Latest / Bloomberg Law / Auto Lending Poses Next Great Subprime Crisis (Audio)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Does this sound familiar? Hasty loans without verification of incomes
- 0:04Speaker 1: or job histories, default rising on loans that buyers just
- 0:08Speaker 1: can't repay outright fraud by salespeople. No, it's not the
- 0:12Speaker 1: US housing market ten years ago. It's the auto industry today,
- 0:17Speaker 1: where many car dealers are gaming the loan application process
- 0:21Speaker 1: so low income borrowers can drive off in new cars
- 0:24Speaker 1: they can't afford, and those auto loans are bundled into
- 0:27Speaker 1: securities for investors. It's classic subprime. Less than a decade
- 0:32Speaker 1: after the mortgage crisis caused the Great Recession, as explained
- 0:35Speaker 1: in movies like The Big Short, so the banks started
- 0:40Speaker 1: filling these bonds with risky and risky on mortgages Inky Baja.
- 0:45Speaker 1: That way they can keep that profit machine channing right.
- 0:49Speaker 1: By the way, these risky mortgages are called subprime. Our
- 0:55Speaker 1: guests are Patricia McCoy, professor at Boston College Law School
- 0:58Speaker 1: and author of the subpri i'm Virus, and Gary People's,
- 1:02Speaker 1: professor at Syracuse University College of Law. Patricia, sub prime
- 1:06Speaker 1: car loans have been around for a long time. Explain
- 1:09Speaker 1: what's been happening in the last eight years or so. Well,
- 1:13Speaker 1: they certainly have been around, and in the last last
- 1:16Speaker 1: eight years, UH auto lending UM became the new growth
- 1:24Speaker 1: area for subprime loans. UH mortgage lenders are basically not
- 1:29Speaker 1: willing to make subprime loans anymore, but UM car dealers
- 1:35Speaker 1: were very eager to expand their markets by selling cars
- 1:40Speaker 1: to weaker and weaker borrowers and lenders stepped in willing
- 1:46Speaker 1: to make loans to people who might have difficulty paying
- 1:50Speaker 1: back the purchase price of the car. Gary, Are there
- 1:54Speaker 1: any legal restrictions here in terms of who can get
- 2:00Speaker 1: these kinds of loans when they buy a car? Or
- 2:02Speaker 1: is it kind of a free for all? It's it's
- 2:05Speaker 1: pretty much a free for all. One of the interesting
- 2:08Speaker 1: things about god Frank is the one area that was
- 2:12Speaker 1: left out of regulation were auto dealers. And auto dealers
- 2:16Speaker 1: finance the vast majority of auto loans, and then of
- 2:20Speaker 1: course seldom UH to to finance companies, and they are
- 2:25Speaker 1: specifically excluded from regulation in your god Frank, So your
- 2:29Speaker 1: regulation you would be looking at would then be up
- 2:31Speaker 1: to the state. And I, you know, I practiced in
- 2:34Speaker 1: New York and even though the general New York Usury
- 2:37Speaker 1: Statute doesn't apply to most automans, Patricia, the name of
- 2:42Speaker 1: your book is the subprime virus. So with the auto loans,
- 2:46Speaker 1: where do we see the virus or the cracks in
- 2:49Speaker 1: the system. What's really interesting is we're seeing a replay
- 2:54Speaker 1: of the mortgage crisis in terms of the dealers don't
- 3:01Speaker 1: check whether the borrowers can UH have the ability to repay.
- 3:06Speaker 1: The lender makes the loan without checking it in most
- 3:10Speaker 1: cases here Santan Dare and then the lender sells on
- 3:14Speaker 1: the loans, packages them for sale to Wall Street. Investors
- 3:21Speaker 1: are not checking UH and are buying this stuff regardless
- 3:26Speaker 1: of the elevated default risk. Um. It's really back back
- 3:32Speaker 1: to the future. Well, so Gary, so what so let's
- 3:38Speaker 1: let's talk about the people taking out the loans. What
- 3:40Speaker 1: happens to them as you know, they they're they're getting
- 3:44Speaker 1: loans that they can't afford to pay, and it's they're
- 3:47Speaker 1: getting those loans are getting bundled. But what's happening to
- 3:50Speaker 1: the actual car purchasers here, Well, depending on how life
- 3:55Speaker 1: that circumstances go, eventually something happens and they can at
- 4:00Speaker 1: the payment that's sometimes a couple of months in and
- 4:02Speaker 1: maybe that's a year end. You know, something happens with
- 4:05Speaker 1: the car, something else happens in their life and they
- 4:08Speaker 1: they they miss a payment and or they realize how
- 4:12Speaker 1: bad off they are and then actively choose no longer
- 4:14Speaker 1: to keep paying UM. But yeah, the people lose the
- 4:17Speaker 1: car and then often get sued UM for the deficiency
- 4:22Speaker 1: that's owed after the cars repossessed, because often these cars
- 4:26Speaker 1: are sold at at huge markups with a bunch of
- 4:29Speaker 1: garbage feeds and and other things in it like extended
- 4:32Speaker 1: warranties and and other things that drive up the price
- 4:36Speaker 1: even above what the car was even remotely worth. So
- 4:39Speaker 1: these folds are well underwater. They end up losing the
- 4:42Speaker 1: car and then getting sued and you know, either filing
- 4:45Speaker 1: bankruptcy or having their wages garnished. But it's bad news
- 4:48Speaker 1: for folks. Patricia explain the allure of the subprime auto
- 4:53Speaker 1: bonds for investors and whether they're protected um from large losses.
- 5:01Speaker 1: So the the topp alur is that the interest rate
- 5:06Speaker 1: on these bonds is higher than the interest rate on
- 5:10Speaker 1: on blue chip bonds and government bonds of uh, you know,
- 5:16Speaker 1: of running around five UM, and so they're chasing yields. Uh.
- 5:22Speaker 1: The reason I think that investors are not doing adequate
- 5:26Speaker 1: due diligence is twofold. Um. They think that the higher
- 5:33Speaker 1: interest rate will compensate them for the higher risk and
- 5:37Speaker 1: at the end of the day, even if the default
- 5:40Speaker 1: rate is high, they'll get a high enough rate of
- 5:43Speaker 1: return to to make money. Uh. The other thing is
- 5:48Speaker 1: they're they're betting on the fact that the securitization has
- 5:54Speaker 1: been designed with a big safety cushion to absorb losses
- 5:59Speaker 1: and to protect them from losses. Uh. Last time in
- 6:03Speaker 1: two thousand and eight, it didn't quite turn out that way,
- 6:07Speaker 1: just quickly in about thirty seconds, Gary, it will it
- 6:10Speaker 1: be different with the auto loans than it was with
- 6:13Speaker 1: the with the marriages. As far as protection shouldn't for
- 6:16Speaker 1: the investors, I think, well, you know, I think people
- 6:21Speaker 1: are going to lose money eventually like they did in
- 6:23Speaker 1: the housing market. You can't. You can't loan people money
- 6:27Speaker 1: that you know they can't pay back on an asset
- 6:30Speaker 1: that's appreciating value would make money even when you're selling
- 6:34Speaker 1: people cars at interest. You know, they said this ten
- 6:38Speaker 1: years ago, and housing, Oh well we're protected. Well, of
- 6:40Speaker 1: course they weren't. We've been discussing how less than a
- 6:43Speaker 1: decade after the Great Depression, the financial industry has embraced
- 6:47Speaker 1: another type of subprime debt, auto loans. Our guests of
- 6:51Speaker 1: Patricia McCoy, professor at Boston College Law School and author
- 6:54Speaker 1: of the sub Prime Virus, and Gary People's professor at
- 6:57Speaker 1: Syracuse University College of Law. Gary, let's talk about the
- 7:03Speaker 1: US auto loan sector. It's small compared to the eight
- 7:07Speaker 1: point four trillion dollar mortgage market. It's about one point
- 7:11Speaker 1: one trillion dollars in loans compared to the mortgage market.
- 7:15Speaker 1: So no one is suggesting that this will cause the
- 7:17Speaker 1: next crisis. But is there a trickle down effect or
- 7:20Speaker 1: any lasting consequences for the industry. Well, it's hard to
- 7:25Speaker 1: know for sure. But obviously, if you have potentially thousands
- 7:30Speaker 1: of individuals who are losing their ability, uh to get
- 7:34Speaker 1: themselves around work and otherwise, that's going to have effects.
- 7:38Speaker 1: And then I think you're gonna have ripples from the
- 7:41Speaker 1: number of defaults. I mean, the number of defaults are
- 7:44Speaker 1: you know, significant, And I think that will will have
- 7:48Speaker 1: some effects. Patricia, when when we talk, when we talk
- 7:53Speaker 1: about the way that we think about the way that
- 7:55Speaker 1: the dealers have dealt with this, how exactly are they
- 8:00Speaker 1: encouraging this sort of these sort of loans. And how
- 8:03Speaker 1: is it that the dealers are you know, what are
- 8:05Speaker 1: they doing to be complicit in how these loans happen. Well,
- 8:10Speaker 1: the dealers in many cases are actually the ones who
- 8:14Speaker 1: are having the borrowers complete the loan applications. And the
- 8:19Speaker 1: dealers don't make money unless they sell a car. And
- 8:24Speaker 1: with these borrowers, they're not going to sell the car
- 8:27Speaker 1: unless the borrower can get financing. That creates a really
- 8:32Speaker 1: bad incentive for some unfortunately dishonest dealers to help the
- 8:41Speaker 1: borrower fill out the loan application by inflating their income
- 8:47Speaker 1: or saying that they work in a fancier job than
- 8:50Speaker 1: they do. Um. And so we call these lawyers loans
- 8:55Speaker 1: and and unfortunately with fantan Dare, a lot of funds
- 9:00Speaker 1: turned out to pay liars Lunds and Gary. Let's talk
- 9:03Speaker 1: about Santon Dair, which has agreed to pay twenty six
- 9:06Speaker 1: million dollars to settle an investigation into predatory subprime auto
- 9:10Speaker 1: loans by Massachusetts and Delaware. Taught about the partnership between
- 9:14Speaker 1: Fiat Chrysler and Banco Santander. Well, it's probably a little
- 9:20Speaker 1: to outside of my area of expertise. UM. I'm mostly
- 9:24Speaker 1: on the uh, the consumer end, and what I see
- 9:29Speaker 1: is that, you know, these dealers are kind of inco
- 9:32Speaker 1: hoots with with the finance companies. They know that. I
- 9:38Speaker 1: think these finance companies know what these dealers are doing,
- 9:41Speaker 1: pushing these loans with nobody that people can't afford UM,
- 9:44Speaker 1: and you know they these lives are being pulled by
- 9:48Speaker 1: the dealership UM, and the the finance companies are are
- 9:52Speaker 1: complicit in that they know what's happening. They're not bothering
- 9:55Speaker 1: to to to check to make sure the dealership UM
- 9:59Speaker 1: is doing what uh, you know, confirming that these incomes
- 10:03Speaker 1: are even remotely close to what they're uh. I mean,
- 10:05Speaker 1: this is happening on a regular basis where these folks
- 10:08Speaker 1: are being steered into loans where that the documentation is
- 10:12Speaker 1: clearly a complete sabrogation. Can you talk a little bit
- 10:15Speaker 1: about Saint and Dair and Chrysler. Well, Chrysler is up
- 10:22Speaker 1: the big three US auto dealers, the smallest one and
- 10:26Speaker 1: UH and the weakest in terms of the demand for
- 10:29Speaker 1: its cars, and so it was quite eager to extend
- 10:34Speaker 1: its customer base down the credit spectrum to weaker UM consumers.
- 10:41Speaker 1: But to do that it needed a financing arm, and
- 10:45Speaker 1: Santon Dair was conveniently very eager itself to expand into
- 10:52Speaker 1: auto financing and particularly subprime. One of the reasons that
- 10:57Speaker 1: Santon Dair was attractive was that it had a computerized
- 11:03Speaker 1: algorithm for analyzing the credit worthiness of sub time borrowers,
- 11:10Speaker 1: and supposedly it was foolproof. Well, uh, didn't turn out
- 11:15Speaker 1: that way. Well, Gary, so what what do you have
- 11:21Speaker 1: these legal actions taken against Santon Dair? What what did
- 11:24Speaker 1: the attorney's general find here? Gary? About thirty seconds, I'm
- 11:34Speaker 1: probably not the best prepared to answer that question if
- 11:39Speaker 1: it's not an entity that I've been involved with. So
- 11:43Speaker 1: I don't know the answer to that one. All right. Um,
- 11:45Speaker 1: we do know that Santander agreed to pay twenty six
- 11:49Speaker 1: million dollars to settle an investigation by Massachusetts and Delaware,
- 11:53Speaker 1: and it's been subpoenut or question by a group of
- 11:55Speaker 1: about thirty states regarding its auto loane underwriting and secure
- 12:00Speaker 1: deization activities. Thank you both for being on Bloomberg Law.
- 12:03Speaker 1: It's been a very interesting. Patricia McCoy, professor at Boston
- 12:08Speaker 1: College Law School and author of the Subprime virus and
- 12:11Speaker 1: Gary People's professor at Syracuse University College of Law. Thank
- 12:15Speaker 1: you both.