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007 - Years of Stalemate Part 2 · Korean War - Brief Histories

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  Speaker 1: Section seven. The Korean War Years of Stalemate July nineteen
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  Speaker 1: fifty one through July nineteen fifty three, Part two by
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  Speaker 1: Andrew J. Bertel The Third Korean Winter December nineteen fifty
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  Speaker 1: two through April nineteen fifty three. By the time the
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  Speaker 1: battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge had wound down
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  Speaker 1: in mid November, both sides had begun the now familiar
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  Speaker 1: pattern of settling down for yet another winter in Korea.
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  Speaker 1: As temperatures dropped, so tooed at the pace of combat. Still, shelling, sniping,
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  Speaker 1: and rating remained habitual features of life at the front,
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  Speaker 1: as did patrol and guard duty, so that even the
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  Speaker 1: quietest of days usually posed some peril for most frontline soldiers.
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  Speaker 1: Home was a huchi, the named soldiers gave to the
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  Speaker 1: log and earth bunkers that were the mainstay of yew
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  Speaker 1: and defenses in Korea. Built for the most part into
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  Speaker 1: the sides of hills, the typical hucci housed from two
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  Speaker 1: to seven men. Each bunker was usually equipped with a
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  Speaker 1: single automatic weapon, which could be fired at the enemy
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  Speaker 1: through above ground firing ports. Inside candles and lamps shed
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  Speaker 1: their pale light on the stramatic floors and pin up
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  Speaker 1: pedecked walls of the cramped five by eight foot areas
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  Speaker 1: that comprised a hucci's living quarters. Oil, charcoal or wood
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  Speaker 1: stoves provided heat, bunk beds made of logs and telephone
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  Speaker 1: wire offered respite, and boxes of extra ammunition and hand
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  Speaker 1: grenades gave comfort to the men for whom these humble
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  Speaker 1: abodes were home. However spartan, the hucchi provided welcome shelter
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  Speaker 1: from the daily storm of bomb bullet rain and snow
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  Speaker 1: that raged outside. Kipping up morale is difficult in any
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  Speaker 1: combat situation, but when the fighting devolves into a prolonged stalemate,
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  Speaker 1: it is particularly hard to maintain. Consequently, the army developed
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  Speaker 1: an extensive system of personnel and unit rotations to combat
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  Speaker 1: soldier burnout and fatigue. Rotation began in a modest way
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  Speaker 1: at the small unit level, where many companies established warm
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  Speaker 1: up buckers just behind the front lines. Every three or
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  Speaker 1: four days, a soldier could expect a short respite of
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  Speaker 1: a few hours duration back at the warm up bunker.
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  Speaker 1: There he would be able to spend his time as
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  Speaker 1: he saw a fit, reading writing letters, washing clothes, or
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  Speaker 1: getting a haircut. When operations were not pressing. Many companies
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  Speaker 1: also arranged to send a dozen or so men at
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  Speaker 1: a time somewhat farther to the rear for a twenty
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  Speaker 1: four hour rest period. The ultimate rest and recuperation R
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  Speaker 1: and R program, however, was a five day holiday in
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  Speaker 1: Japan that Eighth Army tried to arrange for every soldier
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  Speaker 1: on an annual basis. Eighth Army complemented these individual R
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  Speaker 1: and R actives vities with an extensive unit rotation program.
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  Speaker 1: Companies regularly rotated their constituent platoons between frontline and reserve duty. Similarly,
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  Speaker 1: battalions rotated their companies. Regiments rotated their battalions. Divisions rotated
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  Speaker 1: their regiments, in corps rotated their divisions. Ought to ensure
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  Speaker 1: that combat units periodically had a chance to rest, recoup, retrain,
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  Speaker 1: and absorb replacements. Last, but not least, the Army maintained
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  Speaker 1: a massive individual replacement program in an effort to equalize
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  Speaker 1: as much as possible the burdens of military service during
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  Speaker 1: a limited war. In September nineteen fifty one, the Army
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  Speaker 1: had introduced a point system that tried to take into
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  Speaker 1: account the nature of individual service when determining eligibility for
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  Speaker 1: rotation home to the United States. According to the system,
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  Speaker 1: a soldier earned four points for every month he served
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  Speaker 1: in close combat, two points per month for rear echelon
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  Speaker 1: duty in Korea, and one point for duty elsewhere in
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  Speaker 1: the Far East. Later, an additional category, divisional reserve status
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  Speaker 1: was established at a rate of three points per month.
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  Speaker 1: The Army initially stated that enlisted men needed to earn
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  Speaker 1: forty three points to be eligible for rotation back to
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  Speaker 1: the States, while officers required fifty five points. In June
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty two, the Army reduced these requirements to thirty
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  Speaker 1: six points for enlisted men and thirty seven points for officers.
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  Speaker 1: Earning the required number of points did not guarantee instant rotation.
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  Speaker 1: It only meant that the soldier in question was eligible
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  Speaker 1: to go home. Nevertheless, most soldiers did return home shortly
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  Speaker 1: after they met the requirement. The point system was a
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  Speaker 1: marvelous palliatiff to flagging spirits, as it gave every soldier
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  Speaker 1: a definite goal in an otherwise indefinite and seemingly goalless war.
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  Speaker 1: Every man knew that typical frontline duty would enable him
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  Speaker 1: to return home after about a year of service in Korea.
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  Speaker 1: The system also helped boost the spirits of loved ones
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  Speaker 1: back home. This was of some consequence in helping to
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  Speaker 1: maintain public support for what was an increasingly unpopular war. Yet,
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  Speaker 1: for all of its psychological and political benefits, the program
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  Speaker 1: was not without its costs. The constant turnover generated by
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  Speaker 1: the policy, approximately twenty thousand to thirty thousand men per month,
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  Speaker 1: was terribly inefficient from the vantage point of manpower administration,
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  Speaker 1: and created tremendous strains on the Army's personnel and training systems.
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  Speaker 1: The program also hurt military proficiency by increasing personnel turbulence
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  Speaker 1: and by producing a continuous drain on skilled manpower. No
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  Speaker 1: sooner had a soldier become fully acclimatized to the physical, mental,
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  Speaker 1: and technical demands of Korean combat, then he was rotated
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  Speaker 1: at home, only to be replaced by a green recruit
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  Speaker 1: who lacked these skills. This was true not only of
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  Speaker 1: the enlisted men who were rushed to the front with
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  Speaker 1: little or no field training, but of the officers as well. Indeed,
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  Speaker 1: by the fall of nineteen fifty two, most junior officers
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  Speaker 1: with World War II combat experience had been rotated at
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  Speaker 1: home and replaced by recent reserve officers training Corps graduates
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  Speaker 1: who would neither command nor combat experience. In a sinister twist,
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  Speaker 1: the system also reduced the effectiveness of many veteran soldiers,
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  Speaker 1: who became progressively more cautious and unreliable in combat as
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  Speaker 1: their eligibility for rotation neared. All of this meant that
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  Speaker 1: combat proficiency tended to stagnate in American units during the
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  Speaker 1: course of the war. This contrasted sharply with those Communist
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  Speaker 1: units that had of void heavy casualties and managed to
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  Speaker 1: keep their morale intact. In these units, battlefield acumen steadily
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  Speaker 1: increased as the war progressed, thanks to the Communists rather
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  Speaker 1: draconian personnel policies and the Red Army victory or death
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  Speaker 1: were the only ways home. The disparity in combat experience
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  Speaker 1: between the typical American and Communist combat unit was just
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  Speaker 1: one factor that contributed to the Eighth Army's heavy reliance
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  Speaker 1: on air and artillery support. Political sensitivity at home to
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  Speaker 1: the war's mounting body count, the stagnant siege like nature
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  Speaker 1: of the war, and a natural desire in the part
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  Speaker 1: of commanders to spare the lives of their men also
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  Speaker 1: contributed it to the United Nations commands preference for expending
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  Speaker 1: metal rather than blood. The Communists understood the terrible power
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  Speaker 1: of America's industrial might and attempted to compensate for it
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  Speaker 1: in a variety of ways. They steadily increased the size
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  Speaker 1: of their own artillery park until it exceeded that of
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  Speaker 1: the Yuens, though they never managed to match the technical
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  Speaker 1: proficiency and ammunition reserves enjoyed by American artillerous. They dug deep,
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  Speaker 1: moved at night, and became masters of the arts of infiltration, deception,
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  Speaker 1: and surprise, all to minimize their vulnerability to the awesome
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  Speaker 1: destructive power wielded by the Yuan's air, land and naval forces.
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  Speaker 1: Yet when push came to shubb, the Communists also had
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  Speaker 1: the political will, the authoritarian control, and the manpower reserves
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  Speaker 1: to indulge in human wave attacks. American industrial might could
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  Speaker 1: and did obliterate many such attacks, but ultimately it was
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  Speaker 1: the infantry who held ground, and when the Communists wanted
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  Speaker 1: a piece of terrain badly enough, they generally had the
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  Speaker 1: human wherewithal to take it. The final summer May through
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  Speaker 1: July nineteen fifty three, the year nineteen fifty three found
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  Speaker 1: seven hundred and sixty eight thousand UN soldiers facing over
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  Speaker 1: one million Communist troops along battle lodge that had not
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  Speaker 1: materially changed for nearly two years. Springthows brought the customary
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  Speaker 1: increase in military activity as Communist soldiers emerged from their
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  Speaker 1: winter dens to probe U N outposts. But the new
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  Speaker 1: year had brought with it some fresh developments on the
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  Speaker 1: political and diplomatic fronts, developments that would dramatically alter the
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  Speaker 1: annual rights of spring at the battlefront. In January nineteen
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  Speaker 1: fifty three, Dwight D. Eisenhower seceeded Harry S. Truman as
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  Speaker 1: President of the United States. Eisenhower's ascension to the presidency
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  Speaker 1: created an air of uncertainty among Communist leaders. Though he
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  Speaker 1: had campaigned on a platform promising to end the war,
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  Speaker 1: some communists feared that Eisenhower, a former five star general
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  Speaker 1: whose report publican Party contained some rapidly hawkish elements, might
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  Speaker 1: seek to end the war by winning it. Communists uncertainty
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  Speaker 1: about the future increased in March when one of North
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  Speaker 1: Korea's pre eminent patrons, Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin, died.
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  Speaker 1: Stalin's death triggered a secession struggle inside the Soviet Union.
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  Speaker 1: Preoccupied with their own political affairs, Kremlin leaders sought to
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  Speaker 1: minimize Soviet involvement in potentially destabilizing activities in the outside world.
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  Speaker 1: Chief among these was the war in Korea, which, should
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  Speaker 1: it escalate, might lead to a direct conflict with the
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  Speaker 1: United States, a conflict which the inward looking Soviets desperately
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  Speaker 1: wanted to avoid. Consequently, shortly after Stalin's death, Soviet officials
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  Speaker 1: began to signal a new interest in seeing the Korean
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  Speaker 1: conflict put to rest. These sentiments were echoed by Mao,
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  Speaker 1: who likewise found that the conflict in Korea was detracting
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  Speaker 1: from his ability to address pressing domestic issues inside the
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  Speaker 1: newly formed People's Republic of China. The convergence of these events,
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  Speaker 1: the death of Stalin, the ascendancy of Eisenhower, and the
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  Speaker 1: growing desire on the part of all sides to find
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  Speaker 1: a way out of a seemingly unending and unprofitable conflict
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  Speaker 1: created an environment conducive to a settlement of the Korean
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  Speaker 1: in Broglio. In twenty six April, Un and Communist negotiators
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  Speaker 1: returned to the truce ten at Padum Jam after a
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  Speaker 1: six month hiatus. This time, Communist negotiators expressed a willingness
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  Speaker 1: to allow prisoners of war to decide whether or not
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  Speaker 1: they wanted to return to their homelands. This key concession
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  Speaker 1: opened the door to fruitful negotiations. As a good will measure,
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  Speaker 1: both sides quickly agreed to an immediate exchange of sick
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  Speaker 1: and wounded prisoners. The exchange, dubbed Operation Little Switch, resulted
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  Speaker 1: in the repatriation of six hundred and eighty four un
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  Speaker 1: and six thousand, six hundred and seventy Communist personnel. The
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  Speaker 1: two parties then sat down to the laborious task of
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  Speaker 1: hammering out all of the many technical details pertaining to
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  Speaker 1: the actual implementation of a ceasefire and a final full
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  Speaker 1: exchange of prisoners. Even at this late date, American negotiators
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  Speaker 1: found that their Communist counterparts were determined to seek every
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  Speaker 1: possible advantage, and the talks dragged on week after week,
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  Speaker 1: month after month. In June, South Korean President Singmund Ree,
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  Speaker 1: who opposed any resolution of the conflict that left North
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  Speaker 1: Korea in communists hands, jarred negotiators on both sides. When
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  Speaker 1: a unilaterally released about twenty five thousand North Korean prisoners
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  Speaker 1: who had previously voiced a desire to remain in South
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  Speaker 1: Korea after the war. The release, which red thinly disguised
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  Speaker 1: as a prison breakout, angered American and Communist negotiators alike
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  Speaker 1: and temporarily disrupted the negotiations. Yet, the act also helped
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  Speaker 1: the North Korean government save face, for by allowing many
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  Speaker 1: anti communists North Koreans to escape South Korea spare the
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  Speaker 1: North Korean government some of the embarrassment of having to
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  Speaker 1: admit that a large number of its captured soldiers did
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  Speaker 1: not want to return home. Thus, after some compulsory sputtering,
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  Speaker 1: the Communists chose to remain at the negotiating table in
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  Speaker 1: the talks preceded, despite Rhe's attempts at disruption. One might
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  Speaker 1: have expected that the communists new found interest in seeking
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  Speaker 1: a secession of hostilities would have translated to inaction on
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  Speaker 1: the battlefield, especially as prospects for a final settlement became
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  Speaker 1: progressively more eminent. Unfortunately, such was not the case. Rather,
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  Speaker 1: the Communists chose to increase the temple of the war.
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  Speaker 1: In part, the heightened activity reflected the natural desire of
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  Speaker 1: Communist generals to secure the best possible ground before the
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: armistice went into effect, but the Communist offensives of the
• 14:12
  Speaker 1: spring and summer of nineteen fifty three also served a
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  Speaker 1: broader political purpose. Ever mindful of the wider propaganda aspects
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  Speaker 1: of the struggle between East and West, the Communists were
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  Speaker 1: determined to end the war on a positive note. A
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  Speaker 1: final offensive that seized additional territory would give the Communists
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  Speaker 1: the opportunity to portray themselves as victors whose martial prowess
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  Speaker 1: had finally compelled the United Nations to sue for peace.
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  Speaker 1: Such claims would also allow Communist propagandists to paper over
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  Speaker 1: some of the more bitter pills the Communists would have
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  Speaker 1: to swallow in the upcoming accords. Communist military activity had
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  Speaker 1: begun in early March with company sized probes of various
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  Speaker 1: yew and front line positions. Mid month, the Chinese had
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  Speaker 1: escalated to battalion size attacks. After a failed attempt to
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  Speaker 1: capture a un hill outpost nicknamed Little Gibraltar, the Chinese
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  Speaker 1: turned their gaze on to one of the central battle
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  Speaker 1: fields of the previous year, old Baldi. On the evening
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  Speaker 1: of twenty three March, a Chinese battalion supported by mortar
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  Speaker 1: and artillery fire overran a Colombian company on Old Baldi.
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  Speaker 1: Repeated efforts by the seventh Infantry Division to regain the
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  Speaker 1: mountain failed to dislodge the Chinese, who were determined to
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  Speaker 1: cling to the pulverized rock regardless of the cost. Although
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  Speaker 1: the UN had killed or wounded two to three Chinese
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  Speaker 1: for every U and soldier lost on Old Baldi, General
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  Speaker 1: Maxwell D. Taylor, who had recently replaced Van Fleet as
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  Speaker 1: eighth Army Commander, decided that the mountain was not worth
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  Speaker 1: additional YUN lives, and on thirty March he suspended UN
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  Speaker 1: efforts to retake the hill. April brought a low and
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  Speaker 1: communist activities, but in May the front began to heat
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  Speaker 1: up as company and battalion attacks gave way to regimental
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  Speaker 1: size assaults. Then in June, as the panmuon jone negotiators
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  Speaker 1: sat down to draw up a final ceasefire line, the
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  Speaker 1: enemy launched a major three division offensive against the Rok
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  Speaker 1: second Corps in the vicinity of Kum Song. The Chinese
• 16:24
  Speaker 1: seceded in pushing the South Koreans back about three miles
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  Speaker 1: before the front restabilized, a significant advance after two years
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  Speaker 1: of stagnant trench warfare. Elsewhere, UN forces largely succeeded in
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  Speaker 1: repulsing more limited Communist attacks. By the end of June,
• 16:42
  Speaker 1: the intensity of the fighting had once again subsided. The Communists, however,
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  Speaker 1: were by no means done. After consolidating their gains and
• 16:50
  Speaker 1: bringing up additional supplies and reinforcements, the Communists launched what
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  Speaker 1: was to be their biggest offensive operation since the spring
• 16:58
  Speaker 1: of nineteen fifty one one. The offensive began on sixth July.
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  Speaker 1: After hammering South Korean line south of the Iron Triangle,
• 17:08
  Speaker 1: the Chinese turned their attention to Pork Chop Hill, a
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  Speaker 1: company sized Seventh Division outpost that over the past year
• 17:15
  Speaker 1: had seen about as much fighting as its neighboring peak
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  Speaker 1: Old Baldi. Following a ferocious artillery and mortar barrage, wave
• 17:24
  Speaker 1: after wave of Chinese infantry stormed up Port Chop Hill,
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: backed by some heavy artillery fire of their own. The
• 17:31
  Speaker 1: beleaguer defenders valiantly held on both sides, funneled in reinforcements,
• 17:37
  Speaker 1: with the Chinese committing a new battalion for every fresh
• 17:40
  Speaker 1: company the Americans sent in. By eleven July, General Taylor
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: reluctantly decided to abandon pork Chop Hill. As had been
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: the case on Old Baldy, Taylor could not justify risking
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  Speaker 1: more lives for a hill that was of minimal strategic significance,
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  Speaker 1: specially given the fact that an armistice was it was
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: just around the corner. Communist commanders operated under a different calculus,
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  Speaker 1: one that held potentially unnecessary losses of life to no account.
• 18:11
  Speaker 1: Two days after Taylor withdrew from pork Chop Hill, six
• 18:15
  Speaker 1: Chinese divisions slammed into Yuan Line south of kun Sung.
• 18:19
  Speaker 1: The RK Second Corps once again bore the brunt of
• 18:22
  Speaker 1: the assault, falling back in confusion for eight miles before
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: regrouping along the banks of the kum Sung River. Ew
• 18:30
  Speaker 1: encounter attacks regained some of this lost ground, but there
• 18:33
  Speaker 1: seemed little point in pressing the issue. On twenty July,
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  Speaker 1: the negotiators reached an armiscist agreement, which they signed seven
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: days later in a ceremony at Pan Munjong at twenty
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  Speaker 1: two hundred. On twenty seven July nineteen fifty three, an
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  Speaker 1: eerie silence fell across the front. The Korean War was over.
• 18:57
  Speaker 1: Analysis the last two months of the war had been
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: some of the most horrific of the entire conflict. In
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  Speaker 1: less than sixty days, Communist artillery had fired over seven
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: hundred thousand rounds at Uan positions, while UN artillery had
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: repaid the favor nearly sevenfold, sending over four point seven
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: million shells back at their tormentors. Approximately one hundred thousand
• 19:21
  Speaker 1: communists in nearly fifty three thousand UN soldiers were killed, captured,
• 19:26
  Speaker 1: or wounded during those final two months of combat. For
• 19:30
  Speaker 1: their trouble, the Communists had regained a few miles of
• 19:32
  Speaker 1: mountainous terrain and some grist for their propaganda mils, but
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: these gains could not mask the spaciousness of Communist claims
• 19:41
  Speaker 1: that they had won the war. In truth, the Korean
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: War had been rather inconclusive. Under the leadership of the
• 19:48
  Speaker 1: United States, United Nations had successfully defended the sovereignty of
• 19:53
  Speaker 1: a free and democratically elected government from totalitarianism, while simultaneously
• 20:00
  Speaker 1: demonstrating the ability of the international community to stand up
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: effectively against aggression. On the other hand, UN action had
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: been possible only because the Soviet Union had chosen to
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: walk out of the UN Security Council in nineteen fifty,
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: a costly miscalculation that the Soviets were unlikely to repeat
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: in the future. Nor had the UN been able to
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: obtain its optimistic goal of liberating North Korea. From the
• 20:28
  Speaker 1: Communists viewpoint, the war likewise brought mixed results. Not only
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: had the North Koreans failed to conquer the South, but
• 20:35
  Speaker 1: they had actually suffered a net loss of fifteen hundred
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: square miles of territory as the price of their aggression.
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: On the other hand, the Communists had successfully rebuffed UN
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: attempts to liberate the North, while the conflict had propelled
• 20:50
  Speaker 1: the Young People's Republic of China to a place of
• 20:54
  Speaker 1: prominence on the world stage. Finally, for good or ill,
• 20:58
  Speaker 1: the war had calcified Cold War animosities and fueled a
• 21:02
  Speaker 1: wider geopolitical confrontation between East and West that would dominate
• 21:07
  Speaker 1: world affairs for the next forty years. Thus, the Korean
• 21:11
  Speaker 1: Conflict would have great repercussions, despite the fact that little
• 21:16
  Speaker 1: territory changed hands as a result of it. Perhaps the
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: greatest repercussions of the Korean conflict, however, were the effects
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: the war had on the human beings. It touched the soldiers,
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: it maimed, the civilians, It displaced, and the families around
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: the world who lost their sons and brothers, fathers and
• 21:35
  Speaker 1: lovers to bomb, bullet and shell for the Korean War
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: was as bloody as it was inconclusive. United Nations forces
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: suffered over five hundred and fifty nine thousand casualties during
• 21:48
  Speaker 1: the war, including approximately ninety four thousand dead. America's share
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: of this bill told of thirty six thousand, five hundred
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: and sixteen dead and one hundred three thousand, two hundred
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: and eighty four wound. It the enemy had taken prisoner
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: seven two hundred and forty five Americans during the war.
• 22:10
  Speaker 1: The UN estimated that Communist military casualties exceeded two million dead,
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: wounded and prisoners. Civilian losses were even more, appalling approximately
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: one million South Korean and up to two million North
• 22:23
  Speaker 1: Korean civilians either died, disappeared, or were injured during the
• 22:28
  Speaker 1: course of the war, while millions more became refugees. While
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: territorial losses and disproportionate casualties belied Communist claims of victory,
• 22:40
  Speaker 1: no facet of the war exposed the bankruptcy of Communism
• 22:43
  Speaker 1: more clearly than the prisoner issue. In accordance with a
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: final armistice agreement, both sides directly exchanged to all prisoners
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: who desired to return to their homelands. All told, seventy five,
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: eight hundred and twenty three Communists and twelve thousand, seven
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: hundred and seventy three UN personnel, including three thousand, five
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: hundred and ninety seven Americans, returned home from captivity. Under
• 23:10
  Speaker 1: this arrangement Operation Big Switch, Prisoners who had expressed a
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: desire not to be repatriated were sent to a temporary
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: camp at Panmujam. There, the government representatives were allowed to
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: talk with their respective nationals under the impartial supervision of
• 23:28
  Speaker 1: a five member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The interviews served
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: to ensure that soldiers had not been coerced into refusing repatriation.
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: They also gave the governments involved the opportunity to try
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: and persuade their nationals to return home. When the interviews
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: were over, each man was free to choose whether or
• 23:49
  Speaker 1: not he wanted to return home. The numbers were revealing.
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: Of the three hundred and fifty nine UN personnel sent
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: to the camp, ten decided to come home, two decided
• 24:02
  Speaker 1: to go to neutral third countries, and the remainder, three
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: hundred and forty seven decided to live among the communists.
• 24:10
  Speaker 1: Included among these were twenty one Americans, who chose to
• 24:13
  Speaker 1: remain with their captors. In contrast, twenty two thousand, six
• 24:18
  Speaker 1: hundred and four communist soldiers initially chose not to be repatriated.
• 24:24
  Speaker 1: After being processed by the Repatriation Commission, six hundred and
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: twenty eight relented and returned home. The rest over twenty
• 24:32
  Speaker 1: one thousand Chinese and North Koreans chose to remain in
• 24:36
  Speaker 1: the non communist world, with the Koreans going to South
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: Korea and the Chinese to nationalists controlled Taiwan. When added
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: to the roughly twenty five thousand North Koreans re had
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: freed in June, this meant that over forty six thousand
• 24:51
  Speaker 1: communist soldiers had refused repatriation. No better testimony as to
• 24:57
  Speaker 1: the merits of life under communism existed than the The
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: United States had taken a noble stand in asserting that
• 25:05
  Speaker 1: prisoners had a right not to return to societies they
• 25:08
  Speaker 1: found objectionable, but the price of establishing this principle had
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: been high. After the Panman Joum negotiators had agreed to
• 25:17
  Speaker 1: use the line of contact as a ceasefire line in
• 25:20
  Speaker 1: November nineteen fifty one. The repatriation question had been the
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: only substantial issue over which the two sides remained at loggerheads.
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: By insisting on voluntary repatriation, a right that had heretofore
• 25:36
  Speaker 1: not existed in international law, the United States had adopted
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: a course that had prolonged the war by fifteen months,
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: during which one hundred and twenty five thousand United Nations
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: and over two hundred and fifty thousand Communist soldiers had
• 25:51
  Speaker 1: become casualties. The forty six thousand Chinese and North Koreans
• 25:55
  Speaker 1: who escaped Communism as a result of American opposition to
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: forcible repatriation had truly been given a precious, if dearly
• 26:05
  Speaker 1: bought gift. Yet the non repatriots were not the only
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: ones to have benefited from America's willingness to fight for
• 26:14
  Speaker 1: principles in which it believed. In Korea, the real struggle
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: had never been about the control of this hill or
• 26:20
  Speaker 1: that hill. Rather, it had been about the principles of
• 26:23
  Speaker 1: national self determination and a freedom from oppression. By successfully
• 26:29
  Speaker 1: defending the fledgling Republic of Korea, the American gi together
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: with his comrades and arms from South Korea and eighteen
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: other nations, had secured the freedom of millions of South
• 26:40
  Speaker 1: Korean civilians from Communist depression. This was a great achievement,
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: but it was not a job that, once done, could
• 26:48
  Speaker 1: stand by itself. For while the Armacist of twenty seven
• 26:52
  Speaker 1: July nineteen fifty three ended the fighting into Korea, it
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: did not truly end at The war was just that
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: a temporary cease fire and not a treaty of peace.
• 27:05
  Speaker 1: It reflected the realization by all parties that neither side
• 27:08
  Speaker 1: had either the will or the means to compel the
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: other to bow to its political agenda. Hence, the warring
• 27:14
  Speaker 1: parties had agreed to disagree to stop the shooting and
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: to transfer the war from the battlefield to the diplomatic field.
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: There the conflict has remained, despite sporadic incidents in border
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: clashes for half a century. The inability of the two
• 27:32
  Speaker 1: sides to resolve their differences has meant that the two
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: Koreas and their allies have had to remain on a
• 27:37
  Speaker 1: war footing along the inter Korean border ever since. Fifty
• 27:42
  Speaker 1: years after the North Korean invasion, Communist and United Nations
• 27:46
  Speaker 1: soldiers still glare at each other across the demilitarized zone
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: established in July nineteen fifty three. Together with the South
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: Koreans U S Army troops continued to make up the
• 27:58
  Speaker 1: bulk of the Yuen Kan tingent in Korea. The burdens
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: of protecting South Korea from the threat of renewed communist
• 28:05
  Speaker 1: digression over the past half century have been great for
• 28:09
  Speaker 1: the United States. Billions of dollars have been spent in
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: some additional lives had been lost the latter as a
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: result of sporadic communist violations of the ceasefire. Yet by
• 28:21
  Speaker 1: standing unswervingly behind its commitments, the United States in general,
• 28:26
  Speaker 1: in the millions of men and women of the United
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: States Armed Forces who have served their country in Korea
• 28:32
  Speaker 1: since nineteen fifty three, in particular, has guaranteed that the
• 28:36
  Speaker 1: sacrifices made by men like Private Pilolau, Sergeant Bleak, and
• 28:41
  Speaker 1: thousands of other American fighting men during the Korean War
• 28:44
  Speaker 1: were not made in vain. Further readings Alexander Bevin, Korea,
• 28:51
  Speaker 1: The First War We Lost New York Hippocrine nineteen eighty six,
• 28:56
  Speaker 1: Blair Clay, The Forgotten War America and Korea nineteen fifty
• 29:01
  Speaker 1: through nineteen fifty three, New York Doubleday, nineteen eighty seven.
• 29:06
  Speaker 1: Bruin Leicester h. Editor, The Korean War Handbook of the
• 29:10
  Speaker 1: Literature and Research, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, nineteen ninety six.
• 29:17
  Speaker 1: Edwards Paul M. Compiler, The Korean War and Annotated Bibliography, Westport, Connecticut,
• 29:25
  Speaker 1: Greenwood Press, nineteen ninety eight. Fahrenbach t. R. This Kind
• 29:30
  Speaker 1: of War, A Study in Unpreparedness, New York, mac Millan,
• 29:35
  Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three. Googler Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea, Washington,
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: d c U. S. Army Center of Military History, nineteen seventy.
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: Hastings Max The Korean War, New York, Simon and Schuster,
• 29:53
  Speaker 1: nineteen eighty seven. Hermes Walter G. Truce, Tent and Fighting Front,
• 29:59
  Speaker 1: United States Army in the Korean War, Washington, d c U. S.
• 30:03
  Speaker 1: Army Center of Military History, nineteen eighty eight. Hinshaw Arnid
• 30:09
  Speaker 1: Heartbreak Ridge, Korea, nineteen fifty one, New York Praker, nineteen
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: eighty nine. Marshall Sla Pork chop Hill, New York, Herma Books,
• 30:22
  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty nine. Reese David Korea The Limited War, New York,
• 30:28
  Speaker 1: Saint Martin's Press, nineteen sixty four. STRUEK. William The Korean
• 30:34
  Speaker 1: War in International History, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: nineteen ninety five. Westover, John G. Combat Support in Korea, Washington,
• 30:47
  Speaker 1: d c U S Army Center of Military History, nineteen
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: eighty seven. End of section seven. End of the Korean War.
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: Brief histories by various s