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Murder In Moscow: Judge Hippler Shoots Down Kohberger's Alternate Perp Theory · Beyond The Horizon

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. In
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  Speaker 1: this episode, we're going to swing back up to Moscow,
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  Speaker 1: and we're going to take a look at the order
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  Speaker 1: that has to do with Brian Koberger and the alternate perpetrators.
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  Speaker 1: Case number CR01-24-31665. State of Idaho plaintiff versus Brian C. Koberger,
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  Speaker 1: the defendant. Redacted order on defendant's offer of proof, alternate perpetrators.
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  Speaker 1: One introduction. The state previously moved in limine seeking to
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  Speaker 1: preclude the defendant from offering or arguing alternative perpetrator evidence
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  Speaker 1: without first satisfying the applicable evidentiary standards. In accordance with
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  Speaker 1: the court's subsequent order on the motion, defendant filed his
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  Speaker 1: offers of proof and evidence in support, identifying for individuals
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  Speaker 1: as possible alternate perpetrators. The state objects to the presentation
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  Speaker 1: of this evidence at trial, arguing it fails to satisfy
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  Speaker 1: the standard under State v. Meester, 148, Idaho, 236, 220, p. 3d, 2009.
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  Speaker 1: Defended conceded at oral argument that, at this point, his
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  Speaker 1: proffer is not sufficient to pursue an alternative perpetrator theory
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  Speaker 1: at trial, but requests latitude and cross-examination of the state's
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  Speaker 1: witnesses to try to establish additional evidence to satisfy the
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  Speaker 1: Meester standard. The court concludes that at this time the
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  Speaker 1: defendant's alternate perpetrator proffer is inadmissible under Meester as it's
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  Speaker 1: irrelevant and or excluded by IRE 403. However, this does
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  Speaker 1: not foreclose defendant from cross-examining law enforcement regarding the reasonableness
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  Speaker 1: of its investigation and its follow-up on plausible leads. And
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  Speaker 1: the translation here is that Judge Hipler is saying you're
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  Speaker 1: not going to care and read this bullshit. Save that
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  Speaker 1: shit for the drunken fools in Canton because it's not
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  Speaker 1: going to go down in this courtroom. 2. Standard. Trial
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  Speaker 1: courts have broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial.
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  Speaker 1: Carlson v. Harris, 140, 2004. A trial court acts within
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  Speaker 1: the bounds of its discretion when it 1. Correctly perceived
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  Speaker 1: the issue as one of discretion, 2. Acted within the
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  Speaker 1: outer boundaries of its discretion, 3. Acted consistently with legal
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  Speaker 1: standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and 4.
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  Speaker 1: Reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lundberg vs.
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  Speaker 1: My Fun Life, 2018. 3. Analysis The seminal Idaho case
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  Speaker 1: on the admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence is Meester. Supra,
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  Speaker 1: prior to Meester, a defendant wishing to present such evidence
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  Speaker 1: at trial had to first present proof of connection with
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  Speaker 1: the crime, such as a train of facts or circumstances
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  Speaker 1: as tend to clearly point out someone besides the accused
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  Speaker 1: as the guilty party. Remote acts, disconnected and outside of
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  Speaker 1: the crime itself, cannot be separately proved for such purpose.
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  Speaker 1: State v. Larson, 91 Idaho, 1966 Meester clarified that the
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  Speaker 1: Idaho Rules of Evidence, rather than the more onerous Larson standard,
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  Speaker 1: control alternative perpetrator evidence admissibility, 148 Idaho, p. 3d at 1059.
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  Speaker 1: Under these rules, evidence is relevant if it has any
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  Speaker 1: tendency to make the existence of Idaho Rule of Evidence
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  Speaker 1: 403 governs the exclusion of relevant evidence and permits a
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  Speaker 1: court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
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  Speaker 1: outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
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  Speaker 1: misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
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  Speaker 1: cumulative evidence. Meester further offered the following guidance on applying
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  Speaker 1: these rules and determining whether proffered alternative perpetrator evidence is
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  Speaker 1: relevant and admissible. If the defendant proffers evidence which merely
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  Speaker 1: tends to mislead the jury that another person committed the crime,
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  Speaker 1: or the evidence is not relevant because it does not
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  Speaker 1: tend to make the defendant's involvement more probable or less probable,
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  Speaker 1: then it's within the trial court's discretion to find the
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  Speaker 1: evidence inadmissible. Mere inferences that another person could have committed
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  Speaker 1: the crime will most likely not be relevant, and if relevant,
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  Speaker 1: will still be subject to the limitation provision of IRE 403.
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  Speaker 1: A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence, and
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  Speaker 1: even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in
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  Speaker 1: certain cases. Self 139, Idaho, at 1121. The Idaho Rules
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  Speaker 1: of Evidence effectively safeguard against the admission of conjectural inferences
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  Speaker 1: without the lower courts needing to apply the Larson Direct
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  Speaker 1: Connection Doctrine. Stay verse, Meester 148, Idaho 2009. Here the
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  Speaker 1: evidence defendant is offered purporting to establish the four individuals
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  Speaker 1: as alternate perpetrators abjectly fails to meet Meester's standard, namely
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  Speaker 1: the evidence is entirely irrelevant. Nothing links these individuals to
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  Speaker 1: the homicide or otherwise gives rise to a reasonable inference
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  Speaker 1: that they committed the crime. Indeed, it would take nothing
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  Speaker 1: short of rank speculation by the jury to make such
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  Speaker 1: a finding. Three of the individuals were socially connected to
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  Speaker 1: one or more of the victims, interacted with one or
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  Speaker 1: more of the victims at social events in the hours
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  Speaker 1: prior to the homicide, next part completely redacted, lived within
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  Speaker 1: walking distance of the crime scene, and were familiar with
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  Speaker 1: the layout of the victim's home from prior social events.
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  Speaker 1: While perhaps this evidence could suggest an opportunity to commit
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  Speaker 1: the crime, which no doubt is an opportunity shared by
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  Speaker 1: dozens of others in the victim's social circles, there is
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  Speaker 1: no compelling evidence that any of them had a motive
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  Speaker 1: to kill the victims, much less physically harm them, or
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  Speaker 1: the means to do so. Further, there is no evidence
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  Speaker 1: connecting them to the crime scene. They have each cooperated
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  Speaker 1: with law enforcement, providing DNA samples, fingerprints, and allowing searches
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  Speaker 1: as requested. Notably, lab testing has excluded their DNA from
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  Speaker 1: samples taken from the crime scene and the victims. The
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  Speaker 1: fourth individual did not know the victims, but had a
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  Speaker 1: passing connection to one of them. While noticing her shopping
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  Speaker 1: at a store approximately five weeks prior to the homicides,
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  Speaker 1: he followed her briefly out the exit of the store.
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  Speaker 1: While considering approaching her to talk, he turned away before
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  Speaker 1: ever speaking to her. The event was captured on a
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  Speaker 1: surveillance camera. This individual subsequently cooperated with law enforcement providing
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  Speaker 1: his phone number and a DNA sample. As with other
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  Speaker 1: alleged alternative perpetrators, lab reports excluded his DNA from samples
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  Speaker 1: taken from the crime scene and victims, and there is
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  Speaker 1: no evidence connecting him to the crime scene. Next part, redacted. Collectively,
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  Speaker 1: defendants' proffer with regard to these four individuals fails to
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  Speaker 1: give rise to even an inference that they committed the crimes,
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  Speaker 1: or otherwise makes it more or less unlikely that the
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  Speaker 1: defendant was the perpetrator. Therefore, it is irrelevant under IRE
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  Speaker 1: 401 defendant is provided no probative, admissible significant evidence of motive,
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  Speaker 1: ill feelings, means, presence at the scene, or any other
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  Speaker 1: connection to the crime that could possibly move the ball
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  Speaker 1: to the extent it supports and Alternate Perpetrator Theory. At best,
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  Speaker 1: defendants offer a proof can give rise to only wild
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  Speaker 1: speculation that it's possible any of these four individuals could
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  Speaker 1: have committed the crimes, which is inadequate under Meester. Again,
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  Speaker 1: mere inferences that another person could have committed the crime
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  Speaker 1: will most likely not be relevant. Meester 148, Idaho at 1060.
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  Speaker 1: In other words, it's not sufficient for a defendant to
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  Speaker 1: merely offer up unsupported speculation that another person may have
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  Speaker 1: committed the crime, which is all the defendant has done here.
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  Speaker 1: Even if there was a shred of probative value in
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  Speaker 1: the offered evidence beyond wild speculation, it is excluded by
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  Speaker 1: IRE 403. As the Tenth Circuit noted regarding alternate perpetrator evidence,
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  Speaker 1: it's not sufficient for a defendant merely to offer up
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  Speaker 1: unsupported speculation that another person may have done the crime.
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  Speaker 1: Such speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion
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  Speaker 1: and and it invites the jury to render its findings
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  Speaker 1: based on emotion or prejudice. Likewise here, presentation of the
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  Speaker 1: proffered alternate perpetrator evidence would pose a great threat of
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  Speaker 1: confusing the issues because it would force the state to
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  Speaker 1: defend against a nebulous allegation that perhaps these individuals were involved.
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  Speaker 1: This foray would lead the jury astray, turning its focus
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  Speaker 1: away from the defendant, the only person whose actions are
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  Speaker 1: on trial, committed the charged crimes. It also presents a
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  Speaker 1: threat of unfair prejudice as it would invite the jury
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  Speaker 1: to blame unrepresented persons for a heinous crime when there
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  Speaker 1: is not a scintilla of competent evidence connecting them to
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  Speaker 1: the crime. Finally, it would do nothing more than waste
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  Speaker 1: the precious time of the jury and the court in
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  Speaker 1: what is already a scheduled three-month trial. Nonetheless, the court's
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  Speaker 1: ruling does not preclude defendant from confronting and cross-examining the
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  Speaker 1: state's law enforcement witnesses regarding the thoroughness of the investigation
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  Speaker 1: and particularly in following up and ruling out leads generally. Indeed,
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  Speaker 1: the Idaho Court of Appeals recently found in an unpublished
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  Speaker 1: opinion that questioning a detective about failing to follow up
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  Speaker 1: on other plausible leads was relevant to alternative perpetrator analysis.
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  Speaker 1: We agree with Emerson that a relevant line of inquiry
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  Speaker 1: would be to question the scope and breadth of the
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  Speaker 1: investigation and to explore, on cross-examination, whether plausible investigative leads
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  Speaker 1: about third parties were ignored. It further stated that this
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  Speaker 1: line of questioning may not include inquiries about the investigation.
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  Speaker 1: of specific third parties absent satisfying Meester, noting, Moreover, With
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  Speaker 1: no connection between the evidence and the crime, there is
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  Speaker 1: no explanation or justification for the questioning, and it would
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  Speaker 1: not help the jury answer the only question in the case,
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  Speaker 1: whether Emerson killed James. The court will apply the same
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  Speaker 1: parameters at trial regarding defendant's cross-examination of law enforcement. He
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  Speaker 1: may inquire as to the reasonableness of the investigation, including
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  Speaker 1: investigating and ruling out other leads. He is not, however,
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  Speaker 1: permitted to question law enforcement about the investigation of any
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  Speaker 1: specific individual as a potential alternate perpetrator without first raising
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  Speaker 1: the matter with the court outside the jury's presence. Order.
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  Speaker 1: Based on the foregoing defendants offered of proof, alternate perpetrators
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  Speaker 1: is denied. This document was signed on June 26, 2025,
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  Speaker 1: and it was signed by Judge Hipler. All of the
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  Speaker 1: information that goes with this episode can be found in
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  Speaker 1: the description box.