Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / A school estate's ransomware attack reads like an AI loop, and the lesson is old
Transcript
- 0:03Good evening, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Tuesday, the third of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the evening edition.
- 0:12A school estate's ransomware attack reads like an AI loop, and the lesson is old.
- 0:18Bitdefender has published the anatomy of a ransomware attack on a UK school estate.
- 0:25In part, it looks as though a machine was doing the typing.
- 0:28A ransomware affiliate working at 3AM encrypted about 37 of nearly 50 machines.
- 0:34And the interesting part isn't the AI.
- 0:37It's how little the intruder needed that a well-run estate wouldn't have handed over.
- 0:42So, how did the break-in actually work?
- 0:45Initial access is unknown.
- 0:47Between 10 and 19 September, the intruder ran a modified public script against three Veeam backup servers and
- 0:55decrypted the stored passwords.
- 0:57Backup software holds the keys to everything, so burglars look there first.
- 1:01Then came Mimikatz, a well-known tool that lifts passwords out of a machine's memory.
- 1:07Two backdoor domain administrator accounts followed, called "library" and "svc_bkpmon".
- 1:14The names were chosen to look like furniture.
- 1:16Finance files were staged and copied out before anything was encrypted.
- 1:21Then the estate's history became its weakness.
- 1:24It began as several separate Active Directory domains.
- 1:27That's the Microsoft directory that decides who may log in to what.
- 1:31Bitdefender reports the attacker joined three of them with two-way trusts.
- 1:35In effect, cutting doors through the walls between separate buildings.
- 1:40And where does the machine come in?
- 1:42Bitdefender's evidence for AI help is oddly readable.
- 1:45A Veeam request was sent to the wrong port, and scripts were numbered revision by revision.
- 1:50On 13 September, four near-identical attempts arrived about 41, 49 and 47 seconds apart, each fixing the last
- 1:59error. Across nine retries, the gap was 40 to 101 seconds, whatever the size of the change.
- 2:06That looks like a loop. Try, read the error, adjust.
- 2:10Like a patient locksmith who never tires.
- 2:13But Bitdefender is careful, and so should we be.
- 2:16It couldn't reach the attacker's machine.
- 2:18It can't exclude a person pasting between a chat window and a shell.
- 2:22It calls this "one case, an anecdote, and not a trend".
- 2:27So what could defenders have seen?
- 2:29Every action came from an unmanaged host with no security agent.
- 2:33In the last stage, the attacker tried to remove Sophos and Bitdefender protection, delete system-state backups
- 2:40and deploy a Rust-based encryptor.
- 2:42But each earlier step was a rare event on a quiet network.
- 2:46Someone reading backup credentials.
- 2:48New domain admin accounts.
- 2:50New trusts between domains.
- 2:52Rare events make cheap alerts.
- 2:56What's the lesson, then, under Secure by Design?
- 2:58Three design decisions would have changed this.
- 3:01First, backup credentials shouldn't be decryptable by whoever lands on a server, and reading them should page
- 3:08someone. Second, joining domains together should need a second person's approval and raise an alarm, because a
- 3:14trust is a permanent door.
- 3:16Third, every machine needs an agent, or shouldn't be on the network.
- 3:20The cost is an afternoon of inventory and a handful of alert rules, not a new product.
- 3:26Speed was never the problem.
- 3:27Time was. So here's the question for your next governors' or board meeting.
- 3:32Who is told when a new domain administrator appears, and how fast?
- 3:36As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:40That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:44The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:48Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.