Latest / Statecraft / How to Build an Authoritarian Regime
Transcript
- 0:00[music]
- 0:05SPEAKER_01: Hi, I'm Santi Ruiz, and you're listening to Statecraft.
- 0:08SPEAKER_01: Today, my guest is Julian Waller.
- 0:11SPEAKER_01: Julian, hello.
- 0:12SPEAKER_01: Hi, great to be here.
- 0:13SPEAKER_01: Thanks for having me on.
- 0:14SPEAKER_01: It's good to have you on.
- 0:16SPEAKER_01: Longtime reader, first time conversationalist.
- 0:19SPEAKER_01: That's me talking about your work.
- 0:20SPEAKER_01: Enjoy your work for a while.
- 0:22SPEAKER_01: Julian is on as another academic.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: We've had a couple of academics on recently.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: Make no mistake, we will have more civil servants on in the near future.
- 0:30SPEAKER_01: We haven't forgotten our dear civil servants.
- 0:33SPEAKER_01: Julian, let me describe you to our audience and you tell me if I'm missing anything.
- 0:37SPEAKER_01: Julian is a student and teacher on authoritarianism.
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: Is that an accurate first path?
- 0:44SPEAKER_00: Sure, absolutely.
- 0:45SPEAKER_00: A political scientist that works in comparative authoritarianism, generally speaking.
- 0:51SPEAKER_01: Julian, you've been on my mind as a potential guest since a couple of years ago,
- 0:56SPEAKER_01: maybe when I saw that in the class that you teach at George Washington University,
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: the moniker is authoritarianism 101.
- 1:03SPEAKER_01: And the final assignment is to pick a real country and write a plan for taking it
- 1:08SPEAKER_01: over and holding it for 20 years as an authoritarian.
- 1:12SPEAKER_01: Are you still teaching that class this fall?
- 1:13SPEAKER_01: Absolutely.
- 1:14SPEAKER_01: We just started actually
- 1:15SPEAKER_01: this past Tuesday.
- 1:16SPEAKER_00: The class is formally titled Dictators in Europe and Russia because authoritarianism
- 1:21SPEAKER_00: in Europe, Russia, and Eurasia was too long.
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: GW bureaucracy didn't allow the title.
- 1:26SPEAKER_00: And so they pitched me Dictators in Europe and Russia.
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: I'm like, well, that sounds fine.
- 1:29SPEAKER_00: That's great.
- 1:30SPEAKER_00: It'll get student interest.
- 1:31SPEAKER_00: It's always been waitlisted.
- 1:32SPEAKER_00: I've been teaching it four semesters now.
- 1:35SPEAKER_00: There's always a backlog.
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: And the trick is it is an authoritarianism 101 class.
- 1:39SPEAKER_00: The whole point is to teach students, introduce students to the wide world of non-democracy.
- 1:45SPEAKER_00: And what we do is we take a historical approach.
- 1:47SPEAKER_00: We go from the French Revolution through the 19th century,
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: the interwar period,
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: the Cold War,
- 1:52SPEAKER_00: into the present and talk about all the ways in which authoritarian regimes in
- 1:57SPEAKER_00: the broader Europe Have existed their institutions, ideologies, things like that.
- 2:02SPEAKER_00: And as you said, the final assignment is perhaps the spiciest assignment at GW.
- 2:07SPEAKER_00: And I fly under the radar a little bit here.
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: I asked them to build me an authoritarian regime,
- 2:11SPEAKER_00: pick a country at any point in time over that 200 year span and either a democracy
- 2:16SPEAKER_00: and transition it to an autocracy.
- 2:18SPEAKER_00: Or another authoritarian regime and transition to a different type.
- 2:22SPEAKER_00: And that gets their creative juices flowing really well.
- 2:25SPEAKER_00: They apply the theories and concepts that we've been talking about all semester to
- 2:30SPEAKER_00: an actual granular case.
- 2:32SPEAKER_00: And students are intimidated initially, I will say.
- 2:35SPEAKER_00: And then by like,
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: when they actually start putting pen to paper,
- 2:38SPEAKER_00: they're like, professor, this is really interesting.
- 2:41SPEAKER_00: I'll get students that come at office hours and like, I'm a little scared.
- 2:44SPEAKER_00: This is so fun.
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 2:46SPEAKER_00: They've caught the bug.
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: So it's great.
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: We have a good time.
- 2:48SPEAKER_01: This was kind of my first thought maybe a year and a half, two years ago.
- 2:51SPEAKER_01: I thought we should have Julian on.
- 2:53SPEAKER_01: And long-time listeners will remember we had the esteemed Edward Lutwock on
- 2:57SPEAKER_01: a little more than a year ago,
- 2:59SPEAKER_01: who wrote famously,
- 3:01SPEAKER_01: maybe his most famous book is Coup d'etat, a practical guidebook.
- 3:05SPEAKER_01: And He's thought very concretely from the perspective of a potential military junta,
- 3:10SPEAKER_01: say, about how to do a coup.
- 3:12SPEAKER_01: Julian, you seem in some ways like the natural follow-on to this conversation.
- 3:15SPEAKER_01: After the coup is over, how do you hold a regime?
- 3:18SPEAKER_01: But before we get into the kind of blow-by-blow or the best practices
- 3:22SPEAKER_01: that you're teaching your students,
- 3:24SPEAKER_01: I want to get your kind of 101 perspective on what makes an authoritarian regime
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: because you've got a fun substack.
- 3:30SPEAKER_01: At least one of them you talk about, the papacy, the Catholic pope.
- 3:34SPEAKER_01: As an example of an authoritarian regime,
- 3:37SPEAKER_01: as a very successful one at that,
- 3:39SPEAKER_01: which suggests to me that the category is pretty broad.
- 3:41SPEAKER_00: That's right.
- 3:42SPEAKER_00: That's exactly right.
- 3:43SPEAKER_00: We can get into a massive rabbit hole about the regime typology and concepts and definitions.
- 3:49SPEAKER_00: I'll try to keep it simple, keep it coherent, and you can yell at me if that's not working out.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: Let's go down the rabbit hole.
- 3:55SPEAKER_01: We can back out later.
- 3:56SPEAKER_00: So we'll start from the political science perspective, right?
- 3:59SPEAKER_00: From the sort of academic literature that's often very explicit.
- 4:03SPEAKER_00: And this is one of the benefits of social science research is we try
- 4:05SPEAKER_00: to keep our concepts Delineated and explicit because we want to measure them down
- 4:10SPEAKER_00: the road.
- 4:10SPEAKER_00: We want to get to the quant head point where we can put together a data set
- 4:15SPEAKER_00: and show all the widgets, the democracy widgets, the authoritarianism widgets.
- 4:18SPEAKER_00: But that requires us having a definition of what that is to operationalize.
- 4:22SPEAKER_00: So that's a benefit as opposed to just saying things.
- 4:25SPEAKER_00: You can always say something's authoritarian.
- 4:28SPEAKER_00: The question is whether or not it makes any sense or is useful comparatively or analytically.
- 4:33SPEAKER_00: Okay, so that's the background.
- 4:34SPEAKER_00: From the political science perspective,
- 4:36SPEAKER_00: authoritarianism is a sort of term of art that we use
- 4:39SPEAKER_00: to describe all political regimes that are not democracies,
- 4:42SPEAKER_00: not electoral democracies.
- 4:44SPEAKER_00: Okay, that's not a very satisfying definition, right?
- 4:48SPEAKER_00: It's this kind of residual category.
- 4:51SPEAKER_00: And it wasn't invented this way.
- 4:52SPEAKER_00: This is an evolution over the last,
- 4:54SPEAKER_00: let's say, three-quarter century of the way we use this term.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: Before,
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: we would have a variety of terms to describe kind of the countries we're talking
- 5:02SPEAKER_00: about, tyranny, for example, or autocracy.
- 5:06SPEAKER_00: Back in the 30s and the 40s, we'd talk a lot about totalitarianism, for example.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: Some of these concepts come from an old,
- 5:13SPEAKER_01: even Greek, classical perspective on regime types, and some of them are more modern.
- 5:18SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 5:18SPEAKER_00: Well, so that's actually a very good point because humans have been thinking about
- 5:22SPEAKER_00: the structures of human governance for over 2000 years.
- 5:26SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 5:27SPEAKER_00: And the idea of regime,
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: the idea of thinking about essentially who rules and how and in what ways.
- 5:33SPEAKER_00: And it comes from the classical Greece, among other traditions.
- 5:36SPEAKER_00: So you have Plato and Aristotle,
- 5:38SPEAKER_00: Polybius, all writing about regime, what we would now call regime type.
- 5:43SPEAKER_00: You have Machiavelli, St.
- 5:44SPEAKER_00: Thomas Aquinas,
- 5:45SPEAKER_00: Jean Baudin in the medieval period and the early modern period,
- 5:49SPEAKER_00: all also talking about regime type.
- 5:52SPEAKER_00: And they're using the classical lexicon, which Right.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 6:17SPEAKER_00: Where you get the aristocracy versus oligarchy divide,
- 6:20SPEAKER_00: and where you get the mixed regime versus, well, democracy divide.
- 6:24SPEAKER_00: So that's the old classical tradition.
- 6:26SPEAKER_00: So we don't do that anymore, mostly.
- 6:30SPEAKER_00: There's a few reasons why.
- 6:31SPEAKER_00: The first is that social scientists are very averse to ascribing normative aspects
- 6:38SPEAKER_00: of regimes into the concept, right?
- 6:40SPEAKER_00: So how can you tell whether the regime is working for the common good or not, right?
- 6:45SPEAKER_00: We can talk about it.
- 6:46SPEAKER_00: We can have a great conversation about whether or not X
- 6:48SPEAKER_00: or Y is country's government means the best for its people.
- 6:52SPEAKER_00: But it's really difficult to classify that and to have sort of a neutral coding, right?
- 6:56SPEAKER_00: So we usually throw that out.
- 6:58SPEAKER_00: There are detractions to this.
- 6:59SPEAKER_00: But we throw that out.
- 7:00SPEAKER_00: Then we're left with structures.
- 7:03SPEAKER_00: What we've found is that we think there's something very,
- 7:05SPEAKER_00: very special and odd about modern democracy.
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: Modern democracy is a strange system.
- 7:14SPEAKER_00: In which the apex political leaders, right,
- 7:16SPEAKER_00: the president,
- 7:17SPEAKER_00: parliament,
- 7:18SPEAKER_00: things like that,
- 7:19SPEAKER_00: are elected regularly in multi-party elections under broad suffrage.
- 7:24SPEAKER_00: And here's the critical bit.
- 7:26SPEAKER_00: The outcomes are uncertain,
- 7:28SPEAKER_00: where there's so much genuine contestation in those regular multi-party elections
- 7:33SPEAKER_00: that you can't guarantee that the top will stay the top.
- 7:36SPEAKER_01: And you have electoral authoritarianism,
- 7:39SPEAKER_01: which would be cases where you have an election,
- 7:40SPEAKER_01: but everybody knows what's going to happen at the end of it.
- 7:42SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 7:43SPEAKER_00: You have all these countries now
- 7:44SPEAKER_00: where you have electoral democratic style constitutions,
- 7:48SPEAKER_00: you have directly elected presidents,
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: directly elected legislatures, formally independent judiciaries,
- 7:54SPEAKER_01: itemized rights.
- 7:55SPEAKER_01: Structurally, it's shaped like a democracy.
- 7:58SPEAKER_00: Structurally identical, right?
- 8:00SPEAKER_00: And people get really confused by this.
- 8:01SPEAKER_00: Oh, this country had an election.
- 8:03SPEAKER_00: Well, yeah, but the election was rigged.
- 8:04SPEAKER_00: Okay, well, how do we know all this?
- 8:05SPEAKER_00: And what's the dividing line between systematic rigging and just standard politics,
- 8:11SPEAKER_01: which is also never fully fair?
- 8:13SPEAKER_01: Or politics, as the wise man once said.
- 8:16SPEAKER_00: Or politics, indeed.
- 8:18SPEAKER_00: Or as the Russians say, political technology.
- 8:21SPEAKER_00: So that's a long way of getting down to this baseline of we think democracy is kind
- 8:25SPEAKER_00: of weird to have uncertainty at the top,
- 8:28SPEAKER_00: to have uncertainty over those apex decision-making political elites.
- 8:32SPEAKER_01: By weird,
- 8:32SPEAKER_01: you mean historically uncommon,
- 8:34SPEAKER_01: not the norm, to be uncertain about who will next rule you.
- 8:37SPEAKER_00: Another norm.
- 8:37SPEAKER_00: It's only 200 years old.
- 8:39SPEAKER_00: And up until the last 100 years or so, it was really only a few countries.
- 8:44SPEAKER_00: I mean,
- 8:44SPEAKER_00: the United States is the oldest functioning electoral democracy in the world by
- 8:47SPEAKER_00: a long shot.
- 8:48SPEAKER_00: Even these old European democracies that we think of as very stable and form
- 8:52SPEAKER_00: the sort of democratic normative core of the EU,
- 8:55SPEAKER_00: many of their democracies are no older than 1945 or 1970, right?
- 9:00SPEAKER_00: The average age of a democracy today is around 35 years worldwide.
- 9:04SPEAKER_00: And depending on the continent, it's even less.
- 9:06SPEAKER_00: We write as if democracy is this thing that's always existed
- 9:09SPEAKER_00: and it's this super common what have you.
- 9:12SPEAKER_00: It's really not.
- 9:13SPEAKER_00: It's very unusual.
- 9:14SPEAKER_00: And so we bracket that aside and then we look at everything else in the world.
- 9:18SPEAKER_00: And what we notice is that everything else in the world is very confusing.
- 9:22SPEAKER_00: The political systems are not the same.
- 9:23SPEAKER_00: A monarchy is not the same thing as a communist party state,
- 9:27SPEAKER_00: is not the same thing as a military junta,
- 9:29SPEAKER_00: is not the same thing as Putin's regime in the 2010s or what have you,
- 9:33SPEAKER_00: or Erdogan's Turkey,
- 9:34SPEAKER_00: which both have elections and all this sort of But they're all lumped together by
- 9:40SPEAKER_00: the fact that there's sort of certain outcome at the top.
- 9:42SPEAKER_00: The leader can't lose an election or is almost never going to lose an election
- 9:46SPEAKER_00: if there are elections.
- 9:47SPEAKER_00: Many, there are no elections at all.
- 9:49SPEAKER_00: The choice set is different.
- 9:51SPEAKER_00: There's certainty at the top as opposed to regular institutionalized uncertainty at the top.
- 9:57SPEAKER_00: And that's the real difference between the two.
- 9:59SPEAKER_00: Does that make sense?
- 10:00SPEAKER_01: Here's a question for you about certainty.
- 10:03SPEAKER_01: You've been a critic, and I know this because I was reading you recently.
- 10:06SPEAKER_01: Always a dangerous thing.
- 10:09SPEAKER_01: Watch out, Julian.
- 10:10SPEAKER_01: Of the idea that autocracies or authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile.
- 10:15SPEAKER_01: You and I are both, to some extent, serial watchers.
- 10:18SPEAKER_01: And when Assad fell, there was a spate of commentary about how it showed.
- 10:22SPEAKER_01: The kind of pathetic end to that regime taught us something
- 10:25SPEAKER_01: about authoritarian regimes in general.
- 10:27SPEAKER_01: Is that No,
- 10:31SPEAKER_00: it's not true.
- 10:32SPEAKER_00: And I have an article on it that presumably you read.
- 10:34SPEAKER_00: It was interesting.
- 10:35SPEAKER_00: The fall of the Assad regime was very instructive in part by how long it took.
- 10:40SPEAKER_00: This is a regime that was isolated for over a decade,
- 10:44SPEAKER_00: massive sanctions, nobody wanted to touch it, economic collapse and degradation.
- 10:49SPEAKER_00: A relatively small ruling elite surrounding this personalist dictator
- 10:54SPEAKER_00: who had lost all of the ideological aspects of the dictatorship, right?
- 10:58SPEAKER_00: And it was really just sort of power for power's sake,
- 11:00SPEAKER_00: as well as existential survival against forces like ISIS and so on,
- 11:05SPEAKER_00: and propped up on the outside.
- 11:06SPEAKER_00: But this regime lasts far longer than you would expect.
- 11:09SPEAKER_00: The word brittle implies that you poke at it and it'll break, right?
- 11:12SPEAKER_00: Or it'll shatter very, very easily.
- 11:15SPEAKER_00: And that's simply not the case.
- 11:16SPEAKER_00: Syria had a decade and a half drawn out process of slow destruction.
- 11:22SPEAKER_00: And if you actually look at that process, it's not a one way street.
- 11:25SPEAKER_00: And it took a long time for that to happen.
- 11:28SPEAKER_00: And it's really important to sort of push back against this idea that autocracies,
- 11:32SPEAKER_00: authoritarianism,
- 11:33SPEAKER_00: which is the same idea,
- 11:34SPEAKER_00: are inherently brittle,
- 11:36SPEAKER_00: inherent as in it's something to do with the very nature of the structures of power,
- 11:40SPEAKER_00: that lack of accountability at the top, right?
- 11:42SPEAKER_00: That certainty at the top.
- 11:43SPEAKER_00: Because it's simply not true.
- 11:45SPEAKER_00: Some authoritarian regimes last for an incredibly long time.
- 11:48SPEAKER_00: Some last for very, very short periods of time.
- 11:51SPEAKER_00: And we can actually cut apart that big residual concept
- 11:56SPEAKER_00: of authoritarianism writ large into subtypes.
- 11:59SPEAKER_00: And we can show,
- 12:00SPEAKER_00: actually,
- 12:01SPEAKER_00: through both qualitative and quantitative analysis,
- 12:05SPEAKER_00: that there is systematic likelihoods relative to how resilient they are,
- 12:10SPEAKER_00: how well they can manage crisis, troubles, tensions, divisions.
- 12:15SPEAKER_00: So for example...
- 12:17SPEAKER_00: We know that we tend to call military juntas or military regimes,
- 12:20SPEAKER_00: countries ruled by uniformed officers, right?
- 12:24SPEAKER_00: They're most commonly formed after a coup, right?
- 12:26SPEAKER_00: Or at the end of a civil war.
- 12:28SPEAKER_00: Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa dealt with lots of military juntas.
- 12:32SPEAKER_00: But of course,
- 12:33SPEAKER_00: Europe had plenty variations on the coup form,
- 12:36SPEAKER_00: the coup form out of government in the interwar period.
- 12:39SPEAKER_00: Or if you look at coups in Iberia in the 19th century.
- 12:41SPEAKER_00: So it's not just a Latin American or African phenomenon or Southeast Asian.
- 12:46SPEAKER_00: These regimes don't last very long.
- 12:47SPEAKER_00: The average age of a military regime is one of the shortest relative to all others.
- 12:52SPEAKER_00: What's up with that?
- 12:53SPEAKER_00: We have a few reasons why.
- 12:54SPEAKER_00: Reason number one is that generals don't actually like to rule whole countries.
- 12:59SPEAKER_00: It's very complicated.
- 13:00SPEAKER_00: That's not in their skill set.
- 13:01SPEAKER_00: And they often want to pass off the job to civilians or to technocrats to run
- 13:06SPEAKER_00: the economy,
- 13:07SPEAKER_00: to manage society,
- 13:09SPEAKER_00: to deal with organizations that are inherently less regimented and hierarchical than
- 13:13SPEAKER_00: an armed forces, right?
- 13:15SPEAKER_00: That's one reason.
- 13:16SPEAKER_00: Another reason is they don't want to be blamed when things go south.
- 13:20SPEAKER_00: Generals often seize power or lower tier officers often seize power
- 13:24SPEAKER_00: because they have this sense that the state or the nation is in danger, right?
- 13:28SPEAKER_00: After a coup,
- 13:29SPEAKER_00: it's very,
- 13:30SPEAKER_00: very often sort of They're promulgated from the new junta government
- 13:34SPEAKER_00: that they're there to save the state,
- 13:36SPEAKER_00: to save the nation, to defend the people and to defend order, right?
- 13:41SPEAKER_00: Once that happens though,
- 13:43SPEAKER_00: unless they're very ideological,
- 13:45SPEAKER_00: and that does happen in a subset of military regimes,
- 13:47SPEAKER_00: but unless they're very,
- 13:48SPEAKER_00: very ideological, they don't want to be in charge when things start breaking.
- 13:52SPEAKER_00: They don't want to be blamed for bad economic progress.
- 13:55SPEAKER_00: They don't want to be blamed for more disorder.
- 13:57SPEAKER_00: They would like to go back to the barracks.
- 14:00SPEAKER_00: That happens quite often.
- 14:01SPEAKER_00: We see this very regularly.
- 14:02SPEAKER_00: And in places where there is an ideological aspect to the junta,
- 14:08SPEAKER_00: to the coup leaders, they often transition away.
- 14:11SPEAKER_00: They have something else going on.
- 14:13SPEAKER_00: It's not just...
- 14:14SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 14:14SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 14:15SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 14:32SPEAKER_00: And they're not just interested in having the military rule.
- 14:35SPEAKER_00: They have ideological underpinnings.
- 14:38SPEAKER_00: They're interested in that.
- 14:39SPEAKER_00: And they usually transition to some sort of party regime where the party is
- 14:42SPEAKER_00: the dominant organizational force in making decisions,
- 14:46SPEAKER_00: not the top tier of the armed forces.
- 14:48SPEAKER_00: Let me ask you about party
- 14:49SPEAKER_01: regimes,
- 14:49SPEAKER_01: because on the one end,
- 14:51SPEAKER_01: I think there's theorists who will say,
- 14:54SPEAKER_01: for instance, look at Assad's embarrassing fall and flight.
- 14:57SPEAKER_01: Authoritarian regimes are inherently brittle.
- 14:59SPEAKER_01: And then there are folks who will look at,
- 15:00SPEAKER_01: say, China, On the other hand, and say, wow, they build so many bridges.
- 15:05SPEAKER_01: Authoritarian regimes are better on these axes.
- 15:07SPEAKER_01: And there's plenty of neo-reactionary folks on the far right,
- 15:11SPEAKER_01: as well as other kinds of theorists will say,
- 15:13SPEAKER_01: actually, these regimes are stronger than democracies.
- 15:16SPEAKER_01: Is it true that party states have a longer shelf life?
- 15:19SPEAKER_01: You can think of the USSR or China or even Cuba as party states,
- 15:24SPEAKER_01: and they've survived in their regime forms maybe longer
- 15:28SPEAKER_01: than you might have expected.
- 15:29SPEAKER_01: What's up with that?
- 15:30SPEAKER_00: It's a great question.
- 15:31SPEAKER_00: And that's exactly the flip side to military juntas.
- 15:34SPEAKER_00: You don't want a military junta.
- 15:35SPEAKER_00: They don't last very long.
- 15:37SPEAKER_00: Coups tend to lead to more coups, tend to lead to more coups.
- 15:39SPEAKER_00: It's all bad.
- 15:40SPEAKER_00: If you're trying to build an authoritarian regime, you really, really, really want a party.
- 15:45SPEAKER_00: It's great if you can get the full party state apparatus,
- 15:48SPEAKER_00: so the Communist Party state style,
- 15:51SPEAKER_00: where it's a single party and the party sits in organizational parallel
- 15:55SPEAKER_00: to Parties organize power.
- 15:56SPEAKER_00: They provide hierarchy.
- 15:58SPEAKER_00: They also provide regular means of career advancement.
- 16:01SPEAKER_00: You work inside the party.
- 16:02SPEAKER_00: You get rewarded.
- 16:03SPEAKER_00: You become part of a network within that party.
- 16:05SPEAKER_00: This happens in democratic parties too.
- 16:25SPEAKER_00: And therefore, as an elite, you're more likely to stay on board.
- 16:28SPEAKER_00: You're less likely to defect.
- 16:30SPEAKER_00: You're more likely to have a longer time horizon.
- 16:33SPEAKER_00: You believe in the party or at the very least, you think the party benefits you.
- 16:36SPEAKER_00: You're going to continue investing in the party and you're going
- 16:39SPEAKER_00: to continue investing your work,
- 16:40SPEAKER_00: your ambition,
- 16:41SPEAKER_00: your time into both rising up the ranks and ensuring that the party does well enough
- 16:46SPEAKER_00: to keep power.
- 16:47SPEAKER_00: All of these things are positive incentive structures.
- 16:50SPEAKER_00: Parties are also good because they control,
- 16:52SPEAKER_00: because there is this top-down hierarchy,
- 16:55SPEAKER_00: which you can discipline members,
- 16:57SPEAKER_00: you can watch them,
- 16:58SPEAKER_00: you have more information, relatively speaking, from people inside the party.
- 17:03SPEAKER_00: That's the party organizational format that's useful.
- 17:06SPEAKER_00: The thing is,
- 17:07SPEAKER_00: we look at places like China,
- 17:09SPEAKER_00: we look at places
- 17:09SPEAKER_01: like Vietnam,
- 17:10SPEAKER_01: or we look at places like
- 17:12SPEAKER_00: These have parties
- 17:14SPEAKER_00: that are not only organizationally beneficial,
- 17:17SPEAKER_00: but the party itself is wrapped around the state and watches over the state.
- 17:21SPEAKER_00: And that's a very specific way of organizing regime.
- 17:25SPEAKER_00: It was developed by Lenin and associates,
- 17:29SPEAKER_00: really perfected under Stalin in the USSR in the 1920s and the 1930s.
- 17:34SPEAKER_00: The idea being that every state institution has a parallel party institution.
- 17:40SPEAKER_00: Looking it over, the party institution makes the political decisions.
- 17:43SPEAKER_00: The state institution implements them.
- 17:46SPEAKER_00: This format allows the head of the party,
- 17:48SPEAKER_00: who has control over its membership,
- 17:50SPEAKER_00: extreme control over essentially all political decisions, right?
- 17:54SPEAKER_00: And this model was then exported to China,
- 17:56SPEAKER_00: exported to a variety of other communist countries in the 40s, 50s, 60s.
- 18:02SPEAKER_00: The problem is to use the meme.
- 18:05SPEAKER_00: We don't know how to build them anymore.
- 18:06SPEAKER_00: There's never been a successful party state built after the Cold War.
- 18:10SPEAKER_00: That doesn't exist.
- 18:11SPEAKER_00: There are no new ones.
- 18:12SPEAKER_00: That particular format of the ideological or idiocratic party overwatching the state
- 18:19SPEAKER_00: in that sort of regimented manner, it's all legacies.
- 18:22SPEAKER_00: China works incredibly well.
- 18:24SPEAKER_00: It's incredibly stable given how large it is,
- 18:26SPEAKER_00: given how potentially diverse it is, given a variety of reasons.
- 18:30SPEAKER_00: But we can't export the model.
- 18:31SPEAKER_00: Not anymore.
- 18:32SPEAKER_01: In some ways,
- 18:33SPEAKER_01: this is similar,
- 18:33SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 18:34SPEAKER_01: maybe to the point that you and other heterodox theorists will make about fascism,
- 18:38SPEAKER_01: that it's just not a useful analytical frame to apply to the present because
- 18:42SPEAKER_01: when you actually look at what makes up fascism,
- 18:44SPEAKER_01: and this is a rich debate in funded class and in the professional class as well,
- 18:47SPEAKER_01: so I don't want to gloss over disagreements,
- 18:49SPEAKER_01: but this would be one version of the argument for fascism as well.
- 18:52SPEAKER_01: Fascism was historically bound,
- 18:54SPEAKER_01: whatever you can say about authoritarian regimes today,
- 18:56SPEAKER_01: they're not fascist because we don't know how to make those anymore.
- 19:00SPEAKER_01: Basically.
- 19:00SPEAKER_01: Same with Communist Party states.
- 19:02SPEAKER_00: It's similar.
- 19:02SPEAKER_00: The difference is actually we still do have Communist Party states.
- 19:06SPEAKER_00: They do in fact still exist.
- 19:07SPEAKER_01: We see them working every day, right?
- 19:08SPEAKER_01: They have persevered.
- 19:09SPEAKER_00: And actually,
- 19:10SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 19:10SPEAKER_00: one thing,
- 19:10SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 19:11SPEAKER_00: the China washers will tell you that the most dangerous thing about contamination.
- 19:15SPEAKER_00: The thing with the party state, we don't know how to make party states anymore.
- 19:30SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 19:49SPEAKER_00: And usually that party is not a single party.
- 19:53SPEAKER_00: It's a dominant party, which means there are other political parties in the political system.
- 19:57SPEAKER_00: They're in opposition.
- 19:59SPEAKER_00: There are regular elections.
- 20:00SPEAKER_00: They may or may not be co-opted or controlled by the government.
- 20:03SPEAKER_00: And there's usually a varying spectrum.
- 20:05SPEAKER_00: But you still have that dominant party.
- 20:07SPEAKER_00: And dominant party authoritarian regimes are also very successful.
- 20:12SPEAKER_00: They're not as long-lived as party states have been historically in
- 20:16SPEAKER_00: the 20th century, but they're pretty good.
- 20:19SPEAKER_00: Mexico, under the pre-regime, lasted seven decades, something like that.
- 20:24SPEAKER_00: Singapore, which is often talked about.
- 20:26SPEAKER_00: We were mentioning neo-reactionaries.
- 20:28SPEAKER_00: Singapore is sometimes discussed as this kind of ideal regime.
- 20:32SPEAKER_00: You know, CEO, monarch, city, state model.
- 20:36SPEAKER_00: We always forget that Singapore has a dominant party and has for a long time.
- 20:40SPEAKER_00: The People's Action Party is one of the core institutional mechanisms
- 20:44SPEAKER_00: within Singapore for both controlling its elite and rewarding its elite.
- 20:49SPEAKER_00: It's not just all schooling and high salaries and business degrees and things like that.
- 20:54SPEAKER_00: There's also a dominant party and it functions very, very well.
- 20:58SPEAKER_00: And other countries have this too.
- 20:59SPEAKER_00: And some dominant parties are very corrupt.
- 21:01SPEAKER_00: So Fidesz in Hungary was sort of an example of a dominant party
- 21:04SPEAKER_00: that ended up eating itself to some degree.
- 21:07SPEAKER_00: You can look at Russia today.
- 21:08SPEAKER_00: Russia has a dominant party and the dominant party really doesn't matter.
- 21:11SPEAKER_00: It's not involved in political decisions.
- 21:14SPEAKER_00: It's there to fill seats in the parliament.
- 21:16SPEAKER_00: And to sort of keep governors on side.
- 21:19SPEAKER_00: So it does things.
- 21:21SPEAKER_00: It's not useless, but it's not involved in politics in the same way.
- 21:25SPEAKER_00: So anyway, those are some distinctions to make because that is the world we live in.
- 21:29SPEAKER_00: That stuff does exist.
- 21:30SPEAKER_00: That's very useful.
- 21:31SPEAKER_01: Let's do a lightning round where I want to name a country today
- 21:37SPEAKER_01: and you just briefly tell me how you would describe where it would fall in
- 21:41SPEAKER_01: the authoritarian pantheon.
- 21:43SPEAKER_01: So let's take Iran right now, locked in a struggle for its life with the US.
- 21:48SPEAKER_01: What kind of regime does it have?
- 21:50SPEAKER_00: We're starting super easy, right?
- 21:52SPEAKER_00: Iran is, of course, one of the most easy, non-complicated, simple authoritarian regime.
- 21:57SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I mean, we could spend a podcast discussing the Iranian political system.
- 22:01SPEAKER_00: But right now,
- 22:03SPEAKER_00: under wartime conditions,
- 22:05SPEAKER_00: it seems to be some kind of military regime under the IRGC.
- 22:09SPEAKER_00: Not least because we haven't seen the supreme leader in months and all of that.
- 22:13SPEAKER_00: It's also unusually decentralized right now in Iran.
- 22:16SPEAKER_00: Theater commanders have surprising amounts of authority.
- 22:19SPEAKER_00: We're not quite sure how it interacts with the civilian population.
- 22:22SPEAKER_00: But if we were to go pre-war,
- 22:24SPEAKER_00: for example,
- 22:25SPEAKER_00: we would call Iran a theocracy because those apex decision-making elites.
- 22:31SPEAKER_00: States, who ultimately call the shots, are chosen by dint of their clerical status.
- 22:35SPEAKER_00: But Iran is complicated because it also contains the whole civilian government.
- 22:40SPEAKER_00: It has an elected parliament,
- 22:42SPEAKER_00: it had an elected president,
- 22:43SPEAKER_00: it has a variety of conciliar bodies,
- 22:45SPEAKER_00: council bodies that have advisory or even decision-making capacities,
- 22:50SPEAKER_00: some of which are elected by other councils or elected by other institutions,
- 22:54SPEAKER_00: some of which are chosen from the top.
- 22:56SPEAKER_00: Iran is unusually complicated, so you picked a good one.
- 22:59SPEAKER_00: What about North Korea?
- 23:02SPEAKER_00: Structurally, it's a party state.
- 23:04SPEAKER_00: Functionally, it's a personalist dictatorship.
- 23:06SPEAKER_00: And the extra added wrinkle is it's a personalist dictatorship with monarchical succession.
- 23:11SPEAKER_00: It has hereditary succession.
- 23:12SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 23:13SPEAKER_00: Now, what's useful is we don't have to classify the regime by succession.
- 23:17SPEAKER_00: We could.
- 23:18SPEAKER_00: That's a different way of doing things is we could do that.
- 23:21SPEAKER_00: Right now,
- 23:22SPEAKER_00: it makes no sense in terms of power flow to think in terms of
- 23:24SPEAKER_00: the personalist dictatorship at the top,
- 23:26SPEAKER_00: this completely unconstrained power of a single man who can sort
- 23:31SPEAKER_00: of do whatever he wants.
- 23:32SPEAKER_00: He sits atop a legacy party estate.
- 23:35SPEAKER_00: And he has a sort of hereditary succession model, which is interesting.
- 23:38SPEAKER_00: And it's not uncommon among some authoritarian regimes
- 23:42SPEAKER_00: that don't look like monarchies to have de facto or attempted hereditary succession.
- 23:47SPEAKER_00: So Syria, for example, the Assads famously had a hereditary succession model.
- 23:53SPEAKER_00: Azerbaijan today.
- 23:55SPEAKER_00: Which is structurally an electoral authoritarian regime that has
- 23:59SPEAKER_00: a liberal democratic constitution,
- 24:01SPEAKER_00: hyper-dominant party, very, very fraudulent elections.
- 24:04SPEAKER_00: The Aliyav family runs it like a personal dynasty.
- 24:08SPEAKER_00: And the next generation is being groomed for succession.
- 24:11SPEAKER_00: Kazakhstan actually almost had the same thing.
- 24:14SPEAKER_00: Nursultan Nazarbayev in the late 2010s was considering his daughter to become
- 24:20SPEAKER_00: the next president.
- 24:20SPEAKER_00: He had her all set up as Speaker of the Senate and so on.
- 24:24SPEAKER_00: And then A series of corruption scandals got in the way
- 24:27SPEAKER_00: and Duriga was considered no longer suitable.
- 24:31SPEAKER_00: So they ended up transitioning to something else, but it's not unusual.
- 24:34SPEAKER_01: Close listeners of Statecraft may remember Nazarbayev from our episode with
- 24:39SPEAKER_01: the esteemed Andy Weber,
- 24:40SPEAKER_01: who was on the ground in Kazakhstan at the fall of the Soviet Union
- 24:44SPEAKER_01: and was instrumental in getting the weapons-grade uranium that was lying around
- 24:48SPEAKER_01: in warehouses safely out of the country and brokered the Nazarbayev-Clinton Yeah.
- 24:54SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 25:12SPEAKER_00: And it's interesting that it's actually a source of internal domestic legitimacy
- 25:15SPEAKER_00: and it's taught to Kazakh students in their middle and high school classes.
- 25:19SPEAKER_00: Fascinating.
- 25:19SPEAKER_00: I guess that makes sense.
- 25:32SPEAKER_00: Okay, a couple more.
- 25:33SPEAKER_00: Let's go to Morocco.
- 25:34SPEAKER_00: There's a monarchy, which is great.
- 25:36SPEAKER_00: So we have some legacy monarchies,
- 25:37SPEAKER_00: and there's sort of two types of monarchy that fit into
- 25:40SPEAKER_00: the authoritarianism category, right?
- 25:42SPEAKER_00: You have democratic monarchies, right?
- 25:45SPEAKER_00: Great Britain, for example.
- 25:46SPEAKER_01: Sure.
- 25:47SPEAKER_01: The queen is sovereign, but she doesn't rule.
- 25:49SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 25:50SPEAKER_00: It's the head of state, but it's a symbol.
- 25:53SPEAKER_00: The apex decision-making political officials have long since been passed over to
- 25:56SPEAKER_00: the prime minister, a cabinet, and a parliament, right?
- 25:59SPEAKER_00: So it's a democracy.
- 26:01SPEAKER_00: Insofar as it has competitive elections.
- 26:02SPEAKER_00: Inside monarchy, on the authoritarianism side of things, there's two fun varieties.
- 26:07SPEAKER_00: One is your absolute monarchy, which sort of does what it says on the tin.
- 26:11SPEAKER_00: That's your Saudi Arabia, right?
- 26:13SPEAKER_00: And that's, of course, also you're thinking about like, you know, historical examples.
- 26:18SPEAKER_00: France prior to the French Revolution is sort of similar.
- 26:20SPEAKER_00: The king reigns and rules,
- 26:22SPEAKER_00: chooses his ministers,
- 26:23SPEAKER_00: and there is no sort of countervailing input from a population through elections
- 26:27SPEAKER_00: or anything like that.
- 26:28SPEAKER_00: The second type is what we can call the authoritarian constitutional monarchy,
- 26:33SPEAKER_00: where you have your monarch, monarch reigns.
- 26:36SPEAKER_00: You also, though, have a parliament.
- 26:38SPEAKER_00: Oftentimes the parliament's just selecting a prime minister.
- 26:41SPEAKER_00: Parliament could be selecting a prime minister.
- 26:43SPEAKER_00: And the difference is in the authoritarian constitutional monarchy, one,
- 26:47SPEAKER_00: often elections aren't fully free and fair,
- 26:49SPEAKER_00: but even if they are, the prime minister is actually chosen by the king.
- 26:55SPEAKER_00: So the apex political decision-making officials are not chosen through
- 26:59SPEAKER_00: that competitive struggle for the people's vote with uncertain outcomes.
- 27:03SPEAKER_00: They're based on confidence from the monarch.
- 27:06SPEAKER_00: And so you have the top-down as opposed to bottom-up set of choice structures
- 27:11SPEAKER_00: for choosing who ultimately makes decisions.
- 27:14SPEAKER_00: What's fun is that the authoritarian constitutional monarchy Was invented in more
- 27:20SPEAKER_00: or less the second half of the 19th century in Europe,
- 27:23SPEAKER_00: in places like Austria-Hungary,
- 27:26SPEAKER_00: in Imperial Germany,
- 27:28SPEAKER_00: and elsewhere to try to square the circle of the fact
- 27:31SPEAKER_00: that they couldn't avoid elections.
- 27:34SPEAKER_00: They couldn't avoid not having a parliament that normatively was no longer possible.
- 27:38SPEAKER_00: And due to the way these states were formed, you needed to have them.
- 27:42SPEAKER_00: And they weren't very good at rigging elections in the 19th century, relatively speaking.
- 27:45SPEAKER_00: The British were actually the best at rigging elections.
- 27:49SPEAKER_00: They hadn't learned how to do it yet.
- 27:50SPEAKER_00: If you look at elections in Austria-Hungary,
- 27:54SPEAKER_00: on the Austrian side anyway,
- 27:55SPEAKER_00: or in Germany, they're surprisingly less rigged than you would expect.
- 27:59SPEAKER_00: There's surprisingly much more competition.
- 28:01SPEAKER_00: The parliaments very quickly became out of control.
- 28:03SPEAKER_00: Austria-Hungary, the Habsburgs famously had to keep closing down the parliament.
- 28:07SPEAKER_00: But that didn't matter because the prime minister of the cabinet,
- 28:11SPEAKER_00: chosen by the royal,
- 28:12SPEAKER_00: And that's sort of that ability to continue the governance structure,
- 28:16SPEAKER_00: even if you have a completely dysfunctional representative system.
- 28:20SPEAKER_00: So anyway, that's a long way of saying Morocco is the latter category.
- 28:24SPEAKER_00: Morocco has an authoritarian constitutional monarchy, right?
- 28:26SPEAKER_00: Royal still rules as well as reigns through a prime minister, has full choice.
- 28:32SPEAKER_00: There's also restrictions in terms of free competition in elections as well.
- 28:37SPEAKER_00: Other examples are Kuwait,
- 28:38SPEAKER_00: which is a similar model,
- 28:40SPEAKER_00: or Jordan, all of which are sort of these authoritarian constitutional monarchies.
- 28:43SPEAKER_01: Last one in our relatively rapid fire series,
- 28:46SPEAKER_01: you have this puckish essay about the papacy as an authoritarian regime.
- 28:50SPEAKER_01: But succession is uncertain in the papacy.
- 28:53SPEAKER_01: You don't know in advance who the next pope will be.
- 28:56SPEAKER_00: So how can you call it authoritarian?
- 28:58SPEAKER_00: Which is really great, which is why we build our democracy model on three legs, right?
- 29:03SPEAKER_00: The most important leg is that uncertain outcomes in terms of the decision-making officials.
- 29:08SPEAKER_00: But it's also the size of the electorate, right?
- 29:12SPEAKER_00: Suffrage, who gets to vote.
- 29:14SPEAKER_00: And it's also those regular multi-party elections that also matter, right?
- 29:17SPEAKER_00: So you have to have elections.
- 29:18SPEAKER_01: The lack of regularity.
- 29:19SPEAKER_00: Yeah, yeah,
- 29:20SPEAKER_00: Well, so it's an electoral monarchy, properly speaking, right?
- 29:23SPEAKER_00: When the Pope dies, the new monarch gets elected.
- 29:26SPEAKER_00: He's elected by a selectorate of a couple hundred people, right, in the College of Cardinals.
- 29:32SPEAKER_00: And so if you'd like it,
- 29:33SPEAKER_00: it's more like the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
- 29:35SPEAKER_00: right, in the terms of the old electoral monarchy.
- 29:38SPEAKER_00: But, of course, the other side is that the College of Cardinals doesn't act as a legislature.
- 29:42SPEAKER_00: It also doesn't meet regularly.
- 29:44SPEAKER_00: Its function is to choose the new all-powerful monarch.
- 29:48SPEAKER_00: Now, of course,
- 29:49SPEAKER_00: an expert on the papacy will say, well,
- 29:50SPEAKER_00: it's more complicated and there's lots of bureaucratic structures and so on,
- 29:54SPEAKER_00: but everywhere is more complicated like that.
- 29:57SPEAKER_00: There's no country even in the most autocratic state where
- 30:00SPEAKER_00: the leader literally makes every decision.
- 30:02SPEAKER_00: The key point is where does ultimate authority and power lie?
- 30:05SPEAKER_00: But the Vatican is a great, it's a really fun example.
- 30:08SPEAKER_00: It is by far the most successful too.
- 30:09SPEAKER_00: And if you know the history of the church,
- 30:13SPEAKER_00: It's not without schism and what we might call coup or even periods of civil war
- 30:19SPEAKER_00: and all of that.
- 30:20SPEAKER_00: And yet it endures, which is something that's quite interesting, actually.
- 30:23SPEAKER_00: Sure.
- 30:23SPEAKER_01: Well, let me ask you a little bit about how one maintains regime.
- 30:27SPEAKER_01: I want to ask you then about how they end transitions or haircuts or perestroika.
- 30:34SPEAKER_01: And then I want to maybe close by talking a little bit about the American context
- 30:37SPEAKER_01: and some of the debates over authoritarianism here.
- 30:40SPEAKER_01: But to go to maintenance of a regime,
- 30:43SPEAKER_01: you've written a lot about how you select talent or remove or purge talent in
- 30:49SPEAKER_01: an authoritarian regime.
- 30:50SPEAKER_01: What is a good in the sense of effective authoritarian leader thinking about
- 30:55SPEAKER_01: when attempting to elevate or destroy talent?
- 30:59SPEAKER_00: It's a very interesting question.
- 31:01SPEAKER_00: Personnel politics is all politics at the end of the day, right?
- 31:05SPEAKER_00: Like who fills the seat, who's there, who's making the decision is what's important.
- 31:09SPEAKER_00: And so The leader of an authoritarian regime who's thinking over the long term,
- 31:14SPEAKER_00: let's say, maybe even thinking for the common good.
- 31:16SPEAKER_00: But again, we'll bracket that away.
- 31:18SPEAKER_00: But just thinking for longevity purposes, right?
- 31:20SPEAKER_00: And longevity is going to be helped by a number of factors, right?
- 31:24SPEAKER_00: In terms of maintenance, right?
- 31:25SPEAKER_00: You want good economic growth, right?
- 31:28SPEAKER_00: You want social order to some degree.
- 31:30SPEAKER_01: You want to avoid the tensions between
- 31:33SPEAKER_00: groups and your country is going
- 31:34SPEAKER_00: to have variations on that.
- 31:36SPEAKER_00: You also want to have clear career trajectories for ambitious elites
- 31:41SPEAKER_00: or those aspiring to be elites, right?
- 31:43SPEAKER_00: They want to not feel constantly frustrated by the process.
- 31:46SPEAKER_01: How do you do that in an authoritarian regime?
- 31:48SPEAKER_01: Let's spend some time on that because when I think about
- 31:50SPEAKER_01: at least our parochial American context,
- 31:52SPEAKER_01: I think there are all kinds of ways to rise in an American system.
- 31:57SPEAKER_01: Even if the pyramid gets narrowed to the top and there's only so many senatorial
- 32:01SPEAKER_01: or gubernatorial roles, there's a lot of ways that you can spend a whole career.
- 32:07SPEAKER_01: You know, and be rewarded maybe by voters.
- 32:11SPEAKER_01: If that's not the case, per se, you don't have kind of true contestation in the same way.
- 32:16SPEAKER_01: How do you stop everybody from feeling like they're under the yoke in your party or
- 32:20SPEAKER_01: in your regime?
- 32:21SPEAKER_00: Sure.
- 32:22SPEAKER_00: And this is something that current regimes actually really struggle with,
- 32:25SPEAKER_00: which is generational change, right?
- 32:26SPEAKER_00: You have to keep enough positions open.
- 32:28SPEAKER_00: Because contestation adds one fun aspect to the circulation of elites, right?
- 32:35SPEAKER_00: So I don't know how much you read Add on the Italian elite theorists,
- 32:38SPEAKER_00: Mosca, Pareto, Mitchell's people writing in the first half of the 20th century.
- 32:43SPEAKER_00: But all countries have elites.
- 32:45SPEAKER_00: Elites are going to circulate around.
- 32:46SPEAKER_00: Elites have a persistent stickiness.
- 32:48SPEAKER_00: They last longer than you expect in individual families.
- 32:51SPEAKER_00: Think about wasps in the United States.
- 32:53SPEAKER_00: You'll know what I'm talking about.
- 32:54SPEAKER_00: What's the...
- 32:55SPEAKER_01: I think it's a paper about Chinese families that were landed before
- 32:59SPEAKER_01: the Cultural Revolution and in families that had everything taken away from them,
- 33:04SPEAKER_01: still their descendants often persist.
- 33:05SPEAKER_01: And they persist back into top leadership.
- 33:07SPEAKER_01: Yep.
- 33:08SPEAKER_00: We actually find the same thing in the Soviet Union,
- 33:11SPEAKER_00: is that the nomenclatura elite that is reestablished after a couple decades of Death
- 33:17SPEAKER_00: and murder and class genocide and fun things like that.
- 33:22SPEAKER_00: When you get to the other side,
- 33:23SPEAKER_00: when you get to the 1970s and 80s,
- 33:25SPEAKER_00: a lot of the family legacies surprisingly persist once you cut off the top, right?
- 33:30SPEAKER_00: So revolutionary regimes are really good at killing the top aristocrats or
- 33:34SPEAKER_00: the top bourgeois, what have you.
- 33:36SPEAKER_00: But people who are more provincial elites or small elites, right?
- 33:41SPEAKER_00: Those families just tend to persist.
- 33:42SPEAKER_00: So there's lots of persistence in the actual people who make up the elite corpus,
- 33:48SPEAKER_00: which can be quite large.
- 33:50SPEAKER_00: But there is still transition, right?
- 33:51SPEAKER_00: There's generational transition.
- 33:53SPEAKER_00: There's also going to be transition shifts from people going from provinces to
- 33:58SPEAKER_00: the center, right?
- 34:00SPEAKER_00: One trick with many authoritarian regimes is
- 34:02SPEAKER_00: that they're highly centralized relative to some democracies.
- 34:07SPEAKER_00: And so people tend to glom to Beijing or they glom to Moscow or
- 34:12SPEAKER_01: they glom to Tehran
- 34:13SPEAKER_01: or something like that right at the end of the day.
- 34:15SPEAKER_00: We see this in some democracies.
- 34:16SPEAKER_00: France is like that.
- 34:17SPEAKER_01: The UK is like that.
- 34:19SPEAKER_01: The US is not like that.
- 34:21SPEAKER_00: When you have over-centralization,
- 34:22SPEAKER_00: that reduces the number of potential slots for people
- 34:25SPEAKER_00: to feel like they've made achievements in their own region.
- 34:30SPEAKER_00: But the standard ways of making elites feel good about themselves is,
- 34:33SPEAKER_00: again, through things like party mechanisms.
- 34:35SPEAKER_00: It's through things like the Soviets have the phrase, the rotation of cadres.
- 34:41SPEAKER_00: The rotation of cadres did two things.
- 34:43SPEAKER_00: One was you were constantly being promoted to the next echelon for good behavior.
- 34:49SPEAKER_00: This encouraged corruption and it encouraged sclerosis over time, but people were happy.
- 34:54SPEAKER_00: People remember the 60s and 70s in the Soviet Union very nicely if they had nice lives.
- 34:58SPEAKER_00: But the other thing it does is it also prevents an elite from establishing
- 35:01SPEAKER_00: a power base anywhere, but you don't sit in a position for too long.
- 35:05SPEAKER_00: This is actually not dissimilar to how military organizations work.
- 35:09SPEAKER_00: So modern generals and admirals don't have commands for more than two
- 35:13SPEAKER_00: to three years, even in peacetime, even without political intervention.
- 35:18SPEAKER_00: Part of that is intentional.
- 35:20SPEAKER_00: You don't have,
- 35:21SPEAKER_00: for example,
- 35:22SPEAKER_00: Captain Picard on a five-year,
- 35:24SPEAKER_00: seven-year mission on the USS Enterprise with his own ship and his own crew
- 35:28SPEAKER_00: that never changes.
- 35:29SPEAKER_00: That doesn't happen.
- 35:30SPEAKER_00: And that's intentionally done, right?
- 35:32SPEAKER_00: To avoid biases, to avoid fiefdoms being established.
- 35:36SPEAKER_00: So authoritarian regimes try to do this too.
- 35:38SPEAKER_00: It's a defense mechanism against, again, alternative power centers being created.
- 35:43SPEAKER_00: It also is a good way to continue the career progression of people
- 35:48SPEAKER_00: who are particularly ambitious.
- 35:50SPEAKER_00: I'll give you an example.
- 35:51SPEAKER_00: In Russia today, there's a lot of talk about the future succession, what's coming after Putin.
- 35:56SPEAKER_00: Putin's getting old.
- 35:57SPEAKER_00: How old is Putin now?
- 35:59SPEAKER_00: 73.
- 35:59SPEAKER_00: He's almost 74.
- 36:01SPEAKER_00: Now, he could last for another 10 years,
- 36:02SPEAKER_00: but he's starting to sound like he's lost a trick or two if you
- 36:06SPEAKER_01: listen to him.
- 36:08SPEAKER_01: The rambling of an older man, let's say.
- 36:10SPEAKER_01: And we have some familiarity with that.
- 36:11SPEAKER_00: So regardless, there's lots of succession questions in Russia.
- 36:16SPEAKER_00: And one of the top figures who is being sort of talked about as
- 36:21SPEAKER_00: a potential successor, he's not been tapped to be heir.
- 36:24SPEAKER_00: There's many reasons why we shouldn't trust this.
- 36:27SPEAKER_00: But this guy named Alexei Duman, who's 53, a younger guy, he was Putin's bodyguard.
- 36:33SPEAKER_00: He started out as Putin's bodyguard,
- 36:35SPEAKER_00: and then he has since moved through the state in a variety of capacities.
- 36:39SPEAKER_00: He was governor for a time, held different positions elsewhere.
- 36:43SPEAKER_00: Currently,
- 36:43SPEAKER_00: he's the head of the state council,
- 36:45SPEAKER_00: which is a major conciliar advisory body underneath the president.
- 36:49SPEAKER_00: This is a career trajectory of an ambitious elite, right?
- 36:52SPEAKER_00: Who's getting rewarded for good service.
- 36:54SPEAKER_00: He's also being moved around.
- 36:56SPEAKER_00: And that's in principle what you want.
- 36:59SPEAKER_00: And one of Russia's problems today,
- 37:00SPEAKER_00: contemporary Russia's difficulties is that that hasn't been happening in a lot
- 37:05SPEAKER_00: of positions.
- 37:06SPEAKER_00: There are the Russian equivalent of boomers who have been sitting
- 37:10SPEAKER_00: in key upper tier offices for 15 years.
- 37:14SPEAKER_00: That's bad.
- 37:14SPEAKER_00: It's bad because there's no fresh blood, right?
- 37:17SPEAKER_00: You don't really want that.
- 37:19SPEAKER_00: It's also bad because it's a blockage at the top.
- 37:22SPEAKER_00: Imagine being a deputy in, let's say, the FSB or something, right?
- 37:27SPEAKER_00: The security services who's trying to rise to the top and
- 37:32SPEAKER_00: a guy named Bortnikov becomes FSB head in the early 2010s.
- 37:36SPEAKER_00: Well, it is 2026.
- 37:38SPEAKER_00: Guess who is still the head of the FSB?
- 37:40SPEAKER_00: A guy named Bortnikov.
- 37:41SPEAKER_00: Same guy.
- 37:43SPEAKER_00: You are still a deputy under him.
- 37:44SPEAKER_00: You haven't moved up.
- 37:45SPEAKER_00: You've just stayed there and gotten old.
- 37:47SPEAKER_00: And imagine that across half of the institutional imperium of Russia's governing bodies.
- 37:54SPEAKER_00: That's a bad thing.
- 37:56SPEAKER_00: And we're starting to see the signs of elite dissatisfaction with that.
- 37:59SPEAKER_01: Just as a side note,
- 38:00SPEAKER_01: this is an interesting problem because I've seen people analyze it
- 38:05SPEAKER_01: as having two different kind of opposite consequences, right?
- 38:08SPEAKER_01: You can talk about it as the system kind of congealing or becoming slower,
- 38:12SPEAKER_01: more sedentary or less dynamic.
- 38:15SPEAKER_01: And at the same time,
- 38:16SPEAKER_01: you can say it's making it in some ways more brittle and more prone
- 38:19SPEAKER_01: to sudden spasmodic change.
- 38:22SPEAKER_01: There's an interesting...
- 38:24SPEAKER_01: Hard to predict quality here.
- 38:26SPEAKER_01: I read Samuel Moyne's book about gerontocracy in America,
- 38:29SPEAKER_01: where he more or less says, not that you can't reconcile his view in your view.
- 38:34SPEAKER_01: I think you can,
- 38:35SPEAKER_01: but he's emphasizing a very different part of the problem,
- 38:37SPEAKER_01: which is that you just get kind of slower and stiffer and less dynamics
- 38:43SPEAKER_01: a society.
- 38:44SPEAKER_01: Whereas you can also see,
- 38:46SPEAKER_01: and maybe this is true for us as well,
- 38:48SPEAKER_01: as the blockage means all that energy has to route elsewhere,
- 38:50SPEAKER_01: potentially in revolutionary outpourings.
- 38:53SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 38:54SPEAKER_00: Which, you know,
- 38:54SPEAKER_00: social revolution doesn't happen that often,
- 38:56SPEAKER_00: but when it happens, it's not fun for anyone.
- 38:59SPEAKER_00: So you want to avoid those things if you can.
- 39:01SPEAKER_01: Tell me a little bit more about Russia today.
- 39:04SPEAKER_01: You've written and analyzed professionally about the war in Ukraine.
- 39:08SPEAKER_01: And I'm curious,
- 39:09SPEAKER_01: we had John Lechner on,
- 39:11SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 39:11SPEAKER_01: last year,
- 39:12SPEAKER_01: who is a great reporter and spent a lot of time in Africa and Syria with
- 39:17SPEAKER_01: the Wagner Group, including under house arrest by the Wagner Group.
- 39:21SPEAKER_01: He was...
- 39:22SPEAKER_01: Very interesting talking about Prigozhin,
- 39:24SPEAKER_01: who was a caterer and rose up through the ranks,
- 39:27SPEAKER_01: not too dissimilar to the bodyguard to governor trajectory,
- 39:32SPEAKER_01: but obviously had a very bloody end.
- 39:35SPEAKER_01: The Wagner group is a pretty interesting case of a power center that is
- 39:38SPEAKER_01: in some ways underneath Putin and in some ways clearly was not fully in control.
- 39:43SPEAKER_01: Russia today, how has the regime learned from the Wagner history?
- 39:48SPEAKER_01: How has it not been able to adjust?
- 39:49SPEAKER_01: How would you describe the moment?
- 39:52SPEAKER_00: Fantastic question in part because it's such a bizarre story,
- 39:56SPEAKER_00: especially to tell in hindsight, right?
- 39:57SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 39:58SPEAKER_00: one day in the summer of 2023,
- 40:01SPEAKER_00: all of a sudden there was a mass military movement by
- 40:05SPEAKER_00: a semi-autonomous mercenary force marching on Moscow in an armed negotiation
- 40:11SPEAKER_00: with Vladimir Putin,
- 40:13SPEAKER_00: president of Russia,
- 40:14SPEAKER_00: over firing his defense minister and chief of the general staff of
- 40:18SPEAKER_00: the Russian armed forces.
- 40:19SPEAKER_00: That then ends.
- 40:21SPEAKER_00: The rebel goes to Belarus and hangs out for a little while under Lukashenko,
- 40:26SPEAKER_00: comes back,
- 40:27SPEAKER_00: starts meeting with African dictators and attending conferences in St.
- 40:30SPEAKER_00: Petersburg, and then two months later has an accident in the sky and is gone.
- 40:36SPEAKER_01: What are the odds?
- 40:37SPEAKER_00: What are the odds?
- 40:37SPEAKER_00: It's bizarre.
- 40:38SPEAKER_00: It's strange.
- 40:39SPEAKER_00: And then, you know, three years later, and it's like it never happened.
- 40:42SPEAKER_00: It's completely bizarre.
- 40:44SPEAKER_00: And we're going to be writing about this and be like, what's going on?
- 40:47SPEAKER_00: But it's very interesting because in principle,
- 40:51SPEAKER_00: One thing that all regimes do,
- 40:53SPEAKER_00: so democracies do this too,
- 40:54SPEAKER_00: but suffice to authoritarian regimes, want to control their military, right?
- 40:59SPEAKER_00: Unless the military is running the show in those military junta sort of cases,
- 41:03SPEAKER_00: you want civilian control of the military.
- 41:06SPEAKER_00: If you read your Samuel Huntington,
- 41:08SPEAKER_00: you will find that civilian control of the military is normative.
- 41:11SPEAKER_00: It is a good thing.
- 41:11SPEAKER_00: We want it.
- 41:12SPEAKER_00: But it also has to be somewhat sensitive,
- 41:15SPEAKER_00: right, to military autonomy, especially policing its own affairs.
- 41:19SPEAKER_00: Things like that.
- 41:19SPEAKER_00: But that's a Huntingtonian aside, and we can always talk
- 41:21SPEAKER_01: more about Sam Huntington later.
- 41:23SPEAKER_01: One of my favorites.
- 41:24SPEAKER_00: However, Russia,
- 41:26SPEAKER_00: and China as well,
- 41:28SPEAKER_00: communist regimes certainly,
- 41:29SPEAKER_00: have very strong traditions of civilian control over the military,
- 41:32SPEAKER_00: precisely to avoid coups, to avoid threat.
- 41:35SPEAKER_00: For communist regimes, there's also ideological loyalty aspects that matter.
- 41:39SPEAKER_00: Russia's not a communist regime,
- 41:40SPEAKER_00: but there's still this legacy of civilian domination over the military.
- 41:44SPEAKER_00: That's all fine and good, but...
- 41:48SPEAKER_00: During the entrepreneurial 2010s,
- 41:50SPEAKER_00: the Russian regime let the Wagner Group under pre-Goshen grow
- 41:54SPEAKER_00: into something quite large,
- 41:56SPEAKER_00: outside the chain of command,
- 41:58SPEAKER_00: the hierarchy of the Russian armed forces directly,
- 42:02SPEAKER_00: therefore outside of the standard civil military order.
- 42:06SPEAKER_00: It was used for political purposes in Africa,
- 42:08SPEAKER_00: in Syria,
- 42:09SPEAKER_00: in And then was redeployed into Ukraine because Wagner seemed to be able
- 42:14SPEAKER_00: to actually produce the mass of men needed and use them on
- 42:19SPEAKER_00: the front line more effectively than other operational commanders at the time.
- 42:24SPEAKER_00: This further increases the autonomy of Wagner because now there are tens
- 42:30SPEAKER_00: of thousands of armed soldiers under Prigozhin's direct command.
- 42:34SPEAKER_00: And the way he ran Wagner...
- 42:35SPEAKER_00: There was a bit of a cult of personality, right?
- 42:37SPEAKER_00: The sense that you're really fighting for pre-Goshen.
- 42:41SPEAKER_00: This proved to be very,
- 42:42SPEAKER_00: very dangerous because when you have semi-autonomous armed warlords,
- 42:48SPEAKER_00: they are going to involve themselves in politics in the country.
- 42:52SPEAKER_00: And that is indeed what pre-Goshen did.
- 42:55SPEAKER_00: It turned out poorly for him.
- 42:57SPEAKER_00: In our report at the CNA,
- 43:00SPEAKER_00: the Center for Naval Analysis,
- 43:01SPEAKER_00: where I work in the Russia Studies program,
- 43:03SPEAKER_00: we have a big report on civil-military relations in Russia, came out a year ago.
- 43:10SPEAKER_00: We call Prigozian a political military baron, right?
- 43:15SPEAKER_00: Someone who exists outside that formal hierarchy,
- 43:18SPEAKER_00: who has sufficient autonomy to both act militarily in an autonomous fashion,
- 43:24SPEAKER_00: but also act politically in a subordinate
- 43:26SPEAKER_01: autonomous fashion.
- 43:28SPEAKER_01: The only other close comparison
- 43:29SPEAKER_00: in Russia is the dictator of Chechnya,
- 43:33SPEAKER_00: Ramzan Kadyrov,
- 43:34SPEAKER_00: who has governed Chechnya as sort of a fiefdom or a feudal state with
- 43:40SPEAKER_00: a direct connection to Putin.
- 43:41SPEAKER_00: So Kadyrov and Putin have a personal patron-client relationship that bypasses all
- 43:46SPEAKER_00: the institutions of the Russian Federation,
- 43:49SPEAKER_00: so much so that the FSB is officially not allowed to investigate or engage
- 43:54SPEAKER_00: in any activities inside of Chechnya.
- 43:57SPEAKER_00: It's this informal part of the deal to keep Chechnya safe, secure, and quiet.
- 44:04SPEAKER_00: There's no terrorism.
- 44:06SPEAKER_00: There's no separatism.
- 44:07SPEAKER_00: There's nothing.
- 44:09SPEAKER_00: Prigozhin had also a personal,
- 44:12SPEAKER_00: feudal sort of relationship with Putin and with a few people around Putin
- 44:16SPEAKER_00: because he was a fixer.
- 44:18SPEAKER_00: And he was a fixer at a mass level,
- 44:20SPEAKER_00: at a political level involving the armed forces and involving coercive violence.
- 44:25SPEAKER_00: That, however,
- 44:26SPEAKER_00: turns out is a really bad model because you get things like the March on Moscow
- 44:30SPEAKER_00: to negotiate over personnel politics, right?
- 44:34SPEAKER_00: Unsurprisingly, the Russians have learned that that's a bad idea.
- 44:37SPEAKER_00: They haven't fully gotten away from the sort of private military contractor structures.
- 44:43SPEAKER_00: They do still exist.
- 44:46SPEAKER_00: A shoe that's never dropped and it might not is the fact that a variety of governors
- 44:50SPEAKER_00: and large state-owned companies have their own militias now.
- 44:54SPEAKER_00: We speculated that Under a different political situation,
- 44:58SPEAKER_00: it's possible that those also might develop into these sort of small baronies,
- 45:02SPEAKER_00: at least of semi-autonomy capacity for autonomous violence.
- 45:06SPEAKER_00: That hasn't happened in part because the FSB and military intelligence figured out
- 45:12SPEAKER_00: that they have
- 45:13SPEAKER_01: to control this stuff much more directly.
- 45:15SPEAKER_00: So this is a successful case of regime resilience.
- 45:18SPEAKER_00: The regime had this massive blow up.
- 45:20SPEAKER_00: It solved the problem and it hasn't had it since.
- 45:24SPEAKER_00: And nobody is close to where pre-Ocean was in terms of autonomous power.
- 45:28SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 45:28SPEAKER_00: the last one I'll say,
- 45:29SPEAKER_00: it's something that's not Well known is that pre-Gosian in
- 45:34SPEAKER_00: the immediate months prior to the rebellion,
- 45:38SPEAKER_00: right in this armed negotiations,
- 45:39SPEAKER_00: not a coup,
- 45:40SPEAKER_00: it was armed negotiation that went south because it was dumb,
- 45:43SPEAKER_00: but that doesn't matter.
- 45:44SPEAKER_00: People make dumb decisions,
- 45:45SPEAKER_00: especially when they have autonomy and they can do things, they do do things, right?
- 45:51SPEAKER_00: What's not well reported is that as the walls were kind of closing in on Prigozhin
- 45:55SPEAKER_00: in the months prior,
- 45:56SPEAKER_00: the Ministry of Defense was changing the contract terms for Wagner soldiers.
- 46:00SPEAKER_00: They were still withholding ammunition, all this sorts of stuff.
- 46:03SPEAKER_00: There was a sense that Prigozhin was on the ropes and he was going to lose his autonomy, right?
- 46:07SPEAKER_00: Lose his access to coercive force of a large scale.
- 46:11SPEAKER_00: He started talking with politicians in Moscow among
- 46:14SPEAKER_00: the co-opted loyalist opposition parties in the country,
- 46:18SPEAKER_00: a party called a Just Russia,
- 46:20SPEAKER_00: a party called the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia,
- 46:22SPEAKER_00: which is, of
- 46:22SPEAKER_01: course, neither liberal nor democratic.
- 46:24SPEAKER_00: But that's a separate topic.
- 46:26SPEAKER_00: He started talking with politicians.
- 46:29SPEAKER_00: There was a plan to have a committee hearing and a presentation in the State Duma,
- 46:34SPEAKER_00: in the parliament.
- 46:35SPEAKER_00: Castigating the defense minister and the chief of the general staff.
- 46:41SPEAKER_00: And there were rumors,
- 46:42SPEAKER_00: and these are like telegram level rumors,
- 46:44SPEAKER_00: that Prigozhin was
- 46:46SPEAKER_01: going to support one of these parties in upcoming elections.
- 46:49SPEAKER_00: All of this is to say that when you give people...
- 46:55SPEAKER_00: That degree of military autonomy, coercive autonomy, they act on it.
- 46:59SPEAKER_00: And in these regimes where otherwise Russia,
- 47:01SPEAKER_00: personalist dictatorship,
- 47:03SPEAKER_00: very closed,
- 47:03SPEAKER_00: very authoritarian,
- 47:05SPEAKER_00: still has these buttons and knobs that exist when an entrepreneurial actor sort
- 47:11SPEAKER_00: of gets out of line and things can go off the rails.
- 47:14SPEAKER_01: Maybe there's one more question here before we move on.
- 47:16SPEAKER_01: Is this general problem,
- 47:19SPEAKER_01: as you point out in democracies and authoritarian regimes alike,
- 47:22SPEAKER_01: of who watches the watchers?
- 47:24SPEAKER_01: How do you control the people who have control of violence?
- 47:27SPEAKER_01: And you can see this in Russian history as well with the NKVD.
- 47:32SPEAKER_01: If you go back a ways,
- 47:33SPEAKER_01: and I'm thinking about this because I recently rewatched The Death of Stalin,
- 47:36SPEAKER_01: which is a really excellent movie.
- 47:38SPEAKER_01: But anytime you have fixers or enforcers In some ways, you face aversion to this problem.
- 47:44SPEAKER_01: So what is the thoughtful authoritarian to do about the fact that you need
- 47:48SPEAKER_01: to have somebody who can exercise violence for you?
- 47:51SPEAKER_01: And especially if you're a more brutal authoritarian,
- 47:54SPEAKER_01: you might need them to have a lot of ability to exercise violence.
- 47:57SPEAKER_00: There's a few solutions.
- 47:58SPEAKER_00: Let's say the safest solution, most common as well, is what we call coup-proofing.
- 48:05SPEAKER_00: Coup-proofing is where you have multiple coercive organizations
- 48:10SPEAKER_00: that can check each other and are distrustful of each other such
- 48:14SPEAKER_00: that no one organization is either powerful enough to think about overthrowing you
- 48:19SPEAKER_00: or to just aggrandize power for itself.
- 48:22SPEAKER_00: And that you kind of have this market that you can manipulate from the top
- 48:27SPEAKER_00: and balance differing coercive organizations.
- 48:30SPEAKER_00: So sometimes this is you balance a regular military with a paramilitary organization, right?
- 48:38SPEAKER_00: Or in other cases,
- 48:40SPEAKER_00: especially in less developed countries,
- 48:42SPEAKER_00: you're balancing a formal security service with tribal groups
- 48:45SPEAKER_00: that have their own access to autonomous violence and have personal connections to
- 48:49SPEAKER_00: the top, right?
- 48:50SPEAKER_00: Libya is a good example.
- 48:51SPEAKER_01: There's a variety of African cases that also fit this model.
- 48:55SPEAKER_00: If you're a more developed institutionalized regime,
- 48:59SPEAKER_00: you tend to have a little bit more hierarchical authority and control,
- 49:02SPEAKER_00: but still you are going to want to balance your security factions.
- 49:05SPEAKER_00: You're going to want to balance intelligence groups.
- 49:08SPEAKER_00: Ideally, you have more than one and they have strict delimitations on what they can do.
- 49:13SPEAKER_00: To go back to Russia right now,
- 49:15SPEAKER_00: one interesting distinction that we've noticed since
- 49:17SPEAKER_00: the wartime period is how much power the FSB,
- 49:21SPEAKER_00: the internal security services, have aggrandized.
- 49:23SPEAKER_00: They are now running around arresting governors and mayors pretty much at will,
- 49:28SPEAKER_00: arresting people in the business community.
- 49:29SPEAKER_00: Sometimes they're doing it for corrupt reasons.
- 49:31SPEAKER_00: Sometimes they're doing it as anti-corruption purges.
- 49:34SPEAKER_00: And this has raised significant tensions because it reneges on the deal that
- 49:38SPEAKER_00: if you are a loyal servant of the regime, if you don't Right.
- 49:42SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 49:42SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 50:02SPEAKER_00: Mostly.
- 50:03SPEAKER_00: And so when you break down that elite contract,
- 50:06SPEAKER_00: elites get really nervous and you don't want nervous elites,
- 50:09SPEAKER_00: which is something that's happening right now.
- 50:10SPEAKER_00: It's actually quite dangerous for the regime internally as this degree of elite discontent.
- 50:15SPEAKER_00: Discontent with what we were talking earlier,
- 50:17SPEAKER_00: generational change, the lack of change at the top.
- 50:19SPEAKER_00: Discontent with a war that doesn't seem to be ending.
- 50:21SPEAKER_00: Discontent with an economy that's stagnant at best.
- 50:25SPEAKER_00: And discontent with the sense that the internal security services have been sort
- 50:28SPEAKER_00: of pulled off the leash.
- 50:30SPEAKER_00: That's all bad.
- 50:31SPEAKER_00: Connoisseurs.
- 50:49SPEAKER_00: Exactly, right?
- 50:49SPEAKER_00: Like the party solves so many things, Santi,
- 50:52SPEAKER_00: and the party can be more or less ideological,
- 50:54SPEAKER_00: but that is the traditional way to do it.
- 50:57SPEAKER_00: In China today, for example, there are party cells at every institutional level.
- 51:02SPEAKER_00: There's party cells at all levels of the military.
- 51:05SPEAKER_00: There's party cells inside intelligence apparatus.
- 51:08SPEAKER_00: There's party cells in schools, right?
- 51:10SPEAKER_00: There's a part of a member of the party elite that is informing on everyone in every classroom.
- 51:16SPEAKER_00: That's how these sorts of regimes solve that problem.
- 51:20SPEAKER_00: They don't do coup proofing in the same way.
- 51:22SPEAKER_00: They have this overwhelming quasi totalitarian approach of this full fusion
- 51:28SPEAKER_01: of party organized state power into society.
- 51:33SPEAKER_01: Let me ask you about how you transition out of an authoritarian regime and Part of
- 51:39SPEAKER_01: the interest here is driven obviously by events in Venezuela recently,
- 51:44SPEAKER_01: by events that may or may not be occurring in Cuba,
- 51:48SPEAKER_01: and honestly initially in Iran where the US has tried a different approach
- 51:53SPEAKER_01: to transitioning or changing regimes that are opposed to US interests.
- 52:00SPEAKER_01: Taking just the top off,
- 52:01SPEAKER_01: taking just a little bit off the top and leaving the power structure of the regime.
- 52:05SPEAKER_01: And I think you can argue as a former colleague has argued that this is
- 52:10SPEAKER_01: in large part just due to technological shifts, that it's easier than ever to...
- 52:15SPEAKER_01: Do decapitations or assassinations or at least easier than it was in the 20th century.
- 52:19SPEAKER_01: And part of the reason that we didn't do this so much in the 20th century
- 52:21SPEAKER_01: and had normative prohibitions on assassinating world leaders was
- 52:24SPEAKER_01: because it was hard.
- 52:25SPEAKER_01: And so, you know,
- 52:26SPEAKER_01: we tried many times to kill Fidel Castro with blowing up cigars and it didn't work.
- 52:30SPEAKER_01: So we just claim we're not going to do that anymore.
- 52:33SPEAKER_01: What's the account of that new mode of trying to switch over a regime?
- 52:39SPEAKER_01: It's not really regime change in the Venezuela case.
- 52:42SPEAKER_01: It's kind of conspicuously not.
- 52:43SPEAKER_01: So what is it?
- 52:45SPEAKER_00: I mean, there's like 17 questions there, right?
- 52:48SPEAKER_00: They're all fantastic.
- 52:50SPEAKER_00: We'll do the abstract stuff really quickly.
- 52:52SPEAKER_00: And then I do, I want to get to Venezuela because it's fascinating.
- 52:54SPEAKER_00: And actually Iran, because it's very frustrating in a similar way.
- 52:58SPEAKER_00: But so at the abstract,
- 52:59SPEAKER_00: I'll be asking about how do you transition out of an authoritarian regime
- 53:02SPEAKER_00: or how does it end?
- 53:02SPEAKER_00: Or how do we get the nice, happy rainbows and unicorns demolished?
- 53:05SPEAKER_00: Yes, that is my question.
- 53:09SPEAKER_00: We all want to get to end of history to besmirch the good Francis Fukuyama.
- 53:13SPEAKER_00: How do we do that?
- 53:15SPEAKER_00: In the popular mind,
- 53:16SPEAKER_00: it's often revolution,
- 53:19SPEAKER_00: revolt, democratic protest that leads to sudden regime change.
- 53:22SPEAKER_00: That's because every now and again, there are waves of that happening.
- 53:26SPEAKER_00: The fall of communism in Eastern Europe is the big example.
- 53:28SPEAKER_00: It's Fantastic.
- 53:30SPEAKER_00: And it's really wonderful.
- 53:31SPEAKER_00: And it turned out so well relative
- 53:32SPEAKER_00: to basically every other wave that's ever happened of democracy.
- 53:37SPEAKER_00: Many of those countries are still democracies.
- 53:39SPEAKER_00: Not most, but many, which is great.
- 53:40SPEAKER_00: That's a good track record.
- 53:41SPEAKER_01: That's better than the Arab Spring where
- 53:43SPEAKER_00: they all failed.
- 53:44SPEAKER_01: Of course.
- 53:44SPEAKER_01: And some of them are doing just better than their Western European democratic compatriots.
- 53:49SPEAKER_00: They seem like more stable and secure regimes.
- 53:51SPEAKER_00: We have this nice story and it's true sometimes, but it's only true sometimes.
- 53:55SPEAKER_00: And actually one of the big takeaways when you actually dive into Trying
- 53:59SPEAKER_00: to make comparisons and show patterns is that temporal differences are really,
- 54:04SPEAKER_00: really big.
- 54:05SPEAKER_00: That it's just not the same what's going on in the 80s is going on in the 2010s
- 54:09SPEAKER_00: or is going on in the 30s or something like that.
- 54:11SPEAKER_00: We can't make full just sort of blanket comparisons,
- 54:15SPEAKER_00: but bracketing aside revolution,
- 54:18SPEAKER_00: popular overthrow,
- 54:19SPEAKER_00: things like that, which don't often happen and often are not successful.
- 54:23SPEAKER_00: There are a few ways to do this.
- 54:24SPEAKER_00: One is called the pacted transition.
- 54:27SPEAKER_00: The pacted transition comes from the Latin American experience in the 1980s primarily.
- 54:32SPEAKER_00: It's the idea that you have a authoritarian regime,
- 54:37SPEAKER_00: but for a variety of reasons,
- 54:38SPEAKER_00: usually social unrest and some elite discontent, there is a view towards reform.
- 54:44SPEAKER_00: And it's often undergirded by a sense that the economy is not doing particularly well.
- 54:47SPEAKER_00: So think Brazil, think Argentina, places like that.
- 54:51SPEAKER_00: And what you end up getting is you kind of have this model where if you divide
- 54:56SPEAKER_00: the regime into what the literature calls hardliners and softliners,
- 55:01SPEAKER_00: those who want everything to stay the same and those who want reform,
- 55:04SPEAKER_00: and then you divide society into the sort of soft opposition and
- 55:08SPEAKER_00: the hard opposition.
- 55:09SPEAKER_00: Those who want massive super overthrow often are very ideological.
- 55:14SPEAKER_00: In Latin American case, they tend to be communists or socialists.
- 55:17SPEAKER_00: And then the softer opposition.
- 55:19SPEAKER_00: You could call them liberals.
- 55:20SPEAKER_00: They're not always liberals, whatever.
- 55:22SPEAKER_00: And the key to a pacted transition in the classic model is that the soft liners
- 55:27SPEAKER_00: at top and the soft opposition at the bottom negotiate with each other,
- 55:32SPEAKER_00: isolate the other two, and sort of push them aside and keep them out of it.
- 55:37SPEAKER_00: And you have this slow negotiation.
- 55:39SPEAKER_00: Where gradually you introduce freer and fairer elections,
- 55:44SPEAKER_00: gradually that opposition comes to take ministerial positions in the government,
- 55:49SPEAKER_00: and you have usually guarantees to the regime elites,
- 55:54SPEAKER_00: the people who are running the government,
- 55:55SPEAKER_00: that they will not be prosecuted for their crimes
- 55:58SPEAKER_01: or for any potential crimes.
- 55:59SPEAKER_00: So again, it happens in a variety of Latin American cases.
- 56:02SPEAKER_00: Chile is a famous one.
- 56:03SPEAKER_00: There's a little complicated history there with a Pinochet's referendum,
- 56:07SPEAKER_00: but we'll put that aside for now.
- 56:09SPEAKER_00: The general model applies.
- 56:10SPEAKER_00: This idea that you don't have violent overthrow.
- 56:13SPEAKER_00: You don't throw all the bums out immediately.
- 56:16SPEAKER_00: You have this negotiation.
- 56:18SPEAKER_00: It can take multiple years and nobody's super thrilled, right?
- 56:24SPEAKER_00: The corrupt bad guys are still kicking around.
- 56:26SPEAKER_00: They might even be elected into parliament later on or could become president in a decade.
- 56:31SPEAKER_01: I'm half Argentine,
- 56:32SPEAKER_01: and there's a book that I remember very vividly,
- 56:35SPEAKER_01: a woman talking about her experience in a dirty war,
- 56:38SPEAKER_01: including being tortured,
- 56:39SPEAKER_01: and then much later in Buenos Aires,
- 56:40SPEAKER_01: she's on a bus,
- 56:42SPEAKER_01: and she realizes that the cross of a real newspaper is one of her former torturers,
- 56:45SPEAKER_01: because as part of this uneasy transition to democracy, we've let those people off.
- 56:51SPEAKER_01: Not everybody's thrilled.
- 56:53SPEAKER_01: No, and not everyone should be thrilled.
- 56:54SPEAKER_00: And we shouldn't model it as if suddenly everything goes away once this happens.
- 56:58SPEAKER_00: That's not how that works.
- 56:59SPEAKER_00: That's not how life works.
- 57:00SPEAKER_00: Some people have this idea that you're going to get these truth
- 57:03SPEAKER_00: and reconciliation commissions where there's Nuremberg-style trials
- 57:07SPEAKER_00: or there's post-apartheid South Africa-style.
- 57:11SPEAKER_01: Those are the two common references.
- 57:12SPEAKER_00: Yeah, exactly.
- 57:13SPEAKER_00: And usually if those happen,
- 57:15SPEAKER_00: they're happening decades later and they're happening after
- 57:18SPEAKER_00: the new political system has been kind of consolidated.
- 57:20SPEAKER_00: In most cases, people are just unhappy and have to deal with it.
- 57:23SPEAKER_00: That's been the Latin American experience anyway.
- 57:25SPEAKER_00: But it works.
- 57:27SPEAKER_00: And all those regimes transition to democracy and have had rough politics,
- 57:33SPEAKER_00: but they've had electoral democratic politics for 30 plus years.
- 57:37SPEAKER_00: And so if that's your outcome, that's a good outcome.
- 57:39SPEAKER_00: So that's a pacted transition.
- 58:02SPEAKER_00: Of the regime apex,
- 58:03SPEAKER_00: literally arresting the president in a special operations event
- 58:07SPEAKER_00: that goes off incredibly well.
- 58:10SPEAKER_01: I believe he's like down the street from me here in a jail in Brooklyn.
- 58:13SPEAKER_01: He's like, it's crazy.
- 58:15SPEAKER_00: It's nuts.
- 58:15SPEAKER_00: It's completely nuts.
- 58:16SPEAKER_00: It totally worked.
- 58:18SPEAKER_00: And it helps that the Venezuela is very poor, very weak.
- 58:23SPEAKER_00: And the political elite surrounding Maduro didn't like him all that much, which helped.
- 58:27SPEAKER_00: And they're also very, very, very corrupt, which also helps.
- 58:30SPEAKER_01: Great.
- 58:30SPEAKER_01: You can buy off a lot of people.
- 58:32SPEAKER_00: Right, so we have this kind of moment where Venezuela's under
- 58:37SPEAKER_00: a de facto vice royalty run out of Marco Rubio's cell phone,
- 58:41SPEAKER_00: connected directly to the people who were previously just under Maduro.
- 58:47SPEAKER_00: And there's lots of talk in Venezuela about a future political transition of some sort.
- 58:53SPEAKER_00: And the State Department is saying the same thing, but the point is to not do it too early.
- 58:57SPEAKER_00: That sounds to me a lot like using the pacted transition model Just coerced from
- 59:03SPEAKER_00: the outside of taking away the top, the linchpin of the system.
- 59:08SPEAKER_00: You increase that sense of vulnerability from people like Delcy Rodriguez,
- 59:13SPEAKER_00: who's currently running the show.
- 59:14SPEAKER_00: A few other figures also in the old Maduro regime negotiating directly with the U.S.
- 59:20SPEAKER_00: The U.S.
- 59:21SPEAKER_00: is signaling extremely strongly that they don't want
- 59:24SPEAKER_00: the classic exiled Venezuelan opposition from Venezuela.
- 59:28SPEAKER_00: Creating social discontent or running too hard, right?
- 59:31SPEAKER_00: The US has been very, very clear about that.
- 59:34SPEAKER_00: That all speaks to this model of trying to manage it slowly,
- 59:37SPEAKER_00: keeping the old authoritarian elites in power for a time,
- 59:41SPEAKER_00: but making it very clear to them that the shadow of the future is coming and
- 59:45SPEAKER_00: the expectation is going to have to be some sort of inclusion, but it'll take years.
- 59:50SPEAKER_00: That's the model.
- 59:51SPEAKER_00: If I'm advising the State Department, I would say, That's not a bad way to look at it.
- 59:56SPEAKER_00: It's much better than purging everyone immediately, doing debathification.
- 1:00:00SPEAKER_00: It's also much better than trying to force the exiled opposition
- 1:00:04SPEAKER_00: into government immediately,
- 1:00:05SPEAKER_00: who are both untried,
- 1:00:06SPEAKER_00: untested,
- 1:00:07SPEAKER_00: but also don't actually have control over the coercive apparatus of
- 1:00:10SPEAKER_00: the Venezuelan state, which is still largely in the old regime's hands.
- 1:00:15SPEAKER_00: So you have to manage it.
- 1:00:17SPEAKER_01: You'll know more about this than me,
- 1:00:18SPEAKER_01: and I don't want to spend too long on this,
- 1:00:20SPEAKER_01: but one counterpoint that you could make is to say, okay, how about this?
- 1:00:27SPEAKER_01: The exiled opposition has massive popular support,
- 1:00:31SPEAKER_01: and in a fair election would have won by an absolute landslide.
- 1:00:35SPEAKER_01: Isn't the argument that those folks are making as they're being locked out by
- 1:00:39SPEAKER_01: the U.S. from returning and attempting to take power, We can handle it.
- 1:00:44SPEAKER_01: We don't need to slow walk this.
- 1:00:46SPEAKER_01: Actually, the vast majority of the country would be very happy to see us in office tomorrow.
- 1:00:51SPEAKER_01: What gives?
- 1:00:52SPEAKER_01: What's wrong with that from a pact of transition standpoint?
- 1:00:54SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I mean, it's a reasonable counterpoint.
- 1:00:56SPEAKER_00: I think it's perfectly acceptable as sort of an answer.
- 1:00:59SPEAKER_00: But the idea undergirding it is that popular support is so pervasive
- 1:01:04SPEAKER_00: that there'll be sort of a cascade in favor, even among regime bureaucrats.
- 1:01:09SPEAKER_00: And most importantly,
- 1:01:10SPEAKER_00: in the army,
- 1:01:11SPEAKER_00: in the security services,
- 1:01:14SPEAKER_00: in the paramilitary organizations that the regime has put together
- 1:01:17SPEAKER_00: through its patch image network.
- 1:01:18SPEAKER_00: So we had to take into account that all those things still exist, right?
- 1:01:22SPEAKER_00: They exist because we didn't invade the country,
- 1:01:25SPEAKER_00: we didn't destroy the government,
- 1:01:26SPEAKER_00: and there was not a popular
- 1:01:28SPEAKER_01: revolution or what
- 1:01:30SPEAKER_00: have you.
- 1:01:31SPEAKER_00: As a result,
- 1:01:32SPEAKER_00: they can be as popular as they want,
- 1:01:33SPEAKER_00: but if people start shooting voters in the street,
- 1:01:36SPEAKER_00: for example,
- 1:01:37SPEAKER_00: or if an election happens and the regime bars the door and doesn't let them in
- 1:01:43SPEAKER_00: or something like that, it doesn't matter all that much.
- 1:01:46SPEAKER_00: And so, I mean, the U.S. could gamble that way.
- 1:01:47SPEAKER_00: I think that's possible.
- 1:01:49SPEAKER_00: That's been our traditional model in sub-Saharan Africa
- 1:01:53SPEAKER_00: for development purposes is just hold an election.
- 1:01:56SPEAKER_00: Just hold an election and we'll be fine.
- 1:01:58SPEAKER_00: The packet transition model says the opposite.
- 1:02:00SPEAKER_00: It says first transition some of that opposition into government and then hold
- 1:02:05SPEAKER_00: an election so that they already have some power.
- 1:02:08SPEAKER_00: And in principle, that's the next step.
- 1:02:10SPEAKER_00: The next step has to be bringing in some of the exiled opposition into the ministries.
- 1:02:16SPEAKER_00: We haven't seen that yet.
- 1:02:17SPEAKER_00: So I can't say if that's the next policy plan, but that's what I would recommend.
- 1:02:23SPEAKER_00: Because then you can say that it's no longer the opposition.
- 1:02:26SPEAKER_00: It's now the civilian pro-democratic politicians in government.
- 1:02:32SPEAKER_00: And we want to then confirm them in a future election, which should be beneficial for stability.
- 1:02:38SPEAKER_00: What we've seen in African context is the opposite.
- 1:02:40SPEAKER_00: You hold an election,
- 1:02:42SPEAKER_00: the regime wins,
- 1:02:43SPEAKER_00: or it sort of creates a very fragmented parliament, and what's next?
- 1:02:47SPEAKER_00: A coup.
- 1:02:50SPEAKER_01: Vain of questioning Julian here is I
- 1:02:53SPEAKER_00: want to come to
- 1:02:53SPEAKER_00: the American context
- 1:02:55SPEAKER_01: or let's say the Western liberal democratic context more broadly.
- 1:02:58SPEAKER_01: Recently,
- 1:02:59SPEAKER_01: we had on the show Dean Will Howell of the Johns Hopkins School of Government
- 1:03:03SPEAKER_01: and Policy and his co-author for a book,
- 1:03:05SPEAKER_01: The Strongman Presidency, political scientist Terry Moe.
- 1:03:08SPEAKER_01: As you can tell from the title of the book,
- 1:03:09SPEAKER_01: A Strongman Presidency,
- 1:03:11SPEAKER_01: it was about the American presidency and the trend over the last
- 1:03:14SPEAKER_01: at least half century
- 1:03:19SPEAKER_01: They and I went back and forth
- 1:03:21SPEAKER_01: on how much authoritarian risk you can describe there being in our American context.
- 1:03:27SPEAKER_01: What's your perspective?
- 1:03:30SPEAKER_00: Well, let's put it this way.
- 1:03:32SPEAKER_00: The authoritarian threat to the United States comes if elections stop being free
- 1:03:37SPEAKER_00: and fair, right?
- 1:03:38SPEAKER_00: That's the big thing.
- 1:03:39SPEAKER_00: If we're no longer choosing our leaders because there's systemic pervasive bias
- 1:03:44SPEAKER_00: in elections, Such that we can no longer reasonably contest power.
- 1:03:49SPEAKER_00: There's no longer reasonable uncertainty over who becomes president,
- 1:03:52SPEAKER_00: over what the Congress looks like.
- 1:03:54SPEAKER_00: Then we become an electoral authoritarian regime if we want to stick by these classifications.
- 1:03:59SPEAKER_00: Does a strong president do that inherently?
- 1:04:02SPEAKER_00: No, absolutely not.
- 1:04:03SPEAKER_00: Of course not.
- 1:04:04SPEAKER_00: Part of the pro case that centralized power under a presidency is dangerous comes
- 1:04:12SPEAKER_00: from comparative cases in Latin America primarily.
- 1:04:16SPEAKER_00: Where strong presidents ended up either pursuing self-coups,
- 1:04:21SPEAKER_00: auto-gulpes, or otherwise seizing power, controlling elections.
- 1:04:26SPEAKER_00: And so there's this something that political scientists have called the peril
- 1:04:29SPEAKER_00: of presidentialism.
- 1:04:30SPEAKER_00: And the fundamental deal with the peril of presidentialism isn't actually just
- 1:04:36SPEAKER_00: the concentration of power, although it involves that.
- 1:04:39SPEAKER_00: It's not just how powerful the president is.
- 1:04:41SPEAKER_00: That's again, power and authority is not quite the issue.
- 1:04:44SPEAKER_00: The issue is that the president and the legislature are separately elected.
- 1:04:49SPEAKER_00: Therefore, they have separate claims to legitimacy from the population.
- 1:04:54SPEAKER_00: And the president has a superior claim because only he was actually elected by
- 1:05:01SPEAKER_00: the entire country.
- 1:05:03SPEAKER_00: Everyone else in the legislature was elected in a district or was elected from
- 1:05:06SPEAKER_00: a party on a list or something like that.
- 1:05:10SPEAKER_00: And so the parallel of presidentialism is the fact that inherently the president and
- 1:05:15SPEAKER_00: the legislature will fight each other because they're independently elected.
- 1:05:18SPEAKER_00: The legislature doesn't elect the president like in a parliamentary system
- 1:05:22SPEAKER_00: where it elects the prime minister.
- 1:05:23SPEAKER_00: So they're going to fight.
- 1:05:25SPEAKER_00: You could imagine having one party in the presidency and one party in
- 1:05:28SPEAKER_00: the legislature and the president will be able to say that I am
- 1:05:32SPEAKER_00: the true representation of the people's will.
- 1:05:35SPEAKER_00: That's the real parallel of presidentialism.
- 1:05:37SPEAKER_00: It's this idea that under executive legislative contestation,
- 1:05:42SPEAKER_00: really hardball politics that could really spiral out of control,
- 1:05:46SPEAKER_00: the president will always win.
- 1:05:47SPEAKER_00: That's the idea.
- 1:05:48SPEAKER_00: It's not about does the president have a lot of authority or power
- 1:05:52SPEAKER_00: or constitutional protections.
- 1:05:55SPEAKER_00: It's this specified structural aspect.
- 1:05:58SPEAKER_01: If that's the case,
- 1:05:59SPEAKER_01: you might agree with our liberal critics of the process that got us to Trump in that
- 1:06:05SPEAKER_01: The current admin does speak that way about President Trump's legitimacy.
- 1:06:09SPEAKER_01: As you point out, this is not just a Trumpian phenomenon.
- 1:06:12SPEAKER_01: The president in any regime or any system has this claim.
- 1:06:16SPEAKER_01: So why not be, on your own terms, spooked about the perils of presidentialism here?
- 1:06:21SPEAKER_00: I'm not really spooked by it.
- 1:06:23SPEAKER_00: I mean, executive legislative contestation is inevitable,
- 1:06:27SPEAKER_00: and it can be part of a healthy process.
- 1:06:28SPEAKER_00: Just like obstruction can be part of a healthy political process, right?
- 1:06:33SPEAKER_00: You don't want everything flowing too smoothly.
- 1:06:35SPEAKER_00: The question is always, it's this qualitative, when does it fall off the rails?
- 1:06:39SPEAKER_00: When does the president close down the legislature?
- 1:06:43SPEAKER_00: That's what happens in these Latin American contexts is that the president is going
- 1:06:47SPEAKER_00: to shut it down or coerce the legislative branch.
- 1:06:52SPEAKER_00: We're just not seeing that at all in the US case.
- 1:06:55SPEAKER_00: We have hardball politics, but hardball politics within constitutional norms.
- 1:07:00SPEAKER_00: We have very competitive elections.
- 1:07:03SPEAKER_00: We have elections at multiple levels,
- 1:07:04SPEAKER_00: not only for the president and the legislature,
- 1:07:07SPEAKER_00: also for governors, also for state legislatures.
- 1:07:11SPEAKER_00: We have all sorts of contestation all the time.
- 1:07:14SPEAKER_00: We have an incredibly pluralistic media.
- 1:07:16SPEAKER_00: All of these point to democratic politics.
- 1:07:19SPEAKER_00: But here's the trick.
- 1:07:21SPEAKER_00: People don't always like democratic politics.
- 1:07:24SPEAKER_00: That's actually the real problem is people want their side to win, right?
- 1:07:28SPEAKER_00: And so the peril of democracy is when people,
- 1:07:33SPEAKER_00: frankly,
- 1:07:33SPEAKER_00: get too discontented with the other side
- 1:07:35SPEAKER_00: and don't think there are institutional routes or solutions.
- 1:07:39SPEAKER_00: And that can get us into very interesting places.
- 1:07:42SPEAKER_01: You describe the polarization and the institutional mistrust,
- 1:07:46SPEAKER_01: et cetera, as a rather separate bucket from the concern about a specific presidency.
- 1:07:53SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 1:07:53SPEAKER_00: Well, and polarization can actually be quite useful sometimes, right?
- 1:07:56SPEAKER_00: Because it provides a natural check-in.
- 1:07:58SPEAKER_00: Creates antibodies.
- 1:07:59SPEAKER_00: Right, yeah.
- 1:08:00SPEAKER_00: Well, it's also motivation, right?
- 1:08:02SPEAKER_00: Because oftentimes when we actually see a transition to an authoritarian regime from
- 1:08:08SPEAKER_00: an electoral democracy,
- 1:08:10SPEAKER_01: you've heard the term democratic backsliding before.
- 1:08:13SPEAKER_00: You've heard this idea of like the centralization of power and aggrandizement
- 1:08:18SPEAKER_00: of power by the executive,
- 1:08:20SPEAKER_00: either a prime minister or president, and it's gradual, right?
- 1:08:24SPEAKER_00: It's always discussed in this sort of gradual mean.
- 1:08:28SPEAKER_00: The part that they don't tell you is that for all that to happen,
- 1:08:31SPEAKER_00: you have to have super majorities in the institutions, right?
- 1:08:34SPEAKER_00: You can't just be the president.
- 1:08:36SPEAKER_00: You need to control the legislature fully.
- 1:08:38SPEAKER_00: You need to be able to make constitutional changes.
- 1:08:41SPEAKER_00: You need to be able to ensure that you can pack all the institutions
- 1:08:45SPEAKER_00: with your loyalists and supporters.
- 1:08:47SPEAKER_00: That actually takes a lot of work, and polarization prevents that from happening.
- 1:08:51SPEAKER_00: When leaders get elected in democracies of whatever quality and they
- 1:08:57SPEAKER_00: then autocratize, think Russia, think Turkey, think Hungary, right?
- 1:09:03SPEAKER_00: These leaders portray themselves essentially as centrists to some degree,
- 1:09:07SPEAKER_00: maybe not full ideological centrists,
- 1:09:10SPEAKER_00: but they argue that they represent the broader nation or they represent stability.
- 1:09:15SPEAKER_00: They represent consensus.
- 1:09:17SPEAKER_00: They represent the average person.
- 1:09:19SPEAKER_00: And at least for their first few elections, that's usually borne out.
- 1:09:23SPEAKER_00: The voter is usually voting for some sort of stability,
- 1:09:27SPEAKER_00: is usually voting for Some form of sitting not at the extremes, right?
- 1:09:33SPEAKER_00: In many of these cases,
- 1:09:34SPEAKER_00: the regimes then become increasingly ideological, but that's not how they start out.
- 1:09:38SPEAKER_00: That's very important because in a highly polarized context, that's almost impossible.
- 1:09:43SPEAKER_00: There's a great book, article first, called Pluralism by Default.
- 1:09:48SPEAKER_00: Pluralism by default is trying to describe those post-Soviet countries
- 1:09:52SPEAKER_00: that never fully autocratized and created sort of very stable authoritarian regimes.
- 1:09:58SPEAKER_00: The motivating case is Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s,
- 1:10:02SPEAKER_00: but Moldova also fits in a few other countries.
- 1:10:05SPEAKER_00: The idea is that these countries are too divided,
- 1:10:07SPEAKER_00: naturally divided for ethno-linguistic reasons, for ideological reasons, and so on.
- 1:10:12SPEAKER_00: That you can never consolidate full authoritarian control
- 1:10:16SPEAKER_00: because they're simply fundamental disagreements inside the body politic.
- 1:10:20SPEAKER_00: The United States is incredibly diverse regionally,
- 1:10:24SPEAKER_00: ethnoculturally, in terms of ideological alignment.
- 1:10:28SPEAKER_00: That feeds into our politics.
- 1:10:30SPEAKER_00: It makes it very nasty, but it also makes it pluralist by default in a way.
- 1:10:35SPEAKER_00: It's very, very hard to aggrandize power here fully and successfully.
- 1:10:39SPEAKER_00: That's good as far as I'm concerned.
- 1:10:42SPEAKER_01: All right, no kidding.
- 1:10:43SPEAKER_01: Okay, last question for you, Julian.
- 1:10:45SPEAKER_01: I'm not going to characterize, I guess, the modal Statecraft listener, but a very common type.
- 1:10:50SPEAKER_01: I'm going to describe him, and it's a him, it's guy.
- 1:10:53SPEAKER_01: Handsome, I imagine.
- 1:10:54SPEAKER_01: Tall.
- 1:10:54SPEAKER_01: High IQ.
- 1:10:58SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 1:10:59SPEAKER_01: You, dear listener,
- 1:11:00SPEAKER_01: may be this kind of guy,
- 1:11:03SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 1:11:03SPEAKER_01: say 20 to 35 into,
- 1:11:06SPEAKER_01: I would say, like,
- 1:11:07SPEAKER_01: Yimby, maybe technocratic, urbanist politics, wonkier than many of your friends.
- 1:11:14SPEAKER_01: And Julian,
- 1:11:15SPEAKER_01: my question to you is,
- 1:11:16SPEAKER_01: if you're talking to this listener and you want them
- 1:11:18SPEAKER_01: to understand – Authoritarianism a little bit better.
- 1:11:22SPEAKER_01: What are they likely to be missing?
- 1:11:24SPEAKER_01: What would you leave with them or push them to further study this particular cadre,
- 1:11:29SPEAKER_01: ideological commissars of Yimby commissars?
- 1:11:32SPEAKER_00: I guess there's two ways to approach this.
- 1:11:34SPEAKER_00: One is purely for thinking purposes.
- 1:11:37SPEAKER_00: And then maybe one gets to that technocratic impulse.
- 1:11:40SPEAKER_00: So first,
- 1:11:42SPEAKER_00: I would say just for pure thinking,
- 1:11:43SPEAKER_00: we could
- 1:11:43SPEAKER_01: call it abstract, we'd call it theoretical,
- 1:11:45SPEAKER_00: whatever you'd like.
- 1:11:46SPEAKER_00: And I will add one characteristic to your audience.
- 1:11:50SPEAKER_00: I don't want to make assumptions, but at least some of them have seen memes about Lee Kuan Yew.
- 1:11:54SPEAKER_01: No, I think that would be very representative.
- 1:11:57SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 1:11:57SPEAKER_00: And some of them have looked at China and been like, oh, wow, that's very interesting.
- 1:12:01SPEAKER_00: Things like that.
- 1:12:02SPEAKER_00: Okay.
- 1:12:03SPEAKER_00: At the theoretical level,
- 1:12:04SPEAKER_00: at the thinking man's level,
- 1:12:06SPEAKER_00: I think the key point is to stress the diversity of authoritarian regimes.
- 1:12:12SPEAKER_00: That they really don't come in one stripe.
- 1:12:15SPEAKER_00: And that when you're reading the New York Times or the Washington Post or
- 1:12:18SPEAKER_00: the latest issue of,
- 1:12:20SPEAKER_00: I don't know,
- 1:12:21SPEAKER_00: some magazine,
- 1:12:21SPEAKER_00: The Atlantic,
- 1:12:22SPEAKER_00: or you're reading Vox as a,
- 1:12:24SPEAKER_00: you know, sort of a dirty secret for the Statecraft Institute.
- 1:12:28SPEAKER_01: That's okay.
- 1:12:29SPEAKER_01: They can read whatever they want.
- 1:12:30SPEAKER_01: Pluralism.
- 1:12:31SPEAKER_01: We love our pluralism.
- 1:12:32SPEAKER_01: We're pluralist by default.
- 1:12:33SPEAKER_00: yeah.
- 1:12:33SPEAKER_00: We're by default.
- 1:12:34SPEAKER_00: Can't help ourselves.
- 1:12:35SPEAKER_00: Read too much.
- 1:12:36SPEAKER_00: Whenever someone writes or says,
- 1:12:38SPEAKER_00: autocracies always do X or Y,
- 1:12:42SPEAKER_00: or there's an inherent logic that always works, it's very rarely true.
- 1:12:48SPEAKER_00: And when it is true,
- 1:12:49SPEAKER_00: it's at such a high level of abstraction that you've likely missed most of
- 1:12:53SPEAKER_00: the country context.
- 1:12:54SPEAKER_00: There are real patterns in the world.
- 1:12:56SPEAKER_00: We've been talking about these things, these categories that matter.
- 1:12:59SPEAKER_00: These categories seem to impact certain things, right?
- 1:13:02SPEAKER_00: Party states versus military hunters and all that.
- 1:13:04SPEAKER_00: That's a useful granular analytic lever that you should be pushing on.
- 1:13:09SPEAKER_00: But if anyone ever says sort of autocracies always do X or they always do Y,
- 1:13:13SPEAKER_00: authoritarian leaders always think this way, run away.
- 1:13:17SPEAKER_00: It's wrong.
- 1:13:18SPEAKER_00: It's wrong and it's not helpful and you're too smart for that.
- 1:13:21SPEAKER_00: You really are too smart for that.
- 1:13:22SPEAKER_00: If you're able to parse the nuances of zoning regulations in some subset
- 1:13:28SPEAKER_00: of Manhattan and have really strong opinions about it,
- 1:13:31SPEAKER_00: you probably should not think that the majority of the world's countries operate on
- 1:13:35SPEAKER_00: a single logic that actually explains their politics in a way that's useful for you
- 1:13:40SPEAKER_00: as a policy oriented listener.
- 1:13:43SPEAKER_01: Or...
- 1:13:43SPEAKER_00: As someone who might want to take lessons from the more successful variants.
- 1:13:47SPEAKER_00: So the diversity of authoritarianism is really important.
- 1:13:50SPEAKER_00: They're not all made the same.
- 1:13:52SPEAKER_00: Their institutions are distinct.
- 1:13:54SPEAKER_00: They're patterned but distinct.
- 1:13:55SPEAKER_00: The flows of power and authority are patterned but distinct.
- 1:14:00SPEAKER_00: And that they change over time.
- 1:14:02SPEAKER_00: And that if I'm talking about Putin's Russia in 2004,
- 1:14:05SPEAKER_00: it doesn't do a great job of describing the politics of Putin's Russia in 2024.
- 1:14:10SPEAKER_00: And you should map that onto your favorite or least favorite authoritarian regime as well.
- 1:14:14SPEAKER_00: So that's thinking man's level.
- 1:14:16SPEAKER_00: I think that's useful.
- 1:14:18SPEAKER_00: I think people don't say that often enough.
- 1:14:20SPEAKER_00: It makes the world more complicated and we don't want to become historians
- 1:14:23SPEAKER_00: and say every single country is unique and a special snowflake
- 1:14:26SPEAKER_00: and we can't make any general characterizations.
- 1:14:29SPEAKER_00: I'm a political scientist.
- 1:14:30SPEAKER_00: That doesn't work.
- 1:14:31SPEAKER_00: I don't buy it.
- 1:14:32SPEAKER_00: But you have to live in that meso level and you have to be cognizant of that.
- 1:14:35SPEAKER_00: I think that's actually important,
- 1:14:37SPEAKER_00: especially as the world is becoming more authoritarian in terms of number
- 1:14:41SPEAKER_00: of countries that look this way.
- 1:14:43SPEAKER_00: And it might be the future in parts of the West as well,
- 1:14:45SPEAKER_00: which is something we haven't even talked about yet.
- 1:14:47SPEAKER_00: Not really.
- 1:14:48SPEAKER_00: The second bit to the technocrat, to someone who wants optimal
- 1:14:53SPEAKER_01: policy outputs,
- 1:14:55SPEAKER_00: right?
- 1:14:55SPEAKER_00: Based on experts, based on, what's the term?
- 1:14:58SPEAKER_00: High human capital or something?
- 1:15:00SPEAKER_01: Yeah.
- 1:15:01SPEAKER_01: I don't really like that term, but yeah, people use it.
- 1:15:02SPEAKER_01: Neither do I, but I've seen it bounced around.
- 1:15:04SPEAKER_00: But anyway,
- 1:15:05SPEAKER_00: in any case,
- 1:15:06SPEAKER_00: and again,
- 1:15:06SPEAKER_00: this is,
- 1:15:06SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 1:15:07SPEAKER_00: to close out Spicely,
- 1:15:09SPEAKER_00: one of the fun
- 1:15:11SPEAKER_00: sort of post-liberal,
- 1:15:13SPEAKER_00: new right, far right, whatever word you like to use, figures, Bronze Age pervert.
- 1:15:18SPEAKER_01: You have to say it with the appropriate Romanian accent.
- 1:15:22SPEAKER_01: Do you have a good version?
- 1:15:24SPEAKER_01: Oh, no.
- 1:15:24SPEAKER_01: I've got to do my Bronze Age pervert.
- 1:15:27SPEAKER_01: Bronze Age pervert.
- 1:15:28SPEAKER_01: Yeah, that sounds right.
- 1:15:29SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 1:15:30SPEAKER_00: Yeah, that's fine.
- 1:15:32SPEAKER_00: He's a Straussian, Yale PhD.
- 1:15:33SPEAKER_00: It's okay.
- 1:15:34SPEAKER_00: We make excuses for those types.
- 1:15:35SPEAKER_00: Anyway, he has a whole article on comparing Singapore to Orban's Hungary.
- 1:15:40SPEAKER_00: It talks a lot about differences in human capital,
- 1:15:43SPEAKER_00: differences in technocratic institutions and what the institutions are doing
- 1:15:47SPEAKER_00: in terms of forming new elites.
- 1:15:49SPEAKER_00: It's not the best essay in the world.
- 1:15:52SPEAKER_00: It's also very partisan per his own particular motivations.
- 1:15:56SPEAKER_00: He loves eugenics.
- 1:15:57SPEAKER_00: I recommend not really paying that much attention to that part of the essay.
- 1:16:00SPEAKER_00: However, it's better than most of the new right stuff in terms of comparative authoritarianism.
- 1:16:05SPEAKER_00: At least it's on target.
- 1:16:06SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 1:16:07SPEAKER_00: That's actually the right level to be discussing these sorts of things.
- 1:16:11SPEAKER_00: But anyway,
- 1:16:12SPEAKER_00: for the technocrat,
- 1:16:13SPEAKER_00: you should be thinking about how the tension of technocracy is that you reduce input
- 1:16:20SPEAKER_00: from the population,
- 1:16:22SPEAKER_00: not only on policy levels, but in terms of political contestation.
- 1:16:27SPEAKER_00: If you're contesting over fewer things,
- 1:16:30SPEAKER_00: people get really dissatisfied, actually, and you're going to have blowback.
- 1:16:34SPEAKER_00: If you've ever heard of the idea of the Uniparty or the idea of the Cartel Party,
- 1:16:39SPEAKER_00: if you're in Europe, you'll have heard of the Cartel Party.
- 1:16:41SPEAKER_00: In the US, you'll hear of the Uniparty.
- 1:16:43SPEAKER_00: The idea that in the 1980s, 1990s,
- 1:16:45SPEAKER_00: especially 2000s,
- 1:16:47SPEAKER_00: parties kind of converged on the same policy model
- 1:16:50SPEAKER_00: with maybe foreign policy differences, but otherwise it's all kind of the same.
- 1:16:54SPEAKER_00: People throw the neoliberalism term that means whatever you'd like it to mean,
- 1:16:58SPEAKER_00: but something like that.
- 1:16:59SPEAKER_01: Much like authoritarianism.
- 1:17:00SPEAKER_01: Indeed.
- 1:17:01SPEAKER_01: Perhaps an overly broad designation.
- 1:17:03SPEAKER_00: Perhaps, perhaps.
- 1:17:04SPEAKER_00: Or a designation that only operates at one level of analysis.
- 1:17:07SPEAKER_00: And then we have to go from there.
- 1:17:09SPEAKER_00: But if you're a technocrat and you're a YIMBY and you think market forces are good
- 1:17:12SPEAKER_00: and all this stuff and expertise is valuable.
- 1:17:15SPEAKER_00: I do.
- 1:17:16SPEAKER_00: Indeed.
- 1:17:16SPEAKER_00: You're going to be inclined to think that a lot of that stuff was on
- 1:17:20SPEAKER_00: the right target and that it produced significant economic growth
- 1:17:23SPEAKER_00: and it might have been better governance in some ways.
- 1:17:26SPEAKER_00: You would not necessarily be wrong.
- 1:17:29SPEAKER_00: However,
- 1:17:29SPEAKER_00: every country that did that in
- 1:17:31SPEAKER_00: the democratic West has seen massive populist backlash,
- 1:17:34SPEAKER_00: first on the right and now in the US on the left, actually.
- 1:17:39SPEAKER_00: And that's an inevitable part of politics.
- 1:17:41SPEAKER_00: You're not going to be able to get out of that as long as the regime form is democratic.
- 1:17:46SPEAKER_00: And that's just something you have to keep in mind as someone who loves technocracy,
- 1:17:50SPEAKER_00: someone who thinks this is really the way forward.
- 1:17:54SPEAKER_00: Democratic politics doesn't allow for long-term technocracy without blowback.
- 1:18:00SPEAKER_00: It just never does.
- 1:18:01SPEAKER_01: You're putting a name to something I've encountered a lot in these conversations
- 1:18:03SPEAKER_01: about state capacity,
- 1:18:04SPEAKER_01: which is many people I know care about state capacity
- 1:18:08SPEAKER_01: because they think improving it can rebuild trust in institutions.
- 1:18:13SPEAKER_01: And I think there's some truth to that.
- 1:18:14SPEAKER_01: Obviously, if an institution performs badly, you will trust it less, all things considered.
- 1:18:19SPEAKER_00: But I think there's a big difference between that
- 1:18:21SPEAKER_01: model, which is basically true.
- 1:18:23SPEAKER_01: You can make people like the DMV more.
- 1:18:25SPEAKER_01: You make them think, okay, the tax man treats me fairly.
- 1:18:28SPEAKER_01: But improved state capacity can't bring back the neoliberal consensus.
- 1:18:32SPEAKER_01: And I think often there's a sense that if you provide better government services
- 1:18:37SPEAKER_01: and deliver on commitments,
- 1:18:39SPEAKER_01: that that is sufficient to end political contestation over some of these questions.
- 1:18:44SPEAKER_01: And I think that's the wrong way to look at it.
- 1:18:45SPEAKER_01: And you should want state capacity,
- 1:18:47SPEAKER_01: despite the fact that your partisan opponents will still be your partisan opponents
- 1:18:52SPEAKER_01: and occasionally hold the reins.
- 1:18:53SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I mean, I think that's exactly right.
- 1:18:55SPEAKER_00: There is unfortunately an elision between good governance in terms of
- 1:18:59SPEAKER_00: the state functioning better,
- 1:19:00SPEAKER_00: providing what it says to its citizens, right,
- 1:19:02SPEAKER_00: more effectively,
- 1:19:03SPEAKER_00: efficiently,
- 1:19:04SPEAKER_00: with a smile on its face, right, that sense that like, oh, I'm being treated well.
- 1:19:08SPEAKER_00: There's that side of good governance.
- 1:19:10SPEAKER_00: And then it elides very quickly into,
- 1:19:11SPEAKER_00: oh, and here's my like specific policy portfolio for trade relations or whatever.
- 1:19:16SPEAKER_00: And any variation on that or central bank policy and any variation on that is bad.
- 1:19:21SPEAKER_00: And the problem is,
- 1:19:22SPEAKER_00: is you're never the high politics side of things is never going
- 1:19:25SPEAKER_00: to avoid democratic inputs.
- 1:19:27SPEAKER_00: No.
- 1:19:28SPEAKER_00: Unless you take my class and then you can have certainty at the top.
- 1:19:33SPEAKER_00: And as long as you can somehow keep the motors running, you can have good outputs.
- 1:19:37SPEAKER_00: It does exist.
- 1:19:39SPEAKER_00: I will say there's far more authoritarian regimes
- 1:19:42SPEAKER_00: whose citizens' lives are pretty poor than there are that are nice and comfy
- 1:19:47SPEAKER_00: and happy.
- 1:19:48SPEAKER_00: That's not inevitable.
- 1:19:49SPEAKER_00: In the present,
- 1:19:50SPEAKER_00: you have your Singaporeans and you have your Hong Kongs and For most people,
- 1:19:56SPEAKER_00: under Chile and Pinochet, it was fine, right?
- 1:19:58SPEAKER_00: You just talk about certain things, right?
- 1:20:01SPEAKER_00: Things like that.
- 1:20:02SPEAKER_00: You can get your good governance outcomes.
- 1:20:04SPEAKER_01: If you live in China or Russia, if you're living in Moscow or Beijing,
- 1:20:08SPEAKER_00: life is nice.
- 1:20:09SPEAKER_00: Life is nice.
- 1:20:10SPEAKER_00: You just don't talk about stuff, right?
- 1:20:12SPEAKER_00: And in Russia, you have to avoid mobilization.
- 1:20:15SPEAKER_00: But that's the Russian state's problem.
- 1:20:17SPEAKER_00: So anyway, these are possible.
- 1:20:19SPEAKER_01: Personally, I'm a big fan of my rights in an electoral democracy.
- 1:20:26SPEAKER_01: I would not trade them away for any measure of stability,
- 1:20:29SPEAKER_01: but some people would and some people do.
- 1:20:33SPEAKER_00: You can see the sort of stealth form of Overbearing technocracy in the EU where more
- 1:20:38SPEAKER_00: and more policy areas are being decided by Brussels.
- 1:20:41SPEAKER_00: You have literally the same backlash.
- 1:20:43SPEAKER_00: You have the same sort of the rejection of it.
- 1:20:46SPEAKER_00: And the EU is still predominantly made up of democracies.
- 1:20:48SPEAKER_00: But part of that tension is inherent to the technocratic impulse.
- 1:20:54SPEAKER_00: It was made that way.
- 1:20:55SPEAKER_00: Technocracy comes from the progressive era.
- 1:20:57SPEAKER_00: It was really popular during the New Deal.
- 1:21:00SPEAKER_00: The New Deal was the closest we've come to a dominant party electoral authoritarian regime.
- 1:21:04SPEAKER_00: We didn't build it.
- 1:21:05SPEAKER_00: FDR didn't do it.
- 1:21:07SPEAKER_00: There are some pluralism by default reasons for that,
- 1:21:09SPEAKER_00: actually, but it was the closest we've gotten so far.
- 1:21:12SPEAKER_01: Well, Julian, on that happy note, thank you for joining Statecraft.
- 1:21:16SPEAKER_01: It was a real pleasure, and I hope to have you back.
- 1:21:18SPEAKER_00: Yeah, really happy to be here.