Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1970 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
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- 0:001970 It may turn out that I am completely wrong.
- 0:03However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what
- 0:07I am thinking in this regard, even though the nature of the
- 0:10business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in
- 0:14such expectations. In any one year, the variations
- 0:18may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but
- 0:22fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side.
- 0:24They won't all be miscellaneous. We are now installed in an
- 0:29office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first class secretary, Beth
- 0:33Henley and an associate with considerable experience in my
- 0:37type of securities. Bill Scott, my father, is
- 0:40sharing office space with us. He also shares the expenses and
- 0:44doing a brokerage business in securities.
- 0:46None of our brokerage is done through him, so we have no
- 0:49vacunicote situation. Overall, I expect our overhead,
- 0:54excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska intangibles tax to
- 0:58run less than 0.5 of 1% of net assets.
- 1:02We should get our money's worth from this expenditure and you
- 1:05are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is
- 1:08being spent. 23 with over 90 partners and probably 40 or so
- 1:14securities. You can understand that it is
- 1:16quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the
- 1:19details. We presently have partners
- 1:21residing in locations from California to Vermont and net
- 1:25assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $7,178,500.
- 1:33Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to
- 1:36$1,025,000 and other relatives of mine have a combined interest
- 1:42totaling $782,600. The minimum for new partners
- 1:47last year was $25,000, but I am giving some thought to
- 1:51increasing it this year. Pete Marwick Mitchell and
- 1:55company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing
- 1:58tax figures much earlier than in the past.
- 2:01They assure me this performance can be continued.
- 2:04Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any
- 2:07aspects of this letter, your audit status of your
- 2:10partnership, interest, etcetera, that may puzzle you cordially.
- 2:14Warren E Buffett 24 Appendix Partnerships operating
- 2:18throughout 1961 Partnership 1161 Capital at overall gain in 1961
- 2:25Percentage gain market Buffett Associates 486,874.2 Seven
- 2:33225,387.8046 Point 3% Buffett Fund 351,839.2 Nine 159,696.9345
- 2:48Point 4% DC 235,480.3 One 116,504.4749 Point 5% NB 140,000
- 3:01and 5.2467 thousand 387.2848 point 1%.
- 3:09Glenhoff 78,482.7 zero 39,693.8050 point 5%.
- 3:19MO Buff 325,844.7 ONE 149,163.7145 point 8%.
- 3:29Underwood 582,256.8 TWO 251,951.2643 Point 3%
- 3:392,200,783.341 million 9785.25 Forty 5.9% Partnerships started
- 3:50in 1961. Partnership paid in overall gain
- 3:54in 1961 Percentage gain and investments 100100 January 30th
- 4:016135 Thousand 367.9335 Point 3%. Buffet TD $250,100 Two 100,100
- 4:12on 3-8 Seventy 1294.0828 Point 1% 60 One $50,000 on May 31st
- 4:2261. Buffett Holland 125100 May 17th,
- 4:276116 thousand 703.7613 Point 3% Gain in net assets at market
- 4:35values plus payments to limited partners during Year 25 Buffett
- 4:39Partnership Ltd 810 Kiwit Plaza, Omaha 31, Nebraska July 6th,
- 4:461962 A reminder In my letter of January 24th, 1962 reporting on
- 4:531961, I inserted a section entitled and a prediction.
- 4:58While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual
- 5:02punishment upon my readers, nevertheless a reprinting of
- 5:06that section in its entirety may be worthwhile and a prediction.
- 5:11Regular readers I may be flattering myself will feel I
- 5:14have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions.
- 5:17This is one thing from which I have always shield away, and I
- 5:20still do in the normal sense. I am certainly not going to
- 5:24predict what general business or the stock market are going to do
- 5:27in the next year or two. Since I don't have the faintest
- 5:30idea. I think you can be quite sure
- 5:32that over the next 10 years there are going to be a few
- 5:35years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it
- 5:40is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in
- 5:44between. I haven't any notion as to the
- 5:46sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of
- 5:49any great importance for the long term investor.
- 5:52Over any long period of years. I think it likely that the Dow
- 5:56will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year
- 6:00compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain.
- 6:04Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting
- 6:08substantially better than that from the general market probably
- 6:11faces disappointment. Our job is to pile up yearly
- 6:15advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too
- 6:18much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a
- 6:21plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which
- 6:25we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior
- 6:30to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced
- 6:3420%. I have stressed this point in
- 6:36talking with partners in half. Watch them nod their heads with
- 6:39varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that
- 6:43you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and
- 6:46agree with me not only in your cerebral regions but also down
- 6:50in the pit of your stomach for the reasons outlined in my
- 6:53method of operation. Our best years relative to the
- 6:56Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets.
- 7:00Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply
- 7:04varying amounts. There are bound to be years when
- 7:07we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can
- 7:11average 10 percentage points per year better than it, I will feel
- 7:14the results have been satisfactory.
- 7:17Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a
- 7:21year and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one
- 7:25year in the next 10, no one knows which one, we should be
- 7:28down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged
- 7:33during the year, we would hope to be up about 10 percentage
- 7:36points. If it is up 20% or more, we
- 7:39would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance
- 7:42such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow
- 7:46produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would
- 7:51hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year. 26 The above
- 7:57expectations may sound somewhat rash and there is no question
- 8:00but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the
- 8:04vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am
- 8:09completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are
- 8:12certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard,
- 8:15even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce
- 8:18a high probability of error and such expectations.
- 8:22In any one year, the variations may be quite substantial.
- 8:26This happened in 1961 but fortunately the variation was on
- 8:31the pleasant side. They won't all be the first half
- 8:34of 1962. Between year end 1961 and June
- 8:3830th, 1962, the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28.
- 8:46If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of
- 8:49approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a
- 8:53loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the
- 8:57Dow. For the statistical minded,
- 8:59Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation
- 9:04of the predecessor partnerships. As stated above, a declining Dow
- 9:08gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage
- 9:11advantages, which coupled with only an average performance
- 9:15during advancing markets will give us quite satisfactory long
- 9:18term results. Our target is an approximately
- 9:2112% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved,
- 9:26means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for
- 9:29investment in stocks than practically any alternative.
- 9:33As outlined in Appendix B showing combined predecessor
- 9:37partnership results during the first half of 1962, we had one
- 9:41of the best periods in our history, achieving a -. 7.5%
- 9:46result before payments to partners compared to the -21.7%
- 9:52overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points
- 9:56advantage can be expected to widen during the second-half if
- 9:59the decline in the general market continues, but will
- 10:02probably narrow should the market turn upward.
- 10:05Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six
- 10:08months or even one year's results are not to be taken too
- 10:11seriously. Short periods of measurement
- 10:14exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance.
- 10:17While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half,
- 10:22there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly.
- 10:25The figures for our performance involve no change in the
- 10:28valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill
- 10:32Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months
- 10:35point toward a probable higher realization investment companies
- 10:39during the first half. Past letters have stressed our
- 10:42belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for
- 10:45investment performance. 2 The extent that funds are invested
- 10:49in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through
- 10:53investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust
- 10:56departments, or do it yourself, Our belief is that the
- 11:00overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly
- 11:03comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the
- 11:06deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a
- 11:09poorer performance than a superior. 1 To illustrate this
- 11:12point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited
- 11:15partners results against the two largest open end investment
- 11:19companies, mutual funds following a program of common
- 11:22stock investment and the two largest closed end investment
- 11:26companies. The tabulation in Appendix C
- 11:29shows the five years results and you will note the figures are
- 11:32extraordinarily close to those of the Dow.
- 11:35These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.
- 11:40In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are
- 11:43mailing it before results are available for the closed end
- 11:46companies. However, the two mutual funds
- 11:49both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors
- 11:52Trust having a -23% overall performance and Investors Stock
- 11:57Fund realizing a -, 25.4%. This is not unusual as witnessed
- 12:03the lead article in the Wall Street Journal of June 13th,
- 12:071962 headed Funds versus Market. Of the 17 large common stock
- 12:13funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from
- 12:16the peak on the Dow of 734 to the date of the article,
- 12:21although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.
- 12:2527 Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called
- 12:29growth funds, which almost without exception were down
- 12:32considerably more than the Dow. The three large growth.
- 12:36The quotation marks are more applicable now.
- 12:39Funds with the best record in the preceding few years,
- 12:42Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington
- 12:45Equity Fund, averaged an overall -32.3% for the first half.
- 12:51It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent
- 12:54records in 1959 to 61, their overall performance to date is
- 12:59still better than average, as it may well be in the future.
- 13:03Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had
- 13:07caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that
- 13:10the poor performance this year was experienced by very many.
- 13:14More holders then enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier
- 13:17years. This experience tends to confirm
- 13:20my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over
- 13:24a period of time. With such a period including
- 13:27both advancing and declining markets, there will continue to
- 13:30be both, a point perhaps better understood now than six months
- 13:34ago in outlining the results of investment companies.
- 13:38I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them
- 13:42or because our investments are similar to theirs.
- 13:45It is done because such funds represent a public batting
- 13:48average of professional, highly paid investment management
- 13:51handling a very significant $20 billion of securities.
- 13:56Such management, I believe is typical of management handling
- 14:00even larger sums as an alternative to an interest in
- 14:03the partnership. I believe it reasonable to
- 14:06assume that many partners would have investments managed
- 14:09similarly. Asset values.
- 14:11The above calculations of results are before allocation to
- 14:15the general partner and monthly payments to partners.
- 14:18Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not
- 14:21plus 6% on a market value basis with deficiencies carried
- 14:26forward, there is no allocation to the general partner.
- 14:29Therefore, non withdrawing partners have had a decrease in
- 14:32their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and
- 14:37partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have
- 14:41had a decrease in their market value equity during the first
- 14:45half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year
- 14:49be less than plus 6%, and unless there should be a material
- 14:52advance in the Dow, this is very probable.
- 14:56Partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in
- 14:59their market value equity at December 31st, 1962.
- 15:04This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity
- 15:08next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis.
- 15:12For example, if our results were an overall -7% for the year, a
- 15:16partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value
- 15:20interest of $100,000 on January 1st, 1962 would have it equity
- 15:26at December 31st, 1962 of $87,000.
- 15:31This reduction would arise from the -7% result or 7 dollars 000
- 15:37plus monthly payments of $500.00 for an additional $6000.
- 15:42Thus with $87,000 of market equity on January 1st.