Latest / Beyond The Horizon / The United States Governments Brief In Response To Ghislaine Maxwell's Appeal Request (Part 5)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:03In this episode, we're getting right back to the United
- 0:06States Government's brief in response to Glenn Maxwell's attempt to
- 0:10appeal her sentence. B applying Section thirty two eighty three
- 0:15to Maxwell complies with Landgraph. Furthermore, under the land Graph framework,
- 0:20the two thousand and three amendment to Section thirty two
- 0:23eighty three properly applies to pre enactment conduct for which
- 0:27the statute of limitations had not expired at the time
- 0:30the amendment was passed. Because the statute of limitations had
- 0:34not expired when Congress amended section thirty two eighty three
- 0:37in two thousand and three, that amendment extended the limitations
- 0:41period for prosecuting Maxwell, rendering the charges timely. I land
- 0:46Graf Step one. At step one of the Landgraph analysis,
- 0:50the question is whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's
- 0:54proper reach land Graph five eleven us A two eighty.
- 0:58When evaluating congress Is intent at step one, this Court
- 1:02has considered both statutory text and legislative history. In re
- 1:08enter mort Acceptance Company Secretary Litigation Enterprise three ninety one FT.
- 1:14Three D four oh one, four oh six, and four
- 1:16oh eight second Circuit two thousand and four. Here, the
- 1:19text and history of Section thirty two eighty three established
- 1:22that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges
- 1:26of child sexual abuse in cases where the limitation periods
- 1:30had not yet expired. Prior to two thousand and three,
- 1:34any child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the
- 1:37victim reached the age of twenty five years, at which
- 1:40point the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution.
- 1:44In two thousand three's amendment, which was titled No Statute
- 1:48of Limitations for Child Abductions and Sex Crimes pub L.
- 1:52Number one O eight through twenty one, Section two two
- 1:56one seventeen Statute six sixty, Congress explicitly provided that no
- 2:01statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for such
- 2:05an offense shall preclude such prosecution during the life of
- 2:09a child. US Code eighteen, Section thirty two eighty three,
- 2:12two thousand and three. The amendment draws no distinction between
- 2:17pre enactment and post enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan
- 2:21explained by stating that no statute of limitations that would
- 2:24otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply the amendments.
- 2:29Planned language unambiguously requires that it applied to prosecutions for
- 2:34offenses committed before the date of enactment. Thus, the breadth
- 2:38of the text shows that Congress intended to extend the
- 2:41Statute of limitations even for a pre enactment conduct. United
- 2:45States Verus Jeffreyes four h five ft. Three d. Six
- 2:49eighty two, six eighty four, Eighth Circuit two thousand and five,
- 2:52reaching same conclusions as Section thirty two eighty three's predecessor,
- 2:57based on similar title end wording of state. Cf. Enterprise
- 3:01three ninety one ft three d at four oh seven,
- 3:04describing provision that no limitation shall terminate the period within
- 3:08which suit may be filed, as example of statute reflecting
- 3:12clear Congressional intent to apply to pre enactment conduct. Legislative
- 3:18history confirms this conclusion. In initially enacting a special statute
- 3:23of limitations for child sex abuse offenses, Congress sought to
- 3:27make it easier to prosecute offenders who commit sex crimes
- 3:30that may be difficult to detect quickly. Wingarten eight sixty
- 3:34five ft three d. At fifty four, but that limitation
- 3:38period proved to be inadequate in many cases. HR Conference
- 3:42number one oh eight through sixty six at fifty four.
- 3:46Telling lye the Conference report offered the example of a
- 3:49child rapist who cannot be prosecuted because he was identified
- 3:53as the perpetrator one day after the victim turned twenty five.
- 3:58Given that Congress bemoan those offenders who escape prosecution because
- 4:02a limitation period had expired, there is every reason to
- 4:05believe that it intended to preserve the ability to prosecute
- 4:09pre enactment offenders whose limitation periods had not yet expired.
- 4:13See the United States versus shir Chief, four thirty eight
- 4:17f Dot three d nine nine twenty four, Ninth Circuit
- 4:20two thousand and six, concluding that in enacting the two
- 4:24thousand and three Amendment, Congress evinced a clear intend to
- 4:28extend the limitations period. Maxwell notes that Congress considered and
- 4:33rejected a retroactivity clause before enacting the two thousand and
- 4:36three Amendment, but as Judge Nathan recognized, the legislative history
- 4:41makes clear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity provision because it
- 4:45would have produced unconstitutional results. A one point fifty two
- 4:50discussing co sponsor remarks expressing concern that the proposed retroactivity
- 4:55provision was a doubtful constitutionality because it would have revived
- 4:59the government its authority to prosecute crimes that were previously
- 5:02time barred. Thus, the rejection of the retroactivity clause shows
- 5:07only that Congress intended to limit the protect Act to
- 5:10its constitutional applications, including past conduct like Maxwell's, on which
- 5:15the Statute of Limitations had not yet expired. The reach
- 5:19of the two thousand and three Amendment to Section thirty
- 5:22two eighty three is clear because Congress has expressly extended
- 5:26the Statute of limitations to pre enactment conduct. Judge Nathan
- 5:29correctly resolved this analysis at land Graph step one. In
- 5:34the alternative, however, the statute is at worst ambiguous. If
- 5:38the Court takes that view, it should proceed to land
- 5:40Graph step two, which examines the retroactive effects of the
- 5:44statute two land Graph step two. As the Supreme Court
- 5:48explained in land Graph, even absence specific legislative authorization, applying
- 5:53a statute to pre enactment conduct is unquestionably proper in
- 5:57many situations. Five eleven US at two seventy three a
- 6:02statute does not operate retrospectively merely because it is applied
- 6:06in a case arising from conduct and to dating the
- 6:09statute's enactment, or of sets expectations based on prior law
- 6:14Idea two sixty nine. Instead, the question is whether the
- 6:17statute would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
- 6:21increase the party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
- 6:25duties with respect to transactions already completed Idea two eighty Importantly,
- 6:31the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after
- 6:34the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make
- 6:37the application of the rule at trial retroactive, because parties
- 6:42have diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure, and because
- 6:46rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct Idea
- 6:51two seventy five. In Vernon versus Casodaga Valley Central School District,
- 6:56forty nine f. Dot three D eight eighty six, Second Circuit,
- 7:00nineteen ninety five, this Court considered a new statute of
- 7:04limitations that shortened the time to file certain discrimination claims,
- 7:08and held that applying the new statute in a case
- 7:11filed after its enactment, but a rising out of events
- 7:15that predate its enactment is not inpermissively retroactive under landgrafh
- 7:20Ida eight eighty nine to ninety. As the Court explained,
- 7:23the conduct to which the statute of limitations applies is
- 7:27not the primary conduct of the defendants the alleged discrimination,
- 7:31but is instead the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs the
- 7:34filing of their suit id at. Eight ninety. The two
- 7:38thousand and three amendment to section thirty two eighty three
- 7:42likewise applies only to the secondary conduct of filing a
- 7:45criminal case. It does not apply to the primary conduct
- 7:49of Maxwell's child sexual abuse by, for example, modifying the
- 7:53elements of an offense to criminalize conduct that previously had
- 7:57not constituted a crime ida at. Eight ninety one. Land
- 8:01graft in other cases continents treating statutes of limitations differently
- 8:05from statutory provisions that affects substantiative rights. Thus, like the
- 8:10new statute in Vernon, the two thousand and three amendment
- 8:13impaired no rights possessed by either party, increased neither party's liability,
- 8:18nor imposed any new duties with respect to pass transactions
- 8:22id At. Eight ninety. Enterprise does not alter this conclusion. Therefore,
- 8:27this Court considered whether an amended statute of limitations operated
- 8:32to revive already expired securities fraud claims Enterprise three ninety
- 8:37one Ft. Three d at four five. While acknowledging that
- 8:40under Vernon retroactive application of a revised statute of limitations
- 8:45generally does not have an impermissible retroactive effect, the Court
- 8:49concluded that the resurrection of previously time barred claims has
- 8:53an impermissible retroactive effect id at four O nine and
- 8:56four to ten. Emphasis removed. Enterprise has no application here,
- 9:01as the limitations period for the charges against Maxwell did
- 9:05not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus,
- 9:09unlike enterprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have stripped
- 9:13defendants of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed Idea
- 9:18four ten, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge
- 9:23Nathan correctly concluded that the two thousand and three Amendment
- 9:27accordingly did not deprive Maxwell of any vested rights. To
- 9:31be sure, this Court has observed that there may be
- 9:35colorable arguments that the logic of enterprise extends to criminal
- 9:38cases where the defendant statute of limitations defense had not
- 9:43vested when the limitations period was extended, because the extension
- 9:47increases the period of time during which a defendant can
- 9:50be sued, thereby increasing a defendant's liability four pass conduct Winingarten,
- 9:55eight sixty five ft three d at fifty seven, oh
- 10:00United States versus Miller, nine to eleven f dot three
- 10:03d six thirty eight, six forty four through six forty six,
- 10:06First Circuit twenty eighteen, discussing potential defense arguments. But such
- 10:12a claim runs headlong into the vast weight of retroactivity decisions,
- 10:17which recognize that revoking a vested statute of limitations defense
- 10:22is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a
- 10:26still viable claim Winingarten, eight sixty five f dot three
- 10:30d at fifty seven. For example, in the criminal context,
- 10:34there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before
- 10:38prosecution is time barred does not run a foul of
- 10:41the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Cruz versus Maipa,
- 10:46seven seventy three f dot three d one thirty eight
- 10:49one forty five, Fourth Circuit twenty fourteen. See also Stagner
- 10:54five point thirty nine US at six thirty two, holding
- 10:57that X post facto clause does not prevent the state
- 11:00from extending time limits for prosecutions not yet time barred,
- 11:05as this Court explained long ago, while it is unfair
- 11:08and dishonest for the government to assure a man that
- 11:10he has become safe from the pursuit but then withdraw
- 11:14its assurance, it is permissible to extend a statute of
- 11:17limitations while the chase is on Falter versus the United
- 11:21States twenty three F. Dot two D four twenty four
- 11:25to twenty six, Second Circuit nineteen twenty eight l. Hand j.
- 11:29These X post facto cases are particularly instructive here because
- 11:33Landgraph and the ex post facto clause are informed by
- 11:37the same retroactivity concerns. Cruse seven seventy three F. Dot
- 11:41three D at one forty five. See also land Graph
- 11:44five eleven US at two sixty six, citing the X
- 11:48post facto clause as an expression as the entire retroactivity
- 11:52principle it was applying. Thus, applying Section thirty two eighty
- 11:56three's two thousand and three amendment to Maxwell's unexpired charges
- 12:00is permissible under LANDGRAF, as the tenh Circuit recently explained
- 12:05with respect to the very same statute of limitations that
- 12:08issue here. By extending the unexpired statute of limitations, Congress
- 12:12did not increase defendant's exposure to prosecution retroactively. It did
- 12:17not raise the penalty for the charge defense. It did
- 12:20not redefine the offense to make it easier to establish.
- 12:23It did not expose defendant to criminal prosecution anew. It
- 12:26merely altered the ongoing charging period for the conduct that
- 12:30had already exposed him to criminal prosecution. Defendant was subject
- 12:34to indictment in two thousand and two before the statutes
- 12:38of limitations were extended, and he remained the subject to
- 12:41indictment in two thousand and seven once the changes were made.
- 12:45A dead charge was not resurrected, and the underlying nature
- 12:48of defendant's potential criminal liability remained the same. United States
- 12:53versus Piot forty five f. Fourth Circuit eleven forty two,
- 12:57eleven sixty one and sixty two ten Circuit twenty twenty two.
- 13:02The decisions of other courts of appeals are in accord
- 13:05sure Chief four thirty eight f. Dot three d At
- 13:08nine twenty two through twenty five. Jeffreys four O. Five
- 13:12F dot three d at six eighty five. Maxwell cites
- 13:16United States versus Richardson five twelve F Dot two D
- 13:19one oh five Third Circuit nineteen seventy five, and two
- 13:23District court decisions that are bound to follow it BR
- 13:26fifty eight and fifty nine. But Richardson, which was decided
- 13:30before Landgraf, is inconsistent with Landgraf. United States versus Nator
- 13:35four twenty five F Dot supp three D six one
- 13:38nine six thirty Eastern District, Virginia, twenty nineteen. Specifically, Richardson
- 13:44focused on weather. Congress expressed a clear intention to overcome
- 13:48the presumption against retroactivity five twelve F Dot two d
- 13:53at one o six without engaging in Landgraf second step
- 13:56I e. Considering whether the statute would have retroactive effect
- 14:01land Graph five eleven US at two eighty. Moreover, unlike
- 14:04the two thousand and three amendment, the statute at issue
- 14:07in Richardson did not expressly provide that no statute of
- 14:11limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of the relevant offense
- 14:15shall preclude prosecution under terms of the amended statute. In
- 14:21some the statute of limitations for the charges in the
- 14:24indictment had not yet expired when the two thousand and
- 14:27three amendment to Section thirty two eighty three extended the
- 14:30limitations period, and Judge Nathan correctly determined that applying the
- 14:34two thousand and three Amendment in this case does not
- 14:37create impermissible retroactive effects. Therefore, step two of land graph
- 14:42is satisfied and Section thirty two eighty three applies retroactively
- 14:48see Winegarden, eight sixty five ft. Three d At fifty five.
- 14:51If a statute would not create impermissible retroactive effects, then
- 14:55the court shall apply the statute to antecedent conduct according
- 14:59to the charges were timely. All right, folks, we're gonna
- 15:02wrap up this episode right here, and in the next
- 15:05episode we're gonna pick up where we left off with
- 15:08Section thirty two eighty three reaches count three and count four.
- 15:12All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 15:15be found in the description box.