Latest / UK Column Radio / Military Matters: Opening Shots—with Brian Gerrish and Charles Malet

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Military Matters: Opening Shots—with Brian Gerrish and Charles Malet · UK Column Radio

0:17
So, Charles, thank you very much for joining me in Studio 2 for a
0:22
discussion about the military. This is going to be fairly
0:26
loose, I think, but over quite a few months, you and I have had a
0:30
number of discussions where we've said we've really ought to
0:33
get together to talk about the military.
0:36
And today's the day. I think there's so much to cover
0:42
that we'll just do as as much as we can in today's conversation.
0:47
And then we'll we'll look to do another episode or maybe or
0:51
maybe some more episodes. So what counts here?
0:59
I think I'm going to pull, I'm going to pull the rank by virtue
1:03
of my age. And I, I think I'll start off by
1:07
just saying, tell me a little bit about your career because I,
1:11
I know, I know quite a few things about you, but it would
1:16
be great to hear you tell us a little bit more about yourself.
1:20
And I'm sure the, I'm sure the audience would like to know
1:22
that. And once you've done that all, I
1:27
will reply with a bit about my ancient heritage in the Royal
1:32
Navy. Not, not, not that ancient.
1:34
Well, in the grand scheme, if. Well, maybe.
1:36
But yeah, I think, I think this will be part of a, an evolving
1:41
conversation. I mean, not least because of the
1:43
speed with which not just the armed forces are evolving, but
1:49
the way that they're being treated, dealt with by their
1:57
political masters, but also by the society that's puts them
2:00
forward. And I think there's a huge
2:02
amount to talk. I always like to say we, we,
2:04
we've spoken a lot leading up to this discussion about the sorts
2:07
of things that we do need to talk about.
2:08
Whether or not we'll get to into much of that today, I can't be
2:12
quite certain. But I think what I'd like to do
2:18
is, is sort of talk, of course we, we will, I'm sure, talk
2:21
about things that might not make that much sense to people that
2:23
perhaps haven't been in the armed forces.
2:24
So what I'd like to do is, is try to make a particular point
2:27
about speaking as though somebody listening has no idea
2:33
what it might be like to be in the armed forces either then or
2:40
now. And the reason I say that is
2:42
that I think one of the things that has changed in actually fun
2:47
enough in both directions in the period of time that I've been
2:51
sort of within the military orbit is, is how people are
2:58
conditioned via various propaganda exercises to either
3:02
regard the military as friend or foe.
3:06
And I, I, I've seen this sort of ebb and flow over the years.
3:13
Now for myself, my first sort of engagement with the armed forces
3:19
was back in the mid 90s whilst still at school.
3:23
And that was a period of quite high turbulence after the
3:29
Options for Change programme. That had been a lot, I'm sorry,
3:33
I should qualify that I'm specifically talking about the
3:35
Army, whereas you're going to be primarily talking about the
3:36
Navy. And I think that's a distinction
3:38
worth making. But at that point the with, with
3:42
the collapse with the Soviet Union and all the fallout from
3:47
that, the, the army specifically was put in a position where
3:51
things were being made to change.
3:53
Definitely not in a way that people were universally happy
3:56
with. There were a lot of very uneasy
3:59
regimental amalgamations which to put that in the sort of silly
4:03
speak is I suppose a form of a merger or or indeed could be
4:09
perceived as an acquisition between two different entities
4:12
and therefore personnel inevitably have to disappear.
4:17
There's a sort of rebranding exercise and if it's not managed
4:20
correctly, there are a lot of upside down smiles because
4:26
people are left in some way bereft of what they regard as
4:30
their identity. And I think this is a, a thing
4:33
that's really worth talking about.
4:34
We, we joked before recording that we're both wearing checked
4:38
shirts. So I said, well, there's a,
4:40
there's a, there's a, there's a conversation about uniform.
4:43
And I don't, and I mean that partially glibly, but actually
4:47
there is a serious point because I think again, to look at it
4:50
from the outside in, for a lot of people, looking at the armed
4:54
forces creates a sort of sense of revulsion at the idea of
4:58
being told what to do, being a tiny cog in a machine, of not
5:00
having any control over your own destiny and all this, all this
5:04
sort of thing with which I I sympathize and understand why
5:07
people say that. That's not my perspective at
5:09
all. My view of it is that you go
5:12
into one of these systems in order to hone your skills in a
5:18
particular job. That means you are going to be
5:21
used, OK, fair enough, use to the very best of your ability.
5:24
And you actually do exert a huge amount of control over the way
5:29
in which you do do that. And the uniform part is really
5:33
significant in that by making everybody look the same, you're
5:38
creating a sense of compassion. You're, you're creating a sort
5:42
of family situation in which people are subconsciously at
5:46
least, if not consciously feeling like they're all part of
5:50
1 body and therefore they will go above and beyond to look
5:56
after and protect those people around them.
5:58
And, and a uniform is absolutely critical to that as our
6:02
standards of behaviour and all the rest of it.
6:04
And that's something that I think has has slipped
6:07
dramatically. So I don't, I don't want to be a
6:08
too far off point, but but, but yes, in my, my sort of first
6:11
engagement was, was mid 90s and with, you know, sort of school
6:15
and university and whatnot. It wasn't actually until the
6:18
2000s that I then went to the wrong Military Academy,
6:22
Sandhurst, which is where the officer training has happened
6:26
for many years. It's now the only place that
6:28
officer training happens for, for the Army.
6:30
It's a year long course. It is.
6:33
It is very, very physically demanding.
6:35
It's also supposed to be intellectually demanding and
6:38
it's supposed to put you at the other side where you're in a
6:40
position to be able to manage for the responsibility of
6:44
looking after, if you're an infanteer, like I was around 30
6:49
soldiers. And, and that's it's, it's
6:51
largely a welfare job, but specifically as a, as a, as an
6:55
officer, as a commander, you're supposed to have the capability
6:58
to plan and plan in such a way that you're going to achieve
7:04
success on the battlefield. And that again is ultimately a
7:08
welfare consideration because you're talking about not losing
7:10
life now, talking about the mid 90s and all change there in the
7:16
mid 2000s. And Mike and Patrick have just
7:18
had an amazing discussion on the 20 years since the 77 events in
7:24
London in 2005. Now that I would say my
7:30
perspective both at the time and now is how that was yet another
7:34
manipulation in the narrative in order to change what it was that
7:41
the country, the politicians were going to do with the armed
7:46
forces. And it was very, very
7:47
interesting. If you go back and you look at
7:48
what was being said by the Ministry of Defence, because of
7:51
course we were already four years into an operational, an
7:56
active operational theatre in Afghanistan, which had
7:58
supposedly started, you know, John Reed's words, without a
8:01
shot being fired, which of course was never realistic.
8:04
And then Iraq starting in 2003. So we had we had two medium
8:07
sized operations going on and the suggestion was never
8:14
anything other than, you know, K the goal posts always move or
8:17
whether it was regime change or stability to the region or any
8:20
of those sorts of things. And then in 2005 it changed and
8:24
up for me the touchdown that what it was that triggered that
8:29
was comments both made by Richard Dannison, Mike Jackson,
8:34
who were who were successive heads of the Army and Cronty is
8:38
not quite right there because then it was later.
8:40
But there there was this suggestion that the armed forces
8:44
weren't sort of getting to do what they wanted to do.
8:46
They weren't they were underemployed.
8:48
And there was, there was reported to have been a
8:50
conversation with Tony Blair, then Prime Minister who, who,
8:53
who but basically didn't take to this idea very well.
8:58
And, and the result of that combined with the, the sort of
9:01
this spectre of terrorism and then it being good sort of going
9:04
live in London, was the idea that somehow operations in
9:09
Afghanistan and Iraq had a bearing on our security in the
9:13
UK. And it was this idea that that
9:15
we would then have to protect the UK and to keep our streets
9:19
safe, which had just come from nowhere.
9:22
There was, that was never, ever part of the, the sort of the
9:27
operational plan or, or indeed the messaging around it.
9:30
So it's a very, very interesting transition.
9:32
And I think if you look at what's happening the, the, the
9:35
sort of succeeding 20 years, then it, it does explain an
9:39
awful lot about how we've got to, to where we've got now.
9:42
But, but, but to, to return to the point, I mean, I, I
9:45
therefore, because of those operations, it meant that the
9:47
pace of life, the tempo in the Army was different from what it
9:50
had been say, for, for the 20 years prior where there was a
9:54
lot of time in sort of Garrison context where there'd be a lot
9:58
of training activity, but but nothing then perhaps after that.
10:03
So people were by and large in the same place doing sort of
10:06
similar, perhaps slightly repetitive things.
10:08
I, however, spent a period of time where that wasn't the case
10:10
at all. There was massive uncertainty.
10:12
There was a huge, well, mismanagement, let's say, of
10:17
resources. So there was a lot of areas in
10:19
which funding was cut to to, you know, access to training,
10:23
training areas and all sorts of things that should make an Army
10:26
career sort of interesting, exciting and rewarding for
10:30
everybody was was being threatened to.
10:36
And then that led inevitably and sort of later towards and yet
10:41
another panic, which is right. Well, these, these operations
10:43
aren't going to last forever. What are we going to do next?
10:46
And that's, that's both thrown without and within because you
10:50
know, as much as one might think that the military does to a
10:54
large extent control what it does, the reality is actually
10:57
very different. That's, that's not at all what I
10:59
saw happening. And to, to, to try to engineer
11:05
the system so that you are going to be doing something is
11:08
different. I mean, I, I personally ended up
11:10
in East Africa. Well, I suppose I should say
11:12
Eastern Africa based in Kenya. And it was fascinating then to
11:16
see how there was a sort of, there was really a scramble for
11:21
jobs and, and, you know, people being called off to, to hold
11:24
this idea of Somali piracy and, and, and all sorts of other
11:27
things. So, you know, it was a real
11:30
period of flux, but also it was the beginning.
11:32
I don't want to jump ahead and, and I'll absolutely hand over in
11:35
a second, but it was also the beginning of the period of time
11:38
where the, this idea that veterans were a sort of
11:44
protected species started to come in.
11:47
And I think we'll go on perhaps later or at another time to talk
11:50
about how that's been hugely manipulated.
11:53
But, but that was what I saw. And, and I think, you know,
11:56
during that period, for all the reasons that I've given, there
11:59
was there was an enormous transition which has absolutely
12:02
not corrected itself. And, and, and the trend, you
12:06
know, as reported many, many times on, on UK column If funds
12:10
to if, if, if you're to strip away all the, the control
12:14
elements and the, the appalling situations in which the armed
12:16
forces do get put, let's say, politically or strategically in
12:21
terms of messing up other people's countries.
12:23
If you just take the organization itself and the, the
12:26
way in which there has been a deterioration and A and a loss
12:29
of of sort of quality and numbers that was absolutely
12:32
already happening then. And it, and it looked, you know,
12:34
to, to use your sort of language, it looked very
12:37
deliberate the way in which it was being done.
12:39
But I can go on to prevent more of that later.
12:41
But anyway, now that let's say that's a little bit of.
12:44
Well, Charles, that was not there.
12:47
And yeah, I was thinking as you're going through, you know,
12:51
there's so many points and where do I start from that?
12:54
I think I just want to ask you one more question before I
12:57
respond. And that's that's you joined.
13:00
You did join the army. Why did you do that?
13:04
Yeah, that's a very good question.
13:06
And actually in the first instance, it was almost by
13:08
accident, which a lot of people have said over the years very
13:13
specifically, and this is, this is an initiative of somebody
13:17
who's sort of good at their job. When I was at school, there was
13:22
a that's sadly defunct. Well, I would say sad because I
13:26
thought it did actually it worked well.
13:28
They ran a program called an Army Scholarship, which meant
13:30
that you could, as a 16 year old, you could go forward to the
13:34
regimental selection board and go basically go through the
13:39
officer's selection as a schoolboy and get a, get a place
13:43
at Sandhurst for whenever it was you wanted to take it up.
13:46
And I had been informed of this, so I went along to speak to the
13:50
visiting careers officer or whatever he was called.
13:53
And my idea was that I was getting along just for him to
13:57
explain a little bit about it, which is how I came away from
14:01
the conversation only to get a letter in the post about two
14:04
days later saying how, you know, delighted to meet you, so glad
14:07
you've decided to go forward for this thing.
14:10
And he had entered me into the process.
14:12
So, so that that was how it sort of took over that that's, that's
14:16
a sort of slightly silly detail. I, my my family have a have a
14:22
strong military background, which is not absolutely not been
14:26
a defining factor, but it did mean and, and as I said, going
14:28
back to the beginning about trying to civilianize this talk,
14:31
it gave me an idea of the sorts of things that military life,
14:36
army life in particular entailed.
14:38
And it wasn't the idea of sort of rigid discipline and being
14:41
told what to do. It was actually totally the
14:42
obverse, which was being able to be fit and do exciting
14:48
adventurous stuff and be paid for it and, and use your brain
14:52
at the same time. And I, I couldn't really at that
14:54
age or stage imagine anything better.
14:56
It was, it was a huge appeal. I, I, I didn't really consider
15:00
that there was any other professional out there that was
15:02
offering in any way that kind of thing, as well as the enormous
15:08
responsibility and privilege of helping other people run their
15:12
lives in, in a command sentence. And that, that was absolutely
15:16
borne out by getting to my first platoon and having a, a bunch of
15:24
in the main, absolutely unbelievable individuals to, to
15:29
look after if they want to a better term.
15:31
And, and I think it's a huge shame that that that I'm talking
15:36
about the perspective of an officer, but this is not
15:39
exclusively the preserve of an officer because everybody has
15:42
this sort of welfare responsibility.
15:44
And for people not to understand that that is such a huge part of
15:48
it. I think it's really regrettable.
15:49
And I think it's also deliberate because it does sort of
15:52
desensitize the whole issue and it, and it enables when
15:55
expedient for people in the armed forces to be sort of
15:58
othered to, you know, they're not high casts.
16:00
They're, they're, they're different.
16:02
And I think again, that's a, that's a, that's a great shame.
16:04
But that, but that was, that was a huge, huge part of it.
16:08
And I, the reason I make that point is that I, what I would
16:11
like to say is it as a really distinct issue is that I was not
16:15
at all drawn to the idea of guns and ammo.
16:20
I just, that was, that's going to be part of it.
16:24
But I was not one of those people who just wanted to, you
16:28
know, get on the ranges and fire off loads of ammunition or, or
16:32
indeed go into a theatre of conflict in order to kill
16:36
people. That was never ever any of my
16:39
motivation at all. But that was because naively
16:42
Queen and country even then still to me meant something.
16:47
And and and this is the problem. But we can come back to that.
16:50
But say, yeah, that was that was the motivation.
16:52
But. Charles, I'm glad I asked you
16:55
the question because I also got a scholarship and at the age of
17:02
16, and this came about because my father had had done wartime
17:08
service in the Navy. He'd originally worked in the
17:11
dockyard here in Devonport and in a particular year, I think it
17:16
was the very beginning of 42, a small number of people from
17:21
protected industries in the dockyard was one of them were
17:25
actually called up. And I can't remember how many
17:29
went from Devonport Dockyard. Several, 100.
17:32
Not on the scale of the thousands that worked there.
17:35
It wasn't very many, but anyway, it resulted in my father
17:39
spending the Second World War in, in the Navy.
17:44
And he he, he ended up chief shipwright, chief Petty Officer
17:50
and he saw some things which, you know, deeply upset him, but
17:57
it was clear that, that he enjoyed a lot of his service
18:01
time. But at the end of the war, he'd
18:04
met my mum, which is probably a good thing.
18:06
And he, he decided that he was going to come out, even though
18:10
the Navy offered him the opportunity to stay on a full
18:15
time career. And they didn't do that with
18:16
many people. So that was a, a feather in his
18:19
cap. But when sort of I, I was a
18:23
teenager and you, you start thinking about what your career
18:26
is, I was pretty uncertain. And then 11 week, my father
18:33
announced that on the Wednesday he was going to be taking me
18:36
into, it was called HMS Flying Fox.
18:39
It was a little ship that was alongside in Bristol.
18:43
And this was just to have a chat.
18:46
It's a parallel just to have a chat.
18:49
And so one very misty cold morning I was my dad and I drove
18:55
down into Bristol and I go on board HMS Flying Fox and I meet
19:00
her. Well, he seemed quite old to me,
19:03
but I suspect he was, he was quite a young Lieutenant.
19:06
And the next minute I was asked a whole load of questions about
19:10
this and that which I quite enjoyed and I didn't find it
19:14
particularly difficult. And the next thing was a letter
19:17
in the post inviting me for a full week assessment which was
19:23
in Portsmouth. And as a result of doing that,
19:26
I, I got a scholarship, which meant all I had to do was get 2A
19:31
levels and then I would be able to go to Dartmouth, which is
19:36
still the Royal Navy's officer training location.
19:42
So that's what happened. I got my got my A levels and the
19:48
next minute I was just 18. Only a couple of weeks into
19:52
being 18I arrived at Dartmouth. I'm not going to say a lot of it
19:57
for me was was absolute fascination and curiosity
20:00
because immediately you were exposed to a very different sort
20:05
of lifestyle. But also very quickly it was to
20:08
do with boats. You were on the river Darts and
20:11
you you were learning about boats and warships and being
20:16
able to sail and mess around in boats.
20:20
And much as you're saying, I found this very enjoyable and
20:24
I'll add. I was fascinated at that time by
20:27
the number of people that bailed out the training and I found
20:32
this astonishing because some people decided after two weeks
20:35
that they'd had enough and I couldn't understand why they
20:41
would leave at that point because I thought you haven't
20:44
seen enough. But they did on subsequent as
20:49
the calls progressed and faces got blacked out on the
20:53
photographs. And until, you know, we passed
20:57
out and that's the terminology we qualified.
21:01
And it was about that time that the Navy suddenly announced that
21:07
it was looking for people to go to university.
21:10
And I'd made a specific decision in my head that I wanted to join
21:14
the military. I didn't want to go to
21:16
university. And suddenly here was the Navy
21:19
pushing and pushing and pushing for these newly qualified
21:23
midshipmen to go to university. And I ended up sort of asking
21:29
some advice from, from some of the staff and they all said,
21:34
well, you know, it's an incredible opportunity because
21:36
you're going to be in, in London, you're going to be paid
21:40
and you get a degree and this can't be bad.
21:43
So in the end, I, I took it. And that meant that I went from
21:47
from the traditional training route through to university, got
21:52
the degree, had a lot of fun, got the degree, just came back
21:57
into the Navy then to start the training properly and
22:01
eventually, you know, you join the fleet at sea.
22:06
So even my training periods, there were these big changes
22:11
happening because prior to that you'd had the system of young
22:17
boys, 12 through till 12 through to probably 17, doing a sort of
22:25
cadet ship with, with the Navy, and then they would become
22:29
midshipmen. And then at that stage they go
22:31
to Dartmouth. And so that was a very, a very
22:36
long introduction to a career in the military.
22:39
And many of those young men that did it, you know, we were going
22:44
to the, let's say, up, up and into the 1930s came from
22:49
military families where their parents been in the military for
22:52
a long time. So you had this inherent
22:55
understanding of what the military was about.
22:58
And when I got to Dartmouth, I'd come to a grammar school.
23:02
But when I got to Dartmouth, that was a very different system
23:05
of training. But previously you had
23:08
youngsters had gone through a system and they were very
23:12
knowledgeable by the time they got to Dartmouth.
23:16
So what am I trying to describe? I'm trying to describe that
23:20
looking back, I can see that I already joined the system where
23:25
the strength of families being involved with the military and
23:30
people getting engaged with the military at a young age, that
23:35
was being pushed aside. And to me, I couldn't, I could
23:40
easily see that this was depriving the military of a lot
23:44
of inherent strength from, from the amount of time that people
23:49
had spent training. It was ingrained in them.
23:52
And this is very powerful thing. This is what makes good troops.
23:57
When it's not, They're just there for a career.
24:00
It's something they really want to do.
24:02
They're very knowledgeable on the subject.
24:04
So I find that very interesting that you also did a scholarship
24:08
like that. Yeah, I mean, well, this is it.
24:12
I think. You know, you're right, the way
24:16
which these things have changed and and you know, the view.
24:22
Therefore from the outside, I mean, I think you know, going
24:28
back to the the type of people that that are drawn towards this
24:33
or do do this. I'm actually very interested to
24:35
hear about the number of people that dropped out that that was
24:39
not maybe exceptions. That certainly wasn't the case
24:44
in my era at Santos. There were, there were there
24:48
were very small number of people who decided not to.
24:51
Some people physically weren't up to it and therefore left.
24:55
But by and large people stayed. And and actually just to just to
24:59
again further qualify the the situation with the sort of the
25:04
people element, which I think is so important.
25:06
I, I well, remember the opening address that we had from what
25:11
Well, Sant has this split up on what would I suppose be a
25:15
regimental basis, but they're, they're colleges say, well, you
25:18
start off in old college and therefore you have a commander
25:21
who is a sort of seasoned Lieutenant Colonel.
25:26
So it's kind of chief executive role, I guess.
25:29
And I, I remember David Hill, he was who spoke to us and said the
25:34
first thing he said was, was welcome.
25:39
You have joined that group of society that picks up other
25:43
people's rubbish. And it was, it was very good.
25:48
And I know the word integrity has, has, has difficult
25:53
connotations for, for UK column because of the integrity
25:57
initiative. But, but if we forget that for
25:59
one minute, it wasn't him that said it.
26:01
But it was always said that because, because you know, this
26:04
old idea of ethos and all that kind of thing, but integrity was
26:07
always the big one. And to, to put out that theme a
26:11
little further, integrity is, was always described as being,
26:16
picking up other people's rubbish when no one's watching.
26:19
And, and, and I think it is a point worth making because there
26:25
are two elements to it. 1 Is this idea that the the military
26:31
shapes the person as opposed to the person having the aptitude,
26:36
all that system and therefore fitting into it well, adapting
26:40
to it and getting the most out of it.
26:42
There will always be debate on that, but my view is that
26:45
predominantly people of a certain bent, of a certain
26:49
character will be drawn towards a particular organization and I
26:54
think the military expressly because ultimately it might lead
26:58
to your death. So you have to be quite sure
27:00
about whether or not you want to do it.
27:02
So that's one side of it. The other side of it is that
27:06
there is AI can totally understand why, but but there is
27:11
a regard that people once they've joined the armed forces,
27:14
they are in effect trained killers.
27:16
That's really all they're about which yes, OK, that is true
27:19
because you're not really going to be of much use in an armed
27:21
force if you're not doing that bit or able to do that bit.
27:25
That is part and parcel of it. But that absolutely goes
27:30
alongside the, the litter picking bit in that the, the
27:36
system simply doesn't work if people don't behave with
27:40
terrific respect for one another.
27:42
And, and any, any breach in that, any failure of that is, is
27:47
catastrophic. And, and you know, it's always
27:50
the, the, the service test was always the, the, the determining
27:54
factor in, in how the situation was looked at, which was does
27:57
it, does the, the situation, if there's been a breakdown in
28:02
communications or discipline or whatever, does it fail the
28:04
service test, which is, does it, does it compromise your
28:07
operational effectiveness? And, and I, I think there are
28:11
two don't get dragged too much down the kind of military ball
28:15
thing, but there are so many really, really positive sort of
28:19
universal elements from the way those systems were managed
28:23
between people that could, I think could and should be
28:26
transposed in a, in a completely non military sense, but into the
28:30
civilian environment. And you know, this goes back to
28:32
what you're talking about where, where that there is this sort of
28:34
intentional breakdown and that the idea of the sort of the
28:39
service family thing being stopped and, and all that.
28:42
And I totally agree. And I think I think the
28:44
consequence for society as a whole has been terrific.
28:47
And and actually, if I may just use one anecdote, I can remember
28:53
about 15 years ago, there was a very, very cold winter.
28:57
It was the winter 2010 eleven. Climate change obviously hasn't
29:02
started by that stage. So there was terrific, terrific
29:05
guys at the time, I was living in a village that had a Ford in
29:10
the road that went out of the village.
29:12
So, so you went down a relatively steep descend through
29:15
the Ford, not the other side, but because nobody had bothered,
29:19
there was a huge amount of ice high side of it.
29:22
Basically people couldn't get in and out.
29:24
And, and I, I, you know, OK, it wasn't something that I'd
29:29
actually need to do for those reasons.
29:31
But when it did become necessary to be able to clear that ice, I
29:37
went down, you know, it was, it was -10 outside.
29:41
And I started sorting the, the tracks and smashing it away with
29:47
a, with a shovel and whatnot. Was one other bloke who arrived
29:50
more or less at exactly the same time.
29:52
And he was a private soldier from the Parachute Regiment.
29:55
He'd just been shot in the leg and was recovering.
29:58
He'd been through heading court. There was some rehabilitation
30:01
thing and there we were, stripped down T-shirts, pouring
30:06
this sweat and -10 clearing the path for this village.
30:10
I don't say that. So why?
30:11
You know how amazing? But the point is that it was
30:13
that it was two people who were, who were both active servicemen
30:17
who just decided to do something that a village of, I don't know,
30:20
300 people hadn't, hadn't thought to do.
30:22
And neither of us. Sorry.
30:23
The point is that we were both sort of visitors.
30:27
Neither of us was actually living there full time.
30:29
So I mean, it just. Yeah.
30:31
And if you if you stop the system from working properly,
30:34
then society doesn't have that sort of dividend as it were
30:37
returned to it. Yeah, it's a very interesting
30:42
area and for me, very well. You saw this very quickly on
30:48
board a ship because the ship does not function if people are
30:51
not working together and you have all sorts of risks around
30:57
you. So that, you know, that could be
30:59
fire or it could be flood or it could be the explosion Ship is,
31:03
is a, is a pretty dangerous mix of things because you've got
31:07
people in a steel box with fuel and explosive in large
31:14
quantities. And so there's an inherent need
31:17
for people to be professional and reliable and trustworthy in
31:22
order to survive in that environment.
31:25
And you add to it, you know, if a ship goes to sea in very rough
31:30
weather, it requires that ship to work properly and to be
31:35
sufficiently robust that you're going to come out the other side
31:38
of, of the storm. And so you've got this, this
31:44
wonderful environment of people who have been, who were very
31:49
well trained. And also they were, they'd built
31:53
up a camaraderie together where people could rely on each other.
31:59
They'd looked out for each other and on top of that, the thing I
32:03
remember of of the Navy was a very quiet working environment.
32:08
Most people were asked if they would do something.
32:12
Occasionally they were told, but generally it was put across in a
32:16
very soft way. And I always laughed when I
32:20
started to see some of the BBC documentaries about the Navy and
32:26
certainly if I saw BBC documentaries about the holding,
32:29
because people were always shouting at each other.
32:32
And this was something I'd never, I'd never encountered,
32:36
you know, maybe once or twice in a serious situation where
32:41
somebody needed to shout because we're in the open air and you
32:44
needed to get water across. The rest of the time it happened
32:49
in a very quiet, measured way. And the interesting thing is, is
32:55
and I, I think it is still the same today, but if you, if you
32:58
then went to the submarine service where the danger was
33:03
even greater because you're in a steel box with fuel and
33:06
explosive nuclear radiation and you're under the water,
33:11
everybody has to know what they're doing.
33:15
And yet the working environment is even quieter and the
33:19
relationship much softer between offices and and the normal
33:23
ranks. And why was it like that?
33:27
Because everything was running very smoothly.
33:30
And, and the other bit so bad to it is, is conversations that I
33:38
remember and usually the best conversations in the Navy always
33:42
do during the night watches. Because if you were officer of
33:45
the watch, you're up on the bridge and you, you had two or
33:49
three the ship's company with you as lookouts or steering.
33:55
And you would have conversations, very normal
33:58
conversations about families and holidays and cars and whatever
34:02
it was always with a sense of humour.
34:08
And and so this idea that, as you say, that the military is
34:12
just this way of ingraining in people that they're, they're
34:16
going to become trained killers, that was absolutely not what I
34:19
saw. Were you expected to do your
34:22
job? Which ultimately, you know, if
34:25
we were at war that does involve killing people, But the but the
34:29
actual day-to-day Society of the military was, was very relaxed
34:36
and personable and it was based on people skills.
34:39
Yeah, I mean, I mean, I totally agree.
34:40
I, I, I agree with you, in fact, trying to find a documentary
34:45
about the army in which anyone actually speaks rather than
34:48
shouts, It's it's difficult. And, and having been
34:51
specifically having been a Guardsman where you spent quite
34:54
a lot of your time shouting on a parade.
34:59
Yeah, it's, it's extraordinary. And of course, again, being
35:02
infantry, most of what you're doing outside in an active sense
35:06
involves shouting because of the the notes.
35:09
But, but clearly there is another element to that.
35:11
No, I mean my, my, my memory of, you know, all services behave
35:16
differently for, for different reasons, but no, my memory was
35:19
exactly the same that think things were conducted in in a,
35:22
in a calm and rational manner. And, and actually this is this,
35:26
this I think is such an interesting.
35:28
It's not exactly a paradox, but but it these these two things
35:31
that are very closely related, that we have this system in
35:36
which people know their job absolutely inside out and can
35:40
depend with their life upon the persons on either side of them.
35:44
That's the only way in which it works.
35:46
And we were talking recently about how different this can be
35:52
in the civilian environment. And I and my own experience is
35:55
subsequent to leaving the Army in terms of having spent any
36:00
time either working within or in close proximity to large
36:06
corporations. I have seen the exact opposite.
36:08
I have seen the vast majority of people with no real idea of
36:13
where the job begins and ends and what indeed they are
36:15
supposed to do in that role. And actually, if the pressure
36:19
increased, they would collapse because they don't get it.
36:22
And there are lots of reasons why that might be the case.
36:26
But ultimately, they're not going to die or get injured if
36:29
they don't get it right. And yet we talk about the
36:34
humanity, the, the human side of, of the armed forces.
36:38
But we cannot get away from the fact that ultimately, if they
36:43
are exercised in the way that that they are currently and have
36:47
been for hundreds of years, lives are lost.
36:50
And what I'd be very interested in, in your perspective, is that
36:57
in retrospect, obviously I, I don't believe there was any
37:02
merit in any of the foreign interventions that were being
37:06
conducted during the period of time that I spent in the Army.
37:10
Quite the opposite. I think they were really
37:14
disgraceful engagement. But but the difficulty is that
37:20
people like me are still getting to want to belong to those sorts
37:24
of organisations because of all the sorts of things that we're
37:27
talking about. Do you remember how you felt
37:32
about the sorts of operational theatres that were either being
37:37
entered into or that were likely or, or you know, your point of
37:42
view on whatever one calls it sort of foreign intervention?
37:48
Because I because I find it's it's a very difficult thing to
37:52
to be absolute about because of all the other it won't be
37:56
positive attributes. It's, it's very interesting.
38:01
This is a very interesting subject.
38:03
I think I would have to say that for the first instance during my
38:08
career, the the overwhelming thing was this was Cold War
38:13
time. And so if everything was focused
38:17
around the Cold War scenario, we still have the British Army of
38:21
the Rhine. There was still major exercises
38:25
taking place in in Germany, and that was all on the basis, of
38:30
course, of the Soviet Union in invading the West and at sea.
38:37
All of the exercises effectively were based on scenarios around
38:44
for me locating and and tracking and ultimately destroying
38:49
Russian submarines, Soviet submarines and the major
38:54
exercises at sea used to be called the teamwork series.
39:00
And they were based on first of all the American carrier groups
39:05
moving across from from the United States principally into
39:11
the North Atlantic and also up into the Norwegian Sea to
39:16
project so projects US air power across Norway and protecting the
39:25
northern flank and deterring the Soviet Air Force from moving
39:30
down into the Norwegian Sea. the US carrier groups were the first
39:37
role for the Royal Navy because we were to be part of the anti
39:43
submarine screen for those units.
39:45
And I think we did a pretty good job.
39:48
But of course, the carriers were the full front of the supply
39:51
ships coming across because nothing has changed from the
39:55
Second World War. In order for a major war to be
39:58
fought in Europe, the American industrial complex had to
40:03
produce the munitions and the food and fuel and everything
40:08
else. And that had to be transported
40:10
in convoy across the North Atlantic.
40:14
So for me, during the bulk of my time, it was it was clearly the
40:20
Cold War and. I didn't really pay attention to
40:27
specific deployments overseas, although I did, I did do one
40:32
particularly boring patrol out in the Gulf when it, it, it's,
40:36
it was getting a little bit serious out there.
40:39
But none of that was a sort of major deployment for the, for
40:44
the Royal Navy. The big thing for me was the
40:47
Falklands and that was particularly of great
40:52
significance to me because I just started my warfare
40:55
training. The career in the, in my career
40:59
in the Navy was that initially you work to train in basic
41:04
navigation skills and then you work to get your bridge watch
41:08
keeping ticket, which means you can, you are capable of holding
41:13
a watch on the bridge on your own day and night.
41:16
And then when you've got those skills then they start to move
41:20
you forward to the warfare training.
41:22
And so I went to HMS Dryad in Portsmouth to start that warfare
41:27
training. And we were only a few weeks in
41:30
when the Falklands started. And what came to the surface
41:34
very quickly was that there was not enough warfare people at
41:38
sea. And so I was, I can't remember
41:42
how many of us there were, but they were, there was a
41:44
relatively small number of us that were pulled off the course
41:48
early, put on a ship and then sent down to the Falklands.
41:53
So I didn't even go through the full warfare training course
41:59
because the Falklands started and rapidly there was this major
42:03
escalation and they were desperately short of certain
42:08
people, including the warfare ones.
42:09
So I was on board a frigate and sent off to the Falklands and I
42:14
have to say I was very lucky because we got down there two
42:19
days after the Armistice was signed and I then did a very
42:26
well. Some of it was interesting.
42:27
I was going to say very boring patrol down there and of course
42:31
you were there having missed all the glory.
42:34
So anybody you encountered had, who had been there was very keen
42:40
to say what they've been doing, etcetera, etcetera.
42:43
But we got down there after the fighting had stopped.
42:46
So I have to be very thankful that I, I wasn't put in harm's
42:50
way. Some of the people that I joined
42:54
the Navy with died in the, in the Falklands.
42:57
And a couple of them I only discovered recently when I was
43:00
doing a bit of research and I was looking through the names of
43:03
the, the deceased across the armed forces and I suddenly
43:07
thought, Oh my goodness, I didn't realize he, he died.
43:11
So, but the preparations for the full Falklands obviously were
43:16
taken very seriously. And yes, I, I got the experience
43:21
of gearing up for war. And then of course, you know,
43:25
we, we started here, the reports of the, of the hits on the other
43:30
ships, HMS Sheffield and Coventry and, and the Type 21
43:35
frigates that were hit. And so as we were on our way
43:39
down, we, we knew that if, you know, it was serious stuff and
43:43
people were dying and, and being killed.
43:48
So that, that was a pretty unique experience for me.
43:51
And then after that I, I specialized in anti submarine
43:56
warfare and that was, that was tracking the, the Russian
43:59
nuclear submarines and bombers as they came out into the
44:03
Atlantic. That was very good because it it
44:08
was real. It wasn't that we were on a
44:10
training exercise. We were, we were finding the
44:13
real, the real deal, the Russian submarines.
44:19
And that was a very enjoyable time because I got a lot of
44:22
satisfaction about that work. And I would also add, we had
44:26
huge respect for the Russian submariners because they were
44:30
very capable people. And to answer your point, it was
44:36
after that that I eventually ended up in the Fishery
44:41
Protection Squadron where I had command one of the fishery
44:45
protection vessels, HMS Orkney. And that is when I really
44:51
started to think about what we were doing, because it quickly
44:55
became apparent to me that though the role of the Fishery
44:59
Protection Squadron had been to protect, at least with a very
45:05
small P, British fishing boats at sea, what we were actually
45:10
doing was imposing the European fisheries policy on those
45:15
fishing. And the story that I've told in
45:18
a lot of life talks over the years is that one very dark
45:25
winter's night we boarded a Scottish fisherman of more or
45:31
less the entrance to the Firth of 4th.
45:34
And he he was breaking the rules for the size of his net.
45:38
We weren't able to make a decision on the spot.
45:43
We always had to refer to Ministry of Agricultural
45:49
Fisheries as it was then. So there was a dedicated team
45:53
and they told us very clearly that we were to come to
45:57
confiscate his net. And the Scottish captain of that
46:02
boat talked to me in some pretty colourful language that I was
46:07
destroying his effing livelihood.
46:10
And I knew that that was exactly true.
46:13
And I also knew that when I was travelling around the the North
46:18
Sea or up around the Shetlands and Falkland Islands doing the
46:22
fishery patrols, we were seeing EU funded fishing boats for the
46:28
French and the Spanish and the Germans in particular.
46:33
Brand new boats paid for with European money that was simply
46:38
wiping the oceans of fish and destroying the livelihoods of
46:42
the British fishermen. And I started to feel deeply
46:46
uncomfortable about that. And it was actually that
46:50
experience that made me get to a point where I thought this is
46:54
not for me. And and so I left.
46:56
So, you know, ironically, it wasn't a military style
47:02
requirement to the armed forces that that brought that home to
47:05
me. I never experienced A
47:09
deployment, you know, where we were operating in the waters of
47:13
some foreign country where I thought, are we doing the right
47:16
thing? It for me it was the fishery
47:19
protection where I knew it was not the right thing.
47:23
Yeah, I mean, I think, I think it's fascinating and, and again
47:25
to the, well actually both military and civilian audience,
47:29
I think, I think it's, you know, one of the things is that, that
47:32
I prefer to quite a number of times on the news.
47:34
And I think it's, it's safe worth bringing out, which is
47:37
that all, all, all activities are governed by rules of
47:42
engagement. You know, any, any, any
47:45
operational deployment whatever that there are, there are set
47:48
conditions under which you may or may not use force or you
47:53
know, you return far or far upon.
47:55
And, and I think it's, it is certainly understood and it's
47:59
certainly not it, it was fairly confident.
48:02
It was never expressly said in any of the laws of our conflict
48:07
training that I undertook. But when you look at when you
48:11
look at how it's written down, which is in joint services
48:15
publication JSP 398 and you and you read what it says about
48:18
rules of engagement, that the rules of engagement are the use
48:25
of force as a political expression.
48:28
It, it, it does just make you think about everything in a
48:32
completely different way. Because in within that
48:35
environment, whether it doesn't matter where you are, whether
48:37
you know that there are for every situation, there are rules
48:40
of engagement. They do, they do get changed,
48:43
but you're always led to believe that that has come from within
48:47
your command structure. And as they there is an
48:49
appraisal of the situation and appraisal of what would be
48:52
regarded as, you know, risk or threats or or whatever.
48:58
But but actually that's not where it comes from.
49:01
All of this is, is a political expression, a political fact.
49:07
And this, this is, you know, where the, the difficulty lies.
49:12
And that's why I thought, you know, find it so interesting to
49:14
listen to you talk about these periods.
49:16
But the only thing I was going to ask as a follow up is do you
49:19
remember either at the time or afterwards, anybody ever
49:23
questioning either what happened in the lead up to or in the
49:29
Falklands or indeed in the activities concerning, you know,
49:34
the the sort of monitoring of the great Soviet bear?
49:38
Was there the sense that, you know, it was not quite as it was
49:43
being? Sold, I'd say, I'd say not in
49:48
this in the Soviet time. But then I'm going to say my
49:52
perception of what was going on was, you know, I was very young
49:58
and you're doing a particular job, doing a particular job.
50:04
And just, you know, something that comes into my mind during
50:08
the Cold War, one of the things that the the Soviets did, you
50:15
know, the Soviet military exercises, they always talked
50:19
with real place names. Whereas if NATO, when it's a
50:23
size usually, well usually inevitably we, we would be
50:29
running to some exercise scenario.
50:32
And if there was a country defined or a power block, the
50:36
breadth power block, you were talking about targets that were
50:43
always given code names, no great code names.
50:47
But when the Soviets were doing their exercises, they would be
50:51
talking about advancing, you know, 30 miles further into West
50:56
Germany and they will be talking about the the names of the
50:59
places that they were going to be taking.
51:02
Now, was that a bit of propaganda to put, put the West
51:06
under pressure? Absolutely.
51:08
But of course that that did make you think that their intent was
51:12
real. So.
51:15
So I'm going to say that Cold War period people were very
51:18
heavily focused and there was there was a lot of deep concern
51:25
about Soviet capability and of course strength in numbers
51:29
because they had very big military and certainly very big
51:34
submarine fleet. And so there was an inherent,
51:38
I'll say fear with a small F about the bear.
51:45
But no, I didn't, I didn't get any pushback.
51:49
Don't see any better pushback about that period.
51:52
The Falklands was mainly the push back actually was against,
51:58
you know, UK because people knew very early on that we'd run into
52:03
major problems in the Falklands because we hadn't got the ships
52:07
or equipment. And very often it was clear that
52:12
within the war Navy people had been warning and complaining
52:17
about this for a long time. I mean, one of the key things is
52:20
that ships started to appear, new design ships started to
52:24
appear during the Cold War that had very few weapon systems on
52:29
them. And, and the moment the Falcons
52:33
blew up, everybody said, well, you're going to be facing
52:37
fighter ground attack aircraft close to coastal areas.
52:40
We need traditional weapons, we need 20 millimetre, 30
52:44
millimetre guns and the ships didn't have them.
52:47
So what then transpired was this rapid retrofitting of ships with
52:53
anything they could find. And the frigate that I was on
52:58
board HMS Sirius, which had four Exocet missiles.
53:04
It had sea cap surface to air missiles which although old,
53:08
proved that that missile system proved pretty capable.
53:11
In the Falklands we had a couple of single 20 millimetres and
53:17
they ended up fitting a twin 20 millimetre on the bridge.
53:22
But that 2020 millimetre was not a modern weapon.
53:26
It was it was a relic from the Second World War and so so ships
53:31
went down there many of them I'll equipped for the battle
53:36
that the Argentinians could bring you know again against the
53:40
British and and we paid the price for that.
53:43
And when, when you look back at good military analysis of the
53:49
Falklands, we were very, very lucky.
53:53
And the bombs not exploding in Borne Alley, when the
53:57
Argentinian, the pilots dropped bombs and they, they didn't own
54:01
properly, that was that was just unbelievable luck for the fleet.
54:07
So I quickly saw from my my, my Falklands experience that the
54:17
military power that was was looking after, sorry, the
54:21
political power that was looking after the military was
54:25
absolutely failing to provide what the military needed.
54:30
And every year that I served, we were being, we were being told
54:36
there were going to be further cuts in manpower and ships and
54:40
training. That was one of the things that
54:42
happened. And the other thing that
54:45
happened with increasing frequency was some form of
54:49
reorganization. And this might be the renaming
54:53
of, of, of professional tasks within the military.
54:58
It could be to do with absolutely stupid changes to the
55:03
uniforms, it changes to the badges.
55:07
So in in an organization, which I would say when it's working
55:11
properly, there's inherent stability and people know not
55:16
only the organizational structure, they they know what
55:19
the systems and they know the training everyone's had that
55:23
that became ever more turbulent and you could see the effects.
55:29
So initially you just put it down to the people who who kick
55:35
started these changes lacked common sense.
55:38
That's what you mind told, told you.
55:41
But later I started to come to the conclusion that these, these
55:46
damaging changes were not a lack of common sense, they were
55:50
orchestrated. And that's when, OK, that was
55:54
before my time with the with the Fishery Protection Squadron.
55:57
But that's why I started to think there's something
56:00
malevolent at work. Yeah, and Ian, I think that's
56:04
totally fascinating. And Julian Assange's words
56:08
spring to mind with The Forever War.
56:10
You know, the, the, the goal is not to have a successful war,
56:15
but a but an endless 1. And it's fascinating and I, you
56:19
know, although a sort of a different period, but this is
56:22
exactly what I saw. You know, I was my point.
56:25
Naomi coincided with two in terms of tech 2 significant
56:30
changes. One was the digitization of all
56:35
radio comms from the Klansman system, which was absolutely
56:40
brilliant because it worked absolutely everywhere.
56:43
It didn't matter how many bogs and puddles and whatever you
56:46
dropped it in, it still worked to Boatman, which was, I don't
56:50
know whether people consider that it works now, but it was
56:53
absolutely hopeless at the start.
56:55
And would the the all comms would drop all the time and it
56:59
took forever to to reinitialize. And you can imagine in a yeah,
57:04
battlefield context that is that is just not workable.
57:08
So that so those two things were changed.
57:11
Oh, sorry, that one thing was changed and that had a, you
57:14
know, I would say a very detrimental effect, not least
57:17
because in actual fact, the other thing was that it required
57:19
considerable skill to understand how to use that technology.
57:22
So it wasn't that was there was not a universality in that in
57:25
the way there was. And just just to explain to
57:27
people that it's sort of the difference between a push button
57:30
and a smartphone. The push button thing, you kind
57:32
of know what what it's going to do in the way that the log radio
57:35
thing just was a radio with dials and you just clicked a
57:38
battery onto it. There were lots of different
57:40
types as opposed to it all being digital and having to have
57:43
complicated process attached. And the other thing was supposed
57:47
personnel management system. All personnel stuff was running
57:50
from Glasgow and they went on to a system JPA, it was called
57:56
joint personnel administration, I think.
57:58
And again, it just didn't work and and and going back to
58:02
Assange's thing and and exactly what we're describing in the
58:05
Falklands. If the armed forces capability
58:10
and I and I say this with all the we don't even NATO summit,
58:13
recent NATO summit in mind, defence review and all this kind
58:16
of stuff. But if it if it can absolutely
58:18
do what it is supposed to do. And we are to to imagine that
58:22
there is a sort of justifiable conflict and we really were able
58:27
to deliver the effects that we promise it would be over within.
58:30
By hampering the capability, it means that it can be extended to
58:35
the enormous benefit of the war industry.
58:38
And we need look at the security, sorry, the strategic
58:41
defensive review and the national security strategy to
58:43
see that that is nothing more than a business plan for these
58:46
industries. And when you do start to think
58:48
about it like that, so much more of it makes sense, you know, to,
58:51
to sort of keep the system going, but continually hamstring
58:54
it in order that you get your forever wars.
58:57
I know that might seem like a terribly cynical way to look at
59:00
it, but I think when you've gone through the system, it's very
59:02
hard to consider it in another way.
59:04
Because I saw exactly the same thing with, let's say with Iraq,
59:08
but Afghanistan in particular, the the the advent of what we're
59:11
called urgent operational requirements, which was the sort
59:15
of the ven process of, you know, just fixing the 30 mil cannon to
59:21
to the front. It wasn't, but it was just
59:23
buying off the shelf kit that wasn't in the budget that no one
59:26
had training on. I mean, it was, it was chaos.
59:28
It was absolutely chaos. And and therefore it meant that
59:31
the effect on the ground was not what it should have been because
59:33
of it. And, you know, don't tell me
59:35
that no one could have seen that coming.
59:37
And then, you know, we go back to well, things.
59:40
Yeah, my experience was people did see these.
59:42
Things coming and they were constantly talking about it.
59:46
And we, we could go a strategic scale, we could go very small
59:50
scale. But for a strategic thing, there
59:54
was the announcement, whatever year it was that they're going
59:57
to get rid of Royal Navy's aircraft carriers.
1:00:01
And everybody said, you know what, what are you talking
1:00:05
about? Because those aircraft carriers,
1:00:06
apart from anything else, invariably formed the task group
1:00:13
that that the Royal Navy. Produced in order to integrate
1:00:18
with the American carrier battle groups we, we were part of the
1:00:22
outer screen and and our carriers carrying anti submarine
1:00:26
helicopters or ASW planes were part of that outer screen.
1:00:32
So, so people started to, you know, question this decision and
1:00:38
of course it trickled down through the the Navy structure
1:00:42
and there was a sufficient backlash that they were known as
1:00:46
the through deck cruisers. This was a new proposal design
1:00:52
and people worked hard enough to say, well, actually the through
1:00:55
deck cruiser should be trying to changed to make it aircraft
1:01:00
carrier life. And I think we were, we were
1:01:05
grateful that we did get these new small aircraft carriers, but
1:01:09
of course they didn't have an angled flight deck, they didn't
1:01:12
have a catapult system and therefore they were very limited
1:01:16
in the aircraft they could carry.
1:01:20
They could carry the Harrier. The Harrier did very well during
1:01:23
the Falklands. But if we had had carrier
1:01:26
launched airborne early warning aircraft, which of course the
1:01:31
Americans had, and we had previously with the old
1:01:34
carriers, a lot of the damage in the Falklands wouldn't have
1:01:38
happened. But somebody made a decision
1:01:41
that we were going to get rid of carriers.
1:01:43
Then when the new carriers came in, there was a gap.
1:01:46
And that means you're losing the training, of course.
1:01:49
And this was something you you saw happening time and time
1:01:54
again. And the other one I'll just
1:01:57
mention was that that at one stage when I got a lot of
1:02:00
experience in the particular sonar systems that we were using
1:02:04
to track the Russians, this is a long toad array.
1:02:10
So it's like a hose pipe full of microphones and you're listening
1:02:15
to sounds in the water and you can detect the sounds of vessels
1:02:19
and submarines. But we had a particular sonar,
1:02:25
it was produced by by Marconi. They were very excited when they
1:02:29
produced it was taken to sea for tests and it's performance was
1:02:34
outstanding. Nobody had ever seen anything
1:02:36
like it. And so eventually this
1:02:38
particular signal set was fitted in the frigate squadron that
1:02:44
that I was part of. And then we very quickly started
1:02:48
to go to sea on on these real life detection trips to find the
1:02:55
Russian nuclear submarines. Well, eventually we were told
1:03:00
that the Admiralty Research Department was going to create
1:03:04
an update of this sonar system. And because computer technology
1:03:10
had moved on the cabinets for it instead of being the size I'll
1:03:15
say if you if you know the size of a double door fridge, an
1:03:20
American double door fridge. The cabinet to drive my sonar
1:03:25
system was three of those side by side.
1:03:28
And the Admiralty Research Organization said they could
1:03:35
produce computer that would do the same job about the size of
1:03:39
your average domestic fridge, big domestic fridge.
1:03:44
When the new sonar system was fitted, it very quickly became
1:03:49
apparent it it wasn't as good or it wasn't as performing well.
1:03:54
And eventually I was sent to sea with two ships, one with one
1:03:59
system, one with the other system where we did a controlled
1:04:03
trial to, you know, see what was going on.
1:04:05
Was was it the equipment of fault or was it the training of
1:04:09
the operators? And it quickly became apparent
1:04:12
that the old system was better than the new one.
1:04:15
So what did they do? They took out all the old
1:04:18
systems and replaced it with a with a new signal.
1:04:22
And it was at that point that I realized that whoever was
1:04:26
controlling the operation was not interested in in you doing
1:04:31
the the job or in your lives. Because if they're giving you
1:04:36
deaf equipment, they don't care what happens to you.
1:04:39
And so that was my one of my key examples of realising that the
1:04:46
machinery driving the military wasn't everything we thought it
1:04:50
was. And I and I, I think anyone.
1:04:52
Anyone. Listening to who has any
1:04:54
military experience will, I'm sure, have have an example of
1:04:57
exactly that just brings to mind, yeah.
1:04:59
As to completely commonplace, I think we might be nearly out of
1:05:04
time. But what I would say is that
1:05:05
there's so much more to talk about that I think we should
1:05:08
definitely do this again because I think we need to sort of bring
1:05:10
ourselves into the the more recent present day.
1:05:15
Yeah, I think so. So we should drop the.
1:05:17
Agenda for It's been an interesting experiment because.
1:05:20
You know, there is a big difference in our time frames
1:05:23
for serving in the military because I left in 93 so well
1:05:28
before you joined. But it hasn't been difficult to
1:05:32
have a a conversation where we know what we're talking about,
1:05:37
even though you're from an Army background and I'm from a Navy
1:05:41
background. And I find that I find that very
1:05:43
interesting. Yeah, I said, well, and I think
1:05:44
and I think that's that. Absolutely.
1:05:46
It's a generational thing. I mean, always think, you know,
1:05:48
to, for again, for, for the sort of civilian audience I've always
1:05:54
taken enormous pleasure in talking to, to the old and bold
1:05:57
as we fondly refer to them. But you know, regimental
1:05:59
gathering, speaking to people of previous generations by some
1:06:02
margin. And, and finally, you absolutely
1:06:04
speak the same language in that case across services as well.
1:06:07
And I think that's, I think that is absolutely fantastic.
1:06:09
But it but it is, you know, it's, it's not a surprise, but
1:06:14
to find that there is that much common ground between our
1:06:17
experiences. It's still sort of amazing until
1:06:20
you start to consider that that absolutely these things are all
1:06:24
done with intent and and those people making these decisions
1:06:28
are are by and large doing doing that for the same set of
1:06:33
reasons. Just just a final comment from
1:06:36
me. And perhaps this shouldn't come
1:06:38
up from, but there was no planned structure to this, so
1:06:42
so. Very, very unmilitary.
1:06:46
Several so I think I think. It's much better because we've
1:06:50
weaved around we wouldn't have done that exactly structure.
1:06:54
But I just wanted to say that we're having a conversation
1:06:58
where we are starting to get a bit critical about matters to do
1:07:02
with the difference in the military.
1:07:04
And I think it's important to say that I and I know for you,
1:07:10
we still have great respect for the people who are are serving.
1:07:14
And I think it's such a huge shame that many of the people
1:07:18
serving today are doing so within the system, which is
1:07:25
rapidly being exposed as a lie. I think that's the best way I
1:07:29
can get it. And I won't add to that.
1:07:31
I think that's a very good. Note to the bottom which to end
1:07:34
and we will go back and revisit exactly that theme.
1:07:36
Yeah, brilliant. Thank you very much, Charles.