Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [1989] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:061989 was $1.515 billion or 44.4%.
- 0:12Over the last 25 years, that is since present management took
- 0:17over, our per share book value has grown from 19.46 dollars to
- 0:214296.01 dollars or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
- 0:28What counts however is intrinsic value, the figure indicating
- 0:33what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth.
- 0:37With perfect foresight. This number can be calculated by
- 0:41taking all future cash flows of a business in and out and
- 0:45discounting them at prevailing interest rates.
- 0:48So valued all businesses for manufacturers of buggy whips to
- 0:52operators of cellular phones become economic equals.
- 0:56Back when Berkshire's book value was 19.46 dollars, intrinsic
- 1:01value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied
- 1:05up in a textile business, not worth the figure at which it was
- 1:09carried. Now most of our businesses are
- 1:11worth far more than their carrying values.
- 1:15This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that
- 1:18Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate
- 1:22that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.
- 1:27The rear view mirror is one thing, the windshield is
- 1:31another. A large portion of our book
- 1:33value is represented by equity securities that with minor
- 1:37exceptions are carried on our balance sheet at current market
- 1:41values. At Euren, these securities were
- 1:44valued at higher prices relative to their own intrinsic business
- 1:48values than has been the case in the past.
- 1:51One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market.
- 1:54More important, the virtues of these businesses have been
- 1:57widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices
- 2:01were inappropriately low, they are not now.
- 2:04We will keep most of our major holdings regardless of how they
- 2:08are priced relative to intrinsic business value.
- 2:11This till death do us part attitude, combined with the full
- 2:14prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be
- 2:18expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply
- 2:22as in the past. In other words, our performance
- 2:25to date has benefited from a double dip one the exceptional
- 2:29gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have
- 2:33achieved to the additional bonus.
- 2:35We realized as the market appropriately corrected the
- 2:38prices of these companies raising their valuations in
- 2:42relation to those of the average business.
- 2:45We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value
- 2:48that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make.
- 2:52But our catch up rewards have been realized, which means we'll
- 2:56have to settle for a single dip in the future.
- 2:59We face another obstacle in a finite world.
- 3:02High growth rates must self destruct if the base from which
- 3:05the growth is taking place is tiny.
- 3:08This law may not operate for a time, but when the base
- 3:12balloons, the party ends. A high growth rate eventually
- 3:16forges its own anchor. Carl Sagan has entertainingly
- 3:19described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of
- 3:22bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15
- 3:26minutes, says Sagan. That means 4 doublings an hour
- 3:30and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only
- 3:35about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of
- 3:39wild asexual abandoned, will collectively weigh as much as a
- 3:43mountain in two days more than the sun.
- 3:46And before very long, everything in the universe will be made of
- 3:50bacteria. Not to worry, says Sagan.
- 3:53Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth.
- 3:57The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they
- 4:01are shy about reproducing in public, even on bad days.
- 4:05Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and my partner and I
- 4:08do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium, nor, to our unending
- 4:12sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15
- 4:17minutes. Furthermore, we are not the
- 4:19least bit shy about reproducing financially in public.
- 4:23Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply from
- 4:26Berkshire's present base of 4.9 dollars billion in net worth.
- 4:31We will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual
- 4:35growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22
- 4:40million we began with. Taxes are 1989 gain of $1.5
- 4:45billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712
- 4:49million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire's share
- 4:53of the income tax is paid by its five major investees totaled
- 4:57about $175 million. Of this year's tax charge, about
- 5:03$172 million will be paid currently.
- 5:06The remainder $540 million is deferred.
- 5:10Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989
- 5:14increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings.
- 5:18Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.
- 5:23We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized
- 5:27profits generated in 1987 and 1988.
- 5:31But as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed
- 5:35before 1987 about 1.2 dollars billion carry reserves booked at
- 5:41the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.
- 5:45A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require
- 5:48companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate,
- 5:53whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%.
- 5:56Such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability and
- 6:00decrease our net worth by about $71,000,000, the result of
- 6:04raising the reserve on our pre 1987 gain by 6 percentage
- 6:09points. Because the proposed rule has
- 6:12sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear,
- 6:16we have not yet made this change.
- 6:18As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe
- 6:22taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our
- 6:27securities at year end market values.
- 6:29Is this $1.1 billion liability equal or even similar to a $1.1
- 6:36billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the
- 6:40end of the year? Obviously not, despite the fact
- 6:43that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net
- 6:47worth, Reducing it by $1.1 billion.
- 6:51On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a
- 6:55meaningless accounting fiction because it's payment can be
- 6:58triggered only by the sale of stocks that in very large part
- 7:02we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
- 7:06In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest free loan
- 7:11from the US Treasury that comes due only at our election, unless
- 7:15of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized.
- 7:19This loan is peculiar in other respects as well.
- 7:23It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular
- 7:27appreciated stocks, and it fluctuates in size daily is
- 7:31market prices change and periodically if tax rates
- 7:34change. In effect, this deferred tax
- 7:37liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is
- 7:42payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another.
- 7:46Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989,
- 7:50incurring about $76 million of transfer tax on 224 dollars
- 7:57million of gains. Because of the way the tax law
- 7:59works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor, if
- 8:04successful, has an important mathematical edge over a more
- 8:08frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme
- 8:11comparison. Imagine that Berkshire had only
- 8:13$1.00, which we put in a security that doubled by year
- 8:17end and was then sold. Imagine further that we use the
- 8:21after tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next
- 8:2519 years, scoring a double each time.
- 8:28At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we
- 8:32would have paid on the profits from each sale would have
- 8:35delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left
- 8:40with about $25,250. Not bad.
- 8:44If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself
- 8:48doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to
- 8:53$1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we
- 8:59would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about
- 9:06$692,000. The sole reason for this
- 9:10staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax
- 9:13payments. Interestingly, the government
- 9:16would gain from scenario 2 in exactly the same 27 colon one
- 9:20ratio as we, taking in taxes of $356,500 versus $13,000, though
- 9:29admittedly it would have to wait for its money.
- 9:31We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring
- 9:36long term investment commitments because of these mathematics.
- 9:40Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after tax returns
- 9:44by moving rather frequently from one investment to another.
- 9:48Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.
- 9:51Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly
- 9:54lower returns. Our reason is simple.
- 9:57We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and
- 10:01so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop.
- 10:05This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that
- 10:09these relationships will produce good, though perhaps not
- 10:12optimal, financial results. Considering that, we think it
- 10:16makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know
- 10:19to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not
- 10:23know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to
- 10:27average. That would be akin to marrying
- 10:29for money, a mistake under most circumstances.
- 10:33Insanity if one is already rich. Sources of reported earnings.
- 10:38The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported
- 10:41earnings in this presentation. Amortization of goodwill and
- 10:46other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not
- 10:49charged against the specific businesses to which they apply,
- 10:52but are instead aggregated and shown separately.
- 10:55This procedure let's you view the earnings of our businesses
- 10:59as they would have been reported had we not purchased them.
- 11:02I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation
- 11:06seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one
- 11:10utilizing generally accepted Accounting principles GAP, which
- 11:14require purchase price adjustments to be made on a
- 11:17business by business basis. The total net earnings we show
- 11:21in the table are of course identical to the GAP total in
- 11:25our audited financial statements.
- 11:27Further information about these businesses is given in that
- 11:30business segment section on pages 37 to 39 and in the
- 11:35management's discussion section on pages 40 to 44.
- 11:39In these sections, you also will find our segment earnings
- 11:42reported on a GAAP basis. 4 Information on West Coast
- 11:46businesses. I urge you to read Charlie
- 11:49Monger's letter, which starts on page 54.
- 11:52In addition, we have reprinted on page 71 Charlie's May 30th,
- 11:571989 letter to the US League of Savings Institutions, which
- 12:02conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent
- 12:06decision to resign. We refer you also to pages 45 to
- 12:1051 where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into
- 12:14four segments. These correspond to the way
- 12:17Charlie and I think about the business and should help you
- 12:20calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value.
- 12:23Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements
- 12:26for one hour insurance operations with their major
- 12:30investment positions itemized. 2 are manufacturing, publishing
- 12:34and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non
- 12:38operating assets and purchase price accounting adjustments. 3
- 12:42are subsidiaries engaged in finance type operations which
- 12:46are mutual savings and Scott Fetzer Financial and four in all
- 12:50other category that includes the non operating assets, primarily
- 12:54marketable securities held by the companies in segment 2, all
- 12:58purchase price accounting adjustments and various assets
- 13:02and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
- 13:06If you combine the earnings and net worths of these 4 segments,
- 13:10you will derive totals matching those shown on our gap
- 13:13statements. However, I want to emphasize
- 13:16that this four category presentation does not fall
- 13:19within the purview of our auditors who in no way bless it.
- 13:22In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from
- 13:26significant earnings of investees that standard
- 13:29accounting rules do not permit us to report.
- 13:32On Page 15, we list five major investees from which we received
- 13:36dividends in 1989 of about $45.00 million after taxes.
- 13:42However, our share of the retained earnings of these
- 13:45investees totaled about $212 million last year, not counting
- 13:50large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola.
- 13:54If this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own
- 13:58operating earnings after the payment of additional taxes
- 14:02would have been close to $500 million rather than the $300
- 14:06million shown in the table. The question you must decide is
- 14:10whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us
- 14:13as those we report. We believe they are and even
- 14:17think they may be more valuable. The reason for this, a bird in
- 14:21the Bush may be worth 2 in the hand.
- 14:23Conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will
- 14:27be deployed by talented owner oriented managers who sometimes
- 14:31have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we
- 14:34would have in ours. I would not make such a generous
- 14:37assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these
- 14:41cases. In our view, Berkshire's
- 14:44fundamental earning power is best measured by a look through
- 14:48approach in which we append our share of the operating earnings
- 14:51retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings,
- 14:55excluding capital gains in both instances, for our intrinsic
- 15:00business value to grow at an average of 15% per year.
- 15:04Our look through earnings must grow at about the same pace.
- 15:08We'll need plenty of help from our present investees and also
- 15:12need to add a new one from time to time in order to reach this
- 15:1515% goal. Non insurance operations.
- 15:18In the past we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing
- 15:22and retail operations the Sainted 7.
- 15:25With our acquisition of Borchium's early in 1989, the
- 15:29challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and
- 15:33appropriate. We failed.
- 15:35Let's call the group the Sainted 7 + 1.
- 15:38This Divine assemblage, Borsheim's The Buffalo News,
- 15:42Fetchheimer Brothers, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott
- 15:46Fetzer Manufacturing Group. See's Candy's World Book is a
- 15:50collection of businesses with economic characteristics that
- 15:54range from good to superb. It's managers range from superb
- 15:58to superb. Most of these managers have no
- 16:00need to work for a living. They show up at the ballpark
- 16:03because they like to hit home runs and that's exactly what
- 16:06they do. They're combined financial
- 16:09statements including those of some smaller operations shown on
- 16:13page 49 illustrate just how outstanding their performance is
- 16:17on an historical accounting basis.
- 16:20After tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average
- 16:24equity capital. Moreover, this return was
- 16:27achieved with no net leverage, cash equivalents, half matched
- 16:31funded debt. When I call off the names of our
- 16:34managers, the Blumkin, Friedman and Hellman families, Chuck
- 16:38Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph Shea, I feel the same glow that
- 16:42Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced
- 16:45the line up of his 1927 New York Yankees.
- 16:49Let's take a look. Business by business owing its
- 16:52first year with Berkshire Borschium's metal expectations,
- 16:57sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than
- 17:00twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to
- 17:04its present location. In the six years prior to that
- 17:07move, sales had also doubled. Like Friedman, Borschium's
- 17:11managing genius. And I mean that has only one
- 17:15speed. Fast forward, if you haven't
- 17:17been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borschium's.
- 17:21Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store
- 17:25can maintain an enormous selection across all price
- 17:29ranges. For the same reason, it can hold
- 17:31its expense ratio to about 1/3 that prevailing at jewelry
- 17:35stores offering comparable merchandise.
- 17:38The stores tight control of expenses, accompanied by its
- 17:41unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than
- 17:45those of other Jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate
- 17:49even more volume. And so the circle goes round and
- 17:53round. The end result is store traffic
- 17:55as high as 4000 people on seasonally busy days.
- 17:59Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great
- 18:03showman, but also a man of integrity.
- 18:06We bought the business without an audit and all of our
- 18:09surprises have been on the plus side.
- 18:11If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler.
- 18:13Makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a
- 18:17tiny diamond. A story will illustrate why I
- 18:19enjoy Ike so much. Every two years I'm part of an
- 18:23informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few
- 18:26subjects. Last September, meeting at
- 18:29Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his
- 18:34son, Alan to come buy and educate us on jewels and the
- 18:37jewelry business. Ike decided to dazzle the group,
- 18:40so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly
- 18:44fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive.
- 18:48Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox, and I mentioned my concern to
- 18:52Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation.
- 18:56Ike took me aside. See that safe?
- 18:58He said. This afternoon we changed the
- 19:00combination, and now even the hotel management doesn't know
- 19:04what it is. I breathed easier.
- 19:06Ike went on. See those two big fellows with
- 19:09guns on their hips? They'll be guarding the safe all
- 19:12night. I now is ready to rejoin the
- 19:15party. But Ike leaned closer, and
- 19:17besides Warren, he confided the jewels aren't in the safe.
- 19:21How can we miss with a fellow like that, particularly when he
- 19:25comes equipped with a talented and energetic family?
- 19:28Allen, Marvin Cohn and Don Yale. Oh, it sees candies.
- 19:32We had an 8% increase in pounds sold even though 1988 was itself
- 19:37a record year. Included in the 1989 performance
- 19:41were excellent. Same store poundage gains, our
- 19:43first in many years. Advertising played an important
- 19:47role in this outstanding performance.
- 19:50We increased total advertising expenditures from $4.00 million
- 19:54to $5,000,000 and also got copy from our agency Hal Riney and
- 19:59Partners Incorporated that was 100% on the money.
- 20:02In conveying the qualities that make C special.
- 20:06In our media businesses such as the Buffalo News, we sell
- 20:09advertising. In other businesses, such as CS,
- 20:13we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly
- 20:16what we preach when we sell. At C's, we more than tripled our
- 20:20expenditures on newspaper advertising last year to the
- 20:24highest percentage of sales that I can remember.
- 20:27The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the
- 20:30Power of Well Directed Newspaper Advertising for this result.
- 20:35C's splendid performances have become routine, but there is
- 20:39nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins.
- 20:42His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales
- 20:47imparts a quality and service message to the thousands of
- 20:50employees we need to produce and distribute over 27,000,000 lbs
- 20:54of candy annually in a company with 225 shops.
- 20:58In a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small
- 21:02trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves.
- 21:05Happy. Chuck makes it look easy.
- 21:08Oh, the Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent
- 21:12earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note.
- 21:16Missus B Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago
- 21:20with $500, quit in May after disagreeing with other members
- 21:25of the Blumkin family management about the remodeling and
- 21:28operation of the carpet department.
- 21:31Missus B probably has made more smart business decisions then
- 21:34any living American, but in this particular case I believe the
- 21:38other members of the family were entirely correct.
- 21:41Over the past three years, while the store's other departments
- 21:45increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17%, but not
- 21:51because of any lack of sales ability by Misses B, who has
- 21:55always personally sold far more merchandise than any other
- 21:58salesperson in the store. You will be pleased to know that
- 22:01Misses B continues to make Horatio Alger's heroes look like
- 22:05victims of tired blood. At age 96, she has started a new
- 22:10business selling what else, carpet and furniture.
- 22:14And as always, she works seven days a week at the Mart.
- 22:17Louie Ron and Irv Blumpkin continue to propel what is by
- 22:21far the largest and most successful home furnishings
- 22:25store in the country. They are outstanding merchants,
- 22:28outstanding managers and a joy to be associated with One
- 22:32reading on there acumen. In the fourth quarter of 1989,
- 22:36the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the
- 22:41Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times
- 22:47that of its nearest competitor. NFM and Borschium's follow
- 22:51precisely the same formula for success.
- 22:55One unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one
- 22:59location to the lowest operating costs in the business. 3 The
- 23:04shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge
- 23:07volumes purchased for gross margins and therefore prices far
- 23:12below competitors. And five, friendly, personalized
- 23:15service with family members on hand at all times.
- 23:18Another plug for newspapers, NFM increased its lineage in that
- 23:23local paper by over 20% in 1989, offer record 1988 and remains
- 23:29the papers largest ROP advertiser by far.
- 23:33ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper as opposed
- 23:37to that in pre printed inserts. To my knowledge, Omaha is the
- 23:41only city in which a home furnishing store is the
- 23:44advertising leader. Many retailers cut space
- 23:48purchases in 1989. Our experience at SEAS and NFM
- 23:52Wood indicate they made a major mistake.
- 23:55Oh, the Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 and three
- 23:59important ways. First, among major metropolitan
- 24:02papers both daily and Sunday, the news is number one in
- 24:06household penetration, the percentage of local households
- 24:10that purchase it each day. Second, in Newshole, the portion
- 24:14of the paper devoted to news, the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989
- 24:19versus 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news rich
- 24:25than any comparable American paper.
- 24:28Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major
- 24:32papers, the news set its 7th consecutive profit record.
- 24:36To some extent, these three factors are related.
- 24:39Though obviously, a high percentage news hole by itself
- 24:42reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently
- 24:46utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of
- 24:50readers and thereby boosts penetration.
- 24:53High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly
- 24:58valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the
- 25:01entire community through a single megaphone.
- 25:04Hello. Penetration paper is a far less
- 25:07compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually
- 25:10suffer in both ad rates and profits.
- 25:14It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither
- 25:17an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County,
- 25:21home territory of the news, has been falling from 1113000 N 1970
- 25:28to 1015000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988.
- 25:36Circulation figures tell a different story.
- 25:39In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the
- 25:43Courier Express, a long established Buffalo paper, was
- 25:48selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County.
- 25:53Last year, with population at least 5% lower, the News sold an
- 25:57average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major
- 26:03Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase
- 26:06in penetration. When this kind of gain is made,
- 26:09and when a paper attains in unequal degree of acceptance in
- 26:13its hometown, someone is doing something right.
- 26:16In this case, major credit clearly belongs to Murray Lite,
- 26:20our long time editor who daily creates an informative, useful
- 26:25and interesting product. Credit should go also to the
- 26:28circulation and production departments.
- 26:30A paper that is frequently late because of production problems
- 26:34or distribution weaknesses will lose customers no matter how
- 26:39strong it's editorial content. Stan Lipsy, publisher of The
- 26:42News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our
- 26:46product. I believe Stan's managerial
- 26:49skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in
- 26:53profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved
- 26:56by an average manager given the same circumstances.
- 26:59That is an amazing performance and one that could only be
- 27:02produced by a talented manager who knows and cares about every
- 27:07nut and bolt of the business. Stan's knowledge and talents, it
- 27:12should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product.
- 27:15His early years in the business were spent on the new side, and
- 27:19he played a key role in developing and editing a series
- 27:22of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for The Sun
- 27:26newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together
- 27:30for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I
- 27:35could not ask for a better partner.
- 27:37O At Fetchheimer, the Hellman clan, Bob, George, Gary, Rodger
- 27:41and Fred continue their extraordinary performance.
- 27:45Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the
- 27:49business experienced in integrating a major 1988
- 27:53acquisition. These problems will be ironed
- 27:56out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested
- 27:59capital at Fetchheimer remains splendid.
- 28:02Like all of our managers, the Hellman's have an exceptional
- 28:05command of the details of their business.
- 28:07At last year's annual meeting, I mentioned that when a prisoner
- 28:10enters in Quinton, Bob and George probably know his shirt
- 28:14size. That's only a slight
- 28:16exaggeration. No matter what area of the
- 28:19country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on
- 28:22with major customers and with the competition.
- 28:26Though we purchased Fetchheimer 4 years ago, Charlie and I have
- 28:29never visited any of its plants or the Home Office in
- 28:33Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome
- 28:35Maytag repairman. The Hellman managerial product
- 28:38is so good that a service call is never needed.
- 28:42O Ralph Shea continues to do a superb job in managing our
- 28:45largest group World book. Kirby and the Scott Fetzer
- 28:50manufacturing companies. Aggregate earnings of these
- 28:52businesses have increased every year since our purchase, and
- 28:56returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional.
- 29:00Ralph is running in enterprise large enough where it's standing
- 29:04alone to be on the Fortune 500, and he's running it in a fashion
- 29:08that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return
- 29:12on equity. For some years, World Book has
- 29:15operated out of a single location in Chicago's
- 29:17Merchandise Mart Anticipating the imminent expiration of its
- 29:22lease, the business is now decentralizing into for
- 29:25locations. The expenses of this transition
- 29:28are significant. Nevertheless, profits in 1989
- 29:32held up well. It will be another year before
- 29:34cost of the move are fully behind us.
- 29:37Kirby's business was particularly strong last year,
- 29:40featuring large gains in export sales.
- 29:43International business has more than doubled in the last two
- 29:46years and quintupled in the past four.
- 29:49Its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%.
- 29:53Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby in
- 29:58preparation for a major model change in 1990.
- 30:02Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings
- 30:06of the non insurance group whose results are shown on page 49.
- 30:10When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our
- 30:14acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important
- 30:17as our acquisition of the businesses.
- 30:20In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph
- 30:23also manages capital extremely well.
- 30:26These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that in turn
- 30:30have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.
- 30:34And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.
- 30:37The combined ratio represents total insurance cost losses
- 30:41incurred plus expenses compared to revenue from premiums.
- 30:45A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit and one
- 30:50above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that
- 30:54an insurer earns from holding policyholders funds, the float
- 30:58is taken into account. A combined ratio in the 107 to
- 31:02111 range typically produces an overall break even result
- 31:07exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
- 31:11For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the
- 31:15industries incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually even
- 31:19in years when general inflation runs considerably lower.
- 31:23Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have
- 31:27grown at a still faster rate, 11%.
- 31:31If premium growth meanwhile materially lacks that 10% rate,
- 31:35underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency
- 31:39to under reserve when business turns bad may obscure their
- 31:43size. For a time last year we said the
- 31:45climb in the combined ratio was almost certain to continue and
- 31:49probably will accelerate for at least two more years.
- 31:53This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must
- 31:57repeat last year's forecast. Premium growth is running far
- 32:01below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate
- 32:05would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it
- 32:09down. The increase in the combined
- 32:11ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because
- 32:15catastrophes led by Hurricane Hugo were unusually severe.
- 32:20These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points
- 32:23of the increase. If 1990 is more of a normal
- 32:27year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the
- 32:31catastrophe swollen base of 1989.
- 32:34In 1991, though, the ratio is apartment to climb by a greater
- 32:39degree. Commentators frequently discuss
- 32:41the underwriting cycle and speculate about its next turn.
- 32:45If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is, in
- 32:49our view, a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the
- 32:53industry's fundamental economics.
- 32:55The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry
- 32:59and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel
- 33:02fashion. At that time, the combined ratio
- 33:05fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags.
- 33:10First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set
- 33:14new corrected rates, which were subsequently put into effect by
- 33:18virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all
- 33:22policies were then issued for a one to three-year term, which
- 33:26meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced
- 33:29policies to expire, delayed the impact of new rates on revenues.
- 33:33These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like
- 33:38alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of
- 33:41significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits
- 33:45averaged out over the cycle would be satisfactory.
- 33:48The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of
- 33:53participants selling a commodity like product at independently
- 33:56established prices. Such a configuration, weather
- 34:00the product being sold as steel or insurance policies, is
- 34:04certain to cause subnormal profitability in all
- 34:07circumstances but one a shortage of usable capacity.
- 34:11Just how often these periods occur and how long they last
- 34:15determines the average profitability of the industry in
- 34:18question. In most industries, capacity is
- 34:21described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however,
- 34:25capacity is customarily described in financial terms.
- 34:29That is, it's considered appropriate for a company to
- 34:32write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of
- 34:36net worth. In practice, however,
- 34:39constraints of this sort have proven ineffective.
- 34:42Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to
- 34:46discipline companies that strain their resources.
- 34:49They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate
- 34:52their true capital. Hence, a company can write a
- 34:56great deal of business with very little capital if it is so
- 34:59inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount
- 35:02of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily
- 35:06depends on the mental state of insurance managers.
- 35:09All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate
- 35:13the industry's profits. Good profits will be realized
- 35:16only when there is a shortage of capacity.
- 35:19Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened.
- 35:22That happens rarely and most assuredly is not happening now.
- 35:26Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently
- 35:30imposed on the insurance industry in 1980 nines
- 35:33catastrophes, Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake will
- 35:38cause prices to strengthen significantly.
- 35:40We disagree. These adversities have not
- 35:43destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at
- 35:46present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't
- 35:49grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend
- 35:54will not reverse. The industry will meantime say
- 35:58it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching
- 36:02that of the average American business.
- 36:04Of course it does. So does the steel business.
- 36:07But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long term
- 36:11profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals
- 36:15determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will
- 36:18improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away
- 36:22business despite higher prices. And we're a long way from that
- 36:25point. Berkshire's premium volume may
- 36:28drop to $150 million or so in 1990 from a high of $1 billion
- 36:34in 1986, partly because our traditional business continues
- 36:39to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received
- 36:437% of the business of Firemans Fund expired last August.
- 36:48Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us.
- 36:51We have no interest in writing insurance that carries A
- 36:54mathematical expectation of loss.
- 36:57We experience enough disappointments doing
- 36:59transactions we believe to carry in expectation of profit.
- 37:04However our appetite for appropriately priced businesses
- 37:08ample. As one tale from 1989 will tell,
- 37:11it concerns cat covers, which are reinsurance contracts that
- 37:15primary insurance companies and also reinsures themselves by to
- 37:19protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a
- 37:22tornado or hurricane that produces losses from a large
- 37:26number of policies. In these contracts, the primary
- 37:30insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a
- 37:34maximum of say, $10 million, buying various layers of
- 37:39reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained
- 37:43amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its
- 37:48contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the
- 37:51remainder. By requiring the primary insurer
- 37:54to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a
- 37:59financial stake in each lost settlement and guards against
- 38:02his throwing away the reinsurers.
- 38:04Money Cat covers are usually one year policies that also provide
- 38:09for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer
- 38:13whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to
- 38:16buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question.
- 38:19By paying another premium, this provision protects the primary
- 38:23company from being bare for even a brief period period after a
- 38:27first catastrophic event. The duration of an event is
- 38:32usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated
- 38:36by the primary company. Under this definition, a
- 38:40widespread storm causing damage for three days will be
- 38:44classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic
- 38:48'cause. If the storm lasts 4 days,
- 38:51however, the primary company will file a claim, carving out
- 38:54the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest
- 38:58damage. Losses that occurred outside
- 39:01that period will be treated as a rising from a separate event.
- 39:05In 1989, two unusual things happened.
- 39:09First, Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured
- 39:13loss at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the
- 39:18Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally
- 39:22severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California
- 39:26earthquake hit within weeks, causing insured damage that was
- 39:30difficult to estimate even well after the event.
- 39:33Slammed by these two or possibly three major catastrophes, some
- 39:38primary insurers and also many reinsurers that had themselves
- 39:42bought cap protection either used up their automatic second
- 39:46cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so.
- 39:50At that point, sellers of cap policies had lost a huge amount
- 39:54of money, perhaps twice, because of the reinstatements and not
- 39:58taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a
- 40:02cat premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of
- 40:08protection purchased. For some years we've thought
- 40:10premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the
- 40:14business. But because the 1989 disasters
- 40:17left many insurers either actually or possibly bare, and
- 40:21also left most cat riders licking their wounds.
- 40:24There was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much
- 40:27needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became
- 40:31attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that cat writers
- 40:35themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire
- 40:37Hathaway offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe
- 40:42coverage advertising that proposition and trade
- 40:45publications. Though we did not write all the
- 40:48business we sought, we did, in a busy 10 days, book a substantial
- 40:52amount. Our willingness to put such a
- 40:54huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets
- 40:58us apart from any reinsurer in the world.
- 41:01There are, of course, companies that sometimes write $250
- 41:05million or even far more of catastrophe coverage, but they
- 41:10do so only when they can in turn reinsure a large percentage of
- 41:15the business with other companies.
- 41:16When they can't layoff in size, they disappear from the market.
- 41:21Berkshire's policy, conversely, is to retain the business way
- 41:25right rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation
- 41:29of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent, and in
- 41:33our case that's a lot. We will accept more reinsurance
- 41:37risk for our own account than any other company because of two
- 41:40factors. One, by the standards of
- 41:43regulatory accounting, we have a net worth an hour insurance
- 41:46companies of about $6 billion, the second highest amount in the
- 41:51United States. And two, we simply don't care
- 41:53what earnings we report quarterly or even annually, just
- 41:57as long as the decisions leading to those earnings or losses were
- 42:01reached intelligently. Obviously, if we write $250
- 42:05million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves,
- 42:09there is some probability that we we'll lose the full $250
- 42:13million in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it
- 42:18is not 0. If we had a loss of that
- 42:20magnitude, our after tax cost would be about $165,000,000,
- 42:26though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in 1/4.
- 42:30The damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our
- 42:33well-being. This posture is one few
- 42:36insurance managements we'll assume.
- 42:38Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms
- 42:41that almost guarantee the mediocre returns on equity, but
- 42:45they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing
- 42:48single quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes
- 42:52the lost promises over time to produce superior results.
- 42:57I can understand their thinking. What is best for their owners is
- 43:00not necessarily best for the managers.
- 43:03Fortunately, Charlie and I have both total job security and
- 43:07financial interests that are identical with those of our
- 43:10shareholders. We are willing to look foolish
- 43:13as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly.
- 43:16Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us say
- 43:19stabilizing force in the industry.
- 43:22We had huge capacity when capacity is short, and we become
- 43:26less competitive only when capacity is abundant.
- 43:29Of course, we don't follow this policy in the interest of
- 43:33stabilization. We follow it because we believe
- 43:36it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action.
- 43:39Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market, in this
- 43:43case, Adam Smith's Invisible Handworks.
- 43:46As advertised, currently, we hold an exceptional amount of
- 43:49float compared to premium volume.
- 43:52This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance
- 43:55results for us during the next few years, as it did in 1989.
- 44:00Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment
- 44:04income from policyholder funds large.
- 44:06This pleasant situation, however, will gradually
- 44:10deteriorate as our float runs off.
- 44:13At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us to
- 44:17write large amounts of profitable business.
- 44:19Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos
- 44:23Ayordnu, Ajit Jain, Phil Urban and Don Wurster continue to
- 44:27position us well for this eventuality.
- 44:30Marketable Securities In selecting marketable securities
- 44:34for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five
- 44:38major categories. 1 long term common stock investments, 2
- 44:42medium term fixed income securities, 3 long term fixed
- 44:46income securities for short term cash equivalents, and five short
- 44:50term arbitrage commitments. We have no particular bias when
- 44:54it comes to choosing from these categories.
- 44:56We just continuously search among them for the highest after
- 45:00tax returns as measured by mathematical expectation,
- 45:04limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives.
- 45:07We think we understand our criteria have nothing to do with
- 45:11maximizing immediately reportable earnings.
- 45:14Our goal rather is to maximize eventual net worth.
- 45:18O. Below we list our common stock
- 45:19holdings having a value of over $100 million.
- 45:23A small portion of these investments belongs to
- 45:26subsidiaries, of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
- 45:30This list of companies is the same as last year's and in only
- 45:34one case has the number of shares changed our holdings up.
- 45:37Coca-Cola increased from 14172500 shares at the end of
- 45:431988223350000. This Coca-Cola investment
- 45:49provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which
- 45:53your Chairman responds to investment opportunities, no
- 45:56matter how obscure or well disguised they may be.
- 46:00I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or
- 46:041936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936
- 46:08that I started buying Cokes at the rate of 6 for $0.25 from
- 46:12Buffett and Son, the family grocery store, to sell around
- 46:16the neighborhood for $0.05 each. In this excursion into high
- 46:20margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary
- 46:24consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the
- 46:27product. I continued to note these
- 46:29qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world.
- 46:34During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a
- 46:38single share, instead allocating major portions of my net worth
- 46:42to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers,
- 46:46anthracite producers, textile businesses, trading stamp
- 46:49issuers and the like. If you think I'm making this up,
- 46:53I can supply the names. Only in the summer of 1988 did
- 46:57my brain finally established contact with my eyes.
- 47:00What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating.
- 47:03After drifting somewhat in the 1970s, Coca-Cola had a 1981
- 47:08become a new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO.
- 47:13Roberto, along with Don Keogh, once my across the street
- 47:16neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the
- 47:20company's policies and then energetically carried them out.
- 47:23What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained
- 47:27new momentum, with sales overseas virtually exploding.
- 47:31Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills,
- 47:35Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the
- 47:39rewards that this growth brings to shareholders.
- 47:42Normally, the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his
- 47:46natural inclinations or experience will cause either
- 47:50marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of
- 47:54the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of
- 47:57marketing and finances perfect and the result is a shareholders
- 48:01dream. Of course, we should have
- 48:03started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and
- 48:06Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking
- 48:10straight, I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the
- 48:13grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into
- 48:18Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson.
- 48:20My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will
- 48:24be slashed to well under 50 years.
- 48:27As I mentioned earlier, the year end prices of our major
- 48:30investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic
- 48:33values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet
- 48:36cost nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general
- 48:40market decline. A drop in their prices would not
- 48:43disturb us at all. It might in fact work to our
- 48:46eventual benefit, but it would cost at least a one year
- 48:50reduction in Berkshire's net worth.
- 48:52We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one
- 48:56of the next three years. Indeed it would take only about
- 49:00a 10% year to year decline in the aggregate value of our
- 49:04portfolio investments to send Berkshires net worth down.
- 49:08We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our
- 49:11portfolio companies. They are high grade, talented
- 49:15and shareholder oriented. The exceptional results we have
- 49:19achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their
- 49:22exceptional personal qualities. What we told you last year that
- 49:26we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989 and that's
- 49:30the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a
- 49:33substitute for short term cash equivalents and during part of
- 49:37the year we held relatively low levels of cash.
- 49:40In the rest of the year we had a fairly good a size cash position
- 49:44and Even so chose not to engage in arbitrage.
- 49:47The main reason was corporate transactions made no economic,
- 49:51since to us, arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing
- 49:55the greater full game. As Wall Streeter Ray Devoe says,
- 49:59fools rush, and where angels fear to trade, we will engage in
- 50:03arbitrage from time to time, sometimes on a large scale, but
- 50:07only when we like the odds. Oh, leaving aside the three
- 50:11convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we
- 50:14substantially reduced our holdings in both medium and long
- 50:18term fixed income securities. In the long terms, just about
- 50:22our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply
- 50:25systems, WPPSS bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to
- 50:30high. During the year we sold a number
- 50:32of the low coupon issues which we originally bought at very
- 50:35large discounts. Many of these issues had
- 50:38approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in
- 50:42addition had paid us 15% -, 17% annually tax free.
- 50:47Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical
- 50:51high grade tax exempts then commanded.
- 50:53We have kept all of our high coupon WPPSS issues.
- 50:58Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992 and
- 51:02we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid 1990s.
- 51:07We also sold many of our medium term tax exempt bonds during the
- 51:11year. When we bought these bonds, we
- 51:13said we would be happy to sell them regardless of whether they
- 51:16were higher or lower than at our time of purchase.
- 51:20If something we liked better came along, something did and
- 51:23concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains.
- 51:28Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale off tax exempt bonds
- 51:32was about $51 million pre tax owe.
- 51:36The proceeds from our bond sales along with our excess cash at
- 51:40the beginning of the year and that generated later through
- 51:43earnings went into the purchase of three convertible preferred
- 51:47stocks. In the first transaction which
- 51:49took place in July, we purchased $600 million of the Gillette
- 51:54Company preferred with an 834% dividend, a mandatory redemption
- 51:59in 10 years and the right to convert into common at $50 per
- 52:03share. We next purchased 358 dollars
- 52:07million of US Air Group Incorporated preferred stock
- 52:10with mandatory redemption in 10 years, a dividend of 914% and
- 52:15the right to convert into common at $60.00 per share.
- 52:19Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of
- 52:23Champion International Corporation preferred with
- 52:26mandatory redemption in 10 years, a 914% dividend and the
- 52:31right to convert into common at $38 per share.
- 52:35Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we
- 52:39owner either non saleable or non convertible for considerable
- 52:42periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain
- 52:46from short term price blips in the common stock.
- 52:49I have gone on that board of Gillette, but I am not on the
- 52:52board of US Air or Champion. I thoroughly enjoy the boards I
- 52:56am on, but can't handle any more.
- 52:59Gillette's business is very much the kind we like, Charlie, and I
- 53:03think we understand the company's economics and
- 53:05therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess
- 53:09about its future. If you haven't tried Gillette's
- 53:11new Sensor razor, go ride out and get one.
- 53:14However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the
- 53:18investment banking business in which we have a position through
- 53:22our 1987 purchase of Salomon Convertible preferred, the
- 53:26airline industry or the paper industry.
- 53:29This does not mean that we predict a negative future for
- 53:32these industries. We're agnostics, not atheists.
- 53:36Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however,
- 53:40means that we must structure our investments in them differently
- 53:44from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have
- 53:47splendid economic characteristics.
- 53:50In one major respect, however, these purchases are not
- 53:54different. We only want to link up with
- 53:56people whom we like, admire and trust.
- 53:59John Gutfreund at Salomon, Coleman Mockler Junior, Ed
- 54:02Gillette, Ed Kolodny at US Air and Andy Sigler at Champion meet
- 54:07this test in spades. They, in turn have demonstrated
- 54:10some confidence in US, insisting in each case that our preferreds
- 54:14have unrestricted voting rights on a fully converted basis, an
- 54:18arrangement that is far from standard, and corporate finance.
- 54:22In effect, they are trusting us to be intelligent owners
- 54:25thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are
- 54:29trusting them to be intelligent managers thinking about tomorrow
- 54:32as well as today. The preferred stock structures
- 54:35we have negotiated well provide a mediocre return for us if
- 54:39industry economics hinder the performance of our investees,
- 54:43but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if
- 54:46they can earn a return comparable to that of American
- 54:49industry in general. We believe that Gillette under
- 54:53Coleman's management will far exceed that return and believe
- 54:56that John, Ed and Andy will reach it in less.
- 54:59Industry conditions are harsh. Under almost any conditions, we
- 55:04expect these preferreds to return us our money plus
- 55:07dividends. If that is all we get though,
- 55:10the result will be disappointing because we will have given up
- 55:13flexibility and consequently we'll have missed some
- 55:17significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves
- 55:21during the decade. Under that scenario, we will
- 55:23have obtained only a preferred stock yield during a period when
- 55:27the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us
- 55:30whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can
- 55:33achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues
- 55:37is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well.
- 55:40Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions
- 55:44will be needed if that is to happen.
- 55:46But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and
- 55:49that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over
- 55:53the years ahead from our preferred stock purchase.
- 55:56The help will come from the fact that each company now has a
- 56:00major, stable and interested shareholder who's Chairman and
- 56:04Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire's investments,
- 56:07indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money
- 56:10to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees,
- 56:14Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical and
- 56:17objective. We recognize that we are working
- 56:20with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their
- 56:24own businesses, but who nevertheless, at certain moments
- 56:27appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone
- 56:30without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.
- 56:34As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the
- 56:38returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful
- 56:41economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market.
- 56:45Nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced
- 56:48when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the
- 56:52acquisition of 80% or more of a fine business with a fine
- 56:56management. But both opportunities are rare,
- 56:59particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated
- 57:03resources. In summation, Charlie and I feel
- 57:07that our preferred stock investments should produce
- 57:09returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed income
- 57:13portfolios and that we can play a minor but enjoyable and
- 57:17constructive role in the investee companies. 0 coupon
- 57:21securities. In September, Berkshire issued
- 57:24$902.6 million principal amount of 0 coupon convertible
- 57:29subordinated debentures, which are now listed on the New York
- 57:33Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the
- 57:36underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice and
- 57:40a flawless execution. Most bonds, of course, require
- 57:44regular payments of interest, usually semi annually.
- 57:48A0 coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest
- 57:52payments. Instead, the investor receives
- 57:55his yield by purchasing the security at a significant
- 57:58discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is
- 58:02determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and
- 58:06the amount of time between issuance and maturity.
- 58:10In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity
- 58:15value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the
- 58:20bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current
- 58:24payment compounded semi annually.
- 58:27Because we received only 44.31 cents on the dollar, our
- 58:31proceeds from this offering were $400 million, less about $9.5
- 58:36million of offering expenses. The bonds were issued in
- 58:40denominations of $10,000 In. Each bond is convertible into
- 58:44.4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway.
- 58:48Because a $10,000 bond cost $4431, this means that they
- 58:54conversion price was $9815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium
- 59:00too the market price then existing.
- 59:03Berkshire can call the bonds at anytime after September 28th,
- 59:071992 at their accreted value. The original issue price plus
- 59:125.5% compounded semi annually and on 2 specified days,
- 59:17September 28th of 1994 and 1999, the bondholders can require
- 59:22Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value.
- 59:26For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5%
- 59:31interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to
- 59:35the bondholders. Thus, the net effect to us
- 59:38resulting from the reduced taxes is positive cash flow.
- 59:42That is a very significant benefit.
- 59:45Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our
- 59:48exact effective rate of interest, but under all
- 59:51circumstances it will be well below 5.5%.
- 59:55There is meanwhile, asymmetry to the tax law.
- 59:58Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the
- 1:00:025.5% interest. Even though he receives no cash,
- 1:00:07neither are bonds nor those of certain other companies that
- 1:00:10issued similar bonds last year. Notably, Lowe's and Motorola
- 1:00:14resemble the great bulk of 0 coupon bonds that have been
- 1:00:18issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have
- 1:00:21been and will continue to be outspoken critics.
- 1:00:25As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in
- 1:00:29the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to
- 1:00:32investors. But before we tackle that
- 1:00:35subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple
- 1:00:39had not yet been bitten. If you're my age, you bought
- 1:00:42your first zero coupon bonds during World War 2 by purchasing
- 1:00:46the famous series EUS Savings Bond, the most widely sold bond
- 1:00:51issue in history. After the war, these bonds were
- 1:00:55held by one out of two US households.
- 1:00:58Nobody, of course, called the series EA0 coupon bond, a term
- 1:01:03in fact that I doubt had been invented.
- 1:01:05But that's precisely what the Series E was.
- 1:01:08These bonds came in denominations as small as 18.75
- 1:01:13dollars. That amount purchased a $25
- 1:01:16obligation of the United States government due in 10 years terms
- 1:01:21that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%.
- 1:01:25At the time, this was an attractive offer.
- 1:01:27The 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on
- 1:01:31government bonds, and the holder faced no market fluctuation risk
- 1:01:36since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor
- 1:01:40reduction in interest. A second form of 0 coupon U.S.
- 1:01:45Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last
- 1:01:49decade. One problem with a normal bond
- 1:01:52is that even though it pays a given interest rate, say 10%,
- 1:01:56the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return
- 1:02:00will be realized. For that rate to materialize,
- 1:02:03each semi annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is
- 1:02:08received. If current interest rates are
- 1:02:11say only 6% or 7% when these coupons come due, the holder
- 1:02:16will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond
- 1:02:20at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other
- 1:02:23investors with long term liabilities, reinvestment risk
- 1:02:27of this type can be a serious problem.
- 1:02:29Savings bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued
- 1:02:33only to individuals and are unavailable in large
- 1:02:36denominations. What big buyers needed was huge
- 1:02:39quantities of savings bond equivalents.
- 1:02:42Enter some ingenious and in this case highly useful investment
- 1:02:47bankers, LED, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers.
- 1:02:51They created the instrument desired by stripping the semi
- 1:02:54annual coupons from standard government issues.
- 1:02:57Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character
- 1:03:01of a savings bond since it represents a single sum.
- 1:03:05Do sometime in the future. For example if you strip the 40
- 1:03:09semi annual coupons from AUS government bond due in the year
- 1:03:132010, you will have 40 zero coupon bonds with maturities
- 1:03:18from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be
- 1:03:22bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed.
- 1:03:26If current interest rates are say 10% for all maturities, the
- 1:03:31six month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value in the
- 1:03:3620 year issue will sell for 14.2%.
- 1:03:40The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a
- 1:03:43compounded rate of 10% for his entire holding period.
- 1:03:48Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in
- 1:03:51recent years as long term investors ranging from pension
- 1:03:55funds to individual IRA accounts recognize these high grade 0
- 1:04:00coupon issues to be well suited to their needs.
- 1:04:03But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise due
- 1:04:07in the beginning, fool's due in the end.
- 1:04:10In the last few years, 0 coupon bonds and their functional
- 1:04:14equivalent Pay in Kind bonds, which distribute additional PK
- 1:04:18bonds semi annually as interest instead of paying cash, have
- 1:04:22been issued in enormous quantities by ever junkier
- 1:04:25credits. To these issuers, 0 or PIK bonds
- 1:04:29offer one overwhelming advantage.
- 1:04:31It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing.
- 1:04:35Indeed, if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970s
- 1:04:40other than long term 0 coupon obligations, they would now have
- 1:04:44a spotless record as debtors. This principle at work, that you
- 1:04:48need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay
- 1:04:52nothing for a long time has not been lost on promoters and
- 1:04:55investment bankers seeking to finance ever shakier deals.
- 1:04:59But it's acceptance by lenders took a while.
- 1:05:02When the leveraged buyout craze began some years back,
- 1:05:05purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in
- 1:05:10which conservatively estimated free cash flow, that is,
- 1:05:13operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization
- 1:05:17less normalized capital expenditures, was adequate to
- 1:05:20cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.
- 1:05:24Later, as the adrenaline of deal makers surged, businesses began
- 1:05:28to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow
- 1:05:32necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest.
- 1:05:36That left nothing for the pay down of debt.
- 1:05:38In effect, a scarlet O'Hara, I'll think about it tomorrow
- 1:05:42position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers
- 1:05:46and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original
- 1:05:50issued junk bonds. Debt now became something to be
- 1:05:53refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New
- 1:05:58Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake
- 1:06:01the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes, I don't know
- 1:06:05how I'll ever repay you. Soon borrowers found even the
- 1:06:09new LAX standards intolerably finding to induce lenders to
- 1:06:14finance even sillier transactions, they introduced an
- 1:06:17abomination ebbed it earnings before depreciation, interest
- 1:06:22and taxes as the test of a company's ability to pay
- 1:06:26interest. Using this sawed off yardstick,
- 1:06:29the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on
- 1:06:32the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay.
- 1:06:36Such an attitude is clearly delusional.
- 1:06:38At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that
- 1:06:43overtime roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and
- 1:06:47are every bit as real and expenses labor or utility costs.
- 1:06:51Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must
- 1:06:55have income that covers not only interest in operating expenses
- 1:06:59but also realistically calculated depreciation.
- 1:07:02He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about
- 1:07:05ebbed it. Capital outlays at a business
- 1:07:08can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human
- 1:07:12can skip a day or even a week of eating.
- 1:07:15But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made-up, the
- 1:07:18body weakens and eventually dies.
- 1:07:21Furthermore, a start in stop feeding policy will, overtime
- 1:07:24produce a less healthy Organism, human or corporate, than that
- 1:07:29produced by a steady diet. As businessman, Charlie and I
- 1:07:33relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital
- 1:07:36expenditures. You might think that waving away
- 1:07:39a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to
- 1:07:42make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall
- 1:07:46Street's ingenuity. If so, you haven't been paying
- 1:07:49attention during the past few years.
- 1:07:52Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier
- 1:07:55acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked, heaven
- 1:07:58forbid, losing deals to other promoters with more imagination.
- 1:08:03So stepping through the looking glass, promoters in there
- 1:08:07investment bankers proclaimed that ebdit should now be
- 1:08:09measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest
- 1:08:13accruing on 0 coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the
- 1:08:17financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed.
- 1:08:21This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the
- 1:08:26Let's ignore it Korner, but gave similar treatment to what was
- 1:08:29usually a significant portion of interest expense.
- 1:08:33To their shame, many professional investment managers
- 1:08:36went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful
- 1:08:39to do so only with clients money, not their own.
- 1:08:43Calling these managers professionals is actually too
- 1:08:47kind. They should be designated
- 1:08:49promotes. Under this new standard, a
- 1:08:51business earning say $100 million pre tax and having debt
- 1:08:56on which $90 million of interest must be paid currently might use
- 1:09:01a 0 coupon or PIK issue to incur another $60 million of annual
- 1:09:06interest that would accrue and compound but not come due for
- 1:09:10some years. The rate on these issues would
- 1:09:12typically be very high, which means that the situation in year
- 1:09:172 might be $90,000,000 cash interest plus $69 million
- 1:09:22accrued interest and so on as the compounding proceeds.
- 1:09:26Such high rate re borrowing schemes, which a few years ago
- 1:09:29were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became
- 1:09:33models of modern finance at virtually all major investment
- 1:09:37banking houses. When they make these offerings,
- 1:09:40investment bankers display their humorous side.
- 1:09:43They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending 5 or
- 1:09:48more years into the future for companies they barely had heard
- 1:09:51of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules,
- 1:09:55I suggest that you join in the fun.
- 1:09:57Ask the investment banker for the one year budgets that his
- 1:09:59own firm prepared as the last few years began, and then
- 1:10:03compare these with what actually happened.
- 1:10:06Some time ago. Ken Galbraith, in his witty and
- 1:10:09insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term, the
- 1:10:13bezel, defined as the current amount of undiscovered
- 1:10:16embezzlement. This financial creature has a
- 1:10:20magical quality. The embezzlers are richer by the
- 1:10:23amount of the bezel, while the embezzles do not yet feel
- 1:10:27poorer. Professor Galbraith astutely
- 1:10:29pointed out that this sum should be added to the national wealth
- 1:10:33so that we might know the psychic national wealth
- 1:10:36logically. A society that wanted to feel
- 1:10:39enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to
- 1:10:42embezzle and try not to detect the crime.
- 1:10:45By this means wealth would balloon, though not an erg of
- 1:10:48productive work had been done. The satirical nonsense of the
- 1:10:52bezel is dwarfed by the rayal world nonsense of the 0 coupon
- 1:10:56bond with zeros. One party 2A contract can
- 1:11:00experience income without his opposite experiencing the pain
- 1:11:04of expenditure. In our illustration, a company
- 1:11:08capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually and
- 1:11:12therefore capable of paying only that much in interest, magically
- 1:11:16creates earnings for bondholders of $150 million.
- 1:11:21As long as major investors willingly Don their Peter Pan
- 1:11:24wings and repeatedly say, I believe there is no limit to how
- 1:11:29much income can be created by the 0 coupon bond.
- 1:11:33Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm
- 1:11:36less enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the
- 1:11:39plow. Here, finally, was an instrument
- 1:11:42that would let the Street make deals at prices no longer
- 1:11:45limited by actual earning power. The result, obviously, would be
- 1:11:50more transactions. Silly prices will always attract
- 1:11:54sellers. And as Jesse Unruh might have
- 1:11:56put it, transactions are the mother's milk of finance.
- 1:12:00The 0 coupon or Pik bond possesses one additional
- 1:12:04attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that
- 1:12:07the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched
- 1:12:10out. This is no small benefit if the
- 1:12:13period before all costs must be faced as long promoters can
- 1:12:17create a string of foolish deals and take in lots of fees before
- 1:12:22any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures.
- 1:12:26But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or
- 1:12:29financial, fails. A base business cannot be
- 1:12:32transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting
- 1:12:36or capital structure. The man claiming to be a
- 1:12:39financial alchemist may become rich, but gullible investors
- 1:12:43rather than business achievements will usually be the
- 1:12:46source of his wealth, whatever their weaknesses.
- 1:12:49We should add many 0 coupon and PIK bonds will not default.
- 1:12:54We have in fact owned some. It may buy more if their market
- 1:12:57becomes sufficiently distressed. We've not, however, even
- 1:13:01considered buying a new issue from a we credit.
- 1:13:04No financial instrument is evil per SE, It's just that some
- 1:13:08variations have far more potential for mischief than
- 1:13:12others. The blue ribbon for mischief
- 1:13:14making should go to the 0 coupon issuer unable to make its
- 1:13:17interest payments on a current basis.
- 1:13:20Our advice? Whenever an investment banker
- 1:13:22starts talking about EBDID, or whenever someone creates a
- 1:13:26capital structure that does not allow all interest, both payable
- 1:13:30and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net
- 1:13:34of ample capital expenditures, zip up your wallet.
- 1:13:38Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his
- 1:13:41high-priced entourage accept 0 coupon fees, deferring their
- 1:13:45take until the 0 coupon bonds have been paid in full.
- 1:13:49See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.
- 1:13:53Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh, but
- 1:13:57Charlie and I, in our hopelessly old fashioned way, belief that
- 1:14:01they should perform a gatekeeping role guarding
- 1:14:04investors against the promoters propensity to indulge in excess.
- 1:14:08Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercise the
- 1:14:12same judgement and restraint in accepting money that Alcoholics
- 1:14:16have exercised in accepting liquor.
- 1:14:18At a minimum, therefore, the bankers conduct should rise to
- 1:14:22that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the
- 1:14:27profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the
- 1:14:30highway. In recent years, unfortunately,
- 1:14:33many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to
- 1:14:37be an intolerably restrictive standard.
- 1:14:40Lately, those who have traveled the High Road and Wall Street
- 1:14:43have not encountered heavy traffic. 1 Distressing Footnote
- 1:14:47The cost of the 0 coupon folly will not be borne solely by the
- 1:14:51direct participants. Certain savings and loan
- 1:14:54associations were heavy buyers of such bonds using cash that
- 1:14:58came from slick insured deposits straining to show splendid
- 1:15:02earnings. These buyers recorded but did
- 1:15:05not receive ultra high interest income.
- 1:15:08On these issues, many of these associations are now in major
- 1:15:12trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits
- 1:15:15worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed
- 1:15:18the profits. In the many cases in which the
- 1:15:21loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill.
- 1:15:24To paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations it was the
- 1:15:28managers who should have been wearing the ski masks.
- 1:15:31Mistakes of the 1st 25 years. A condensed version to quote
- 1:15:35Robert Benchley. Having a dog teaches a boy.
- 1:15:38Fidelity. Perseverance and to turn around
- 1:15:41three times before lying down. Such are the shortcomings of
- 1:15:45experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea
- 1:15:48to review past mistakes before committing new ones.
- 1:15:51So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.
- 1:15:55Oh, my first mistake, of course, was in buying control of
- 1:15:59Berkshire. Though I knew its business,
- 1:16:01textile manufacturing, to be unpromising, I was enticed to
- 1:16:05buy because the price looked cheap.
- 1:16:07Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in
- 1:16:11my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in
- 1:16:141965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.
- 1:16:19If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there
- 1:16:22will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business
- 1:16:26that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even
- 1:16:30though the long term performance of the business may be terrible.
- 1:16:33I call this the cigar butt approach to investing.
- 1:16:37A cigar butt found on that street that has only one puff
- 1:16:40left in it may not offer much of A smoke, but the bargain
- 1:16:44purchase will make that puff all profit.
- 1:16:46Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying
- 1:16:49businesses is foolish. First, the original bargain
- 1:16:53price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all.
- 1:16:57In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved
- 1:17:00than another surfaces. Never is there just one
- 1:17:04cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage
- 1:17:07you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that
- 1:17:10the business earns. For example, if you buy a
- 1:17:13business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10
- 1:17:18million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high
- 1:17:22return. But the investment will
- 1:17:24disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in 10 years
- 1:17:29and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a
- 1:17:33few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the
- 1:17:36wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
- 1:17:40You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn
- 1:17:43it the hard way. In fact, I had to learn it
- 1:17:46several times over. Shortly after purchasing
- 1:17:49Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hot
- 1:17:53Shield Cone, buying through a company called Diversified
- 1:17:56Retailing that later merged with Berkshire.
- 1:17:59I bought at a substantial discount from Book Value.
- 1:18:02The people were first class and the deal included some extras,
- 1:18:06unrecorded real estate values, and a significant LIFO inventory
- 1:18:11cushion. How could I miss so?
- 1:18:14Three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what
- 1:18:17I had paid after ending our corporate marriage to Hot Shield
- 1:18:21Cone. I had memories like those of the
- 1:18:24husband in the Country song. My wife ran away with my best
- 1:18:28friend and I still miss him a lot.
- 1:18:30I could give you other personal examples of bargain purchase
- 1:18:33folly, but I'm sure you get the picture.
- 1:18:35It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair
- 1:18:39price than a fair company at a wonderful price.
- 1:18:42Charlie understood this early. I was a slow learner, but now
- 1:18:46when buying companies are common stocks, we look for first class
- 1:18:50businesses accompanied by first class managements.
- 1:18:53Oh, that leads right into a related lesson.
- 1:18:56Good jockeys well do well on good horses but not on broken
- 1:18:59down nags. Both Berkshire's textile
- 1:19:02business and Hotchild Cohen had able and honest people running
- 1:19:06them. The same managers employed in a
- 1:19:09business with good economic characteristics would have
- 1:19:12achieved fine records, but they were never going to make any
- 1:19:15progress while running in quicksand.
- 1:19:18I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for
- 1:19:21brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad
- 1:19:25economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains
- 1:19:29intact. I just wish I hadn't been so
- 1:19:31energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that
- 1:19:35admitted by May West I was Snow White, but I drifted owe a
- 1:19:40further related lesson. Easy does it.
- 1:19:42After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of
- 1:19:47businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve
- 1:19:50difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid
- 1:19:53them. To the extent we have been
- 1:19:56successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying 1
- 1:19:59foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we
- 1:20:02acquired any ability to clear 7 footers.
- 1:20:06The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and.
- 1:20:09Investments It is usually far more profitable to simply stick
- 1:20:13with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult.
- 1:20:17On occasion, tough problems must be tackled, as was the case when
- 1:20:21we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo.
- 1:20:24In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs
- 1:20:27when a marvelous business encounters A1 time huge but
- 1:20:31solvable problem, as was the case many years back at both
- 1:20:35American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done
- 1:20:40better by avoiding Dragons than by slaying them.
- 1:20:43Oh, my most surprising discovery the overwhelming importance in
- 1:20:47business of an unseen force that we might call the institutional
- 1:20:51imperative. In Business School, I was given
- 1:20:54no hint of IT imperatives existence, and I did not
- 1:20:57intuitively understand it when I entered the business world.
- 1:21:01I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced
- 1:21:04managers would automatically make rational business
- 1:21:07decisions. But I learned over time that
- 1:21:09isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently
- 1:21:12Wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
- 1:21:16For example, one is If governed by Newton's first law of motion,
- 1:21:20an institution will resist any change in its current direction.
- 1:21:252 Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate
- 1:21:29projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available
- 1:21:33funds. 3 Any business craving of the leader, however foolish,
- 1:21:37will be quickly supported by detailed rate of return and
- 1:21:41Strategic Studies prepared by his troops.
- 1:21:43And for the behavior of peer companies, whether they are
- 1:21:47expanding, acquiring, setting, executive compensation, or
- 1:21:51whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
- 1:21:54Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set
- 1:21:58businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided.
- 1:22:02After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the
- 1:22:05power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage
- 1:22:09Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence.
- 1:22:12Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our
- 1:22:16investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
- 1:22:20Oh, after some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only
- 1:22:24with people whom I like, trust, and admire.
- 1:22:27As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure
- 1:22:30success. A second class textile or
- 1:22:33department store company won't prosper simply because its
- 1:22:37managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter
- 1:22:40Mary. However, an owner or investor
- 1:22:43can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself
- 1:22:47with such people and businesses that possess decent economic
- 1:22:51characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to
- 1:22:54join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter
- 1:22:58how attractive the prospects of their business.
- 1:23:01We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.
- 1:23:04Oh, some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible.
- 1:23:08These were stock in business purchases whose virtues I
- 1:23:11understood and it didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great
- 1:23:15opportunity outside one's area of competence, but I have passed
- 1:23:19on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to
- 1:23:21me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding.
- 1:23:26For Berkshire shareholders, myself included, the cost of
- 1:23:29this thumb sucking has been huge or consistently conservative
- 1:23:33Financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my
- 1:23:37view, we're not. In retrospect, it is clear that
- 1:23:40significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage
- 1:23:43ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better
- 1:23:47returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged even
- 1:23:52in 1965. Perhaps we could have judged
- 1:23:55there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead
- 1:23:59to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have
- 1:24:03seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or
- 1:24:07internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to
- 1:24:10produce a result falling somewhere between temporary
- 1:24:13anguish and default. We wouldn't have liked those 99
- 1:24:17colon One odds and never will. A small chance of distress or
- 1:24:21disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of
- 1:24:26extra returns. If your actions are sensible,
- 1:24:29you are certain to get good results, and most such cases,
- 1:24:33leverage just moves things along faster.
- 1:24:36Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry.
- 1:24:38We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds, though we
- 1:24:42have learned to live with those also.
- 1:24:45We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the
- 1:24:481st 50, if we are around in 2015.
- 1:24:52To do that, you can count on this section occupying many more
- 1:24:55pages than it does here. Miscellaneous.
- 1:24:58We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we
- 1:25:02have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits
- 1:25:05the following criteria, call me or preferably right here's what
- 1:25:10we're looking for. One, large purchases at least
- 1:25:12$10 million of after tax earnings. 2 demonstrated
- 1:25:17consistent earning power. Future projections are of little
- 1:25:20interest to us, nor are turn around situations. 3 Businesses
- 1:25:25earning good returns on equity while employing little or no
- 1:25:28debt for management in place. We can't supply it. 5 Simple
- 1:25:32businesses. If there's lots of technology,
- 1:25:34we won't understand it. 6 An offering price.
- 1:25:37We don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking
- 1:25:41even preliminarily about a transaction when price is
- 1:25:45unknown. We will not engage in unfriendly
- 1:25:47takeovers. We can promise complete
- 1:25:50confidentiality and a very fast answer, customarily within 5
- 1:25:54minutes as to whether we're interested.
- 1:25:56We prefer to buy for cash, but we'll consider issuing stock
- 1:26:00when we receive as much an intrinsic business value as we
- 1:26:04give. Our favorite form of purchase is
- 1:26:061 fitting the Blumkin Friedman Hellman mold.
- 1:26:09In cases like these, the company's owner managers wish to
- 1:26:13generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves,
- 1:26:17but often for their families or inactive shareholders.
- 1:26:21At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant
- 1:26:25owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in
- 1:26:29the past. We think we offer a particularly
- 1:26:31good fit for owners with such objectives.
- 1:26:34We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting
- 1:26:38people with whom we have done business in the past.
- 1:26:41Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
- 1:26:44that don't come close to meeting our tests.
- 1:26:47We found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a
- 1:26:50lot of people will call hoping to sell you their Cocker
- 1:26:53spaniels. Our interest in new ventures,
- 1:26:56turnarounds or auction like sales can best be expressed by a
- 1:27:00Goldwyn ISM. Please include me out.
- 1:27:03Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as
- 1:27:07described above, we are also interested in the negotiated
- 1:27:10purchase of large but not controlling blocks of stock
- 1:27:14comparable to those we hold in capital cities, Salomon,
- 1:27:18Gillette, US Air and Champion. Last year we said we had a
- 1:27:22special interest in large purchases of convertible
- 1:27:25preferreds. We still haven't appetite of
- 1:27:27that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the
- 1:27:31maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of
- 1:27:35investment. Two years ago I told you about
- 1:27:37Harry Bottle, who in 1962 quickly cured a major business
- 1:27:42mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster
- 1:27:46Mill Manufacturing, one of my bargain purchases, and who 24
- 1:27:50years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from
- 1:27:54problems at K&W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that
- 1:27:59produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order
- 1:28:03Harry reduced capital employed at K&W, rationalized production,
- 1:28:08cut costs and quadrupled profits.
- 1:28:11You might think he would then have paused for breath, but last
- 1:28:14year Harry, now 70, attended A bankruptcy auction and for a
- 1:28:19pittance acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W.
- 1:28:24That company's profitability may well be increased 50% by this
- 1:28:28coup. Watch this space for future
- 1:28:31bulletins on Harry's triumphs. With more than a year behind him
- 1:28:35of trading Berkshires stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our
- 1:28:38specialist, Jim McGuire of Henderson Brothers Incorporated,
- 1:28:42HBI continues his outstanding performance.
- 1:28:46Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or more of market
- 1:28:50price. Jim has maintained the spread at
- 1:28:5350 points or less, which at current prices is well under 1%.
- 1:28:58Shareholders who buy or sell benefits significantly from this
- 1:29:01reduction in transaction costs. Because we are delighted by our
- 1:29:05experience with Jim, HBI and the NYSEI said as much in ads that
- 1:29:11have been run in a series placed by the NYSE.
- 1:29:14Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this
- 1:29:18instance to publicly compliment the exchange.
- 1:29:21Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased
- 1:29:24for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for 6.7
- 1:29:30dollars million. Those of you who recall the
- 1:29:32mathematics of the multiplying bacteria on page 5 will
- 1:29:36understandably panic if our net worth continues to increase at
- 1:29:41current rates and the cost of replacing planes also continues
- 1:29:45to rise. At the now established rate of
- 1:29:47100% compounded annually, it will not be long before
- 1:29:51Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.
- 1:29:55Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria.
- 1:29:58He feels it's degrading to the bacteria.
- 1:30:00His idea of traveling in style is an air conditioned bus, a
- 1:30:04luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect.
- 1:30:08My own attitude toward the jet can be summarized by the prayer
- 1:30:12attributed apocryphal Eon sure to Saint Augustine as he
- 1:30:16contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a
- 1:30:20priest. Battling the conflict between
- 1:30:23intellect and glance. He pled help me, a Lord to
- 1:30:27become chaste, but not yet. Naming the plane has not been
- 1:30:31easy. I initially suggested the
- 1:30:34Charles Tea monger. Charlie countered with the
- 1:30:36aberration. We finally settled on the
- 1:30:39indefensible. About 96.9% of all eligible
- 1:30:43shares participated in Berkshire's 1989 Shareholder
- 1:30:47Designated Contributions Program.
- 1:30:49Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million and
- 1:30:542550 charities were recipients. We urge new shareholders to read
- 1:31:00the description of our shareholder designated
- 1:31:02contributions program that appears on pages 52 to 53.
- 1:31:07If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly
- 1:31:11urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered
- 1:31:14in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a
- 1:31:18broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on
- 1:31:22August 31st, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.
- 1:31:28The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 AM on
- 1:31:32Monday, April 30th, 1990. Attendance grew last year to
- 1:31:36about 1000, very close to the seating capacity of the
- 1:31:40Witherspoon Hall at Jocelyn Museum.
- 1:31:43So this year's meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theater,
- 1:31:46which is in downtown Omaha about 1/4 of a mile from the Red Line
- 1:31:51Hotel. The Radisson Reddick Tower, a
- 1:31:53much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from
- 1:31:57the Orpheum where you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which
- 1:32:01is in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borschium's.
- 1:32:05We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30
- 1:32:09and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
- 1:32:13Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting and we hope you can make
- 1:32:16it. The quality of our shareholders
- 1:32:19is reflected in that quality of the questions we get.
- 1:32:22We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features
- 1:32:25such a consistently high level off intelligent owner related
- 1:32:29questions. An attachment to our proxy
- 1:32:32material explains how you can obtain the card you will need
- 1:32:35for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be
- 1:32:38tied around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots
- 1:32:42for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains
- 1:32:46information about them. As usual, we will have buses to
- 1:32:50take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borschium's after the
- 1:32:53meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the
- 1:32:56airport later. I hope that you will allow
- 1:32:59plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores.
- 1:33:03Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day
- 1:33:07of the week. It is open from 10:00 AM to 5:30
- 1:33:10PM on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 PM on Sundays.
- 1:33:16Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for
- 1:33:19shareholders and their guests from noon to 6:00 PM on Sunday,
- 1:33:23April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and
- 1:33:26you can rely on him to produce something very special for our
- 1:33:29shareholders. In this letter, we've had a lot
- 1:33:32to say about rates of compounding.
- 1:33:34If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day.
- 1:33:38Not a pretty thought, I admit. Visit Icon, the 29th Warren E
- 1:33:43Buffett, March 2nd, 1990, Chairman of the Board.