Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Zyxel switches, a five-week campaign, and the passwords nobody changed
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Tuesday, the twenty-second of September.
- 0:07Zyxel switches, a five-week campaign, and the passwords nobody changed.
- 0:13A Chinese-speaking crew has spent five weeks quietly walking into network switches through a web page nobody
- 0:21designed with strangers in mind.
- 0:23Now Sisa is giving US federal agencies until Thursday to lock the door.
- 0:29The vulnerability is called C V E twenty twenty-six, seven two seven three, and it sits in Zyxel's GS1900 ser
- 0:39ies of smart managed switches.
- 0:42That's the workgroup-level box that lives in a comms cupboard at a branch office, a school or a small busines
- 0:48s. It switches traffic quietly in the background, and once it's racked, it rarely gets touched again.
- 0:54Next. How a switch became a front door.
- 0:57The flaw is a stack-based buffer overflow in the switch's web management C G I script.
- 1:03Send it a deliberately oversized, crafted H T T P request, and the fixed-size buffer it expects to hold gets
- 1:11overwritten, along with the instructions the program was about to execute next.
- 1:16No login required. The flaw carries a C V S S score of 8.
- 1:218. Think of it like a reception desk built to check your I D before letting you through to the server room.
- 1:27Except the check-in form itself has a fault.
- 1:30Hand over a name field a few characters too long, and you walk straight past the desk.
- 1:35Zyxel patched the flaw in June.
- 1:38Sisa added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 21 September, giving federal agencies until
- 1:4524 September to patch it or disconnect the device.
- 1:49And also. What the attackers actually did.
- 1:52GreyNoise traced the exploitation back to on or about 17 August.
- 1:58A Chinese-speaking threat actor, already linked to earlier WordPress and Gitea campaigns, ran a Python exploi
- 2:05t script against unpatched GS1900 switches, obfuscated with the commercial tool PyArmor.
- 2:11Once in, it used T F T P to pull down a custom collector and harvest each switch's configuration, its network
- 2:19details, and its hashed root credentials.
- 2:22By the time GreyNoise counted, 996 switches across 48 countries had been compromised, concentrated in Italy,
- 2:31the United States, Taiwan, South Korea and several EU states.
- 2:36Here's the detail worth sitting with.
- 2:38564 of those 996, well over half, were still running Zyxel's factory default credentials.
- 2:47For those devices, the buffer overflow was almost superfluous.
- 2:51And finally. The design lesson.
- 2:54Two failures stack up here, and only one of them needed a patch.
- 2:58The overflow is Zyxel's to fix, and it has.
- 3:02The default credentials are the harder problem, because they're a design choice repeated across an entire pro
- 3:08duct category. Ship a device with a known, unchanged password, and you're pre-authenticating every attacker wh
- 3:15o finds it. Secure by Design's answer is to make unique-per-device credentials, or forced rotation on first lo
- 3:22gin, the default, rather than an option buried in a manual nobody reads.
- 3:27For UK organisations, the practical task is less glamorous than patch management.
- 3:32Know which switches, routers and access points on your network were racked and forgotten years ago.
- 3:38Confirm their management interfaces aren't reachable from anywhere they don't need to be.
- 3:43And check nobody left the sticker password in place.
- 3:46This is exactly the estate that the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill wants managed service providers to sta
- 3:53rt being accountable for.
- 3:56The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:59Thanks for listening.