Latest / The Team House / Assistant Secretary of Special Ops and Low Intensity Conflict | Mike Vickers | Ep. 249
Transcript
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- 0:48and the Team House with your hopes. Jack Murphy and David Bark Hi,
- 1:02Everyone, Welcome to episode two hundred and forty nine of The Team House.
- 1:04I'm Jack Murphy here with David Park and joining us for part two of our
- 1:08interview is Mike Vickers. Mike served in the CIA and tenth Special Forces Group
- 1:15and we talked about that on last Friday's episode Tonight's episode, we're going to
- 1:19talk about his time primarily at ASD. Solik. He served as the Assistant
- 1:25Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and then went on to
- 1:30work at USDI. So there's actually a lot to talk about in his book
- 1:36by all means available, actually more than we're going to be able to talk
- 1:40about in this interview, but we'll try to get to some interesting parts.
- 1:44And Mike, thank you again for joining us. Oh I'm sorry, you
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- 5:00or from a little burg. So, Mike, thank you for joining us
- 5:05for part two. We'll pick up kind of where we left off. You
- 5:11left the agency, you went and pursued your PhD, got a consulting.
- 5:15Tell us a little bit about your life after service leading up to kind of
- 5:19getting called back in once again. Sure so, Yeah. The first thing
- 5:26I did was get an MBA from the Wharton School and then decided did a
- 5:30couple of ventures. Want an externally find fund a venture in the biotech instrumentation
- 5:38area and then an internal venture in information services that did fairly well and that
- 5:45financed the PhD program for me. And while I was completing my PhD,
- 5:53I co founded a think tank Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. I did
- 5:57the strategy part of it, and then I also started working for the legendary
- 6:01Andy Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment for several decades in the Pentagon,
- 6:08working on a emerging revolution and military affairs, you know, big change in
- 6:14the way wars might be fought in over the next several decades and the rise
- 6:17of China, and that took me up through nine to eleven and then after
- 6:24nine to eleven increasingly drawn into that world until President Bush asked me to come
- 6:29in to an expanded position as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. So let's I
- 6:38want to start off a little bit we asking you what asd soul it is,
- 6:42because unless you kind of exist in the national security or the special operations
- 6:46field, there are some folks out there who don't know what that office is,
- 6:48or what its importance is or the role it plays. Sure so after
- 6:56some of our challenges in the nineteen eighties, the failed Irani and Rescue attempt
- 7:02to a rescue attempt to rescue our hostages held captive in Iran in nineteen eighty,
- 7:09and then the invasion of Grenada led to a series of reforms Goldwater Nichols
- 7:15Act that changed a lot about the senior ranks of the Pentagon, but also
- 7:20a year later in the non Cohen Amendment, the creation of Special Operations Command
- 7:27and also a civilian official essentially a service secretary light the Assistant Secretary of Defense
- 7:33for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in the Pentagon in the Policy Organization,
- 7:41and that organization continues to exist today with the oversight over our special operations forces,
- 7:49capabilities and operations. When I was offered the job, just during my
- 7:58tenure, they expanded the position and even more on godly acronym called Assistant Secretary
- 8:05for Special Operations, Low Intensity, Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities or solik ICK,
- 8:11which doesn't suff it's an acronym, but it gave me oversight, policy oversight
- 8:18over all of the department's operational capabilities, so the strategic capabilities that had previously
- 8:24been under another Assistant secretary, so nuclear weapons, space, missile defense,
- 8:30cyber and then what was the Office of Force Transformation, you know how we
- 8:37needed to transform our military services Army, Navy or force Marine corps over the
- 8:45next twenty years. And then the traditional special operations, counter terrors and portfolio.
- 8:50So it was a very big portfolio and a very very good one.
- 8:56Were these extra responsibilities that you saw out or things that came to you,
- 9:01It sounds like maybe you were you were reaching for these things too. You
- 9:03had an interest in this. Well, when I started working on the rise
- 9:09of China, you know, in the revolution and military affairs, it kind
- 9:13of naturally gave me the background for this, but they kind of created the
- 9:18job or expanded the job to get me to come back into government to do
- 9:20it. So in two thousand and six, President Bush or his senior staff
- 9:28asked me in two retired four star Special Operations Generals Wayne Downing and well the
- 9:37other one conventional Force Barry McCaffrey, a great, great combat leader, to
- 9:41come into the Oval office to talk about a rock strategy when it wasn't going
- 9:46well in two thousand and six. And then coming out of that, President
- 9:50Bush called Secretary Don Rumsfeld and said we should try to get Vickers back into
- 9:56government. And so after that they created this position, and the Under Secretary
- 10:03for Policy, Eric Gateelman called me in and said, hey, he wrote
- 10:05this book on the revolution and war, and we've got a job for you
- 10:09that combines this with special You're you know, it is flattery and stuff,
- 10:15but you know you're the only guy who can do this, so you have
- 10:16to say yes. So that's how it came about. So there's one thing
- 10:22I do want to ask you about, or even I don't want to say
- 10:26challenge, but I do have something that interesting that I think it's even on
- 10:31the ASD soul like website and you mentioned it too. I believe that it
- 10:37provides oversight but also advocacy for the special operations community, which on the surface
- 10:43of things to me almost sounds like a contradiction in terms. And I was
- 10:48just wondering if you could explain a little bit more like, how does that
- 10:50office do these two perform these two functions at the same time, and what
- 10:54does that entail. Yeah, so the idea, you know, coming out
- 10:58of these reforms was to make sure that special Operations forces voice was adequately represented
- 11:07in the Pentagon and the military services, and so, you know, part
- 11:11of it was done by the creation of this hybrid combatant command. You know,
- 11:16Special Operations Command is a unique command and then it is both sort of
- 11:22like a service and also an operational command with subordinate operational commands. But it
- 11:28does, you know, man, train, and equip the things the military
- 11:31service would do for special operations forces, including procurement and career development and others.
- 11:37And it's had a very positive impact on the growth of SOFT but also
- 11:43getting SOFT leaders into key positions into the general and flag officer ranks and others.
- 11:50And then the ASD Solik and in my day, solc at Ic is
- 11:56really designed to provide the same function in the Pentagon integrate and all the pentagons
- 12:01processes. And you know, some people equate oversight with a negative term,
- 12:07but it really, you know, at least from my point of view,
- 12:13advocacy and oversight come together in a sense of making sure that special operations are
- 12:20adequately funded but also properly used and integrated more fully into the rest of the
- 12:30department. And the das d's under ASD SOLC also provide like the inspector general
- 12:35capabilities and things, if I understand correctly, well, they provide policy oversight,
- 12:43but they're more functionally aligned. So again my day was different because I
- 12:48had people with nuclear oversight of nuclear weapons and force transformation and others. But
- 12:54there's typically a dazz D for special ops and counter terrorism and then maybe one
- 12:58for or it changes over the years. It can be peacekeeping or stability operations
- 13:05and counterinsurgency that also integrates with the conventional forces when we're in that kind of
- 13:11war, you know, broader policy in that area. And then sometimes there's
- 13:16a budget DASDY that's you know, working with SOCOM on the budget, et
- 13:20cetera. Mike out of curiosity, you know, you went from special forces
- 13:24to the CIA and then into these more leadership positions, and you had you
- 13:30had a great understanding knowledge and you know the spread of knowledge for these types
- 13:35of operations in that type of position. How important is that because a lot
- 13:41of times we see like civilians with no military experience and no intelligence experience getting
- 13:46put in these roles. Is is that a deficit or is is it so
- 13:50more of an overwatched position where it really doesn't matter if they have that experience.
- 13:54Well, I think it's very helpful one. You know, generally for
- 14:03policy advice at the higher levels of our government to the Secretary of Defense,
- 14:07but if you're also representing the department in the White House and deputies, you
- 14:11know, it helps to have an operational grounding. Most senior government officials on
- 14:16the civilian side don't. And you know, it just reflects the nature of
- 14:20our country and how you know, one percent of the population serves in the
- 14:26military, so you're drawing from a smaller pool. And it's very different than
- 14:31the world we found ourselves in coming out of World War Two, where you
- 14:35know, everybody was a veteran right so several decades we had a different government
- 14:39in some respects in terms of people who had experienced war and you know,
- 14:43had some degree of operational expertise. Now, you know, to be most
- 14:48relevant, that expertise needs to be aligned to the problems of the day,
- 14:52just like our top military officials. You know, you pick a great officer,
- 14:56but they might have spent their career preparing for air warfare against the Soviets
- 15:01and then suddenly they find them overseeing a war against al Qaeda. You know,
- 15:05there they've got a lot of operational experience, not necessarily the right kind,
- 15:09right, And so you know, the effectiveness depends on that for you
- 15:16know, to some extent, but when particularly you're engaged in operations. Uh,
- 15:22it's just invaluable to have to have that kind of experience, at least
- 15:26in part of your team. Right. And then one more question that uh
- 15:31I wanted to ask you last week, but I think it's really good this
- 15:33week. Is you know, you were very involved with the Afghan war,
- 15:37uh uh, you know, against the Russians and and understood a large part
- 15:43of what it took to bring them down. What were your initial impressions and
- 15:48then developing impressions with our with our war in Afghanistan? Yeah, so it
- 15:56went in a couple of phases, you know, last over two decades.
- 16:00And you know, the initial takedown of the Taliban regime was really done brilliantly,
- 16:06you know, combining Special Operations forces with CIA and then with American air
- 16:11power and the Afghan resistance, and it really allowed the Afghan resistance to you
- 16:18know, do a lot of the big ground campaign by that combination of assets.
- 16:21And you know, so you had depending on how you count it,
- 16:27a few hundred if you just take the CIA and Special Operators, you know,
- 16:32maybe for four hundred plus with the Afghan resistance that started only ten thousand
- 16:38or so and then built up a bit over time, defeating a Taliban force
- 16:44of fifty thousand. You know, so it really was leveraging American air power
- 16:48and assistance and other things. And then you know, not to slight the
- 16:52brigade of Marines that then Brigadier General Jim Mattis led into southern Afghanistan, you'd
- 16:59still only get to under five thousand or so American boots on the ground.
- 17:03So a really really successful campaign that worked in a couple of months. You
- 17:07know. The one unfortunate part about it is al Kaeda leaders, you know,
- 17:11largely got away, some to Iran and many to Pakistan, including Osama
- 17:17bin Laden, and we had to deal with them later. And then for
- 17:23the first few years of the war, you know, it was pretty modest,
- 17:29and we made some mistakes by trying to build a central centralized military force
- 17:36and a very decentralized country. Afghanistan has made up of a lot of different
- 17:41ethnic groups and it's been governed historically decentralized for most of its history in a
- 17:48small military and so as the Taliban started recovering and coming back in, the
- 17:53US had to take up more and more of the burden and eventually leading to
- 18:00a big surge of forces that still couldn't win the war given the Pakistan sanctuary.
- 18:07And you know, so we achieved our objective at the end of twenty
- 18:11years in terms of preventing another nine to eleven attack out of there. We
- 18:15had successfully transitioned, although I think it took too long to building up Afghan
- 18:21forces and then supporting them. We did that by twenty fifteen, but then
- 18:26we just gave it away, you know, in twenty twenty one, and
- 18:29allowed the Taliban to come back in. And that's the great tragedy of it.
- 18:33So it's a war really in multiple parts with different roles. Special operations
- 18:38forces certainly acquitted themselves very well in raids and building up Afghan forces and doing
- 18:47out in the rural areas with the Afghan local police and village stability ops and
- 18:52so a lot of big contributions to the effort. But now sadly Alabama in
- 18:56power. So as you came in and took this huge portfolio in asd Solick,
- 19:04I mean, the amount of things that you touched upon in the subsequent
- 19:08years is pretty dizzying. But I tried to pick out just a couple of
- 19:12them for the sake of the interview. And one of them that I wanted
- 19:17to talk to you about that you had some involvement in dealing with that doesn't
- 19:22get talked about as often as maybe it should be, especially considering its sort
- 19:26of a success story in the long run. Is the farc insurgency in Colombia.
- 19:33Can you talk to us a little bit about when you first sort of
- 19:36put your hands on that problem set and your perceptions of it, how that
- 19:40evolved during your time in office. Sure, so, you know, I
- 19:44had global responsibility for operations and the full breadth of the Department's operational capabilities,
- 19:49and so the two things I really focused on in Latin America since most of
- 19:56my attention was al Qaeda and the wars in the Middle East and Iran nuclear
- 20:00program and things like that. And then for the modernization parts of the portfolio
- 20:06still the rise of China and then later dealing with a troublesome Russia. But
- 20:11in Latin America it was really Colombia with the Marxist insurgency and then the drugs
- 20:17coming out of there and then Mexican drug cartels. You know, those were
- 20:21the two big areas for me there. And you know, my engagement with
- 20:26Columbia goes back to my time as essentially a commander as in the third of
- 20:34the seventh Special Forces, when my two odas were tasked with collecting intelligence in
- 20:41case we needed to do hostage rescues of a taken over embassy, and Columbia
- 20:47was on that list along with El Salvador and lots of others. And then
- 20:51the threat was a terrorist group called M nineteen, although the FARC was still
- 20:56around, and you know M nineteen had done a bunch of takeovers. But
- 21:02then you know the problem in Columbia morphed into the drug problem with Pablo Escobar
- 21:08and others, and so Special Operations Forces played a pretty big role in beating
- 21:14back that threat in the late eighties and nineties. And then finally the far
- 21:19consurgency, which had been around since the nineteen sixties, and another group called
- 21:23the eln really was on the gates or at the gates of Bogata at the
- 21:30end of the Clinton administration. You know, they had controlled a lot of
- 21:33the country and were intermixed with the druggies, and so that started planned Columbia
- 21:41at the end of Clinton and then the beginning of the George W. Bush,
- 21:45a lot of military assistants and the small numbers of Special Operations advisors and
- 21:52then others with the Colombian National Police, including some retired Special Forces people that
- 21:56I had served with them back in the day. And with the election of
- 22:03Ovarro Rube as the president I think it was two thousand and three or so,
- 22:10and the expansion of Columbia's armed forces, they gradually started pushing the FARC
- 22:15back. And so my involvement really started as a senior policy official in two
- 22:22thousand and eight, about a year into the job, as an assistant secretary
- 22:29when we had the opportunity to resolve a hostage crisis. Three American northwik government
- 22:36employees were being held there for five years and by the FARC deep in Colombia's
- 22:42interior, and along with former presidential candidate Ingrid Bettencore and eleven Colombian soldiers and
- 22:52the Colombian special forces, devised a really brilliant plan to trick the FARC into
- 23:00handing them over to what they thought was an NGO and actually rescued those fifteen
- 23:04people. So my first trip to Colombia, and must have been almost thirty
- 23:14years twenty five years at that point, was really to oversee the preparations of
- 23:18this operation and then to talk about strategy for dealing with the FARC. And
- 23:26I should also mention the third leg of the stool was some of the FARC
- 23:30leaders were deep in Colombia's interior, but somewhere in Venezuela, and some were
- 23:37in Ecuador. And the Colombians with our assistants, had just done a strike
- 23:41on a leader in Ecuador right in the border region, and there was volumes
- 23:45of intelligence gathered from that that then I wanted to talk to the Colombians about
- 23:51their successful precision strike and a campaign against the FARC leadership, but also the
- 23:57big intelligence take that we just got. And so over the next four years,
- 24:03every couple of years, I would meet with top Colombian officials, particularly
- 24:10a Minister of Defense who remains a good friend to this day, one Carlos
- 24:15Pinzone, to dismantle the FARC. Even more so, within a period of
- 24:23ten twelve years, the FARK went down from having twenty thousand troops to a
- 24:33few thousand or so and then started the peace negotiations that occurred over the last
- 24:41several years. How did that happen? Was it strictly like direct action?
- 24:47Were their civilian operations? Like how does that happen to take an organization like
- 24:52the park from twenty thousand to two thousand or whatever their numbers were. But
- 24:56one was the expansion of the Colombian our forces to push deeper into the Colombian
- 25:03hinterlands. And the National National Police, which is very good in police intelligence
- 25:11and I can't I don't want to say his name, but the head of
- 25:14National Police intelligence was a good friend of mine as well, who really ran
- 25:18a great organization. And then there was a precision strike campaign against the FARC
- 25:23leaders that you know, it's really a combination. It's sort of like our
- 25:29predator campaigns against al Qaeda, you know, combination of great intelligence with precision
- 25:33weapons, and it took a number of them off the battlefield, even if
- 25:37they were in adjacent countries, but mostly deep in Columbia's interior. And then
- 25:47our special operations advisors both with the police and with the military, and we're
- 25:52working with both conventional forces and the special operations forces also helped pushed on the
- 26:00FARC. And then you know, at the end of the day, it
- 26:03was also an amnesty program to reintegrate people who didn't you know, want to
- 26:07live in the jungle forever and wanted their kids to go to school, and
- 26:11you know, and whatever reason they joined this Marxist insurgency, you know twenty
- 26:17years ago, they didn't want that to be their whole life. And so
- 26:19combination of those things really helped reduce the FARC's influence dramatically. Is a pretty
- 26:29stark change from you know, if you think back to I guess the late
- 26:32nineties or early two thousands, some people speculated that Colombia would become our next
- 26:37Vietnam. Yes, it turned out very differently. It turned out very differently.
- 26:41And one of the big lessons of it is that one we did that
- 26:45with assistance and with you know, one hundred or so special operators at a
- 26:49time advising, so really highly leveraged without you know, a big war on
- 26:56our part. And then second, it took forty five years. Yes,
- 27:00wasn't It had ups and downs. It wasn't something that was won overnight.
- 27:03Right, you know, the endgame the last decade was decisive and all in
- 27:08the right direction. But you know, before that there had been all kinds
- 27:12of things, and you know, being the drug capital of the world,
- 27:15and so you know, it shows the value of strategic persistence. Yeah,
- 27:19the military to military relationship goes back to like the Korean War, I believe.
- 27:25Yes, they fought in Korea and and and after they had largely beaten
- 27:30back the FARC, they helped other governments with trainers and other things, you
- 27:38know, exporting there now greater military capability. Do you think we would have
- 27:44been as interested if it was not a Marxist movement, if it was just
- 27:48a criminal movement, if it posed a real national security threat. I mean,
- 27:55because that's a really good question, because there were other places, you
- 27:59know, I spent a lot of time in Central America in the early eighties
- 28:02when that was a major foreign policy focus. You know, it was beset
- 28:07by criminal problems, but I had too many other things on my plate to
- 28:11even the nostalgia I felt for the region to spend much time there. So
- 28:17Mexico because it was a big country, and the drug problem became a national
- 28:22security threat, not only for the effects that was having on the United States
- 28:27and today even worse with fentanyl, but the stabilizing effects that was having in
- 28:33Mexico that the government might actually fall and it might become a failed narco state.
- 28:38And so that in Columbia really really got my attention. Do you feel
- 28:44any point in time, because people on not just different sides of the aisles,
- 28:48but just people have different opinions, will call out for different things.
- 28:52Do you see at any point in time where the cartels that are active in
- 28:56Mexico right now will be deemed like a national security threat to the point of
- 29:02the same type of intervention. Well, in a sense of you know,
- 29:10the relationship with Mexico has been a little more politically dicey than ours with Columbia,
- 29:15to say the least, but we have provided assistance to them both with
- 29:21training and intelligence to help them go after the cartels. You know, it's
- 29:26a big, big business, and the cartels are formidable military organizations and there's
- 29:33plenty of them, and so this is not something that can be one in
- 29:37a day. You know. One of the things I point out in the
- 29:40book is we took some of our counter terrorism lessons and applied it to the
- 29:45cartels and had had success in enabling Mexican special operations forces to capture or kill
- 29:53cartel leaders, but it barely put a dent in the in the problem because
- 29:57other cartels move, and you know, decapitation as a strategy in this area
- 30:04is just not very good. You actually have to you know, own the
- 30:07territory at the end of the day, and you know, really reduce or
- 30:12eliminate as much as you can the organizations. And that's that's tough, you
- 30:17know, and it took us time in Colombia. Mexico is a tougher problem,
- 30:19and things like Fenton will make it still a tougher problem yet, because
- 30:23you don't have to have these big growing areas or you know, right right,
- 30:30And the other thing I want to ask you about from this time period
- 30:33around two thousand and nine, you write in your book about playing a part
- 30:38in the approval process to have more Predator orbits pushed to Pakistan. And I
- 30:44want to ask you a little bit about you had this previous experience launching covert
- 30:49operations in Afghanistan from Pakistan. Now it's sort of the other way around,
- 30:53and you're in Afghanistan launching covert operations into Pakistan, even if it's a quite
- 31:00public campaign. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about
- 31:03about that experience and about the Predator program around that timeframe. Sure, So,
- 31:11you know, the Predator is developed in the late nineties, as an
- 31:15earlier version of the aircraft is used in the Balkans, and then it makes
- 31:19its first flight over Afghanistan in September two thousand and Actually a Predator then sees
- 31:33Osama bin Laden in a camp near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, but it's not
- 31:37armed, and so then that starts the idea that you know, we need
- 31:44these aircraft and we need them to not just have censors on them, but
- 31:48weapons, so that when you get an opportunity to strike, you can do
- 31:51it. But then you know, nine to eleven happens, and we have
- 31:56the invasion of Afghanistan and predator plays a little role in that conflict. It
- 32:00helps take out al Qaeda's number three, Muhammad Atev in Kabble with a marine
- 32:06fighter aircraft providing the final strike. And then between two thousand and four and
- 32:14two thousand and eight there's some or two thousand and seven, there's some predator
- 32:20strikes in the Pakistan border region. You know, as El Qaeda had fled
- 32:22into Pakistan, first into the cities and then came back into the border region
- 32:28was more secure, predators started to be used a little bit there as well
- 32:34as helping our special operators in Iraq against al Qaeda in Iraq and in Afghanistan
- 32:40against the Taliban. And in two thousand and six we have a very worrisome
- 32:47development. A threat to the American homeland goes way up. But we have
- 32:52this transatlantic airliner plot where a number of operatives in the United Kingdom planned to
- 32:58blow up ten airliners en route to the United States and kill three thousand plus
- 33:02people. And it's broken up by good intelligence in Pakistan. The leader of
- 33:07this is in Pakistan. He gets killed in a predator strike. A couple
- 33:10of years after that two thousand and eight Rashid Grove. But that then triggers
- 33:17we have to start denying this sanctuary, and so President Bush tasked the Department
- 33:25of Defense and Secretary Gates tasked me in particular, and then the counter Terrorism
- 33:31Center at CIA to come up with a joint strategy to go after this sanctuary
- 33:37between two thousand and seven and two thousand and eight, and Predator is very
- 33:42central to that, to do the surveillance of these al Qaeda operatives in leaders
- 33:51in the region. But also we had developed a campaign to do special operations,
- 33:55raids that would be cross border, a couple of other things, and
- 34:00then joint capture operations with the Pakistanis to try to seal off the kill zone,
- 34:05if you will, you know where they'd be vulnerable to these things.
- 34:08And the Pakistanis thought we did one raid in two thousand and eight. They
- 34:15thought it was a violation of their sovereignty. The Pakistani people would question,
- 34:20how come you know a military is invading us, so to speak, when
- 34:23we've got a big army that we're paying for. But the Predator was a
- 34:27capability they didn't have, and so they continued to support that, and so
- 34:31with some innovations that we really broadened our target list. We expanded the number
- 34:37of orbits dramatically, so we went from a couple of orbits an orbit is
- 34:44you know, one air keeping one aircraft twenty four to seven over a target
- 34:47area, so you may need three to make one or two to make one,
- 34:52depending on the distances. And then we went up to eight first and
- 34:59then eventually fourteen and then more for Yemen and other parts of the world.
- 35:04So it became our really strategic counter terrorism war instrument, and it produced really
- 35:09great results. Suddenly we're taking a lot of top al Qaeda leaders off the
- 35:15battlefield. From two thousand and eight to twenty twelve, about fifty plus overall
- 35:21in that border region, and then more in Yemen and elsewhere as well.
- 35:28I remember, you know, the program in Pakistan being pretty intensely criticized at
- 35:32the time concerns about collateral damage. But in time it does seem like it
- 35:38effectively hollowed out the al Qaeda organization to the I mean to the point where
- 35:43I mean, by the time we get to like twenty eleven, they're trying
- 35:45to send their guys to Syria to start up something there because they're not effective
- 35:51in Pakistan. Yeah, it's exactly right. I mean, one of the
- 35:53things that keeps al qaedolive after this, after twenty twelve is that they were
- 35:59able to create these franchises elsewhere in Yemen, in Syria and Somalia and North
- 36:05Africa gave him longer life, but in Iraq for a while as well,
- 36:09with al Qaida in Iraq. And you know, the the civilian casualties bit
- 36:17is one that's subject to huge disagreement. There are a number of private organizations
- 36:27NGOs internationally and domestic who claimed that, you know, a few thousand civilians
- 36:31were killed or so. The US government released numbers in twenty sixteen, and
- 36:37the number is somewhere between you know, the low sixties to maybe one hundred,
- 36:42with twenty five hundred al Qaeda operatives taken off the battlefield and fifty plus
- 36:49top leaders. So it's about as precise as you can make an air campaign
- 36:54as you can get, you know, ninety eight percent, you know,
- 36:59something just taking out a combatant, you know, and sometimes we would wait
- 37:05for a couple of months to strike an al Qaeda leader when he got away
- 37:09from his family, you know, just waiting until the opportunity came, you
- 37:15know, in close proximity or something. So you know, it's about as
- 37:17precise as you can make it. And by the time we get to twenty
- 37:22ten, you had this new offer to go over to USDI. Can you
- 37:28tell us a little bit about how that came about? Sure, So the
- 37:32first thing that happened is, you know, I when I was asked to
- 37:37come into the Bush administration, I thought it would be for two years.
- 37:40You know, typically when you serve at a high level, and I wasn't
- 37:44a political person, but when you serve at a high level in you know,
- 37:47an administration, you're assume that you know, when the administration's done,
- 37:52you're done. And then President Obama asked Secretary Gates to stay on, and
- 38:00then Jim Clapper, who was USDI at the time and later became our Director
- 38:06of National Intelligence. And then me is the assistant secretary for Solok and ICE
- 38:15and so then in two than and ten, so that was unusual to have,
- 38:20you know, people in very senior positions transitioned from Republican to Democrat or
- 38:24vice versa. And then in twenty ten, when Clapper became d and I
- 38:30they asked me to become the under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and so
- 38:36then I was actually for six weeks because the Congress wasn't confirming people, and
- 38:43they said I would be confirmed unanimously. They had me do both jobs,
- 38:47and then I got soon as the Congress came back, they confirmed me unanimously,
- 38:53and I was USDI from early twenty eleven. On same question, I'm
- 39:00afraid for people who are not in intelligence community national security circles. What is
- 39:07USDI? What is the important role that they play? Yeah, so this
- 39:09was a post nine to eleven innovation. Like the Director of National Intelligence you
- 39:14know, didn't exist before, so Solik you know, created in the late
- 39:17nineteen eighties. USDI was created in two thousand and two, two thousand and
- 39:22three, and then the Director of National Intelligence two thousand and five. And
- 39:28the logic behind USDI, this is something that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted a lot.
- 39:32Was he had you know, seventy percent of the intelligence community, all of
- 39:38the big agencies except CIA and others who were part of other government departments,
- 39:45mostly staff organizations, except for Justice, where you had you know, FBI
- 39:51and Drug Enforcement Administration and no one really we're seeing this in the Pentagon,
- 40:00you know. So so everything concerning defense intelligence would have to come up to
- 40:06the Deputy Secretary Defense or secretary, and so he wanted given we were in
- 40:12a big intelligence war, they wanted to create this organization and they did.
- 40:19And I was the third Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence and the Undersecretary is
- 40:27also dual had it as the Director of Military Intelligence Defense Intelligence under the Director
- 40:35of National Intelligence too. Because the relationship with the d and I is important,
- 40:40they're shared resources. The d and I directs the National Intelligence program,
- 40:46the USDI directs the military intelligence program. But all those defense agencies, the
- 40:52National Security Agency, the defense intelligence agencies, they work for both masters,
- 40:58both the secret career of Defense through the usd I and the d n I,
- 41:02And so that relationship with the dn I is very important. I think
- 41:07I confused myself earlier talking about oversight and ag capability. That's actually usd I
- 41:14that sends the IGS down to different places. Correct, Well, there's a
- 41:22no, I mean, there's a separate Intelligence Oversight Executive that really is just
- 41:30aimed at making sure compliance. That's separate usd I, but it's very small.
- 41:38Usdi's job is more, you know, the budget and capabilities and of
- 41:46these defense intelligence organizations, so not only the big four n G A,
- 41:52n S, A, n RO, O, and d I, but
- 41:54all the intelligence organizations of the military services and Combatant Command. So it's uh,
- 42:00you know, it's roughly an eighty billion dollar budget, a couple hundred
- 42:07thousand employees, uh, you know, a mix of civilians and military about
- 42:12half and half or so. And you know, it's a big it's a
- 42:15big enterprise, the defense intelligence enterprise. And then given that I had been
- 42:22a policymaker, had served on top White House committees, Deputies committees, and
- 42:27others, they asked me to continue that role too. So I continued kind
- 42:32of the countercris and portfolio for the Bin Laden raid and our predator campaigns against
- 42:38al Qaeda and all that, which was what's you know, something that previous
- 42:44usdis hadn't done. But you know, I was asked to continue. Well,
- 42:49you know, you had been a SF, you've been CIA. Were
- 42:52how familiar were you with d I, A and and the human side of
- 42:57the military up until that point, So from a special forces perspective, I
- 43:02was, and then a little bit from my CIA days, but you know,
- 43:09I was a consumer of the NROS products and nsas products and stuff.
- 43:15And then now I had more responsibility to build their capabilities. What's the next
- 43:21generation of satellite's going to look like? How do we stay ahead of so
- 43:25we can continue to break codes and collect different types of communications. You know,
- 43:30as you go to you know, faster and faster and higher volume communication
- 43:37systems, fiber optics, you know, you go from ten g a second
- 43:42to one hundred g or whatever. You know, you got to keep up
- 43:45with that. Well, what's the learning curve like that for somebody coming Well,
- 43:51I'd already dealt with nuclear weapons and stealth bombers and lots of other stuff
- 43:54from my Special Forces and CIA days, so this was just another area.
- 44:00But there is a steep learning curve for those things, that's true. And
- 44:04unfortunately, again, you know, having the interdependent capabilities added on to the
- 44:09SOLIK made me as an assistant secretary even though I didn't oversee intelligence, to
- 44:15deal with those organizations a lot as a customer, so that helped. I
- 44:20had four years of kind of understudy. Yeah, and I gotta I gotta
- 44:24ask, of course. Uh, you write in your book that you know
- 44:29we're getting around this timeframe that you were one of the very first people under
- 44:34do D that got read on that we think we have something on high value
- 44:39target number one. And I was wondering if you could tell us like what
- 44:44that experience was like, what it was like going through all that and kind
- 44:47of the lead up to strike itself. Sure, so you know, one
- 44:53of the main reasons I was brought back into government was to deal with the
- 44:58growing al Qaeda threat, which with our predators and other things, in addition
- 45:04to a lot of other duties. But bin Laden was certainly on my mind
- 45:07a lot. And you know, it took us nine years to find him
- 45:13after he escaped from the Tora Bora Mountains in December two thousand and one,
- 45:17and you know, in sort of piece by piece to learn how he communicated
- 45:24with al Qaeda through a courier, who that courier was, where he was
- 45:30located, and then finally to be able to geolocate him and follow him back
- 45:35to that compound. And so in two thousand and seven when I became an
- 45:38assistant secretary, bin Laden was thought to be somewhere in northern Pakistan, but
- 45:45a big ellipse that could be all along the border region north to south,
- 45:51then east to west, a bit too, and you know, there were
- 45:55cells working, our teams working on finding him, but you know, we
- 46:02weren't super close. We first learned the nom daguer or Kunyan Arabic of his
- 46:12courier, and then a few years later learned his ethnic identity and true name
- 46:20where he was from, and then about him and his family. And then
- 46:24he was very operational security conscious. He wouldn't turn on his phone until he
- 46:30was ninety minutes away from ben Laden's house. And so there were a couple
- 46:37of glimpses of him, but not enough to fix him, as we say,
- 46:42to track him back to the compound. And so a year before we
- 46:47actually found him, we had one of those and I thought, oh my
- 46:51goodness, you know, we got him, and then we lost them,
- 46:53you know, and it was very high and then very low, and then
- 46:58sure enough, several months later, it was called into a special meeting with
- 47:04the vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Deputy CIA Director was briefing the
- 47:08two of us that they think they had found Ben Laden in late August twenty
- 47:13ten. And so this was a series of briefings of how they did it
- 47:19and all the habits, and then what we learned about the house. Once
- 47:22we saw the house, and even some glimpses of bin Laden walking around a
- 47:27courtyard. We ended up seeing him five times before the raid that actually killed
- 47:32him in early May twenty eleven. But all that was presented and I thought,
- 47:39now we're going to get him, you know. So that was my
- 47:42first reaction that very likely he's there. It wasn't definitive, but it seemed
- 47:49very likely he was there. And at the same time the Vice Chairman and
- 47:52I were being brief the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
- 47:58were being briefed by Leon Panett, the CIA director, and so the four
- 48:04of us was it for the entire Department of Defense. So there were a
- 48:07handful of people in the White House with President, Vice President, very top
- 48:12officials, people working on it at CIA, very very small group and with
- 48:16support from NSA and MGA, and then the four of us in the Department
- 48:22of Defense. And that was it for the US government for some months because
- 48:28they wanted a military option. No, they well more as policy makers,
- 48:35but there could be a military option. So from the time I was read
- 48:39in in the early fall of twenty ten until the end of the twenty ten,
- 48:50we just focused on the intelligence case and trying to get more intelligence,
- 48:54which we did get some not as much as we would have liked. And
- 49:00then right before Christmas, President Obama's National Security advisor Tom Donellan, on direction
- 49:07of the President, told Leon Panetta that he wanted to start looking at operational
- 49:15options. So I was called over to CIA with a small team to start
- 49:21developing these operations. You know, do we do it unilaterally or do we
- 49:24do it with the pakistanis Do we do a ground raid or do we do
- 49:30an air strike? And fleshing the pros and cons and how we would do
- 49:34this, what kind of raid do we do? You know, how do
- 49:36we infiltrate to the target area, et cetera. And putting this together and
- 49:43then progressively and so then at one point then for the raid option, Secretary
- 49:54Panetta says, we need now to look at a military option, and we
- 50:00need to bring in Admiral Bill mccraven, the commander of the Joint Special Operations
- 50:05Command. So I called Bill up who was in Afghanistan at the time,
- 50:08and say, please come to Washington. We got a brief you on something,
- 50:13and he and I go to CIA and they give him the briefing that
- 50:15I had gotten some months earlier, and then and then he starts developing feasibility
- 50:24with a couple planners. And then at CIA we build a mock up of
- 50:32the facility so that if we do decide to start looking at a military option,
- 50:37we have that ready for the force. And then the forces assembled in
- 50:49second half of March to this facility and they get briefed on it for the
- 50:54first time, you know, the handpicked force that's going to go to the
- 50:59ground operationation or possibly if the President approves it. And at the same time,
- 51:05we had gone to war with Libya, and so when they were called
- 51:07in, they thought they were going to Libya for WN weapons of mass destruction
- 51:13or something else. And when the CIA briefer said, we believe we found
- 51:16ben Laden and then Admiral mccraven tells them and we're here to rehearse a plan
- 51:22to go get them. Let's get to work. You know, you could
- 51:24have heard you could have heard a pin drop. And then we had five
- 51:30meetings with the President from mid March till the end of April to brief him
- 51:37on both in detail on the intelligence and then on the options. And so
- 51:42Initially, some of the top leaders in our government, the President and Secretary
- 51:50of Defense and others, favor a B two strike on the compound, and
- 51:52so I spend a couple of weeks with planners with the B two wing about
- 52:00you know what we would need on that to hit that target. And it
- 52:04turned out, because we didn't know what was underneath it or tunnels or hardened
- 52:07stuff, we needed thirty two to two thousand pound bombs, sixty four thousand
- 52:15pounds of explosives, and so, needless to say, when you looked at
- 52:19that, you know, every woman and child in that house would have been
- 52:22killed, along with the four males Ben Laud and his son, and the
- 52:27courier and his brother, and neighbors in the area would have been killed.
- 52:31And then others would have had their you know, houses damaged and windows and
- 52:37other things. And so that option was taken off the table while we continued
- 52:40to develop the raid option. A drone strike was substituted in case we could
- 52:46get Ben laden in a walking around that courtyard. And those two options that
- 52:52the President looked at at the end, and you mentioned in your book that
- 52:55you brought up or reminded Admiral McRaven about a special helicopter program that sounds like
- 53:01it was near and dear to your heart that you had supervised. Yeah,
- 53:07so we had some specially configured helicopters that had a better chance of infiltrating a
- 53:13force to the target without going into detail, and you know that we hadn't
- 53:17used them yet, and best of that would be, you know, with
- 53:23the special configuration of them, when they have the carrying capacity of a standard
- 53:32helicopter and go the distance because you know, it was a ninety minute flight,
- 53:37you know, one hundred and fifty plus miles to get to the target
- 53:42from Afghanistan, So it was a long helicopter flight. And so we started
- 53:46working through that. But it ended up being the right decision. And so
- 53:52as the plan is refined, you're going through rehearsals, you're getting closer and
- 53:58closer to know no D day essentially on this on this operation. And I
- 54:05think Obama wrote in his memoirs, as I recall hearing all the information,
- 54:10getting all of the briefings, and the President eventually getting to the point where
- 54:14saying, guys, stop making up numbers in regards to percentages of likelihood that
- 54:19he's there. It kind of comes down to a flip of the coin and
- 54:22authorizing the operation. I'd love to hear you have this great picture in the
- 54:30book of yourself in the situation room, as with the President and Vice President
- 54:37as this operation is happening. Can you tell us what it was like to
- 54:40come into work that day in an absolute cloak of secrecy and to sit down
- 54:45in the room with all of these folks on the National Security Council and the
- 54:49President and actually witness this thing go down. Sure so, so, as
- 54:53I said, we had lots of meetings with the Deputies and principles, and
- 55:00lots of plan rehearsals with the operational force, and I had lots of separate
- 55:06meetings at CIA on things. But when the President finally made the decision first
- 55:17to deploy the force and then a few days before the raid, heard from
- 55:28all his advisors and some were for the raid, others were for the drone
- 55:35strike, and others were for doing nothing, just waiting. So it was
- 55:38a very gutsy decision by the president. He didn't have unanimity among his team.
- 55:44The deputies were more not completely unanimous, but ninety percent unanimous that we
- 55:49ought to do the raid and as you mentioned, there were different assessments probability
- 55:55assessments about whether bin Laden was there, from fifty to ninety five percent.
- 56:00I was at eighty five myself. But it's a made up number, I
- 56:04mean, to be honest with It just means, you know, you look
- 56:07at all the evidence and you think it's highly likely, or it's better than
- 56:12average, it's likely. But as you mentioned, President Obama said, okay,
- 56:15fifty to fifty, it's still way better than we've had the last ten
- 56:20years. And le Panetta said, the American people knew what we knew,
- 56:24they would want us to go forward. And you know, so fifty became
- 56:28eighty five or ninety, it really didn't matter. We were going to go.
- 56:31And so that last weekend we had all day meetings at the White House,
- 56:40first with the deputies and then the principles, and the raid was postponed
- 56:45to day. It was supposed to be a Saturday night and ended up shifting
- 56:47to Sunday because of bad weather. And so we all then had to go
- 56:52to this White House correspondence dinner and that was excruciating to be at this comedy
- 56:59fest and stuff, which was very good comedy, black tie, you know,
- 57:01a tuxedo and everything, and all I could think about is get this
- 57:05over with so we can get onto the raid and you know, get some
- 57:08justice for the American people. And then the morning of the raid, we
- 57:15have another meeting at the White House to go over last minute things. And
- 57:19again nobody on my staff knows the thing about this. There's a handful of
- 57:23people at the top of Pentagon. I have to brief the General counsel in
- 57:27at the last minute, so there's some legal things we had to do,
- 57:30and you know, the very just top officials, the chairman, the Vice
- 57:34chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and I had gotten the Under Secretary for
- 57:37Policy read in, Michelle Flornin, And so you know, I get in
- 57:44my car, go to the Pentagon, get some papers, and then decide
- 57:47to pause at the nine to eleven Memorial for a bit. We have benches
- 57:52for each of the victims, the one hundred and eighty four that lost their
- 57:54lives in the plane crash. And just wanted to sit there and collect my
- 57:59thoughts before I went to the White House about you know, why we were
- 58:01doing this raid, and it seemed like a good idea to me. And
- 58:07then went to the White House and then the operation was done under CI authorities.
- 58:12So then went to CIA that afternoon a handful of us, the Director,
- 58:16the deputy director Director for Operations and counter Terrorism Center, and then some
- 58:24of our other intelligence organization's chiefs who were involved in the directly in the operation
- 58:30or their a few of their people were and then Admiral Eric Olsen from the
- 58:35head of Special Operations Command. And so we monitored the operation in real time
- 58:40from CIA for some four hours or so for the long flight in the long
- 58:46flight out the thirty eight minutes on target, and then when it was over,
- 58:53then went to the White House that night, and so that was a
- 58:55long gun to answered the question. But that photo was taken Sunday night after
- 59:01the raid was successfully done, and at the White House and talking about it
- 59:07with the President and Vice President others, but also then getting the President ready
- 59:10for his address to the nation much later that night, and then the briefing
- 59:16on background to the press that we would do after that, which there was
- 59:22five of us, and you know, from the political aspects of it,
- 59:27to the intelligence, to the military, and I was stucky as the briefer
- 59:31for the military part of the operation, which you know, he couldn't say
- 59:36much, and so he just said, well, we went a helicopter,
- 59:39we killed him, we flew back out. We don't have any casualties.
- 59:44He's dead. You know. That's about it. Can you you know,
- 59:49you mentioned that it was done under CIA authorities. Can you tell our audience
- 59:55why that is what the difference is between the CIA authorities and the military authority.
- 1:00:00Yeah, so they're different parts of the US law. CI is called
- 1:00:02Title fifty of the US Code, and the Department the Armed Forces of the
- 1:00:07United States are Title ten. So people abbreviated as Title ten or Title fifty,
- 1:00:12which means the broad authorities given to the Secretary Defense or the Director of
- 1:00:15the CIA. And so if you were doing it under military authorities, the
- 1:00:22chain of command would go from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to
- 1:00:28typically the combatant commander, the central command commander in this case, then to
- 1:00:34the operational commander, you know, who's executing the mission. If it's done
- 1:00:38under CIA authorities, it's the President to the Director of the CIA directly,
- 1:00:45and then if he's using a military force, if any military capabilities are detailed
- 1:00:53over to CI, because CIA doesn't have that, for example, and so
- 1:00:58we have provisions to be able to do that sort of thing. Then it's
- 1:01:02from the president to the CI director to the operational commander, nothing in between.
- 1:01:09And you know, and the reason you choose the one, the natural
- 1:01:14one, the overwhelming one for military force is you know, through the defense
- 1:01:19chain of command. The reason you would choose CIA and the president with his
- 1:01:23advisors recommending did it in this case is if we went in and did a
- 1:01:30raid because we didn't have proof that Bin Laden was there, we had a
- 1:01:32really strong circumstantial case. So if we went in and did the raid and
- 1:01:37it turned out to be some crazy drug lord or you know, who knows
- 1:01:39who was living in this house that and then we got out without making a
- 1:01:45big commotion, that it would, you know, given this was deep in
- 1:01:49the heart of Pakistan in kind of a resort town, that you know,
- 1:01:53it would be a little more deniable than if we did it, you know,
- 1:02:00under Department of Defense authority. So that was one of the reasons why
- 1:02:04we went to CIA route. So does that only matter or in this case
- 1:02:08keep it quiet, I should say, rather than deniable, but just keep
- 1:02:12it quiet. So in this case, did it only matter if the mission
- 1:02:16was a bust? If if yeah, clean bust. Yeah, if there
- 1:02:21were a messy bust, you know, you'd have the right problem, right
- 1:02:24right, So we're clean bust, you know. So as it turned out,
- 1:02:28you know, because we had the helicopter that had the hard landing and
- 1:02:32was damaged and couldn't fly out, we had to blow it up, you
- 1:02:37know, even though we didn't have casualties or anything. That made it messier,
- 1:02:42and that forced the president to then take change it from a covert action
- 1:02:49to a military action after the fact, right and say, basically, I'm
- 1:02:52declassifying the fact that the United States did this, just that fact, you
- 1:02:58know, and that I can talk talk about it, you know, if
- 1:03:00I'm the president, I can give my speech to the nation. So there
- 1:03:04are some authors out there that are very grateful that the helicopter went down.
- 1:03:12Yeah, I have loads more questions, but if we have viewer questions for
- 1:03:21mister Vickers, we should probably try to get to some of those. Yeah,
- 1:03:24So we have a couple left over from last show that we promised the
- 1:03:29folks would get to and then so let me get to these real quick,
- 1:03:35and then we have a couple more for tonight and then d were there any
- 1:03:38on Patreon. So I think so from last week from Tom k thank you
- 1:04:02much. What is your take on Iran It's negative influence on the Middle East
- 1:04:06and potential actions to take So Iran is definitely a malign influence in the Middle
- 1:04:16East and sometimes elsewhere. It wants to be the hegemon of its region and
- 1:04:25destabilize others. It also sees itself as the defender of sites around and so
- 1:04:32it's and it's built up of substantial proxy forces and has Bala in Lebanon and
- 1:04:40now and Sheite militias and Katab has Bala and others in Iraq, the Huthi's
- 1:04:47in Yemen, it's allied with Syria, and then even non Shia groups like
- 1:04:54Hamas it's supported as part of its Revolutiontionary Islamic Front. And so it's been
- 1:05:02a destabilizing force in the Middle East since the Iranian Revolution. And you know,
- 1:05:11our objectives with Iran are really severalfold. One to prevent them from getting
- 1:05:19nuclear weapons, because if they did, all the trouble that they cause now
- 1:05:26would be magnified. They'd feel more emboldened to do it if if they thought
- 1:05:30you couldn't invade them because of you would risk nuclear retaliation and then also to
- 1:05:38try to deal with this mondelign influence to get them to stop, which in
- 1:05:43some cases means shoring up our allies in the region their defenses against missiles and
- 1:05:48other things. In other cases it means working to undermine the Iranian regime or
- 1:05:58other things insideran. And you know, you know, the challenge with these
- 1:06:05things is that you're unlikely to solve this problem until you until you there is
- 1:06:14a change of regime. American presidents really don't want to invade Iran and take
- 1:06:18on that burden of occupying it. And if you did do a strike against
- 1:06:26their nuclear weapons complex, you would set them back a few years, but
- 1:06:31you might even make them more likely than to want to have them eventually.
- 1:06:35And so it's a difficult problem and a work work in progress. You can't
- 1:06:42just let them run free because you know, as we see right now,
- 1:06:46UH with allied with hamas their their aim is to destabilize the Middle East and
- 1:06:55you know, get rid of Israel and lots of other things, and also
- 1:06:59take shot and get the US out of the Middle East. You know,
- 1:07:01so taking shots that are soldiers who were deployed in the region and others and
- 1:07:05so they're going to do that and if you show weakness, they're just going
- 1:07:10to continue doing right, you know. So it's a it's a it's a
- 1:07:15it's a tricky issue with with with them to make sure we're doing enough to
- 1:07:20put them on their back foot without necessarily an all out war. Do you
- 1:07:27feel that the target strikes, like against Solomonia that the other like targeted strikes
- 1:07:32when they're outside their area, do you feel like those are a step forward
- 1:07:38into turns step backwards into terrence? Yeah? I mean Solomon he had a
- 1:07:42lot of American blood on his hands, supporting ship groups that you know,
- 1:07:45killed several hundred Americans, and he was getting bolder and bolder, and you
- 1:07:50know, kind of getting a pass. You know, he traveled around the
- 1:07:55Middle East pretty freely. But it's a difficult decision, you know, in
- 1:08:00a way to do the strike because you know, then what are you going
- 1:08:02to get back down the road. But given given the blood he had on
- 1:08:09his hands and his efforts to destabilize the Middle East and that you know,
- 1:08:15yes he's replaced, but he won't necessarily be replaced by an equally ambitious and
- 1:08:20so I think it was a good decision. Yeah, Andrew Dunbar, thank
- 1:08:30you very much. Given the recent events in uh Ghana, right Kaya and
- 1:08:36Venezuelaana, what do you think the chances are that foreign influence is pushing it
- 1:08:43or Maduro is just going bunkers. Well, so Iranians and Russians have pretty
- 1:08:51significant influence and Cubans in Venezuela, and you know with the old Chavez regime
- 1:08:58and then now Madu and Chinese as well. But I think I don't know,
- 1:09:05but I suspect this is internally Venezuela. You know, Venezuela is a
- 1:09:12resource rich country with talented population, and they've managed to run it into the
- 1:09:17ground. And so you know, trying to take some resources from a neighbor
- 1:09:21who doesn't have much of a military probably seems like a good idea to them.
- 1:09:27You know. One of the sad things is Guyana has been a poor
- 1:09:30country and then they discover this oil and gas and stuff off their coast,
- 1:09:35and you know, a chance to improve their prosperity. And big Venezuela next
- 1:09:42door says, thank you very much. I think I'll want that. So
- 1:09:46we'll see what happens. But it's a you know, it's clearly a case
- 1:09:50of a bully saying, you know, that's a nice lunch you have there.
- 1:09:56You know, you know you mentioned we don't talk about Cuba that often.
- 1:10:00We've talked to like Mark bally Monopolis about you know, the Havana syndrome,
- 1:10:06and we don't really see Cuba. I think in our national news as
- 1:10:12competitors, we see Russia, China and Iran. But you know, we
- 1:10:15just had the big a diplomat, the big diplomat, uh, you know,
- 1:10:21indicted for Do you do you think that Cuba flies? Do you think
- 1:10:27that they're a bigger threat than what the US populist thinks they are or are
- 1:10:30they just getting successful and sort of one off type things. So during the
- 1:10:38Cold War they had a very formidable intelligence service when they recruited a number of
- 1:10:43these people spy and dea for many years. This ambassador for four decades.
- 1:10:49Another senior State Department official that was caught I think a couple of decades ago
- 1:10:56or something, but has been spying for several day decades. And so they've
- 1:11:01you know, they've done pretty well. And then you know they fomenting insurgency
- 1:11:08in Latin America, but particularly Central America in the eighties, sent twenty thousand
- 1:11:13troops to Angola. We ended up defeating him there with the opposition, but
- 1:11:17you know, they were punching above their weight like some other Soviet allies.
- 1:11:23And what really hurt Cuba was at the end of the Cold War in the
- 1:11:28collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cut off all its subsidies and
- 1:11:31stuff, and so that caused the regime to really retrench pretty dramatically, you
- 1:11:38know, in its ambitions, but it really didn't go away, and so
- 1:11:42over time, you know, the Russians have kind of expanded again, they're
- 1:11:47the Chinese are interested in it as an intelligence platform, et cetera. So
- 1:11:53I wouldn't you know, it's not to the level of threat that it was
- 1:12:00in the Cold War as a significant Soviet proxy for extending Soviet power, but
- 1:12:06it's more formidable, i think today than it was twenty twenty five years ago
- 1:12:13after the Cold War, when it was you know, flat on its back
- 1:12:16for a while. So it's you know, it it bears attention to and
- 1:12:20it's something that shouldn't just be ignored because they don't have our interests at heart.
- 1:12:25Yeah. Yeah, because we also had that DIA off sir arrested in
- 1:12:30like two thousand and one and Montes. Yeah, Mohamed Sevani, thank you
- 1:12:35very much for the genestfer nation. As an investor, what can American companies
- 1:12:40do and what should foreign pauls be regarding the plague five hundred billion annual intellectual
- 1:12:45property and innovation theft by China because of the fifty percent plus equity requirement.
- 1:12:54Yeah, great question. So one I think, you know, Chinese economy
- 1:12:58has been stumbling late. Xixhinping, you know, has been prioritizing political control
- 1:13:03over economic growth and innovation, and you know, and hurting the future and
- 1:13:11kind of going against Chinese strategy over the last four decades, which is,
- 1:13:15you know, hid your capabilities and by your time, you know, be
- 1:13:18pals with the West and get investment until you really are more powerful, you
- 1:13:24know, don't peak too soon. And he may be doing some of that,
- 1:13:27but China's done remarkably well with intellectual property theft. You know, during
- 1:13:31the Cold War, where we had really non integrated economic systems between the East
- 1:13:39and the West, and the Soviets would try to steal technology and occasionally they'd
- 1:13:43be successful, and we'd frustrate them. From time to times with things as
- 1:13:47we learned about them. And you know, I looked at that and I
- 1:13:53thought, you know, one, communism produces a crappy economy, but you
- 1:13:57know you're not going to steal your way to economic prosperity. You know,
- 1:14:00you just can't compete in that world against people who are inventing stuff all the
- 1:14:03time, and you know, have the freedom and the capital to do it
- 1:14:09with. China's made me rethink that, one because of their integration with the
- 1:14:13West and access to capital. But two, it's so much easier to steal
- 1:14:15these days with cyber than Soviet's ever could have. You know, where you
- 1:14:19physically got to get the good and smuggle at someplace. And so they've done
- 1:14:26rather well. And you know something we have to harden our defenses against,
- 1:14:30and we strict new technologies from going there, much as we did during the
- 1:14:36Cold War. I also think that over the long haul, whether the United
- 1:14:42States remains the leading power in the international system, you know, thirty years
- 1:14:46from now, or whether it's China, will depend on our economic might and
- 1:14:50our technological innovation. And so that's where your callers comments, that really is
- 1:14:57the core of US grand strategy. If we get that right, and we
- 1:15:01create a prosperous, very healthy, and unified, an ambitious society. We
- 1:15:09on the national security side will do our parts in defense and intelligence to make
- 1:15:15sure we stay number one. If we fail in that economic and technological competition,
- 1:15:20we're going to have a much tougher time. How you know, and
- 1:15:24I know that counterintelligence isn't necessarily your focus bailiwick, but how do you fight
- 1:15:31like the Chinese threat and not you know, the threat in our institutions,
- 1:15:36the threat in our companies things like that, and not be presented as a
- 1:15:41racist like an anti Chinese, but more an anti CCP focused country. Yeah.
- 1:15:46So, you know, the FBI is maligned a lot these days,
- 1:15:51but it really has a tough mission. It's mission has expanded dramatically. So,
- 1:15:57one, you have all this cyber crime and intellectual property theft that you
- 1:16:01know, is a new challenge to us. Two, you have a lot
- 1:16:06of spies. You have Russian spies and Chinese and others, and so the
- 1:16:10counterintelligence problem has has grown. And then you have domestic and foreign extremists,
- 1:16:16and and uh, you know, the foreign one is down a bit,
- 1:16:21the domestic one has risen, unfortunately, and so they've got a they've got
- 1:16:27a challenge. They've got a much more diverse counterintelligence challenge than they had.
- 1:16:32And you know, if I were king for a day, I would be
- 1:16:35trying to build up that agency and give them more resources, not less,
- 1:16:40because the domestic environment has gotten a lot tougher, and part of it is
- 1:16:44counterintelligence. And you know, the Chinese target a lot American born Chinese because
- 1:16:57some of them have relatives and also there you know, you know, if
- 1:17:01you look at our top companies, particularly our top top tech companies, they're
- 1:17:08led by either recent or semi recent immigrants here. You know, we're very
- 1:17:13fortunate as a country to have these people from India or China, Taiwan,
- 1:17:19wherever it is that have come here and built great you know, got an
- 1:17:24education here in engineering or science or whatever and have built fantastic companies. But
- 1:17:30you know, they're targeted and lower level employees are targeted, you know,
- 1:17:34by by China, much as the Soviets a lot of times in the past
- 1:17:39would target Eastern European emigrats and others who you know still had family behind the
- 1:17:45Iron curtain. Yeah, Joey Holt, thank you very much. You have
- 1:17:50to choose one. Who are you sending for the most difficult dangerous hostage rescue
- 1:17:55mission TAG or PS. I know it's kag starting to find fight. Yeah.
- 1:18:02Oh you know, as a former assistant secretary overseeing it all, I
- 1:18:06love all my children and they are both fantastic and uh, you know,
- 1:18:16our units have in some cases, you know, different specialties where for some
- 1:18:23missions one's the obvious choice and for others the other. But for a lot
- 1:18:28of them, they're interchangeable and fantastic and the best in the world. Ud.
- 1:18:33Do you want to hit the Patreon? Oh you don't, Okay,
- 1:18:36hold on, just while I'm pulling out the Patreon, Mike, do you
- 1:18:41mind for you somebody who's been around for a very long time. Are there
- 1:18:46threats that you see rising that Americans aren't aware of that maybe America isn't focused
- 1:18:53on that they should be. So I don't think it's a necessarily a threat
- 1:19:03that comes out of the blue. I think it's not more a case of
- 1:19:11not accurately characterizing the threat. So in one case, it might come from
- 1:19:18a combination of threats that you know, you see them all individually, but
- 1:19:24you don't think they might gang up on you and really make a much tougher
- 1:19:27problem where the whole is worse greater than the sum of parts. So Iran,
- 1:19:31China, Russia or two of them would pose challenges for us in a
- 1:19:36way that we haven't had to deal with in a long long time, at
- 1:19:42least since World War Two. We thought about it a lot, but we've
- 1:19:45planned for different contingencies like that, but we haven't faced that really since then,
- 1:19:50And you know, that would put a lot a lot in play.
- 1:19:55And then I think these are uraging technologies that I believe really are going to
- 1:20:01change the world for good and bad, you know, artificial intelligence, maybe
- 1:20:06quantum computing, synthetic biology for sure. And you know, a lot of
- 1:20:11this debate is goofy in a sense, particularly in the AI sense of it's
- 1:20:17either going to do nothing or terminator machines are going to kill all humans,
- 1:20:21and it's really going to be bad humans having machines do very bad things for
- 1:20:29them. That is more likely the bigger threat to us than you know,
- 1:20:33machines by themselves going against all humans or something. And you don't want,
- 1:20:40you know. And so for instance, while we're worried about bottling up AI
- 1:20:45and putting all the safeguards around it and everything else, so it can't kill
- 1:20:47all humanity. Someone else might be thinking, how do I serve my foreign
- 1:20:51policy objectives and defeat your military with this or do something else? And the
- 1:20:57same is true for biology. You know, biology is in an area where
- 1:21:00people don't like to talk about it too, right, because it's gonna cure
- 1:21:04diseases, it's gonna do what, it's gonna feed lots of people. It's
- 1:21:08gonna do wonderful, wonderful things for humans. But it can also be used
- 1:21:12for very bad purposes. And it's not going to escape certain folks to think
- 1:21:17about that. And so it's really more the like I said, the aspects
- 1:21:26of threats that people know something about but not enough about. That I think
- 1:21:30is where we could be caught, right, David Dan, thank you very
- 1:21:35much. Question about the Angola Bushwar last week when you said we beat the
- 1:21:40Cubans, there, are you referring to the American support for unate you need
- 1:21:44a united or something like that. I had the impression that there was little
- 1:21:47CIA involvement. But it's mostly the South Africa who fought the Cubans in Angola.
- 1:21:53No, so the South Africans were engaged from time to time, but
- 1:22:03supporting UNDA from nineteen eighty six on if I remember, right after a thing
- 1:22:12called the Clark Amendment was repealed or something or other. But the last years
- 1:22:17of the Cold War, it was part of the Reagan doctrine and the US
- 1:22:24government had a pretty big, big role supporting in Golans against the Cuban.
- 1:22:30I believe it was the second largest covert action program after Afghanistan. Yeah,
- 1:22:35it was pretty good sized. Duncan, Idaho. Thank you very much.
- 1:22:41Love the book and the book. If you guys have not read it,
- 1:22:45we highly recommend Knew by all means available. Love the book. You talk
- 1:22:50a lot about government oversight near the end. I have several questions, and
- 1:22:56I know you can't take them all. Feel free to pick and choose.
- 1:22:59So I'm going to ask the first two docan uh do one twenty seven E
- 1:23:03operations undermine Congressional oversight? I I don't think so. I don't know enough
- 1:23:15about that particular issue since I left in twenty fifteen and we had different titles.
- 1:23:21But Congress generally puts you know, they passed the they give you the
- 1:23:26authorities for these things, and generally with their oversight and so I don't you
- 1:23:30know, you can you can step beyond what's intended, you know, as
- 1:23:36occasionally a government will do and then get rained in after that. But but
- 1:23:43but generally the creators of the law try to make sure that you don't overstep
- 1:23:47the interesting mechanism with one twenty seven E that differs from like the older twelve
- 1:23:53oh eight or twelve oh six or twelve o eight and twelve oh six is
- 1:23:56what I know, well under one twenty seven, what a foreign partner actually
- 1:24:01op cons their military unit to our special ops advisors. That's the big difference
- 1:24:06between the two. That perhaps we use programs like that in places like Somalia.
- 1:24:14Yeah, but I mean twelve o eight kind of lets you do you
- 1:24:17know that again, it wouldn't be necessarily a forum. You know, twelve
- 1:24:20oh six was trained them, twelve o eight was used a non governmental entity
- 1:24:27essentially of some kind or another under our direction. If I understand what you're
- 1:24:32saying correctly that it's a foreign partner that's doing it, but you know,
- 1:24:38you still could be subject to other constraints. I think the devil details.
- 1:24:42Yeah, and then do you think any changes are needed for the eminent pisas
- 1:24:47seven oh two reauthorization, and it's not just a reauthorization. I think it's
- 1:24:51an expansion, isn't it. I'm not sure. I don't know that it's
- 1:24:56an expansion. I think they're putting some more guardrails around it. But seven
- 1:25:00oh two is a very important program. And you know, the reason for
- 1:25:04seven oh two is it's just a it's a feature of the design of the
- 1:25:12Internet, which most global traffic it's been declining in the past decade or so,
- 1:25:17but eighty ninety percent of global traffic, no matter who the communicators are
- 1:25:24in the world, routes through the United States. So that used a legal
- 1:25:28challenge for us in a sense that you know, you have two foreigners in
- 1:25:31parts of the world talking to each other, two Al Qaeda terrorists, they're
- 1:25:35communications. When you know Mohammad sends it to the i'men or whatever it is,
- 1:25:45that communication is going to go through the pipes go through the United States.
- 1:25:49So unless the pipes have some special privileges, US privileges because they transit
- 1:25:57the United States, when two foreigners communicateation is writing on it. You know,
- 1:26:01you don't want to deprive yourself of that intelligence when you start using communications
- 1:26:10where an Americans party to that, then the pipes aren't the issue so much.
- 1:26:15But then you know, you get into the FISA issue, the real
- 1:26:18FISA issue, right supervision, the warrants and that's all appropriate, and if
- 1:26:25that had been violated in certain cases, you know, again you have judges
- 1:26:30who review these things, the vice of court and stuff. But then then
- 1:26:35you know that should be tightened up or the standards of evidence. But broadly
- 1:26:41because of the feature of global communications, seven O two is essential. It's
- 1:26:48not an American program, it's a foreign intelligence program. Principally ISAAC, thank
- 1:26:55you. How can people achieve privacy, anonymity and privacy and both online and
- 1:27:00IRL in real life? Also how can they build and evolve their offset?
- 1:27:06So I think it's pretty tough. I mean, there's ways to do some
- 1:27:10but generally, you know, just from an intelligence officer or a clandestine intelligence
- 1:27:15officers perspective, you know, the challenge these days, and if you want
- 1:27:20to do normal business, is to hiden plain sight or hide temporarily for something,
- 1:27:26not to hide permanently. You know. Yeah, we live in an
- 1:27:29age of surveillance capitalism. You make money by knowing a lot about people and
- 1:27:34their data and you know, it's just the world we live in, you
- 1:27:43know, So there's this is a problem like AI and other things that governments
- 1:27:48will have to wrestle with for a while. You don't want to overregulate.
- 1:27:53But on the other hand, you know, you do have basic privacy rights,
- 1:27:57and so whether things sunset at a certain period of time that you know,
- 1:28:02you have a you know, you give up your privacy to be on
- 1:28:09social media or something, but it doesn't mean it should last forever, assuming
- 1:28:14you have a mechanism of enforcing that. You know, these are these are
- 1:28:17issues governments have to wrestling. Do you think that our government at some point
- 1:28:21in time, uh, should look at sort of the European model of having
- 1:28:27you know, the right to forget, Like maybe I don't. I'm not
- 1:28:30an expert. Yeah, I do think it's important, but it's but you
- 1:28:35know, you you know, and again you have a right to your data,
- 1:28:39and there's there's tools and things that can help you restrict some of that
- 1:28:45as well. I'm not I'm not an expert, so I don't really feel
- 1:28:47qualified to talk about it. But but on the other hand, you know,
- 1:28:51just a lot of it's out there, and it's it's it's so integral
- 1:28:55to the economy and the way we do in life, just the way we
- 1:28:58do business. Yes, Mike, since you've left governmental service, had a
- 1:29:03great private sector career as well, received recipient of a Bill Donovan Award,
- 1:29:10could tell us last question. I mean, what's next for Mike Vickers.
- 1:29:15Oh, I don't know. I'm thinking about me a follow on book.
- 1:29:17And uh, you know, I've got seven grandchildren and maybe some more down
- 1:29:24the road, so I've got a full, full life right now. And
- 1:29:29uh, you know, my heart is in professionally in national security and contributing
- 1:29:36where I can contribute best. It's not everywhere. But you know, if
- 1:29:41I were given the right opportunity and the right world situation to come back into
- 1:29:45government one more time before I'm absolutely too old, I'd welcome the chance.
- 1:29:51Well for someone else to decide, Mike, we support you being director of
- 1:29:56CIA or Odie and I like whatever you want. Let us know, we'll
- 1:30:00start calling people, We'll start an email campaign. Well, I appreciate the
- 1:30:06settle that I guess I have two votes. In the meantime, you wrote
- 1:30:12a terrific memoir. I hope folks will go and check it out. By
- 1:30:15all means available. It's out now wherever books are sold. Ebook. Is
- 1:30:19there an audiobook? Mike, there is all right audio I narrated myself.
- 1:30:25Awesome. Yeah, people people love that. Link. Link is in the
- 1:30:29description. Yeah, the link is down below in the description. Please check
- 1:30:31it out, folks, Mike, before we let you go, any final
- 1:30:34thoughts, anything you'd like to put out there. No, you guys are
- 1:30:38great, and it's a very comprehensive interview and subjects near and dear to my
- 1:30:43heart. Thank you for doing it. Really appreciate your time on a Friday
- 1:30:46to Friday evenings in a row. And next week you're going to be here
- 1:30:51with Mark Palmeeropolis, right, yeah, an old friend. Yeah yeah,
- 1:30:57okay, so yeah, thank you. We'll see you guys next Friday.
- 1:31:00Take care out there, have a nice weekend. Thanks everybody, Thank you,
- 1:31:04Mike. We really appreciate it. Sure,