Latest / Yaron Brook Show / Conversation W/George Selgin -- Lessons from The Great Depression | Yaron Brook Show
Transcript
- 0:02Speaker 1: Right, and there'll be some music and then it starts.
- 0:07Speaker 2: All right, make a little adjustment here, all.
- 0:39Speaker 1: Right, everybody, welcome to your on bookshow on this Monday,
- 0:43Speaker 1: July twenty first. And I am super happy to have
- 0:47Speaker 1: a join in Sulgient with me. You know, I've probably
- 0:51Speaker 1: most of what I know, if not all, of what
- 0:53Speaker 1: I know about money, monetary policy, banking and the way
- 0:58Speaker 1: you know, suddenly the history of banking, I have learned
- 1:00Speaker 1: from either George or his partner in many of his books,
- 1:06Speaker 1: Larry White. So it's a real pleasure to have to
- 1:09Speaker 1: have George here. So thanks for joining us.
- 1:12Speaker 2: George. Oh yeah, thank you for the fine compliment. And
- 1:16Speaker 2: I'm very happy to be here. Good.
- 1:20Speaker 1: So, you have a new book out. You've got a
- 1:24Speaker 1: lot of books out, but but you have a brand
- 1:26Speaker 1: new one out on the Great Depression, and you know,
- 1:32Speaker 1: specifically on kind of whether FDR, whether the New Deal
- 1:37Speaker 1: got us out of the Great Depression. But first I
- 1:40Speaker 1: want to ask you. I mean, there's been a lot
- 1:41Speaker 1: of there a lot of books in the Great Depression,
- 1:44Speaker 1: even quite a few books from kind of free market
- 1:47Speaker 1: advocates about the Great Depression. So why another book?
- 1:52Speaker 2: Well, first of all, I don't see my book as
- 1:56Speaker 2: a work of free market advocacy. I wrote it as
- 2:01Speaker 2: a scholarly assessment of the New Deal, but specifically of
- 2:08Speaker 2: the New Deal as a program for recovery, and so
- 2:14Speaker 2: the purpose of the book was to focus on how
- 2:16Speaker 2: the US recovered from the Depression and how the New
- 2:20Speaker 2: Deal contributed or held back that recovery. I wrote it
- 2:26Speaker 2: for University Chicago Press, so even if I had tried
- 2:31Speaker 2: to write a polemical book, I certainly wouldn't have gotten
- 2:35Speaker 2: through the gamut that they made me and all their
- 2:38Speaker 2: authors go through. They were very supportive of the effort,
- 2:43Speaker 2: by the way, and there aren't many books about that.
- 2:47Speaker 2: In fact, although there are many many shelves worth of
- 2:52Speaker 2: books on the New Deal and also on the Great Depression,
- 2:56Speaker 2: I was surprised to discovered that there was none that
- 2:59Speaker 2: specifically addressed the question of how the US recovered. And
- 3:04Speaker 2: more than that, I was conscious of the fact from
- 3:09Speaker 2: my learning on the subject, because I taught a course
- 3:12Speaker 2: on the Great Depression for some years when I was
- 3:15Speaker 2: a university professor. I was conscious of the fact that
- 3:19Speaker 2: the at least the popular explanations for how the US
- 3:24Speaker 2: got out of the depression were completely unsatisfactory, and some
- 3:29Speaker 2: of the scholarly explanations were at best incomplete. What I
- 3:36Speaker 2: mean by the popular explanations are two extreme views. One
- 3:42Speaker 2: is the view you alluded to that the New Deal
- 3:44Speaker 2: got us out of the depression, and that is simply untenable,
- 3:50Speaker 2: obviously untenable for those who know the chronology, because the
- 3:54Speaker 2: New Deal effect as an effective ongoing legislative program, had
- 3:59Speaker 2: ended by thirty eight. They had done all that they
- 4:02Speaker 2: could think of doing to end the depression, and by
- 4:05Speaker 2: then they weren't able to get any more radical legislation through.
- 4:10Speaker 2: Yet the depression was still raging. At the end of
- 4:12Speaker 2: the nineteen thirties. We still had over seventeen percent of
- 4:16Speaker 2: the labor force either unwork orly for unemployed in nineteen
- 4:20Speaker 2: thirty nine. The other popular explanation is World War two
- 4:24Speaker 2: got us out are There's some truth to that, as
- 4:27Speaker 2: I argue in the book, but it's not as simple as, oh,
- 4:30Speaker 2: the government spent a lot and enlisted a lot of
- 4:34Speaker 2: people who were unemployed in the armed services, and so
- 4:38Speaker 2: the depression ended. It's not that simple for the simple
- 4:42Speaker 2: reason that the war ended, and when the war ended,
- 4:47Speaker 2: the government spending ended that we went back down to
- 4:51Speaker 2: a percentage of government spending relative to GDP that was
- 4:56Speaker 2: roughly what it was putting all levels of government together
- 4:59Speaker 2: in nineteen And of course all the soldiers came back
- 5:04Speaker 2: looking for jobs. So the question, or rather the answer
- 5:08Speaker 2: to the question, how did the depression end, has to
- 5:11Speaker 2: refer to what happened after World War Two ended. It
- 5:14Speaker 2: can't just be what happened during the war. So for
- 5:18Speaker 2: these are some of the reasons why I felt a
- 5:20Speaker 2: book on that issue was called for great.
- 5:25Speaker 1: So before we get into kind of the details of
- 5:29Speaker 1: what the New Deal was and how it contributed or
- 5:31Speaker 1: not to recovery, maybe walk us through. I know this
- 5:36Speaker 1: is going to be have to be simplified. What caused
- 5:39Speaker 1: the Great Depression? What led to the Great Depression? Or
- 5:42Speaker 1: what caused it? You know, the three minute version?
- 5:47Speaker 2: Yeah, well I should say I don't even offer a
- 5:50Speaker 2: three minute version in my book. I scrupulously avoid the
- 5:55Speaker 2: question of what caused the depression, except somewhat indirectly. Of course,
- 6:00Speaker 2: have to address some of its causes, because one controversial
- 6:05Speaker 2: topic per book is enough, and a lot of people
- 6:09Speaker 2: have debated forever the causes. But if I had to
- 6:12Speaker 2: answer as I apparently do. I would say that the
- 6:18Speaker 2: biggest problem was the monetary disturbances and disarray that the
- 6:26Speaker 2: First World War left the world in upon its termination.
- 6:33Speaker 2: And to make a very long story short, many countries
- 6:36Speaker 2: had inflated like mad during the war. The belligerents had
- 6:41Speaker 2: almost all of them, the US less so than other
- 6:43Speaker 2: countries because it entered late, and most of them got
- 6:47Speaker 2: off the gold standard once again. The US was an
- 6:49Speaker 2: exception in that we didn't go off gold entirely, but
- 6:52Speaker 2: we did suspend restrict gold exports. All of this left
- 6:57Speaker 2: the world with a money supply in price level or
- 7:01Speaker 2: money supplies and price levels that were really not consistent
- 7:06Speaker 2: with the classical gold standard, and more particularly with the
- 7:09Speaker 2: actual availability of gold. You couldn't have the thing. You
- 7:12Speaker 2: couldn't restore the old gold parodies under those circumstances unless
- 7:19Speaker 2: there was going to be a lot of deflation or
- 7:22Speaker 2: there were going to be some devaluations. Now all of
- 7:25Speaker 2: these things, Both of those things happened, but they didn't
- 7:30Speaker 2: happen enough. There was resistance to both. England, for example,
- 7:34Speaker 2: refused to devalue the pound, and clever people politicians came
- 7:41Speaker 2: up with a third solution, a kind of gold standard
- 7:46Speaker 2: on the cheap, where most countries would not hold their
- 7:50Speaker 2: own gold reserves but would instead participate in a so
- 7:54Speaker 2: called gold exchange standard, where the Bank of England and
- 8:00Speaker 2: the Federal Reserve between them became sort of central banks
- 8:03Speaker 2: for all the other central banks. And what this did
- 8:06Speaker 2: was to allow us limited amount of gold reserves to
- 8:11Speaker 2: stretch further and sustain post war money supplies and price
- 8:17Speaker 2: levels at higher levels and would otherwise have been the case.
- 8:20Speaker 2: The problem with that arrangement is if the people who
- 8:24Speaker 2: are participating in it changed their mind. For example, if
- 8:27Speaker 2: the French decide they're going to cash in all their
- 8:30Speaker 2: deposits at the Bank of England, they can send the
- 8:33Speaker 2: whole house of cards tumbling down. And that's what happened
- 8:37Speaker 2: in the late nineteen twenties, and that precipitated a very
- 8:42Speaker 2: severe worldwide deflationary depression that then most countries had to
- 8:51Speaker 2: struggle to get out of. And we took longer than
- 8:54Speaker 2: every one of them except France, of the major economies
- 8:58Speaker 2: get out.
- 9:00Speaker 1: So how did it play out in the United State?
- 9:02Speaker 1: That is the what are the what are the things
- 9:05Speaker 1: that happened to kind of manifest the Great Depression from
- 9:08Speaker 1: twenty nine on.
- 9:10Speaker 2: Well, there were, of course, we faced the usual macroeconomic
- 9:16Speaker 2: consequences that essentially define the depression, a collapse in output
- 9:21Speaker 2: and a collapse in employment. At one point in nineteen
- 9:26Speaker 2: thirty three, the peak level of employment plus workers on
- 9:31Speaker 2: work relief was twenty five percent of the labor force,
- 9:34Speaker 2: a figure we haven't seen even half of since. So
- 9:42Speaker 2: a lot of people are out of work and a
- 9:43Speaker 2: lot of production is not happening. Factories are closed down.
- 9:48Speaker 2: Also behind all of this is a lack of spending.
- 9:51Speaker 2: That's kind of driving it all. The other thing that
- 9:56Speaker 2: is important in the US case, specifically, because all the
- 10:00Speaker 2: countries experienced severe macrick and other consequences, we had as
- 10:05Speaker 2: well a severe banking crisis. Many many, many thousands of
- 10:11Speaker 2: US banks failed. Now we had a lot to begin with.
- 10:13Speaker 2: We had over twenty thousand banks going into this event,
- 10:17Speaker 2: but a high proportion of them failed, and we had
- 10:22Speaker 2: banking crises, not just failures, but situations where panic spread,
- 10:29Speaker 2: culminating in a major banking crisis in February March nineteen
- 10:35Speaker 2: thirty three that only ended with the shutting down of
- 10:39Speaker 2: all US banks by Roosevelt as soon as he took
- 10:43Speaker 2: office in March.
- 10:46Speaker 1: So what is it So to what extent did what
- 10:50Speaker 1: Rosevil did when he came to office in thirty three,
- 10:52Speaker 1: To what extent did it moderate or improve situations? To
- 10:58Speaker 1: what extent did it make it worse? I mean he
- 11:00Speaker 1: did some big there was some big, big projects.
- 11:06Speaker 2: Well, the first thing Roosevelt did, and the first thing
- 11:10Speaker 2: he had to do, which of course he hadn't been
- 11:12Speaker 2: anticipating doing doing during his campaign or at any time
- 11:16Speaker 2: the year before, was to deal with the banking crisis,
- 11:19Speaker 2: because that broke out during the so called interregnum between
- 11:23Speaker 2: his election and his taking office. So he had to
- 11:27Speaker 2: deal with that, and he dealt with it pretty astutely.
- 11:29Speaker 2: As most historians agree, shutting down the banks was an
- 11:34Speaker 2: essential step, or at least it was part of an
- 11:38Speaker 2: overall plan for shutting them down and then gradually reopening them.
- 11:43Speaker 2: That worked. It worked. When the banks were reopened, generally speaking,
- 11:49Speaker 2: they were not faced with runs again. Various steps taken
- 11:55Speaker 2: during the so called National Bank Holiday had quelled people
- 12:00Speaker 2: speares or just as importantly, eliminated otherwise their incentive to
- 12:06Speaker 2: run on banks. One of those steps, for example, was
- 12:09Speaker 2: denying making it impossible for people to hoard gold. One
- 12:13Speaker 2: of the main causes of runs in February March was
- 12:16Speaker 2: fear of devaluation, so people were running on the dollar
- 12:20Speaker 2: to get gold, not necessarily running on banks because they
- 12:24Speaker 2: thought they were about to fail. And of course, by
- 12:28Speaker 2: first prohibiting gold ownership and also demanding forcing people to
- 12:36Speaker 2: bring the gold they'd taken out back, which they did
- 12:39Speaker 2: in various ways that I talked about in my book,
- 12:42Speaker 2: they eliminated this one incentive to run, but there were
- 12:44Speaker 2: other steps. Of course, there was ensuring bank deposits. Eventually.
- 12:49Speaker 2: What's interesting about this successful addressing of the bank holiday
- 12:55Speaker 2: from a historian's point of view, is that the whole
- 12:58Speaker 2: thing was actually planned, or most of it was planned
- 13:01Speaker 2: by the Hoover administration treasury team, many of from stayed
- 13:06Speaker 2: on to help the Roosevelt knew. Roosevelt folks, oh frankly,
- 13:13Speaker 2: had no plan at all coming into office. So what
- 13:16Speaker 2: Roosevelt did, wisely, he was to let the Hoover Treasury
- 13:21Speaker 2: experts let them help, because he didn't have to do that,
- 13:27Speaker 2: and then he helped execute the plan with his wonderful
- 13:30Speaker 2: fireside chat. The first one soothing depositors and all that.
- 13:35Speaker 2: So these first steps mark the turnaround. It's very important
- 13:38Speaker 2: to give the Roosevelt plus the Hoover administration credit for
- 13:42Speaker 2: stopping the rot, for stopping the down turn of the economy,
- 13:50Speaker 2: because of course, unless you did that, you couldn't even
- 13:53Speaker 2: begin to talk about recovery. So that was the early days. Unfortunately,
- 13:58Speaker 2: subsequent New de policies, which is the real New Deal,
- 14:02Speaker 2: the part that was not, as it were, a reaction
- 14:06Speaker 2: to events that couldn't be anticipated. Many of those proved counterproductive,
- 14:13Speaker 2: and that's where the New Deal really takes effect. And
- 14:17Speaker 2: much of it is unhelpful, not all of it. I
- 14:20Speaker 2: talked in my book about programs New Deal programs that
- 14:23Speaker 2: also were very I think constructive. So it isn't all that.
- 14:31Speaker 1: So if we take you know, the the NRA for example,
- 14:35Speaker 1: maybe walk us through this is a very controversial, big
- 14:38Speaker 1: part of that first administrations. Administration. What was it and
- 14:44Speaker 1: what was it trying to achieve? And you know what
- 14:49Speaker 1: was its fate?
- 14:51Speaker 2: Yes, Well, first of all, it's important to recognize that
- 14:55Speaker 2: the New Deal comprised three sorts of legislative efforts. Roosevelt
- 15:00Speaker 2: was very clear on this, aimed at the so called
- 15:03Speaker 2: three hours recovery, relief and reform. Recovery is obviously getting
- 15:11Speaker 2: out of the depression. Relief is providing aid and sustenance
- 15:15Speaker 2: to the people who would otherwise would be unemployed and
- 15:19Speaker 2: not have a way to make a living. And reform
- 15:23Speaker 2: was more long term, and the New Deal involved elements
- 15:26Speaker 2: of all three. I mentioned this because as a prelude
- 15:30Speaker 2: to saying that of the New Deal's original reform plans,
- 15:35Speaker 2: there were two major components. The first, and actually the
- 15:40Speaker 2: earliest to be implemented, was the Agricultural Adjustment Act the AAA,
- 15:46Speaker 2: and its complement, because these were meant to work together,
- 15:51Speaker 2: was the NRA. That's the National Recovery Administration, which was
- 15:55Speaker 2: passed as part of the NIRA, or National Industrial Recovery Act.
- 16:02Speaker 2: The alphabet stuff, the alphabet soup gets very confusing, very quickly.
- 16:08Speaker 2: The NRA was part of the Roosevelt team's efforts to
- 16:14Speaker 2: get prices back up. Now this here we have to
- 16:18Speaker 2: be very careful, because it is true that, like many economists,
- 16:24Speaker 2: they felt the Roosevelt people felt that getting prices up
- 16:28Speaker 2: was something they needed to do for recovery. The problem
- 16:33Speaker 2: is that unlike most economists, unlike Kines. Yes, but also
- 16:39Speaker 2: unlike the Chicago School economists and many others, and unlike me,
- 16:44Speaker 2: they weren't. They didn't want to do this by getting
- 16:49Speaker 2: making it possible for people to spend more. They were
- 16:53Speaker 2: particularly they were opposed the FDR, the New Dealers, especially
- 16:58Speaker 2: in that those first years. They were opposed to both
- 17:02Speaker 2: fiscal and monetary stimulus, which is the two main things
- 17:05Speaker 2: that we think of today as you know, what you
- 17:07Speaker 2: do for depression, and this is very important. Roosevelt was
- 17:11Speaker 2: a fiscal conservative. First of all. Yes, his deficits were
- 17:15Speaker 2: bigger than Hoover's, but as was the case with Hoover,
- 17:19Speaker 2: these deficits were inadvertent. He wasn't he wasn't willing to
- 17:25Speaker 2: dispense with relief, and because the depression was so bad,
- 17:29Speaker 2: the government ended spending a lot on relief, including public works.
- 17:33Speaker 2: But Roosevelt never believed the deficits per se were helpful.
- 17:37Speaker 2: He thought that they hurt, so he tried to avoid
- 17:39Speaker 2: them except if it would make people destitute. And on
- 17:44Speaker 2: monetary policy, Roosevelt didn't believe in monetary expansion. That's what
- 17:50Speaker 2: they called inflation in those days. Inflation was a word
- 17:53Speaker 2: that meant monetary expansion, just as the roth Bardians used
- 17:56Speaker 2: the term. Today most people don't use it that way.
- 18:00Speaker 2: But Roosevelt was against inflation. So how do you get
- 18:04Speaker 2: the price level up if you're not going to do
- 18:06Speaker 2: fiscal spent timulus, which is government spending deficit spending, or
- 18:10Speaker 2: you're not going to do monetary expansion, or you're trying
- 18:12Speaker 2: not to do it. Well, you come up with all
- 18:14Speaker 2: these other things that can get prices to rise, but
- 18:17Speaker 2: not necessarily with the same consequences. And the NRA was
- 18:22Speaker 2: one of those. The AA was another. In both cases,
- 18:25Speaker 2: the idea was to get prices up by restricting output.
- 18:29Speaker 2: In the case of the NRA, industries were commanded to
- 18:33Speaker 2: come up with industry wide codes that the government would
- 18:37Speaker 2: help enforce that would set prices higher, including the prices
- 18:42Speaker 2: of labor, wage rates and uh, and and enforce those
- 18:47Speaker 2: higher prices and wages, wage rates and the ideal And
- 18:51Speaker 2: of course to do this, what you're what they're doing
- 18:53Speaker 2: is forming legal cartels. Every industry is being cartilized. This
- 18:57Speaker 2: was understood, it is not and uh. There's a very
- 19:02Speaker 2: good book on this, by the way, called The New Deal.
- 19:04Speaker 2: In the Problem of Monopoly. It was a very famous
- 19:08Speaker 2: book that the deals just with this odd, odd aspect
- 19:13Speaker 2: of the new deal in the ni it anyway, they
- 19:18Speaker 2: they mandated higher prices and wage rates. But the problem
- 19:22Speaker 2: with doing that without monetary or fiscal stimulus is nobody's
- 19:26Speaker 2: earning more money. Firms aren't earning any more revenues. So
- 19:31Speaker 2: how are they going to and and how are they
- 19:34Speaker 2: going to pay workers higher wage rates? Well, they can
- 19:37Speaker 2: only do it if they hire fewer labor hours, and
- 19:40Speaker 2: that's exactly what happened. How are they going to sell
- 19:43Speaker 2: their products for higher prices, Well, they can do it
- 19:47Speaker 2: by restricting output, right, because you don't have demand pushing
- 19:52Speaker 2: up prices, you must have a supply contract to push
- 19:57Speaker 2: them up. Yep. So the the NRA is trying to
- 20:01Speaker 2: get the economy going again by restricting output and employment,
- 20:08Speaker 2: though they didn't see it as doing that, and in fact,
- 20:12Speaker 2: the only reason unemployment didn't go sharply up under the
- 20:17Speaker 2: NRA was because of another government program called work sharing
- 20:23Speaker 2: that required firms to divvy up existing jobs into larger
- 20:29Speaker 2: numbers of jobs with smaller hours or lower hours per week.
- 20:34Speaker 2: So that hid the actual unemployment from the standard statistics.
- 20:39Speaker 2: But in fact, if you look at total labor hours employed,
- 20:43Speaker 2: they go down. And all this time, with all these
- 20:47Speaker 2: people were looking for jobs, real wage rates had gone up.
- 20:53Speaker 2: They were going up while people were lining lining up
- 20:56Speaker 2: for jobs, and that can only happen with controls. So
- 21:00Speaker 2: that's the NR. Most economists think it was a disaster,
- 21:04Speaker 2: and even during the time many people concluded that it
- 21:07Speaker 2: was a disaster. Ultimately, including some New Dealers themselves, they're
- 21:11Speaker 2: not FDR. He tried to keep the thing alive.
- 21:14Speaker 1: Uh the does it come from economically? I mean, is
- 21:17Speaker 1: this just a you know, off the cuff. It was
- 21:20Speaker 1: the theory behind this, because.
- 21:22Speaker 2: There was a theory, well there was a theory. Particularly,
- 21:26Speaker 2: there were a couple of things that played input. One
- 21:28Speaker 2: was the idea that you know, we're now in the
- 21:30Speaker 2: managerial state and firms aren't working the way they used to.
- 21:35Speaker 2: It's all about planning. So it's either they're going to plan,
- 21:39Speaker 2: or the government's going to plan, or they're going to
- 21:41Speaker 2: have some combination of the two do the planning. So
- 21:44Speaker 2: the planning mentality is very much at the forefront of
- 21:48Speaker 2: the early New Deal. The people in charge or leading
- 21:51Speaker 2: that phase of the New Deal are very much advocates
- 21:55Speaker 2: of planning, and because they think it's going to happen
- 21:59Speaker 2: one way or they are and if it's going to happen,
- 22:02Speaker 2: the government is more reliable in the saddle than the
- 22:06Speaker 2: businessman alone. And of course, in this particular case, the
- 22:10Speaker 2: way they did it, the businessman, the big businesses were
- 22:13Speaker 2: very happy to cooperate because they say, we can cartelize.
- 22:17Speaker 2: The smaller firms are going to just have to go
- 22:20Speaker 2: along with it, because, as you would expect, the big
- 22:23Speaker 2: firms were able to exercise more control of the process,
- 22:28Speaker 2: but ultimately they all got sick of it. Because it
- 22:32Speaker 2: is the classic case of Bastiat's famous dictum that you
- 22:37Speaker 2: know that the stage is that fictitious entity by which
- 22:42Speaker 2: everybody tries to get rich at the expense of everybody else,
- 22:48Speaker 2: through which everybody tries that, and that's what's happening. Everybody's
- 22:51Speaker 2: trying to be a monopolist or a cartel but everybody
- 22:56Speaker 2: has to face the fact that the costs that they
- 22:58Speaker 2: bear are rising with everything else anyway. So the other
- 23:03Speaker 2: theory that's fueling the NRA, and particularly the wage components
- 23:08Speaker 2: of the NRA, is something called the high wage doctrine
- 23:12Speaker 2: that emerged in the nineteen thirties after the twenty twenty
- 23:15Speaker 2: one crisis, where the idea developed that if we pay
- 23:23Speaker 2: workers hire wages, I'm doing this on purpose, then they'll
- 23:29Speaker 2: have more to spend and that will help out get
- 23:34Speaker 2: achieve recovery. But wages is a terrible word because it
- 23:40Speaker 2: has two different meaning. One is the total wage bill,
- 23:43Speaker 2: or the number of dollars that are being received by workers,
- 23:47Speaker 2: the total mind, which is their incomes. The other is
- 23:51Speaker 2: the wage rates, which is how much you're having to
- 23:55Speaker 2: pay workers per hour. Now, if you increase wage rates,
- 24:00Speaker 2: you don't necessarily increase the wage bill. In fact, unless
- 24:03Speaker 2: somehow firms can be earning more revenue, the only way
- 24:08Speaker 2: they can raise wage rates is by paying hiring fewer
- 24:14Speaker 2: labor hours. And so unless you have an independent policy
- 24:20Speaker 2: that is providing more spending, that is achieving more spending
- 24:25Speaker 2: and increasing total revenues in a depression, the firms are
- 24:29Speaker 2: not going to have a lot of profits that they
- 24:32Speaker 2: can dig into in order to pay higher wage rates,
- 24:35Speaker 2: so you end up with more unemployment. It was a
- 24:40Speaker 2: very stupid policy, quite frankly, because you can draw the
- 24:44Speaker 2: supply and demand curves on the table nap and figure
- 24:47Speaker 2: out that raising wage rates doesn't give you more employment
- 24:53Speaker 2: on the contrary. Nevertheless, it caught on, partly caught on
- 24:57Speaker 2: because of Henry Ford paying workers hour than usual in
- 25:01Speaker 2: it and the idea that the seed they can all
- 25:03Speaker 2: now buy Fords. But it weren't able to buy Fords
- 25:09Speaker 2: because Ford was paying them high salaries. They were able
- 25:13Speaker 2: to buy Fords because other people were buying Fords and
- 25:17Speaker 2: otherwise spending a lot more money, and the revenues were good,
- 25:20Speaker 2: and Ford could afford to pay the higher wage rates.
- 25:24Speaker 2: And so anyway, very bad theory. I have a paper
- 25:27Speaker 2: about it.
- 25:28Speaker 1: Brought some thing about why Ford wrote it raised wages.
- 25:31Speaker 1: Why did you he doubled them?
- 25:33Speaker 2: Right? Yes, well, because he realized that he could get
- 25:37Speaker 2: good labor for that product that those wage rates. Remember
- 25:42Speaker 2: that Ford is also a pioneer with advances in assembly
- 25:47Speaker 2: line technology, so his workers are more productive than other
- 25:51Speaker 2: workers because they have this technology or management arrangements that
- 26:01Speaker 2: allow them to be more productive and be worth those
- 26:05Speaker 2: higher wage traits. So you really he could afford to
- 26:10Speaker 2: do it because his plants where his plants were productive. Anyway,
- 26:16Speaker 2: so you had all these theories that didn't form the NRA.
- 26:20Speaker 2: And also the AAA, and the AAA tried to get
- 26:23Speaker 2: agricultural prices up by telling farmers to quit farming so much,
- 26:29Speaker 2: by paying them to reduce their farm their acreage, and
- 26:34Speaker 2: by kill their piglets and et cetera. And of course
- 26:39Speaker 2: that will raise prices, but it does so by reducing
- 26:43Speaker 2: agricultural output. And when you reduce agricultural output, you hire
- 26:47Speaker 2: fewer workers. The people who really got screwed, if you
- 26:52Speaker 2: pardon the expression, but it's quite appropriate here by the
- 26:56Speaker 2: AAA the most where the poor sharehold and agricultural laborers,
- 27:03Speaker 2: particularly in the Common South, you had many of these
- 27:10Speaker 2: persons who didn't they legally some of them were entitled.
- 27:17Speaker 2: The shareholders were entitled to part of the payments for
- 27:20Speaker 2: reducing output. But guess what they farm owners took it all.
- 27:25Speaker 2: And so these people ended up with no jobs and
- 27:29Speaker 2: no opportunities to find them anywhere down South where they're
- 27:32Speaker 2: now farming less, and they ended up going to the
- 27:36Speaker 2: urban cities and usually joining the roles of the unemployed
- 27:41Speaker 2: unless they were lucky and got work relief. And the
- 27:44Speaker 2: black African American families, many of them, were part of
- 27:49Speaker 2: that exodus. It was a great tragic consequence of that
- 27:54Speaker 2: component of the new deal that's often forgotten about.
- 28:00Speaker 1: The nWay ultimately is ruled onun constitutional. Is that right
- 28:03Speaker 1: by the courts.
- 28:05Speaker 2: Yes, they were both ruled unconstitutional, the AAA and the NRA.
- 28:10Speaker 2: The AAA was ruled unconstitutional because of what was considered
- 28:14Speaker 2: a discriminatory tax that was used to raise the money
- 28:19Speaker 2: with which farmers were paid to not have farmed. And
- 28:26Speaker 2: and by the way, they recreated another AAA after that
- 28:30Speaker 2: one was struck down that avoided that particular constitutional issue.
- 28:37Speaker 2: The NRA was struck down unsimilar somewhat similar constitutional grounds,
- 28:44Speaker 2: particularly concerning whether the whether the actions of the NRA
- 28:54Speaker 2: of the National Recovery Administration were justified or warranted by
- 28:59Speaker 2: the commerce clause. And they found that it was not.
- 29:03Speaker 2: So that disappeared, and thank goodness, wasn't revived. Nothing quite
- 29:08Speaker 2: like it has ever been tried again since. By the way,
- 29:11Speaker 2: only one other country implemented reforms that resembled to address
- 29:17Speaker 2: the depression that resembled the NRA. And I think I
- 29:22Speaker 2: mentioned that France was the only other country that recovered
- 29:25Speaker 2: as slowly or perhaps a little more slowly than the USA.
- 29:28Speaker 2: And guess what they were the ones. So there's a
- 29:32Speaker 2: lot of evidence that that kind of planning solution to
- 29:37Speaker 2: the New Deal didn't work. And there are some economists
- 29:43Speaker 2: who contest this, but the vast majority then and now
- 29:48Speaker 2: I think the NRA was a big mistake, and often
- 29:54Speaker 2: the worst mistake of the New Deal. I think it
- 29:57Speaker 2: was probably the worst mistake. I hope we get a chance,
- 30:01Speaker 2: by the way to talk about the positive things, because
- 30:03Speaker 2: they wear some I don't want people to think that
- 30:05Speaker 2: I'm only cataloging the New deals bad attempts. That it
- 30:13Speaker 2: was certainly one of the worst things that was done.
- 30:16Speaker 1: So what happens, you know, a n O A. They
- 30:20Speaker 1: make things in a sense, wus not better, and yet
- 30:24Speaker 1: the economy doesn't do us. So what is going on?
- 30:28Speaker 1: Is the positive going on? That is that is offsetting
- 30:31Speaker 1: kind of in terms of the effects.
- 30:33Speaker 2: Well, most of the positive recovery is during the very
- 30:37Speaker 2: first early period, and there there's actually a big post
- 30:43Speaker 2: bank holiday uplift of the economy and things are looking
- 30:47Speaker 2: pretty good for a while. But it's actually after the
- 30:51Speaker 2: NRA and the AAA kick in, it takes. It takes.
- 30:57Speaker 2: There's a little bit of a delay, but that recovery
- 30:59Speaker 2: is starts to peter out, It starts to Peter up.
- 31:02Speaker 2: Now there is afterwards, there is another period of recovery.
- 31:09Speaker 2: But I would argue, and I think the evidence supports
- 31:12Speaker 2: the argument that the recovery that took place overall beyond
- 31:17Speaker 2: the initial phase where you have the advantage of getting
- 31:22Speaker 2: the bank situation resolved, which is very positive. Then though,
- 31:29Speaker 2: when the NRA first is announced and it's being expected,
- 31:33Speaker 2: you have another little mini boom. You have a mini boom.
- 31:36Speaker 2: But most economists think that that's because there was a
- 31:40Speaker 2: lot of anticipatory buying by producers stocking up on inventories
- 31:46Speaker 2: and inputs and other things because they know that the
- 31:48Speaker 2: prices are all going to be going up, and then
- 31:51Speaker 2: it peters out already in the fall, you have the
- 31:54Speaker 2: New dealers themselves noting that, Okay, now things are starting
- 31:58Speaker 2: to look a little bit shaky, but what's the art's happening?
- 32:00Speaker 2: Then that is driving the recovery from that point on
- 32:05Speaker 2: to the big Roosevelt downturn of thirty seven thirty eight.
- 32:11Speaker 2: Is a factor for which the New Deal is only
- 32:14Speaker 2: partially responsible. And that's gold. What we started talking about,
- 32:20Speaker 2: how lack of gold was part of the problem that
- 32:23Speaker 2: caused the Great Depression, and that's absolutely true. What many
- 32:28Speaker 2: people don't realize was that the United States was facing
- 32:32Speaker 2: an inundation of gold after nineteen thirty three, or actually
- 32:38Speaker 2: mostly after January nineteenth, after January nineteen thirty four, to
- 32:43Speaker 2: be precise, that's when Roosevelt finally devalued the dollar, and
- 32:48Speaker 2: that initially caused some increase in gold inflows into the
- 32:55Speaker 2: United States, because devaluing the dollar means you're raising the
- 32:58Speaker 2: price of gold and making it worth more. But the
- 33:01Speaker 2: main factor that has a temporary effect. For reasons I
- 33:05Speaker 2: discussed in my book, devaluation won't keep gold in flowing forever,
- 33:10Speaker 2: even if other countries don't devalue in turn. But there's
- 33:14Speaker 2: something else going on, and this is the biggest driver
- 33:17Speaker 2: of the recovery between nineteen thirty four and nineteen thirty seven.
- 33:23Speaker 2: It's Europe's war clouds. It's Hitler, mainly Hitler. Hitler becomes
- 33:30Speaker 2: chancellor around this actually a little bit before this time,
- 33:33Speaker 2: and increasingly there's fear of war, and these jitters are
- 33:41Speaker 2: become the main reason why gold starts heading in large amounts,
- 33:46Speaker 2: even larger than devaluation itself would have promoted to the
- 33:50Speaker 2: United States. In all that gold that is monetary stimulus,
- 33:56Speaker 2: but it's not on purpose. The Federal Reserve, the Federal
- 34:01Speaker 2: Reserve is passively having to accept not gold itself actually,
- 34:06Speaker 2: because now that gold ownership is illegal, even the FED
- 34:09Speaker 2: isn't allowed to have gold. Instead, the Treasury buys all
- 34:12Speaker 2: the gold that comes into the country and gives the
- 34:15Speaker 2: FED gold certificates, the piece of paper saying we have
- 34:19Speaker 2: this gold, and that becomes the Fed's asset. Anyway, the
- 34:23Speaker 2: FED is passively allowing this. It's not engaging in any
- 34:27Speaker 2: monetary stimulus on purpose. And here's the biggest irony. This
- 34:32Speaker 2: is helping to restore spending. This is doing what the
- 34:36Speaker 2: NRA isn't doing and the AAA isn't doing, and it's
- 34:40Speaker 2: making It is limiting the damage done by those programs,
- 34:44Speaker 2: which would otherwise be quite counterproductive. But then guess what
- 34:48Speaker 2: happens The government officials in the Treasury and elsewhere. Remember,
- 34:53Speaker 2: they don't like inflation monetary expansion, so they don't like this,
- 34:59Speaker 2: and they actually start are absolutely fearing that this is
- 35:02Speaker 2: going to cause inflation. Not sorry, they don't mind prices rising,
- 35:09Speaker 2: but they saying this is inflation. What they're really worried
- 35:12Speaker 2: about is monetary expansion. And particularly that the banking system
- 35:16Speaker 2: is going to expand they're sitting on tons of reserves,
- 35:19Speaker 2: and that that's going to cause another a stock market boom,
- 35:22Speaker 2: and it's all going to lead to a crash. So
- 35:26Speaker 2: you might say they're very Austrian about it, but the
- 35:28Speaker 2: sad reality is that here you had the one thing
- 35:32Speaker 2: that's really driving recovery. It's gold coming in doing what
- 35:37Speaker 2: gold a gold standard is supposed to do. Right, you
- 35:39Speaker 2: got low prices, you go comes in and it gots
- 35:43Speaker 2: things going again. They decided they needed to do something
- 35:46Speaker 2: about it, and so they did two things. The Treasury
- 35:50Speaker 2: and the Fed separately did these anti gold inflation things,
- 35:59Speaker 2: kind of with the it's not exactly talking to the other.
- 36:02Speaker 2: So you get a double dose of efforts to keep
- 36:05Speaker 2: the gold from resulting in more spending. The FED doubles
- 36:11Speaker 2: reserve requirements, doubles them, and at the same time, the
- 36:17Speaker 2: Treasury starts sterilizing for a period gold inflows, so they're
- 36:22Speaker 2: not giving the Fed the gold certificates for that much
- 36:25Speaker 2: for gold for an extensive Between these two things and
- 36:29Speaker 2: also some government austerity, but mostly I think the sterilization
- 36:33Speaker 2: first of all, and then the reserve requires the recovery
- 36:36Speaker 2: stops because the thing driving it stops. There's no more
- 36:40Speaker 2: goods to me. And that precipitates the great so called
- 36:45Speaker 2: Roosevelt procession of nineteen thirty seven nineteen thirty eight, which
- 36:49Speaker 2: wipes out a huge part, not all, but a big
- 36:53Speaker 2: chunk of the recovery, the progress toward recovery that had
- 36:57Speaker 2: occurred in the preceding years. And it's all on New
- 37:00Speaker 2: Dealers because they were the ones who put the brakes
- 37:05Speaker 2: on that one important source of spending stimulus, golden flows.
- 37:11Speaker 2: It's very tragic. By the way, Caneskines was very good
- 37:14Speaker 2: on the depression. I know people hated when I say that,
- 37:17Speaker 2: but he was for the most part. If the New
- 37:19Speaker 2: Dealers had listened to Knes, we would have a much
- 37:21Speaker 2: more rapid recovery. Knes noted this golden flow. He noted
- 37:25Speaker 2: the connection between it and Stalin, by the way, was
- 37:30Speaker 2: another between Hitler and Stalin. They did more for recovery
- 37:33Speaker 2: at this time than Roosevelt. I'm only being semi facetious
- 37:37Speaker 2: when I say that Stalin was subsidizing gold mining, and
- 37:43Speaker 2: so he was their mind out. Their minds were putting
- 37:46Speaker 2: out tons of gold, much more than they had in
- 37:49Speaker 2: the twenties, and a lot of it was ending up
- 37:51Speaker 2: as part of that flow to the US via Europe.
- 37:54Speaker 2: And so anyway Keynes is noting, they say, what this
- 37:57Speaker 2: is ironic, but this might be. This is the thing
- 38:00Speaker 2: that's helping the recovery. And what he didn't anticipate when
- 38:05Speaker 2: he wrote about that was that the US authorities would
- 38:08Speaker 2: respond to this with policies designed to stop it. We
- 38:13Speaker 2: can't have all this gold, and I'm absolutely not exaggerating.
- 38:19Speaker 2: So this was a tragic response to what would have been.
- 38:26Speaker 2: And by the way, I'm not being radical here. Christina
- 38:28Speaker 2: Roemer is a very good economic historian who's written all
- 38:32Speaker 2: about how the gold then flows with a main thing
- 38:34Speaker 2: driving recovery, and she's not crazy the libertarian or anything
- 38:41Speaker 2: like that. But this was very tragic. So after that,
- 38:48Speaker 2: by thirty eight, as the economy is finally getting out
- 38:52Speaker 2: of this secondary depression, but by then the new Deal
- 38:56Speaker 2: kind of peters out. There's no more efforts in the
- 38:59Speaker 2: parts of the old Deal are being dismantled and found unconstitutional,
- 39:04Speaker 2: and so you end up that's why we end up
- 39:06Speaker 2: with seventeen point something percent of the labor force either
- 39:10Speaker 2: on work relief or unemployee. I want to add a
- 39:12Speaker 2: footnote here on if I may. There's some people say, oh,
- 39:16Speaker 2: you shouldn't count the people on work relief as being,
- 39:22Speaker 2: you know, among the unemployed, and I don't. They're not unemployed,
- 39:27Speaker 2: they're working, but they should be counted if you're trying
- 39:30Speaker 2: to assess how the recovery is going, because work relief
- 39:35Speaker 2: is a substitute for recovery. And Roosevelt and Company were
- 39:40Speaker 2: very clear on this. They said, look, you know, these
- 39:44Speaker 2: jobs are temporary, emergency jobs. It's a way of keeping
- 39:48Speaker 2: putting money in people's pockets. But it's relief, it's not recovery.
- 39:52Speaker 2: Recovery is getting them back to work in the factories
- 39:55Speaker 2: that are shuttered and getting those factories working again. That's recovery.
- 40:00Speaker 2: And that did not happen had not happened as of
- 40:06Speaker 2: nineteen thirty nine.
- 40:09Speaker 1: So from thirty nine on, is it basically a woy
- 40:15Speaker 1: economy that kind of generates the jobs?
- 40:17Speaker 2: And yes, it starts. It starts with the outbreak of
- 40:22Speaker 2: the war in Europe, where there's a very sharp increase
- 40:29Speaker 2: in the demand for war material in Europe, and the
- 40:34Speaker 2: US is happy to supply it. We have the means,
- 40:37Speaker 2: and that helps, that starts a recovery. That starts a recovery,
- 40:42Speaker 2: and of course it's not long before we start to militarize,
- 40:49Speaker 2: even prior to Pearl Harbor. And then the Pearl Harbor,
- 40:53Speaker 2: of course, causes US military spending to absolutely skyrocket, and
- 41:03Speaker 2: that in turn means that we have this temporary for
- 41:09Speaker 2: the time being. The depression is over because millions of
- 41:15Speaker 2: workers of unemployed, who would have been unemployed or who
- 41:19Speaker 2: are on work relief, they are drafted into the armed
- 41:23Speaker 2: services or they volunteer, and so that's the end of
- 41:28Speaker 2: unemployment as far as the statistics are concerned. And likewise
- 41:35Speaker 2: you have now a great increase in output of war
- 41:39Speaker 2: material plants being reopened or established newly established for the
- 41:45Speaker 2: purpose of building airplanes and such ships. And so the
- 41:50Speaker 2: depression is over except the war ends. The depression as
- 41:57Speaker 2: long as the war continues. But as soon as the
- 42:02Speaker 2: war ends, the government applied shock therapy, as it were,
- 42:08Speaker 2: It completely cut back war time spending. Yes, there were
- 42:11Speaker 2: things like the GI Bill and all, but the fact
- 42:14Speaker 2: is that total spending on all levels declined to the
- 42:17Speaker 2: share of GDP it had constituted before the war. That
- 42:21Speaker 2: is before the European War, and of course all those
- 42:25Speaker 2: workers are coming back demanding jobs. So in order to
- 42:29Speaker 2: explain the recovery, you have to explain why you didn't
- 42:34Speaker 2: have another depression as soon as the war ended, or
- 42:36Speaker 2: what you didn't see the economy lapse back into depression.
- 42:40Speaker 2: And that's a serious question. One way to engauge how
- 42:44Speaker 2: serious it a question it was, and why it's not
- 42:48Speaker 2: obvious is by noting that the administration's economists first, especially
- 42:54Speaker 2: this is the end towards the end of the war,
- 42:57Speaker 2: it's still the Roosevelt administration. Now most of those economists
- 43:01Speaker 2: are Kansians. The Kynesians have slowly gained importance, but it
- 43:06Speaker 2: should be noted that they were not important during most
- 43:09Speaker 2: of the New Deal. Canes had hardly any influence directly
- 43:13Speaker 2: or indirectly on the New Deal. But now there are
- 43:16Speaker 2: plenty of Kansians in the government, and they are for
- 43:20Speaker 2: the most part, almost all them predicting a terrible calamity,
- 43:25Speaker 2: a depression in many cases predicted to be worse than
- 43:29Speaker 2: it had been in the thirties unless the government gets
- 43:34Speaker 2: peace time spending up as high as wartime spending had been.
- 43:40Speaker 2: Particularly deficit spending, we are going to see a depression
- 43:44Speaker 2: that it is as bad or worse than in the thirties. Well,
- 43:50Speaker 2: of course, shock therapy was what they were arguing against. Right,
- 43:53Speaker 2: we can't do we can't just stop spending and not
- 43:56Speaker 2: do anything else. We can't just liberate prices. They were
- 44:00Speaker 2: arguing that all of this would be a disaster, with
- 44:03Speaker 2: some good reason because unless something changed, right, unless there
- 44:07Speaker 2: was some big change that had taken place between nineteen
- 44:13Speaker 2: thirty nine and the end of the war, some change,
- 44:17Speaker 2: it would not cause conditions to revert to where they'd been.
- 44:21Speaker 2: It was sensible enough to fear that it would be
- 44:23Speaker 2: you'd go right back to where you started. And yet
- 44:27Speaker 2: they were all horribly well, they were all fortunately wrong,
- 44:32Speaker 2: because there was nothing. The unemployment rate never went much
- 44:38Speaker 2: above four percent, which by their own by the keynesing
- 44:43Speaker 2: z Own estimates, it never never was far above after
- 44:46Speaker 2: the war, immediately after war, never rose far above what
- 44:49Speaker 2: they would consider full employed employment. Yeah, it was remarkable
- 44:53Speaker 2: that we avoided that. Something had to change. And one
- 44:56Speaker 2: of the things I try to explain in my book
- 44:58Speaker 2: is what else happened during the war that made it
- 45:04Speaker 2: may allowed the economy instead of having a renewed depression
- 45:08Speaker 2: to actually take off right after the war when the
- 45:11Speaker 2: government stops all this spending. So what was it. I'm
- 45:16Speaker 2: glad you asked what it was. I believe and I
- 45:21Speaker 2: think there's a lot of evidence for it. What it
- 45:24Speaker 2: was was a change in the government's attitude toward business,
- 45:27Speaker 2: major change. And there are books about this and brooks
- 45:31Speaker 2: end articles that are very good that I cite. Because
- 45:35Speaker 2: one of the problems one of the things that interfered
- 45:38Speaker 2: with recovery in the thirties. We've mentioned some others, but
- 45:42Speaker 2: one of the others, especially toward the last phase of
- 45:45Speaker 2: the New Deal, was what Bob Higgs calls regime uncertainty,
- 45:50Speaker 2: which is all the experimentation and the unpredictability of government
- 45:55Speaker 2: policy combined these days. Yes, indeed, very much combined with
- 46:02Speaker 2: outright fear of the hostility demonstrated by the Roosevelt administration
- 46:08Speaker 2: and Roosevelt personally towards businessman and his rhetoric and other
- 46:12Speaker 2: things that got very, very nasty. And there were some
- 46:15Speaker 2: policies that went along with a nasty rhetoric that, as
- 46:19Speaker 2: it were, implemented in a nasty rhetoric. The rhetoric was
- 46:22Speaker 2: mostly aimed at big businessmen, but the policies tended to
- 46:28Speaker 2: affect businessmen more generally. So there was a lot of
- 46:32Speaker 2: reason for businessmen to not be confident in the future,
- 46:36Speaker 2: to not be confident enough to invest and with the
- 46:41Speaker 2: hope of recouping of profiting from the investment. And so
- 46:47Speaker 2: what happens in the thirties is investment absolutely collapsed for
- 46:53Speaker 2: the whole decade. There was especially if you are looking
- 46:57Speaker 2: at net investment, right, not just replacement of depreciating capital,
- 47:02Speaker 2: but growth. There was none. It was essentially zero. Sometimes
- 47:07Speaker 2: it was negative. And that remained true during the war
- 47:09Speaker 2: because there's no private investment during the war. So something
- 47:14Speaker 2: has to happen to make businessmen confident again, and the
- 47:19Speaker 2: war did that. Now, by the way, Caines was very
- 47:23Speaker 2: good on this. You Canes was scolding Roosevelt for scaring businessmen,
- 47:31Speaker 2: and he was saying to them, look, everybody, all economists agreed,
- 47:35Speaker 2: you got to get investment going if you're going to
- 47:37Speaker 2: have her recovered. You know, you can't just have consumer
- 47:40Speaker 2: goods being consumed because you've got to make stuff. You
- 47:44Speaker 2: got to get the factories working again. So they all
- 47:46Speaker 2: agreed on that, but Kines was particularly It was particularly
- 47:54Speaker 2: scornful of new deal policies that intimidated businessmen or otherwise
- 47:59Speaker 2: made it difficult for them to be optimistic about the future.
- 48:06Speaker 2: He couched it in the general theory, especially in terms
- 48:09Speaker 2: of what he called animal spirits. He said, Look, the
- 48:12Speaker 2: way you have businessmen do their thing investing is you
- 48:16Speaker 2: can't have them thinking about what can go wrong. They
- 48:20Speaker 2: have to have this optimism. It's like, you know, you
- 48:23Speaker 2: can't go out and you can't live well if you're
- 48:27Speaker 2: constantly thinking you're going to die any minute. Right, But
- 48:30Speaker 2: he said, businessmen have to not fear the future. And
- 48:35Speaker 2: he said to Roosevelt, basically, quit picking on him. Coddle them,
- 48:41Speaker 2: make them feel happy, make them feel proud. He said,
- 48:46Speaker 2: all of these things. It's very very good because it
- 48:51Speaker 2: helps us understand how the recovery happened. Because World War
- 48:56Speaker 2: Two comes along American entry in particular, and all of
- 48:59Speaker 2: a US. So the administration is, oh, we need them,
- 49:03Speaker 2: we need them, and we need to then we need
- 49:08Speaker 2: to have them cooperate in the war effort. And the
- 49:11Speaker 2: next thing you know is all the businessmen are piling
- 49:13Speaker 2: into Washington taking power, and they produce the planes. They
- 49:21Speaker 2: you know the record of the production under the cordial
- 49:26Speaker 2: let's say, detante between the government and business. The result
- 49:31Speaker 2: of this is an incredible production of wartime materials, all
- 49:38Speaker 2: the planes Roosevelt promised and more. But there's more to
- 49:42Speaker 2: it than that. The new dealers themselves, working with these businessmen,
- 49:46Speaker 2: start saying, you know, maybe they're not so bad, and
- 49:50Speaker 2: other people are looking at all this saying maybe capitalism
- 49:54Speaker 2: isn't dead after all, and so everything changes. This is
- 49:58Speaker 2: not a small chain. It goes from one extreme of
- 50:02Speaker 2: hostility to business and believing that capitalism is doomed and
- 50:06Speaker 2: all that to the beginning of what becomes the military
- 50:09Speaker 2: industrial complex, which is where, if anything, the government and
- 50:13Speaker 2: business are much too cozy. But as far as recovery
- 50:17Speaker 2: is concerned, this is a very good development. The long
- 50:21Speaker 2: run implications may not have been so great, but for
- 50:26Speaker 2: the recovery it means a businessman and the war on
- 50:31Speaker 2: an upbeat view of the future, and investment takes off
- 50:38Speaker 2: like our rocket. And so basically it's like scissors. The
- 50:43Speaker 2: government spending is going I got to do it backwards.
- 50:45Speaker 2: Government spending is going and private investment is going shit.
- 50:50Speaker 2: And that's why you didn't need the government peace time
- 50:53Speaker 2: spending that the Keynesians thought would be necessary, because private
- 50:57Speaker 2: investment has taken off. This I think this aspect of
- 51:02Speaker 2: the war. So you can still tell a story where
- 51:04Speaker 2: World War II helps end the depression, but it is
- 51:07Speaker 2: not a simple story of government spending. It's a story
- 51:11Speaker 2: of more importantly, for the longer haul, for post war,
- 51:16Speaker 2: the post war revival. The big change isn't the spending,
- 51:20Speaker 2: it's not the lasting it's the change in attitudes that
- 51:23Speaker 2: gives businessmen the you know, warm fuzzy feeling that Caines
- 51:27Speaker 2: thought they needed if they were going to start doing
- 51:30Speaker 2: their investment thing again. So I think that's the part
- 51:33Speaker 2: of part of the recovery story that both critics of
- 51:37Speaker 2: the New Deal, both the conventional criticisms of the New
- 51:42Speaker 2: Deal UH and the champions of the New Deal argument
- 51:49Speaker 2: arguments in favor of the New New Deal omit. And
- 51:52Speaker 2: by the way, it has to be said that this
- 51:55Speaker 2: change and attitude is part of the abandonment of the
- 52:01Speaker 2: New Deal, it's not a new new deal. And Kansianism
- 52:05Speaker 2: helps here too, yarn, because remember Kaanesianism is saying just
- 52:12Speaker 2: have the government stimulate. Nowadays, it put the Knesian emphasis
- 52:17Speaker 2: on physical stimulus, but Kanes himself thought monetary stimulus was,
- 52:21Speaker 2: you know, another possibility. But for businessmen, this kind of
- 52:28Speaker 2: thing changing interest rates, having the government spend more, it's
- 52:32Speaker 2: not as oppressive as all that New Deal stuff. It's
- 52:36Speaker 2: not interfered with their decision making, it's not as scary.
- 52:40Speaker 2: So for businessmen, they may not like deficit spending, you know,
- 52:43Speaker 2: they don't like inflation, but they would rather have the
- 52:48Speaker 2: government pushing and pulling that one big lever than micromanaging
- 52:54Speaker 2: them or scaring them to death. So for business investment,
- 52:59Speaker 2: the Kanes revolution which is taking hold, that is the
- 53:03Speaker 2: idea that the main way you should combat recessions is
- 53:06Speaker 2: by government spending or monetary stimilus. For them, it's a
- 53:10Speaker 2: big relief that change, and we need to remember that
- 53:14Speaker 2: when we're being critical of gains.
- 53:19Speaker 1: Did that effect also the Fed? That is, did data
- 53:22Speaker 1: also cause a change in terms of the Fed's monetary
- 53:26Speaker 1: policy or the attitude towards monetary policy.
- 53:31Speaker 2: The truth is that monetary policy never really deliberately contributed
- 53:37Speaker 2: much to recovery even after the war. After the war,
- 53:41Speaker 2: the main concern of the monetary authorities and the Truman
- 53:46Speaker 2: administration was inflation and keeping a lid on it, because
- 53:51Speaker 2: of course prices had been kept down by wartime controls,
- 53:55Speaker 2: and once those controls were lifted, the tendency was for
- 53:57Speaker 2: them to go up, particularly when you have all this
- 54:01Speaker 2: private spending is kicking in, so you can't count on
- 54:05Speaker 2: the reduction and government spending. By the way, the government
- 54:07Speaker 2: went into surplus very quickly after the war, and fiscal surpluses,
- 54:13Speaker 2: which was the Keynesians thought, you know, this is the
- 54:16Speaker 2: last thing you're going to be able to get away
- 54:18Speaker 2: with without trouble. So the fact is that you had
- 54:24Speaker 2: renewed fiscal and monetary austerity, as it were relatively tight
- 54:31Speaker 2: regimes after World War Two. So neither neither of those
- 54:36Speaker 2: stimulus sources was contributing to the recovery, and that made
- 54:41Speaker 2: the recovery of private investment spending all the more important.
- 54:45Speaker 2: That should be said that many people think that what
- 54:50Speaker 2: was driving all this was consumer demand, because consumers were
- 54:55Speaker 2: forced to save a lot during the war. I mean,
- 54:57Speaker 2: the government is spending a lot and it's ending up
- 55:00Speaker 2: in consumers' pockets, but they and they saved a lot
- 55:03Speaker 2: because they couldn't. There weren't as many household goods to
- 55:07Speaker 2: produce with all the productive machinery of the economy oriented
- 55:12Speaker 2: towards wartime output. And so one theory says, Okay, after
- 55:17Speaker 2: the war, they dissaved, they took all these savings and
- 55:21Speaker 2: they went on shopping spree. But that actually didn't happen.
- 55:25Speaker 2: They they their savings rate fell after the war. They
- 55:31Speaker 2: weren't saving as much as a percentage of consumption, but
- 55:33Speaker 2: they didn't dissave after the war. And that's all the
- 55:37Speaker 2: more evidence that it's really the investment side of things
- 55:41Speaker 2: that sustaining the recovery, and it's it's what's allowing these
- 55:46Speaker 2: people to buy more without dissaving.
- 55:50Speaker 1: So anyway, if we go back to if we go
- 55:54Speaker 1: back to the beginning, you know, there's certain people I
- 55:58Speaker 1: think we know would say nothing should have been done, right,
- 56:04Speaker 1: you know, these things take care of themselves. Yeah, you
- 56:07Speaker 1: shouldn't do anything. Yes, So what's what's your view? I mean,
- 56:12Speaker 1: in terms of you're ninety thirty three, it is what
- 56:15Speaker 1: it is.
- 56:17Speaker 2: What I think plenty needed to be done. I don't
- 56:22Speaker 2: that argument makes little sense. Let's just let's just assume,
- 56:28Speaker 2: for the sake of argument, that are completely free market
- 56:33Speaker 2: economy with a proper gold standard and a good free
- 56:38Speaker 2: banking system of the sort I like had had been
- 56:42Speaker 2: in effect. You might say doing nothing should suffice. But
- 56:46Speaker 2: then again, in that sort of system, I think it
- 56:49Speaker 2: probably wouldn't have had the disaster.
- 56:50Speaker 1: That you yeah, you don't get it exactly.
- 56:53Speaker 2: Well, but so we had a disaster, Why well, we
- 56:56Speaker 2: have had monetary arrangements that had been done badly muddled
- 57:01Speaker 2: as I described early on, and those weren't going to
- 57:05Speaker 2: change instantly. So you know, if you're going to do nothing,
- 57:09Speaker 2: you have to start doing nothing, have to have a
- 57:12Speaker 2: good economic system in place, not while you still have
- 57:16Speaker 2: a lousy one in place, and certainly not while the
- 57:19Speaker 2: lousy one has just caused a massive collapse. That's not
- 57:24Speaker 2: the time to do nothing, because like it or not,
- 57:28Speaker 2: the same government that, as we're assuming for the sake
- 57:32Speaker 2: of argument, created the circumstances that allowed the economy to collapse,
- 57:37Speaker 2: is also the only agency in a position to try
- 57:40Speaker 2: to fix things, that is, to correct its own mistakes.
- 57:44Speaker 2: The banking system isn't one that's going to automatically recover
- 57:48Speaker 2: the debts that have suffered from deflation. Aren't automatically going
- 57:52Speaker 2: to just go away. The unemployment is not going to
- 57:57Speaker 2: quickly resolve itself through deflation because of rigid contracts, especially
- 58:04Speaker 2: debt contracts, but also because of other kinds of price
- 58:07Speaker 2: and flexibilities. Some of them are not part of the
- 58:11Speaker 2: market system, but are not going to go away. There's all.
- 58:14Speaker 2: The government had an absolute responsibility to take steps to
- 58:20Speaker 2: help end the recession, and those steps, many of them
- 58:24Speaker 2: that were necessary, were not going to happen otherwise. One
- 58:29Speaker 2: of the programs that was a good new deal program,
- 58:33Speaker 2: in my opinion, perhaps the best setting aside dealing with
- 58:37Speaker 2: the banking crisis, but this is the new deal proper
- 58:40Speaker 2: we're talking about, was the creation of the Home Loan
- 58:47Speaker 2: h Home Loan Mortgage Corporation h I always botched this
- 58:55Speaker 2: up and homeowners some homeowners Loan corporation. See now, what
- 59:01Speaker 2: this thing does is you have all these debtors with
- 59:05Speaker 2: mortgages and the I won't go into the structure of
- 59:09Speaker 2: the mortgages, but suffice to say these weren't going to
- 59:12Speaker 2: be easy to refinance, and they're all underwater, and the
- 59:15Speaker 2: lenders are in trouble because all they can get by
- 59:20Speaker 2: for closing is properties that's the price of which is
- 59:24Speaker 2: down and impossible to sell, and that's not going to
- 59:27Speaker 2: help them. What you ideally needed was refinancing, restructure all
- 59:33Speaker 2: these mortgages, pretend they'd write them the way they might
- 59:37Speaker 2: have been written if the depression had been anticipated. Well,
- 59:41Speaker 2: that's what the HLC did, very cleverly. They swapped. They
- 59:47Speaker 2: swapped their own the new agency swapped its own agency
- 59:50Speaker 2: bonds for the mortgages in terms that the mortgage lenders
- 59:55Speaker 2: were bound to consider better than sitting, than foreclosing or
- 59:59Speaker 2: holding these non performing loans. And then they refinanced the
- 1:00:06Speaker 2: mortgages on better terms, including introducing thirty year new loans
- 1:00:14Speaker 2: with its long loan terms mortisized terms, and they managed
- 1:00:20Speaker 2: to do it. They are relying on taxpayers because the
- 1:00:24Speaker 2: key to this, they're relying on implicit guarantees on loans
- 1:00:30Speaker 2: and the interests. So there's risk and taxpayers are bearing it.
- 1:00:34Speaker 2: But guess what, it's a macroeconomic crisis. It's a perfect
- 1:00:38Speaker 2: example of a public good because if this works, if
- 1:00:41Speaker 2: this works, taxpayers are going to be among the beneficiaries
- 1:00:45Speaker 2: getting out of it, helping get out of a depression.
- 1:00:48Speaker 2: And it works very well. In fact, the government didn't
- 1:00:50Speaker 2: lose any money at all it might have, but World
- 1:00:54Speaker 2: War Two raised the prices of mortgage of property, and
- 1:00:59Speaker 2: eventually the thing came out with very low cost. It
- 1:01:02Speaker 2: didn't actually profit. Some people claim it profited, but if
- 1:01:05Speaker 2: you get the accounting right, it lost a little bit
- 1:01:08Speaker 2: of money, but did a heck of a lot of good.
- 1:01:10Speaker 2: It kept a lot of people in their homes, It
- 1:01:12Speaker 2: saved a lot of the mortgage lenders, and by doing
- 1:01:16Speaker 2: these things it did help the recovery. It was one
- 1:01:19Speaker 2: of the best new deal programs in my opinion, because
- 1:01:23Speaker 2: it's essentially dealing with price rigidities that the marketplace wasn't
- 1:01:28Speaker 2: able to easily overcome. And they had a similar program
- 1:01:32Speaker 2: for farm mortgages, but the statistics don't allow us to
- 1:01:37Speaker 2: conclude that it was as successful. Moreover, it was kept
- 1:01:43Speaker 2: in place long after, in one form or another. It
- 1:01:47Speaker 2: became almost a permanent program, and then it ended up
- 1:01:50Speaker 2: wreaking havoc with aquaculture, and the whole thing went blotto
- 1:01:54Speaker 2: in the nineteen eighties, as people predicted it would. If
- 1:01:57Speaker 2: it wasn't eliminated after having done it should have done
- 1:02:00Speaker 2: in the thirties. So you don't want these things to
- 1:02:03Speaker 2: be perpetual.
- 1:02:04Speaker 1: Well, That is kind of the thirty three to thirty
- 1:02:07Speaker 1: four bank regulations, right, I mean they.
- 1:02:10Speaker 2: Well, those were meant to be permanent all along the AA,
- 1:02:15Speaker 2: you know, yeah, some programs were supposed to be temporary.
- 1:02:18Speaker 2: The AAA was supposed to be temporary. Roosevelt went back
- 1:02:21Speaker 2: on his word on it. He signed it off as
- 1:02:24Speaker 2: a temporary measure and then said, oh, we're not going
- 1:02:26Speaker 2: to We never thought this would be temporary. It was
- 1:02:29Speaker 2: very clear about it, and I think the AAA and
- 1:02:32Speaker 2: its post New Deal versions, of course, it ended up
- 1:02:36Speaker 2: being the basis for the whole drama and ordeal of
- 1:02:42Speaker 2: farm subsidies that were still not completely passed. Anyway, the
- 1:02:48Speaker 2: banking legislation was permanent, and it was sad because the
- 1:02:52Speaker 2: more astute observers of the situation understood that the reason
- 1:02:57Speaker 2: the US banking system was so we and so many
- 1:03:01Speaker 2: banks failed was the same reason why we had so
- 1:03:04Speaker 2: many in the first place, which was the lack of
- 1:03:06Speaker 2: branch banking, which the countries with strong banking systems allowed
- 1:03:10Speaker 2: their banks to branch are usually nationwide, and most countries
- 1:03:15Speaker 2: that suffered from the depression didn't have banking crises because
- 1:03:18Speaker 2: they had better banking systems. Canada, by the way, was
- 1:03:22Speaker 2: a very good example. So this was not simply a
- 1:03:24Speaker 2: matter of having a central bank that did the right thing.
- 1:03:27Speaker 2: Canada had none until thirty five. Anyway, what the banking
- 1:03:33Speaker 2: law did was to treat deposit solution as this way
- 1:03:37Speaker 2: of propping up these weak banks, because of course, if
- 1:03:41Speaker 2: you have if you were fully ensured, you don't worry
- 1:03:45Speaker 2: about your bank being weak, even if you know it
- 1:03:47Speaker 2: is right, you know these are this is the same
- 1:03:50Speaker 2: goddamn bank, that same sort of bank that collapsed a
- 1:03:55Speaker 2: few years ago. Nothing's basically changed. It's underdiversified. It can't
- 1:04:00Speaker 2: stand a shock to the farm sector in which it deals.
- 1:04:05Speaker 2: That's great, It's okay because we have insurance. The alternative,
- 1:04:09Speaker 2: of course, was still out branching, but there was a
- 1:04:12Speaker 2: glass Carter Glass wanted branching. Henry Stiegel was totally opposed
- 1:04:17Speaker 2: to it, so we ended up with this. Roosevelt didn't
- 1:04:21Speaker 2: like deposit insurance, and he fought the legislation that deposit
- 1:04:25Speaker 2: insurance component of the nineteen thirty three Act Banking Act.
- 1:04:30Speaker 2: He fought it till the eleventh hour when he finally
- 1:04:33Speaker 2: realized that the deck was stacked against him, that he
- 1:04:38Speaker 2: didn't want to veto the whole bill, and he probably
- 1:04:40Speaker 2: would have faced his veto being overturned, so he relented,
- 1:04:45Speaker 2: and of course, being a wise politician, he then took
- 1:04:48Speaker 2: credit for deposit insurance as if he'd wanted it all along,
- 1:04:51Speaker 2: But he didn't really, he never liked the idea. Truman, interestingly,
- 1:04:56Speaker 2: also hated depause insurance originally, but by the end, during
- 1:04:59Speaker 2: the banking crisis, he was saying, well, you know, maybe
- 1:05:02Speaker 2: this will be a lesser of two evils. So between
- 1:05:05Speaker 2: the two of them, it was Hoover who showed some
- 1:05:09Speaker 2: inclination to support deposit insurance. And by the way, when
- 1:05:14Speaker 2: I say this about FDR, that's not one of my
- 1:05:16Speaker 2: criticisms of him. I think that I think that his
- 1:05:21Speaker 2: criticisms of deposit insurance, which we should really call deposit
- 1:05:25Speaker 2: guarantees because it's not run like insurance, I think they
- 1:05:28Speaker 2: were perfectly sound, and they would many economists would say
- 1:05:32Speaker 2: that they were perfectly sound well.
- 1:05:34Speaker 1: And the consequences were felt in the eighties to two
- 1:05:37Speaker 1: thousand and eight and are still being felt right.
- 1:05:40Speaker 2: Eventually, Eventually, badly designed insurance systems, anyway, tend to lead
- 1:05:45Speaker 2: to trouble. We had dozens of them before the Great Depression,
- 1:05:49Speaker 2: and they all went belly up. They were state depositor,
- 1:05:52Speaker 2: they all failed, And so that was part of what
- 1:05:56Speaker 2: was informing both Trumen and Roosevelt's negative towards insurance. They'd
- 1:06:01Speaker 2: seen what it had done in various state attempts. So
- 1:06:05Speaker 2: it was perfectly reasonable for somebody who was and Roosevelt was,
- 1:06:09Speaker 2: you know, he was where he understood banking. He was
- 1:06:13Speaker 2: no economist, but banking he was familiar with, and so
- 1:06:17Speaker 2: I think his views on banking were quite sound, but
- 1:06:22Speaker 2: he accepted this as the best that could be had
- 1:06:26Speaker 2: in order to get the whole banking bill through. I
- 1:06:30Speaker 2: write about the other components of the Banking Act, including
- 1:06:33Speaker 2: this famous Glass Stiegal components writing, investment, and commercial banking,
- 1:06:40Speaker 2: but only to point out that those things did nothing
- 1:06:43Speaker 2: to help end the depression either. The pause insurance may
- 1:06:47Speaker 2: have contributed to stabilizing the banking system, it's controversial whether
- 1:06:51Speaker 2: it was really that important for that, But the other
- 1:06:55Speaker 2: components of the thirty three Banking Act did nothing, nothing
- 1:07:00Speaker 2: to help the recovery because the things they dealt with
- 1:07:05Speaker 2: weren't part of the problem at the time.
- 1:07:08Speaker 1: All right, So we've got a few questions here. Let's
- 1:07:11Speaker 1: let's go to those and see. Okay, Wes asks, what
- 1:07:17Speaker 1: are common misconceptions fallacies around banking and financing that drive
- 1:07:23Speaker 1: you crazy?
- 1:07:25Speaker 2: The policies around banking and financing financing.
- 1:07:29Speaker 1: I guess generally finance and banking did drive you crazy. Misconceptions?
- 1:07:35Speaker 2: Oh goodness, Well, the way I'm gonna I have to
- 1:07:41Speaker 2: be very selective here, because there's a long list of
- 1:07:44Speaker 2: things that drive me crazy in banking about banking in otherwise.
- 1:07:50Speaker 2: I think the biggest one, though, is the belief that
- 1:07:55Speaker 2: only a central banking system can be stable. That would
- 1:07:59Speaker 2: be not my number one. It's a belief that is,
- 1:08:04Speaker 2: if not completely uninformed by history, is informed by a
- 1:08:09Speaker 2: very limited knowledge of history, including people looking back at
- 1:08:18Speaker 2: the US history and concluding that all our troubles before
- 1:08:21Speaker 2: the FED were things that could not have been solved
- 1:08:25Speaker 2: without creating the FED. Now, apart from the fact that
- 1:08:29Speaker 2: the FED did not perform very well at all, especially
- 1:08:32Speaker 2: in its first few decades, and didn't perform any better
- 1:08:37Speaker 2: than the preceding systems really in almost any criterion you
- 1:08:41Speaker 2: could pick, the fact is that the pre FED problems
- 1:08:46Speaker 2: of the United States banking and currency system can all
- 1:08:50Speaker 2: be traced easily without a shoehorn or anything to misguided legislation.
- 1:08:57Speaker 2: Has to be remembered that we did not have a
- 1:08:59Speaker 2: free market banking system at any time in the US history. Instead,
- 1:09:03Speaker 2: we had various experiments with regulation, first at the state
- 1:09:09Speaker 2: level mainly, and then mainly or at least as much
- 1:09:14Speaker 2: on the federal level. And if you examine these regulations
- 1:09:20Speaker 2: both before the Civil War and since, you find a
- 1:09:23Speaker 2: lot of stuff that was god awful and that played
- 1:09:28Speaker 2: very important parts in all of the financial banking problems
- 1:09:33Speaker 2: currency problems. We mentioned the lack of branch banking. That
- 1:09:38Speaker 2: was the main reason why we didn't have a uniformed
- 1:09:40Speaker 2: currency before the Civil War. It wasn't because we had
- 1:09:43Speaker 2: a lot of separate, independent banks that issued banknote currency.
- 1:09:49Speaker 2: We know from other countries experience that you could have
- 1:09:52Speaker 2: that you wouldn't have thirty thousand of them, but you
- 1:09:55Speaker 2: might have dozens, and their notes would circulate at par
- 1:10:00Speaker 2: where in the nation because they had branches where they
- 1:10:02Speaker 2: could be redeemed everywhere in the nation. The US didn't
- 1:10:05Speaker 2: allow that, so we had this ridiculous system with thousands
- 1:10:10Speaker 2: of banks and notes that were worth different amounts depending
- 1:10:13Speaker 2: on where they were and all that. But I could
- 1:10:16Speaker 2: say the same you name me. I used to say
- 1:10:18Speaker 2: this to my money in banking students. That's another course
- 1:10:21Speaker 2: I talked for a long time. If you can name
- 1:10:27Speaker 2: a US banking or currency crisis and explain how it
- 1:10:32Speaker 2: happened without attaching an important role to some stupid regulation,
- 1:10:40Speaker 2: I will give you an A in this class. You
- 1:10:42Speaker 2: won't have to do any more work. No, you can't
- 1:10:46Speaker 2: do it. No competent economic historian can do it none.
- 1:10:51Speaker 2: So what bugs me is the inattention both to the
- 1:10:56Speaker 2: details of US history and to experience elsewhere, which many
- 1:11:02Speaker 2: US economists are very parochial, and that includes foreigners trained
- 1:11:06Speaker 2: in the US and economics. They know a little tiny
- 1:11:09Speaker 2: bit enough to be dangerous about US monetary history and
- 1:11:14Speaker 2: nothing at all about other countries. Can't. You can't be
- 1:11:17Speaker 2: a good monetary banking economist or historian if you don't
- 1:11:21Speaker 2: know about the wide range of different experiences to be
- 1:11:27Speaker 2: encountered beyond the US board. You just can't. So that
- 1:11:30Speaker 2: drives me nuts. That's number one in my list. Do
- 1:11:33Speaker 2: I need to come up with more?
- 1:11:35Speaker 1: No? I think that's good. So you do this. What
- 1:11:40Speaker 1: would be a good source one of your books or
- 1:11:43Speaker 1: articles that cover kind of the history of free banking
- 1:11:47Speaker 1: in other countries and the history in the United States,
- 1:11:51Speaker 1: so that people can can dig deeper if they want to.
- 1:11:54Speaker 2: Well. The best book on experiences around the world is
- 1:12:00Speaker 2: a book edited by Kevin Dowd published by a new
- 1:12:05Speaker 2: edition recently published by the Institute of Economic Affairs in London,
- 1:12:10Speaker 2: which we would have published at CATO by the way,
- 1:12:13Speaker 2: we had started the project, but a chapter got in
- 1:12:16Speaker 2: there that the person in charge, meaning me, did not like,
- 1:12:20Speaker 2: and Kevin wouldn't take it out, so we had a
- 1:12:22Speaker 2: party of the ways anyway, that chapters and banking in Manchuria.
- 1:12:27Speaker 2: I highly recommend the book, except for that chapter which
- 1:12:31Speaker 2: GE's what free banking is all wrong? And it's called
- 1:12:34Speaker 2: the Experience of free banking, so that's a very good
- 1:12:38Speaker 2: place to start. It goes through a lot of episodes
- 1:12:42Speaker 2: of relatively free. Of course, none of these systems are
- 1:12:44Speaker 2: perfectly free of regulation, but relatively free banking systems and
- 1:12:50Speaker 2: how they performed, and I think it includes a chapter
- 1:12:53Speaker 2: did originally include a chapter in the United States. It
- 1:12:56Speaker 2: talks about all the ways in which we did not
- 1:12:58Speaker 2: have free banking, even though we had laws that were
- 1:13:01Speaker 2: called free banking lists that would be probably the most important.
- 1:13:05Speaker 2: On the Scottish system, of course, I'm bound to recommend
- 1:13:07Speaker 2: that's the most one of the most well studied, Lawrence
- 1:13:11Speaker 2: White's class now classic study of free banking in Britain.
- 1:13:14Speaker 2: That's all on the Scottish system. Otherwise, on the United States,
- 1:13:18Speaker 2: I would recommend the book of essays I put together
- 1:13:21Speaker 2: called Money Free and Unfree, published with the Cato Institute,
- 1:13:26Speaker 2: and that has a lot of chapters on various aspects
- 1:13:30Speaker 2: of US banking and currency history. So those three I
- 1:13:34Speaker 2: think would cover things very well.
- 1:13:36Speaker 1: Great, all right, Limo asks, can you explain how bond
- 1:13:41Speaker 1: collateral banking wooked and how it contributed to the Great Depression?
- 1:13:47Speaker 2: Well, okay, bond collateral banking, this is I think we
- 1:13:53Speaker 2: mainly want to talk about. Bond collateral banking goes back
- 1:13:57Speaker 2: before the Civil War. In fact, all those free bank
- 1:14:00Speaker 2: laws that people confused with truly free banking. About a
- 1:14:04Speaker 2: dozen states had these laws. All their banks were required
- 1:14:08Speaker 2: to back their banknotes, their circulating currency, with specific securities,
- 1:14:14Speaker 2: which included typically state government bonds. Naturally, because the states
- 1:14:20Speaker 2: wanted to sell their securities, but sometimes included other sorts
- 1:14:24Speaker 2: of bonds, and those caused trouble in those free banking
- 1:14:28Speaker 2: so called free banking systems, but let's not go into that.
- 1:14:31Speaker 2: During the Civil War, the Union government did two things.
- 1:14:38Speaker 2: They created a new system of national banks, and they
- 1:14:42Speaker 2: eventually taxed state banks out of the currency business. So
- 1:14:46Speaker 2: the only banknote currency from then on until the FED
- 1:14:52Speaker 2: was notes of national banks, and they all had to
- 1:14:56Speaker 2: be secured by United States government bonds. Once again, by
- 1:15:01Speaker 2: the way, that that big part of the motivation is
- 1:15:04Speaker 2: not making the bank safe, it's financing the government the
- 1:15:08Speaker 2: Union war effort. So keep that in mind. Now, what
- 1:15:13Speaker 2: happened in that system was kind of very different from
- 1:15:18Speaker 2: what happened in the state systems because in the state
- 1:15:21Speaker 2: systems a lot of the securities that banks were required
- 1:15:24Speaker 2: to hold turned into junk, and it was the main
- 1:15:26Speaker 2: cause of free pre bank set failures. In the case
- 1:15:30Speaker 2: of the national bank currency, something opposite. But just as
- 1:15:34Speaker 2: that happened, which is this, so the currency supply is
- 1:15:38Speaker 2: tied to the availability of certain US government securities that
- 1:15:42Speaker 2: have to back the notes. The banks have to buy
- 1:15:46Speaker 2: these securities. In fact, they have to have more than
- 1:15:48Speaker 2: one hundred percent face value of securities to cover their
- 1:15:53Speaker 2: note issues. What happens is, after the war ends for decades,
- 1:16:00Speaker 2: government's running surpluses, so the availability of these securities is shrinking.
- 1:16:05Speaker 2: On the other hand, the economy is growing and it
- 1:16:08Speaker 2: needs more currency, not less.
- 1:16:12Speaker 3: And.
- 1:16:14Speaker 2: So you have essentially the conditions for a sort of
- 1:16:19Speaker 2: supply demand train wreck where demand's growing, supply is secularly shrinking.
- 1:16:25Speaker 2: By eighteen just to give you an idea of the
- 1:16:27Speaker 2: secular story, by eighteen ninety, the supply of national banknote
- 1:16:34Speaker 2: currency is half what it was in eighteen eighty in
- 1:16:37Speaker 2: a growing economy. Okay, Now, economies are very capable of
- 1:16:43Speaker 2: adapting to a lot of things. They can handle a lot,
- 1:16:46Speaker 2: and so there was some long run secular adaptation. What
- 1:16:50Speaker 2: there wasn't was a capacity of the system to deal
- 1:16:53Speaker 2: with short run spikes in demand, particularly those that happened
- 1:16:56Speaker 2: in the harvest season when there'd be a big peak
- 1:16:59Speaker 2: demand for currency to pay migrant workers and of course
- 1:17:02Speaker 2: don't have bank accounts. And since it was given the
- 1:17:07Speaker 2: high price of the rare securities, increasingly rare securities banks
- 1:17:11Speaker 2: had to have to secure notes, and the fact that
- 1:17:14Speaker 2: that made it absolutely prohibitively costly for banks to acquire
- 1:17:19Speaker 2: the necessarity necessary collateral to meet temporary peaks in demand
- 1:17:26Speaker 2: for currency, like the harvest time peak. So every time
- 1:17:29Speaker 2: the harvest would occur, and with increasing severity over time,
- 1:17:35Speaker 2: you tended to have spikes and interest rates. Why because
- 1:17:41Speaker 2: when the farmer comes to his bank and says, I
- 1:17:43Speaker 2: need currency to pay my workers, and the bank says
- 1:17:45Speaker 2: we can't issue any more of our own IOUs, he says, okay,
- 1:17:50Speaker 2: I'll have some legal fender. I'll take some of your
- 1:17:52Speaker 2: reserves up, which he's entitled to do, and that leads
- 1:17:55Speaker 2: to a contraction of credit. So credit titans, interest rates
- 1:18:00Speaker 2: go up. Now, in the good years, that's all that happens.
- 1:18:03Speaker 2: Interest rates seasonally spike, But in some occasions you had
- 1:18:07Speaker 2: severe currency panics and shortages eighteen eighty four, eighteen ninety three,
- 1:18:13Speaker 2: the worst of all in nineteen oh seven. In each
- 1:18:15Speaker 2: case there were other aggrevating factors. But behind resting behind
- 1:18:19Speaker 2: it all is this inelastic supply of currency that is
- 1:18:24Speaker 2: a consequence of the bond deposit requirement combined with the
- 1:18:29Speaker 2: increasing scaragecity of eligible securities. So now that explains crises
- 1:18:36Speaker 2: leading up to the FED which was established for the
- 1:18:39Speaker 2: purpose of supplying an elastic currency. There's no magic behind
- 1:18:44Speaker 2: this reform. Basically, the newly established twelve Federal Reserve banks
- 1:18:48Speaker 2: were exempt from the bond collateral requirement, and so the
- 1:18:52Speaker 2: other banks could come up to the FED with their
- 1:18:55Speaker 2: other assets commercial paper mainly which were not eligible backing
- 1:19:00Speaker 2: for notes, and they could say, please, sir, here are
- 1:19:03Speaker 2: my here's my commercial paper which you discounted for me,
- 1:19:07Speaker 2: and give me some Federal Reserve notes so I don't
- 1:19:09Speaker 2: have to dip into my recitt That's how the FED worked.
- 1:19:12Speaker 2: It's rather like the scene people are now too young
- 1:19:16Speaker 2: to remember the movie Misery with Kathy Bates and James
- 1:19:20Speaker 2: kan He's a writer, famous writer gets in a car
- 1:19:25Speaker 2: crash and she happens to rescue him, and she's a
- 1:19:29Speaker 2: big fan. She's obsessed with him. Well, he starts and
- 1:19:32Speaker 2: she loves taking care of him as he's recuperating. But
- 1:19:35Speaker 2: at one point he looks like he's ready to get out,
- 1:19:37Speaker 2: so she smashes his legs with a sledgehammer to keep
- 1:19:40Speaker 2: him around a little more so she can cure him longer.
- 1:19:43Speaker 2: And that's sort of what the federal government did with banking.
- 1:19:45Speaker 2: They smashed the legs and the national banks, and then
- 1:19:48Speaker 2: Kathy Bates and the form of the Fed comes along,
- 1:19:51Speaker 2: and you know it saves saved. Yeah. Anyway, but you
- 1:19:57Speaker 2: asked about the Great Depression, and at that point the
- 1:20:02Speaker 2: Federal Reserve is starting to take over currency supply. So
- 1:20:07Speaker 2: although it's technically true that the national banks might have
- 1:20:13Speaker 2: done more to avert the depression had they been able
- 1:20:16Speaker 2: to issue more of their notes, the fact is that
- 1:20:20Speaker 2: by the time of the Great Depression, their note issuing
- 1:20:23Speaker 2: ability is very, very limited, and the government has come
- 1:20:28Speaker 2: to rely almost exclusively, not quite on the Federal Reserve
- 1:20:33Speaker 2: to supply all currency, not just emergency correct. It's taking
- 1:20:37Speaker 2: over as the sole supply. By nineteen thirty five, the
- 1:20:40Speaker 2: last national banknotes are issued. But here's an interesting footnote.
- 1:20:45Speaker 2: At some point during the depression, before thirty five, a
- 1:20:48Speaker 2: law was passed that relaxed the bound requirement. So they
- 1:20:52Speaker 2: really did relax and guess what it helped. There was
- 1:20:56Speaker 2: a substantial increase in the supply of national bank notes
- 1:21:01Speaker 2: on collateral that wasn't the usual bonds, but unfortunately it
- 1:21:04Speaker 2: was too little to make any big difference. I've always
- 1:21:08Speaker 2: wanted to write a paper about this episode, because in
- 1:21:10Speaker 2: my opinion, if it's said, if they had said to
- 1:21:12Speaker 2: the national banks or to the state banks, it still
- 1:21:15Speaker 2: existed for that matter, because said you can issue all
- 1:21:18Speaker 2: your banknotes that you want. It would have alleviated the
- 1:21:23Speaker 2: crisis of the early nineteen thirties. It would have helped.
- 1:21:26Speaker 2: But that the Fed said, no, you leave it to us,
- 1:21:30Speaker 2: We'll supply all the good bet are reserved notes that
- 1:21:33Speaker 2: are needed, which, of course, as Milton, Friedman and Schwartz
- 1:21:37Speaker 2: have demonstrated at great length, it did not do. It
- 1:21:42Speaker 2: did not do its job as meeting the needs of
- 1:21:45Speaker 2: the early nineteen thirties avoiding a monetary collapse.
- 1:21:50Speaker 1: So have a few more questions here from listeners. I
- 1:21:54Speaker 1: but that you know sparked in me a question of
- 1:21:59Speaker 1: you know this idea of the notes being backed by
- 1:22:01Speaker 1: GUP and bonds. What are your thoughts on this new
- 1:22:05Speaker 1: legislation around stable coins.
- 1:22:08Speaker 2: Well, here here I'm going to appear to contradict myself.
- 1:22:13Speaker 2: I wrote a paper a few years ago while at
- 1:22:16Speaker 2: CATO called what's it called anyway, a narrow Path to
- 1:22:25Speaker 2: Efficient stable Coins or something like that, where I argued
- 1:22:29Speaker 2: that rather than suppress stable coins altogether, the government should
- 1:22:36Speaker 2: embrace them, specifically by allowing stable coin issuers to take
- 1:22:40Speaker 2: part in the Federal Reserves clearing and settlement system, to
- 1:22:45Speaker 2: have master accounts and treat stable coins like so many
- 1:22:51Speaker 2: banknotes of your But since I knew they were never
- 1:22:55Speaker 2: going to just allow them to do that without regulating
- 1:22:58Speaker 2: them otherwise, they said, well, let's say, least, you know,
- 1:23:01Speaker 2: allow them to do it as long as they hold
- 1:23:03Speaker 2: one hundred percent reserves at the FED one hundred percent.
- 1:23:07Speaker 2: So I said, let's have narrow banking for stable coins. Yep,
- 1:23:11Speaker 2: a compromise. Now this isn't bound deposit, right, this is
- 1:23:16Speaker 2: one hundred percent reserves. It's not the same thing. But
- 1:23:22Speaker 2: it does of course mean that you can't issue stable
- 1:23:24Speaker 2: coins for which you don't have full reserves. The because
- 1:23:29Speaker 2: one of the big problems with stable coins as they've
- 1:23:32Speaker 2: existed is that, in fact, many of them claim to
- 1:23:36Speaker 2: have one hundred percent reserves, but they don't. They don't
- 1:23:40Speaker 2: they have other stuff, They have cash equivalents, And it
- 1:23:43Speaker 2: turns out the closer you look at these things, the
- 1:23:46Speaker 2: less they look equivalent to cash. And so and you've had,
- 1:23:51Speaker 2: of course, a few disasters where people had reason to
- 1:23:55Speaker 2: suspect that their banks were fully liquid and found out
- 1:23:58Speaker 2: the hard way their stable coins were fully liquid, found
- 1:24:01Speaker 2: out the hard way that they went. So in my opinion,
- 1:24:05Speaker 2: it was a reasonable compromise to preclude any more drastic
- 1:24:12Speaker 2: opposition to stable coins at least give them at least
- 1:24:15Speaker 2: give them the opportunity to exist and take part in
- 1:24:21Speaker 2: the Federal Reserve system if they have one reserves, which
- 1:24:25Speaker 2: and the other thing about that arrangement is unlike the
- 1:24:28Speaker 2: case with actual stable coins, monitoring is a cinch. The
- 1:24:32Speaker 2: Federal Reserve always knows if you're holding what your reserves
- 1:24:37Speaker 2: its participants have because it's the reserves are in an
- 1:24:43Speaker 2: account at the Fed. So they don't know. Nobody knows.
- 1:24:47Speaker 2: So that was my suggestion. So it's not I'm not
- 1:24:49Speaker 2: advocating bond deposit requirements, which are a different kettle of fish.
- 1:24:57Speaker 2: And by the way, bond values suctuate, so they're not
- 1:25:01Speaker 2: the same. If you're holding a long maturity bond with
- 1:25:05Speaker 2: a coupon of x percent in rates go up, that
- 1:25:09Speaker 2: bond is going to depreciate. The bank discovered that, right, yes,
- 1:25:14Speaker 2: and the Federal Reserve has discovered it. It's taken the
- 1:25:17Speaker 2: men's losses, but of course, not being your average bank,
- 1:25:21Speaker 2: it doesn't have to worry about it. But bonds are
- 1:25:25Speaker 2: not the same as reserves as actual cash reserves. Anyway,
- 1:25:30Speaker 2: what I think about the legislation is that I think
- 1:25:34Speaker 2: of it in the same spirit. Is my suggestion. If
- 1:25:38Speaker 2: it's either that or have stable coins suppressed entirely or
- 1:25:44Speaker 2: regulated out of existence, I would prefer this legislation. And
- 1:25:49Speaker 2: the reason is because the reason is that I think
- 1:25:52Speaker 2: stable coins have the potential to be beneficial, and we
- 1:25:57Speaker 2: should give them a chance. Rule out the worst possible
- 1:26:03Speaker 2: disasters and fraud and all that, but don't rule them
- 1:26:08Speaker 2: out altogether, because we really haven't seen them achieve what
- 1:26:12Speaker 2: they might achieve. Let's give them a chance.
- 1:26:18Speaker 1: If you have a few more minutes, We've got a
- 1:26:20Speaker 1: few more questions that. Okay, sure, go ahead, Sure molten
- 1:26:24Speaker 1: has Why did the Great Depression last as long as
- 1:26:27Speaker 1: it did. What would have been the best and most
- 1:26:30Speaker 1: effective response to offset the depression and effect your recovery
- 1:26:33Speaker 1: and effectuate recovery?
- 1:26:35Speaker 2: Yeah, well, I talked about some of that. Let me
- 1:26:38Speaker 2: just remind our questioner that the length of the depression
- 1:26:46Speaker 2: varied a lot from country to country, and as I
- 1:26:49Speaker 2: mentioned earlier there were two countries that were the biggest laggards,
- 1:26:52Speaker 2: and one of them was the United States and the
- 1:26:55Speaker 2: other one was Friends And the reason they were laggarts
- 1:27:00Speaker 2: was because, to a large extent, because they pursued poor
- 1:27:08Speaker 2: solutions to recovery. That should be said that in the
- 1:27:10Speaker 2: United States case, we also had a deeper depression because
- 1:27:13Speaker 2: of our banking crisis. That might have made our recovery
- 1:27:16Speaker 2: take longer anyway, but it didn't have to take as
- 1:27:19Speaker 2: long as it actually did. And now, ending a depression
- 1:27:25Speaker 2: takes time. If it's deep, it's going to take longer.
- 1:27:29Speaker 2: There's no way around that. But as far as what
- 1:27:33Speaker 2: I consider the best remedies, I've already said that I
- 1:27:35Speaker 2: don't think doing nothing is acceptable or workable. I think
- 1:27:40Speaker 2: you have to get spending up. You have to get
- 1:27:43Speaker 2: depressions involved, at least approximately a collapse in spending. People
- 1:27:48Speaker 2: spend less, firms, earn less, firms, higher less, and so on.
- 1:27:54Speaker 2: You've got to get spending back up because getting prices
- 1:27:57Speaker 2: to all adjust down without being able somehow to magically
- 1:28:01Speaker 2: rewrite long term contracts painlessly is not practical. And to
- 1:28:08Speaker 2: get spending up there are various possibilities. The most desirable
- 1:28:15Speaker 2: is monetary expansion because it involves less interference with the
- 1:28:20Speaker 2: forms that spending takes. What gets what money gets spent on,
- 1:28:25Speaker 2: There's less opportunity for waste. That's not to say that
- 1:28:30Speaker 2: there should be no role for fiscal policy, which is
- 1:28:34Speaker 2: government increasing its spending on fiscal policy. I see a
- 1:28:40Speaker 2: lot of merit in what was a very old fashioned
- 1:28:42Speaker 2: approach to countercyclical fiscal policy was the one Hoover favored
- 1:28:46Speaker 2: in many econdoms favors. It's you save up for a
- 1:28:49Speaker 2: rainy day. You don't save up. You may run surpluses.
- 1:28:53Speaker 2: But saving up here means keep some government public works
- 1:28:57Speaker 2: and other projects that it has to undertake anyway, keep
- 1:29:01Speaker 2: them aside, and then really do them all when you
- 1:29:03Speaker 2: get a downturn in the economy. And I think that's
- 1:29:07Speaker 2: a perfectly reasonable thing for governments to do. Is a
- 1:29:12Speaker 2: fiscal answer. I'm also a believer in relief spending. If
- 1:29:17Speaker 2: people can't get jobs any other way, give them other jobs, certainly,
- 1:29:21Speaker 2: give them a check, don't let them starve, And that
- 1:29:25Speaker 2: itself is a source of demand. But most of all,
- 1:29:30Speaker 2: I think the most effective, potentially and most desirable solution
- 1:29:35Speaker 2: is monetary stimulus. It's not always easy. If interest rates
- 1:29:39Speaker 2: hit zero, it can be very hard to use monetary stimulus.
- 1:29:45Speaker 2: But there are also ways to try to avoid having
- 1:29:48Speaker 2: an economy reach the zero lower round so that you
- 1:29:51Speaker 2: don't have to deal with that contingency. Anything that gets
- 1:29:55Speaker 2: real interest rates up high and makes the economy more
- 1:29:58Speaker 2: productive reduces the odds of that happening for starters. So obviously,
- 1:30:05Speaker 2: from my talk with Yarn, there are many things I
- 1:30:08Speaker 2: think you have to avoid to not make a depression worse,
- 1:30:12Speaker 2: and that includes interfering with price adjustment to the extent
- 1:30:17Speaker 2: that prices are trying to struggle their way to a
- 1:30:19Speaker 2: new equilibrium levels that don't interfere with that. Certainly, don't
- 1:30:24Speaker 2: try to force firms to pay higher wage rates or
- 1:30:30Speaker 2: raise their product prices. Let them be induced to do
- 1:30:36Speaker 2: those things by the fact that their revenues are being
- 1:30:41Speaker 2: increased through other kinds of policies. So these are some
- 1:30:46Speaker 2: of the steps. In the nineteen thirties, of course, it
- 1:30:50Speaker 2: was very important to let that goal come into the
- 1:30:53Speaker 2: country and make sure it does as much to stimulate
- 1:30:57Speaker 2: bank credit, lending and spending as possible. Instead of worrying
- 1:31:03Speaker 2: that it's going to cause an artificial boom. Kanes Knes
- 1:31:08Speaker 2: is said to have equipped I can never find I
- 1:31:10Speaker 2: can't find a primary source for this that when the
- 1:31:14Speaker 2: authorities put the brakes on gold stimulus, he said, they
- 1:31:20Speaker 2: profess to fear that for which they dare not hope,
- 1:31:24Speaker 2: meaning rising price it and and the boom boom.
- 1:31:29Speaker 1: Right, quite articulate.
- 1:31:32Speaker 3: Yeah, a boom is what you want to have, a boodresion.
- 1:31:38Speaker 3: You know, maybe you don't want it to go too far,
- 1:31:41Speaker 3: but you sort of want it to want to have
- 1:31:43Speaker 3: it something boom.
- 1:31:47Speaker 2: So so there are a lot of both negative lessons
- 1:31:50Speaker 2: and positive lessons to be learned from the nineteen thirties.
- 1:31:53Speaker 2: If I had to say, though, one of one of
- 1:31:55Speaker 2: the biggest lessons for that people should remember is this.
- 1:32:00Speaker 2: Every time we have another depression or recession, people say, oh,
- 1:32:02Speaker 2: let's look at the new Deal. They solved it. Let's
- 1:32:05Speaker 2: do what they'd do. No, the biggest lesson we can
- 1:32:09Speaker 2: have from the New Deal is that we know more
- 1:32:13Speaker 2: than they did about fighting recessions. We're still not very
- 1:32:17Speaker 2: good at it, but know about fiscal stimulus. They didn't
- 1:32:21Speaker 2: know about monetary stimulus. They knew all kinds of things
- 1:32:23Speaker 2: that were wrong. And so that is generally speaking, with
- 1:32:27Speaker 2: some few exceptions, there is very little that the New
- 1:32:30Speaker 2: Dealers have to teach us about fighting depressions. So if
- 1:32:34Speaker 2: we need innovative steps, let's not look there. That's not
- 1:32:39Speaker 2: Maybe we do need new innovative ideas for fighting depressions.
- 1:32:43Speaker 2: I'm sure we could use some, but that is not
- 1:32:46Speaker 2: where you're going to get them. That's the place to
- 1:32:48Speaker 2: look for innovative ideas that didn't work, and for the
- 1:32:52Speaker 2: failure to use things that arguably do help.
- 1:32:59Speaker 1: Hey, let's take that for what is your essentialized evaluation
- 1:33:02Speaker 1: of panics depressions in the ninteenth century? What are the
- 1:33:06Speaker 1: most important things to know about them?
- 1:33:09Speaker 2: Well, I think I already answered that yarn by saying
- 1:33:11Speaker 2: that bad currency and banking laws were a very important
- 1:33:18Speaker 2: part of the problem. You know a lot of people say, oh,
- 1:33:22Speaker 2: the gold standard. Look at all the crises in the
- 1:33:25Speaker 2: United States that happened under the gold standard before the
- 1:33:29Speaker 2: meaning before the Federal Reserve Chris passed and the Fed
- 1:33:33Speaker 2: supposedly was going to fix everything. But they don't understand
- 1:33:37Speaker 2: that this couldn't it couldn't be the gold standard. How
- 1:33:40Speaker 2: do I know it couldn't be the gold tender. Well,
- 1:33:43Speaker 2: Canada was on the very same gold dollar. Yep, Canada
- 1:33:48Speaker 2: was bound to be buffeted by the way by anything
- 1:33:51Speaker 2: bad that happened to the US economy. Yet for the
- 1:33:56Speaker 2: most part, they evaded all of those crises. They simply
- 1:33:59Speaker 2: didn't have. We have the record of banking crises that
- 1:34:01Speaker 2: we had. Now, how could they escape with the same
- 1:34:03Speaker 2: called dollar. Well, the answer is there were other differences
- 1:34:08Speaker 2: between the Canadian banking and currency system and the US system.
- 1:34:12Speaker 2: And so if you want to know why we had
- 1:34:13Speaker 2: crisis in the US, you better look at those other things.
- 1:34:16Speaker 2: And there were plenty of them, and they were bad.
- 1:34:19Speaker 2: We had stupid banking laws, we had really bad banking life.
- 1:34:23Speaker 2: That I think is the most important thing to learn
- 1:34:25Speaker 2: about US history, at least to judge by the wrong
- 1:34:29Speaker 2: things people often say. And this goes back to that
- 1:34:32Speaker 2: insolarity I was complaining about before. These people who say, oh,
- 1:34:37Speaker 2: the gold standard was the problem before the creation of
- 1:34:40Speaker 2: the FED, or only the creation of the FED could
- 1:34:43Speaker 2: have addressed the banking crisis, they don't know the reality
- 1:34:48Speaker 2: of what was causing US crises, and they know nothing
- 1:34:51Speaker 2: about even the country just to the north of US
- 1:34:55Speaker 2: and what happened there. If they did, they would be aware.
- 1:35:00Speaker 2: Their arguments are really not very satisfactory explanations for what happened.
- 1:35:08Speaker 1: So Remo asks thoughts on libertarians who against fraction with
- 1:35:12Speaker 1: their banking.
- 1:35:16Speaker 2: Well, I won't just limit There are other people who
- 1:35:19Speaker 2: are opposed to fractioners are banking too, so let's not
- 1:35:21Speaker 2: just limit this to libertarians. And of course many libertarians aren't.
- 1:35:27Speaker 2: But I'll talk mainly about the Rothbardians because they are
- 1:35:31Speaker 2: the most notorious the followers of Rothbart, of whom there
- 1:35:38Speaker 2: are many, of course, And the big problem with them
- 1:35:44Speaker 2: and with the Rothbart himself, is that they've made a
- 1:35:48Speaker 2: complete botch job of the banking law. They just don't
- 1:35:53Speaker 2: understand how fractioners are banking works, what its legal foundation is.
- 1:35:59Speaker 2: They're very con fused about what it is that a
- 1:36:02Speaker 2: bank deposit in titles. It's older too. It's not a
- 1:36:05Speaker 2: property right to the money you brought to the bank.
- 1:36:08Speaker 2: It is a deposit credit that entitles you to a
- 1:36:12Speaker 2: certain sum on demand the money you bring to your
- 1:36:16Speaker 2: bank that goes that that you the banker takes possession
- 1:36:21Speaker 2: of that. And this has been true since this has
- 1:36:24Speaker 2: been legally the case since ancient dis goes all the
- 1:36:26Speaker 2: way back to ancient law. Basically, h if you went
- 1:36:32Speaker 2: to a money change or a bank or anyone else,
- 1:36:36Speaker 2: there were two things you could do with a bag.
- 1:36:38Speaker 2: You have a you have a bunch of coins. All right,
- 1:36:40Speaker 2: let's see, you have a bunch of money. I write
- 1:36:42Speaker 2: about this in an article that the title of which
- 1:36:45Speaker 2: it's called the bagging the bagging rule, bagging law. If
- 1:36:48Speaker 2: you went to a bank with a bunch of loose
- 1:36:52Speaker 2: coins and put them over the counter and said here,
- 1:36:56Speaker 2: those coins became the property of the bank. Now he
- 1:37:00Speaker 2: might give you. Presumably he would give you a little something,
- 1:37:04Speaker 2: a banknote or a little contract that says you can
- 1:37:09Speaker 2: have an equivalent amount of coins anytime you want it.
- 1:37:14Speaker 2: That would be a demand deposit. Or if you had
- 1:37:16Speaker 2: the banknote, then you have you know that the right
- 1:37:22Speaker 2: to redeem that note, or someone else who gets it
- 1:37:25Speaker 2: can do so. And that's all. But those coins aren't
- 1:37:28Speaker 2: yours anymore. And there was a very practical reason for this,
- 1:37:31Speaker 2: because the only way the bank could honor the commitment
- 1:37:36Speaker 2: to give you back your property would be by giving
- 1:37:39Speaker 2: you back exactly the same coins. So what if you
- 1:37:44Speaker 2: don't want the banker to own your money. Well, the
- 1:37:46Speaker 2: law was very simple on that and very specific. You
- 1:37:49Speaker 2: bring them in a sealed container, could be a bag,
- 1:37:53Speaker 2: could be a box, and you say here, I want
- 1:37:56Speaker 2: you to store these coins for me, and then they're
- 1:37:59Speaker 2: not going to touch them. Then there's still your property.
- 1:38:02Speaker 2: And you get a bailment contract, which is a storage contract.
- 1:38:07Speaker 2: And I've had articles on this too. The two types
- 1:38:09Speaker 2: of contracts very easy to see the difference. A banknote
- 1:38:14Speaker 2: doesn't say the same thing as a bailment contract. It
- 1:38:17Speaker 2: says we promise to pay the bearer on demand X amount.
- 1:38:20Speaker 2: A bailment contract says we have this stuff for you
- 1:38:23Speaker 2: in our warehouse and we're storing very different. A Rothbard
- 1:38:28Speaker 2: and company have totally twisted all this history, and it's
- 1:38:32Speaker 2: tempting to say, I will say it they lie. And
- 1:38:38Speaker 2: so you have people like Hans Herman Hoppy running around saying, oh,
- 1:38:41Speaker 2: the banks are replicating titles to the same property. No,
- 1:38:45Speaker 2: when I bring money to a bank, when you bring
- 1:38:48Speaker 2: money to your bank, you are parting with that property
- 1:38:52Speaker 2: and you're getting something else, a financial instrument in exchange
- 1:38:56Speaker 2: that doesn't title you to money, but doesn't entitle you
- 1:38:59Speaker 2: to that same money because you don't have property rights
- 1:39:02Speaker 2: to that anymore. So there's no duplication of titles. By
- 1:39:06Speaker 2: the way, most not all, but most banking contracts, you
- 1:39:10Speaker 2: look at your depositor agreement with your bank. Many of them,
- 1:39:14Speaker 2: I don't say all, because I've seen some exception. Many
- 1:39:16Speaker 2: of them very clearly state hey, this is not a
- 1:39:19Speaker 2: bailment contract. We are your debtor and you are our creditor.
- 1:39:26Speaker 2: That very clearly means that you've made a loan to
- 1:39:30Speaker 2: them of money and you're entitled to get the same
- 1:39:33Speaker 2: value of money back with interest or whatever. It does
- 1:39:37Speaker 2: not have anything to do with storage anyway. They're all
- 1:39:41Speaker 2: wrong about that. Now they're also wrong about the economic
- 1:39:46Speaker 2: consequences of fractional vers are banking. I don't mind the
- 1:39:50Speaker 2: mistakes they make there because they're less part they're more pardonable.
- 1:39:55Speaker 2: But when it comes to claiming that there's a fraudulent
- 1:40:00Speaker 2: basis to all banking, it's just false and there's no
- 1:40:06Speaker 2: two ways around it. It's bad banking history, bad banking law.
- 1:40:12Speaker 2: And this again I go back, goes back to ancient times.
- 1:40:16Speaker 2: So this is not some innovation that some crooked judge
- 1:40:21Speaker 2: came up with in the Victorian era. This another story
- 1:40:25Speaker 2: Rothbard tells about a case where the judges perverted the law. No,
- 1:40:31Speaker 2: you look at that case. He is simply abiding by
- 1:40:37Speaker 2: legal doctrines that already were many centuries old by the time.
- 1:40:45Speaker 1: Paul asks what effect did tariffs have on the Great Depression?
- 1:40:49Speaker 2: Oh gosh, this is something people debate a whole lot.
- 1:40:53Speaker 2: I can't claim to have any novel opinions about this.
- 1:40:57Speaker 2: I will simply say that the terror in question of
- 1:41:00Speaker 2: the smooth so called smooth Heart Hawley tariffs passed under
- 1:41:05Speaker 2: the Hoover administration nineteen thirty two, and they wear a
- 1:41:08Speaker 2: pretty serious round of tariffs, to be sure, though not
- 1:41:11Speaker 2: as bad as trumps. And they started with Hoover trying
- 1:41:15Speaker 2: to get some protection for farmers who are struggling, had
- 1:41:19Speaker 2: been struggling ever since the end of World War One,
- 1:41:22Speaker 2: and it ballooned into a much more widespread set of
- 1:41:25Speaker 2: tariffs thanks to log rolling, and then of course that
- 1:41:29Speaker 2: invited retaliation by the countries that the teriffs were imposed upon,
- 1:41:33Speaker 2: So he really ended up with a big tariff mess,
- 1:41:37Speaker 2: and many people think that it did a lot of harm.
- 1:41:41Speaker 2: I would be inclined to think so, except that person
- 1:41:46Speaker 2: whose work on this subject I trust mote most, which
- 1:41:50Speaker 2: is Doug Irwin's, and he's no friend of Tariff's. He
- 1:41:55Speaker 2: says he doesn't think the effect of the contribution to
- 1:41:58Speaker 2: the depression was very great, and if Doug says it,
- 1:42:02Speaker 2: I hesitate to say otherwise. I'm not sure, but I'm
- 1:42:10Speaker 2: I'm just not sure. But I do think that Doug's
- 1:42:13Speaker 2: opinion should be taken seriously. They didn't have a positive effect.
- 1:42:19Speaker 2: We know that, and then it's numble no, we can
- 1:42:22Speaker 2: rule that out. The question is how big the negative? Yeah, yeah, yeah, This.
- 1:42:27Speaker 1: Is the last question. What is it?
- 1:42:30Speaker 2: What is it?
- 1:42:31Speaker 1: It's actually a good last question. What is an achievable
- 1:42:33Speaker 1: first step towards free of banking that advocates could focus
- 1:42:37Speaker 1: on today, one which wouldn't cause major displacement and disruption
- 1:42:41Speaker 1: and might be actual chance of passing.
- 1:42:45Speaker 2: Well, you know, there's a lot of confusion about what
- 1:42:48Speaker 2: free banking means, and that's because free banking today doesn't
- 1:42:52Speaker 2: mean what it meant in the nineteenth century. In the
- 1:42:54Speaker 2: nineteenth century, under the gold Standard, it meant there was
- 1:42:57Speaker 2: no central bank. There's an alternative to central banking. Where
- 1:43:02Speaker 2: banknotes are competitively issued. There's no one source of currency,
- 1:43:07Speaker 2: and there's no bank that is supplying reserves of any
- 1:43:12Speaker 2: kind any other bank. Now today, of course, the gold
- 1:43:16Speaker 2: standard's gone. Our basic basic money is the fiat money
- 1:43:22Speaker 2: issued by the Federal Reserve system. There isn't anything else,
- 1:43:27Speaker 2: and so our dollar rests on this foundation of as
- 1:43:32Speaker 2: it were, Federal reserve paper and digital book entries and
- 1:43:37Speaker 2: nothing more. So now you can have free banking on
- 1:43:41Speaker 2: a federal reserve fiat dollar where you let the banks
- 1:43:47Speaker 2: issue IOUs that are claims to dollars. It could be banknotes,
- 1:43:50Speaker 2: but it more likely would be stable coins, right, And
- 1:43:52Speaker 2: that's what we're talking about with the legislation. Of course,
- 1:43:55Speaker 2: to have true free banking you have to get rid
- 1:43:57Speaker 2: of other obnoxious regulations. We have gotten rid of some.
- 1:44:01Speaker 2: We got rid of barriers to branch banking, which used
- 1:44:03Speaker 2: to be extremely obnoxious. On the other hand, we've introduced
- 1:44:09Speaker 2: and ratcheted up deposit guarantees in a big way. The
- 1:44:15Speaker 2: biggest departure today of our modern system from free banking,
- 1:44:22Speaker 2: apart from the fact that we have a fiat standard,
- 1:44:24Speaker 2: it's just huge, is that we have both deposit insurance
- 1:44:31Speaker 2: and tremendous implicit guarantees to banks that are too big
- 1:44:36Speaker 2: to fail. You can't have free banking unless you roll
- 1:44:40Speaker 2: those things back. So now I'm in a bit of
- 1:44:42Speaker 2: a I'm in a quandary because the question was what
- 1:44:45Speaker 2: can we most easily accomplished, and now I'm talking about
- 1:44:49Speaker 2: what most badly needs to be accomplished, which is to
- 1:44:53Speaker 2: get rid of these guarantees implicit and explicit, or you're
- 1:44:58Speaker 2: not the main problems in the US banking system today,
- 1:45:02Speaker 2: Instead of being lack of branch banking and other pesky
- 1:45:05Speaker 2: regulations that interfere with what banks can do today, the
- 1:45:09Speaker 2: main problem is government guarantees that let that encourage them
- 1:45:13Speaker 2: to take excessive risk. That is number one. Now it's
- 1:45:17Speaker 2: really changed since before the thirties. The government's screwing things
- 1:45:23Speaker 2: up one way or the other, but it's changed the
- 1:45:25Speaker 2: way it doesn't now. I don't know any easy way
- 1:45:28Speaker 2: to get rid of these guarantees. I really don't. I
- 1:45:32Speaker 2: have argued, and most recently my colleagues at CATO have
- 1:45:37Speaker 2: argued again that the FED really doesn't need to be
- 1:45:41Speaker 2: in the last resort lending business, in the sense of
- 1:45:44Speaker 2: providing loans to any specific institutions. It should stick to
- 1:45:49Speaker 2: providing liquidity in the marketplace through its open market operations
- 1:45:54Speaker 2: when necessary, quantitative easing, whatever you want to call it,
- 1:46:00Speaker 2: and of course regulating interest rates, but through nowadays through
- 1:46:05Speaker 2: setting interest rate unreserved. It should be taken out of
- 1:46:10Speaker 2: the business of direct blending. That can be done, and
- 1:46:14Speaker 2: it shouldn't prevent It shouldn't prevent banks. It shouldn't make
- 1:46:21Speaker 2: it easy for solvent banks to fail solvent. If there's
- 1:46:27Speaker 2: enough liquidity in the marketplace, solvent banks can borrow from
- 1:46:30Speaker 2: other solvent banks, and that's been demonstrated many, many times
- 1:46:36Speaker 2: in the past. It's also been demonstrated historically that there
- 1:46:39Speaker 2: are very few banks that suffer and fail simply because
- 1:46:43Speaker 2: people run on them out of sheer panic. Bank bank
- 1:46:47Speaker 2: runs are almost always runs on banks that are already
- 1:46:51Speaker 2: in trouble, and they usually start by the way they
- 1:46:54Speaker 2: start with the smart money. The people you see lined
- 1:46:57Speaker 2: up at the bank, they're the last ones. It's the
- 1:46:59Speaker 2: smart art money has already wired its money away by
- 1:47:02Speaker 2: the time they show up at the front door. And
- 1:47:05Speaker 2: that's that smart money knows, knows, usually knows when banks
- 1:47:11Speaker 2: are sounded when they aren't, and stages runs on the
- 1:47:13Speaker 2: unsound ones. So we need more bank runs actually and
- 1:47:17Speaker 2: less last resort lending by the FED. And those are
- 1:47:21Speaker 2: some of the central steps and very hard to take
- 1:47:24Speaker 2: steps to get toward free banking. I wish I could say,
- 1:47:27Speaker 2: you know, the things that are easy are far less important.
- 1:47:31Speaker 2: You know a lot of dumb tesky regulations out there
- 1:47:34Speaker 2: still that might be easier to get rid of. DoD
- 1:47:38Speaker 2: Frank is bad read bad legislation. My colleague Mark Collaborate
- 1:47:43Speaker 2: is very good about why the myths behind its passage.
- 1:47:47Speaker 2: But well, I'm going to cop out and say what
- 1:47:51Speaker 2: I think we badly need to do without pretending I've
- 1:47:54Speaker 2: answered the question about what's easy to do. I don't
- 1:47:57Speaker 2: think anything's easy.
- 1:47:59Speaker 1: So JOJ have a lot of your time. Really really
- 1:48:01Speaker 1: appreciate it. Thank you.
- 1:48:04Speaker 2: That's it all. I love the opportunity Yard. That's all.
- 1:48:08Speaker 2: It's my pleasure.
- 1:48:09Speaker 1: We should we should do this again, and and and uh,
- 1:48:12Speaker 1: because because there's a lot to talk about. I mean,
- 1:48:14Speaker 1: there's a there's a ton going on in the world
- 1:48:16Speaker 1: of finance fun to talk about. So remind everybody the
- 1:48:20Speaker 1: book is forced on the new deal and the promise
- 1:48:23Speaker 1: of recovery nineteen thirty three to nineteen forty seven. You
- 1:48:26Speaker 1: can find it pretty much every week. Can find books,
- 1:48:29Speaker 1: and you can find Jodge's work.
- 1:48:32Speaker 2: Where would they?
- 1:48:32Speaker 1: Where would where's the best place for them to go?
- 1:48:35Speaker 2: Well? Nowadays, of course, it's the Internet basically, and a
- 1:48:40Speaker 2: lot of my stuff is out there. A lot of
- 1:48:43Speaker 2: my essays for the Cato Institute are online. They've been
- 1:48:48Speaker 2: transferred to CATO at Liberty from the old all Them
- 1:48:51Speaker 2: site that I used to run. And a lot of
- 1:48:55Speaker 2: my papers are out there. My academic papers they can
- 1:48:58Speaker 2: find listed on Google and elsewhere Jay Store. They may
- 1:49:06Speaker 2: need a university library access to get to some of them,
- 1:49:10Speaker 2: but there's plenty of stuff out there easy to look up.
- 1:49:16Speaker 2: All right.
- 1:49:17Speaker 1: Well, I know it's a nighttime where you are, so
- 1:49:18Speaker 1: I have a great night and you seeing you sometimes.
- 1:49:23Speaker 2: I hope if we will get together yar, And thank
- 1:49:25Speaker 2: you very much for having me on this show. Bye
- 1:49:30Speaker 2: bye by