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Fukuyamas End of History - Still valid? · Diplomacy and International Relations

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Welcome to Diplomacy and International Relations by
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Bastian Freeborg. Just a quick note before we dive
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OK, so today we're diving deep into, well, one of the most
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compelling and frankly, continually tested ideas in
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modern political thought, Francis Fukuyama's end of
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history thesis. Right.
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It was first put forward back in 1989, you know, right as the
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Berlin Wall was coming down. And Fukuyama made this this
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really bold suggestion that liberal democracy and market
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capitalism represented the final, inevitable destination
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for humanity's sociopolitical evolution.
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Exactly. But in the decades since, global
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events, I mean, everything from democratic backsliding to new
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geopolitical rivalries, they've pushed back and pushed back hard
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against that assertion. And that's the tension, Yeah.
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My argument today is going to be that recent events, while OK,
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certainly challenging, they actually under score the
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enduring relevance of Fukuyama score insights.
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What we're witnessing, I believe, are largely challenges
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within the Liberal Democratic framework, not its fundamental
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refutation. And I'm going to contend that
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the current global landscape presents truly compelling
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evidence that Fukuyama's vision was, well, let's say, at best
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premature and maybe at worst fundamentally flawed.
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We're seeing deep contradictions emerging that liberal democracy
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and capitalism as they're currently structured are really
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struggling, perhaps even failing to resolve.
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OK, so let's layout the initial positions.
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Fukuyama's original thesis positing Western liberal
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democracy as the final socioeconomic stage.
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It really emerged from that profound historical moment,
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didn't it? The fall of the Berlin Wall, the
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disintegration of the Soviet Union.
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It genuinely felt like a coherent political aspiration
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had sort of triumphed globally. Now, I know many point to
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democratic backsliding today, and you see it with figures like
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Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or, you know,
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movements like Trump's MAGA in the US.
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However, Fukuyama himself actually anticipated things like
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this. He described them as a kind of
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death rattle of authoritarianism.
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He noted that even regimes that have fallen back into autocracy,
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places like Iran or North Korea, they often still maintain the
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the trappings of democracy. You know, a constitution, a
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parliament, elections, however much of A sham they might be,
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and the global dominance of capitalism that further
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reinforces this point. Anti capitalist ideologies are,
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well for the most part, relegated to the fringe, aren't
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they? Even overtly anti democratic
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states understand they need to kind of scramble to hold fake
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elections. Why?
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Because they tacitly acknowledged the democratic
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mandate as the recognized source of legitimate authority in the
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modern international system. So when we see things like the
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rise of the radical Alternative for Germany, the Afd, fueled by,
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say, immigration debates, or our rejection of the excesses of
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wokeness in America, these strike me as issues within
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liberal democracy. They're not fundamental
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contradictions that are going to lead to its collapse, but rather
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problems. Serious problems, sure, but ones
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that can be resolved through political means, through
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negotiation, adaptation. Fukuyama's argument, remember,
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also leaned heavily on the logic of modern natural science
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driving economic development towards capitalism and,
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crucially, humanity's desire for recognition, what he called
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thymos, ultimately finding its most rational and universal
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satisfaction in the reciprocal recognition offered by liberal
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States and that underlying mechanism for progress,
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especially the economic aspect, it's still largely holds, I
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think. OK, well, I come at it from a
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very different perspective, because when I look at the
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contemporary global landscape, end of history feels like a
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phrase describing, well, a fantasy really.
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I truly believe it has been decisively proven wrong by the
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current state of affairs. We're not just seeing temporary
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blips. True democracies are teetering,
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and perhaps more worryingly, organized groups that want to
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burn down the House of liberal democracy.
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They're becoming genuinely competitive.
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This is far, far more than mere backsliding.
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The rise of far right nativist parties like Germany's Afd
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tapping into these deep anxieties about immigration and
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national identity. And the whole Trump phenomenon
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rejecting what it labels wokeness.
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They highlight just how profoundly vulnerable liberal
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democracies are to internal divisions and, let's be honest,
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sometimes humanity's worst instincts.
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And we really shouldn't overlook the internet's role here.
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It has fundamentally altered the information landscape.
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It's made these inconvenient truths about capitalist liberal
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democracies think about things like regime change operations,
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war crimes, atrocities against indigenous peoples so much
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easier to access and disseminate globally.
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And this naturally erodes trust in institutions.
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It weakens nations internally. Meanwhile, more authoritarian
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countries can often, you know, keep their dirt under wraps,
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maintaining at least a facade of stability.
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And crucially, the China model presents a powerful counter
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narrative to Fukuyama's idea of universality.
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It shows a clear path of economic development and
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increasing global influence without adopting Western liberal
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democracy. The historical record also
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strongly suggests that the US, often under the guise of
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promoting democracy, has launched wars wantonly and tried
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to export democracy by force, frequently protecting financial
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oligarchy's interests at the cost of other nations stability.
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That Baffler commentary, I think, rightly points out
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Fukuyama's maybe omission of US foreign policy in this imperial
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adventurism, which led directly to failed projects of nation
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building in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria.
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These actions, they directly undermine the liberal principles
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curtailing rights and legitimizing interventionism in
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ways that frankly make a mockery of universal ideals.
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OK, I understand that interpretation, especially given
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the very real anxieties we see playing out in nations from, you
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know, Denmark to Germany and across the Atlantic.
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But my concern is that we might be conflating problems with
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fundamental contradictions. The rise of nationalists or
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populist movements, while absolutely concerning and
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requiring serious attention, yes, they often attach
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themselves to what many people perceive as I'll fated decisions
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of governments, whether that's specific immigration policies,
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maybe in Germany, or certain cultural shifts happening in
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America. These, in my view, are policy
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failures or perhaps profound societal shifts that can
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eventually be addressed within the the robust, flexible
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framework of liberal democracy. They are not, I would argue,
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inherent systemic flaws that are threatening to dismantle the
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system itself. Fukuyama himself was quite
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careful, actually, to distinguish between problems and
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contradictions. He suggested that a problem only
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becomes a contradiction in that sort of Hegelian sense if it
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corrodes the system's legitimacy to the point of collapse.
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Now, while challenged by these movements, the fundamental
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legitimacy of universal rights and market economics has not in
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these nations, actually collapsed.
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In fact, these ideals still remain aspirational for
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populations globally, even for those who are protesting within
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the system. So while you point to deep
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discontent, and it's there, I see societies grappling with
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difficult issues through the very mechanisms of liberal
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debate and electoral politics. I have to respectfully disagree
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there. While you frame these as
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problems, the sheer magnitude and and pervasiveness of the
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current democratic backsliding, coupled with this palpable
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erosion of trust in institutions fueled by those readily
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available inconvenient truths about state actions.
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It suggests something far more profound to me when democracies
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are genuinely described as teetering and when organized
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groups that want to burn down the House of liberal democracy
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are actually competitive electorally.
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It indicates A deeper source of social discontent that is simply
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not being sufficiently resolved within the existing system.
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This, to my mind, absolutely reaches the level of a Hegelian
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contradiction where the very tensions within the system are
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so fundamental they actively threaten its stability and its
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coherence. You know, the rise of the far
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right, often fed by very legitimate concerns of economic
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insecurity among working class populations in the West, points
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directly to systemic failures of capitalism itself to deliver on
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its promise of prosperity for everyone.
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That's creating internal fissures that liberalism is
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really struggling to contain. It's not just about specific
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policy missteps anymore. It feels like it's about a
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widening gap between the promise of liberal prosperity and the
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lived reality for significant number of people.
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And if a system cannot address the material well-being of a
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large portion of its citizenry, that isn't just a problem, it's
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a fundamental challenge to its legitimacy.
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I understand that argument and the economic anxieties are
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certainly real and need addressing.
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But to pivot slightly, let's consider the universality of
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liberalism versus the supposed challenge of alternative models
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like China. While the China model has
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undeniably achieved remarkable economic growth and it certainly
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holds sway in its region, it hasn't, in my opinion, presented
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A universally appealing political ideology that truly
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supplants the liberal ideal on a global scale.
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I mean, even vocally anti democratic states like China,
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Russia, North Korea, they still engage in what we might call
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fake elections. They maintain these trappings of
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democracy, things like a National Assembly or a
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constitution. Now this to me underscores the
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intrinsic appeal and the perceived legitimacy of the
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democratic ideal itself, even if it's not genuinely practiced in
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those places. It shows that even
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authoritarians feel compelled to pay lip service to democratic
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forms. But is that enough?
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Well. And furthermore, Fukuyama
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himself, you know, he eventually distance himself from the
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excessive militarism and embrace of unilateral armed intervention
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of neoconservatism that marked some US foreign policy after the
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Cold War. He advocated instead for what he
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called a realistic Wilsonianism, that is, promoting values
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through example through international institutions,
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rather than primarily through force.
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This was his way, I think, of acknowledging the internal
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fallibility of EU and the critical imortance of its own
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conduct in upholding liberal principles, rather than
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abandoning the core idea that liberal democracy is the most
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desirable form of government. The failures in Iraq and
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Afghanistan, while tragic and deeply problematic, don't
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necessarily invalidate the ideal itself.
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They highlight the immense difficulties, or perhaps even
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the hubris involved in trying to impose it forcefully.
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I'm sorry, but I just don't buy that the trappings of democracy
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argument holds much water against the substantive
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challenge presented by models like China saying that
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authoritarian states merely play pretend with democracy.
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It really overlooks the fact that the China model prioritizes
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things like stability, the collective good, national
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sovereignty over western defined individual democratic freedoms
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in its undeniable economic success.
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It's increasing geopolitical influence provide a powerful,
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tangible counter narrative to the kind of universality
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Fukuyama once posited. It clearly shows that there are
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alternative paths to power and prosperity, or at least paths
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perceived as such by many. Moreover, EU s s imperial
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adventurism, post Cold War, launching wars in places like
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Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan under the, you know, guise of
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democracy. It didn't just undermine its
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conduct, it fundamentally undermined the credibility of
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liberal ideals themselves on the global stage.
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These actions were widely perceived, rightly or wrongly,
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as prioritizing selfish US motives and financial interests,
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not genuine democratic promotion.
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This isn't just a problem of excessive militarism or a
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misapplication of principles. It feels like a fundamental
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hypocrisy that weakens the universal claim of liberal
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democracy to be the end point of history.
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It reveals that the logic of modern natural science doesn't
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inevitably lead to political liberty.
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When power is applied in such a, well, self-serving manner, how
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can an ideal remain universal when its most powerful proponent
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so often appears to act against its own stated values,
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particularly in international relations?
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That's a sharp point about the credibility gap created by
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perceived hypocrisy, and it's certainly a valid criticism of
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certain periods of US foreign policy.
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No doubt. However, let's explore another
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aspect that Fukuyama himself really grappled with,
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Nietzsche's Last Man critique. You mentioned anxieties earlier
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about a rejection of the excesses of wokeness and this
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potential societal annuity. The challenges we observe, like
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say, a perceived decline in work ethic or the fragmentation of
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cultural discourse, they often relate to a fundamental tension
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within liberal society itself. This balance between universal
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equality and the individual's inherent desire for recognition
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or thymos, that innate human longing for dignity, for being
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seen and valued beyond just material comfort.
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Nietzsche famously warned of the last man, these individuals
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content with just comfortable self preservation, lacking
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striving, becoming, as he rather bleakly put it, men without
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chests. Fukuyama considered this deeply.
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However, I would argue that liberal societies, even with all
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their flaws, still offer diverse and pretty robust outlets for
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ambitious natures. This happens through electoral
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politics, through entrepreneurial striving,
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scientific innovation, and even, as Fukuyama noted regarding
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Japan, through seemingly contentless formal arts.
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The ongoing intense debates we have today, even if they
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sometimes seem petty or overly focused on identity politics,
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are arguably manifestations of this very themonic Dr. being
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channeled and contained within the system.
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People are still striving for recognition, even if it's
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through new, maybe sometimes unfamiliar, forms of social and
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political engagement. It shows the desire for
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recognition, though perhaps sometimes misdirected, continues
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to find expression within the liberal framework.
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That's a compelling argument, but have you considered that
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maybe the last man critique, far from being some minor tension,
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actually points to a critical weakness that might be
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foundational? I mean, if liberalism's
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commitment to universal equality in its very pursuit of universal
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recognition actually leads to a kind of creeping mediocrity and
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a Society of men without chests, where relativism discourages
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strong belief in anyone doctrine, well, doesn't it risk
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stripping individuals of the proud self assertiveness that's
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necessary for a robust, dynamic society?
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Consider the argument about the decline of community life not
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despite liberal principles, but precisely because of them, as
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some have argued. This suggests that liberalism
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may be in its pure form, could unintentionally undermine the
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more irrational forms of thymos, things like fierce patriotism, a
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strong communal work ethic, or deep religious community that
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are arguably essential for its own stability and dynamism
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without these more foundational, sometimes maybe irrational
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sources of self worth and belonging.
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Fukuyama himself worried, didn't he, that this could lead men to
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struggle against the just cause out of sheer boredom, seeking
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conflict and identity even within conditions of peace and
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material prosperity. And when we look at the rise of
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tribalism and identity politics across the globe today, it seems
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to suggest that people are indeed seeking meaning and
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recognition in ways that traditional liberalism maybe
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doesn't adequately provide, pointing to a potentially
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profound vulnerability in the thesis of a wholly satisfying
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end of history. Well, today's discussion has
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truly illuminated the the complexities surrounding Francis
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Fukuyama's end of history thesis.
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It's a concept that clearly continues to spark vigorous
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debate in international relations and political
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philosophy. From my perspective, liberal
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democracies certainly face significant internal and
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external pressures, many of which we've discussed today.
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You know, from populism to geopolitical competition.
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These are largely, I still think, problems that can and are
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being addressed within the existing framework.
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I would maintain that the underlying principles of liberal
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democracy and market capitalism remain the most coherent and
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widely aspirational ideals for humanity, with even non
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democratic states ultimately paying homage to them through
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those various trappings of democracy.
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My view. However, as we've explored
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contends that contemporary global events, from the rise of
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authoritarian populism, the powerful challenge of
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alternative models like China's, to the internal erosion of trust
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due to past actions and the very real potential for a last man
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societal end, we I think these reveal deeper contradictions.
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These challenges, I believe, fundamentally destabilize the
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notion of history having reached its end, suggesting that the
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journey is, well, far from over, and perhaps diverging down
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entirely new, quite unpredictable paths.
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It is. Absolutely clear that the global
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political landscape continues to evolve in fascinating and often
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unpredictable ways, and that invites all of us to critically
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examine the assumptions of past theories and to actively engage
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with the unfolding present. There is certainly much more to
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explore in the ongoing history of our world, and we encourage
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our listeners to consider these perspectives as they observe the
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significant issues shaping international relations,
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international politics, and indeed national politics in
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places like Denmark and and well beyond today.
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Thank you for joining us for this debate.
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We hope it's offered you some new perspectives.
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