03petroleum. When the price fell, the
- 37:06country's lifeline frayed. The government's response
- 37:10deepened the crisis. Rather than cutting spending or
- 37:14adjusting the currency, Maduro's administration printed money to
- 37:20cover the shortfall. The Bolivar lost value at an
- 37:25alarming rate. Inflation accelerated into
- 37:30hyperinflation. By 2018, the International
- 37:36Monetary Fund estimated that Venezuela's annual inflation had
- 37:42passed 1,000,000%. Wages became worthless almost as
- 37:49soon as they were paid. Imports collapsed because the
- 37:54country had spent decades importing nearly everything
- 37:59food, medicine, spare parts. The shortages were immediate and
- 38:05severe. Supermarket shelves emptied.
- 38:09Pharmacies ran out of basic drugs.
- 38:13Hospitals lost the ability to perform routine procedures.
- 38:18People lined up for hours for bread, cooking oil, soap.
- 38:23Many families began losing weight.
- 38:27A study in 2017 reported that the average Venezuelan had lost
- 38:33roughly 20 lbs in a year, a figure so grim it acquired its
- 38:39own name, the Maduro Diet. Power outages spread, the
- 38:47electricity grid depended on hydroelectric plants, and
- 38:52imported equipment no longer being maintained, began to fail
- 38:58in waves. Caracas, the gleaming capital of
- 39:02the boom years, sat in darkness for days at a time.
- 39:08Water pressure dropped in some neighborhoods.
- 39:12Residents collected drinking water from broken pipes or
- 39:16polluted streams. As conditions worsened,
- 39:20Venezuelans began leaving in numbers not seen in the region's
- 39:25modern history. By the early twenty 20s, more
- 39:29than 7 million people had left, walking across borders into
- 39:34Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and beyond.
- 39:41It became one of the largest displacement crises in the
- 39:45world, comparable in scale to the flight from Syria.
- 39:50The country that held the largest proven oil reserves on
- 39:54Earth had within a few short years become one of the most
- 40:00distressed states in the Americas.
- 40:04The collapse was not caused by oil alone.
- 40:08Policy choices and political decisions all played their
- 40:13roles, but the underlying vulnerability the country's
- 40:18decades old dependence on a single commodity.
- 40:23Was the foundation on which everything else had been built.
- 40:28When that foundation cracked, much of the structure came down
- 40:32with it. It is worth pausing here for a
- 40:37moment before moving on. Venezuela's story is not simply
- 40:43a tale of bad leaders or bad luck, though both played their
- 40:48parts. It is more deeply an
- 40:51illustration of how the three mechanisms we traced earlier in
- 40:56this story can work together slowly over generations to undo
- 41:02a country that once seemed full of promise.
- 41:07Dutch disease arrived first. In the early decades of the 20th
- 41:12century. As oil flowed and the bolivars
- 41:16strengthened, Venezuelan agriculture and manufacturing
- 41:21thinned. The country grew more dependent
- 41:24on imports for food and finished goods and less able to produce
- 41:30them at home. By the time anyone gave the
- 41:34phenomenon a name, the damage had already settled into the
- 41:38structure of the economy. Price volatility followed close
- 41:43behind. Every oil boom in Venezuelan
- 41:47history was followed by a price crash, and every crash exposed
- 41:52how thin the rest of the economy had become.
- 41:56The 70s brought riches and overconfidence.
- 42:01The 80s brought collapse and debt.
- 42:04The 2000s brought another surge of revenue, and then, in 2014,
- 42:10another fall. Each cycle drained more than
- 42:15money. It drained the country's ability
- 42:18to plan, to save, to imagine a future not tied to a single
- 42:24price. The rentier effect bound
- 42:27everything together. Because oil revenue flowed
- 42:30directly to the state, governments could spend without
- 42:35taxing, distribute without producing, and reward loyalty
- 42:41without much accountability. Institutions that might have
- 42:46steadied the country, an independent judiciary, a
- 42:50professional civil service, a transparent budget process were
- 42:56never fully built and overtime were actively dismantled.
- 43:03When the test came, the structures that might have
- 43:06absorbed it were too weak to hold.
- 43:10None of this means oil was the only cause.
- 43:13Leaders made choices. So did opposition figures,
- 43:18international actors and ordinary citizens.
- 43:23Venezuela's tragedy belongs to many hands.
- 43:28But the resource curse describes a kind of gravity, a steady pull
- 43:34that bends a country in certain directions unless something
- 43:37strong enough resists it. And that brings us to the most
- 43:42interesting question of all. If the curse exists, what does
- 43:48resistance look like? What does a country actually do
- 43:53to receive the same gift of natural wealth and not be undone
- 43:58by it? To find out, we now travel to a
- 44:02place very different from Venezuela, different in climate,
- 44:06in culture, in size, in history. A country of long winters, deep
- 44:12fjords and small coastal towns. A place that until quite
- 44:19recently in its history, was one of the poorer corners of Europe,
- 44:24surviving on fishing, timber and a stubborn maritime tradition.
- 44:30We travel to Norway and we begin the story not in a glittering
- 44:35capital, but on a cold, grey sea where in 1969, on a winter
- 44:44evening just before Christmas, a discovery would change the
- 44:50country forever. For most of its modern history,
- 44:56Norway was a country that had to work hard for what it had carved
- 45:02out of mountains and fjords along Europe's northwestern
- 45:07edge. It spent centuries under the
- 45:10rule of Denmark, then Sweden, before achieving full
- 45:16independence in 19 O 5. Its population was small, its
- 45:24arable land limited and its climate demanding.
- 45:29Norwegians lived from the sea more than from the soil, and
- 45:33from timber more than from manufacturing as late as the
- 45:391960s. It was one of the less
- 45:42prosperous countries in Western Europe.
- 45:45In the late 1950s, geologists began to wonder whether the
- 45:51floor of the North Sea, the shallow body of water between
- 45:56Norway, Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, might hold oil and
- 46:01gas. The Dutch discovery at Groningen
- 46:05in 1959 had encouraged the question, but the sea bed off
- 46:12Norway's coast was deeper, stormier and far harder to
- 46:16reach. Many experts doubted that
- 46:20significant hydrocarbons would be found in commercial
- 46:24quantities. The Norwegian government,
- 46:27cautious by nature, took its time.
- 46:31In 1963. It formally declared sovereignty
- 46:36over the continental shelf in the parts of the North Sea
- 46:40adjacent to Norway. In 1965, it began awarding
- 46:46exploration licenses to foreign oil companies, but on carefully
- 46:52negotiated terms that preserved the state's right to participate
- 46:58in future discoveries. There was no rush, no fevered
- 47:03grant of concessions. The first wells came up dry.
- 47:08So did the 2nd and the 3rd. Year after year, exploration
- 47:15continued without success. By the late 1960s, some foreign
- 47:22companies had begun to lose interest.
- 47:26Then, on the evening of December 23rd, 1969, an American firm
- 47:33called Phillips Petroleum was preparing to wind down its
- 47:38operations on a drilling rig in the Norwegian sector.
- 47:43The well, codenamed Eco Fisk, had not been a priority, but the
- 47:48engineers decided to drill one final Test before packing up.
- 47:56What they found surprised everyone.
- 47:59Eco Fisk turned out to be one of the largest oil and gas fields
- 48:04in the North Sea. Beneath the cold, grey water lay
- 48:08reserves of staggering size. Within months, the news had
- 48:14transformed Norway's prospects. A poor coastal country on the
- 48:19edge of Europe had, almost by accident, become a major energy
- 48:26producer. And here, in how Norway
- 48:29responded, lies one of the most important lessons of the
- 48:33resource curse. Other countries had received
- 48:37similar news and rushed to spend, to borrow, to expand.
- 48:44Norway did something different. It paused.
- 48:47Almost from the moment of the discovery, Norwegian
- 48:51politicians, civil servants and economists began asking
- 48:56questions that other oil rich states had not always thought to
- 49:01ask. What if the boom did not last?
- 49:07What if the discovery damaged the rest of the economy?
- 49:11What if future generations should also benefit from this
- 49:15gift, not just the present one? These were not abstract
- 49:20questions. They became the foundation of
- 49:23policy. Norway's approach to its new oil
- 49:28wealth did not arrive in a single brilliant flash.
- 49:33It took shape over decades, through debates in parliament,
- 49:38papers from economists and the steady accumulation of habit.
- 49:44But certain principles emerged early and held firm.
- 49:48The first principle was that the oil belonged to the Norwegian
- 49:53people, not just to those alive at the moment of discovery.
- 49:58As one early parliamentary report put it, the petroleum on
- 50:03the continental shelf was a common heritage.
- 50:08The state created a national oil company, Statoil, in 1972 to
- 50:15ensure that Norwegians themselves held a central role
- 50:19in developing the resource. Foreign firms could participate,
- 50:25but on terms set by the state. The second principle was that
- 50:30oil revenue should not flow directly into ordinary
- 50:34government spending. This was in some ways the most
- 50:38counter intuitive choice. A poor country had suddenly
- 50:44discovered enormous wealth. The temptation to spend it on
- 50:49better roads, more generous benefits and immediate
- 50:53improvements in daily life was real and politically powerful.
- 50:59But Norwegian leaders had studied the experiences of other
- 51:04oil rich nations. Countries that spent their
- 51:08windfalls quickly tended to overheat their economies,
- 51:13weakened their currencies in the wrong ways and find themselves
- 51:17stranded when prices fell. The mechanism it built was, at
- 51:23the time, unusual. In 1990, parliament established
- 51:28what would eventually be called the Government Pension Fund
- 51:32Global, though it had little to do with pensions in the ordinary
- 51:37sense. It was a savings account for the
- 51:40nation, designed to hold the surplus revenue from oil and
- 51:45gas. The fund would invest that
- 51:48revenue in financial markets outside Norway, in stocks, bonds
- 51:54and real estate around the world.
- 51:58By keeping the money abroad, the fund avoided pumping foreign
- 52:03currency into the domestic economy, which would have
- 52:06strengthened the krone and damaged Norwegian industry.
- 52:11For years. The fund grew slowly.
- 52:15Oil prices were modest in the 1990s and Norway was still
- 52:20building the infrastructure for its offshore industry.
- 52:25But by the 2000s, as prices rose and production matured,
- 52:30contributions became substantial.
- 52:33By the Twenty 20's, the Government Pension Fund Global
- 52:38had become the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world,
- 52:42holding assets worth more than $1 trillion spread across
- 52:49thousands of companies and dozens of countries.
- 52:52It owned, on average, more than 1% of every publicly traded
- 52:57company on Earth. For a country of just over 5
- 53:01million people, this was an extraordinary store of
- 53:05collective wealth. It was, in effect, a buffer the
- 53:10size of an ocean. If oil prices fell tomorrow,
- 53:15Norway would not collapse. The fund would continue to
- 53:20generate returns, and those returns could be drawn on
- 53:25modestly and carefully to support public spending.
- 53:29But a savings account alone was not enough.
- 53:34The discipline to leave the savings alone year after year
- 53:38required a rule. A savings account, no matter how
- 53:43vast, is only useful if its owners can keep their hands off
- 53:49it. Many countries have created
- 53:52sovereign wealth funds over the years.
- 53:55Not all have managed to leave them undisturbed.
- 53:59Politicians facing elections, recessions or sudden popular
- 54:04demands have often dipped into such funds more deeply than was
- 54:10wise, treating long term savings as a cushion for short term
- 54:16troubles. Norway tried to guard against
- 54:19this temptation by binding itself in advance.
- 54:24In 2001, the parliament adopted a formal fiscal rule for the use
- 54:29of oil revenue. The rule is elegantly simple in
- 54:33its core idea. In any given year, the
- 54:37government may spend from the fund an amount equal to the
- 54:42expected real return on its investments, not the underlying
- 54:46oil revenue itself. Originally, that figure was set
- 54:51at 4%, later adjusted downward to three per cent.
- 54:57The reasoning was patient. If the fund grew in real terms
- 55:03by about 3 per cent a year, then spending three per cent each
- 55:08year would draw on returns without depleting the savings.
- 55:14The principal would remain intact, available to future
- 55:19generations. Norway, in other words, would
- 55:22live off the interest on its oil wealth, not the wealth itself.
- 55:28The petroleum beneath the sea bed was finite, but the
- 55:33financial fund could last indefinitely.
- 55:36This was not just an accounting convention.
- 55:40It became a binding political commitment, defended across
- 55:44party lines and through multiple changes of government.
- 55:49Even during difficult years when other countries might have
- 55:54leaned more heavily on their reserves, Norway largely held to
- 55:59the rule. The temporary deviations during
- 56:03the global financial crisis of 2008 and again during the
- 56:09pandemic were modest and carefully bounded.
- 56:14Just as importantly, the institutional environment around
- 56:19the fund was designed for transparency.
- 56:23Norway publishes detailed reports on its oil revenues, the
- 56:29fund's investments, and its governance.
- 56:33The Norgus Bank Investment Management Division, which runs
- 56:37the fund, has been studied as a model of disclosure.
- 56:42There are debates about ethical investment policies, about
- 56:46whether the fund should hold shares in arms manufacturers,
- 56:51fossil fuel firms or companies linked to human rights
- 56:56violations. These debates are public.
- 57:00That public quality is not incidental.
- 57:04The Norwegian state had, long before oil arrived, built habits
- 57:09of transparency, trust, and rule of law that other resource rich
- 57:15countries had not. Citizens paid taxes, officials
- 57:20were accountable. Courts were independent, media
- 57:24were free. When oil revenue began to flow,
- 57:28these institutions did not have to be invented from scratch.
- 57:33They simply absorbed a new responsibility into structures
- 57:39that already knew how to hold one another to account.
- 57:43This is one of the quieter lessons of the resource curse.
- 57:48The fund is famous, the fiscal rule is admired.
- 57:52But beneath both lies something older and harder to copy, a
- 57:58political culture that had already learned how to be honest
- 58:02about money. The fund and the fiscal rule are
- 58:07the most famous parts of Norway's story, but they are not
- 58:12the whole of it. Around them, Norway has built a
- 58:16wider set of habits that together explain why oil
- 58:21enriched the country rather than undoing it.
- 58:24One habit is investment in the rest of the economy.
- 58:30Even as oil revenues grew, Norway kept building industries
- 58:36that had nothing to do with petroleum.
- 58:40The country remained a global leader in shipping, in fish
- 58:44farming, in hydroelectric power. Its companies in aluminum
- 58:50fertilizer and renewable energy continued to compete on world
- 58:56markets. Successive governments resisted
- 59:01the temptation to let the rest of the economy wither in the
- 59:06shadow of oil. Another habit is the careful
- 59:10management of currency. By placing oil revenue into a
- 59:15foreign fund rather than spending it at home, Norway
- 59:20avoided much of the Dutch disease pressure that had
- 59:23damaged the Netherlands decades earlier.
- 59:27The Crone did strengthen during the oil years, but not
- 59:31catastrophically. Norwegian manufacturers
- 59:36continued to find buyers abroad even as their compatriots in the
- 59:42energy sector grew prosperous on the rigs of the North Sea. 1/3
- 59:47Habit is generational thinking. Norwegian policy documents,
- 59:54parliamentary speeches and public debates often invoke the
- 59:59obligation to those who will come after.
- 1:00:03The fund itself is framed not as wealth for the present, but as a
- 1:00:08trust held on behalf of the unborn.
- 1:00:12This kind of language can sound abstract.
- 1:00:15But it appears repeatedly enough in Norwegian public life to
- 1:00:20suggest something deeper than rhetoric.
- 1:00:24It is, in its way, a national commitment to the Longview.
- 1:00:30A fourth habit is moderation in consumption.
- 1:00:34For a country with such a vast sovereign fund, Norway is in
- 1:00:39many respects modest. Public services are generous but
- 1:00:46not extravagant. Taxes remain among the highest
- 1:00:51in Europe. Houses are comfortable but not
- 1:00:55enormous. Inequality exists, but the
- 1:01:00country has avoided the kind of conspicuous extravagance, the
- 1:01:05glittering capitals, the empty megaprojects that have marked
- 1:01:11some other oil states quiet. Wealth, distributed broadly, has
- 1:01:17been the Norwegian pattern. It is worth noting that Norway
- 1:01:22is not perfect. Its model has critics.
- 1:01:26Some argue the country has been too cautious, hoarding wealth
- 1:01:32that might have been spent on faster improvements at home.
- 1:01:36Others note that Norway has remained a major oil and gas
- 1:01:41producer even as it has positioned itself as a climate
- 1:01:46conscious nation, an arrangement that raises difficult ethical
- 1:01:52questions in a warming world. The fund has had to navigate its
- 1:01:58own controversies around ethical investing and political
- 1:02:03influence. Yet for all that, the result is
- 1:02:08hard to deny. Norway to day is among the
- 1:02:13wealthiest, healthiest and most stable societies on earth.
- 1:02:19It has lived through the same oil price swings that wrecked
- 1:02:23other economies and emerged each time intact.
- 1:02:30It is, in a quiet way, what a country looks like when it does
- 1:02:35not surrender to the gravity of the curse.
- 1:02:42From the cold seas of the North Sea, our journey now turns to a
- 1:02:48very different shore. The southeastern edge of the
- 1:02:53Arabian Peninsula, where the Persian Gulf meets the open
- 1:02:57ocean, is a landscape of low sand, salt flats, mangrove
- 1:03:04inlets and shallow turquoise water.
- 1:03:08Today, this coastline is lined with gleaming towers, 8 lane
- 1:03:14highways and one of the busiest airports in the world.
- 1:03:19But to understand what the United Arab Emirates has become,
- 1:03:23it helps to remember what it was not so very long ago.
- 1:03:29For centuries, the small shakedoms scattered along this
- 1:03:33coast lived from the sea. The Gulf's warm, shallow waters
- 1:03:40were home to oyster beds that produced some of the finest
- 1:03:44natural pearls in the world. Each summer, fleets of wooden
- 1:03:50boats called Dow's would sail out from villages along the
- 1:03:54coast, carrying divers who would descend without breathing
- 1:03:58equipment to gather oysters from depths of 10 or 20 meters,
- 1:04:04sometimes more. The work was dangerous and
- 1:04:08exhausting. Divers wore nose clips made of
- 1:04:11bone or wood and weighted ropes to help them sink.
- 1:04:16A boy might begin diving in his early teens and continue for
- 1:04:21decades, his body marked by injuries, infections and the
- 1:04:26lasting effects of the deep. The pearls fed a global trade.
- 1:04:31By the early 20th century, the Gulf provided much of the
- 1:04:35world's natural Pearl supply, and the coastal towns of what
- 1:04:40would later become the Emirates, places like Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
- 1:04:47Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah depended on the trade.
- 1:04:52It was a hard living, but a steady one.
- 1:04:55Merchant families grew. Rich communities organized
- 1:05:00themselves around the diving season.
- 1:05:03Then, in the late 1920's, the trade collapsed. 2 events undid
- 1:05:10it almost at once. The Great Depression dried up
- 1:05:14demand for luxury goods around the world, and in Japan, a
- 1:05:19businessman named Kokichi Mikimoto perfected a technique
- 1:05:24for producing cultured pearls, pearls grown intentionally
- 1:05:30inside oysters in controlled farms.
- 1:05:34The cultured pearls were nearly indistinguishable from natural
- 1:05:38ones and could be produced at a fraction of the cost.
- 1:05:44The bottom fell out of the natural Pearl market within a
- 1:05:48few years. The consequences along the
- 1:05:51Trucial Coast, as the British then called it, were severe.
- 1:05:56Diving fleets sat idle, merchant fortunes evaporated, coastal
- 1:06:03towns emptied as families moved inland in search of work.
- 1:06:09In the 1930s and 40's the region became, by some measures, one of
- 1:06:16the poorest places on earth. Most people lived in palm frond
- 1:06:21houses, drank from shared wells and depended on date palms,
- 1:06:27modest fishing and Pearl economy savings that were rapidly
- 1:06:32running out. This was the world into which
- 1:06:35oil would soon arrive. A world of small Emirates,
- 1:06:40mostly nomadic and coastal populations, no formal nation
- 1:06:45and very little infrastructure. The future that the world now
- 1:06:50associates with the Emirates was not yet imaginable.
- 1:06:55It had to be built almost from nothing on the bones of a fallen
- 1:07:01industry. And the first step toward that
- 1:07:04future was political. Oil was first found beneath the
- 1:07:09Gulf in 1932 in nearby Bahrain. Over the next decades,
- 1:07:17exploration moved gradually along the Arabian coast.
- 1:07:22Geologists suspected that the Sheikhdams along the Trucial
- 1:07:26Coast might also hold petroleum, but early surveys produced
- 1:07:31little. It was not until 1958 that a
- 1:07:36major discovery was made offshore from Abu Dhabi at a
- 1:07:40field called Umm Shaif. Commercial exports began in
- 1:07:471962. Almost overnight, Abu Dhabi
- 1:07:52found itself in possession of vast oil reserves.
- 1:07:57The ruler at the time was Sheikh Shahbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan.
- 1:08:03He was famously cautious about the new wealth he had seen in
- 1:08:08his lifetime, the Pearl trade, rise and fall.
- 1:08:13He distrusted sudden riches Sheikh Shahbut kept much of the
- 1:08:19early oil revenue locked away, sometimes literally in a chest
- 1:08:25beneath his bed, rather than spending it on roads, schools or
- 1:08:31hospitals. To him, oil money was unfamiliar
- 1:08:38and dangerous. But the population of Abu Dhabi
- 1:08:43was changing. People were beginning to expect
- 1:08:47more. They saw the wealth and wondered
- 1:08:50why their lives remained so plain.
- 1:08:54By the mid 1960's, the country's elite, with British
- 1:08:59encouragement, decided a different leadership was needed.
- 1:09:06In 1966, Sheikh Shahbut was peacefully replaced by his
- 1:09:13younger brother, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.
- 1:09:18Sheikh Zayed would shape the history of the Emirates more
- 1:09:23deeply than any other single figure.
- 1:09:27He had governed the inland Oasis town of Al Ain for many years,
- 1:09:32and he had a clear sense of what oil revenue could do if used
- 1:09:38carefully. Almost immediately, he began
- 1:09:42investing in roads, water systems, schools and hospitals.
- 1:09:47He distributed land. He built housing.
- 1:09:52The transformation of Abu Dhabi from a small coastal town into a
- 1:09:57modern city began in earnest under his rule.
- 1:10:03Sheikh Zayed also turned his attention outward.
- 1:10:08The seven small sheikhdoms along the coast, Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
- 1:10:14Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Qawain, Fujairah and Ras Al Qaimah had
- 1:10:22long been linked by trade, kinship and dependence on
- 1:10:27Britain for defence. As Britain prepared to withdraw
- 1:10:31from the Gulf at the end of 1971, Sheikh Zayed worked
- 1:10:36patiently with the other rulers to bring most of them into a
- 1:10:40single federation. On December 2nd, 1971, six
- 1:10:47Emirates formed the United Arab Emirates.
- 1:10:51Ras Al Khaimah joined the following year.
- 1:10:56Sheikh Zayed became the 1st president of the new country, a
- 1:11:01position he would hold until his death in 2004.
- 1:11:07The federation was an unusual arrangement, a union of
- 1:11:11monarchies with shared institutions but considerable
- 1:11:16local autonomy. Each emirate kept its own ruler,
- 1:11:20its own laws and its own resources.
- 1:11:23Abu Dhabi, with the most oil, would carry the heaviest share
- 1:11:28of national spending. The others would chart their own
- 1:11:33paths. For Dubai with only modest oil
- 1:11:38reserves, this meant finding a very different strategy.
- 1:11:43Dubai had been ruled since 1958 by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al
- 1:11:50Maktoum. Sheikh Rashid was a different
- 1:11:54kind of leader, where Sheikh Zayed presided over enormous oil
- 1:11:59reserves and the responsibility of a national budget.
- 1:12:04Sheikh Rashid governed a smaller emirate with far less oil
- 1:12:09beneath it. Dubai's first commercial
- 1:12:12petroleum exports began in 1969, modest compared with Abu
- 1:12:18Dhabi's. Sheikh Rashid understood,
- 1:12:22perhaps earlier than anyone else along the coast, that his
- 1:12:26Emirates oil would not last. He is often quoted as saying.
- 1:12:32My grandfather rode a Camel, my father rode a Camel, I drive a
- 1:12:37Mercedes, my son drives a Land Rover, my grandson will drive a
- 1:12:42Land Rover, but my great grandson will ride a Camel.
- 1:12:47The line captured a clear eyed view of resource impermanence.
- 1:12:53To prepare for that future, Sheikh Rashid spent his oil
- 1:12:57revenue and significant borrowed money on infrastructure that
- 1:13:03would outlast the wells. The first great project was the
- 1:13:08dredging of Dubai Creek, the salt water inlet around which
- 1:13:13the original town had grown. Through the 1950s and 60's, the
- 1:13:19Creek had been silting up, threatening the Dow trade that
- 1:13:24connected Dubai with India, Iran and East Africa.
- 1:13:30Sheikh Rashid commissioned engineers to deepen the channel
- 1:13:35and turn the Creek into a usable port for larger vessels.
- 1:13:41Then came Port Rashid, a modern deep water container port opened
- 1:13:47in 1972 on land reclaimed from the Gulf.
- 1:13:53It was followed in the late 1970s by Jebel Ali, a far more
- 1:13:59ambitious project. An artificial deep water harbor
- 1:14:04and free trade zone built on what was then empty desert South
- 1:14:09of the city, Jebel Ali became one of the largest man made
- 1:14:14harbors in the world. The free zone allowed foreign
- 1:14:19companies to operate with full ownership, unusual in the region
- 1:14:25at the time, drawing investment from Asia, Europe and the Middle
- 1:14:30East. Sheikh Rashid also invested in
- 1:14:34aviation. Dubai's first airport had opened
- 1:14:38in 1960 as a small airstrip. Most striking was the founding
- 1:14:46of Emirates Airline in 1985. Launched with two leased
- 1:14:51aircraft, Emirates would grow into one of the largest long
- 1:14:56haul carriers on earth, with Dubai International eventually
- 1:15:01becoming the world's busiest hub for international travel.
- 1:15:06Sheikh Rashid died in 1990 and his sons continued the strategy.
- 1:15:13The next generation, particularly Sheikh Mohammed bin
- 1:15:17Rashid Al Maktoum, expanded the vision dramatically.
- 1:15:23Real estate, tourism, finance, technology, retail and
- 1:15:27conferences became central. Dubai built artificial islands
- 1:15:32shaped like palms, the tallest building in the world, the
- 1:15:36busiest mall on earth, and a financial district modeled on
- 1:15:41London and New York. The result was a city state
- 1:15:46whose oil revenue had become almost incidental.
- 1:15:51By the Twenty 20s, petroleum accounted for less than 1% of
- 1:15:56Dubai's gross domestic product. The emirate had, in effect, used
- 1:16:03modest hydrocarbons to fund an escape from hydrocarbons.
- 1:16:09While Dubai built its harbors and airports, Abu Dhabi pursued
- 1:16:14a quieter but equally consequential strategy.
- 1:16:18With its much larger oil reserves, Abu Dhabi could afford
- 1:16:22to think on longer time horizons.
- 1:16:25In 1976, only five years after the federation was formed, the
- 1:16:32emirate established the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority,
- 1:16:36known by its initials Adia. It was one of the first
- 1:16:42sovereign wealth funds in the world, predating Norway's by
- 1:16:47more than a decade. The idea behind Adia was simple.
- 1:16:53Oil revenue would not be spent only on present needs.
- 1:16:57A substantial portion would be invested abroad in stocks,
- 1:17:02bonds, real estate and infrastructure across the globe.
- 1:17:08The returns would generate income long after the wells ran
- 1:17:13dry. By the Twenty 20s, ADA was
- 1:17:16estimated to manage assets worth several $100 billion, though the
- 1:17:23exact figure remained famously opaque.
- 1:17:27Other Emirati funds followed, including Mubadala and ADQ, each
- 1:17:34directing oil wealth into global investment.
- 1:17:37Beyond sovereign wealth, the UAE built layers of diversification
- 1:17:43that other oil states had rarely attempted.
- 1:17:47Tourism became a deliberate national project.
- 1:17:51Dubai marketed itself as a destination for travelers from
- 1:17:56Europe, India, Russia and East Asia, building luxury hotels,
- 1:18:01theme parks and shopping districts.
- 1:18:04Abu Dhabi pursued a different angle, branding itself around
- 1:18:08culture, opening a branch of the Louvre on Sadiat Island in 2017.
- 1:18:15Finance also grew. The Dubai International
- 1:18:19Financial Center opened in 2004, designed as a regulatory zone
- 1:18:26aligned with international standards, attracting banks, law
- 1:18:31firms and asset managers from across the world.
- 1:18:36Abu Dhabi Global Market followed in 2015.
- 1:18:40Together, they made the UAE one of the leading financial hubs of
- 1:18:46the Middle East. Logistics tied the strategy
- 1:18:51together. Jebel Ali Port grew into one of
- 1:18:55the busiest container terminals on earth.
- 1:18:59Emirates and Etihad Airlines connected hundreds of cities
- 1:19:04through the 2 main airports. Dubai Ports World, a state
- 1:19:09linked operator, expanded to manage terminals on every
- 1:19:14inhabited continent. The country positioned itself as
- 1:19:19the natural intermediary between Asia, Europe and Africa.
- 1:19:24There were also industrial investments, aluminum smelters
- 1:19:29in Abu Dhabi, petrochemicals along the coast, renewable
- 1:19:34energy projects including the Masdar initiative, which
- 1:19:39announced ambitious plans for solar power.
- 1:19:43None of these by themselves transformed the economy.
- 1:19:48Together they reduced the country's exposure to any single
- 1:19:53revenue source. By the 20 twenties.
- 1:19:57Oil and gas still mattered to the UAE, particularly in Abu
- 1:20:02Dhabi, where most of the national hydrocarbon reserves
- 1:20:06are located, but the share of the overall economy directly
- 1:20:11tied to petroleum had fallen substantially.
- 1:20:14Services, trade, tourism, finance.
- 1:20:19Real estate and aviation had taken on weights few had
- 1:20:24imagined possible in the 1970's. The country had used its oil.
- 1:20:31It had not, in the end, been used by it.
- 1:20:35It is worth pausing to ask how the UAE managed what so many
- 1:20:41other oil states did not. The country is not a democracy
- 1:20:48in the Norwegian sense. It does not publish the detailed
- 1:20:53accounts of its sovereign wealth funds the way Oslo does.
- 1:20:58It has serious critics, particularly on questions of
- 1:21:03Labor rights, political openness and the treatment of migrant
- 1:21:08workers. And yet, when measured against
- 1:21:12the mechanisms of the resource curse we traced earlier, the UAE
- 1:21:17has by most standards escaped them.
- 1:21:21Consider Dutch disease. The Emirati economy did not
- 1:21:26hollow out around oil. It diversified outward with
- 1:21:30deliberation. Aviation, logistics, finance,
- 1:21:35tourism, real estate and trade now contribute the bulk of the
- 1:21:40country's economic activity. Foreign workers, who make up the
- 1:21:45majority of the population, fill rolls across nearly every
- 1:21:50sector, allowing the economy to grow far beyond what a small
- 1:21:54Emirati citizen population could have sustained alone.
- 1:22:01This arrangement raises its own difficult questions, but it has
- 1:22:06worked to prevent the narrow dependence that trapped other
- 1:22:10oil states. Consider price volatility.
- 1:22:15The UAE has weathered every major oil price crash since the
- 1:22:191970's. The federation has not
- 1:22:22collapsed. Public services have continued
- 1:22:26to function, construction projects have paused at times
- 1:22:32and budgets adjusted. But the country has never
- 1:22:36experienced the kind of collapse Venezuela suffered.
- 1:22:42The buffer of accumulated sovereign wealth combined with
- 1:22:46diversified revenue, has absorbed shocks that would have
- 1:22:50shattered a less prepared economy.
- 1:22:53Consider the rentier effect. This is where the UAE story
- 1:22:59becomes most complicated. Its citizens pay no personal
- 1:23:04income tax. The state provides generous
- 1:23:07benefits, free education, subsidized housing and well paid
- 1:23:12public sector jobs. By classic theory, this should
- 1:23:17produce weak institutions and disengaged citizens.
- 1:23:22And yet, in practice, the Emirati state has built an
- 1:23:27unusually competent administrative apparatus.
- 1:23:32Ministries, function, infrastructure works, public
- 1:23:38services are delivered. The country has invested heavily
- 1:23:43in education and in capacity building within the government
- 1:23:47itself. The UAE solution to the rentier
- 1:23:51challenge has been to professionalize the state
- 1:23:55without democratizing it. Whether that solution is stable
- 1:24:01in the long run is a serious question, but in the time frame
- 1:24:07we have observed, it has produced one of the most
- 1:24:11efficient governments in the Middle East.
- 1:24:14There is also a cultural element.
- 1:24:18The Emirati leadership from Sheikh Zayed onward has spoken
- 1:24:24openly and repeatedly about life after oil.
- 1:24:29The vocabulary of post petroleum economies is not confined to
- 1:24:35think tank reports. It appears in official speeches,
- 1:24:40school curricula and national strategy documents.
- 1:24:46The expectation that oil will not last forever has been woven
- 1:24:52deliberately into the country's self-image.
- 1:24:57In that sense, the UAE has done something Venezuela never did.
- 1:25:03It has chosen again and again never to take its own resource
- 1:25:09for granted. The UA ES success did not unfold
- 1:25:14in isolation. The countries of the Gulf
- 1:25:17Cooperation Council, founded in 1981, share many features Small
- 1:25:24native populations, vast hydrocarbon wealth.
- 1:25:28Similar monarchic political systems, dependence on foreign
- 1:25:33workers and proximity to the same shipping lanes as the
- 1:25:40Emirati model demonstrated that diversification was possible.
- 1:25:46Other Gulf states began to follow.
- 1:25:48Saudi Arabia, by far the largest oil producer in the region,
- 1:25:54watched its smaller neighbor with growing interest.
- 1:25:59For decades, the Kingdom had relied almost entirely on
- 1:26:03petroleum revenue, producing fewer than 2% of its export
- 1:26:09earnings from anything other than oil.
- 1:26:13In 2016, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the
- 1:26:20government unveiled an ambitious plan called Vision 2030.
- 1:26:26The strategy borrowed openly from the Emirati playbook.
- 1:26:30It called for the expansion of tourism, entertainment, mining,
- 1:26:35technology and renewable energy. It restructured the kingdom's
- 1:26:41sovereign wealth fund into one of the largest pools of
- 1:26:45investment capital in the world. Saudi Arabia is trying with
- 1:26:51urgency to escape its dependence on oil.
- 1:26:56Qatar followed a different path, oriented around natural gas.
- 1:27:01The country sits atop the North Field, the largest natural gas
- 1:27:07reservoir on earth shared with Iran.
- 1:27:11From the late 1990s onward, Qatar invested heavily in
- 1:27:15liquefied natural gas, becoming one of the world's leading
- 1:27:20exporters. It also built sovereign wealth
- 1:27:24funds, an international airline, a global media network in Al
- 1:27:29Jazeera and major investments abroad.
- 1:27:34Hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2022 was both a showcase and a
- 1:27:41strategy. Bahrain, with smaller oil
- 1:27:45reserves, became one of the earliest regional financial
- 1:27:50centers, though it has struggled in recent decades with political
- 1:27:55tensions and competition from Dubai.
- 1:27:59Kuwait built one of the world's oldest sovereign wealth funds,
- 1:28:05the Kuwait Investment Authority. Established in 1953.
- 1:28:11Even before formal independence from Britain, Oman has pursued A
- 1:28:17steadier diversification through tourism, ports and logistics,
- 1:28:24drawing on a long maritime tradition.
- 1:28:28None of these countries have escaped oil dependence as fully
- 1:28:32as the UAE. The economic transitions remain
- 1:28:37incomplete, and rising tensions, demographic pressures and
- 1:28:43climate concerns add new layers of difficulty.
- 1:28:47But the broader pattern is striking.
- 1:28:50Across the Arabian Peninsula, the assumption that hydrocarbons
- 1:28:55would fund every future has given way to a more
- 1:29:00forward-looking question. What will these countries do
- 1:29:05when the oil and gas eventually fade?
- 1:29:09The UAE did not answer that question alone, but it answered
- 1:29:14it earlier and more visibly than most.
- 1:29:18And in doing so, it helped reshape the strategic horizon of
- 1:29:25the entire region. Sometimes a single small
- 1:29:29country, by the example of its choices, can change the
- 1:29:34imagination of its neighbors. If we step back now and look at
- 1:29:40Norway and the UAE together, the contrast is striking.
- 1:29:45They arrived at similar outcomes by very different paths.
- 1:29:51Norway is a small parliamentary democracy with a long tradition
- 1:29:56of consensus politics, broad social trust and powerful public
- 1:30:01institutions. The UAE is a federation of
- 1:30:06monarchies in which most political power rests with
- 1:30:11ruling families and where the native citizen population is
- 1:30:16dwarfed by a larger expatriate workforce.
- 1:30:20Norway is cold, mountainous and northern.
- 1:30:24The UAE is hot, coastal and Arab.
- 1:30:30By almost any measure of political form or cultural
- 1:30:34style, the two countries could not be more different.
- 1:30:38And yet, when they discovered enormous hydrocarbon wealth
- 1:30:43within years of each other, both did something unusual.
- 1:30:49They resisted the gravity of the resource curse.
- 1:30:53Norway resisted through restraint.
- 1:30:57It established A sovereign wealth fund, bound itself with a
- 1:31:01fiscal rule, invested its oil revenue abroad, kept its
- 1:31:06existing industries strong, and protected its institutions
- 1:31:12through transparency. The Norwegian model is one of
- 1:31:17self binding. It worked because Norwegians
- 1:31:23broadly agreed to limit their own ability to spend.
- 1:31:28The UAE resisted through diversification.
- 1:31:32It used its oil revenue to build airports, ports, free zones,
- 1:31:37tourism, finance and global investment platforms.
- 1:31:43It established sovereign wealth funds early.
- 1:31:46It professionalized its administrative state.
- 1:31:50It planned openly for a future beyond petroleum.
- 1:31:54The Emirati model is one of construction.
- 1:31:58It worked because Emirati leadership broadly agreed to
- 1:32:03invest rather than to consume. Both models share certain deeper
- 1:32:09features. Both took the Longview.
- 1:32:13Both treated oil revenue as a temporary opportunity rather
- 1:32:18than a permanent entitlement. Both invested heavily in human
- 1:32:23capital, in education, in skills, in capacity.
- 1:32:29Both built institutions, whether democratic or technocratic, that
- 1:32:35could carry weight beyond a single ruler or election.
- 1:32:40Both avoided the temptation to spend every windfall the moment
- 1:32:45it arrived. There are also serious
- 1:32:48differences worth naming. Honestly, Norway's wealth is
- 1:32:53more evenly distributed among its citizens.
- 1:32:58The UA ES wealth, while broadly available to its citizens,
- 1:33:03depends on a foreign workforce whose treatment has drawn
- 1:33:07international concern. Norway publishes detailed
- 1:33:11accounts of its fund. Emirati funds are more opaque.
- 1:33:17Norway's political system invites accountability through
- 1:33:21elections, the UA ES through long term planning and elite
- 1:33:26consensus. Neither model is without flaws,
- 1:33:31and neither is the perfect prescription for any other
- 1:33:35country. But both stand, in their own
- 1:33:38ways, as proof that the resource curse is not destiny.
- 1:33:44Two countries with almost nothing in common found their
- 1:33:48own answers to the same question, and the answers,
- 1:33:53however different in form, shared one essential trait.
- 1:33:58Each treated its sudden wealth as a responsibility rather than
- 1:34:04a reward. That, more than any single fund
- 1:34:09or policy, may be the deepest lesson of all.
- 1:34:18We began with a question that seemed almost paradoxical.
- 1:34:23Why does the gift of natural wealth so often wound the
- 1:34:27countries that receive it? Why does the richest ground so
- 1:34:32often yield the poorest nations? We followed that question
- 1:34:37through the slow machinery of Dutch disease, through the
- 1:34:42swings of commodity prices, through the strange erosion that
- 1:34:47comes when a state lives off the wellhead rather than off its
- 1:34:52citizens. We watched these forces work
- 1:34:56together and apart, on one country in particular, where
- 1:35:02extraordinary oil reserves coincided with one of the
- 1:35:06steepest declines of the modern era.
- 1:35:10And then we travelled to two very different places, far from
- 1:35:14one another in almost every way, and watched what countries do
- 1:35:19when they refused to let the gift become a wound.
- 1:35:24We saw Norway pause before spending, build a vast fund,
- 1:35:30bind itself with a fiscal rule and treat its wealth as a trust
- 1:35:35for future generations. We saw the UAE under Sheikh
- 1:35:40Zayed and his successors use its oil revenue to construct
- 1:35:45airports, ports, sovereign wealth funds and a diversified
- 1:35:51economy, planning openly for the day when the wells would no
- 1:35:56longer matter. We saw the rest of the Gulf
- 1:36:00watching the Emirati example begin to chart paths of its own.
- 1:36:06What unites these stories is not a single policy.
- 1:36:11It is a posture, a way of holding wealth carefully rather
- 1:36:16than gripping it tightly. A willingness to see oil as
- 1:36:20something temporary, not as something permanent.
- 1:36:25A patience to invest in habits and institutions that will
- 1:36:30outlast any single well. The resource curse, we have
- 1:36:34learned tonight, is not a verdict.
- 1:36:37It is a tendency, a gravity, a pull on the structure of a
- 1:36:44country that bends it in certain directions unless something
- 1:36:48stronger resists. The countries that succumb are
- 1:36:53not cursed by nature. The countries that escape are
- 1:36:58not blessed beyond ordinary merit.
- 1:37:02The difference lies in what each country does year after year
- 1:37:08with the gift it has been given. Outside the room, somewhere
- 1:37:13across the world, oil is still rising from beneath the sea bed.
- 1:37:19Cargo ships are crossing the Strait of Hormuz.
- 1:37:23Sovereign wealth funds are quietly buying shares in distant
- 1:37:27companies, A pump Jack is turning under a desert moon.
- 1:37:34And in some country we have not yet imagined, geologists are
- 1:37:39about to find something that will change everything.
- 1:37:43What that country does next will depend more than anything on
- 1:37:48what it has already become. For tonight, you do not need to
- 1:37:53solve any of it. You do not need to remember the
- 1:37:57figures. You do not need to keep track of
- 1:38:00the names. Let the names drift away like
- 1:38:05soft lights. Let the question settle.
- 1:38:09The world will continue its turning.
- 1:38:12The Wells will continue their pumping, and the cities of Glass
- 1:38:17and the towns of Palm Franz will continue their long, patient
- 1:38:22negotiation with the future. The world slows, and so do we.
- 1:38:28Good night.