Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2004] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:062004 was $8.3 billion, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value off both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.5%.
- 0:16Over the last 40 years, that is. Since present management took
- 0:19over, book value has grown from $19.00 to $55,824, a rate of
- 0:2621.9% compounded annually. It's per share intrinsic value
- 0:31that counts, however, not book value.
- 0:34Here the news is good. Between 1964 and 2004, Berkshire
- 0:39morphed from a struggling northern textile business who's
- 0:42intrinsic value was less than book into a diversified
- 0:45enterprise worth far more than book.
- 0:48Our 40 year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat
- 0:52exceeded our 21.9% gain in book. For an explanation of intrinsic
- 0:57value in the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my
- 1:01partner and Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and me and Running
- 1:04Berkshire, please read our Owner's Manual beginning on page
- 1:0873. Despite their shortcomings,
- 1:11yearly calculations of book value are useful at Berkshire as
- 1:14a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long term rate of
- 1:18increase in our intrinsic value. The calculations are less
- 1:22relevant, however, than they once were in rating any single
- 1:26year's performance versus the S&P 500 index, a comparison we
- 1:30display on the facing page. Our equity holdings, including
- 1:34convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a
- 1:38percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the
- 1:421980s, for example, to less than 50% in recent years.
- 1:47Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a
- 1:51much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case, a
- 1:54fact that will normally cause us to underperform in years when
- 1:58stocks rise substantially and over perform in years when they
- 2:01fall. However, the yearly comparisons
- 2:04work out. Berkshires long term performance
- 2:06versus the S&P remains all important.
- 2:10Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very
- 2:14low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per
- 2:17share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P,
- 2:21Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can
- 2:24accomplish on your own. Last year Berkshire's book value
- 2:27gain of 10.5% fell short of the indexes 10.9% return.
- 2:33Our lackluster performance was not due to any stumbles by the
- 2:37CEO's of our operating businesses.
- 2:39As always, they pulled more than their share of the load.
- 2:42My message to them is simple. Run your business as if it we're
- 2:46the only asset your family will own over the next 100 years.
- 2:50Almost invariably they do just that and after taking care of
- 2:54the needs of their business, send excess cash to Omaha for me
- 2:57to deploy. I didn't do that job very well
- 2:59last year. My hope was to make several
- 3:02multibillion dollar acquisitions that would add new and
- 3:05significant streams of earnings to the many we already have, but
- 3:09I struck out. Additionally, I found very few
- 3:12attractive securities to buy. Berkshire therefore ended the
- 3:15year with $43 billion of cash equivalents.
- 3:19Not a happy position. Charlie and I will work to
- 3:22translate some of this poured into more interesting assets
- 3:25during 2005. Though we can't promise success.
- 3:29In one respect, 2004 was a remarkable year for the stock
- 3:33market, a fact buried in the maze of numbers on page 2.
- 3:37If you examine the 35 years since the 1960s ended, you will
- 3:41find that an investor's return, including dividends from owning
- 3:45the S&P, has averaged 11.2% annually, well above what we
- 3:50expect future returns to be. But if you look for years with
- 3:54returns anywhere close to that 11.2%, say between 8% and 14%,
- 3:59you will find only one before 2004.
- 4:02In other words, last year's normal return is anything but.
- 4:06All figures used in this report apply to Berkshires A shares,
- 4:10the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding
- 4:14before 1996. The B shares have an economic
- 4:18interest equal to 130th, that of BA3.
- 4:22Over the 35 years, American business has delivered terrific
- 4:26results. It should therefore have been
- 4:28easy for investors to earn juicy returns.
- 4:31All they had to do was piggyback corporate America in a
- 4:34diversified, low expense way. An index fund that they never
- 4:38touched would have done the job. Instead, many investors have had
- 4:41experiences ranging from mediocre to disastrous.
- 4:45There have been three primary causes.
- 4:47First, high costs, usually because investors traded
- 4:51excessively or spent far too much on investment management.
- 4:54Second, portfolio decisions based on tips and fads rather
- 4:59than on thoughtful, quantified evaluation of businesses.
- 5:02And 3rd, a start and stop approach to the market, marked
- 5:06by untimely entries after an advance has been long under way
- 5:10and exits after periods of stagnation or decline.
- 5:14Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are
- 5:17their enemies, and if they insist on trying to time their
- 5:20participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when
- 5:23others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.
- 5:27Sector results. As managers, Charlie and I want
- 5:30to give our owners the financial information and commentary we
- 5:34would wish to receive if our roles were reversed.
- 5:37To do this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more
- 5:41difficult as Berkshire's scope widens.
- 5:43Some of our businesses have vastly different economic
- 5:46characteristics from others, which means that our
- 5:49consolidated statements, with their jumble off figures, make
- 5:53useful analysis almost impossible.
- 5:56On the following pages, therefore, we will present some
- 5:59balance sheet and earnings figures from our four major
- 6:02categories of businesses, along with commentary about each.
- 6:05We particularly want you to understand the limited
- 6:08circumstances under which we will use debt.
- 6:11Given that we typically shun it. We will not, however, inundate
- 6:16you with data that has no real value in estimating Berkshire's
- 6:19intrinsic value. Doing so would tend to obfuscate
- 6:22the facts that count regulated utility businesses.
- 6:26We have an 80.5% fully diluted interest in Mid American Energy
- 6:30Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations.
- 6:35The largest of these are One Yorkshire Electricity and
- 6:37Northern Electric, Whose 3.7 million electric customers make
- 6:42it the third largest distributor of electricity in the UK, to Mid
- 6:47American Energy, which serves 698,000 electric customers
- 6:52primarily in Iowa and three Kern River and Northern Natural
- 6:56Pipelines, which carry 7.9% of the natural gas consumed in the
- 7:01US. The remaining 19.5% of Mid
- 7:04American is owned by three partners of ours, Dave Sokol and
- 7:08Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of these businesses,
- 7:11and Walter Scott, a longtime friend of mine who introduced me
- 7:15to the company. Because Mid American is subject
- 7:18to the Public Utility Holding Company Act, Puka Berkshires
- 7:22voting interest is limited to 9.9%.
- 7:26Voting control rests with Walter.
- 7:28Our limited voting interest forces us to account for Mid
- 7:31American in an abbreviated manner.
- 7:33Instead of our fully incorporating the company's
- 7:36assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses into Berkshires
- 7:40statements, we make one line entries only in both our balance
- 7:44sheet and income account. It's likely, though, that Puka
- 7:48will someday, perhaps soon, be repealed or that accounting
- 7:51rules will change. Berkshire's consolidated figures
- 7:54would then incorporate all of Mid American, including the
- 7:58substantial debt it utilizes. Though this debt is not now, nor
- 8:02will it ever be, an obligation of Berkshire.
- 8:05At year end, $1.478 billion of Mid Americans junior debt was
- 8:10payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed
- 8:13acquisitions to be financed without our partners needing to
- 8:16increase their already substantial investments in Mid
- 8:20American. By charging 11% interest,
- 8:23Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed
- 8:26for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of
- 8:30their equity interests. Because Mid American made no
- 8:33large acquisitions last year, it paid down $100 million of what
- 8:38it owes us. 4 Mid American also owns a significant non utility
- 8:42business, Home Services of America, the second largest real
- 8:47estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations,
- 8:50this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one
- 8:54we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager,
- 8:58Ron Peltier, who threw both his acquisition and operational
- 9:02skills, is building a brokerage powerhouse.
- 9:05Home Services participated in $59.8 billion of transactions in
- 9:102004, a gain of $11.2 billion from 2003.
- 9:15About 24% of the increase came from six acquisitions made
- 9:19during the year through our 17 brokerage firms, all of which
- 9:23retain their local identities. We employ more than 18,000
- 9:27brokers in 18 states. Home Services is almost certain
- 9:32to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to
- 9:35acquire leading localized operations.
- 9:38Last year, Mid American Road off a major investment in a zinc
- 9:42recovery project that was initiated in 1998 and became
- 9:46operational in 2002. Large quantities of zinc are
- 9:50present in the brine produced by our California geothermal
- 9:54operations, and we believed we could profitably extract the
- 9:57metal. For many months it appeared that
- 10:00commercially viable recoveries were imminent.
- 10:03But in mining, just as an oil exploration prospects have a way
- 10:07of teasing their developers, and every time one problem was
- 10:10solved, another popped up. In September, we threw in the
- 10:14towel. Our failure here illustrates the
- 10:16importance of a guideline. Stay with simple propositions
- 10:19that we usually apply in investments as well as
- 10:22operations. If only one variable is key to a
- 10:25decision and the variable has a 90% chance of going your way,
- 10:30the chance for a successful outcome is obviously 90%.
- 10:34But if 10 independent variables need to break favorably for a
- 10:38successful result and each has a 90% probability of success, the
- 10:43likelihood of having a winner is only 35%.
- 10:46In our Zinc venture we solved most of the problems, but one
- 10:50proved intractable and that was one too many.
- 10:53Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it makes
- 10:57sense to look for if you'll excuse an oxymoron, monolink
- 11:00chains. A breakdown of Mid Americans
- 11:02results follows in 2004. The other category includes a
- 11:0772.2 dollars million profit from sale of an Enron receivable that
- 11:12was thrown in when we purchased Northern Natural two years
- 11:16earlier. Walter, Dave and I, as natives
- 11:19of Omaha, view this unanticipated gain as war
- 11:22reparations, partial compensation for the loss our
- 11:25city suffered in 1986 when Ken Lay moved northern to Houston
- 11:30after promising to leave the company here.
- 11:32For details, see Berkshire's 2002 annual report.
- 11:36Here are some key figures on Mid Americans operations insurance
- 11:41since Berkshire purchased National Indemnity Nikko in
- 11:441967. Property casualty insurance has
- 11:47in our core business and the propellant of our growth
- 11:50insurance has provided a fountain of funds with which
- 11:53we've acquired the securities and businesses that now give us
- 11:57an ever widening variety of earnings streams.
- 12:00So in this section I will be spending a little time telling
- 12:03you how we got where we are. The source of our insurance
- 12:06funds is float, which is money that doesn't belong to us, but
- 12:10that way temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because
- 12:14one premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide,
- 12:17insurance protection is delivered over a period that
- 12:20usually covers a year. And two, loss events that
- 12:24occurred today do not always result in our immediately paying
- 12:27claims because it sometimes takes many years for losses to
- 12:31be reported. Asbestos losses would be an
- 12:33example, negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that
- 12:39came with our 1967 purchase has now increased both by way of
- 12:43internal growth and acquisitions to $46.1 billion.
- 12:48Float is wonderful if it doesn't come at a high price.
- 12:51It's cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning
- 12:55how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with
- 12:58the premiums we have received. When an underwriting profit is
- 13:02achieved, as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of
- 13:05the 38 years we have been in the insurance business, float is
- 13:09better than free. In such years we are actually
- 13:12paid for holding other people's money.
- 13:14For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult.
- 13:18In aggregate, the property casualty industry almost
- 13:22invariably operates at an underwriting loss.
- 13:25When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes
- 13:29devastatingly so. Insurers have generally earned
- 13:32poor returns for a simple reason.
- 13:34They sell a commodity like product.
- 13:37Policy forms are standard, and the product is available from
- 13:40many suppliers, some of whom are mutual companies owned by
- 13:44policyholders rather than stockholders with profit goals
- 13:47that are limited. Moreover, most insurers don't
- 13:50care from whom they buy customers by the millions.
- 13:52Say I need some Gillette blades or I'll have a Coke.
- 13:56But we wait in vain for ID like a national indemnity policy,
- 13:59please. Consequently, price competition
- 14:02and insurance is usually fierce. I think airline seats.
- 14:06So you may ask, how do Berkshires insurance operations
- 14:09overcome the dismal economics of the industry and achieve some
- 14:13measure of enduring competitive advantage?
- 14:16We've attacked that problem in several ways.
- 14:19Let's look first at Nikko's strategy.
- 14:21When we purchased the company as specialist in commercial auto
- 14:24and general liability insurance, it did not appear to have any
- 14:28attributes that would overcome the industry's chronic troubles.
- 14:31It was not well known, had no informational advantage, the
- 14:35company has never had an actuary, was not a low cost
- 14:39operator and sold through general agents, a method many
- 14:42people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of
- 14:46the past 38 years, Nikko has been a star performer.
- 14:50Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be
- 14:53lucky to be worth half of what it is today.
- 14:56What we've had going for us is a managerial mindset that most
- 14:59insurers find impossible to replicate.
- 15:02Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public
- 15:06company embracing a business model that would lead to the
- 15:09decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through
- 15:121999? That colossal slide, it should
- 15:16be emphasized, did not occur because business was
- 15:19unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars
- 15:22were readily available to Nikko had we only been willing to cut
- 15:26prices, but we instead consistently priced to make a
- 15:30profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor.
- 15:33We never left customers, but they left us.
- 15:36Most American businesses harbor an institutional imperative that
- 15:40rejects extended decreases in volume.
- 15:43What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did
- 15:46business contract last year, but that it will continue to drop in
- 15:51insurance? The urge to keep writing
- 15:53business is also intensified because the consequences of
- 15:56foolishly prized policies may not become apparent for some
- 16:00time. If an insurer is optimistic in
- 16:03its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated and years may
- 16:07pass before true loss costs are revealed, a form of self
- 16:11deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s.
- 16:15It takes a long time to learn the true profitability of any
- 16:19given year. First, many claims are received
- 16:22after the end of the year and we must estimate how many of these
- 16:25there will be and what they will cost.
- 16:28In insurance jargon, these claims are termed IBNR, incurred
- 16:32but not reported. Second, claims often take years
- 16:36or even decades to settle, which means there can be many
- 16:39surprises along the way. For these reasons, the results
- 16:43in this column simply represent our best estimate at the end of
- 16:462004 as to how we have done in prior years.
- 16:50Profit margins for the years through 1999 are probably close
- 16:54to correct because these years are mature in the sense that
- 16:58they have few claims still outstanding.
- 17:00The more recent the year, the more guesswork is involved.
- 17:04In particular, the results shown for 2003 and 2004 are apartment
- 17:09to change significantly. Finally, there is a fear factor
- 17:12at work in that a shrinking business usually leads to
- 17:15layoffs 2 avoid pink slips. Employees will rationalize
- 17:20inadequate pricing, telling themselves that poorly priced
- 17:24business must be tolerated in order to keep the organization
- 17:27intact and the distribution system happy.
- 17:30If this course isn't followed, these employees will argue, the
- 17:34company will not participate in the recovery that they
- 17:37invariably feel is just around the corner.
- 17:40To combat employees natural tendency to save their own
- 17:43skins, we have always promised Nico's workforce that no one
- 17:47will be fired because of declining volume, however severe
- 17:50the contraction. This is not Donald Trump's sort
- 17:53of place. Nico is not labor intensive and,
- 17:56as the table suggests, can live with excess overhead.
- 18:00It can't live, however, with underpriced business and the
- 18:04breakdown in underwriting discipline that accompanies it.
- 18:08An insurance organization that doesn't care deeply about
- 18:10underwriting at a profit this year is unlikely to care next
- 18:14year either. Naturally, a business that
- 18:16follows a no layoff policy must be especially careful to avoid
- 18:21overstaffing when times are good. 30 years ago, Tom Murphy,
- 18:25then CEO of Cap Cities, drove this point home to me with a
- 18:29hypothetical tale about an employee who asked his boss for
- 18:32permission to hire an assistant. The employee assumed that adding
- 18:36$20,000 to the annual payroll would be inconsequential, but
- 18:40his boss told him the proposal should be evaluated as a
- 18:44$3,000,000 decision, given that an additional person would
- 18:48probably cost at least that amount over his lifetime,
- 18:51factoring in raises, benefits and other expenses.
- 18:54More people, more toilet paper. And unless the company fell on
- 18:58very hard times, the employee added, would be unlikely to be
- 19:02dismissed, however marginal his contribution to the business.
- 19:06It takes real fortitude embedded deep within a company's culture
- 19:10to operate as Nikko does. Anyone examining the table can
- 19:13scan the years from 1986 to 1999 quickly.
- 19:18But living day after day with dwindling volume while
- 19:21competitors are boasting of growth and reaping Wall Street's
- 19:24applause is an experience few managers can tolerate.
- 19:28Nico, however, has had four CEO's since its formation in
- 19:311940, and none of bent. It should be noted that only one
- 19:35of the four graduated from college.
- 19:38Our experience tells us that extraordinary business ability
- 19:41is largely innate. The current managerial star make
- 19:45that superstar at Nico is Don Wurster.
- 19:47Yes, he's the graduate who has been running things since 1989.
- 19:52His slugging percentage is right up there with Barry Bonds
- 19:55because like Barry, Don will accept a walk rather than swing
- 19:59at a bad pitch Don has now amassed. $950 million of float
- 20:04at Nikko that over time is almost certain to be proved the
- 20:07negative cost kind because insurance prices are falling.
- 20:12Don's volume will soon decline very significantly and as it
- 20:16does Charlie and I will applaud him ever more loudly.
- 20:19Another way to prosper in a commodity type business is to be
- 20:23the low cost operator among auto insurers.
- 20:26Operating on a broad scale, GEICO holds that cherished title
- 20:30for Nikko. As we have seen, an ebb inflow
- 20:33business model makes sense, but a company holding a low cost
- 20:37advantage must pursue an unrelenting foot to the floor
- 20:40strategy. And that's just what we do at
- 20:42GEICO. A century ago when autos first
- 20:45appeared, the property casualty industry operated as a cartel.
- 20:49The major companies, most of which were based in the
- 20:52Northeast, established Bureau rates and that was it.
- 20:55No one cut prices to attract business.
- 20:58Instead, insurers competed for strong, well regarded agents, a
- 21:02focus that produced high commissions for agents and high
- 21:06prices for consumers. In 1922, State Farm was formed
- 21:10by George Metroli, a farmer from Smyrna, Illinois, who aimed to
- 21:15take advantage of the pricing umbrella maintained by the high
- 21:18cost giants of the industry. State Farm employed A captive
- 21:22agency force, a system keeping its acquisition costs lower than
- 21:26those incurred by the Bureau insurers whose independent
- 21:30agents successfully played off one company against another.
- 21:33With its low cost structure State Farm eventually captured
- 21:37about 20. 25% of the personal lines auto and homeowners
- 21:41business far out distancing its once mighty competitors.
- 21:45Allstate formed in 1931 put a similar distribution system into
- 21:50place and soon became the runner up in personal lines to State
- 21:54Farm. Capitalism had worked its magic
- 21:57and these low cost operations looked unstoppable. 8 But a man
- 22:01named Leo Goodwin had an idea for an even more efficient auto
- 22:04insurer and, with a skimpy $200,000, started GEICO in 1936.
- 22:11Goodwin's plan was to eliminate the agent entirely and to deal
- 22:15instead directly with the auto owner.
- 22:18Why, he asked himself, should there be any unnecessary and
- 22:22expensive links in the distribution mechanism when the
- 22:25product auto insurance was both mandatory and costly?
- 22:29Purchasers of business insurance, he reasoned, might
- 22:32well require professional advice.
- 22:34But most consumers knew what they needed in an auto policy.
- 22:38That was a powerful insight. Originally, GEICO mailed its low
- 22:42cost message to a limited audience of government
- 22:45employees. Later, it widened its horizons
- 22:48and shifted its marketing emphasis to the phone working
- 22:51inquiries that came from broadcast and print advertising.
- 22:55And today, the Internet is coming on strong.
- 22:57Between 1936 and 1975, GEICO grew from a standing start to a
- 23:024% market share, becoming the country's fourth largest auto
- 23:07insurer. During most of this period, the
- 23:09company was superbly managed, achieving both excellent volume
- 23:13gains and high profits. It looked unstoppable.
- 23:16But after my friend and hero Lorimer Davidson retired as CEO
- 23:20in 1970, his successor soon made a huge mistake by under
- 23:25reserving for losses. This produced faulty cost
- 23:28information which in turn produced inadequate pricing.
- 23:31By 1976, GEICO was on the brink of failure.
- 23:36Jack Byrne then joined GEICO as CEO and almost single handedly
- 23:40saved the company by heroic efforts that included major
- 23:44price increases. Though Geico's survival
- 23:46required, these policyholders fled the company and by 1980 its
- 23:51market share had fallen to 1.8%. Subsequently, the company
- 23:56embarked on some unwise diversification moves.
- 23:59This shift of emphasis away from its extraordinary core business
- 24:03stunted Geico's growth, and by 1993 its market share had grown
- 24:08only fractionally to 1.9%. Then Tony nicely took charge.
- 24:13And what a difference that's made.
- 24:15In 2005, GEICO will probably secure a 6% market share.
- 24:19Better yet, Tony has matched growth with profitability.
- 24:23Indeed, GEICO delivers all of its constituents major benefits.
- 24:28In 2004, its customers saved $1 billion or so compared to what
- 24:33they would otherwise have paid for coverage.
- 24:35Its associates earned a $191,000,000 profit sharing
- 24:39bonus that averaged 24.3% of salary.
- 24:43And its owner, that's us, enjoyed excellent financial
- 24:46returns. There's more good news.
- 24:48When Jack Byrne was rescuing the company in 1976, New Jersey
- 24:53refused to grant him the rates he needed to operate profitably.
- 24:56He therefore promptly and properly withdrew from the
- 24:59state. Subsequently, GEICO avoided both
- 25:02New Jersey and Massachusetts, recognizing them as two
- 25:06jurisdictions in which insurers were destined to struggle.
- 25:09In 2003, however, New Jersey took a new look at its chronic
- 25:13auto insurance problems and enacted legislation that would
- 25:17curb fraud and allow insurers a fair playing field.
- 25:21Even so, one might have expected the state's bureaucracy to make
- 25:25change slow and difficult, but just the opposite occurred.
- 25:28Holly Bakke, the New Jersey Insurance commissioner who would
- 25:32be a success in any line of work, was determined to turn the
- 25:36laws intent into reality. With her staff's cooperation,
- 25:40GEICO ironed out the details for re entering the state and was
- 25:44licensed last August. Since then, we've received a
- 25:47response from New Jersey drivers that is multiples of my
- 25:50expectations. We are now serving 140,000
- 25:54policyholders, about 4% of the New Jersey market and saving
- 25:58them substantial sums as we do drivers everywhere.
- 26:02Word of mouth recommendations within the state are causing
- 26:05inquiries to pour in, and once we hear from a New Jersey
- 26:08prospect, our closure rate, though percentage of policies
- 26:12issued to inquiries received, is far higher in the state than it
- 26:15is nationally. We make no claim, of course,
- 26:18that we can save everyone money. Some companies using rating
- 26:22systems that are different from ours will offer certain classes
- 26:26of drivers a lower rate than we do, but we believe GEICO offers
- 26:30the lowest price more often than any other national company that
- 26:34serves all segments of the public.
- 26:36In addition, in most states, including New Jersey, Berkshire
- 26:40shareholders receive an 8% discount.
- 26:44So gamble 15 minutes of your time and go to geico.com or call
- 26:48800-847-7536 to see nine whether you can save big money which you
- 26:55might want to use, of course, to buy other Berkshire products.
- 26:59Reinsurance insurance sold to other insurers who wish to lay
- 27:02off part of the risks they have assumed should not be a
- 27:05commodity product. At bottom, any insurance policy
- 27:09is simply a promise, and as everyone knows, promises vary
- 27:13enormously in their quality. At the primary insurance level,
- 27:16nevertheless, just who makes the promise is often of minor
- 27:20importance. In personal lines insurance, for
- 27:23example, states levy assessments on solvent companies to pay the
- 27:27policy holders of companies that go broke.
- 27:30In the business insurance field, the same arrangement applies to
- 27:33workers compensation policies. Protected policies of these
- 27:37types account for about 60% off the property casualty industries
- 27:41volume. Prudently run insurers are
- 27:43irritated by the need to subsidize poor or reckless
- 27:47management elsewhere, but that's the way it is.
- 27:49Other forms of business insurance at the primary level
- 27:52involve promises that carry greater risks for the insured.
- 27:56When Reliance insurance and home insurance were run into the
- 27:59ground, for example, there promises proved to be worthless.
- 28:04Consequently, many holders of their business policies, other
- 28:07than those covering workers compensation, suffered painful
- 28:10losses. The solvency risk in primary
- 28:13policies, however, pales in comparison to that lurking in
- 28:17reinsurance policies. When a reinsurer goes broke,
- 28:21staggering losses almost always strike the primary companies it
- 28:25has dealt with. This risk is far from minor.
- 28:29GEICO has suffered 10s of millions, and losses from its
- 28:32careless selection of reinsurers in the early 1980s were a true
- 28:37mega catastrophe to occur in the next decade or two, and that's a
- 28:40real possibility some reinsurers would not survive.
- 28:44The largest insured loss to date is the World Trade Center
- 28:47disaster, which cost the insurance industry an estimated
- 28:51$35 billion. Hurricane Andrew cost insurers
- 28:55about 15 point $5 billion in 1992, though that loss would be
- 29:00far higher in today's dollars. Both events rocked the insurance
- 29:04and reinsurance world, but a $100 billion event or even a
- 29:08larger catastrophe remains a possibility if either a
- 29:12particularly severe earthquake or hurricane hits just the wrong
- 29:16place. For significant hurricanes
- 29:18struck Florida during 2004, causing an aggregate of $25
- 29:23billion or so in insured losses. 2 of these, Charlie and Ivan,
- 29:28could have done at least three times the damage they did had
- 29:31they entered the US not far from their actual landing points.
- 29:35Many insurers regard a $100 billion industry loss as
- 29:39unthinkable and won't even plan for it.
- 29:41But at Berkshire, we are fully prepared.
- 29:44Our share of the loss would probably be 3% to 5%, and
- 29:48earnings from our investments and other businesses would
- 29:51comfortably exceed that cost. When the day after arrives,
- 29:55Berkshire's checks will clear. Though the Hurricanes hit us
- 29:58with a $1.25 billion loss, our reinsurance operations did well
- 30:03last year. At General Re, Joe Brandon has
- 30:07restored a long, admired culture of underwriting discipline that
- 30:10for a time had lost its way. The excellent results he
- 30:14realized in 2004 on current business, however, were offset
- 30:19by adverse developments from the years before he took the helm at
- 30:23Nikko's reinsurance operation. Ajit Jane continues to
- 30:27successfully underwrite huge risks that no other reinsurer is
- 30:30willing or able to accept. Ajit's value to Berkshire is
- 30:34enormous. Our insurance managers,
- 30:37maximizing the competitive strengths I've mentioned in this
- 30:40section again delivered first class underwriting results last
- 30:44year. As a consequence, our float was
- 30:46better than cost less. Hey Race The Scorecard 10 in
- 30:50dollars millions Underwriting Profit Year end Float Insurance
- 30:54Operations 2004 2004 2003 General Re $3 Twenty 3120
- 31:03Dollars $23,654 BH Reinsurance 417 One 527813948 GEICO 97059605
- 31:18Thousand 287 Other Primary 1-611-736-1331 Total $1551 Forty
- 31:306094 Dollars $44,220 Includes, in addition to National
- 31:37Indemnity, a variety of other exceptional insurance businesses
- 31:41run by Rod Eldred, John Kaiser, Tom Nernie and Don Tall.
- 31:45Berkshire's float increased $1.9 billion in 2004, even though a
- 31:50few insureds opted to commute, that is, unwind certain
- 31:54reinsurance contracts. We agree to such commutations
- 31:58only when we believe that economics are favorable to us
- 32:02after giving due weight to what we might earn in the future on
- 32:05the money we are returning. To summarize, last year we were
- 32:08paid more than $1.5 billion to hold an average of about 45
- 32:13point $2.00 billion in 2005. Pricing will be less attractive
- 32:18than it has been. Nevertheless, absent a mega
- 32:21catastrophe, we have a decent chance of achieving no cost
- 32:24float again this year. Finance and finance products
- 32:28Last year in this section, we discussed the potpourri of
- 32:30activities. In this report we'll skip over
- 32:33several that are now of lesser importance.
- 32:36Arcadia is down to tag ends. Value Capital has added other
- 32:40investors, negating our expectation that we would need
- 32:43to consolidate its financials into ours.
- 32:46And the trading operation that I run continues to shrink.
- 32:50Both of Berkshire's leasing operations rebounded last year.
- 32:54At court. Office furniture earnings remain
- 32:56inadequate but are trending upward.
- 32:59XDRA disposed of its container and intermodal businesses in
- 33:03order to concentrate on trailer leasing, long its strong suit.
- 33:06Overhead has been reduced, asset utilization is up, and decent
- 33:11profits are now being achieved under Bill Franz, the company's
- 33:15new CEO. The wind down of Gen.
- 33:17Re Securities continues. We decided to exit this
- 33:20derivative operation three years ago, but getting out is easier
- 33:24said than done. Though derivative instruments
- 33:26are purported to be highly liquid, and though we have had
- 33:29the benefit of a benign market while liquidating ours, we still
- 33:33had 2890 contracts outstanding at your end, down from 23218 at
- 33:39the peak. Like hell, derivative trading is
- 33:42easy to enter but difficult to leave.
- 33:45Other similarities come to mind as well.
- 33:47Gen. residential derivative contracts have always been
- 33:50required to be marked to market and I believe that companies
- 33:54management conscientiously tried to make realistic marks.
- 33:57The market prices up. Derivatives, however, can be
- 34:01very fuzzy in a world in which settlement of a transaction is
- 34:05sometimes decades away and often involves multiple variables as
- 34:08well. In the interim, the marks to
- 34:11influence the managerial and trading bonuses that are paid
- 34:14annually. It's Small wonder that phantom
- 34:17profits are often recorded. Investors should understand that
- 34:20in all types of financial institutions, rapid growth
- 34:23sometimes masks major underlying problems and occasionally fraud.
- 34:28The real test of the earning power of a derivatives operation
- 34:32is what it achieves after operating for an extended
- 34:34period. In a no growth mode, you only
- 34:37learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out.
- 34:40After 40 years, we've finally generated a little synergy at
- 34:44Berkshire. Clayton Homes is doing well and
- 34:47that's in part due to its association with Berkshire.
- 34:50The manufactured home Industry 11 continues to reside in the
- 34:54intensive care unit of corporate America, having sold less than
- 34:58135,000 new homes last year, about the same as in 2003.
- 35:04Volume in these years was the lowest since 1962, and it was
- 35:08also only about 40% of annual sales during the years 1995 to
- 35:1399. That era, characterized by
- 35:16irresponsible financing and nave funders, was a fool's paradise
- 35:20for the industry because one major lender after another has
- 35:24fled the field. Financing continues to bedevil
- 35:27manufacturers, retailers and purchasers of manufactured
- 35:31homes. Here Berkshires support has
- 35:34proven valuable to Clayton. We stand ready to fund whatever
- 35:37makes sense and last year Clayton's management found much
- 35:40that qualified. As we explained in our 2003
- 35:43report, we believe in using borrowed money to support
- 35:46profitable interest bearing receivables.
- 35:49At the beginning of last year, we had borrowed $2 billion to
- 35:53rel into Clayton at A1 percentage point markup and by
- 35:56January 2005 the total was $7.35 billion.
- 36:01Most of the dollars added were borrowed by us on January 4th,
- 36:062005 to finance a seasoned portfolio that Clayton purchased
- 36:11on December 30th, 2004 from a bank exiting the business.
- 36:15We now have two additional portfolio purchases in the works
- 36:18totaling about $1.6 billion, but it's quite unlikely that we will
- 36:23secure others of any significance.
- 36:26Therefore, Clayton's receivables, in which
- 36:28originations will roughly offset payouts, will probably hover
- 36:32around $9 billion for some time and should deliver steady
- 36:36earnings. This pattern will be far
- 36:38different from that of the past in which Clayton, like all major
- 36:42players in its industry, securitized its receivables,
- 36:45causing earnings to be front ended.
- 36:48In the last two years, the securitization market has dried
- 36:51up. The limited funds available
- 36:53today come only at higher cost and with harsh terms.
- 36:57Had Clayton remained independent in this period, it would have
- 37:00had mediocre earnings as it struggled with financing.
- 37:04In April, Clayton completed the acquisition of Oakwood Homes and
- 37:08is now the industry's largest producer and retailer of
- 37:11manufactured homes. We love putting more assets in
- 37:14the hands of Kevin Clayton, the company's CEO.
- 37:18He is a prototype Berkshire manager.
- 37:20Today, Clayton has 11,837 employees, up from 7136 when we
- 37:26purchased it, and Charlie and I are pleased that Berkshire has
- 37:30been useful in facilitating this growth.
- 37:33For simplicity's sake, we include all of Clayton's
- 37:36earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion of these are
- 37:39derived from areas other than consumer finance, manufacturing,
- 37:43service and retailing operations.
- 37:46Our activities in this category cover the waterfront, but let's
- 37:49look at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement
- 37:52consolidating the entire group. Balance sheet 123104 in dollars
- 37:58millions. This eclectic group, which sells
- 38:01products ranging from dilly bars to fractional interests in
- 38:04Boeing 730 Sevens, earned a very respectable 21.7% on average
- 38:11tangible net worth last year compared to 20.7% in 2003.
- 38:16It's noteworthy that these operations used only minor
- 38:19financial leverage in achieving these returns.
- 38:22Clearly, we own some very good businesses.
- 38:25We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums
- 38:29to net worth, a matter that is reflected in the goodwill item
- 38:32shown on the balance sheet and that fact reduces the earnings
- 38:36on our average carrying value to 9.9%.
- 38:39Here are the pre tax earnings for the larger categories or
- 38:42units since we purchased My Tech in 2001.
- 38:46Gene Toomes, its CEO, has made some brilliant bolt on
- 38:50acquisitions and is on his way to creating a mini Berkshire.
- 38:54Shaw fielded a barrage of price increases in its main fiber
- 38:57materials during the year, a hit that added more than $300
- 39:01million to its costs. When you walk on carpet, you are
- 39:05in effect stepping on processed oil.
- 39:08Though we followed these hikes in costs with price increases of
- 39:11our own, there was an inevitable lag.
- 39:14Therefore, margins narrowed as the year progressed and remain
- 39:18under pressure today. Despite these roadblocks, Shaw,
- 39:21led by Bob Shaw and Julian Saul, earned an outstanding 25.6% on
- 39:27tangible equity in 2004. The company is a powerhouse and
- 39:31has a bright future in apparel. Fruit of the Loom increased unit
- 39:35sales by 10 million dozen or 14%, with shipments of intimate
- 39:40apparel for women and girls growing by 31%.
- 39:44Charlie, who is far more knowledgeable than I am on this
- 39:47subject. This assures me that women are
- 39:49not wearing more underwear. With this expert input, I can
- 39:53only conclude that our market share in the women's category
- 39:56must be growing rapidly. Thanks to John Holland, Fruit is
- 40:00on the move. A smaller operation, Garan also
- 40:03had an excellent year. Led by Seymour Lichtenstein and
- 40:07Jerry Camille, this company manufacturers the popular Gar
- 40:10Animals line for children. Next time you are in a Walmart,
- 40:14check out this imaginative product.
- 40:16Among our retailers, Ben Bridge Jewelry and RC Wiley Home
- 40:21furnishings were particular standouts.
- 40:23Last year at Ben Bridge, same store sales grew 11.4%, the best
- 40:29gain among the publicly held Jewelers who's reports I have
- 40:32seen. Additionally, the company's
- 40:34profit margin widened Last year was not a fluke.
- 40:37During the past decade, the same store sales gains of the company
- 40:41have averaged 8.8%. Ed and John Bridge are 4th
- 40:44generation managers and run the business exactly as if it were
- 40:49their own, which it is in every respect except for Berkshire's
- 40:52name on the stock certificates. The Bridges have expanded
- 40:56successfully by securing the right locations and more
- 40:59importantly by staffing these stores with enthusiastic and
- 41:03knowledgeable associates. We will move into Minneapolis
- 41:07Saint Paul this year. At Utah based RC Wiley, the
- 41:12gains from expansion have been even more dramatic, with 41.9%
- 41:16off 2004 sales coming from out of state stores that didn't
- 41:20exist before 1999. The company also improved its
- 41:24profit margin in 2004, propelled by its two new stores in Las
- 41:28Vegas. I would like to tell you that
- 41:30these stores were my idea. In truth, I thought they were
- 41:33mistakes. I knew, of course, how
- 41:36brilliantly Bill Child had run the RC Wiley operation in Utah,
- 41:41where its market share had long been huge.
- 41:44But I felt our closed on Sunday policy would prove disastrous
- 41:47away from home. Even our first out of I kept
- 41:55asking whether Las Vegas residents conditioned to seven
- 41:58day a week retailers would adjust to us.
- 42:01Our first Las Vegas store opened in 2001 answered this question
- 42:05in a resounding manner, immediately becoming our number
- 42:09one unit. Bill and Scott Hymus, his
- 42:11successor as CEO, then proposed a second Las Vegas store only
- 42:16about 20 minutes away. I felt this expansion would
- 42:19cannibalize the first unit, adding significant costs but
- 42:23only modest sales. The result?
- 42:26Each store is now doing about 26% more volume than any other
- 42:30store in the chain and is consistently showing large year
- 42:33over year gains. RC Wiley will soon open in Reno.
- 42:38Before making this commitment, Bill and Scott again asked for
- 42:42my advice. Initially I was pretty puffed up
- 42:44about the fact that they were consulting me, but then it
- 42:48dawned on me that the opinion of someone who is always wrong has
- 42:51its own special utility to decision makers. 14 Earnings
- 42:56improved in flight services At Flight Safety, the world's
- 43:00leader in pilot training, profits rose as corporate
- 43:03aviation rebounded and our business with regional airlines
- 43:07increased. We now operate 283 simulators
- 43:11with an original cost of $1.2 billion.
- 43:14Pilots are trained one at a time on this expensive equipment.
- 43:18This means that as much as 3.50 dollars of capital investment is
- 43:23required to produce $1.00 of annual revenue.
- 43:26With this level of capital intensity, Flight Safety
- 43:29requires very high operating margins in order to obtain
- 43:33reasonable returns on capital, which means that utilization
- 43:37rates are all important. Last year, Flight Safety's
- 43:40return on tangible equity improved to 15.1% from 8.4% in
- 43:462003. In another 2004 event, al
- 43:50Uelchi, who founded Flight Safety in 1951 with $10,000,
- 43:55turned over the CEO position to Bruce Whitman, a 43 year veteran
- 44:00at the company. But ALS not going anywhere.
- 44:03Why won't let him? Bruce shares ALS conviction that
- 44:06flying an aircraft is a privilege to be extended only to
- 44:10people who regularly receive the highest quality of training and
- 44:14are undeniably competent. A few years ago, Charlie was
- 44:18asked to intervene with Al on behalf of a tycoon friend whom
- 44:21Flight Safety had flunked. ALS reply to Charlie.
- 44:25Tell your pal he belongs in the back of the plane, not the
- 44:28cockpit. Flight Safety's number one
- 44:30customer is Net Jets, our aircraft fractional ownership
- 44:34subsidiary. It's 2100.
- 44:37Pilots spend an average of 18 days a year in training.
- 44:40Additionally, these pilots fly only one aircraft type, whereas
- 44:44many flight operations juggle pilots among several types.
- 44:48Net Jets. High standards on both fronts
- 44:51are two of the reasons I signed up with the company years before
- 44:54Berkshire bought it. Fully is Important in my
- 44:56decisions to both use and buy net jets, however, was the fact
- 45:00that the company was managed by Rich Santouli, the creator of
- 45:04the fractional ownership industry and a fanatic about
- 45:07safety and service. I viewed the selection of a
- 45:10flight provider as akin to picking a brain surgeon.
- 45:13You simply want the best, let someone else experiment with the
- 45:16low bidder. Last year, net jets again gained
- 45:19about 70% of the net new business measured by dollar
- 45:22value going to the four companies that dominate the
- 45:25industry. A portion of our growth came
- 45:28from the 25 hour card offered by Marquee Jet Partners.
- 45:32Marquee is not owned by Net Jets, but is instead a customer
- 45:35that repackages the purchases it makes from us into smaller
- 45:39packages that it sells through its card.
- 45:41Marquee deals exclusively with Net Jets utilizing the power of
- 45:46our reputation in its marketing. Our US contracts, including
- 45:50Marquee customers grew from 3877 to 4967.
- 45:55In 2004, versus approximately 1200 contracts when Berkshire
- 46:00bought Net Jets in 1998. Some clients, including me,
- 46:04enter into multiple contracts because they wish to use more
- 46:08than one type of aircraft, selecting for any given trip,
- 46:11whichever type best fits the mission at hand.
- 46:14Net Jets earned a modest amount in the US last year, but what we
- 46:18earned domestically was largely offset by losses in Europe.
- 46:22We are now however generating real momentum abroad.
- 46:26Contracts including 25 hour cards that we ourselves market
- 46:30in Europe increased from 364 to 693 during the year.
- 46:35We will again have a very significant European loss in
- 46:382005, but domestic earnings will likely put us in the black.
- 46:42Overall, Europe has been expensive for net jets, far more
- 46:45expensive than I anticipated, but it is essential to building
- 46:49a flight operation that will forever be in a class by itself.
- 46:53Our US owners already want a quality service wherever however
- 46:57they travel, and their wish for flight hours abroad is certain
- 47:00to grow dramatically in the decades ahead.
- 47:03Last year, US owners made 2003 flights in Europe, up 22% from
- 47:09the previous year and 137% from 2000.
- 47:13Just as important, our European owners made 1067 flights in the
- 47:19US, up 65% from 2003 and 239% from 2000.
- 47:25This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
- 47:29Gap cost differs in a few cases because of write ups or write
- 47:32downs that have been required. Some people may look at this
- 47:35table and view it as a list of stocks to be bought and sold
- 47:38based upon chart patterns, brokers opinions or estimates of
- 47:43near term earnings. Charlie and I ignore such
- 47:46distractions and instead view our holdings as fractional
- 47:49ownerships in businesses. This is an important
- 47:51distinction. Indeed, this thinking has been
- 47:54the cornerstone of my investment behavior since I was 19.
- 47:58At that time, I read Ben Graham's The Intelligent
- 48:01Investor and the scales fell from my eyes.
- 48:03Previously, I had been entranced by the stock market but didn't
- 48:07have a clue about how to invest. Let's look at how the businesses
- 48:11of our BIG4, American Express, Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Wells
- 48:15Fargo have fared since we bought into these companies.
- 48:18As the table shows, we invested 3.83 dollars a billion in the
- 48:23four by way of multiple transactions between May 1988
- 48:27and October 2003 on a composite basis.
- 48:31Our dollar weighted purchase date is July 1992 by year end
- 48:352004. Therefore, we had held these
- 48:39business interests on a weighted basis about 12 years.
- 48:42In 2004, Berkshire's share of the group's earnings amounted to
- 48:46$1.2 billion. These earnings might
- 48:50legitimately be considered normal.
- 48:52True, they were swelled because Gillette and Wells Fargo omitted
- 48:56option costs in their presentation of earnings, but on
- 48:59the other hand, they were reduced because Coke.
- 49:01At a non recurring write off, our share of the earnings of
- 49:04these four companies has grown almost every year and now
- 49:08amounts to about 31.3% of our cost.
- 49:12Their cash distributions to us have also grown consistently
- 49:16totaling 434 dollars a million in 2004 or about 11.3% of cost.
- 49:23All in all, the BIG4 have delivered us a satisfactory,
- 49:26though far from spectacular business result.
- 49:30That's true as well of our experience in the market with
- 49:32the group. Since our original purchases,
- 49:35valuation gains have somewhat exceeded earnings growth because
- 49:39price earnings ratios have increased on a year to year
- 49:42basis. However, the business and market
- 49:45performances have often diverged, sometimes to an
- 49:48extraordinary degree. During the Great bubble, market
- 49:52value gains far outstripped the performance of the businesses.
- 49:56In the aftermath of the bubble, the reverse was true. 16
- 50:00Clearly, Berkshire's results would have been far better if I
- 50:03had caught this swing of the pendulum.
- 50:05That may seem easy to do when 1 looks through an always clean
- 50:09rear view mirror. Unfortunately, however, it's the
- 50:12windshield through which investors must peer, and that
- 50:15glass is invariably focked. Our huge positions add to the
- 50:20difficulty of our nimbly dancing in and out of holdings as
- 50:24valuations swing. Nevertheless, I can properly be
- 50:27criticized for merely clucking about Nosebleed valuations
- 50:31during the bubble rather than acting on my views.
- 50:34Though I said at the time that certain of the stocks we held
- 50:36were priced ahead of themselves, I underestimated just how severe
- 50:40the overvaluation was. I talked when I should have
- 50:44walked. What Charlie and I would like is
- 50:46a little action now. We don't enjoy sitting on $43
- 50:49billion of cash equivalents that are earning paltry returns.
- 50:54Instead, we yearn to buy more fractional interest similar to
- 50:58those we now own, or better still, more large businesses
- 51:01outright. We will do either, however, only
- 51:04when purchases can be made at prices that offer us the
- 51:07prospect of a reasonable return on our investment.
- 51:10We've repeatedly emphasized that the realized gains that we
- 51:13report quarterly or annually are meaningless for analytical
- 51:17purposes. We have a huge amount of
- 51:19unrealized gains on our books an hour.
- 51:22Thinking about when and if to cash them depends not at all on
- 51:26a desire to report earnings at one specific time or another.
- 51:30A further complication in our reported gains occurs because
- 51:34GAAP requires that foreign exchange contracts be marked to
- 51:37market, a stipulation that causes unrealized gains or
- 51:41losses in these holdings to flow through our published earnings
- 51:45as if we had sold our positions despite the problems enumerated.
- 51:49You may be interested in a breakdown of the gains we
- 51:52reported in 2003 and 2004. The data reflect actual sales,
- 51:57except in the case of currency gains, which are a combination
- 52:01of sales and marks to market. The junk bond profits include a
- 52:05foreign exchange component. When we bought these bonds in
- 52:082001 and 2002, we focused first, of course, on the credit quality
- 52:14of the issuers, all of which were American corporations.
- 52:17Some of these companies, however, had issued bonds
- 52:20denominated in foreign currencies.
- 52:23Because of our views on the dollar, we favored these for
- 52:26purchase when they were available.
- 52:27As an example, we bought 254 million of Level 3 bonds, 10% of
- 52:332008 and 2001 at 51.7% off par and sold these at 85% of par in
- 52:40December 2004. This issue was traded in euros
- 52:44that cost us 88 at the time of purchase, but that brought 1.29
- 52:48dollars when we sold. Thus, of our $163 million
- 52:53overall gain, about $85 million came from the markets revised
- 52:58opinion about Level 3 S credit quality with the remaining $78
- 53:03million resulting from the appreciation of the euro.
- 53:06In addition, we received cash interest during our holding
- 53:10period that amounted to about 25% annually on our dollar cost.
- 53:14The media continued to report that Buffett buys this or that
- 53:18stock. Statements like these are almost
- 53:20always based on filings Berkshire makes with the SEC and
- 53:24are therefore wrong. As I've said before, the story
- 53:27should say Berkshire buys. Even then, it is typically not I
- 53:31who make the buying decisions. Lou Simpson manages about $2.00
- 53:35billion of equities that are held by GEICO and it is his
- 53:38transactions that Berkshire is usually reporting.
- 53:41Customarily, his purchases are in the $200 to $300 million
- 53:46range and are in companies that are smaller than the ones I
- 53:49focus on. Take a look at the facing page
- 53:51to see why Lou is a cinch to be inducted into the Investment
- 53:55Hall of Fame. You may be surprised to learn
- 53:57that Lou does not necessarily inform me about what he is
- 54:00doing. When Charlie and I assign
- 54:02responsibility, we truly hand over the baton and we give it to
- 54:06Lou just as we due to our operating managers.
- 54:09Therefore, I typically learn of Laos transactions about 10 days
- 54:13after the end of each month. Sometimes, it should be added, I
- 54:17silently disagree with his decisions, but he's usually
- 54:20right. Foreign currencies.
- 54:22Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange
- 54:26contracts at year end, spread among 12 currencies.
- 54:30As I mentioned last year, holdings of this kind are a
- 54:33decided change for us. Before March 2002, neither
- 54:37Berkshire nor I had ever traded in currencies.
- 54:40But the evidence grows that our trade policies will put
- 54:43unremitting pressure on the dollar for many years to come.
- 54:46So since 2002, we've heeded that warning and setting our
- 54:50investment course, as WC Fields once said when asked for a
- 54:54handout. Sorry, son, all my money's tied
- 54:57up in currency. Be clear on one point.
- 55:00In no way does our thinking about currencies rest on doubts
- 55:03about America. We live in an extraordinarily
- 55:06rich country, the product of a system that values market
- 55:10economics, the rule of law, and equality of opportunity.
- 55:14Our economy is far and away the strongest in the world and will
- 55:18continue to be. We are lucky to live here.
- 55:21But as I argued in a November 10th, a 2003 article in Fortune,
- 55:25available at berkshirehathaway.com, our
- 55:28country's trade practices are weighing down the dollar.
- 55:31The decline in its value has already been substantial, but is
- 55:35nevertheless likely to continue. Without policy changes, currency
- 55:39markets could even become disorderly and generate
- 55:42spillover effects, both political and financial.
- 55:46No one knows whether these problems will materialize, but
- 55:49such a scenario is a far from remote possibility that policy
- 55:53makers should be considering now.
- 55:55Their bent, however, is to lean toward not so benign neglect.
- 56:00A 318 page congressional study of the consequences of
- 56:04unremitting trade deficits was published in November 2000 and
- 56:08has been gathering dust ever since.
- 56:11The study was ordered after the deficit hit of then alarming
- 56:14$263 billion in 1999. By last year it had risen to
- 56:19$618 billion. Charlie and I, it should be
- 56:23emphasized, believe that true trade, that is, the exchange of
- 56:27goods and services with other countries, is enormously
- 56:30beneficial for both us and them. Last year we had 1.15 dollars
- 56:35trillion of such honest to God trade, and the more of this the
- 56:39better. But as noted in our country also
- 56:42purchased an additional $618 billion in goods and services
- 56:47from the rest of the world that was unreciprocated.
- 56:50That is a staggering figure and one that has important
- 56:53consequences. The balancing item to this one
- 56:56way pseudo trade in economics there is always an offset, is a
- 57:00transfer of wealth from the US to the rest of the world.
- 57:04The transfer may materialize in the form of IO us, our private
- 57:08or governmental institutions give to foreigners or by way of
- 57:11their assuming ownership of our assets such as stocks and real
- 57:15estate. In either case, Americans end up
- 57:18owning A reduced portion of our country while non Americans own
- 57:22a greater part. This force feeding of American
- 57:24wealth to the rest of the world is now proceeding at the rate of
- 57:28$1.8 billion daily, an increase of 20% since I wrote you last
- 57:33year. Consequently, other countries
- 57:36and their citizens now on a net of about $3 trillion of the US.
- 57:41A decade ago, their net ownership was negligible.
- 57:44The mention of trillions numbs most brains.
- 57:47A further source of confusion is that the current account
- 57:50deficit, the sum of three items, the most important by far being
- 57:54the trade deficit and our national budget deficit, are
- 57:58often lumped as twins. They are anything but.
- 58:01They have different causes and different consequences. 19 A
- 58:05budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie
- 58:09that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and
- 58:13their citizens have no net ownership of the US, 100% of our
- 58:17country's output belongs to our citizens.
- 58:20Under any budget scenario, even 1, involving a huge deficit as a
- 58:25rich family awash in goods, Americans will argue through
- 58:28their legislators as to how government should redistribute
- 58:32the national output, that is, who pays taxes and who receives
- 58:35governmental benefits. If entitlement promises from an
- 58:39earlier day have to be re examined, family members will
- 58:43angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain.
- 58:46Maybe taxes will go up, maybe promises will be modified, maybe
- 58:51more internal debt will be issued.
- 58:53But when the fight is finished, all of the families huge pie
- 58:57remains available for its members.
- 58:59However it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.
- 59:02Large and persisting current account deficits produce an
- 59:05entirely different result. As time passes and as claims
- 59:09against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce.
- 59:13In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever growing royalty
- 59:17on American output. Here we are like a family that
- 59:20consistently overspends its income.
- 59:23As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more
- 59:27for the finance company and less for itself.
- 59:30Should we continue to run current account deficits
- 59:33comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of
- 59:36the US by other countries and their citizens a decade from now
- 59:40will amount to roughly $11.00 trillion.
- 59:44And if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net
- 59:47holding, we would need to send a net of dollars point 55 trillion
- 59:52of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the
- 59:56US investments then held by foreigners at that date.
- 1:00:00A decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18
- 1:00:04trillion, assuming low inflation, which is far from a
- 1:00:07sure thing. Therefore, our US family would
- 1:00:10then be delivering 3% of its. The annual output to the rest of
- 1:00:14the world simply is tribute for the overindulgences of the past.
- 1:00:18In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the
- 1:00:22sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.
- 1:00:25This annual royalty paid the world, which would not disappear
- 1:00:29unless the US massively underconsumed and began to run.
- 1:00:33Consistent and large trade surpluses would undoubtedly
- 1:00:36produce significant political unrest in the US Americans would
- 1:00:40still be living very well indeed, better than now, because
- 1:00:44of the growth in our economy, but they would chafe at the idea
- 1:00:47of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners
- 1:00:51abroad. A country that is now aspiring
- 1:00:53to an ownership society will not find happiness in, and I'll use
- 1:00:57hyperbole here for emphasis, A sharecropper society.
- 1:01:01But that's precisely where our trade policies, supported by
- 1:01:05Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.
- 1:01:08Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of
- 1:01:12government, have stated that hour current account deficits
- 1:01:15cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the
- 1:01:18Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29th to 30th,
- 1:01:222004 say the staff noted that outsized external deficits could
- 1:01:27not be sustained indefinitely. But despite the constant hand
- 1:01:31ringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions
- 1:01:35to tame the burgeoning imbalance.
- 1:01:37In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned
- 1:01:41that a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer,
- 1:01:45and so far it hasn't. Yet policy makers continue to
- 1:01:48hope for a soft landing, meanwhile counseling other
- 1:01:51countries to stimulate reinflate their economies and Americans to
- 1:01:55save more. In my view, these admonitions
- 1:01:58missed the mark. There are deep rooted structural
- 1:02:01problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge
- 1:02:04current account deficit unless trade policies either change
- 1:02:08materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could
- 1:02:11prove unsettling to financial markets.
- 1:02:15Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam
- 1:02:18Smith. What is prudence in the conduct
- 1:02:20of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great
- 1:02:24Kingdom. If a foreign country can supply
- 1:02:26us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better
- 1:02:30buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry
- 1:02:33employed in a way in which we have some advantage.
- 1:02:36I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith's
- 1:02:39statement refers to trade of product for product, not of
- 1:02:43wealth for product, as our country is doing to the tune of
- 1:02:46dollars point 6 trillion annually.
- 1:02:48Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that
- 1:02:52prudence consisted of his family selling off part of its farm
- 1:02:55every day 20 in order to finance it's overconsumption.
- 1:02:59Yet that is just what the great Kingdom called the United States
- 1:03:03is doing. If the US was running a dollars
- 1:03:06point 6 trillion current account surplus, commentators worldwide
- 1:03:09would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme
- 1:03:14form of mercantilism, a long discredited economic strategy
- 1:03:18under which countries fostered exports, discouraged imports,
- 1:03:22and piled up treasure. I would condemn such a policy as
- 1:03:26well, but in effect, if not an intent, the rest of the world is
- 1:03:30practicing mercantilism in respect to the US, an act made
- 1:03:34possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit
- 1:03:38history. Indeed, the world would never
- 1:03:41let any other country use a credit card denominated in its
- 1:03:44own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours.
- 1:03:49Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine.
- 1:03:51They may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are
- 1:03:54rich junkies as well. Our spendthrift behavior won't,
- 1:03:58however, be tolerated indefinitely.
- 1:04:01And though it's impossible to forecast just when and how the
- 1:04:04trade problem will be resolved, it's improbable that the
- 1:04:07resolution will foster an increase in the value of our
- 1:04:11currency relative to that of our trading partners.
- 1:04:14We hope the US adopts policies that will quickly and
- 1:04:17substantially reduce the current account deficit.
- 1:04:20True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record
- 1:04:24losses on its foreign exchange contracts, but Berkshire's
- 1:04:28resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar based
- 1:04:31assets and both a strong dollar in a low inflation environment
- 1:04:35are very much in our interest. If you wish to keep abreast of
- 1:04:39trade and currency matters, read the Financial Times.
- 1:04:42This london-based paper has long been the leading source for
- 1:04:45daily international financial news and now has an excellent
- 1:04:49American edition. Both its reporting and
- 1:04:52commentary on trade are first class, and, again, our usual
- 1:04:56caveat. Macroeconomics is a tough game
- 1:04:59in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated
- 1:05:03skill. We may well turn out to be wrong
- 1:05:05in our currency judgments. Indeed, the fact that so many
- 1:05:09pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.
- 1:05:13If so, our mistake will be very public.
- 1:05:15The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all
- 1:05:19of Berkshire's assets and dollars even as they declined
- 1:05:22significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake, John
- 1:05:26Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory.
- 1:05:29Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail
- 1:05:34conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.
- 1:05:37Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may
- 1:05:41be derided, but never does an individual lemming get
- 1:05:44criticized. From a reputational standpoint,
- 1:05:47Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign exchange
- 1:05:50commitment, but we believe in managing Berkshire as if we
- 1:05:54owned 100% of it ourselves and were that the case, we would not
- 1:05:59be following a dollar only policy.
- 1:06:01Miscellaneous Last year I told you about a group of University
- 1:06:05of Tennessee finance students who played a key role in our
- 1:06:08$1.7 billion acquisition of Clayton Homes earlier.
- 1:06:13They have been brought to Omaha by their professor, Al Oxier.
- 1:06:16He brings a class every year to tour Nebraska Furniture Mart and
- 1:06:20Borsheims, eat at Gorretz, and have AQ and a session with me at
- 1:06:24Kiewit Plaza. These visitors, like those who
- 1:06:27come for our annual meeting, leave impressed by both the city
- 1:06:30and its friendly residents. Other colleges and universities
- 1:06:34have now come calling. This school year we will have
- 1:06:37visiting classes ranging in size from 30 to 100 students from
- 1:06:42Chicago, Dartmouth, Tuck, Delaware State, Florida State,
- 1:06:46Indiana, Iowa, Iowa State, Maryland, Nebraska NW Nazarene,
- 1:06:52Pennsylvania, Wharton, Stanford, Tennessee, Texas, Texas A&M,
- 1:06:58Toronto, Rotman, Union and Utah. Most of the students are NBA
- 1:07:03candidates and I've been impressed by their quality.
- 1:07:06They are keenly interested in business and investments, but
- 1:07:09their questions indicate that they also have more on their
- 1:07:12minds than simply making money. I always feel good after meeting
- 1:07:16them. 21 At our sessions, I tell the newcomers the story of the
- 1:07:20Tennessee group and it's spotting of Clayton Holmes.
- 1:07:23I do this in the spirit of the farmer who enters his hen house
- 1:07:27with an ostrich egg and admonishes the flock.
- 1:07:30I don't like to complain, girls, but this is just a small sample
- 1:07:34of what the competition is doing.
- 1:07:36To date, our new scouts have not brought us deals, but their
- 1:07:40mission in life has been made clear to them.
- 1:07:42You should be aware of an accounting rule that mildly
- 1:07:45distorts our financial statements in a pain today game
- 1:07:49tomorrow manner. Berkshire purchases life
- 1:07:51insurance policies from individuals and corporations who
- 1:07:55would otherwise surrender them for cash.
- 1:07:57As the new holder of the policies, we pay any premiums
- 1:08:01that become due and ultimately, when the original holder dies,
- 1:08:05collect the face value of the policies.
- 1:08:08The original policyholder is usually in good health when we
- 1:08:11purchase the policy. Still, the price we pay for it
- 1:08:14is always well above its cash surrender value CSV.
- 1:08:18Sometimes the original policyholder has borrowed
- 1:08:21against the CSV to make premium payments.
- 1:08:24In that case, the remaining CSV will be tiny, and our purchase
- 1:08:28price will be a large multiple of what the original
- 1:08:31policyholder would have received had he cashed out by
- 1:08:34surrendering it. Under accounting rules, we must
- 1:08:37immediately charge as a realized capital loss the excess over CSV
- 1:08:42that we pay upon purchasing the policy.
- 1:08:44We also must make additional charges each year for the amount
- 1:08:48by which the premium we pay to keep the policy in force exceeds
- 1:08:51the increase in CSV. But obviously, we don't think
- 1:08:55these bookkeeping charges represent economic losses.
- 1:08:58If we did, we wouldn't buy the policies.
- 1:09:01During 2004, we recorded net losses from the purchase of
- 1:09:04policies and from the premium payments required to maintain
- 1:09:08them totaling $207 million, which was charged against
- 1:09:12realized investment Gains in our earnings statement included
- 1:09:16another in the table on page 17. When the proceeds from these
- 1:09:20policies are received in the future, we will record as
- 1:09:24realized investment gained. The excess over the then CSV 2
- 1:09:28post bubble governance reforms have been particularly useful at
- 1:09:31Berkshire and I fault myself for not putting them in place many
- 1:09:35years ago. The first involves regular
- 1:09:37meetings of directors without the CEO present.
- 1:09:40I've sat on 19 boards and on many occasions this process
- 1:09:44would have led to dubious plans being examined more thoroughly.
- 1:09:48In a few cases, CEO changes that were needed would also have been
- 1:09:52made more promptly. There is no downside to this
- 1:09:54process and there are many possible benefits.
- 1:09:58The second reform concerns the whistle blower line, an
- 1:10:01arrangement through which employees can send information
- 1:10:04to me and the board's audit committee without fear of
- 1:10:07reprisal. Berkshires extreme
- 1:10:10decentralization makes this system particularly valuable
- 1:10:13both to me and the committee. In a sprawling city of 180,000
- 1:10:18Berkshires current employee count, not every Sparrow that
- 1:10:21falls will be noticed at headquarters.
- 1:10:23Most of the complaints we have received are of the guy next to
- 1:10:27me has bad breath variety, but on occasion I have learned of
- 1:10:30important problems that are subsidiaries that I otherwise
- 1:10:34would have missed. The issues raised are usually
- 1:10:36not of a type discoverable by audit, but relate instead to
- 1:10:40personnel and business practices.
- 1:10:42Berkshire would be more valuable today if I had put in a whistle
- 1:10:46blower line decades ago. Charlie and I love the idea of
- 1:10:49shareholders thinking and behaving like owners.
- 1:10:52Sometimes that requires them to be proactive, and in this arena,
- 1:10:56large institutional owners should lead the way.
- 1:10:59So far, however, the moves made by institutions have been less
- 1:11:03than awe inspiring. Usually, they focused on
- 1:11:07minutiae and ignored the three questions that truly count.
- 1:11:10First, does the company have the right CEO?
- 1:11:13Second, is Husha overreaching in terms of compensation?
- 1:11:17Third, are proposed acquisitions more likely to create or destroy
- 1:11:21per share value? 22 On such questions, the
- 1:11:25interests of the CEO may well differ from those of the
- 1:11:28shareholders. Directors, moreover, sometimes
- 1:11:31lack the knowledge or gumption to overrule the CEO.
- 1:11:34Therefore, it's vital that large owners focus on these three
- 1:11:38questions and speak up when necessary.
- 1:11:41Instead, many simply follow a checklist approach to the issue
- 1:11:44du jour. Last year, I was on the
- 1:11:46receiving end of a judgment reached in that manner.
- 1:11:49Several institutional shareholders in there advisors
- 1:11:53decided I lacked independence in my role as a director of
- 1:11:56Coca-Cola. One group wanted me removed from
- 1:11:59the board, and another simply wanted me booted from the audit
- 1:12:03committee. My first impulse was to secretly
- 1:12:05fund the group behind the second idea.
- 1:12:08Why anyone would wish to be on an audit committee is beyond me.
- 1:12:12But since directors must be assigned to one committee or
- 1:12:15another, and since no CEO wants me on his compensation
- 1:12:18committee, it's often been my lot to get an audit committee
- 1:12:21assignment. As it turned out, the
- 1:12:23institutions that opposed me failed, and I was re elected to
- 1:12:27the audit job. I fought off the urge to ask for
- 1:12:30a recount. Some institutions question my
- 1:12:32independence because, among other things, McClain and Dairy
- 1:12:36Queen by lots of Coke products. Do they want us to favor Pepsi?
- 1:12:40But independence is defined in Webster's as not subject to
- 1:12:43control by others, and puzzled how anyone could conclude that
- 1:12:47our Coke purchases would control my decision making when the
- 1:12:50counterweight is the well-being of $8 billion of Coke stock held
- 1:12:55by Berkshire. Assuming I'm even marginally
- 1:12:57rational, elementary arithmetic should make it clear that my
- 1:13:01heart and mind belong to the owners of Coke, not to its
- 1:13:04management. I can't resist mentioning that
- 1:13:07Jesus understood the calibration of independence far more clearly
- 1:13:11than do the protesting institutions.
- 1:13:14In Matthew 6 verse 21, He observed.
- 1:13:17For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
- 1:13:20Even to an institutional investor, $8 billion should
- 1:13:24qualify as treasure. That dwarfs any profits
- 1:13:27Berkshire might earn on its routine transactions with Coke,
- 1:13:31measured by the biblical standard.
- 1:13:33The Berkshire board is a model. Every director is a member of a
- 1:13:37family owning at least $4 million of stock be.
- 1:13:41None of these shares were acquired from Berkshire via
- 1:13:44options or grants. See No Directors receive
- 1:13:47committee consulting or board fees from the company that are
- 1:13:51more than a tiny portion of their annual income and D.
- 1:13:54Although we have a standard corporate indemnity arrangement,
- 1:13:57we carry no liability insurance for directors at Berkshire.
- 1:14:01Board members travel the same Rd. as shareholders, Charlie and
- 1:14:05I have seen much behavior confirming the Bible's treasure
- 1:14:08point. In our view, based on our
- 1:14:10considerable boardroom experience, the least
- 1:14:13independent directors are likely to be those who receive an
- 1:14:17important fraction of their annual income from the fees they
- 1:14:20receive for board service and who hope is well to be
- 1:14:23recommended for election to other boards and thereby to
- 1:14:26boost their income further. Yet these are the very board
- 1:14:29members most often classed as independent.
- 1:14:32Most directors of this type are decent people and do a first
- 1:14:36class job, but they wouldn't be human if they weren't tempted to
- 1:14:39thwart actions that would threaten their livelihood.
- 1:14:42Some may go on to succumb to such temptations.
- 1:14:45Let's look at an example based upon circumstantial evidence.
- 1:14:49I have first hand knowledge of a recent acquisition proposal, not
- 1:14:53from Berkshire, that was favored by management less buy the
- 1:14:56company's investment banker and slated to go forward at a price
- 1:14:59above the level at which the stock had sold for some years or
- 1:15:03now sells for. In addition, a number of
- 1:15:06directors favored the transaction and wanted it
- 1:15:09proposed to shareholders. 23 Several of their brethren,
- 1:15:13however, each of whom received board and committee fees
- 1:15:17totaling about $100,000 annually, scuttled the proposal,
- 1:15:21which meant that shareholders never learned of this multi
- 1:15:25billion offer. Non management directors owned
- 1:15:27little stock except for shares they had received from the
- 1:15:31company. Their open market purchases in
- 1:15:33recent years had meanwhile been nominal, even though the stock
- 1:15:37had sold far below the acquisition price proposed.
- 1:15:40In other words, these directors didn't want the shareholders to
- 1:15:44be offered X even though they had consistently declined the
- 1:15:47opportunity to buy stock for their own account at a fraction
- 1:15:50of XI. Don't know which directors
- 1:15:52opposed letting shareholders see the offer, but I do know that
- 1:15:56$100,000 is an important portion of the annual income of some of
- 1:16:01those deemed independent, clearly meeting the Matthew 6
- 1:16:04verse 21 definition of treasure. If the deal had gone through
- 1:16:08these fees, it would have ended. Neither the shareholders nor I
- 1:16:12will ever know what motivated the dissenters.
- 1:16:15Indeed, they themselves will not likely know, given that
- 1:16:18self-interest inevitably blurs introspection.
- 1:16:21We do know one thing though. At the same meeting at which the
- 1:16:25deal was rejected, the board voted itself a significant
- 1:16:29increase in directors fees. While we are on the subject of
- 1:16:32self-interest, let's turn again to the most important accounting
- 1:16:36mechanisms still available to CEOs who wish to overstate
- 1:16:39earnings, the non expensing of stock options.
- 1:16:43The accomplices in perpetuating this absurdity have been many
- 1:16:47members of Congress who have defied the arguments put forth
- 1:16:50by all BIG4 auditors, all members of the Financial
- 1:16:54Accounting Standards Board, and virtually all investment
- 1:16:58professionals. Him.
- 1:16:59In closing, an op-ed piece I wrote for the Washington Post
- 1:17:02describing a truly breathtaking bill that was passed 312 to 111
- 1:17:07by the House last summer thanks to Senator Richard Shelby, the
- 1:17:11Senate. He didn't ratify the Houses
- 1:17:13foolishness and to his great credit Bill Donaldson, the
- 1:17:17investor minded chairman of the SEC, has stood firm against
- 1:17:21massive political pressure generated by the check waving
- 1:17:25CEOs who first muscled Congress in 1993 about the issue of
- 1:17:29option accounting and then repeated the tactic last year.
- 1:17:33Because the attempts to obfuscate the stock option issue
- 1:17:36continue, it's worth pointing out that no one, neither the
- 1:17:39FASB nor investors generally nor I, are talking about restricting
- 1:17:44the use of options in any way. Indeed, my successor at
- 1:17:48Berkshire may well receive much of his pay via options, albeit
- 1:17:52logically structured ones, in respect to 1 inappropriate
- 1:17:55strike price to an escalation in price that reflects the
- 1:17:59retention of earnings and 3A ban on his quickly disposing of any
- 1:18:03shares purchased through options.
- 1:18:06We cheer arrangements that motivate managers, whether these
- 1:18:09be cash bonuses or options. And if a company is truly
- 1:18:13receiving value for the options it issues, we see no reason why
- 1:18:17recording their costs should cut down on their use.
- 1:18:20The simple fact is that certain CEOs know their own compensation
- 1:18:24would be far more rationally determined if options were
- 1:18:27expensed. They also suspect that their
- 1:18:29stock would sell at a lower price if realistic accounting
- 1:18:33were employed, meaning that they would reap less in the market
- 1:18:36when they unloaded their personal holdings.
- 1:18:39To these CEO's, such unpleasant prospects are a fate to be
- 1:18:42fought with all the resources they have at hand, even though
- 1:18:45the funds they use in that fight normally don't belong to them
- 1:18:49but are instead put up by their shareholders.
- 1:18:52Option expensing is scheduled to become mandatory on June 15th.
- 1:18:56You can therefore expect intensified efforts to stall or
- 1:19:00emasculate this rule between now and then.
- 1:19:03Let your Congressman and Senators know what you think on
- 1:19:05this issue. 24 The Annual Meeting There are two changes
- 1:19:09this year concerning the Annual Meeting.
- 1:19:12First, we have scheduled the meeting for the last Saturday in
- 1:19:15April, the 30th, rather than the usual first Saturday in May.
- 1:19:19This year, Mother's Day falls on May 8th, and it would be unfair
- 1:19:23to ask the employees of Borsheims and Goritz to take
- 1:19:27care of us at that special time, so we've moved everything up a
- 1:19:30week. Next year we'll return to our
- 1:19:33regular timing, holding the meeting on May 6th, 2006.
- 1:19:37Additionally, we are changing the sequence of events on
- 1:19:40meeting day, April 30th. Just as always, the doors will
- 1:19:44open at the Quest center at 7:00 AM and the movie will be shown
- 1:19:47at 8:30. At 9:30, however, we will go
- 1:19:51directly to the question and answer period, which, allowing
- 1:19:54for lunch at the quest, stands well last until 3:00.
- 1:19:58Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the
- 1:20:02Annual meeting at 3:15. We have made this change because
- 1:20:05a number of shareholders complained last year about the
- 1:20:08time. Consumed by two speakers who
- 1:20:10advocated proposals of limited interest to the majority of the
- 1:20:14audience and who were no doubt relishing their chance to talk
- 1:20:17to a captive group of about 19500.
- 1:20:21With our new procedure, those shareholders who wish to hear it
- 1:20:24all can stick around for the formal meeting and those who
- 1:20:28don't can leave or better yet, shop.
- 1:20:30There will be plenty of opportunity for that pastime in
- 1:20:33the vast exhibition hall that adjoins the meeting area.
- 1:20:36Kelly Mutimore, The Flow Ziegfeld of Berkshire, put on a
- 1:20:40magnificent shopping extravaganza last year and she
- 1:20:43says that was just a warm up for this year.
- 1:20:45Kelly, I am delighted to report, is getting married in October,
- 1:20:50am giving her away and suggested that she make a little history
- 1:20:53by holding the wedding at the annual meeting.
- 1:20:55She balked, however, when Charlie insisted that he be the
- 1:20:59ring bearer again. We will showcase a 2100 square
- 1:21:03foot Clayton home featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, John's
- 1:21:07Manville insulation, My Tech fasteners, carefree awnings and
- 1:21:11NFM furniture. Take a tour through the home.
- 1:21:14Better yet, buy it. GEICO will have a booth staffed
- 1:21:17by a number of its top counselors from around the
- 1:21:19country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance
- 1:21:23quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:21:26able to give you a special shareholder discount, usually
- 1:21:298%. This special offer is permitted
- 1:21:31by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate.
- 1:21:36Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out
- 1:21:39whether we can save you money. On Saturday at the Omaha
- 1:21:42Airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from Net Jets
- 1:21:46available for your inspection. Stop by the Net Jets booth at
- 1:21:50the Quest to learn about viewing these planes.
- 1:21:52Come to Omaha by bus, leaving your new plane.
- 1:21:55The Bookworm Shop did a terrific business last year selling
- 1:21:59Berkshire related books displaying 18 titles.
- 1:22:02They sold 2920 copies for $61,000.
- 1:22:07Since we charged the shop no rent, I must be getting soft it
- 1:22:11give shareholders a 20% discount.
- 1:22:14This year I've asked the Bookworm to add Graham Allison's
- 1:22:17Nuclear Terrorism, the ultimate preventable catastrophe.
- 1:22:21A must read for those concerned with the safety of our country.
- 1:22:25In addition, the shop will premiere Poor Charlie's Almanac,
- 1:22:28a book compiled by Peter Kaufman.
- 1:22:31Scholars have for too long debated whether Charlie is the
- 1:22:34reincarnation of Ben Franklin. This book should settle the
- 1:22:38question. An attachment to the proxy
- 1:22:40material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can
- 1:22:43obtain the credential you will need for admission to the
- 1:22:46meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car
- 1:22:50reservations, we have again signed up American Express
- 1:22:54800-799-6634 to give you special help.
- 1:22:59They do a terrific job for us each year and I thank them for
- 1:23:02it. At Nebraska Furniture Mart
- 1:23:04located on a 77 acre site on 72nd St. between Dodge and
- 1:23:09Pacific, we will again be having Berkshire Weekend pricing.
- 1:23:12We initiated this special event at NFM 8 years ago and sales
- 1:23:17during the weekend grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $25.1
- 1:23:23million in 2004, up 45 percent, 25 from a year earlier.
- 1:23:29Every year has set a new record and on Saturday of last year we
- 1:23:33had the largest single day sales in NFMS history, $6.1 million.
- 1:23:39To get the discount, you must make your purchases between
- 1:23:42Thursday, April 28th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also
- 1:23:46present your meeting credential. The period special pricing will
- 1:23:50even apply to the products of several prestigious
- 1:23:53manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against
- 1:23:56discounting, but that in the spirit of our shareholder
- 1:24:00weekend, have made an exception for you.
- 1:24:02We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10:00 AM to
- 1:24:079:00 PM Monday through Saturday from 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on
- 1:24:11Sunday. On Saturday, this year from 5:30
- 1:24:14PM to 8:00 PM, we are having a special affair for shareholders
- 1:24:19only. They'll be there eating barbecue
- 1:24:21and drinking Coke. Borsheim's, the largest jewelry
- 1:24:24store in the country except for Tiffanus Manhattan store, well
- 1:24:28have two shareholder only events.
- 1:24:30The first will be a cocktail reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00
- 1:24:33PM on Friday, April 29th. The 2nd, the main gala, will be
- 1:24:38from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM on Sunday, May 1st.
- 1:24:42On Saturday, we will be open until 6:00 PM.
- 1:24:45We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend
- 1:24:48for your convenience. Therefore, shareholder prices
- 1:24:51will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May
- 1:24:557th. During that period, just
- 1:24:58identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting
- 1:25:01credentials or a brokerage statement.
- 1:25:04Borsheim's operates on a gross margin that is fully 20
- 1:25:07percentage points below that of its major rivals.
- 1:25:10Even before the shareholders discount last year, business
- 1:25:14over the weekend increased 73% from 2003, setting a record that
- 1:25:19will be tough to beat. Show me it can be done in a tent
- 1:25:23outside of Borsheim's. Patrick Wolf, twice US chess
- 1:25:26champion, will take on all comers in groups of 6
- 1:25:30blindfolded. Additionally, we will have Bob
- 1:25:33Hammond and Sharon Osberg, 2 of the world's top bridge experts,
- 1:25:37available to play with our shareholders on Sunday
- 1:25:40afternoon. They plan to keep their eyes
- 1:25:42open, but Bob never sorts his cards, even when playing for a
- 1:25:46national championship. Gore, it's my favorite
- 1:25:48steakhouse, will again be open exclusively for Berkshire
- 1:25:51shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, and we'll be serving from 4:00
- 1:25:56PM until 10:00 PM. Please remember that to come to
- 1:25:59Gourds on that day, you must have a reservation.
- 1:26:03To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st, but not before.
- 1:26:10If Sunday is sold out, try Gourds on one of the other
- 1:26:14evenings you will be in town. Enhance your reputation as an
- 1:26:17epicure by ordering, as I do, a rare T-bone with a double
- 1:26:21helping of hash Browns. We will again have a special
- 1:26:24reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for
- 1:26:28shareholders who have come from outside of North America.
- 1:26:31Every year our meeting draws many people from around the
- 1:26:35globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet
- 1:26:38those who have come so far. Last year, we enjoyed meeting
- 1:26:41more than 400 of you, including at least 100 from Australia.
- 1:26:45Any shareholder who comes from other than the US or Canada,
- 1:26:49we'll be given a special credential and instructions for
- 1:26:52attending this function. Charlie and I are lucky.
- 1:26:56We have jobs that we love and are helped every day in a myriad
- 1:26:59of ways by talented and cheerful associates.
- 1:27:03No wonder we tap dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us
- 1:27:06then getting together with our shareholder partners at
- 1:27:09Berkshire's Annual meeting. So join us on April 30th at the
- 1:27:13Quest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.
- 1:27:16February 28th, 2005 Warren E Buffett, Chairman of the Board
- 1:27:2126.