Latest / State Of Mind Mental Health Podcast / #118 - The Pathway to Violence: Why "Random" Attacks Almost Never Are | Grievance, Isolation, and the Long Runway Before an Attack with Robert Mahoney, MA

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#118 - The Pathway to Violence: Why "Random" Attacks Almost Never Are | Grievance, Isolation, and the Long Runway Before an Attack with Robert Mahoney, MA · State Of Mind Mental Health Podcast

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what I found was that there is an actual pathway to violence.
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There is a scientific pathway that,
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that irregardless of what the motivating factors are.
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that these individuals often follow the same pattern,
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which is sort of a grievance matures into sort of an ideation.
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That ideation turns into sort of research Then they begin to prep
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and then they usually have like a real explosion breach as a last ditch effort
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to announce that they're going to do something and then they kind of do an attack.
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when you begin to look at whether it's religious fundamentalism
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or political or racial or it's conspiratorial or all the above
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and everything in between, you begin to realize yeah,
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these individuals just sort of died by a thousand paper cuts down this pathway.
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Hello, everybody. Welcome to the State of Mind Podcast:
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Tools, Stories, and Truth on Being Human.
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My name is Mike Stroh, and this is a podcast for living with courage,
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clarity, and compassion. On today's episode,
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I am speaking with Robert Mahoney.
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Hello, Robert. Thank you so much for being here.
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Can you tell us a little bit about yourself,
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your work, and what brings you to this point in your life?
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Sure, thanks for having me. It's an absolute pleasure.
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So, Robert Mahoney, I'm the CEO and founder of TVTP Solutions.
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So the TVTP is an acronym for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention.
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So basically what we do is we work with all sectors of the community,
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whether that's education, mental and public health,
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law enforcement, governmental,
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general public, houses of worship,
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the whole...
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whole kit and caboodle and we begin to do trainings and consultations
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on how they can approach this sort of targeted violence program problem that
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we have and move into a more proactive and preventative stance.
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What we have seen over the years has been sort of an overvaluation
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of protection and preparedness slash response measures and there has been
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sort of a devaluation of prevention.
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And there's a couple of reasons why I think this,
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but how I got into this field was I was sitting at home in 2005
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and watching the Hurricane Katrina response.
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And there were certain things within that response that I just felt were pretty
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basic things.
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one of the things that really stuck with me was people who were not able
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to evacuate the city of New Orleans because no accommodations had been
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met made for their pets. And I thought like of all the things,
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like there's not one pet person like in,
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all of FEMA that, that could have thought about that.
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And so I, I went to grad school and got a master's in public administration,
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with a concentration in emergency and disaster management.
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and have worked in the emergency management field from local county governments,
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states, and up through the federal doing different plans and things like that.
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And a lot of what that work is,
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is bringing people together and just getting everybody on sort of like
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the same page and taking their expertise and showing how their resources
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or their expertise could help.
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another sector and sort of coordinating responses and doing mitigation
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and all these different sorts of things.
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But really what it is is relationship building.
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And as I got further and further into my emergency management career,
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obviously, you know, we've we've had more and more targeted violent attacks
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and things like that. And I was just really curious as to sort of what what
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the tripping point was, right?
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Like what was the thing that we kept stumbling over and and
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You know, in a post 9, 9 11 era,
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we've basically all grown up with the see something,
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say something campaign, which is,
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which is just sort of an everyday sort of thing.
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Um, and in terms of like a marketing campaign,
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that's probably one of the best marketing campaigns we've ever heard of,
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right? Like see something, see what doesn't say,
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but we all kind of know say something,
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say to who say what we didn't doesn't say,
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but we all sort of know. Um, and as I started really digging into sort
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of this violence,
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sort of thing, I began to realize that we don't really have a reporting problem.
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We have a coordination problem and that,
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you know, after each attack,
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you sort of hear this terminology of random act of violence.
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And what that does with the public is that moves our minds and shifts
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our minds over into, there was no way that this was predictable or there
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was no way that we could have figured this out or,
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~ known that something was going to happen like this.
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And so when I started delving into it,
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I started realizing, well then yeah,
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obviously then if you're framing it as random,
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then yeah, put as many protection measures as you possibly can between
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me and whatever, right? Just put,
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Right. Yeah.
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put as many fences, put as many bulletproof glass,
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put as many doors, put as many cameras and put as many security personnel
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as you can.
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because it's random. And yeah,
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practice. Do the preparedness and the response.
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Do the active shooter drills, head down drills,
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all these different types of things every year so that it becomes almost like
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a fire drill, like it's just sort of like natural.
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But then like five minutes later after that press conference,
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after they call it a tragic random act of violence,
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they start going through the perpetrator's sort of history and
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you start seeing like, oh, they had a lot of behavioral problems starting in...
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you know, elementary school or they were having a really tough time
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at work and people were getting really,
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really concerned about them. Or they had touch points with mental health
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or public health or different types of organizations and stuff like that
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for different types of crises.
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And then, they also had like a few run-ins with the police.
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And I'm like, how is this random?
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Right? Like, how is this? Then why are you framing it one way,
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basically?
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saying to the public it's one thing,
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and yet out of the other side of your mouth you're saying like,
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oh yeah, there was this huge runway.
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And so that disconnect and that sort
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of paradoxical countermeasure messaging got me really,
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really intrigued of like, all right,
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well, why don't I start delving into this sort of runway of these individuals
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and start trying to figure out what is it if it's not
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Cause it obviously isn't sort of like a reporting problem,
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like the see something, say something,
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right? Like you don't get on that many people's radars if there's
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a reporting problem. And so it went back to this idea of like,
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okay, there's definitely like a coordination problem.
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And I think what I found was that there is an actual pathway to violence.
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There is a scientific pathway that,
7:05
that irregardless of what the motivating factors are.
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that these individuals often follow the same pattern,
7:14
which is sort of a grievance matures into sort of an ideation.
7:18
That ideation turns into sort of research and the like.
7:22
Then they begin to prep and then they usually have like a real explosion breach
7:28
as sort of like a last ditch effort to sort of announce that they're going
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to do something and then they kind of do an attack.
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you know, when you begin to sort of look at whether it's religious fundamentalism
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or political or racial or it's conspiratorial or like all the above
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and everything in between, you begin to realize like,
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yeah, these individuals just sort of died by a thousand paper cuts down this
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pathway. And because different sectors were getting little slivers
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of information about the individual,
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And the hyper sort of specialized system that we have created with all
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of these sort of different programs and sectors,
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and we've defined their lanes very,
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very rigidly in the sandbox and everything else.
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just either they don't look at it as a threatening behavior,
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or they don't look at it from a holistic standpoint,
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where it just sort of this one off thing within the context of,
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you know, their interaction.
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and they don't know all the other different things that are happening
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on with that individual. And so when I started TVTP solutions,
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that was kind of the goal was to sort of bring that sort of knowledge
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or that clarity to these different sectors of how they were approaching
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it and what sort of was the real stumbling block here and then begin
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to kind of break.
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break down slightly those rigid systematic structures and create something where
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they were a piece of the puzzle that would in sort of sharing some information while
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keeping sort of privacy and those kinds of concerns,
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civil rights concerns there, getting a much better,
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trying to get much better picture of what's happening and being more proactive.
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in addressing these sort of issues before they sort of snowball,
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right? And so much of the system is sort of is designed around this sort
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of threshold, right? Like you have to qualify or you have to be
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in certain crisis that crosses over some sort of theoretical threshold
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and then we can act, right? And if you're only working with a certain sliver
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of information, right, you may never get past that threshold.
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Right? So it's like, if you go to law enforcement,
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they'll ask you, well, is this person doing anything illegal or they'll assess
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if there's any sort of legal thing that's being done there.
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If they're not doing anything illegal,
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there's not a whole lot of resources and that threshold isn't going to
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be sort of crossed. So there's really not a whole lot that they can do.
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You go to like mental health and crisis teams,
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CIT teams or something like that.
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And, you know, they'll ask you,
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well, are they a threat to themselves or others?
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Well, no, not yet. All right. Well,
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then.
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get to the back of the line because I've got a bunch of,
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you know, I've got a stack of people that are,
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and I've got only so many clinicians.
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So you're going to have to wait until they cross that threshold.
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Schools are completely different.
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They've got so many different sort of legal restrictions on what they
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can do because most of what they're most of their focus is obviously
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on 18 and under. And so different privacy concerns,
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whether it's HIPAA or FERPA or all of those types of things.
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But also they have a much more insular type of culture where they like
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to try and keep things as in-house as possible because it becomes very,
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very taxing if you have to go outside to different resources and
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get the parents involved and everything that goes on with there.
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So you begin to sort of see how each of these sectors is just sort
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of designed slightly improperly to take a much more prevention approach.
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where they are kind of designed in a way to be more responsive to a crisis.
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Like they're there to respond.
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But they're there to respond and trying to thread sort of like this needle,
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right? And sometimes they don't get the resources there in time or they miss
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all the signs and they have to bring in a whole bunch of different resources
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and services after the fact.
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when they had sort of, if they had just been able to connect some
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of these puzzle pieces, they would have been able to be far more pro-act.
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Okay, yeah, thank you. Yeah, it's good.
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Yeah, sorry about the long-winded nature of that.
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That was good. That
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was good. That was good. It touched so much of the start to finish.
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A couple of questions and maybe sort of choose which one to go down.
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One is the see something, say something idea.
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When it comes to...
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somebody's acting irrationally or you can observe this spiral going down,
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ruminating about stuff, researching stuff.
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One recent case in Western Canada was this person,
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right, who shot up the school.
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So many signs on the way to that
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Exactly.
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moment, right? And just the human resistance to calling a spade
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a spade and addressing a problem,
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how does, or how do you see that the human sort of avoidance
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of those difficult things?
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playing into this.
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So I think you're correct in sort of like the human perception of these things.
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Like why do we, when there's, it's always great to Monday morning quarterback sort
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of like after the fact of like,
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Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
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~ you see this. So I have
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also as part of this, I'm a certified behavioral threat assessment instructor.
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And as an instructor and as sort of an evangelist for behavioral threat assessment.
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I know that the ethos behind behavioral threat assessment is to sort
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of not necessarily focus so much on profiles and risk factors,
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but to focus in on behaviors, right?
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And so that the behaviors are the things that are the far more telling signs
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of future aggression or of future,
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you know, other behavioral issues rather than sort of risk factors.
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And however,
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as sort of an instructor and an expert in that field,
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I can tell you, I hate that type.
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And the reason why is because in the same way that random act of violence puts your
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brain into a certain context, behavioral
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Yeah.
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threat assessment also puts it into a certain context.
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And so if you start telling people that,
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yes, in order to stop these threats,
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or in order to stop these targeted attacks in this violent nature,
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Mm-hmm.
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you have to look at their behavior,
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then you will automatically begin to look for threatening behavior,
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right? And so many of these individuals are beginning to sort of head down that
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pathway of violence off of things that are not threatening behavior or are taking,
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are hitting them
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in a way that are sort of not looked at as being precursors to violent activity,
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right? So, yeah, so like the death of a grandfather,
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Right, can you give us some, yeah,
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I guess you were about to, yeah,
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yeah. Right, right.
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right?
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Or the loss of a job or moving to
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a different city or just all of a sudden not,
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you know, being on the soccer team or the hockey team for forever and then just sort
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of deciding this isn't for me and just going away.
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~ One of the tall, tall signs of sort of the precursors down the pathway
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of violence is isolation. So an increased sort of repeal away from sort
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of friends and family and just kind of going in there.
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And so these types of things, because they aren't threatening or they're
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not in an aggressive nature, often kind of go by the wayside,
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right? Okay, they're just having a bad time or they don't want to talk to me or...
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you know, they're now onto this new thing,
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right? You hear a lot of parents of people who have committed attacks say like,
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well, they were really into this thing and I thought it was just a phase,
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right? Like it wasn't, it wasn't threatening.
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They were getting more agitated and this is sort of the thing that they always
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wanted to talk about, but I didn't think it was going to be going down like this,
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right? And so,
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Because of that, think that's when you talk about reporting,
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often get that sort of like, we're concerned,
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but it's not on a level where we think they're going to do violence to us.
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And so we kind of just hold it back.
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Like maybe they're just having a bad day or we'll return to it later.
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When I go to schools and I start talking about schools or talk to schools,
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about behavioral threat assessment,
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I'll basically ask them this question,
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like, you tell me about the difference between the quiet kid in the corner,
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who's not a problem, and the quiet kid in the corner,
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who's, you know, in the depths of isolation and doesn't have any friends
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and is just sitting there and,
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you know, just wants to get out of the class and doesn't,
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it just hates it there and therefore doesn't speak up,
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right? And it's sort of seething inside.
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And they can't.
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Right? And so typically what,
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you know, when we talk about sort of proactive prevention and just general security
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in itself, when you go into an environment,
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now that could be a town or that could be a school or a specific classroom
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or an office building or what have you,
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you know, as a security professional,
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the one thing that you want to do is really try to create calm.
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And I've created this sort of,
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you know,
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~ analogy of sort of Zen security,
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right? And this haiku of you want to make the water as still
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as possible so that you can see what's causing the ripple,
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right? And looking at it from an anthropological sort of way,
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like our brains and our senses are triggered for the abnormal.
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Like we don't have enough bandwidth to be taking in absolutely everything.
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So
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whether it's a smell or a sound or even a sensation if somebody walks
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in the room and the whole just the whole room just changes like those types
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of things. There's like there's something different here and that's from like
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an evolutionary survival type thing.
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Right. And so by by kind of putting in I said like you know this idea
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of like putting in more protection measures or more response measures
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in there into that environment.
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What you're doing is you're kind of creating a little bit of noise.
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So you're not really able to see those ripples,
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right? And you're more focused on sort of the things that are right in front
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of your face. And so those, when you're talking about prevention,
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like those little ripples are the things that you wanna kind of like
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hit really quick. You wanna tamp those down or figure out what you can
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do early on to get those people sort of the help that they need or to
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get them over this hump.
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so that it doesn't sort of begin to come up into a point where you have to,
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you have to take out sort of like the big resources and stuff like that.
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have, know, narratives is also like,
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we talked a lot about context,
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like narratives is like a huge thing.
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And I see this being like a real pitfall within sort of the security
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law enforcement sort of realm.
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Even to a certain extent, a lot of the public assistance sort of ~ realm have
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a problem with sort of like these narratives of,
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you know, I have this experience where I,
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I went into a city liquor store.
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went to go buy something. And as I'm approaching the liquor store,
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I can see the CCTV camera outside and there's bars in the windows and there's
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a huge fluorescent light. That's sort of right in front of the door
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and doors reinforced and I'm
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you know, I'm able to get that thing open.
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And then there's like a little alarm that says that the door is open.
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And I get into this little holding pen,
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right? And there's a metal detector that's there and I have to go through
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the metal detector. Then there's an armed security guard who has like
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one of those wands. So he wands me down.
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Then I get finally into the store and I can see like the TVs and everything else
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of me being in the store and what's going on outside.
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it's again, really harsh fluorescent lighting.
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and it's floor to ceiling bulletproof glass.
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And I have to do
19:51
You
19:52
like all of my commerce through like a drawer.
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And I remember thinking in that moment that like,
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this is the safest place that I have ever been,
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right? And yet I've never been more scared in my entire life,
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right? Because the narrative
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Yeah, yeah.
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isn't, ~ look how safe you are.
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Aren't you relaxed? Cause you have all these protection measures in front
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of you or in between you and whatever.
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It was like, what the hell goes on here that they felt the need that all
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of this was necessary, right? And it totally
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Shit.
20:24
changes your entire relationship with the space and things like that.
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And it's not that sort of like school resource officers
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or police in the schools and stuff like that,
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or wandering the perimeter doesn't have value.
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It's just that.
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The narrative sometimes is a little bit different than what maybe the SRO,
20:50
the school resource officer thinks that their narrative is,
20:53
or what it is. Cause I have talked to a lot of SROs and they think that they're
20:57
extensions of sort of like the clinician,
21:01
the school clinician or something
21:02
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
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like that, right? Like come and tell me what,
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I'm that one trusted adult. You can tell me and we'll keep it confident and...
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you know, I want to be buddies and stuff like that.
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And that's not the narrative that the students have.
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That's not the narrative that the staff have,
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right? The narrative is, is if basically shit hits the fan,
21:22
like you are the first line of defense if,
21:25
if something bad happens. And that's a different dynamic.
21:29
And when I talk about sort of like that long runway through the pathway,
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why would I go to an SRO to talk to them about my disinterest in leaving
21:39
the hockey team or the soccer team,
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right? Why would I talk to them about the death of my grandfather?
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Why would I look at them as an advisor
21:51
to certain relationship problems or if my parents are having a tough time at work?
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That's not what you're necessarily there for.
22:01
And so you begin to sort of see these sort of
22:04
cracks all over the place within just sort of the holistic
22:07
Mm-hmm.
22:08
security sort of apparatus that we kind of put in place.
22:12
And some of that is due to the fact that,
22:15
you know, mental health, they're hyper specialized.
22:18
is not their, security is not their forte.
22:21
So they reserve to law enforcement.
22:24
Law enforcement is trying to tell everybody,
22:26
look, it has protect and serve on the side of our cars,
22:30
not prevent and serve.
22:32
Okay. And so there's stop asking me about these things that I can
22:37
do nothing about other than put these people on a list.
22:40
Right. And the schools are sort of like,
22:43
well, we've got this great relationship with the SROs and we also take,
22:48
you know, security seriously and we do our active shooter drills
22:52
and things like that. So we feel that we're really,
22:55
we know what we're doing. And it's like,
22:58
In a certain sense, yes. And in another sense,
23:01
you have no idea, right? Because you're not,
23:04
you don't have any kind of concept of care that's coming,
23:09
that's enveloping sort of how you do business.
23:14
There's a great sort of story that's sort of non-security related,
23:19
which is, which I share, which is like back in the late seventies
23:23
and early eighties.
23:24
the two most reliable cars on the market was a Mercedes-Benz
23:30
SL something or other and a Toyota Corolla.
23:35
people who studied the car industry could not figure out how this was happening,
23:40
right? Because Mercedes-Benz was sort of the gold standard.
23:43
You went there, you had an apprenticeship,
23:45
you had, you know, years and years of training.
23:50
And you were sort of a master of one thing on that assembly line.
23:54
And then before the car even hit the parking lot,
23:59
there was like a 2000 point inspection and all these types of things.
24:03
And so you paid a premium for that.
24:05
And here was like Toyota that gave like a 45 minute training sort
24:11
of video.
24:13
had no apprenticeship whatsoever,
24:15
sort of a ~ jack of all trades,
24:17
master of none. There was no inspection that was done at the end of
24:22
the line and everything else. And they just couldn't figure out like what
24:25
the heck was happening that this little car company that was one third
24:29
the price was being able to be one of the most reliable cars
24:34
and compete with Mercedes-Benz.
24:37
And what they ended up finding out was the reason why they were able to
24:40
do that was the quality. What Mercedes-Benz was the quality control had been
24:43
put at the, the end of the, manufacturing process where Toyota integrated
24:49
it throughout the entire process.
24:52
And basically that's kind of what we are trying to do with
24:56
of being proactive prevention.
24:58
have to integrate it into just the way you do business because
25:02
You you look at any of the cross sector networks that
25:08
happen, they're usually, you know,
25:11
the systems are very, very rigid and the networks that cross over are really flimsy.
25:16
They're usually one point of failure.
25:18
Somebody retires or somebody gets promoted or somebody decides to just go
25:23
on to a different project or priorities and the whole network kind
25:27
of like falls apart, right?
25:30
So what you want is you want to have this sort of concept that
25:33
is integrated into just the way you do business.
25:36
So if a new principal comes in,
25:38
well, this is just the way we do things.
25:40
Or if a new chief of police or if a new,
25:42
you know, a clinician comes on board,
25:45
like this is just the way we do things.
25:46
you know, part of that is taking that,
25:52
I talked about that behavioral threat assessment sort of to model a lot.
25:57
at least here in the United States,
25:59
a lot of the behavioral threat assessments are teams are located in schools.
26:03
And there's
26:03
Ahem.
26:04
a real effort to try and get them out of the schools,
26:08
not because they shouldn't have threat assessment teams,
26:12
but that they shouldn't be the nucleus to all of these different sectors,
26:17
right? They shouldn't be the coordinating body that
26:21
has to connect with law enforcement and mental health and the department
26:25
of rec and the library association and you know,
26:29
boys and girls clubs and houses of worship,
26:31
right? To try and figure out all these different things.
26:34
It should be a little bit higher.
26:37
The other reason why they should be taken out of the school is because we're getting
26:40
data now that is really,
26:44
really skewed and just absolutely ridiculous where,
26:47
you know.
26:48
98 % of all threats within the town are coming from like 18 and under,
26:52
right? And it's just sort of like,
26:54
well, yeah, because you put the behavioral threat assessment team in
26:57
the schools and you're using a metric that's not,
27:01
you know, holistic enough to sort of look at it.
27:04
like if, if 98 % of all violent threats are coming from 18 and under,
27:09
I'm sorry, like children are no longer the future.
27:11
They're the problem, right? And so,
27:14
um,
27:16
There needs to be a way in which in certain towns are beginning to sort of do this,
27:20
where they're kind of elevating the behavioral threat assessment team into sort
27:23
of more of an emergency management type structure,
27:26
where all these sectors kind of come around the table and are a participant,
27:31
but aren't like the principal coordinating body.
27:36
How so if we take take an individual case,
27:40
maybe this person in since I'm in Canada,
27:43
I mean, we got all the American news,
27:45
obviously,
27:46
Right.
27:47
perhaps not as much as we might with the stuff that happens here.
27:50
Person person is sort of going down this pathway that you're describing.
27:56
And I have experience with this with family with severe mental illness and
28:02
Where's the boundary of intervention and reporting and that kind of stuff,
28:07
which we, kind of asked you about with the,
28:09
the human precarious for self deception,
28:12
right? Or not wanting to see something,
28:15
say something because you don't want to feel like a bad person or you don't want
28:18
to make the wrong decision. How,
28:20
at what point in, a person's journey to an act of violence,
28:25
how does the
28:28
prevention determine when that intervention happens and then
28:33
how do you navigate the inevitability that sometimes
28:40
you may act too soon, you may act too late,
28:42
whatever, just that not everything always goes according to plan and sort of,
28:47
I don't know, re-aligning after that.
28:50
Yeah. So one of the things that's interesting about this,
28:54
about this process, about this whole pathway is even how they get on
28:58
the pathway to begin with.
29:00
Mm-hmm.
29:01
And every, everybody in the world,
29:05
has to have, is basically looking to fill three metaphorical buckets really
29:11
of identity, purpose, and community.
29:13
That's what we were always on the lookout for.
29:17
whether it's something that will fill that bucket or something that will reinforce
29:22
what's already in that bucket.
29:24
Because the brain cannot deal with...
29:27
I coffee all over myself. Okay,
29:28
~ no, no,
29:32
sorry, sorry. The brain cannot.
29:33
no.
29:35
The human brain finds it completely unacceptable to not know what it is,
29:39
who they are, what they're there for,
29:42
or who they're connected
29:43
to, right? To be just sort of sent adrift is just not okay.
29:48
And so in the absence of that,
29:51
like we go and we start searching for those things that will fill that bucket,
29:55
right? And this can, this you can sort of see in a lot of different ways,
30:00
but typically what we will do when you talk about sort of interventions
30:04
is we will try to combat the what,
30:07
right? So whether it is a ~
30:10
political thing or religious thing or conspiratorial thing,
30:13
et cetera, et We will try to combat the what?
30:16
Like we are going to convince them or change their thoughts
30:20
and opinions about something through debate or logic or reason or anything else.
30:26
This often just fails, right,
30:29
on impact, right? And the reason why is because they are not always necessarily
30:36
attaching themselves to the what,
30:38
they are attaching themselves to those intangible things that the what provides.
30:42
Right? And so it's that sense of an identity,
30:45
that sense of purpose, that sense of community that is the tying bonds,
30:50
the magnetic effect, not necessarily the message.
30:53
Right? And it also is a misunderstanding of how behaviors begin
30:59
to mature and are created.
31:03
It's not through logic, it's not through reason,
31:05
right? And it's not through our thoughts and opinions.
31:08
Actually what it is is our feelings,
31:10
which are illogical, irrational,
31:13
right? And everything else. And our behaviors stem from
31:17
our feelings about something. Our behaviors then feed into our thoughts
31:22
and opinions about something, and then we will post-rationalize our behaviors.
31:27
And so that's sort of like the downward flow.
31:31
that you sort of get to.
31:33
We begin to sort of just see, we use the term radicalization when people kind
31:38
of get locked in, right? And I think that's sort of a loaded sort of word because,
31:44
you know, it's used in sort of a context
31:51
of a dangerous context that you've become radicalized.
31:55
And I think there's a lack of complexity that comes with that.
32:01
You see this in Alcoholics Anonymous,
32:03
right? Hi, I'm Rob, I'm an alcoholic.
32:06
Boom, there's my identity. What's my purpose?
32:09
Well, I'm here to get clean, all right?
32:11
And then my community is everybody else that's in this room that also shares that
32:16
same identity with me and shares that same purpose and is gonna help me.
32:19
Boom, I'm locked in, right? After COVID,
32:23
you see a lot of individuals who were,
32:25
know, public health.
32:27
professionals and doctorates in public health and things like that,
32:31
when the pushback began to sort of come,
32:33
whether warranted or not, they started to become really personally offended,
32:38
right? Their identity was that they were a doctorate of public health,
32:41
their purpose was to keep the public healthy,
32:44
and their community was generally other public health entities and public health
32:48
~ people. And so they began to take that as sort of a personal attack.
32:53
And that's what ends up happening when you start going through trying
32:56
to change somebody's mind that has been sort of locked in onto something through
33:01
a logical and reasonable sort of way through thoughts and opinions
33:05
and things like that. It often has a counter effect.
33:07
An intervention, doing an intervention has a top-down power dynamic attached
33:14
to it already.
33:16
~ It works with people with substance abuse because they can't physically sort
33:21
of get themselves over the line So doing an intervention of all right,
33:24
we're gonna grab you. We're gonna take you we're gonna get in control We're gonna
33:27
move you over to this area, right?
33:30
That doesn't work as you can sort of tell With these people they have attached their
33:35
identity their purpose in their community to these things So there's
33:38
an emotional and psychological sort of fixation that happens on these
33:42
on this stuff and
33:44
It becomes almost impossible to get off that,
33:48
that thing, unless you treat it as sort of more of
33:54
a intercession or an interruption or a negotiation,
33:57
right? You want to try and level out that power dynamic.
34:01
The best way to do that is to provide an alternative.
34:05
So you have to provide a new identity,
34:09
a new purpose, or a new community or all three,
34:12
right? And they have to see.
34:14
that they're going to get basically,
34:16
if we go back to the metaphor of the buckets,
34:18
like they're gonna get the same amount of flow into that bucket that they're getting
34:23
from this other thing. Because.
34:24
Yeah, sorry.
34:25
Yeah. So let me interrupt you there for a second.
34:27
I'm quite fond of AA.
34:30
And so one thing about the identity,
34:33
like identifying with whatever it is,
34:37
as you're describing can be unhealthy for sure.
34:40
And in this context of the person,
34:46
I always think it's so helpful to think as sort of sort of moment
34:51
to moment practically as possible.
34:53
So
34:55
16 year old kid gets it in their head that something's happening.
34:59
So they start to identify with this persona and perception and it becomes them.
35:05
They get sort of fully, whatever.
35:10
There is on that.
35:10
Yeah, yeah, yeah,
35:12
that is a good word. So then it's parent.
35:15
one, two, if they have parents or whatever,
35:17
starts noticing a little bit, as you mentioned earlier,
35:20
I just thought it was a phase or whatnot.
35:22
That person sort of gets deeper and deeper in this.
35:27
I think you use the analogy. So there's see something,
35:31
say something, and then there's see something,
35:33
do something. ~
35:34
Right.
35:35
How, again, like in your,
35:38
you just brought up that idea of giving them another option,
35:41
which is actually kind of what AA does for a lot of people.
35:43
Mm-hmm.
35:44
any really helpful intervention.
35:46
How do we get the person from the place they're
35:51
in into these other alternatives?
35:54
Does it have to be hospitalization or apprehension or whatever?
36:01
you know, like, does that make sense?
36:02
So,
36:03
so the data, if we're going to go for the data,
36:04
Yeah, yeah.
36:05
so most
36:06
of these attackers only about,
36:08
I think it's like six to 8 % of them are meant to are considered mentally ill.
36:14
Okay.
36:15
Sure, okay, yeah.
36:16
The, the, the other 92, 94 % are mentally unhealthy.
36:21
Okay. So that's bad coping skills.
36:22
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
36:24
It's, it's all that kind of stuff.
36:26
And so.
36:26
Yeah.
36:27
By offering those alternatives,
36:29
this is I kind of use more of like,
36:31
it's like a hostage negotiation more than sort of an intervention,
36:33
Yeah, yeah, right. Okay, okay,
36:34
right? Because what you're trying
36:35
yeah.
36:36
to do is you're trying to, as you said,
36:38
like you're trying to display these other options and you
36:41
Mm-hmm.
36:42
want them to feel as though they are in control,
36:45
okay?
36:45
Right. Right.
36:46
When you have sort of a substance abuse or you hit that sort of rock bottom
36:49
and you don't feel like you
36:50
Yeah, yeah.
36:51
no longer have control, you need to abdicate that control to somebody else.
36:55
Yeah,
36:55
yeah, yeah. Right, right,
36:56
this is not that same sort of situation,
36:58
right? And the more
36:59
yeah.
36:59
control you try to put onto that person or take away from that person,
37:04
the stronger they're going to get buried in.
37:06
like resistant. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
37:09
And so with sometimes that messaging doesn't,
37:12
isn't great when it comes from a family member or even when it's friends
37:16
or teachers or something like that,
37:18
because there's just a...
37:19
Again, the narratives and the context,
37:21
if my parents are telling me that they don't want me to do something,
37:24
well, there's a power dynamic there that's relinquishing control.
37:28
Same thing with teachers, same thing with mental health professionals
37:33
or law enforcement, right? There's these different power dynamics.
37:36
And so what you're trying to do,
37:38
much like they do with hostage negotiations,
37:41
is you're trying to present these different alternatives and get them to be like,
37:45
okay, yeah, that makes like...
37:47
I can see that or I see that landing pad over there.
37:50
I can go and do that. You know,
37:53
yeah, we're, we're no, we hear you.
37:55
You've asked for a helicopter.
37:57
We're getting the helicopter. ~ why don't you let out one of the hostages though,
38:01
just to show us that you're serious.
38:02
Okay. I can do that. Right. And you know,
38:04
so there's like, there's, there's a leveling of the power dynamic there and yeah.
38:09
Where, sorry, sorry,
38:10
where does that come from if they're suspicious of their parents,
38:16
the school, the police, the mental health worker,
38:19
So that is part
38:20
yeah, yeah.
38:20
of sort of the behavioral threat assessment team,
38:22
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
38:23
right? So that's,
38:24
and so what we have had really good success on,
38:27
I talked to you about sort of like the behavioral,
38:29
I hate the title, behavioral threat assessment team.
38:31
So
38:32
Yeah.
38:32
one of the things that we've really had a lot of headway with that has been very,
38:36
very well responded to was relabeling them care teams,
38:40
okay? And so that opens up a whole bunch,
38:44
right?
38:46
What we were getting, feedback we were getting,
38:47
especially from schools was, listen,
38:50
before every, you know, at every summer,
38:53
towards the end of every summer,
38:54
we have to come in, we have all these trainings and it's,
38:56
you know, we get all the new standards for education.
39:00
But then we have like signs of substance abuse,
39:02
signs of suicide, signs of child trafficking,
39:05
signs of it, right? And I come in and I'm like,
39:08
signs of targeted violence and terrorism,
39:10
like heading down the pathway violence.
39:12
And it becomes just, it just gets drained in the wash,
39:16
right? Like
39:17
Mm-hmm.
39:17
it becomes all these different risk factors and all these different things.
39:21
And the feedback we were getting was like,
39:23
all right, well, I saw something that peaked my interest,
39:28
but I didn't know if it had to go into this bucket or that pathway
39:33
or that protocol or that. So I was like,
39:36
all right, I'm just going to sit here,
39:38
wait, see if something else happens.
39:41
and then I'll have a better sense of it,
39:42
right? And if you have a behavioral threat assessment team,
39:47
again, you're looking for behaviors that are threatening to give to that team.
39:51
A care team kind of opens up the windows where it doesn't matter what
39:57
the concern is. It doesn't matter if it's gonna go into a child trafficking protocol
40:01
or if it's going to substance or it goes into violence protocol.
40:05
It gets all, it gets just thrown all into one.
40:08
one sort of basket, right? And you're just going to be able to address
40:11
it because it piqued your interest or something you felt that something was wrong.
40:16
Right? And from a parent standpoint,
40:19
like you're much more open to if you get a call from your son
40:25
or daughter's care team at school,
40:26
then if you are your son or daughter's behavioral threat assessment team,
40:30
like we want to talk to you about your kid,
40:32
like there's a, you're going to create that sort of resistance almost automatically.
40:38
And a care team is good because you can get it from all information from
40:42
all different angles. So we talked about sort of like the death of a grandfather,
40:48
that goes into a care team. The breakup of a girlfriend,
40:52
concerned about somebody having disinterested in the hockey team or soccer team,
40:57
that can all go into the care team.
40:59
And the other...
41:02
way that you want to do this is you want to sort of spread
41:05
out the responsibility where not you're not trying to make intervention experts
41:10
out of everybody, but you want to
41:12
Mm-hmm.
41:13
try and have as many multi dimensional multi cross sectional nodes
41:19
as you possibly can. One of the great example was we installed
41:24
bus drivers into the care teams,
41:27
right?
41:28
Hmm.
41:29
And for the purpose, because it was still called the behavioral threat assessment
41:32
team at the time, for figuring out threatening behaviors or something like that.
41:36
What we got back was a report of an individual who was being picked
41:42
up and dropped off at a different spot,
41:44
which was sort of unusual, and coming
41:46
Yeah.
41:46
to find out that there was some substance abuse that was happening on that home.
41:50
Again, not really.
41:52
behavioral threat assessment or violence related,
41:54
something that needed to be addressed.
41:56
Boom, done. We found another instance where the family was driving up
42:02
and the kid was getting out of the car to get onto the bus and the
42:05
car just looked like it was filled with pillows and blankets and things like that.
42:09
Sure enough, they had been evicted from their apartment.
42:12
Again, not threatening necessarily from a violence perspective,
42:16
but something that they felt that they needed to be proactive on and they
42:19
got that individual.
42:21
and that family, the help that they needed.
42:23
That's kind of what we're sort of looking for.
42:25
So I began to start working with,
42:28
when I start setting these sort of these care teams up in these towns
42:33
is looking at the sanitation department,
42:36
whether you like it or not, your garbage man and your recycling people know when
42:40
you've had a party at your house,
42:41
they know the type of beer that you like,
42:43
they know it right. Like they see
42:43
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
42:45
these things on a weekly basis.
42:47
We had gotten
42:49
FedEx, we brought FedEx in, to a couple because,
42:53
FedEx has or had a process if you,
42:57
for drivers, if they were assaulted or,
43:01
or had something happen to them or the truck or something like that,
43:05
there was a protocol to, to, for security that way.
43:08
They did not have any protocols or procedures if they notice something unusual,
43:14
right?
43:15
So some of these drivers admitted that like they wish they had
43:19
it because they've been on this route for three years.
43:22
They've never stopped at this house.
43:23
Then all of a sudden, you know,
43:26
they're bringing package upon package upon package within a two week window
43:29
and it's all hazardous material.
43:31
Right. And it's like, just strikes like what
43:32
Yeah.
43:35
is going on the house. Like, you know,
43:38
so there's something odd there.
43:40
Libraries, houses of worship, departments of rec,
43:43
right? We've had instances where these individuals are absolute terrors at school.
43:49
They're absolute dreams at the afterschool program with Department of Rec.
43:53
It's a different context, right?
43:54
Like sometimes just the environment that they're in is just not conducive
43:59
to the way they learn or there's something going on personally when they're there.
44:03
And then they get out of that environment and they're amazing.
44:07
And so you really have to get your team and your ability
44:12
to get more information as much as you can to make a more informed decision
44:18
of not only how you're going to do this of inter interrupted negotiation kind
44:24
of thing, but also like what is really going on in that person's life.
44:29
Again, they may be not causing a problem at school.
44:34
But outside, they're going back to a home with substance abuse or domestic abuse,
44:38
and they don't have any more friends,
44:41
they're gonna get kicked out of their apartment,
44:43
or they need food assistance and things like that,
44:45
but they're just quiet at school.
44:47
so, therefore, obviously, there's no problem there,
44:50
right? So I think there's all these different things that get put into this sort
44:57
of mixing bowl, but how we do it,
45:00
and how we get people to be more proactive is an interesting behavioral science
45:07
type thing of like, all right,
45:08
how do we construct it? of like Toyota,
45:11
we want this to sort of be integrated in just how we do business,
45:15
but how do we frame things and how do we develop them so that
45:19
it becomes something that is almost second nature,
45:23
right? Like when we observe things.
45:25
And one of the sectors that
45:28
I've really started to delve into recently that has a lot of research on
45:32
how to get people to just do proactive behaviors for safety
45:36
is actually the transportation sector.
45:38
There are ~ a whole host of different things between the way in which
45:43
a sign is created or like how high it's supposed to be off the ground
45:48
to different types of city planning and things like that.
45:52
that get people to do things that are safer.
45:55
One great way that they do is something called pedestrian refuges.
45:59
So this is sort of like a little concrete island sort of in the middle of
46:03
a two lane road. And usually you'll have sort of a crosswalk that'll
46:07
cut through this little pedestrian refuge.
46:09
And it's just sort of like this little island,
46:11
probably sticks out maybe six to eight inches on either side of the lane.
46:15
But that six or eight inches, when you're a driver,
46:18
is just enough
46:20
to narrow your scope of vision that you will naturally take your foot
46:24
off the gas and you will go slower.
46:27
And so certain cities, you know,
46:30
that have a main street where people just tear through it or straight away
46:33
or something like that, they'll install these different things.
46:36
You don't have to just install the concrete things.
46:39
Sometimes they have these sort of little large cones type things that they
46:44
can put up to help that.
46:45
Other things to do with speed,
46:47
they found that using speed cameras or flashing your speed to get you
46:53
to slow down doesn't work really at all.
46:55
One of the things that they found was if they just print a smiley face
46:59
or a frowny face underneath a speed sign,
47:02
that has more of an emotional effect on us than just flashing our speed.
47:07
we'll actually, if we see a frowny face,
47:09
we'll actually slow down a lot quicker.
47:11
than if we just see ourselves being 10 miles over the speed limit.
47:15
All different types of things.
47:16
So, and you can play these sort of psychological hacks on
47:19
Yeah.
47:20
people. And it's not really manipulation,
47:22
but it's definitely, you know,
47:24
if I look at it as sort of more of a contextual placebo effect,
47:30
schools have tried to introduce healthier meals to limited success.
47:35
~ And then I heard of a school that just sort of changed the
47:38
the the architectural the option architecture,
47:41
right? So they put the healthier items on sort of a top level Near
47:46
the thing and then they put like the pizzas and the hot dogs and the french fries
47:49
on the bottom level and just that change in perspective Got kids to
47:54
eat more the healthier items than going down
47:57
I have this great story about Grey Goose.
47:59
Have you heard this story about Grey Goose?
48:00
Like the vodka, Greggies. Yeah.
48:01
Yeah, Grey Goose Vodka
48:03
Bottle. So Grey Goose from France,
48:05
nobody associates vodka with France,
48:07
right? And
48:09
Yeah.
48:10
somebody, somebody knew the CEO comes in and they do like a larger bottle.
48:16
They just put a larger bottle so that you couldn't put it necessarily with
48:20
all the other vodkas behind the bar.
48:23
You had to put it on the top shelf.
48:26
And so people got a sense of like,
48:27
it's French, it's unusual, it's vodka,
48:30
and it has this tall bottle that's striking to my eye.
48:35
It must be high quality, right?
48:37
And then there's way other, and there's just those types of little shift,
48:42
contextual shift changes that get people to either buy a bottle,
48:46
a different vodka, or to order a different food,
48:50
or to slow down naturally.
48:53
without a whole lot of like authority of
48:56
Yeah.
48:57
telling you what to do, right?
48:58
You just sort of naturally move in these sort of areas.
49:03
that kind of complexity is, or that kind of attention to detail happens a
49:09
lot in the commercial sector. I have a huge
49:11
you
49:12
section in my talks and stuff like that about Starbucks and about how,
49:16
you know, things like, you know,
49:19
wood tones and the music that goes into it and the lighting of what kind
49:23
of lumens and even the sound they like commissioned a special coffee maker that
49:30
was loud enough that you knew your coffee was being made but soft enough that
49:34
you could still carry out a conversation right and
49:35
Yeah.
49:37
so all these things like moving the air vent system
49:41
Yeah.
49:41
to
49:42
over the dining area where the tables are so that you get the smell of sort
49:46
of the croissants and the sandwiches and everything else down in there.
49:49
This is also just sort of like get you to buy,
49:52
you know, a warm croissant and a $5 cup of coffee,
49:55
right? that feels like a lot of detail and minutia to like
50:01
put into a space. But it's...
50:04
been very effective, right? Like at its peak,
50:06
Starbucks was opening a store every three hours,
50:10
I think, three to six hours, something like that,
50:13
somewhere in the world. And so these types of things sort of have a tendency
50:17
to take off. I don't see that sort of level of detail within the security realm
50:23
or within even the prevention space,
50:25
right? Of looking at going into a cafeteria and saying,
50:29
okay, if we put this sort of soundproofing thing,
50:33
either up on the ceiling or on the walls,
50:34
we're going to reduce sort of anxiety a little bit more or we'll be able
50:39
to hear things more. If we change the lighting in the hallways,
50:42
right, we're going to have a different sort of atmosphere going from class
50:46
to class or from room to room.
50:48
If we put different color on the walls,
50:51
if we have a different smell that's in the house,
50:54
in the place, all these different things contribute to the context of
50:59
how we feel and how we interact.
51:02
never has there been a mass attack at a Starbucks.
51:04
Okay, there have been attacks at Starbucks,
51:07
but they've won, like a mass attack has never happened.
51:11
And these are structures that are basically floor to ceiling glass.
51:15
I mean, if you go into one, there's no security guard ever.
51:18
I've never been into a Starbucks
51:19
Yeah, yeah.
51:20
that has a security guard. The bathroom is free for the public.
51:22
So they're just letting people kind of come in and go.
51:25
You can stay there for as long as you want.
51:26
And you know,
51:28
that nobody goes into that space thinking like they're unsafe,
51:31
right? And checking over their shoulder.
51:33
And that's the kind of stuff when I started talking about sort of like that
51:36
Zen security, like these are the types of things that you want to create within
51:41
the space because you're able to sort of pick up better those little abnormalities.
51:46
And so you can address
51:46
Yeah.
51:47
those abnormalities quicker and it doesn't take
51:51
a huge apparatus to sort of get moved or get activated or get into place
51:57
to sort of just shift somebody early on one way or the other.
52:02
Yeah. All right. As we sort of run out of time here,
52:05
two questions. I know the, one of the academic jargony words around that is nudging.
52:11
think. So,
52:12
Yes.
52:12
yeah, that's one thing that, or that at least I read some book called nudging.
52:16
was all about that
52:16
Mm-hmm.
52:17
stuff, which was pretty interesting.
52:18
Two questions. One would be, how do you maintain your tranquility
52:23
and sort of balance amongst all this type of work?
52:27
Because a lot of things I talk about on here is how we sort of become
52:32
the type of person who can do what we do.
52:34
So that's one question. And one is more of a,
52:38
an interest question. I contradicting approaches to what happens
52:45
if there is an active shooter or a threat in a school.
52:48
So I've, as I understand it,
52:51
the actually the safest thing to do is to let people escape the school
52:56
and run from the shooter. Yet all our protocols are locked in place.
53:02
So I'm curious, could you just talk maybe about that lock in place versus
53:07
run thing and then to your own personal practices and how do you kind
53:11
of maintain your balance and focus throughout all this type of work?
53:15
Yeah, most of that sort of that response stuff
53:21
is slightly out of my lane, but just because of the complexity
53:25
of the environment and the design of the school and everything else sort
53:28
of dictates more how, which one is more appropriate,
53:33
right? And that's more of a law enforcement sort of thing.
53:38
I will say to that though.
53:41
We have spent a lot of time almost over a century of creating buildings with fire
53:47
codes, right? And how, you know,
53:51
how much distance of a hallway and where the staircase needs to be
53:56
and all these different types of things.
53:58
And the building just does not get made unless,
54:01
you know, the fire marshal basically seals the approval of the,
54:05
of the plans. We do not do that for security.
54:08
We don't do that for, for.
54:10
active shooter. so oftentimes what you get is sort of like this makeshift either
54:15
lock in place, throw the tables in front of the doors and throw the,
54:18
Yeah.
54:20
you know, close the windows
54:21
and get your head under the desk or something like that.
54:25
Because you're sort of, again,
54:26
we're trying to put a square peg in a round hole at that point.
54:32
And so I do encourage not that I think that we can go and redesign every school,
54:37
you know, in
54:39
in the North America and everything else,
54:40
but there has to be some type of on new builds or something like that
54:46
or renovations where either the SWAT teams or the local responders,
54:52
the first responders to something like this have to have some type of
54:56
say into how they enter a building.
54:59
What is the best way to get people out?
55:02
and as quickly and as efficiently and everything else.
55:06
Again, that goes back to sort of the behavior things.
55:09
When the fire alarm goes out, you don't see people necessarily running for panic,
55:14
right? They kind of have an orderly way in which they do things
55:19
and they're relatively quiet and they move out very,
55:22
very quickly and they know where their meeting point is and they take
55:26
the attendance and everything else and boom,
55:29
we're done.
55:30
This is a very different sort of situation,
55:32
obviously, but by designing certain things or knowing,
55:37
you know, different protocols,
55:39
whether if you're on a hallway,
55:41
on one certain hallway, you evacuate in one different way.
55:44
If you are on another level, you have to do something completely different,
55:48
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
55:49
right? And so
55:50
that, that contextual change is just something that has to be sort of worked on and
55:55
Mm-hmm.
55:57
developed.
55:58
In terms of sort of how I keep myself,
56:00
Yeah.
56:01
I
56:03
don't know. Understanding the complexity of this,
56:09
understanding that we are dealing with human behaviors,
56:13
we're dealing with with humans that are struggling,
56:17
that are doing human behaviors that are not rational and that
56:21
are not going to fit in a linear sort of logical path and addressing people
56:27
who may not necessarily be struggling to the same degree,
56:30
but are in charge of keeping those people and others around them sort
56:34
of safe and knowing that they also don't follow necessarily a logical approach,
56:40
especially when it comes to this stuff and that
56:41
Yeah.
56:43
it's all emotion, helps a lot,
56:45
right? Because it gives me enough
56:48
Patience and gives me enough leash to not get really Wrapped around
56:54
the axle and upset that these that these people or these sectors just don't get it,
56:59
right? Like they are operating the best that they can within the sector that they're
57:05
in within sort of the rules and regulations that they have been given
57:09
and They are doing their best and it is really up to
57:15
you know, our leaders, our towns,
57:17
but then, you know, the people within the sectors themselves to sort of
57:22
strip the ego a little bit, you know,
57:25
and the hubris and understand that like the way that you are doing
57:28
it isn't necessarily wrong. It's just not as effective as it could be.
57:33
And with a few tweaks here and there contextually,
57:37
we can get you to where you actually want to be,
57:40
right? And because everybody that I talk to wants to have a safe community,
57:45
a more interconnected community.
57:49
~ they want to be more proactive and get to issues long before,
57:54
you know, they begin to sort of snowball and,
57:57
and get everybody scared. And,
57:59
you know, they just want a safer community.
58:02
But the, way in which we design things in a logical sort
58:07
of more systematic fashion, sometimes just butts up,
58:12
it sort of creates these glass ceilings.
58:13
and I think.
58:15
The worst part about having a glass ceiling is that you don't know it's
58:18
a glass ceiling until it's like you hit it with your face,
58:20
All right.
58:21
right? Like, know,
58:23
and I think that's, that's sort of one of the big,
58:26
the biggest issues is, is, is just under having that general understanding of like,
58:31
all right, we're just all people like,
58:34
and we're all trying to navigate this.
58:36
We're all rookies in life. Nobody has come back and been like,
58:39
my last life this way. ~ so.
58:41
Yeah.
58:43
We're all kind of working on the fly here and we just want to
58:48
try to optimize the correct metrics,
58:51
right? And one of those things with overvaluing the protection measures
58:56
and the response measures is I often ask them,
58:59
okay, so what metric are you using to showcase value of that?
59:03
Like if you spend 250,000 on those things,
59:07
you're expecting an ROI of 250 plus,
59:11
right?
59:12
So what metric are you? Because it can't be just like,
59:16
well, something didn't happen today,
59:17
therefore it's working. Right?
59:19
That's not the metric. So what is the
59:20
Mm-hmm.
59:21
metric? And that's the one thing that's interesting because they'll always tell
59:24
me like, well, there's prevention stuff.
59:26
Like, how do we measure it? Well,
59:27
how do you measure that? Right?
59:28
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
59:29
And so satisfaction and happiness and a general sense of security and connectedness.
59:36
Like, how much how much money is that worth?
59:40
in your community. And so they begin to sort of like,
59:42
opens up the brains and things like that.
59:45
And like, yeah, maybe, maybe there needs to be a little bit more of
59:48
a leveling out here of, you know,
59:50
we've we've we may have overvalued some of these things,
59:54
because they were sort of logical or reasonable that we thought like,
59:58
that was the way to go.
1:00:00
Okay, well, Robert, thank you so much for all your wisdom.
1:00:04
All your sort of information will be in the show notes for people to follow
1:00:09
up with you after. otherwise, again,
1:00:12
thank you so much. hope you have a great day.
1:00:14
You too, thank you so much. And I hope that your audience got a lot out of it.
1:00:18
yeah, again, if they want to contact me,
1:00:20
there's a contact page right on the website.
1:00:22
And we can do some bespoke services and things like that.
1:00:25
The one thing that we don't do is we don't take on cases.
1:00:28
So we're not caseworkers. And so we're more creating sort
1:00:34
of the protocols to get to the...
1:00:38
thwart those individuals before they need those caseworkers.
1:00:41
if we want to do more of the structural stuff or even the training stuff,
1:00:47
we're happy to do that.
1:00:50
Awesome. Again, thank you so much.
1:00:51
Yeah,
1:00:52
Thank you.
1:00:52
until next time.
1:00:53
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1:00:57
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